Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 2

    I. IN GENERAL


    § 1. Scope of Title

    In this title is discussed malicious defamation, by words spoken, written, or printed, or by signs, pictures, etc., injurious to a person in his general reputation, or exposing a living person, or the memory of one deceased, to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or prejudicial to a person in his profession, trade, occupation, employment, or office, or otherwise causing one special damage, or injurious to one's interest in property, real or personal, or tending to provoke a breach of the peace. This title also considers the defenses of justification, excuse, or privilege for or in mitigation of malicious defamation. Further, this title treats the nature and extent of liability of those speaking or publishing defamatory words, etc., and actions for damages therefor; along with criminal responsibility for libels in general, and the prosecution and punishment thereof as public offenses.

    Matters which are not discussed in this title but which are treated elsewhere in this work include the right of privacy, (1) malicious prosecution, (2) negligent misrepresentation, (3) and the intentional infliction of mental or emotional distress. (4) Also treated elsewhere are the freedoms of speech, expression, and press. (5)

    § 2. Definitions and Distinctions
    a. Defamation
    b. Libel
    c. Slander
    d. Libel and slander distinguished
    a. Defamation

    "Defamation" is an attack on the reputation of another. Libel and slander are methods of defamation.
    Library References

    Libel and Slander 1, 6(1), 15.
    Broadly speaking, "defamation" is an attack on the reputation of another, (6) that is to say, the unprivileged publication of false statements which naturally and proximately result in injury to another. (7) The term is used to connote fault in the context of broadcasting an alleged insult. (8)

    It is in essence an invasion of a person's relational interest, analagous to the tort of interference with advantageous relations. (9) Libel and slander are both methods of defamation. (10)

    "Defamatory."

    Words which produce any perceptible injury to the reputation of another, (11) either generally or with respect to a person's occupation, (12) are called "defamatory." A communication is considered "defamatory" if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from

    (1) See C J.S. titles Constitutional Law and Right of Privacy.

    (2) See C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution.

    (3) See C.J.S. Negligence.

    (4) See C.J.S. Torts.

    (5) See C.J.S. Constitutional Law.

    (6) Iowa – Fey v. King, 190 N.W. 519, 194 Iowa 835.

    N.J. – Hall v. Heavey, 481 A.2d 294, 195 N.J.Super. 590.

    Ohio – Matalka v. Lagemann, 486 N.E.2d 1220, 21 Ohio App.3d 134, 21 O.B.R. 143.

    Community opinion

    "Defamation" is invasion of plaintiffs interest in reputation which is relational interest involving community opinion of plaintiff.

    Mo. – Jones v. Pinkerton's Inc., App., 700 S.W.2d 456.

    (7) U.S. – Pica Services, Inc. v. Behringer, D.C.Fla., 593 F.Supp. 113.

    Fla. – Barry College v. Hull, App., 353 So.2d 575.

    (8) La. – Young Oil Ca. of Louisiana, Inc. v. Durbin, App. 2 Cir., 412 So.2d 620.

    (9) N.H. – Thomson v. Cash, 402 A.2d 651. 119 N.H. 371.

    (10) Fla. – Sailboat Key, Inc. v. Gardner, App., 378 So.2d 47.

    Ga. – Spence v. Johnson, 82 S.E. 646, 142 Ga. 267.

    Kan. – Luttrell v. United Telephone System, Inc., App., 683 P.2d 1292, 9 Kan.App.2d 620, 47 A.L.R.4th 669, affirmed 695 P.2d 1279, 236 Kan. 710.

    Ohio – Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Hancock, 474 N.E.2d 357, 16 Ohio App.3d 9, 16 O.B.R. 9.

    (11) D.C. – Joseph v. Xerox Corp., D.C., 594 F.Supp. 330.

    Ind. – Shallenberger v. Scoggins–Tomlinson, Inc., App., 439 N.E.2d 699.

    Kan. – Sheridan v. Davies, 31 P.2d 51, 139 Kan. 256.

    Mich. – Wilkerson v. Carlo, 300 N.W.2d 658, 101 Mich.App. 629.

    N.Y. – Salomone v. Macmillan Pub. Co., Inc., 411 N.Y.S.2d 105, 97 Misc.2d 346.

    N.D. – Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconness Hospital, 23 N.W.2d 247, 74 ND. 525, 166 A.L.R. 99.

    Pa. – Vitteck v. Washington Broadcasting Co., Inc., 389 A.2d 1197, 256 Pa.Super. 427.

    (12) La. – Bradford v. Murray, App. 4 Cir., 467 So.2d 1297, writ denied 469 So.2d 988.

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    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 2 53 C.J.S.

    associating or dealing with him, (13) or if it tends to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. (14)

    Defamation distinguished from other torts.

    Although the torts of defamation and invasion of privacy are closely allied, and the same considerations (15) and legal standards (16) apply to each, they are separate and distinct torts, (17) because different injuries are caused (18) and different interests are protected and compensated. (19) Likewise, defamation and commercial disparagement are two distinct torts. (20) A publication of false and defamatory matter from which harm to reputation is presumed constitutes defamation, even though the harm proven is emotional distress. (21)

    b. Libel

    "Libel" has been defined as a malicious publication, expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs and pictures, tending either to blacken the memory of one dead or the reputation of one who is alive, and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.


    A "libel," has been defined as a malicious publication, expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs and pictures, tending either to blacken the memory of one dead or the reputation of one who is alive, and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. (22) In its most general and comprehensive sense, it may be said that any publication that is injurious to the reputation of another is a "libel." (23)

    Where "libel" is defined by statute, the statu–

    (13) U.S. – Redco Corp. v. CBS, Inc., C.A.3 (Pa.), 758 F.2d 970. certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 131, 474 U.S. 843, 88 L.Ed.2d 107.

    Ala. – Harris v. School Annual Pub. Co., 466 So.2d 963.

    Alaska – Green v. Northern Pub. Co., Inc.. 655 P.2d 736, 38 A.L.R.4th 817, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 3539, 463 U.S. 1208, 77 L.Ed.2d 1389.

    D.C. – Joseph v. Xerox Corp., D.C., 594 F.Supp. 330.

    Hawaii – Fernandes v. Tenbruggencate, 649 P.2d 1144, 65 Haw. 226.

    Ill. – Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 41, 33 Ill.Dec. 708, 78 Ill.App.3d 67.

    Ind. – Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211, 175 lnd.App. 548.

    Mich. – Swenson–Davis v. Martel, 354 N.W.2d 288, 135 Mich.App. 632. appeal dismissed.

    N.M. – Bookout v. Griffin, 639 P.2d 1190, 97 N.M. 336.

    Pa. – Raffensberger v. Moran, 485 A.2d 447, 336 Pa.Super. 97.

    R.I. – Elias v. Youngken, 493 A.2d 158.

    Tex. – Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Hurlbut. App. 5 Dist., 696 S.W.2d 83, error granted.

    W.Va. – Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70.

    Wis. – Voit v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., 341 N.W.2d 693, 116 Wis.2d 217.

    (14) U.S. – Arsenault v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., D.C.Mass., 485 F.Supp. 1373, affirmed 636 F.2d 1199, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 105, 454 U.S. 821, 70 L.Ed.2d 93.

    La. – Joiner v. Downing, App., 383 So.2d 93.

    Minn. – Church of Scientology of Minnesota v. Minnesota State Medical Assn Foundation, 264 N.W.2d 152.

    N.M. – Bookout v. Griffin, 639 P.2d 1190, 97 N.M. 336.

    Or. – Worley v. Oregon Physicians Service, 686 P.2d 404, 69 Or.App. 241, review denied 691 P.2d 483. 298 Or. 334.

    Pa. – Agriss v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 483 A.2d 456, 334 Pa.Super. 295.

    R.I. – Elias v. Youngken, 493 A.2d 158.

    Wyo. – Tschirgi v. Lander Wyoming State Journal, 706 P.2d 1116.

    (15) U.S. – Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc., D.C.N.J., 510 F.Supp 761.

    Md. – Phillips v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 472 A.2d 98, 58 Md.App. 30, certiorari denied 475 A.2d 1201, 300 Md. 89.

    (17) U.S. – Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc., D.C.N.J., 510 F.Supp 761–Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., D.C.Pa., 500 F.Supp. 1081.

    (18) U.S. – Bolduc v. Bailey, D.C.Colo., 586 F.Supp. 896.

    W.Va. – Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70.

    (19) CaI. – Selleck v. Globe Intern., Inc.. 2 Dist., 212 CaI.Rptr. 838 166 C.A.3d 1123, review denied.

    Conn. – Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican–American, Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 188 Conn. 107.

    (20) U.S. – Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp., D.C.Pa., 561 F.Supp. 404.

    Product disparagement and injurious falsehood see infra § 204 et seq.

    (21) Md. – Hearst Corp. v. Hughes, 466 A.2d 486, 297 Md. 112.

    (22) U.S. – Smith v. McDonald, D.C.N.C., 562 F.Supp. 829. Affirmed 737 F.2d 427 and 105 Set. 2787, 472 U.S. 479, 86 L.Ed.2d 384.

    Colo. – Knapp v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 144 P.2d 981, 111 Cob. 492.

    Ga. – Ajouelo v. Auto–Soler Co., 6 S.E.2d 415, 61 Ga.App. 216.

    Iowa – Kelly v. Iowa State Educ. Assn, App., 372 N.W.2d 288.

    Mass. – Commonwealth v. Szliakys, 150 N.E. 190, 191, 254 Mass. 424.

    N.C. – Hake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 SE. 55, 212 NC. 780.

    Pa. – Brophy v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 422 A.2d 625, 281 Pa. Super. 588.

    S.C. – Riley v. Askin & Marine Co., 132 S.E. 584, 134 S.C. 198, 46 A.L.R. 558.

    Tex. – Musser v. Smith, App. 14 Diet., 690 S.W.2d 56, affirmed Musser v. Smith Protective Services, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653.

    Vt. – Kinsley v. Herald & Globe Ass'n, 34 A.2d 99. 113 Vt. 272, 148 A.L.R. 1164.

    Similar definitions

    (1) "Libel' is malicious defamation of person made public by printing or writing tending to expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule or to deprive him of benefits of public confidence and social intercourse.

    U.S. – Quartana v. Utterback, D.C.Mo., 609 F.Supp. 72, reversed on other grounds 789 F.2d 1297.

    (2) "Libel' is false or malicious unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture of effigy, or other fixed representation, which exposes any person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or which tends to deprive him of public confidence, or to injure him in his occupation; or any malicious publication, as aforesaid, designed to blacken or vilify memory of one who is dead, and tending to scandalize his surviving relatives and friends.

    U.S. – Miller v. Lear Siegler, Inc., D.C.Kan., 525 F.Supp. 46.

    (23) Ga. – Ajouebo v. Auto–Soler Co., 6 S.E.2d 415, 61 Ga.App. 216.

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    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 2

    tory definition governs, (24) but the language alleged to be libelous need only be fairly included within the statutory definition of libel. (25) A full and complete statutory definition of "libel" is exclusive. (26)

    Form of communication; what constitutes "writing."

    In determining whether a particular communication constitutes libel, the form of the communication does not matter; (27) and although libel is generally perpetrated by written communication, (28) it also includes defamation through the publication of drawings, pictures, or photographs. (29)

    c. Slander

    The word "slander" is defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to injure another in his reputation, office, trade, business, or means of earning a living.

    Research Note


    "Slander of title" involving utterances or words made with reference to real or personal property is discussed infra §§ 204–216.

    "Slander" may be defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to injure another in his reputation, office, trade, business, or means of earning a living. (30)

    The interests protected by the tort of slander and the tort of the intentional infliction of mental distress are different and must be recognized as such. (31)

    d. Libel and Slander Distinguished

    While according to most authority, the terms "libel" and "slander" are not the same either in all their elementary ingredients or in the penalties attached, there is also authority that no distinction between actions for libel and slander exists. Under the former view, "libel" is expressed by print, writing, pictures, or signs, while "slander" is expressed orally and is limited to defamation by words spoken.

    According to most authority, "libel" and "slander" are distinguishable terms, and are not the same, (32) either in all their elementary ingredients (33) or in the penalties attached. (34) However, there is also authority for the view that no distinction between actions for libel and slander exists. (35)

    The important difference between the two ac–

    Mo. – Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 107 S.W. 496, 209 Mo. 35.

    N.C. – Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 212 N.C. 780.

    (24) Iowa – Miller v. First Nat. Hank of Gladbrook, 264 N.W. 272, 220 Iowa 1266.

    Mont. – Grimm v. Opinion Pub. Co., 138 P.2d 580, 114 Mont. 502. N.M. – State v. EIder, 143 P. 482, 19 N.M. 393.

    Language within statutory definition as constituting libel per se see infra § 11.

    (25) U.S. – Hoest v. U.S., D.C.Cal., 451 F.Supp. 1170, affirmed 629 F.2d 586.

    (26) U.S. – Sweeney v. Caller–Times Pub. Co., D.C.Tex., 41 F.Supp. 163.

    Iowa – Miller v. First Nat. Bank of Gladbrook, 264 N.W. 272, 220 Iowa 1266.

    Tex. – Deen v. Snyder, Civ.App., 57 S.W.2d 338.

    (27) U.S. – Mullenmeister v. Snap–On Tools Corp., D.C.N.Y., 587 F.Supp. 868.

    (28) W.Va. – Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70.

    (29) U.S. – Mullenmeister v. Snap–On Tools Corp., D.C.N.Y., 587 F.Supp. 868.

    N.Y. – Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 N.E. 505, 256 N.Y. 36. W.Va. – Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70. Cartoon

    In determining whether a cartoon will sustain an action for libel, a court must first determine its underlying themes.

    Colo. – Russell v. McMillen, App., 685 P.2d 255.

    Motion pictures
    Motion picture production may be libelous.

    N.Y. – Brown v. Paramount Publix Corporation. 270 N.Y.S. 544, 240 App.Div. 520.

    (30) U.S. – Chambers v. National Battery Co., D.C.Mo., 34 F.Supp. 834.

    D.C. – Smith v. District of Columbia, App., 399 A.2d 213.

    Fla. – Axelrod v. Califano, App., 357 So.2d 1048.

    Mo. – Harbison v. Chicago, RI. & P. R. Co., 37 S.W.2d 609, 327 Mo. 440, 79 A.L.R. 1.

    N.Y. – Liffman v. Booke, 398 N.Y.S.2d 674, 59 A.D.2d 687.

    N.C. – Morrow v. Kings Dept. Stores. Inc., 290 S.E.2d 732, 57 N.C. App. 13, review denied 294 S.E.2d 210, 306 N.C. 385.

    Tenn. – Little Stores v. Isenberg, 172 S.W.2d 13, 26 Tenn.App. 357.

    (31) Falsely accusing another of crime
    The same conduct, for example, falsely accusing another of crime, may give rise to either cause of action depending on interest which was injured.

    Mich. – Campos v. Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corp., 246 N.W,2d 352, 71 Mich.App. 23.

    (32) Ga. – Harrison v. Pool, 101 S.E. 765. 24 Ga.App. 587.

    Pa. – Williams v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.. 1 A.2d 495, 133 Pa. Super. I, affirmed 10 A.2d 8, 337 Pa. 17.

    S.C. – Lily v. BeIk's Department Store, 182 S.E. 889, 178 S.C. 278.

    (33) Ga. – Harrison v. Pool, 101 S.E. 765, 24 Ga.App. 587.

    S.C. – Lily v. Belk's Department Store, 182 SE. 889, 178 S.C. 278.

    (34) Ga. – Harrison v. Pool, 101 SE. 765, 24 Ga.App. 587.

    S.C. – Lily v. Belk's Department Store, 182 S.E. 889, 178 S.C. 278.

    (35) Va. – Fleming v. Moore, 275 S.E.2d 632, 221 Va. 884, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 3513, 472 U.S. 1032, 87 L.Ed.2d 643 and Lewis v. Port Packet Corporation, 105 S.Ct. 3528, two cases, 473 U.S. 905, 87 L.Ed.2d 653. appeal after remand Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d 713, 229 Va. 1.

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    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 2 53 C.J.S.

    tions is that the scope of liability for libel is broader than it is for slander. (36) Libel undertakes to grant redress for all of the injurious consequences inflicted by the defamatory words, (37) whereas one defamed by another's oral communications can secure redress, in the absence of special injury, only in the event the injury can be pigeon–holed into certain well–defined classifications recognized by the action of slander; (38) and while all slanderous statements would be libelous if written, not all libelous statements would be slanderous if spoken. (39)

    Libel is expressed by print, writing, pictures, or signs; (4) slander is expressed orally, (41) and is limited to defamation by words spoken. (42) An oral slanderous statement, which is then published, is a libel (43) as is the oral publication of written defamation. (44) Statutory definitions of both libel and slander include almost any language which, on its face, has a natural tendency to injure a person's reputation. (45)

    Defamatory matter broadcast by television or radio.

    While there is authority that televised defamation occurring in a prepared script is libel and televised defamation of a spontaneous utterance is slander, (46) there is also authority that the broadcasting of defamatory matter by means of radio or television is libel, (47) whether or not it is read from a manuscript; (48) but extemporaneous interpolations, not in the script, if actionable as defamation, have been considered as slander. (49) It has been intimated that the distinctions between libel and slander are inapplicable to radio broadcasting. (50)

    § 3. Malice

    a. In general
    b. Express or actual malice

    a. In General
    Implied "malice" in the law of defamation denotes merely the absence of lawful excuse or privileged occasion.

    (36) U.S. – Gonzalez v. Avon Products, Inc., D.C.Del., 609 F.Supp. 1555.

    (37) Or. – Reiman v. Pacific Development Soc., 284 P. 575, 132 Or. 82.

    (38) Or. – Reiman v. Pacific Development Soc., 284 P. 575, 132 Or. 82.

    (39) Reason for rule
    While all slanderous statements would be libelous if written, not all libelous statements would be slanderous if spoken, for reason that written word leaves more permanent blot on one's reputation, written word is capable of wider circulation than that which is communicated orally and reducing defamation to writing evidences greater deliberation and intention on part of one who records it.

    Del. – Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967,

    (40) U.S. – Vargas v. Royal Bank of Canada, D.C.Puerto Rico, 604 F.Supp. 1036 – Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.. D.C.Colo., 568 F.Supp. 602, reversed on other grounds 811 F.2d 511.

    Ala. – First Independent Baptist Church of Arab v. Southerland, 373 So. 2d 647.

    Del. – Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967.

    Ga. – Ajouelo v. Auto–Soler Co.. 6 S.E.2d 415. 61 Ga.App. 216.

    N.Y. – Locke v. Gibbons, 299 N.Y.S. 188, 164 Misc. 877, affirmed 2 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 253 App.Dis. 887.

    Or. – Reiman s'. Pacific Development Soc., 284 P. 575, 132 Or. 82.

    Libel requires a record

    N.J. – Molt v. Public Indemnity Co., 161 A. 346, 10 N.J.Misc. 879.

    (41) U.S. – Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., D.C.Colo., 568 F.Supp. 602, reversed on other grounds 811 F.2d 511.

    Del. – Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967.

    Ga. – Ajouelo v. Auto–Soler Cc.. 6 S.E.2d 415, 61 Ga.App. 216.

    N.Y. – Locke v. Gibbons. 299 N.Y.S. 188, 164 Misc. 877, affirmed 2 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 253 App.Div. 887.

    Or. – Reiman v. Pacific Development Soc., 284 P. 575, 132 Or. 82.

    Tex. – Bayoud v. Sigler, Civ.App.. 555 S.W.2d 913, error dismissed.

    (42) Ga. – Aiken v. May, 37 S.E.2d 225, 73 Ga.App. 502.

    (43) Ill. – Owen v. Carr, 4 Dist., 478 N.E2d 658, 88 Ill.Dec. 343, 134 Ill.App.3d 855, affirmed 497 N.E.2d 1145, 100 Ill.Dec. 783, 113 Ill.2d 273.

    Or. – Newton v. Family Federal Say, and Loan Ass'n, 616 P.2d 1213, 48 Or.App. 373.

    (44) U.S. – Gonzalez v. Avon Products, Inc., D.C.Del., 609 F.Supp. 1555.

    Ga. – Land v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 250 S.E.2d 188, 147 Ga.App. 738.

    (45) Cal. – Washer v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 136 P.2d 297, 21 C.2d 822, 155 A.L.R. 1338.

    (46) U.S. – Street v. National Broadcasting Co., D.C.Tenn., 512 F.Supp. 398, affirmed 645 F.2d 1227, certiorari dismissed 102 Set. 667, 454 U.s. 1095, 70 L.Ed.2d 636.

    (47) N.Y. – Matherson v. Marchello, 2 Dept., 473 N.Y.S.2d 998, 100 A.D.2d 233.

    Radio broadcasts of sermons
    Ala. – First Independent Baptist Church of Arab v, Southerland, 373 So. 2d 647.

    Radio broadcast of script
    Radio broadcast of a script containing defamatory matter constitutes libel rather than slander.
    Neb. – Sorensen v. Wood, 243 NW. 82, 123 Neb. 348, appeal dismissed KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorenson, 54 S.Ct. 209, 290 U.S. 599, 78 L.Ed. 527.

    N.Y. – Hartmann v. Winchell, 63 N.Y.S.2d 225, 187 Misc. 54, affirmed 66 N.Y.S.2d 272, 27! App.Div. 777, affirmed 73 N.E.2d 30, 296 N.Y. 296.

    (48) Ala. – Gray v. WALA–TV, 384 So.2d 1062.

    (49) N.Y. – Locke v. Gibbons, 299 N.Y.S. 188, 164 Misc. 877, affirmed 2 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 253 App.Div. 887.

    (50) Or. – Irwin v. Ashust, 74 P.2d 1127, 158 Or. 61.

    Pa. – Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A.2d 302, 336 Pa. 182, 124 A.L.R. 968.

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    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 3

    Research Note

    Malice as a consideration in the determination of a necessary ingredient of the action to recover general damages, or to destroy a privilege, is discussed infra §§ 44, 66 respectively, and in connection with the mitigation of damages is considered infra § 194.

    Library References

    Libel and Slander 3–5.
    The term "malice," in the law of defamation, may be used in a special and technical sense (51) to denote merely the absence of lawful excuse (52) or to indicate the absence of a privileged occasion. (53)

    Such malice, which may be implied or presumed from the use of certain words, (54) is variously known as "constructive malice," (55) "malice in law," (56) or "implied malice." (57) Such "malice," is presumed to exist by fiction of law. (58) It does not impute motives of ill will with intent to injure, (59) and it is not necessarily inconsistent with an honest purpose or with good faith. (60)

    b. Express or Actual Malice

    "Malice" may denote ill will, evil motive, intention to injure, or wanton disregard of the rights of others.


    "Malice," in the law of defamation, may be used as a term involving some intent, that is to say, ill will against a person, (61) clearly distinguishable from "constructive malice," or "implied malice." (62) This classification is variously called "express malice," (63) "actual malice," (64) "malice in fact," (65) and "common–law malice." (66)

    This type of malice is always in its analysis malice of the one kind, the malice of the evil motive, (67) implying desire and intention to injure, (68) or indicating that the party was actuated either by spite or ill–will toward an individual or by

    (51) Ga. – . – Ajouelo v. Auto–Soler Co., 6 S.E.2d 415, 61 Ga.App. 216.

    (52) Ga. – Ajouelo v. Auto–Soler Co., 6 S.E.2d 415, 61 Ga.App. 216.

    Iowa – Vinson v. Linn–Mar Community School Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108.

    Mo. – Boehm v. Western Leather Clothing Co., App., 161 S.W.2d 710.

    Neb. – lden v. Evans Model Laundry, 236 N.W. 444, 121 Neb. 184.

    N.J. – Hoffman v. Trenton Times, 8 A.2d 837, 17 N.J.Misc. 339.

    (53) Ga. – Ajouelo v. Auto–Soler Co., 6 S.E.2d 415, 61 Ga.App. 216.

    Me. – Jellison v. Goodwin, 43 Me. 287, 69 Am.D. 62.

    (54) N.C. – Swain v. Oakey, 129 SE. 151, 190 NC. 113.

    S.C. – Scott v. McCain, 250 S.E.2d 118, 272 S.C. 198, appeal after remand 274 S.E.2d 299, 275 S.C. 599.

    (55) Wis. – Williams v. Hicks Printing Co., 150 NW. 183, 159 Wis. 90.

    (56) Ga. – Ajouelo v. Auto–Soler Co., 6 S.E.2d 415, 61 Ga.App. 216.

    Iowa – Vinson v. Linn–Mar Community School Dist.. 360 N.W.2d 108.

    Miss. – Scott–Burr Stores Corporation v. Edgar, 177 So. 766, 181 Miss. 486.

    N.C. – Swain v. Oakey, 129 SE. 151, 190 NC. 113.

    Va. – Chesapeake Ferry Co. v. Hudgins, 156 SE. 429, 155 Vs. 874.

    (57) Ga. – Ajouelo v. Auto–Soler Co., 6 S.E.2d 415, 61 Ga.App. 216.

    Iowa – Vinson v. Linn–Mar Community School Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108.

    Mo. – Boehm v. Western Leather Clothing Co., App., 161 S.W.2d 710.

    N.J. – Hoffman v. Trenton Times, 8 A.2d 837, 17 N.J.Misc. 339.

    N.C. – Swain v. Oakey, 129 S.E. 151, 190 N.C. 113.

    (58) Ill. – Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, 64 N.E.2d 751, 327 Ill.App. 559.

    N.J. – Hoffman v. Trenton Times, 8 A.2d 837, 17 N.J.Misc. 339.

    (59) Ga. – Ajouelo v. Auto–Soler Co., 6 S.E.2d 415, 61 Ga.App. 216.

    (60) Wis. – Williams v. Hicks Printing Co., 150 N.W. 183, 159 Wis. 90.

    (61) Ga. – Ajouelo V. Auto–Soler Co., 6 S.E.2d 415, 61 Ga.App. 216.

    (62) Cal. – Davis v. Hearst, 116 P. 530, 160 Cal. 143.

    lowa – Vinson v. Linn–Mar Community School Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108.

    (63) Ga. – Ajouelo v. Auto–Soler Co., 6 S.E.2d 415, 61 Ga.App. 216.

    Iowa – Vinson v. Linn–Mar Community School Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108.

    Miss. – Scott–Burr Stores Corporation v. Edgar, 177 So. 766, 181 Miss. 486.

    Mo. – Boehm v. Western Leather Clothing Co., App., 161 S.W.2d 710.

    N.J. – Hoffman v. Trenton Times, 8 A.2d 837, 17 N.J.Misc. 339.

    Va. – Chesapeake Ferry Co. v. Hudgins, 's56 SE. 429, 155 Va. 8,74.

    (64) Miss. – Scott–Burr Stores Corporation v. Edgar, 177 So. 766, 181 Miss. 486.

    Mo. – Boehm v. Western Leather Clothing Co., App., 161 S.W.2d 710. N.C. – Swain v. Oakey, 129 S.E. 151, 190 N.C. 113.

    S.C. – Scott v. McCain, 250 S.E.2d 118, 272 S.C. 198, appeal after remand 274 S.E.2d 299, 275 S.C. 599.

    Va. – Chesapeake Ferry Co. v. Hudgins. 156 S.E. 429, 155 Va. 874.

    (65) Ill. – Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, 64 N.E.2d 751, 327 Ill.App. 559.

    Mo. – Boehm v. Western Leather Clothing Co., App., 161 S.W.2d 710.

    N.C. – Swain v. Oakey, 129 SE. 151, 190 NC. 113.

    Va. – Chesapeake Ferry Co. v. Hudgins. 156 S.E. 429, 155 Va. 874.

    (66) Va. – Great Coastal Exp., Inc. v. Ellington, 334 S.E.26 8,46, 230 Va. 142.

    (67) Mo. – Boehm v. Western Leather Clothing Co., App., 161 S.W.2d 710.

    Tex. – Lattimore v. Tyler Commercial College, Com.App., 24 S.W.2d 361.

    Any improper or unjustifiable motive

    Conn. – Bleich v. Ortiz, 493 A.2d 236, 196 Conn. 498.

    (68) U.S. – Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Watson, C.C.A.W.Va., 55 F.2d 184.

    Cal. – Harris v. Curtis Pub. Ca., 121 P.2d 761, 49 C.A.2d 340.

    Fla. – Axelrod v. Califano, App., 357 So.2d 1048.

    Ill. – Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, 64 N.E.2d 751, 327 Ill.App. 559.

    Mo. – Boehm v. Western Leather Clothing Co., App., 161 S.W.2d 710.

    N.J. – Hoffman v. Trenton Times, 8 A.2d 837, 11 N.J.Misc. 339. Infliction of harm through falsehood

    lnd. – Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211,175 Ind.App. 548.

    29


    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 3 53 C.J.S.

    improper motives, (69) or a wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of others (70) However, there is also authority that "actual malice" does not simply mean ill will or spite, (71) and even that ill will and bad motive toward plaintiff are not elements of "actual malice;" (27) but, rather, that "actual malice" concentrates on defendant's attitude toward truth or falsity, and does not focus on defendant's attitude toward plaintiff. (73)

    "Actual malice" means the knowing publication of a falsehood, or reckless disregard of falsity, (74) and if the speaker has reason to doubt the truth of the statements, this may amount to "actual malice;" (75) but, mere falsity, without more, is generally not sufficient to establish "actual malice," (76) and negligence is insufficient to show the recklessness that is required for a finding of "actual malice." (77) It requires that at the time of defendant's act or omission to act, defendant be conscious, or chargeable with consciousness of his wrongdoing; (78) and "actual malice" cannot be implied from the character and content of the publication. (79)

    Failure to investigate.

    While there is authority that the failure of defendant to investigate, without more, does not demonstrate "actual malice," (80) there is also authority that "actual malice" is established when a person departs from responsible standards of investigation and prints matter on the basis of an admittedly unreliable source, without further verification. (81)

    § 4. Inducement, Colloquium, and Innuendo

    In general, as used in pleadings in actions for libel or slander, the "inducement" is the statement of extrinsic facts which makes the charge intelligible; the "colloquium" is the statement of extrinsic facts which shows that the language published concerned the plaintiff; the "innuendo" is an explanation of the published words by reference to previously ascertained facts.


    (69) Cal. – Harris v. Curtis Pub. Co., 121 P.2d 761, 49 C.A.2d 340.

    Iowa – .Vinson v. Linn–Mar Community School Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108.

    Miss. – Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Beard, 176 So. 156, 179 Miss. 764.

    Mo. – Boehm v. Western Leather Clothing Co., App., 161 S.W.2d 710.

    N.Y. – Konowitz v. Archway School Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 757, 65 A.D.2d 752.

    N.C. – Swain v. Oakey, 129 S.E. 151, 190 N.E. 113.

    S.C. – Padgett v. Sun News. 292 S.E.2d 30, 278 S.C. 26. 70.

    (70) Ill. – Edwards by Phillips v. University of Chicago Hospitals and Clinics, I Dist., 484 N.E.2d 1100, 92 Ill.Dec. 245, 137 IlI.App.3d 485.

    Miss. – Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Beard, 176 So. 156, 179 Miss. 764.

    Mo. – Boehm v. Western Leather Clothing Co., App., 161 S.W.2d 710.

    N.Y. – Konowitz v. Archway School Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 757, 65 A.D.2d 752.

    S.C. – Padgett v. Sun News. 292 S.E.2d 30, 278 S.C. 26.

    Tex. – Lattimore v. Tyler Commercial College, Com.App., 24 S.W.2d 361.

    Va. – Great Coastal Exp., Inc. v. Ellington, 334 S.E.2d 846, 230 Va. 142.

    (71) U.S. – Reliance Insurance Company v. Barrons, D.C.N.Y., 442 F.Supp. 1341.

    N.Y. – Schulman v. Anderson Russell Kill & Olick, P.C., 458 N.Y.S.2d 448, 117 Misc.2d 162.

    (72) Colo. – Fink v. Combined Communications Corp., App., 679 P.2d 1108.

    (73) Cal. – Widener v. Pacific Gas & EIec. Co., 142 Cal.Rptr. 304, 75 C.A.3d 415, certiorari denied 98 Set. 2265, 436 U.S. 918, 56 L.Ed.2d 759.

    (74) Ariz. – Hansen v. Stoll, App., 636 P.2d 1236, 130 Ariz. 454.

    Fla. – Cape Publications, Inc. v. Adams, App., 336 So.2d 1197, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 440. 434 U.S. 943, 54 L.Ed.2d 305 and 348 So.2d 945.

    La. – Lemeshewsky v. Dumaine, App. 4 Cir., 464 So.2d 973.

    "New York Times malice" analyzed

    Va. – Great Coastal Exp.. Inc. v. Ellington. 334 S.E.2d 846, 230 Va. 142.

    "Reckless" defined

    Term "reckless," in such context, does not mean grossly negligent, its common use, but rather intentional disregard.

    U.S. – Reliance Insurance Company v. Barron's, D.C.N.Y., 442 F.Supp. 1341.

    "Reckless disregard" analyzed

    "Reckless disregard" for libel purposes, cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition but rather its outer limits must be marked out through case–by–case adjudication, though it is clear that it involves stringent and subjective standard.

    Cal. – Widener v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 142 Cal.Rptr. 304, 75 C.A.3d 415, certiorari denied 98 Set. 2265, 436 U.S. 918, 56 L.Ed.2d 759.

    (75) N.Y. – Vasquez v. O'Brien. 445 N.Y.S.2C1 305, 85 A.D.2d 791.

    (76) U.S. – Marcone v. Penthouse Intern. Magazine For Men, CAPs., 754 F.2d 1072, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 182, 474 U.S. 864, 88 L.Ed. 2d 151, rehearing denied 106 S.Ct. 548, 88 L.Ed.2d 477.

    Good faith belief in truth

    Inaccuracy itself will not demonstrate "actual malice" in libel case; mistakes or bad judgment will not substitute for knowing falsehood or reckless disregard as to falsity, when uncontradicted testimony reveals that author and publisher held good faith belief that article was correct and truthful.

    U.S. – Reliance insurance Company v. Barron's, DeNY., 442 F.Supp. 1341.

    (77) Mo. – .Glover v. Herald Co., 549 S.W.2d 858, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 505, 434 U.S. 965. 54 L.Ed.2d 451.

    (78) S.C. – Padgett v. Sun News, 292 S.E.2d 30, 278 S.C. 26.

    (79) Ohio – Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co.. Inc., 413 N.E.2d 1187,64 Ohio St.2d 116, 18 O.O.3d 354, certiorari denied 101 Set. 3111, 452 U.S. 962, 69 L.Ed.2d 973.

    (80) U.S. – Maccone v. Penthouse Intern. Magazine For Men, CAPs., 754 F.2d 1072. certiorari denied 106 Set. 182. 474 U.S. 864, 88 L.Ed. 2d 151, rehearing denied 106 S.Ct. 548, 88 L.Ed.2d 477.

    Tex. – Sherman v. Times Herald Printing Co.. App. 8 Dist.. 671 S.W.2d 700.

    (81) S.C. – Stevens v. Sun Pub. Co., 240 S.E.2d 812. 270 S.C. 65, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 2847, 436 U.S. 945, 56 L.Ed.2d 786.

    30


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 5

    Library References

    Libel and Slander 81, 82, 86, 86(1).

    The inducement, as used in pleadings in a libel or slander action, is the statement of facts out of which the charge arises or which are necessary or useful to make the charge intelligible. (82)

    In other words, it is intended to state facts by reference to which the libel or slander is rendered intelligible and is shown to contain an injurious imputation. (83)

    Colloquium.

    The "colloquium," as used in pleadings, is a direct allegation that the language published was concerning plaintiff or concerning plaintiff and his affairs, or concerning plaintiff and facts alleged as inducement. (84) A colloquium serves to show only that the words were spoken with reference to the matter of the averment. (85)

    Innuendo.

    In pleadings, an innuendo is an explanation of the words published or spoken by a reference to facts previously ascertained by averment or otherwise. (86) It explains the words used and annexes to them their proper meaning if they are ambiguous. (87) Strictly speaking, it is not an averment (88) of fact, (89) but an inference of reason; (90) only a matter of explanation. (91)

    The office of an innuendo is to connect the defamatory matter with other facts and circumstances sufficiently expressed before, for the purpose of explaining or showing the meaning and application of the charge, (92) or to explain that which is of doubtful or ambiguous meaning in the language of the publication. (93) It is not the office of the innuendo to supply the place of the colloquium. (94)

    § 5. Nature and General Considerations
    a. In general
    b. What law governs
    a. In General

    The law of defamation embodies a public policy that individuals and business entities should be free to enjoy their reputations unimpaired by false and defamatory attacks.


    Research Note

    Elements of liability for defamation are discussed generally infra § 6.

    Library References

    Libel and Slander 1, 6, 6(1).

    (82) Ala. – Penry v. Dozier, 49 So. 909, 161 Ala. 292.

    Necessity and propriety of inducement in complaint or petition see infra § 130.

    (83) Ala. – Penry v. Dozier, 49 So. 909, 161 Ala. 292.

    Cal. – Peabody v. Barham, 126 P.2d 663, 52 C.A.2d 581.

    (84) Mont. – Nolan v. Standard Pub. Co., 216 P. 571, 67 Mont. 212.

    Necessity and propriety of colloquium in complaint or petition see infra § 130.

    (85) Ala. – Penry v. Dozier, 49 So. 909, 161 Ala. 292.

    (86) Del. – MacDonough v. A.S. Beck Shoe Corporation, 10 A.2d 510, 40 Del. 318, 1 Terry, 318.

    N.Y. – Fry v. Bennett, 7 N.Y.Super. 54, Code Rep.,N.S., 238.

    Necessity and propriety of innuendo in complaint or petition see infra § 131.

    (87) U.S. – Hayes v. Irwin, D.C.Ga.. 541 F.Supp. 397, affirmed 729. F.2d 1466, rehearing denied 733 F.2d 908, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 185, 469 U.S. 857. 83 L.Ed.2d 119.

    Tex. – Gartman v. Hedgpeth, 157 S.W.2d 139, 138 Tex. 73, 138 A.L.R. 666.

    (88) Iowa – Wisner v. Nichols, 143 NW. 1020, 165 Iowa 15.

    (89) Mo. – State v. Pardo, App., 180 SW. 578, affirmed, Sup., 190 SW. 264.

    Tex. – Harris V. Santa Fe Townsite Co., 125 SW. 77, 58 Tex.Civ.App. 506.

    (90) Mo. – State v. Pardo, App., 180 SW. 578, affirmed, Sup., 190 SW. 264.

    Tex. – Harns v. Santa Fe Townsite Ca., 125 SW. 77, 58 Tex.Civ.App. 506.

    (91) Iowa – Wisner v. Nichols, 143 N.W. 1020, 165 Iowa 15.

    (92) U.S. – Berg v. Printers' Ink Pub. Co., D.C.N.Y., 54 F.Supp. 795, affirmed, C.C.A., 141 F.2d 1022.

    Cal. – Okun v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 175 Cal.Rptr. 157, 629 P.2d 1369, 29 C.3d 442, certiorari denied Maple Properties v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 102 S.Ct. 673, 454 U.S. 1099, 70 L.Ed.2d 641, appeal after remand 205 Cal.Rptr. 532, 158 C.A.3d 997, certiorari denied Norminton Levy & Norminton v. Court of Appeal of California, 105 S.Ct. 1758, 470 U.S. 1054, 84 L.Ed.2d 820.

    Del. – Corbett v. American Newspapers, 5 A.2d 245, 40 Del. 10, 1 Terry 10.

    Ky. – Sweeney & Co. v. Brown, 60 S.W.2d 381, 249 Ky. 116.

    N.Y. – Devany v. Quill, 64 N.Y.S.2d 733, 187 Misc. 698.

    N.D. – Ellsworth v. Martindale–Hubbell Law Directory, 268 NW. 400, 66 ND. 578.

    Ohio – Westropp v. E.W. Scripps Co., 59 N.E.2d 205, 76 Ohio App. 463, 32 0.0. 214.

    Pa. – Sarkees v. Warner–West Corporation, 37 A.2d 344, 349 Pa. 363.

    Tex. – Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Peaster, Civ.App., 178 S.W.2d 302.

    Va. – Guide Pub. Co. v. Futrell, 7 S.E.2d 133, 175 Va. 77.

    W.Va. – Parker v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 30 S.E.2d 1, 126 W.Va. 666.

    Wis. – Kassowitz v. Sentinel Co., 277 NW. 177, 226 Wis. 468.

    Rule that innuendo cannot be used to change or enlarge natural meaning of words see infra § 129.

    (93) Ga. – Aiken v. Constitution Pub. Co., 33 S.E.2d 555, 72 Ga.App. 250.

    (94) Ky. – Sweeney & Co. v. Brown, 60 S.W.2d 381, 249 Ky. 116.

    31


    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 5 53 C.J.S.

    The law of defamation embodies a public policy that individuals and business entities should be free to enjoy their reputations unimpaired by false and defamatory attacks, (95) and it imposes liability for the publication of false matters injuring the reputation of others. (96) Society has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation, (97) and the legitimate state interest underlying the law of defamation is the compensation of individuals for harm inflicted upon them by defamatory falsehoods. (98) The law of libel and slander serves to protect one's interest in character and reputation. (99)

    The foundation of an action for defamation is injury done to one's reputation, (1) although the remedy does not extend to one's reputation in a limited community in which attitudes and social values may depart substantially from those prevailing generally. (2) A mere injury to feelings alone will not constitute the basis of an action, (3) although, as discussed infra § 191, it may be

    (95) Ga.. – Ajouelo v. Auto–Soler Cc., 6 S.E.2d 415, 61 Ga.App. 216.

    Mich. – Campos v. Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corp.. 246 N.W.2d 352, 71 Mich.App. 23.

    N.J. – Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 445 A.2d 376, 89 N.J. 176, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 211, 459 U.S. 907, 74 L.Ed.2d 269.

    Pa. – Rybas v. Wapner, 457 A.2d 108, 311 Pa.Super. 50. Basis of action

    Action for defamation is based on violation of fundamental right of individual to enjoy reputation unimpaired by false and defamatory attacks.

    Pa. – Berg v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 422 A.2d 831, 280 Pa. Super. 495.

    Remedy against excesses of print and media
    Defamation action, properly limited, plays important role in free society as it represents individual's sole remedy against occasional excesses of print and electronic media which often have vast resources to inflict untoward damage upon individual.

    Fla. – Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Ace, App. 3 Dist., 423 So.2d 376, approved 458 So.2d 239.

    Personal security
    (1) individual's right to personal security includes his uninterrupted entitlement to enjoyment of his reputation.

    Va. – Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d 713, 229 Va. 1, certiorari denied Fleming v. Moore, 105 S.Ct. 3513, 472 U.S. 1032, 87 L.Ed.2d 643 and Lewis v. Port Packet Corporation, 105 S.Ct. 3528, two cases, 473 U.S. 905, 87 L.Ed.2d 653.

    (2) Right to enjoyment of good reputation as within constitutional guaranty of personal security see C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 511.

    Right to privacy distinguished

    Fundamental difference between right to "privacy" and right to freedom from "defamation" is that former directly concerns one's own peace of mind whereas latter concerns primarily one's reputation.

    Mass. – Themo v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 27 N.E.2d 753, 306 Mass. 54.

    (96) La. – Kennedy v. Item Co., 3 So.2d 175, 197 La. 1050. Md. – Bowie v. Evening News, 129 A. 797, 148 Md. 569. N.J. – Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 445 A.2d 376, 89 N.J. 176,
    certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 211, 459 U.S. 907, 74 L.Ed.2d 169.

    Tex. – Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 160 S.W.2d 246, 138 Tex. 434. Constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press in connection with exemption from liability for libel and slander, see C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 585–587.

    (97) U.S. – Rosenblatt v. Baer, N.H., 86 S.Ct. 669, 383 U.S. 75, 15 L.Ed.2d 597.

    McCabe v. Kevin Jenkins and Associates, Inc., D.C.Pa., 532 F.Supp. 648.

    (98) U.S. – Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., III., 94 S.Ct. 2997, 418 U.S. 323, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, appeal after remand 680 F.2d 527, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1233, 459 U.S. 1226, 75 L.Ed.2d 467–Time, Inc. v. Hill, N.Y., 87 S.Ct. 534, 385 U.S. 374, 17 L.Ed.2d 456.

    (99) U.S. – Fausett v. American Resources Management Corp., D.C. Utah, 542 F.Supp. 1234.

    Ark. – Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Dodrill, 660 S.W.2d 933, 281 Ark. 23.

    Kan. – Luttrell v. United Telephone System, Inc., 683 P.2d 1292, 9 Kan. App.2d 620, affirmed 695 P.2d 1279, 236 Kan. 710.

    (1) U.S. – Bolduc v. Bailey, D.C.Colo., 586 F.Supp. 896.

    Ark. – Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Dodrel, 660 S.W.2d 933, 281 Ark. 25.

    Del. – Saunders v. Board of Directors, WHYY–TV (Channel 12), Super., 382 A.2d 257.

    Ga. – Kaplan v. Edmondson, 22 S.E.2d 343, 68 Ga.App. 151.

    Ill. – Voris v. Street & Smith Publications, 71 N.E.2d 338, 330 Ill.App. 409.

    Kan. – Gobin v. Globe Pub. Co., 649 P.2d 1239, 232 Kan. 1.

    Ky. – Fordson Coal Co. v. Caner, 108 S.W.2d 1007, 269 Ky. 805.

    La. – Freeman v. Cooper, 414 So.2d 355.

    Mass. – Hughes v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 43 N.E.2d 657, 312 Mass. 178.

    Mich. – Meyer v. Hubbell, 324 N.W.2d 139, 117 Mich.App. 699.

    Miss. – Furman v. Mississippi Publishers Corporation, 14 So.2d 344, 193 Miss. 90.

    N.J. – Cole v. Richards, 158 A. 466, 108 N.J.L. 356.

    N.Y. – Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, 186 N.E. 217, 262 N.Y. 99.

    Okl. – Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Kight, 50 P.2d 350, 174 Okl. 359.

    S.C. – Wardlaw v. Peck, App., 318 S.E.2d 270, 282 S.C. 199.

    Tex. – LyIe v. Waddle. 188 S.W.2d 770, 144 Tex. 90.

    Necessity of injury to reputation as element of cause of action, see infra § 6.

    (2) Prison community

    Del. – Saunders v. Board of Directors, WHYY–TV (Channel 12), Super., 382 A.2d 257.

    (3) Miss. – Furman v. Mississippi Publishers Corporation, 14 So.2d .344, 195 Miss. 90.

    N.Y. – Hansen v. Dethridge, 67 N.Y.S.2d 168.

    Okl. – Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Knight, 50 P.2d 350, 174 Okl. 359,

    Pa. – Rybas v. Wapner, 457 A.2d 108, 311 Pa.Super. 50.

    S.C. – Wardlaw v. Peck, 318 S.E.2d 270, 282 S.C. 199.

    32


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 5

    considered in assessing the damages recoverable where a cause of action otherwise exists. Furthermore, a defamation action cannot be based upon individual negative reactions to a particular statement. (4)

    Generally, defamation requires words, not merely actions, (5) but conduct may be held defamatory despite the fact that the statement communicated is not actually verbalized. (6)

    Application of statutes.

    In accordance with the rules governing the retroactive operation of statutes generally, discussed in C.J.S. Statutes §§ 412–440, statutes affecting actions for defamation apply only to causes of action accruing subsequent to the enactment of the statute, (7) unless the statute affects the remedy or procedure only, and has no substantive effect, in which case it applies to the trial of actions which may have accrued prior to the enactment of the statute. (8)

    b. What Law Governs

    The substantive law of defamation is governed by the law of the state having the most significant relationship to each issue.


    Generally, the law of the state having the most significant relationship to each issue governs the substantive law of defamation. (9) This is usually the state of plaintiff's domicile at the time of publication if the matter was published in that state, (10) and that law will also govern if the principal injuries occurred there. (11)

    However, this law does not apply if, with respect to some particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the issue or the parties. (12) So, the law of the place where the defamation took place applies if that is where the harm to plaintiff is likely to be felt, (13) and, under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, liability is determined by the law of the place where publication is made. (14)

    Moreover, where the action involves multistate defamation, as where the communication is published simultaneously in two or more states, the law of the state which has the most significant relationship to the issues applies; (15) this is usually

    (4) Pa. – Rybas v. Wapner, 457 A.2d 106, 311 Pa.Super. 50.

    (5) Discharge of employee

    N.Y. – O'Donnell v. Westchester Community Service Council, Inc., 2 Dept., 466 N.Y.S.2d 41, 96 A.D.2d 885.

    (6) Repossession of store by landlord

    Alaska – Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288.

    (7) N.Y. – Campbell v. New York Evening Post, 157 N.E. 153, 245 N.Y. 320.

    (8) Tex. – Express Pub. Co. v. Hormuth, Civ.App., 5 S.W.2d 1025, error refused.

    (9) U.S. – Ritzman v. Weekly World News, Inc., D.C.Tex., 614 F.Supp. 1336–Zimmerman v. Board of Publications of Christian Reformed Church, Inc., D.C.Colo., 598 F.Supp. 1002.

    (10) U.S. – Ritzman v. Weekly World News, Inc., D.C.Tex., 614 F.Supp. 1336–Davis v. Costa–Gavras, D.C.N.Y., 580 F.Supp. 1082.

    (11) U.S. – Ritzman v. Weekly World News, Inc., D.C,Tex., 614 F.Supp. 1336 (publication elsewhere but intrastate distribution)– Zimmerman v. Board of Publications of Christian Reformed Church, Inc., D.C.Colo., 598 F.Supp. 1002 (printing elsewhere, in–state publication).

    Standard of fault
    New Jersey bore most significant relationship to New Jersey residents' claim of defamation brought against New York broadcasting company in light of New Jersey's important interest in protecting its citizens from defamation and additional interest in governing fault of those who come within its boundaries to investigate the news and later broadcast it there.

    U.S. – Machleder v. Diaz, D.C.N.Y., 538 F.Supp. 1364.

    (12) U.S. – Davis v. Costa–Gavras, D.C.N.Y., 580 F.Supp. 1082.

    Campaign publicity
    New York law governed in defamation action brought by former brother–in–law of New York gubernatorial candidate based on news story published in New York concerning candidate's involvement in corporation founded by brother–in–law where brother–in–law maintained personal apartment in New York, corporation, although having its principal headquarters in Pennsylvania, had retail outlets in New York, and defendants' focus was reasonably on New York.

    U.S. – Grass v. News Group Publications, Inc., D.C.N.Y., 570 F.Supp. 178.

    (13) U.S. – Denenberg v. American Family Corp. of Columbus, Georgia. D.C.Pa.. 566 F.Supp. 1242–Ardoyno v. Kyzar, D.C.La., 426 F.Supp. 78 (punitive damages allowed).

    Situs of gambling casino
    Slander action against New Jersey casino based on statements made by casino employees about a Pennsylvania resident was governed by New Jersey law.

    U.S. – Lamelza v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., D.C.Pa., 580 F.Supp. 445.

    Target

    Employer's slander claim against former employee was governed by Indiana law where, for the most part, assertedly defamatory statements were made in state and state was Site of employer's division which was target of allegedly defamatory statements.

    U.S. – Flettung Sales Co., Inc. v. Rawley, D.C.III., 611 F.Supp. 5077.

    (14) U.S. – Church of Scientology of California v. Flynn, D.C.Mass., 578 F.Supp. 266.

    (15) U.S. – System Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Development Corp., C.A.N.J., 555 F.2d 1131.

    Ill. – Velle Transcendental Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Esquire, Inc., 354 N.E.2d 622, 41 III.App.3d 799.

    Particular factors considered

    U.S. – Rudin v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., D.C.N.Y., 510 F.Supp. 210.


    33


    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 5 53 C.J.S.

    the state of the plaintiff's domicile, (16) but it may be elsewhere. (17) In the application of the doctrine of lex loci delicti to multistate defamation the law of plaintiff's domicile has been selected as the governing law. (18) Also, where an action arising out of multistate defamation is brought by a corporation, the legal issues are generally governed by the law of the state where the corporation has its principal place of business, as long as that state is also one of the states where the allegedly defamatory statement was published. (19)

    The law of the place having the most significant relationship with the issue involved governs the matter of privilege in connection with defamation. (20)


    § 6. Elements of Liability for Defamation

    a. In general
    b. Injury to reputation

    a. In General

    In order to create liability for defamation, there must be an unpriviieged publication of false and defamatory matter about another.
    Library References

    Libel and Slander 1.

    The elements of a cause of action for defamation, whether libel or slander, variously stated, are a false and defamatory statement concerning plaintiff, an unprivileged publication to a third party, generally with fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the person making the statement, and either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. (21) The particular elements of defamation will be discussed in greater detail infra § 6 et seq.

    While each state may define for itself the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual, (22) liability cannot be

    Republication

    New York law should govern hardback publisher's and author's liability for allegedly libelous republication, in that New York, as a national center of publishing industry, had a significant interest in assuring that risks and liabilities flowing from publishing and related movie options contracts, negotiated and largely performed in New York, would be uniform.

    U.S. – Davis v. Costa–Gavras, D.C.N.Y., 580 F.Supp. 1082.

    (16) U.S. – Prager v. American Broadcasting Cos., D.C.N.J., 569 F.Supp. 1229, affirmed 734 P.2d 7 (telecast)–Fitzpatrick v. Milky Way Productions, Inc., D.C.Pa., 537 F.Supp. 165.

    (17) Local contacts

    D.C. – Dowd v. Calabrese, D.C., 589 F.Supp. 1206.

    (18) U.S. – Miller v. Lear Siegler, Inc., D.C.Kan., 525 F.Supp. 46 (formulation of libeling document done elsewhere).

    (19) U.S. – Bio/Basics Intern. Corp. v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., D.C.N.Y., 545 F.Supp. 1106.

    (20) U.S. – Yip v. Pagano, D.C.N.J., 606 F.Supp. 1566, affirmed 782 F.2d 1033 and Appeal of Yip, 782 F.2d 1033, certiorari denied 106 SC:. 2248, 90 L.Ed.2d 694 (legislative witness immunity).

    Broadcast

    Even though defendant broadcasting company executive and broadcasting company were residents of New York and news report was broadcast nationwide from Washington, D.C., California law applied to cause of action alleging defamation of plaintiff broadcasting company executive, where plaintiff executive was a resident of California when this occurred and report centered on investigations of activities which took place in California.

    U.S. – Reeves v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., D.C.N.Y., 580 F.Supp. 84, affirmed 719 F.2d 602.

    (21) U.S. – Ganzalez v. Avon Products, Inc., D.C.DeI., 609 F.Supp. 1555–Dion v. Kiev, D.C.Pa.. 566 F.Supp. 1387–Williams v. Burns, D.C.Colo., 540 F.Supp. 1243.

    D.C. – Harrison v. Washington Post Co., App., 391 A.2d 781.

    Fla. – Hay v. Independent Newspapers, Inc., App. 2 Dist., 450 So.2d 293.

    Hawaii – Beaintr v. Nishiki, 670 P.2d 1264, 66 Haw. 572.

    Kan. – Luttrell v. United Telephone System, Inc., 683 P.2d 1292, 9 Kan. App.2d 620, affirmed 695 P.2d 1279, 236 Kan. 710.

    Ky. – Columbia Sussex Corp., Inc. v. Hay, App., 627 S.W.2d 270.

    La. – Wiggins v. Creary, App. 1 Cir., 475 So.2d 780, writ denied 478 So. 2d 910.

    Md. – Mareck v. Johns Hopkins University, 482 A.2d 17, 60 Md.App. 217, certiorari denied 487 A.2d 292, 302 Md. 288.

    Minn. – Woody v. Krueger, App., 374 N.W.2d 822.

    Mo. – Tucker v. Delmar Cleaners, Inc., App., 637 S.W.2d 222.

    Mont. – Madison v. Yunker, 589 P.2d 126. 180 Mont. 54.

    Ohio – Hersch v. E. W. Scripps Co., 445 N.E.2d 670, 3 Ohio App.3d 367, 3 O.B.R. 430.

    Pa. – Berg v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 421 A.2d 831, 280 Pa. Super. 495.

    S.C. – Capps v. Watts, 246 S.E.2d 606, 271 S.C. 276.

    Tex. – Holly v. Cannady, App. 5 Dist., 669 S.W.2d 381.

    Vt. – Lent v. Huntoon, 470 A.2d 1162, 143 Vt. 539.

    Wash. – Carusa v. Local Union No. 690, Intern. Broth, of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 670 P.2d 240, 100 Wash.2d 543, appeal after remand 730 P.2d 1299, 107 Wash.2d 524, petition for certiorari filed.

    W.Va. – Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 10.

    Wis. – Stoll v. Adriansen, App., 362 N.W.2d 182, 122 Wis.2d 503, review denied 367 N.W.2d 222, 122 Wis.2d 782.

    (22) U.S. – Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., Ill., 94 S.Ct. 2997, 418 U.S. 323, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, appeal after remand 680 F.2d 527, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1233, 459 U.S. 1226, 73 L.Ed.2d 467.
    Levine v. CMP Publications, Inc., C.A.Tex., 738 F.2d 660, rehearing denied 753 F.2d 1341.
    Yerkie v. Post–Newsweek Stations, Michigan, Inc., D.C.Md., 470 F.Supp. 91.

    34


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 6

    imposed without fault, (23) varying with the character of the person defamed, as a public official or figure, or as a private person. (24) However, some authority may be viewed as suggesting that this rule would not necessarily apply to statements of exclusively private concern regarding a private figure, (25) or to statements made by persons other than the media. (26) Some authorities explicitly hold that the rule does not apply to statements by persons other than the media regarding private figures and of private concern. (27) The standard or degree of fault required in a defamation action generally is discussed infra §§ 44–47.

    b. Injury to Reputation

    To recover in an action for defamation, plaintiff ordinarily must show injury to reputation.

    Library References

    Libel and Slander 31, 32, 61.
    Since the foundation of an action for defamation is injury to one's reputation, as discussed supra § 5, plaintiff to recover in a defamation action must show injury to reputation, unless there is defamation per se. (28)

    Libel–proof doctrine.

    Plaintiff who has established a bad reputation, and who consequently cannot show injury to reputation is libel–proof, and thus cannot maintain an action for defamation. (29) However, a person may not be considered libel–proof simply because he has been plaintiff in several other defamation cases, (30) or his reputation has been severely af–

    Cal. – Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 160 Cal. Rptr. 97, 603 P.26 14, 25 C,3d 763, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 242. 449 U.S. 886, 66 L.Ed.2d 113.

    D.C. – Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., App., 424 A.2d 78, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 2327, 451 U.S. 989, 68 L.Ed.2d 848.

    Mo. – Anton v. St. Louis Suburban Newspapers, Inc., App., 598 S.W.2d 493.

    Vt. – Colombo v. Times–Argus Ass n, Inc., 380 A.2d 80, 135 Vt. 454. Wyo. – Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Cc., 555 P.2d 556.

    (23) U.S. – Time, Inc. v. Firestone, Fla., 96 S.Ct. 958, 424 U.S. 448, 47 L.Ed.2d 154, on remand 332 So.2d 68–Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., Ill., 94 S.Ct. 2997, 418 U.S. 323, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, appeal after remand 680 F.2d 527. certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1233, 459 U.S. 1226, 75 L.Ed.2d 467.

    Zerpol Corp. v. DMF Corp., D.C.Pa., 561 F.Supp. 404.

    Cal. – Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 160 Cal. Rptr. 97, 603 P.2d 14, 25 C.3d 763, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 242, 4.49 U.S. 886, 66 Llld.2d 113.

    D.C. – Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 2327, 451 U.S. 989, 68 L.Ed.2d 848.

    Fla. – Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Ane, App. 3 Dist., 423 So.2d 376, approved 458 So.2d 239.

    Ill. – Reed v. Northwestern Pub. Co., 4 Dist., 471 N.E.2d 1071, 84 Ill. Dec. 305, 129 Ill.App.3d 133.

    La. – Melon v. Capital City Press., App., 407 So.2d 85, writ denied 409 So.2d 656.

    Mass. – New England Tractor–Trailer Training of Connecticut, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Cc., 480 N.E.2d 1005, 395 Mass. 471.

    N.Y. – Ortiz v. Valdescastilla, 1 Dept., 478 N.Y.S.2d 895, 102 A.D.2d 513.

    Pa.. – Chicarella v. Passant, 494 A.2d 1109, 343 Pa.Super. 330.

    R.I. – DeCarvalho v. daSilva, 414 A.2d 806.

    Tex. – Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc. v. Buck, App. 14 Dist., 678 S.W.2d 612, error refused no reversible error, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 2704, 472 U.s. 1009, 86 L.Ed.2d 720.

    Vt. – Colombo v. Times–Argus Assn, Inc., 380 A.2d 80, 135 Vt. 454.

    (24) Mich. – Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc.. 325 N.W.2d 511, 118 Mich.App. 608.

    (25) U.S. – Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, Pa., 106 S.Ct. 1558, 475 U.S. 767, 89 L.Ed.2d 783.

    (26) U.S. – Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, Pa., 106 S.Ct. 1558, 475 U.S. 767, 89 L.Ed.2d 783.

    (27) Iowa – Vinson v. Linn–Mar Community School Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108.

    Or. – Harley–Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 219 Or. 361.

    Vt. – Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 461 A.2d 414, 143 Vt. 66, affirmed Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 Set. 2939, 472 U.S. 749, 86 L.Ed.2d 593.

    Wis. – Denny v. Mertz, 318 N.W.2d 141, 106 Wis.2d 636, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 179, 459 U.S. 883. 74 L.Ed.2d 147.

    Presumption of damages in case of defamatory statements against private persons by nonmedia defendant see infra § 198.

    (28) U.S. – Korkala v. W.W. Norton & Co., D.C.N.Y., 618 F.Supp. 152.

    D.C. – Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., Inc.. D.C., 518 F.Supp. 1285. Kan. – Gobin v. Globe Pub. Co., 649 P.2d 1239, 232 Kan. 1.

    N.Y. – Wilson v. Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2 Dept., 490 N.Y.S.2d 553, 111 A.D.2d 807, dismissal denied 488 N.E.2d 133, 66 N.Y.2d 760, 497 N.Y.S.2d 1031, affirmed 489 N.E.2d 1297, 66 N.Y.2d 988, 499 N.Y.S.2d 395.

    S.C. – Capps v. Watts, 246 S.E.2d 606, 271 S.C. 276.

    Libel per se see infra § 17.

    Slander per se see infra § 18.

    General or special damages see infra § 189.

    Labor relations dispute

    U.S. – Lion v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, Mich., 86 S.Ct. 657, 383 U.S. 53, 15 L.Ed.2d 582.

    (29) U.S. – Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., C.A.N.Y., 518 F.2d 638. Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc.. D.C.Cal., 564 F.Supp. 924– Ray v. Time, Inc., D.C.Tenn., 452 F.Supp. 618, affirmed 582 F.2d 1280.

    D.C. – Logan v. District of Columbia, D.C., 447 F.Supp. 1328.

    Mass. – Jackson v. Longcope. 476 N.E.2d 617, 394 Mass. 577. Doctrine limited and narrow

    U.S. – Buckley v. Littell, C.A.N.Y., 539 F.2d 882, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 785, 429 U.S. 1062, 50 L.Ed.2d 777 and 97 S.Ct. 786, 429 U.S. 1062, SO L.Ed.2d 777.

    (30) Mass. – Lyons v. New Mass Media, Inc., 453 N.E.2d 451, 390 Mass. 51.

    35


    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 6 53 C.J.S.

    fected by unchallenged facts and events. (31)

    § 7. Criminal Responsibility

    Libel may constitute a criminal offense either at common law or under statute, but slander is not an offense at common law. The validity of common–law criminal libel and statutory variations thereof has been denied where truthful criticism of public officials or figures is involved.

    Research Note


    Breach of the peace arising out of the use of abusive and
    insulting language is discussed in C.J.S. Breach of the Peace.

    Library References

    Libel and Slander 141, 142, 150, 152–162.

    Libel may constitute a criminal offense either at common law (32) or under a particular statute. (33) While slander is not a crime at common law, (34) under some constitutional and statutory provisions, it is made an offense. (35)

    In view of the fact that criminal defamation statutes, where criticism of public officials is concerned, do not serve interests distinct from those secured by civil defamation laws, they are subject to the same constitutional limitations. (3) In view of, or outside of, such limitations, the courts have invalidated statutes, when applied to public officials or public figures, that are vague or overbroad, (37) as where the common–law definition of what is defamatory or scandalous is relied on. (38)

    Also, other statutes have been declared invalid in context of criticism of official conduct of public officials in that they direct punishment for true statements made with actual malice (39) or for false statements against public officials if made with ill will without regard to whether they were made with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of whether they are true or false, or if not made in reasonable belief of their truth, (40) or which make truth a conditional rather than an absolute defense in such cases. (41) Furthermore, it has been held that the elements of the common–law crime are so indefinite and uncertain that they should not be enforced where no case has redefined the crime in understandable terms. (42)

    However, a statute which defines criminal libel in terms of a tendency to provoke a breach of the peace is not unconstitutionally vague where it can be construed to refer only to fighting words which tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. (43) Furthermore, a statute making truth a defense when an alleged defamation is published with good motives and for justifiable ends can be constitutionally applied to a prosecution involving defamation by a private person or an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure; truth as an absolute defense is not constitu–

    (31) Military leader
    While reputation of former Minister of Defense of State of Israel as a military and political leader was severely affected by unchallenged facts and events reported in magazine article describing findings and recommendations of commission appointed by Israel to investigate murders of Palestinian refugees, his reputation could not be said as a matter of law to have been so damaged by the reported events that he was "libel proof."

    U.S. – Sharon v. Time, Inc., D.C.N.Y., 575 F.Supp. 1162.

    (32) U.S. – Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, III., 72 S.Ct. 725, 343 U.S. 250, 96 L.Ed. 919, rehearing denied 72 S.Ct. 1070. 343 U.S. 988, 96 L.Ed. 1375.

    Ky. – Cole v. Commonwealth, 300 SW. 907, 222 Ky. 350.

    Mass. – Commonwealth v. Szliakys, 150 N.E. 190, 254 Mass. 424.

    (33) U.S. – Francis v. People of Virgin Islands, C.C.A.Virgin Islands, 11 F.2d 860, certiorari denied Francis v. Williams, 47 S.Ct. 91, 273 U.S. 693, 71 L.Ed. 843.

    Ariz. – Wahl v. State, 3 P.2d 1052, 39 Ariz. 62.

    Colo. – Leighton v. People, 6 P.2d 929, 90 Cola. 106.

    N.Y. – People v. Edmondson, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 168 Misc. 142.

    Or. – State v. Pierce. 12 P.2d 320, 140 Or. 1.

    Pa. – Commonwealth v. Shipherd, 41 A.2d 429, 157 Pa.Super. 27.

    Tex. – Allen v. State, Cr., 189 S.W.2d 753, 148 Tex.Cr.R. 611.

    (34) N.J. – State v. Klapprott, 22 A.2d 877, 127 N.J.L. 395.

    (35) Cal. – People v. Faber, 77 P.2d 921, 29 C.A.2d Supp. 751.

    Wis. – Branigan v. State, 244 N.W. 761, 209 Wis. 249.

    (36) U.S. – Herbert v. Lando, N.Y., 99 S.Ct. 1635, 441 U.S. 153, 60 L.Ed.2d 115–Garrison v. State of Louisiana, La., 85 S.Ct. 209, 379 U.S. 64, 13 L.Ed.2d 125.

    Ill. – People v. Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d 966, 83 Ill.Dec. 546, 104 Ill.2d 137, appeal dismissed Heinrich v. Illinois, 103 S.Ct. 2010, 471 U.S. 1011, 85 L.Ed.2d 294.

    (37) Ga. – Williamson v. State, 295 S.E.2d 305, 249 Ga. 851 (inclusion of words "tends to provoke a breach of peace").

    (38) Alaska – Gottschalk v. State, 515 P.2d 289.

    (39) U.S. – Garrison v. State of Louisiana, La., 85 Set. 209, 379 U.S. 64, 13 L.Ed.2d 125.

    Ark. – Weston v. State, 528 S.W.2d 412, 238 Ark. 707. La. – State v. Defley, 395 So.2d 759 (deceased officials).

    (40) U.S. – Garrison v. State of Louisiana, La., 85 S.Ct. 209, 379 U.S. 64, 13 L.Ed.2d 125.

    Ark. – Weston v. State, 528 S.W.2d 412, 258 Ark. 707.

    (41) U.S. – Garrison v. State of Louisiana, La., 85 SO. 209, .379 U.S. 64, 13 L.Ed.2d 125.

    Alaska – Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289.

    (42) U.S. – Ashton v. Kentucky, Ky., 86 S.Ct. 1407, 384 U.S. 195, 16 L.Ed.2d 469.

    (43) Ill. – People v. Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d 966, 83 Ill.Dec. 346, 104 Ill.2d 137, appeal dismissed Heinrich v. Illinois, 105 S.Ct. 2010, 471 U.S. 1011, 85 L.Ed.2d 294.

    36


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 8

    tionally required. (44)
    A "false rumors" statute, which proscribes the intentional disparagement of the reputation or character of another by a false communication, has been held not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. (45)

    Slander of title.

    The validity of statute defining the offense of criminal slander of title has been upheld. (46)

    § 8. – Elements of Offense

    a. In general
    b. Nature of imputation; construction of language
    c. Malice and intent

    a. In General

    Ordinarily, the basis for criminal libel is its injurious effect on the public or its tendency to provoke a breach of the public peace.

    Library References

    Libel and Slander 141, 146, 147.

    Ordinarily, the basis of criminal liability for libel at common law or under the statute is its injurious effect on the public or its tendency to provoke a breach of the public peace, (47) and not the injury to the reputation of the person Iibeled. (48) Under some statutes, the tendency of the defamatory matter to injure the defamed party generally, (49) or in his business or occupation, (50) or to provoke him to wrath, (51) will provide a basis for criminal prosecution. Other factors have been made essential elements of the offense, such as that the statements be false, (52) or false and scandalous, (53) or that the statements be maliciously made, as discussed infra subdivision c of this section.

    Criminal slander statutes have also made the falsity of the defamatory statement an element of the offense. (54)

    Publication.

    As a general rule, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, (55) a communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed is a sufficient publication to constitute a criminal offense. (56) Under some statutes, it is not necessary that there should be a publication to some third person, it being sufficient if accused knowingly parted with the immediate custody of the libel under circumstances which exposed it to be read or seen by any other person than himself. (57)

    b. Nature of Imputation; Construction of Language

    A criminal prosecution for libel may be based on an imputation which tends to disgrace and degrade the person libeled, or to hold him up to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided.

    Library References

    Libel and Slander 144, 145.

    In order to constitute a criminal libel, it has generally been held sufficient if the defamatory words are of such nature that they tend to disgrace and degrade the person libeled, or hold him up to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or

    (44) Ill. – People v. Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d 966, 83 Ill.Dec. 546, 104 III.2d 137, appeal dismissed Heinrich v. Illinois, 105 Set. 2010, 471 U.S. 1011, 85 L.Ed.2d 294.

    (45) Okl. – Pegg v. State. Cr., 659 P.2d 370.

    (46) Wis. – State v. Minniecheske, App., 347 N.W.2d 610, 118 Wis.2d 357.

    Slander of title, injurious falsehood or product disparagement generally see infra § 204 et seq.

    (47) U.S. – Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, III., 72 S.Ct. 725, 343 U.S. 250, 96 L.Ed. 919, rehearing denied 72 S.Ct. 1070, 343 U.S. 988, 96 L.Ed. 1375.

    Conn. – State v. Gardner, 151 A. 349, 112 Conn. 121.

    Fla. – Annenberg v. Coleman, 163 So. 405, 121 FIa. 133.

    Mass. – Commonwealth v. Szliakys, 150 N.E. 190, 254 Mass. 424.

    Wyo. – State v. Levand, 262 P. 24, 37 Wyo. 372, rehearing denied 263 P. 623, 37 Wyo. 372.

    (48) Conn. – State v. Gardner, 151 A. 349, 112 Conn. 121.

    (49) Ariz. – Gardner v. State, 139 P. 474, 15 Ariz. 403.

    (50) N.Y. – people v. Edmondson, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 168 Misc. 142.

    (51) Iowa – Fey v. King, 190 N.W. 519, 194 Iowa 835.

    (52) Cal. – People v. Calkins, 47 P.2d 544, 8 C.A.2d 251.

    Ind. – Cummins v. State, 166 N.E. 155, 89 Ind.App. 256.

    Ky. – Cole v. Commonwealth, 300 SW. 907, 222 Ky. 350.

    Mass. – Commonwealth v. Szliakys, 150 N.E. 190, 254 Mass. 424.

    Okl. – Pegg v. State, Cr., 659 P.2d 370–Tucker v. State, 275 P. 382, 42 Okl.Cr. 204.

    (53) Or. – State v. Pierce, 12 P.2d 320, 140 Or. 1.

    (54) Mo. – State v. Hartley, 263 S.W. 95, 304 Mo. 58.

    Wis. – Branigan v. State, 244 N.W. 767, 209 Wis. 249.

    (55) Wis. – Branigan v. State, 244 N.W. 767, 209 Wis. 249–Hyde v. State, 150 N.W. 965. 159 Wis. 651.

    (56) Tex. – Mankins v. State, 57 SW. 950, 41 Tex.Cr. 662.

    Absence of intent to provoke breach of peace

    Where no intent to provoke breach of peace is charged, publication of the defamatory words to third persons is essential element of the offense.

    Colo. – Leighton v. People, 6 P.2d 929, 90 Cob. 106.

    S.C. – State v. Syphrett, 2 SE. 624, 27 S.C. 29.

    (57) Ariz. – Gardner v. State, 139 P. 474, 15 Ariz. 403.

    Cal. – People v. Miller, 54 p. 523, 122 Cal. 84.

    37


    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 8 53 C.J.S.

    cause that person to be shunned or avoided. (48)
    Although it is not necessary that the imputation should amount to a charge of crime (59) imputations of crime may be sufficient to warrant an indictment or information for criminal libel. (60)

    In slanderous form.

    Some statutes are directed against oral imputations generally which injure a person's reputation or which expose him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule. (61)

    Construction of language; certainty and positiveness of charge.

    In determining whether criminal libel has been committed, the publication must be construed as a whole, (62) and the words are to be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning, (63) as they would naturally be understood by persons reading or hearing them, (64) unless it affirmatively appears that they were used and understood in some other sense (65) It is not necessary, in order to render words defamatory and indictable, that they shall make a defamatory charge in direct terms. (66)

    It is not necessary that the person defamed should be mentioned by name, if the words used in describing the person meant can be shown to have referred to him, and were so understood by others. (67)


    c. Malice and Intent

    Generally, malice and intent to injure are essential elements of the offense.

    Library References

    Libel and Slander 143.
    As a general rule, malice in the sense of hatred or ill–will (68) and intent to injure (69) are essential elements of the offense of criminal libel. Malice may be inferred or implied. (70)

    Generally, where a communication is qualifiedly privileged, malice is a necessary element. (71)

    § 9. – Defenses
    a. In general
    b. Privilege

    a. In General

    in a criminal prosecution for defamation, the accused may avail himself of any legal excuse or justification as a defense, including truth.

    Library References

    Libel and Slander 149.

    In defense to a criminal prosecution for defamation, accused may avail himself of any legal excuse or justification. (72) Under some statutes, an honest mistake is a good defense, but immunity from criminal liability, under such a statute, exists only where the publication is honestly

    (58) Ind.. – Cummins v. State, 166 N.E. 155, 89 lnd.App. 256.

    Ky. – Cole v. Commonwealth, 300 S.W. 907, 222 Ky. 350.

    N.Y. – People v. Edmondson, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 168 Misc. 142.

    Okl. – Tucker v. State, 275 P. 382, 42 Okl.Cr. 204.

    Wyo. – State v. Levand, 262 P. 24, 37 Wyo. 372, rehearing denied 263 P. 623, 37 Wyo. 372.

    (59) Ill. – People v. Spielman, 149 N.E. 466, 318 Ill. 482.

    N.Y. – People v. Viu Kui Chu, 7 N.E.2d 96, 273 N.Y. 191.

    Okl. – Tucker v. State, 275 P. 382, 42 Okl.Cr. 204.

    (60) Ariz. – Wahl v. State, 3 P.2d 1052, 39 Ariz. 62.

    Ill. – People v. Spielman, 149 N.E. 466, 318 Ill. 482.

    Ky. – Cole v. Commonwealth, 300 SW. 907, 222 Ky. 350.

    Mass. – Commonwealth v. Canter, 168 N.E. 790, 269 Mass. 359.

    (61) Cal. – People v. Faber, 77 P.2d 921, 29 C.A.2d Supp. 751.

    Wis. – State v. Mueller, 243 N.W. 478, 208 Wis. 543.

    (62) La. – State v. Lambert, 178 So. 508, 188 La. 968.

    Mont. – State v. Winterrowd, 249 P. 664, 77 Mont. 74.

    N.Y. – People v. Vin Ku Chu, 7 N.E.2d 96, 273 N.Y. 191.

    Tex. – Allen v. State, Cr., 189 S.W.2d 753, 148 Tex.Cr.R. 611.

    (63) Wis. – State v. Mueller, 243 N.W. 478, 208 Wis. 543.

    (64) Idaho – State v. Sheridan, 93 P. 656, 14 Idaho 222.

    Ill. – People v. Fuller, 87 N.E. 336, 238 III. 116.

    (65) Idaho – State v. Sheridan, 93 P. 656, 14 Idaho 222.

    (66) Mo. – State v. Pardo, App., 180 S.W. 578, affirmed Sup., 190 SW. 264.

    Tex. – Alsup v. State, 238 S.W. 667, 91 Tex.Cr.R. 224.

    (67) Ky. – Cole v. Commonwealth, 300 SW. 907, 222 Ky. 350.

    Mo. – State v. Pardo, 190 S.W. 264.

    (68) Ala. – Krasner v. State, 26 So.2d 526, 248 Ala. 12.

    Cal. – People v. Faber, 77 P.2d 921, 29 C.A.2C1 Supp. 751.

    FIa. – State ex rel. Arnold v. Chase, 114 So. 856, 94 FIa. 1071.

    Ind. – Cummins v. State, 166 N.E. 155, 89 Ind.App. 256.

    Mass. – Commonwealth v. Szliakys, 150 N.E. 190, 254 Mass. 424.

    Mo. – State v. Bartley, 263 S.W. 95, 304 Mo. 58.

    N.Y. – People v. Edmondson, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 168 Misc. 142.

    Okl. – Tucker v. State, 275 P. 382, 42 Okl.Cr. 204.

    Wash. – State v. Wilson, 241 P. 970, 137 Wash. 125.

    Wis. – Branigan v. State, 244 N.W. 767, 209 Wis. 249.

    (69) Cal. – People v. Faber, 77 P.2d 921, 29 C.A.2d Supp. 751.

    (70) Pa. – Commonwealth v. Foley, 140 A. 50, 292 Pa. 277.

    Wash. – State v. Wilson, 241 P. 970, 137 Wash. 125.

    (71) FIa. – State ex rel. Arnold v. Chase, 114 So. 856, 94 Fla. 1071.

    (72) N.J. – State v. Dedge, 127 A. 539, 101 N.J.L. 131, 16 Gummere 131.

    38


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 9

    made in the belief of its truth and on reasonable grounds for its belief after the exercise of such means to verify its truth as would be employed by a man of ordinary prudence under similar circumstances. (73)

    Under other statutes, accused may show in his defense that the defamation was made without malice or negligence. (74)

    Truth.

    By force of constitutional or statutory provision, the truth of the publication may be a complete defense, (75) and the truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable ends, may constitute a complete defense. (76) The truth has also been held to be a defense where a privileged communication is involved. (77) Where the truth is urged in defense, such justification is required to be as broad as the charge. (78)

    However, at common law, the truth of a libel may not be shown as a defense in a criminal prosecution. (79)

    b. Privilege

    The accused in a criminal prosecution for defamation may avail himself of the defense of privilege. A communication made in good faith on a subject in which the person communicating has an interest or with respect to which he has a duty, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, is qualifiedly privileged.

    Library References

    Libel and Slander 148.

    The fact that the communication complained of was published on a privileged occasion may be set up as a defense to a criminal prosecution. (80) However, actual or express malice, in the sense of hatred or ill–will, may destroy the privilege, (81) and if the statute defines "privileged communications," the communication must come within the statutory definition in order to set up the plea of privilege. (82)

    Absolute privilege.

    With respect to criminal prosecutions for defamation, a communication which is absolutely privileged is one for which no remedy is available because of the occasion on which it is made. (83) The instances of absolute privilege have been stated to be practically limited to legislative and judicial proceedings and other acts of state. (84)

    Qualified privilege.

    Communications made bona fide on subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest or with respect to which he has a duty, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, are qualifiedly privileged. (85) The duty need not be strictly legal, but it may be one of doubtful or imperfect obligation. (86) Although the occasion may be qualifiedly privileged, accused may be criminally liable if the communication goes beyond what the exigencies of the privileged occasion require. (87)

    Under the construction given some statutes,

    (73) Tex. – Yecker v. State, 152 S.W.2d 355. 142 Tex.Cr.R. 358.

    (74) Pa. – Commonwealth v. Wilhelm, 90 Pa.Super. 473. affirmed 141 A. 52, 292 Pa. 283.

    (75) Ala. – Krasner v. State, 26 So.2d 526, 248 Ala. 12. Colo. – Leighton v. People, 6 P.2d 929, 90 Colo. 106.

    (76) U.S. – Beauharnajs v. People of State of Illinois, III., 72 Set. 725, 343 U.S. 250, 96 L.Ed. 919, rehearing denied 72 S.Ct. 1070, 343 U.S. 988, 96 L.Ed. 1375.

    Ill. – People v. Heinrich. 470 N.E.2d 966, 83 Ill.Dec. 546, 104 Ill.2d 137, appeal dismissed Heinrich v. Illinois, 105 S.Ct. 2010, 471 U.S. 1011, 85 L.Ed.2d 294.

    Iowa – McCuddin v. Dickinson, 300 N.W. 308, 230 Iowa 1141.

    Mont. – State v. Winterrowd, 249 P. 664, 77 Mont. 74.

    N.J. – State v. Dedge, 127 A. 539, 101 N.J.L. 131, 16 Gummere 131.

    Okl. – Thomas v. State, 244 P. 1116, 34 Okl.Cr. 63.

    (77) Okl. – Thomas v. State, 244 P. 1116, 34 Okl.Cr. 63.

    (78) N.Y. – People v. Yiu Kui Chu, 7 N.E.2d 96, 273 N.Y. 191.

    (79) U.S. – Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, Ga., 95 S.Ct. 1029, 420 U.S. 469, 43 L.Ed.2d 328, on remand 214 S.E.2d 530, 234 Ga. 67– Garrison v. State of Louisiana, La., 85 S.Ct. 209. 379 U.S. 64, 13 L.Ed2d 125–Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, Ill., 72 S.Ct. 725, 343 U.S. 250, 96 L.Ed. 919, rehearing denied 72 S.Ct. 1070, 343 U.S. 988, 96 L.Ed. 1375.

    Colo. – Leighton v. People, 6 P.2d 929, 90 Colo. 106.

    Iowa – McCuddin v. Dickinson, 300 NW. 308, 230 Iowa 1141.

    N.J. – State v. Dedge, 127 A. 539, 101 N.J.L. 131, 16 Gummere 131.

    (80) La. – State v. Lambert, 178 So. 508, 188 La. 968.

    N.J. – State v. Dedge, 127 A. 539, 101 N.J.L. 131, 16 Gummere 131.

    N.C. – People v. Stokes, 24 N.Y.S. 727, 30 Abb.N.C. 200.

    Wash. – State v. Wilson, 241 P. 970, 137 Wash. 125.

    (81) Cal. – People v. Faber. 77 P.2d 921, 29 C.A.2d Supp. 751.

    La. – State v. Lambert, 178 So. 508, 188 La. 968.

    (82) Cal. – People v. Lusinchi, 142 P. 113, 24 Cal.App. 623.

    (83) Ark. – Baker v. State, 137 S.W.2d 938, 199 Ark. 1005, certiorari denied Baker v. Arkansas, 61 S.Ct. 25, 311 U.S. 666, 85 L.Ed. 428.

    (84) Ark. – Baker v. State, 137 S.W.2d 938, 99 Ark. 1005, certiorari denied Baker v. Arkansas. 61 S.Ct. 25, 311 U.S. 666, 85 L.Ed. 428.

    (85) Ariz. – Ross v. State, 96 P.2d 285, 54 Ariz. 396.

    La. – State v. Lambert, 178 So. 508, 188 La. 968.

    Wis. – Branigart v. State, 244 NW. 767, 209 Wit. 249.

    (86) Ariz. – Rota v. State, 96 P.2d 285, 54 Ariz. 396.

    Tex. – Hix v. State, Cr., 20 SW. 550.

    (87) Fla. – State ex rel. Arnold s. Chase, 114 So. 856, 94 P18. 1071.

    39


    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 9 53 C.J.S.

    moreover, a false communication cannot be qualifiedly privileged. (88) On the other hand, where express malice is not shown, a communication has been held to be qualifiedly privileged without regard to its truth or falsity. (89)

    The publication of a report of a judicial proceeding may be conditionally privileged. (90) The publication of the contents of public records is also privileged. (91)

    II. DEFAMATORY OR ACTIONABLE CHARACTER OF WORDS OR CONDUCT

    A. IN GENERAL


    § 10. General Considerations

    A publication must be defamatory or reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning in order to support an action for defamation.

    Research Note

    Construction of language is discussed infra § 13.

    Library References

    Libel and Slander 1, 6, 6(1), 15.

    A statement must be defamatory in its nature in order to support an action for defamation. (92) If it is not defamatory or actionable, falsehood and malice cannot make it so, (93) nor can it be made so by an innuendo which puts an unfair and forced construction on the interpretation thereof (94) Hence, in a defamation action, the threshold issue is whether the words complained of are defamatory or reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning, (95) and the determination of such issue depends on the general tendency of the words to have such an effect, and no demonstration of any actual harm to reputation is necessary. (96)

    (88) Cal. – People v. Faber, 77 P.2d 921, 29 C.A.2d Supp. 75!.

    (89) La. – State v. Lambert, 178 So. 508, 188 La. 968.

    (90) Wash. – State v. Sefrit, 144 P. 725, 82 Wash. 520.

    (91) Wash. – State v. Darwin. 115 P. 309, 63 Wash. 303.

    (92) U.S. – Hallmark Builders, Inc. v. Gaylord Broadcasting Co., C.A. Fla., 733 F.2d 1461.
    Ritzmann v. Weekly World News, Inc., D.C.Tex., 614 F.Supp. 1336.

    Del. – Gordon v. News–Journal Co., 176 A. 657, 6 W.W.Harr 396, 36 Del. 396.

    D.C. – American Postal Workers Union, AFL–CIO v. U.S. Postal Service, D.C., 598 F.Supp. 564.

    Ga. – Kaplan v. Edmondson, 22 S.E.2d 343, 68 Ga.App. 151.

    Ill. – Audition Div. Ltd. v. Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan Chicago, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 115, 75 Ill.Dec. 947, 120 Ill.App.3d 254 (critical words not necessarily actionable).

    Ky. – Sweeney & Co. v. Brown, 60 S.W.2d 381, 249 Ky. 116. La. – Brown v. Red River Parish School Bd., App. 2 Cir., 469 So.2d 1110. appeal after remand 488 So.2d 1132.

    Md. – Hearst Corp. v. Hughes, 466 A.2d 486, 297 Md. 112.

    Mass. – Albano v. Ide. 363 N.E.2d 283, 5 Mass.App. 830.

    Minn. – Marudas v. Odegard, 10 N.W.2d 233, 215 Minn. 357. Neb. – Silence v. Journal Star Printing Co., 266 N.W.2d 533, 201 Neb. 159.

    N.Y. – Connelly v. McKay, 28 N.Y.S.2d 327, 176 Misc. 685.

    Tex. – Skillern v. Brookshire, Civ.App., 58 S.W.2d 544.

    Wis. – Voit v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., 341 N.W.2d 693, 116 Wis.2d
    217.

    Head of CIA task force

    Statement in magazine article that plaintiff Central Intelligence Agency officer had headed CIA task force involved with Chilean military brass who opposed leader of Chile was not defamatory.

    Md. – Phillips v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 472 A.2d 98, 58 Md.App. 30, certiorari denied 475 A.2d 1201, 300 Md. 89.

    (93) La. – Schaefer v. Lynch, 406 So.2d 185, concurring opinion 483 So.2d 607.

    Mass. – Colby Haberdashers v. Bradstreet Co., 166 N.E. 550, 267 Mass.
    166.

    Minn. – Marudas v. Odegard, 10 N.W.2d 233, 215 Minn. 357.

    Falsity see infra § 43,

    Malice see infra § 44,

    (94) Ala. – Harris v. School Annual Pub. Co., 466 So.2d 963 (cartoon of teacher in place of yearbook photograph).

    Fla. – Byrd v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., App.4 Dist., 433 So.2d 593, petition for review denied 443 So.2d 979.

    N.Y. – Bytner v. Capital Newspaper, Div. of Hearst Corp., 3 Dept., 492 N.Y.S.2d 107, 112 A.D.2d 666, affirmed 492 N.E.2d 1228, 67 N.Y.2d 914. 501 N.Y.S.2d 812.

    Forced construction of language see infra § 14.

    Nude photograph

    U.S. – McCabe v. Village Voice, Inc., D.C.Pa., 550 F.Supp. 525.

    (95) La. – Bradford v. Murray, App. 4 Cit., 467 So.2d 1297, writ denied 469 So.2d 988.

    N.J. – Karnell v Campbell, 501 A.2d 1029, 206 N.J.Super. 81.

    Pa. – Agriss v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 483 A.2d 456, 334 Pa.Super. 295.

    S.C. – Capps v. Watts, 246 S.E.2d 606, 271 S.C. 276.

    Tex. – Musser v. Smith, App. 14 Dist., 690 S.W.2d 56, error granted, affirmed 723 S.W.2d 653.

    Wis. – Fields Foundation, Ltd. v. Christensen, 309 N.W.2d 125, 103 Wis.2d 465.

    (96) U.S. – Marcone v. Penthouse Intern. Magazine For Men, CAPs., 754 F.2d 1072, certiorarI denied 106 S Ct 182, 474 U.S. 864, 88 L.Ed. 2d 151, rehearing denied, 106 S.Ct 548, 88 L.Ed.2d 477.

    Pa. – Agriss v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 483 A.2d 456, 334 Pa.Super. 295.

    Injury to reputation see supra § 6.

    40


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 11

    Accurate statements do not become defamatory merely because they are included in a publication which is false in other respects, (97) and defamation may not be predicated upon a factual misstatement unless the content of the statement would warn a prudent person of its defamatory potential. (98) To paraphrase a derogatory statement made by another person is not defamatory unless defendant employed words conveying greater opprobrium than the original language used. (99)

    Overall impact.

    The overall impact of a television broadcast and a magazine article does not constitute a separate basis for a defamation action where the claimed defamatory impact of the publication is the same as the claimed defamatory implication conveyed by each of the individual statements. (1)

    § 11. Defamation per Se or per Quod

    a. In general
    b. Distinction between oral and written words

    a. In General

    In general, defamatory words may be divided into those that are defamatory or actionable per Se, which on their face and without the aid of extrinsic proof are recognized as injurious, and those that are defamatory or actionable per quod, as to which the injurious character appears only in consequence of extrinsic facts.

    Library References

    Libel and Slander 6(1).

    While the term "libelous per se" has been used interchangeably with the term "actionable per se," (2) in analyzing such cases it has been said that the two terms are not synonymous in the law of defamation. (3) "Actionable per se" simply means that a libelous publication, whether libelous on its face or by reason of extrinsic facts, is actionable without the pleading of special damage, (4) while "libelous per se" means that a publication is both libelous on its face and actionable on its face without the pleading of special damages. (5) Notwithstanding such statement, however, the terms "actionable per Se," "libelous per se," and "slanderous per se" have been often used interchangeably in this title.

    Defamatory words may be divided into those that are defamatory or actionable per se, and those that are defamatory or actionable per quod, (6) depending on the nature of the charge embodied in the words. (7) Defamatory words actionable per se are those which on their face and

    (97) U.S. – Bromhall v. Rorvik, D.C.Pa., 478 F.Supp. 361. Truth as justification see infra § 108.

    (98) Tex. – .Outlet Co. v. International Sec. Group, Inc., App. 4 Dist. 693 S.W.2d 621, error refused no reversible error, dismissed in part.

    (99) Ohio – Hersch v. E. W. Scripps Co., 445 N.E.2d 670, 3 Ohio App. 3d 367, 3 O.B.R. 430.
    (1) U.S. – Herbert v. Lando, C.A.2 (N.Y.), 781 F.2d 298, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 2916, 91 L.Ed.2d 545.

    (2) S.C. – Costas v. Florence Printing Co., 118 S.E.2d 696, 237 S.C. 655–Prickett v. Western Union Tel. Co., 132 S.E. 587, 134 S.C. 276.

    (3) S.C. – Capps v. Watts, 246 S.E.2d 606, 271 S.C. 276.

    (4) S.C. – Capps v. Watts, 246 S.E.2d 606, 271 S.C. 276.

    (5) S.C. – Capps v. Watts, 246 S.E.2d 606, 271 S.C. 276.

    (6) U.S. – Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp. (Baltimore News, Am. Division), C.A.Md., 538 F.2d 588. Wilder v. Johnson Pub. Co., Inc., D.C.Va., 551 F.Supp. 622.

    Ala. – White v. Birmingham Post Co., 172 So. 649, 233 Ala. 547.

    Cal. – Selleck v. Globe Intern., Inc., 2 Dist., 212 Cal.Rptr. 838, 166 C.A.3d 1123, review denied.

    Colo. – Knapp v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 144 P.2d 981, 111 Colo. 492.

    Fla. – Lundquist v. Alewine, App., 397 So.2d 1148.

    Ga. – Macon Telegraph Pub. Co. v. Elliott. 302 S.E.2d 692, 165 Ga. App. 719, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 2343, 466 U.S. 971, 80 L.Ed.2d 817.

    Kan. – Thompson v. Osawatomie Pub. Ca., 156 P.2d 506, 159 Kan. 562.

    Ky. – Smith v. Mustain, 276 SW. 154, 210 Ky. 445.

    La. – Lemeshewsky v. Dumaine, App. 4 Cir., 464 So.2d 973.

    Mo. – Eby v. Wilson, 289 S.W. 639, 315 Mo. 1214.

    N.C. – Cathy's Boutique, Inc. v. Winston–Salem Joint Venture, 325 S.E.2d 283, 72 N.C.App. 641.

    N.D. – Ellsworth v. Martindale–Hubbell Law Directory, 268 N.W. 400, 66 N.D. 578.

    S.C. – Norton v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 193 S.E. 126, 184 S.C. 525.

    Tex. – Braugh v. Enyart, App. 13 Dist., 658 S.W.2d 221, error refused no reversible error.

    Either/or
    A defamatory statement which is not defamatory per se is defamatory per quod.

    Ill. – Richardson v. Dunbar. 419 N.E.2d 1205. 50 Ill.Dec. 756, 95 III. App.3d 254.

    (7) Conn. – Ventresca v. Kissner, 136 A. 90, 108 Conn. 533.

    Mich. – Iacco v. Bohannon, 245 N.W.2d 791, 70 Mich.App. 463.

    Actionable character of imputations in:

    Libelous form generally see infra § 17.

    Slanderous form generally see infra § 18.

    Determination from face of publication

    Fla. – Perry v. Cosgrove, App. 2 Dist., 464 So.2d 664.

    Okl. – Sellers v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 687 P.2d 116.

    Truth or falsity irrelevant

    Iowa – Kelly v. Iowa State Educ. Ass'n, App., 372 N.W.2d 288.

    41


    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 11 53 C.J.S.

    without the aid of extrinsic proof are recognized as injurious. (8) On the other hand, if the injurious character of the words appears, not from their face in their usual and natural signification, but only in consequence of extrinsic facts showing the circumstances under which they were said or the damages which resulted to the defamed party therefrom, they are defamatory or actionable per quod. (9)

    Thus, words which are defamatory per se are defamatory without innuendo, colloquium or explanation, (10) while defamation per quod involves publications which are not obviously defamatory

    (8) U.S. – Quilici v. Second Amendment Foundation, C.A.7 (III.), 769 F.2d 414, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1192, 89 L.Ed.2d 307–Brewer v. Memphis Pub. Co., Inc., C.A.Miss., 626 F.2d 1238, rehearing denied 638 F.2d 247, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 3112, 452 U.S. 962, 69 L.Ed.2d 973–Sauerhott v. Hearst Corp. (Baltimore News Am. Division), C.A.Md., 538 F.2d 588.

    Burns v. Supermarkets General Corp., D.C.Pa., 615 F.Supp. 154– Professional Asset Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, N.A., D.C.Okl., 607 F.Supp. 1290.

    Ala. – White v. Birmingham Post Co., 172 So. 649, 233 Ala. 547.

    Colo. – Lind v. O'Reilly, App.. 636 P.2d 1319.

    Del. – Zanker v. Lackey, 128 A. 373, 2 W.W.Harr. 588, 32 Del. 588.

    Fla. – Hood v. Canners, App.. 419 So.2d 742.

    Ga. – Wright v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 313 S.E.2d 150, 169 Ga.App. 454.

    Ill. – American Pet Motels, Inc. v. Chicago Veterinary Medical Assn, 435 N.E.2d 1297, 62 Ill.Dec. 325, 106 Ill.App.3d 626.

    lowa – Vinson v. Linn–Mar Community School Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108.

    Kan. – Jerald v. Huston, 242 P. 472, 120 Kan. 3.

    Ky. – Columbia Sussex Corp., Inc. v. Hay, App., 627 S.W.2d 270.

    La. – Lemeshewsky v. Dumaine, App. 4 Cir., 464 So.2d 973.

    Mo. – Hagler v. Democrat–News, Inc., App., 699 S.W.2d 96.

    Mont. – Wainman v. Bowler, 576 P.2d 268, 176 Mont. 91.

    Neb. – Nelson v. Rosenberg, 280 N.W. 229, 135 Neb. 34.

    N.J. – Lawrence v. Bauer Pub. & Printing Ltd., 446 A.2d 469, 89 N.J. 451, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 358, 459 U.S. 999, 74 L.Ed.2d 395.

    N.M. – Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 648 P.2d 321, 98 N.M. 282, certiorari quashed 648 P.2d 794, 98 N.M. 336.

    N.Y. – Luisi v. JWT Group, Inc., 488 N.Y.S.2d 554, 128 Misc.2d 291.

    N.C. – Morris v. Bruney, 338 S.E.2d 561, 78 N.C.App. 668.

    N.D. – Ellsworth v. Martindale–Hubbell Law Directory, 268 N.W. 400, 66 N.D. 578.

    Okl. – Lindley v. Delman, 26 P.2d 751, 166 Old. 165. S.C. – Capps v. Watts, 246 S.E.2d 606, 271 S.C. 276. Tenn. – Sweeney v. Newspaper Printing Corporation, 147 S.W.2d 406, 177 Tenn. 196.

    Utah – Baum v. Gillman, 667 P.2d 41.

    Wis. – Denny v. Mertz, 267 N.W.2d 304, 84 Wis.2d 654, appeal after remand 302 N.W.2d 503, 100 Wis.2d 332, affirmed 318 N.W.2d 141, 106 Wis.2d 636, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 179, 459 U.S. 883, 74 L.Ed. 147.

    "Libel as a matter of law"

    (1) Term "libel as a matter of law" is to be used in situations where "libel per se" has been used in the past.

    Vt. – Lent v. Huntson, 470 A.2d 1162, 143 Vt. 539.

    (2) Phrase "libel per se" refers to statements that are defamatory as a matter of law; such term is not used to distinguish libel per se that is actionable without proof or special damages from libel "per quad' that is not.

    Minn. – Advanced Training Systems, Inc. v. Caswell Equipment Co., Inc., 352 N.W.2d I.

    "Libel per quod" not recognized
    Libel, whether defamatory on the face of the writing alone or with the aid of extrinsic evidence, is actionable per se; "libel per quad" is not recognized.

    Vt. – Lent v. Huntoon, 470 A.2d 1162, 143 Vt. 539.

    (9) U.S. – Pruitt v. Chow, C.A.C., 742 F.2d 1104. Burns v. Supermarkets General Corp., D.C.Pa., 615 F.Supp. 154– Professional Asset Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, N.A., D.C.OkI., 607 F.Supp. 1290.

    Ala. – White v. Birmingham Post Co., 172 So. 649, 233 Ala. 547.

    Ariz. – Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 560 P.2d 1216, 114 Ariz. 309.

    Colo. – Knapp v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 144 P.2d 981, 111 Colo. 492.

    Del. – Zanker v. Lackey, 128 A. 373, 2 W.W.Earr. 588, 32 Del. 588.

    Fla. – Hoad v. Connors, App. 5 Dist., 419 So.2d 742.

    Ga. – Wright v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 313 S.E.2d 150. 169 Ga.App. 454.

    Ill. – Audition Div., Ltd. v. Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan Chicago, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 115, 75 Ill. Dec. 947, 120 Ill.App.3d 254.

    Ind. – Jacobs v. City of Columbus By and Through Police Dept., App. I Dist., 454 N.E.2d 1253.

    Iowa – Vinson v. Linn–Mar Community School Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108.

    Ky. – Smith v. Mustain, 276 S.W. 154, 210 Ky. 445.

    Minn. – Echternacht v. King, 259 N.W. 684, 194 Minn. 92.

    Mont. – Keller v. Safeway Stores, 108 P.2d 605, Ill Mont. 28.

    Nev. – Ornatek v. Nevada State Bank, 558 P.2d 1145, 93 Nev. 17.

    N.Y. – Luisi v. JWT Group, Inc., 488 N.Y.S.2d 554, 128 Misc.2d 291.

    N.C. – Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 SE. 55, 212 N.C. 780.

    N.D. – Ellsworth v. Martindale–Hubbell Law Directory, 268 N.W. 400, 66 N.D. 578.

    S.C. – Norton v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 193 S.E. 126, 184 S.C. 525.

    Tenn. – Sweeney v. Newspaper Printing Corporation, 147 S.W.2d 406, 177 Tenn. 196.

    (10) U.S. – Smith v. McDonald, D.C.N.C., 562 F.Supp. 829, affirmed 737 F.2d 427 and 105 S.Ct. 2787, 472 U.S. 479, 86 L.Ed.2d 384– Walters v. Linhof, D.C.Colo., 559 F.Supp. 1231–Miller v. Lear Siegler, Inc., D.C.Kan., 525 F.Supp. 46. Colo. – Lind v. O'Reilly, App., 636 P.2d 1319.

    FIa. – Perry v. Cosgrove, App. 2 Dist., 464 So.2d 664.

    Ill. – Dombrowski v. Shore Galleries, Inc., 376 N.E.2d 43, 17 Ill.Dec. 152, 59 Ill.App.3d 237.

    Mo. – Greening v. Klamen, App., 652 S.W.2d 730, appeal after remand 683 S.W.2d 298.

    N.Y. – Aronson v. Wiersma, 483 N.E.2d 1138, 63 N.Y.2d 392, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1006.

    N.C. – Boston v. Webb, 326 S.E.2d 104, 73 N.C.App. 457, review denied 332 S.E.2d 479, 314 N.C. 114.

    Ohio – Hersch v. E. W. Scripps Co., 445 N.E.2d 670, 3 Ohio App.3d 367, 3 O.B.R. 430.

    42


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 11

    but require innuendo, colloquium or explanatory circumstances to establish their defamatory nature. (11)

    Words, in order to be defamatory per Se, must be susceptible of but one meaning, (13) and a publication is defamatory per se where an average lay reader or listener would interpret it as defamatory on its face. (14) A publication which, on its face, is necessarily within the scope of a statute defining defamation is also defamatory per se. (15) Contrariwise, a publication which is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which is defamatory and the other innocent, is not defamatory per se. (16)

    No strict rule of law may be laid down in distinguishing between publications that are defamatory per se and those that are defamatory per quod, (17) but each case will depend on its own facts. (18) Defamation per se and per quod have been distinguished on the basis of the elements of each which must be proved, (19) in particular, knowledge of the facts extrinsic to those published, (20) and resulting injury or damage. (21) However, where the defendant in a defamation action

    Unnecessary in determination

    In determining whether material is libel per se, it alone must be construed, stripped of all insinuations, innuendo, colloquialisms, and explanatory circumstances.

    Okl. – Sellers v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 687 P.2d 116.

    (11) U.S. – Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., D.C.Colo., 568 F.Supp. 602, reversed on other grounds 811 F.2d 511–Smith v. McDonald, D.C.N.C., 562 F.Supp. 829, affirmed 737 F.2d 427 and
    105 S.Ct. 2787, 472 U.S. 479, 86 L.Ed.2d 384.

    Ariz. – Central Arizona Light & Power Co. v. Akers, 46 P.2d 126, 45 Ariz. 526.

    Fla. – Hood v. Connors, App., 419 So.2d 742.

    Ga. – Wright v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 313 S.E.2d 150, 169 Ga.App. 454.

    Ill. – Hewell v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 415 N.E.2d 434, 47 Ill.Dec. 429, 91 Ill.App.3d 735.

    Iowa – Miller v. First Nat. Bank of Gladbrook, 264 N.W. 272, 220 Iowa 1266.

    Kan. – Thompson v. Osawatomie Pub. Co., 156 P.2d 506, 159 Kan. 562.

    Ky. – Towles v. Travelers Ins. Co., 137 S.W.2d 1110, 282 Ky. 147.

    Md. – Wineholt v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 476 A.2d 217, 59 Md.App.
    443, certiorari denied 483 A.2d 38, 301 Md. 354.

    Mont. – Tucker v. Wallace, 3 P.2d 404, 90 Mont. 359.

    Neb. – Hudson v. Schmid, 272 N.W. 406, 132 Neb. 583.

    N.M. – Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 648 P.2d 321, 98 N.M. 282, certiorari quashed, 648 P.2d 794, 98 N.M. 336.

    N.C. – Arnold v. Sharpe. 251 S.E.2d 452, 296 N.C. 533.

    Tex. – Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Peaster, Civ.App., 178 S.W.2d 302.

    Wis. – Kassowitz v. Sentinel Co., 277 N.W. 177, 226 Wis. 468. Necessity of pleading inducements, colloquium, and innuendo see infra § 130, and definitions thereof see supra § 4.

    (12) U.S. – smith v. McDonald, D.C.N.C., 562 F.Supp. 829, affirmed
    737 F.2d 427 and 105 S.Ct. 2787, 472 U.S. 479, 86 L.Ed.2d 384. D.C. – Lane v. Washington Daily News, 85 F.2d 822, 66 App.D.C. 245.

    Mont. – Miller Ins. Agency v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of California, 51 P.2d 628, 100 Mont. 551.

    N.M. – Dillard v. Shattuck, 11 P.2d 543, 36 N.M. 202.

    N.C.. – Renwick v. News and Observer Pub. Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 310 NC. 312, rehearing denied 315 S.E.2d 704, 310 N.C. 749, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 187, 469 U.S. 858, 83 L.Ed.2d 121.

    Or. – Ruble v. Kirkwood, 266 P. 252, 125 Or. 316.

    (13) Cal. – Washer v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n. 136 P.2d 297, 21 C.2d 822.

    Mont. – Keller v. Safeway Stores, 108 P.2d 605, 111 Mont. 28.

    N.C. – Renwick v. News and Observer Pub. Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 310 N.E. 312, rehearing denied 315 S.E.2d 704, 310 N.E. 749, certiorari denied 105 Set. 187, 469 U.S. 858, 83 L.Ed.2d 121.

    Okl. – Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Kight, 50 P.26 350, 174 Okl. 359.

    (14) U.S. – Miller v. Lear Siegler, Inc., D.C.Kan., 525 F.Supp. 46.

    La. – Deville v. Defending Attorneys for Continental Oil Co., 448 So.2d 885.

    Meaning and sense of words generally see infra § 14.

    Consideration of circumstances

    Circumstances, time and place of defamatory statement and situation of person defamed, should always be considered in determining what average person who heard the remarks thought upon hearing them.

    Fla. – Hood v. Connors, App. 5 Dist., 419 So.2d 742.

    (15) U.S. – Southard v. Forbes, Inc., C.A.Ca.. 588 F.26 140, rehearing denied 590 F.2d 333, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 62, 4.44 U.S. 832, 62 L.Ed.2d 41.

    Mo. – Missouri Church of Scientology v. Adams, 543 S.W.2d 776.

    (16) U.S. – Miller v. Lear Siegler, Inc., D.C.Kan,, 525 F.Supp. 46.

    Cal. – Peabody v. Barham, 126 P.2d 668. 52 C.A.2d 581.

    Md. – Sherrard v. Hull, 456 A.2d 59, 53 Md.App. 553, affirmed 460 A.2d 601. 296 Md. 189.

    Mo. – Huller v. Pulitzer Pub. Ca., App., 684 S.W.2d 473.

    N.M. – Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., App., 648 P.2d 321, 98 N.M. 282, certiorari quashed 648 P.2d 794, 98 N.M. 336.

    N.C. – Renwick v. News and Observer Pub. Co., 312 S.E.2d 405,310 N.C. 312, rehearing denied 315 S.E.2d 704, 310 NC. 749, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 187, 469 U.S. 858, 83 L.Ed.2d 121.

    Utah – Allied v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318.

    (17) Ill. – Korbar v. Hite, 357 N.E.2d 135, 2 Ill.Dec. 158, 43 Ill.App.3d 636, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 127, 434 U.S. 837, 54 L.Ed.2d 98.

    Okl. – Wimmer v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 1 P.26 671, 151 Okl. 123.

    (18) Ill. – Korbar v. Mite, 357 N.E.2d 135, 2 Ill.Dec. 158,43 lll.App.3d 636, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 127, 434 U.S. 837, 54 L.Ed.2d 98.

    (19) Fla. – Budd v. B. Y. Gooch Co., 27 So.2d 72, 157 FIa. 716. Hoyles v. Mid–Florida Television Corp.. App. 5 Dist., 431 So.2d 627, decision approved 467 So.2d 282.

    N.D. – Ellsworth v. Martindale–Hubbell Law Directory, 268 N.W. 400, 66 ND. 578.

    Tex. – Stearns v. McManis, Civ.App., 543 S.W.2d 659, error dismissed.

    (20) Fla. – Boyles v. Mid–Florida Television Corp., App. 5 Dist., 431 Sa.2d 627, decision approved 467 So.2d 282.

    Knowledge, malice, or fault as element of defamation generally see infra §§ 43–47, and requirement of pleading thereof with regard to innuendo see infra § 131.

    43


    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 11 53 C.J.S.

    is a member of the news media, this distinction between defamation per se and per quod is no longer valid and fault and actual damage must be pleaded and proved in either action. (22)

    It has been said that libels not defamatory on their face are not any less actionable than libels defamatory on their face; (23) so, there is no reason to distinguish for the purposes of actionability between libels which are defamatory on their face and libels which are defamatory through extrinsic facts and circumstances. (24) It has also been said that the distinction pursuant to which defamations were classified as either actionable per se or per quad no longer has any practical meaning, because injury must be shown from the defamatory words, whether or not their defamatory meaning is obvious. (25)

    Future happening.

    Statements which may be injurious only to some future happening do not give rise to a cause of action for either per se or per quad defamation. (26)

    b. Distinction between Oral and Written Words

    A distinction is generally recognized between oral and written words as defamatory or actionable per se, and the law of libel is generally of wider extent than that of slander.


    While it has been broadly stated that the same rules, in general, apply to parol as to written words, (27) it is generally held that there is a recognized distinction between words spoken and those written, with respect to their constituting a ground of action per se; (28) and, in determining whether particular words are actionable per se, the same rules do not apply to libel as to slander. (29)

    Generally speaking, the law of libel is of wider extent than that of slander; (30) or, stated conversely, the law of slander is much narrower in scope and operation than the law of libel. (31) The presumption that words are defamatory arises much more readily in cases of libel than in cases of slander. (32) While whatever charge will sustain a suit for slander when the words are merely spoken will sustain a suit for libel if they are written or printed and published, (33) defamatory matter printed and published may be per se ac–

    (21) Hawaii – Johnson v. Finance Acceptance Co. of Georgia, 159 So. 364, 118 Ha. 397.

    Kan. – Thompson v. Osawatomie Pub. Co., 156 P.2d 506, 159 Kan. 562.

    N.D. – Ellsworth v. Martindale–Hubbell Law Directory, 268 N.W. 400, 66 ND. 578.

    Tex. – Express Pub. Co. v. Wilkins, Civ.App.. 218 S.W. 614.

    Necessity of proving special damages with regard to defamation per quod see infra § 198.

    (22) Fla. – Boyles v. Mid–Florida Television Corp., App. 5 Dist., 431 So.2d 627, decision approved 467 So.2d 282.

    Elements of defamation by news media generally see infra § 91 et seq.

    Open question

    Whether Gertz v. Welch has abolished concept of libel per se in a case of a nonmedia defendant remains an open question in Arkansas.

    Ark. – Hogue v. Ameron, Inc., 695 S.W.2d 373, 286 Ark. 481.

    (23) Pa. – Agriss v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 483 A.2d 456, 334 Pa.Super. 295.

    (24) Pa. – Agriss v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 483 A.2d 456, 334 Pa.Super. 295.

    (25) Tenn. – Memphis Pub. Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412.

    (26) Ind. – Gibson v. Kincaid, 221 N.E.2d 834, 140 Ind.App. 186.

    Utah – Baum v. Gillman, 667 P.2d 41.

    (27) Del. – Snavely v. Booth, 176 A. 649, 6 W.W.Harr. 378, 36 Del. 378.

    Ill. – Owen v. Carr, 478 N.E.2d 658, 88 I11.Dec. 343, 134 Ill.App.3d 855, affirmed 497 N.E.2d 1145, 100 Ill.Dec. 783, 113 Ill.2d 273.

    Effect of abolishment of distinction

    Illinois has abolished the distinction between slander and libel and in the process has assimilated libel per se to the quite different concept of slander per se, rather than vice versa.

    U.S. – Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, C.A.IlI., 713 F.2d 262.

    (28) Ala. – Marion v. Davis, 114 So. 357, 217 Ala. 16.

    Fla. – Commander v. Pedersen, 156 So. 337, 116 Fla. 148.

    Neb. – Nelson v. Rosenberg, 280 NW. 229, 135 Neb. 34.

    N.C. – Davis v. Askin's Retail Stores, 191 S.E. 33, 211 N.C. 551.

    Ohio – Ohio Public Service Co. v. Myers, 6 N.E.2d 29, 54 Ohio App. 40, 7 O.O. 422.

    Libelous imputations generally see infra § 17.

    Slanderous imputations generally see infra § 18.

    (29) Idaho – Dwyer v. Libert. 167 P. 651, 30 Idaho 576.

    Neb. – Nelson v. Rosenberg, 280 N.W. 229, 135 Neb. 34.

    N.C. – Davis v. Askin's Retail Stores, 191 S.E. 33, 211 NC. 551.

    (30) Mass. – Robinson v. Caulter, 102 N.E. 938, 215 Mass. 566.

    Or. – Reiman v. Pacific Development Soc., 284 P. 575, 132 Or. 82.

    (31) Ky. – Williams v. Riddle, 140 SW. 661, 145 Ky. 459.

    Neb. – Nelson v. Rosenberg, 280 NW. 229, 135 Neb. 34.

    (32) Mo. – Hagener v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 158 S.W. 54, 172 Mo.App. 436.

    N.Y. – Matherson v. Marchello, 2 Dept., 473 N.Y.S.2d 998, 100 A.D.2d 233.

    Pa. – Collins v. Dispatch Pub. Co.. 25 A. 546, 152 Pa. 187.

    Vt. – Lent v. Huntoan. 470 A.2d 1162, 143 Vt. 539.

    (33) Del. – Zanker v. Lackey, 128 A. 373, 2 W.W.Harr. 588, 32 Del. 588.

    Mass. – Lynch v. Lyons, 20 N.E.2d 953, 303 Mass. 116.

    44


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 12

    tionable while the same matter orally published would not be so. (34)

    The reasons usually assigned for this distinction between written and spoken words are that the former is in more permanent form and may be circulated more extensively than the latter and, therefore, is calculated to do much greater injury than slander merely spoken; (35) and further, that a written slander requires deliberation and is, therefore, more injurious, since a person reducing an accusation to writing is presumed to have satisfied himself of its truth. (36)

    However, some courts, while recognizing the rule as established by the authorities, have expressed a doubt whether this distinction between verbal and written or printed slander is well founded in principle; (37) and other courts, in an effort to remove the somewhat illogical inconsistencies existing in the law of defamation, have in fact abandoned such distinction and equated liable per se with slander per se. (38)

    § 12. Opinions or Facts

    Generally, statements of pure opinion cannot constitute actionable defamation, but the distinction between a statement of fact and a statement of opinion is frequently a difficult one, and even if a statement can be characterized as an opinion, it will support a defamation action if the language is defamatory and the underlying defamatory facts which provide a basis for the opinion are false.

    Research Note


    Opinions about public figures and public concerns, as constituting comment or criticism immune from liability, are considered infra § 104.

    Library References

    Libel and Slander 6(1).
    Generally, despite some authority to the contrary, (39) statements of pure opinion cannot constitute actionable defamation, (40) however unreasonable the opinion or vituperous the expression of it may be. (41) Opinions may be harsh or critical or even abusive yet still not subject the speaker or writer to civil liability. (42) In this connection, a publication is not libelous merely because the

    (34) Del. – Zanker v. Lackey, 128 A. 373, 2 W.W.Harr. 588, 32 Del. 588.

    Hawaii – Chow v. Alston, 634 P.2d 430, 2 Haw.App. 480.

    Ill. – Hotz v. Alton Telegraph Printing Co., 57 N.E.2d 137. 324 Il1.App. 1.

    Mont. – Liebel v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 62 P.2d 667, 103 Mont. 370.

    Neb. – Nelson v. Rosenberg, 280 N.W. 229, 135 Neb. 34.

    N.Y. – Ostrowe v. Lee. 175 N.E. 505, 256 N.Y. 36.

    Ohio – Bigelow v. Brumley, 37 N.E.2d 584, 138 Ohio St. 574, 21 0.0. 471.

    Or. – Reiman v. Pacific Development Soc., 284 P. 575, 132 Or. 82.

    S.C. – Riley v. Askin & Marine Ca., 132 S.E. 584, 134 S.C. 198.

    (35) N.Y. – .Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 N.E. 505, 256 N.Y. 36.

    (36) Cal. – Tonini v. Cevasca, 46 P. 103, 114 Cal. 266.

    (37) Ga. – Spence v. Johnson, 82 S.E. 646, 142 Ga. 267, Ann.Cas. 1916A, 1195.

    (38) Ill. – Irving v. 1. L. Marsh. Inc., 360 N.E.2d 983. 4 Ill. Dec. 720, 46 Ill.App.3d 162.

    (39) Mont. – Woolston v. Montana Free Press. 2 P.2d 1020, 90 Mont. 299.

    Wis. – Canverters Equipment Corp. v. Condes Corp., 258 N.W.2d 712, 80 Wis.2d 257.

    (40) U.S. – Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., C.A.8 (S.D.), 759 F.2d 644, on rehearing 788 F.2d 1300, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 272, 93 L.Ed.2d 249–Buckley v. Littell, C.A.N.Y., 539 F.2d 882, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 785, 786, 429 U.S. 1062, 50 L.Ed.2d 777. Avins v. Mall, D.C.Pa., 610 F.Supp. 308, affirmed 774 F.2d 1150, two cases–Hillman v. Metromedia. Inc., D.C.Md., 452 F.Supp. 727.

    Cal. – Morales v. Coastside Scavenger Co., 1 Dist., 213 Cal.Rptr. 482, 167 C.A.3d 731–Bindrim v. Mitchell, 155 Cal.Rptr. 29, 92 C.A.3d 61, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 490, 444 U.s. 984. 62 L.Ed.2d 412, rehearing denied 100 S.Ct. 713, 444 U.S. 1040, 62 L.Ed.2d 675.

    Fla. – Eastem Air Lines, Inc. v. Gellert, App. 3 Dist., 438 So.2d 923.

    Ga. – Bergen v. Martindale–Hubbell, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 770, 176 Ga.App. 745, appeal dismissed, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 45, 93 L.Ed.2d 7.

    Ill. – Naked City, Inc. v. Chicago Sun–Times, 395 N.E.2d 1042, 32 Ill. Dec. 661, 77 Ill.App.3d 188.

    Nev. – Nevada Independent Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 664 P.2d 337, 99 Nev. 404.

    N.J. – Karnell v. Campbell, 501 A.2d 1029, 206 N.J.Super. 81.

    N.Y. – Ettinger v. Karlsson, 2 Dept., 490 N.Y.S.2d 20, 111 A.D.2d 739.

    Pa. – Gordon v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Assn, Inc., 489 A.2d 1364, 340 Pa.Super. 253, appeal denied.

    Tenn. – Windsor v. Tennessean, App., 654 S.W.2d 680, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1294, 465 U.S. 1030, 79 L.Ed.2d 695.

    Va. – .Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97, 230 Va. 112.

    Judgmental expletive

    Characterizing police chief as egotistical was not defamatory, but was merely a judgmental expletive, rather than a factual statement, which cannot form the basis of a libel action.

    Okl. – Tanner v. Western Pub. Co., App., 682 P.2d 239.

    (41) U.S. – Hotchner v. Castillo–Puche, C.A.N.Y., 551 F.2d 910, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 120, 434 U.S. 834, 54 L.Ed.2d 95. Grass v. News Group Publications, Inc., D.C.N.Y., 570 F.Supp. 178.

    Cal. – Weingarten v. Block, 162 Cal.Rptr. 701. 102 C.A.3d 129, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 267, 449 U.S. 899, 66 L.Ed.2d 128.

    Ill. – Colson v. Stieg, 408 N.E.2d 431, 42 Ill.Dec. 53, 86 Ill.App.3d 993, affirmed and remanded 433 N.E.2d 246, 60 IIl.Dec. 449, 89 lll.2d 205.

    N.Y. – DeLuca v. New York News Inc., 438 N.Y.S.2d 199, 109 Misc.2d 341.

    (42) Ill. – Sloan v. Hatton, 383 N.E.2d 259, 22 Ill.Dec. 783, 66 Ill.App. 3d 41.

    La. – Foote v. Sarafyan, App. 4 Cir., 432 So.2d 877, writ denied 440 So. 2d 736, 737.

    45


    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 12 53 C.J.S.

    opinion may be expressed in terms of strong invectives, profanity, or sarcastic language. (43)

    Even though an opinion may contain factual assertions, there is no defamation if the speaker discloses the facts underlying his opinion. (44) A simple expression of opinion based on disclosed or assumed nondefamatory facts is not itself sufficient for an action of defamation, no matter how unjustified and unreasonable the opinion may be or how derogatory it is. (45) However, an expression of opinion that is not based on disclosed or assumed facts and therefore implies that there are undisclosed facts on which the opinion is based, is treated differently. (46) If a listener cannot evaluate the alleged defamatory language because no basis for the statement has been disclosed, a defamation action may properly be brought. (47)

    Thus, even if a statement can be characterized as an opinion, it will support a defamation action if the language is defamatory and the underlying defamatory facts which provide a basis for the opinion are false; (48) although immune for expression of the opinion, defendant would nevertheless be subject to liability for the false factual statement. (49)

    Statements of fact distinguished.

    The question whether a statement has a defamatory meaning does not even arise unless the statement is an assertion or implication of fact, (50) but the distinction between a statement of fact and a statement of opinion is frequently a difficult one, and what constitutes a statement of fact in one context may be treated as a statement of opinion in another, in light of the nature and content of the communication taken as a whole. (51) Whether a statement constitutes fact or opinion is a question of law for the court to decide. (52) A statement can be defined as factual if it relates to an event or state of affairs that existed in the past or present and is capable of being known; such statements usually concern a person's conduct or character. (53) On the other hand, an opinion is a personal comment about another's conduct, qualifications or character that has some basis in fact. (54)

    (43) N.M. – Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., App., 648 P.2d 321. 98 N.M. 282, certiorari quashed 648 P.2d 794. 98 N.M. 336.

    (44) U.S. – Koch v. Goldway, D.C.Cal., 607 F.Supp. 223, affirmed 817 F.2d 507.

    (45) U.S. – Koch v. Goldway. D.C.Cal., 607 F.Supp. 223, affirmed 817 F.2d 507.

    (46) U.S. – Avins v. White, C.A.DeI.. 627 F.2d 637, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 398, 449 U.S. 982, 66 L.Ed.2d 244. Koch v. Goldway, D.C.Cal., 607 F.Supp. 223, affirmed 817 F.2d 507.

    Fla. – Eastern Air Lines. Inc. 'q. Gellert, App. 3 Dist, 438 So.2d 923.

    Ill. – Howell v. Blecharczyck, 1 Dist., 457 N.E.2d 494, 75 Ill.Dec. 500, 119 Ill.App.3d 987.

    Me. – Caron v. Bangor Pub. Co., 470 A.2d 782. certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 3512. 467 U.S. 1241, 82 L.Ed.2d 821.

    Miss. – Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So.2d 271.

    N.H. – Wash v. Keene Pub. Corp., 498 A.2d 348, 127 N.H. 214.

    N.J. – Karnell v. Campbell, 501 A.2d 1029, 206 N.J.Super. 81.

    Pa. – Braig v. Field Communications, 456 A.2d 1366, 310 Pa.Super. 569, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 2341, 466 U.S. 970, 80 L.Ed.2d 816.

    Wash – Henderson v. Pennwalt Carp., 704 P.2d 1256. 41 Wash.App. 547.

    W.Va. – Havalunch. Inc. v. Mazza, 294 S.E.2d 70.

    "Mixed opinion"

    When a derogatory opinion is a "mixed opinion," that is, it is upon a concealed set of facts which speaker implies would confirm his opinion, is it proper subject of a private damage action.

    N.Y. – Rand v. New York Times Co., 430 N.Y.S.2d 271, 75 A.D.2d 417.

    (47) Colo. – Burns v. McGraw–Hill Broadcasting Co., Inc., 659 P.2d 1351.

    (48) U.S. – McManus v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., D.C.N.Y., 513 F.Supp. 1383.

    Colo. – Burns v. McGraw–Hill Broadcasting Co., Inc., 659 P.2d 1351.

    Mass. – Cole v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc., 435 N.E.2d 1021, 386 Mass. 303, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 449, 459 U.S. 1037, 74 L.Ed.2d 603.

    Wash. – Henderson v. Pennwalt Corp., 704 P.2d 1256, 41 Wash.App. 547.

    (49) Mo. – Iverson v. Crow, App., 639 S.W.2d 118.

    N.Y. – Rand v. New York Times Co., 430 N.Y.S.2d 271, 75 A.D.2d 417.

    (50) N.J. – Karnell v. Campbell, 501 A.2d 1029, 206 N.J.Super. 81.

    (51) Cal. – Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 131 Cal.Rptr. 641, 552 P.2d 425, 17 C.3d 596.

    Mass. – Cole v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc., 435 N.E.2d 1021, 386 Mass. 303, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 449, 459 U.S. 1037, 74 L.Ed.2d 603.

    (52) U.S. – Held v. Pokomy. D.C.N.Y., 583 F.Supp. 1038.

    Mo. – Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775.

    (53) Conn. – Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican*metican, Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 188 Conn. 107.

    (54) Conn. – Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican–American, Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 188 Conn. 107.

    Comment in form of statement of fact

    Comment ostensibly in the form of statement of fact is an opinion, and not actionable, if it is clear from surrounding circumstances that maker of statement did not intend to state objective fact but, rather. intended to make penanal observation on the facts.

    Me. – Caron v. Bangor Pub. Co., 470 A.2d 782, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 3512, 467 U.S. 1241, 82 L.Ed.2d 821.

    46


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 13

    The inquiry into whether a statement should be viewed as one of fact or one of opinion must be made from the perspective of an ordinary reader of the statement. (55) The language generally used throughout an article may strongly indicate whether it is to be accepted as fact or opinion, (56) but, in addition, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances under which the statement was made (57) including the forum in which the statement is made, (58) the medium by which the statement is disseminated and the audience to which it is published. (59)

    In general, rhetorical hyperbole and vigorous epithets are expressions of opinion, as are concepts whose content is so debatable, loose and varying, that they are insusceptible to proof of truth or falsity. (60) Thus, where potentially defamatory statements are published in a public debate, a heated labor dispute, or in another setting in which the audience may anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade others to their positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole, language which generally might be considered as statements of fact may well assume the character of statements of opinion. (61) On the other hand, accusations of criminal or unethical activity are expressions of fact, as are allegations relating to one's professional integrity that are susceptible of proof. (62)

    § 13. Construction of Language; Certainty and Positiveness

    In determining whether or not particular language is defamatory, the particular facts in each case govern; and the effect, not the form, of the language is the criterion.

    Library References

    Libel and Slander 19, 20.
    In determining whether or not particular language is defamatory, it is impossible to lay down any definite rule which will govern in all cases; (63) but the language used and the particular facts and circumstances of each case must control. (64) Unless there can be no reasonable difference in

    (55) U.S. – Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., C.A.$ (S.D.), 759 F.2d 644, on rehearing 788 F.2d 1300. certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 272, 93 L.Ed.2d 249–Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., C.A.2 (N.Y.), 759 F.2d 219. Korkala v. W.W. Norton & Co., D.C.N.Y., 618 F.Supp. 152.

    Conn. – .Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican–American, Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 188 Coon. 107.

    N.M. – Marchiondo v. Brown, 649 P.2d 462, 98 N.M. 394, certiorari quashed 648 P.2d 794, 98 N.M. 336.

    Wash. – Benjamin v. Cowles Pub. Co., 684 P.2d 739, 37 Wash.App. 916.

    (56) U.S. – Batsklow v. Newsweek, Inc., C.A.S (S.D.), 759 F.2d 644, on rehearing 788 F.2d 1300, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 272, 93 L.Ed.2d 249.

    (57) U.S. – Batsklow v. Newsweek, Inc., C.A.S (S.D.), 759 F.2d 644, on rehearing 788 F.2d 1300, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 272, 93 L.Ed.2d 249.

    Cal. – Kaufman v. Fidelity Federal Say, and Loan Ass'n, 189 Cal.Rptr. 818, 140 C.A.3d 913.

    Fla. – Hay v. Independent Newspapers. Inc., App. 2 Dist. 4513 So.2d 293.

    Mass. – Tartaglia v. Townsend. 477 N.E.2d 178, 19 Mass.App. 693.

    Mo. – Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775.

    (58) U.S. – Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., C.A.S (S.D.), 759 F.2d 644, on rehearing 788 F.2d 1300, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 272, 93 L.Ed.2d 249.

    (59) Fla. – Hay v. Independent Newspapers. Inc., App. 2 Dist., 450 So. 2d 293.

    Mass. – Fleming v. Benzaquin, 454 N.E.2d 95, 390 Mass. 175.

    (60) U.S. – Held v. Pokorny, D.C.N.Y., 583 F.Supp. 1038–Grass v. News Group Publications. Inc., D.C.N.Y., 570 F.Supp. 178.

    (61) CaI. – 43regory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 131 CaI.Rptr. 641.
    552 P.2d 425, 17 C.3d 596.

    Mass. – Cole v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc., 435 N.E.2d 1021, 386 Mass. 303, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 449, 459 U.S. 1037, 74 L.Ed.2d 603.

    Mo. – Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775

    Describing plaintiff as "little Hitler"

    Even if picketing incidents did not constitute a labor dispute, language used in describing the plaintiff as a "little Hitler" was capable of different meanings, was mere hyperbole or rhetoric and was an expression of opinion, not fact, and was protected from a claim of defamation.

    Ohio – Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers of America, 453 N.E.2d 666, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 6 O.B.R. 421.

    (62) U.S. – Held v. Pokorny, D.C.N.Y., 583 F.Supp. 1038.

    Radio talk show host's statement

    Radio talk show host's statement that police officer 'wants to put me away forever and leave those two kids out there to get hit by a vehicle," could not be viewed as assertion of fact, but rather, audience could only reasonably have understood comments, especially in light of obvious hyperbole, as host's opinion of officer's attitude as evidenced by officer's refusal to let host continue driving his car after officer noted vehicle's expired registration.

    Mass. – Fleming v. Benzaquin. 454 N.E.2d 95, 390 Mass. 175.

    (63) Miss. – Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wales, 171 So. 536, 171 Miss. 875.

    Okl. – Tulsa Tribune Ca. v. Kight, 50 P.2d 350. 174 Okl. 359.

    (64) Ga. – Aiken v. May, 37 S.E.2d 225. 73 Ga.App. 502.

    Ky. – Towles v. Travelers Ins. Co.. 137 S.W.2d 1110, 282 Ky. 147.

    La. – Otero v. Ewing, 110 So. 648, 162 La. 453.

    Mich. – Sawabini v. Desenberg, 372 N.W.2d 559, 143 Mich.App. 373.

    Miss. – Taylor v. Standard Oil Co.. 186 So. 294, 184 Miss. 392.

    Neb. – Morearty v. Strunk, 226 NW. 329, 118 Neb. 718.

    N.H. – Morrissette v. Cowette, 449 A.2d 1221. 122 N.H. 731.

    N.Y. – James v. Gannett Co., Inc., 353 N.E.2d 834, 40 N.Y.2d 415, 386 N.Y.S.2d 871, reargument denied 359 N.E.2d 440, 40 N.Y.2d 990, 390 N.Y.S.2d 1027.

    Pa. – Wendler v. DePaul. Super., 499 A.2d 1101, 346 Pa.Super. 479, appeal denied.

    47


    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 13 53 C.J.S.

    opinion or understanding that the words are plainly defamatory regardless of the circumstances, (65) the effect and tendency of the language used, not its form, are the criteria by which to determine the actionable quality of the words. (66)

    It is not necessary, in order to render words defamatory and actionable, that they shall make a defamatory charge in direct terms. (67) It may be made indirectly, (68) as well as by direct assertion in positive terms; (69) and it is not less actionable because made indirectly. (70) It matters not how artful or disguised the modes in which the meaning is concealed if it is in fact defamatory. (71)

    Accordingly, a defamatory charge may be made by inference or implication, (72) by allegorical or figurative allusion, (73) by innuendo (74) or insinuation, (75) by mere questions, (76) by sarcasm or irony, (77) By words of comparison, (78) or by words of praise and congratulation. (79) However, there is authority that the defamation must be clear and unmistakable from the words themselves. (80) In any event, when the meaning of a publication is sufficiently clear on its face, innuendo cannot imbue an otherwise nonlibelous statement with the taint of defamation. (81)

    A defamation may be accomplished by falsely putting words into the mouth, or attaching them

    S.C. – Lily v. Belk's Department Store, 182 S.E. 889, 178 S.C. 278.

    Tex. – Caller Times Pub. Co. v. Chandler, 130 S.W.2d 853, 134 Tex. 1.

    Fair, not a broad reading

    Because of countervailing interest in free expression, courts must be careful to give a fair, not a broad reading to allegedly defamatory material.

    U.S. – Mullenmeister v. Snap–On Tools Corp., D.C.N.Y., 587 F.Supp. 868.

    Omission of word "alleged"

    Supreme Court decision holding that under the circumstances the omission of word "alleged" from news report which summarized government report including statements which were contained in civil rights complaint against deputy chief of detectives did not present a jury issue as to malice is not to be understood as making word "alleged" a superfluity in published reports of information damaging to reputation.

    U.S. – Time, Inc. v. Pape. III., 91 S.Ct. 633, 401 U.S. 279, 28 L.Ed.2d 45, rehearing denied 91 S.Ct. 1248, 401 U.S. 1018, 28 L.Ed.2d 552.

    (65) Miss. – Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wales, 171 So. 536, 171 Miss. 875.

    (66) U.S. – Walters v. Linhof, D.C.Colo., 559 F.Supp. 1231.

    Ala. – Marion v. Davis, 114 So. 357. 217 Ala. 16.

    Cal. – Rosenberg v. 3. C. Penney Co., 86 P.2d 696, 30 C.A.2d 609.

    Miss. – Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wales, 171 So. 536, 171 Miss. 875.

    N.Y. – DalI v. Time, Inc.. 300 N.Y.S. 680, 252 A.D. 636, affirmed 16 N.E.2d 297, 278 N.Y. 635, reargument denied 17 N.E.2d 138, 278 N.Y. 718.

    (67) Ala. – Marion v. Davis, 114 So. 357, 217 Ala. 16.

    Ind. – Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211, 175 Ind.App. 548.

    Miss. – Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wales, 171 So. 536, 177 Miss. 875.

    S.C. – Tyler v. Macks Stores of South Carolina, Inc., 272 S.E.2d 633, 275 S.C. 456.

    W.Va. – .Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70.

    (68) Ala. – Marion v. Davis, 114 So. 357, 217 Ala. 16.

    (69) N.D. – Lauder v. Jones, 101 N.W. 907, 13 N.D. 525.

    S.C. – Duncan v. Record Pub. Co., 143 S.E. 31, 145 S.C. 196.

    (70) N.D. – Lauder v. Jones, 101 N.W. 907, 13 N.D. 525.

    (71) N.D. – Lauder v. Jones, 101 N.W. 907, 13 ND. 525.

    (72) U.S. – General Products Co., Inc. v. Meredith Corp., D.C.Va., 526 F.Supp. 546.

    Ala. – Marion v. Davis, 114 So. 357, 217 Ala. 16.

    Cal. – Selleck v. Globe Intern., Inc., 2 Dist., 212 Cal.Rptr. 838. 166 C.A.3d 1123, review denied.

    Conn. – Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 477 A.2d 1005, 193 Conn. 313.

    Ind. – Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211, 175 Ind.App. 548.

    Ky. – McClintock v. McClure, 188 SW. 867, 171 Ky. 714.

    Me. – Saunders v. VanPelt, 497 A.2d 1121.

    Mont. – Burr v. Winnett Times Pub. Co., 258 P. 242, 80 Mont. 70.

    W.Va. – Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc.. 320 S.E.2d 70.

    (73) Ariz. – Arizona Pub. Co. v. Harris, 181 P. 373, 20 Ariz. 446.

    (74) U.S. – Hayes v. Irwin, D.C.Ga., 541 F.Supp. 397, affirmed 729 F.2d 1466, rehearing denied 733 F.2d 908, certiorari denied 105 Set. 185, 83 L.Ed.2d 119.

    W.Va. – Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70. Definition of innuendo see supra § 4.

    Necessity and propriety of innuendo in complaint or petition see infra § 131.

    (75) U.S. – Mills v. Kingsport Times–News, D.C.Va., 475 F.Supp. 1005.

    Cal. – Forsher v. Bugliosi, 163 Cal.Rptr. 628, 608 P.2d 716, 26 C.3d 792.

    Mass. – Morgan v. Republican Pub. Co., 144 N.E. 221, 249 Mass. 388.

    S.C. – Duncan v. Record Pub. Co., 143 S.E. 31, 145 S.C. 196.

    W.Va. – Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70.

    (76) U.S. – Cantrell v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.. D.C. III., 529 F.Supp. 746.

    Ill. – Maclaskey v. McCartney, 58 N.E.2d 630. 324 Ill.App. 498.

    Miss. – Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wales, 171 So. 536, 171 Miss. 875.

    N.Y. – Burnham v. Hornaday, 223 N.Y.S. 750, 130 Misc. 207, modified on other grounds 228 N.Y.S. 246, 223 A.D. 218.

    Wash. – Henderson v. Pennwalt Corp., 704 P.2d 1256, 41 Wash.App. 547.

    (77) Mo. – Diener v. Star–Chronicle Pub. Co., 132 SW. 1143, 230 Mo. 613.

    (78) N.H. – Richardson v. Thorpe, 63 A. 580, 73 N.H. 532.

    (79) La. – Martin v. The Picayune, 40 So. 376, 115 La. 979.

    (80) Miss. – Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So.2d 271.

    Wash. – Sims v. Kiro, Inc., 580 P.2d 642, 20 Wash.App. 229, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 2164, 441 U.S. 945, 60 L.Ed.2d 1047.

    (81) U.S. – Professional Asset Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, NA., D.C.OkI., 607 F.Supp. 1290.

    Ky. – Cullen v. South East Coal Co., App., 685 S.W.2d 187.

    48


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 14

    to the pen, of the person defamed and thus imputing to such person a willingness to use them, where the mere fact of having uttered or used the words would produce the results contemplated in the definition of libel and slander. (82) Jest or merriment.

    The rule that a defamatory charge may be made indirectly has been applied to words of merriment or jest. (83) Thus, it is generally no defense that the words were spoken (84) or written (85) in jest or merriment; or that defendant did not mean the offending statement to be taken seriously. (86) However, it has been held that if the words are spoken without malice and in jest, and are so understood by those who hear them, no action will lie. (87)

    In alternative form.

    Generally, an imputation in alternative form is actionable only when both alternatives are defamatory, and if either alternative statement is harmless the charge is not actionable. (88)

    In conditional form.

    Where the charge is conditional in its form, the actionable quality of the imputation depends on the facts assumed in the conditional clause; and, if defendant makes the charge to depend on a fact which he has stated conditionally but which is known to be true, it is equivalent to a direct charge and actionable. (89)

    § 14. – Meaning and Sense of Words

    a. In general
    b. Construction as a whole

    a. In General

    Allegedly defamatory words are to be taken in their plain and natural meaning and according to the sense in which they appear to have been used and the ideas they are adapted to convey to those who heard or read them.
    Library References

    Libel and Slander 19.

    As a general rule, allegedly defamatory words are to be taken in their plain and natural meaning and understood by courts and juries as other people would understand them, and according to the sense in which they appear to have been used and the ideas they are adapted to convey to those who heard or read them. (90) A construction different from what they bear in their common accept–

    (82) Cal. – Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 127 P.2d 577, 53 C.A.2d 207.

    N.Y. – Locke v. Benton & Bowles, 1 N.Y.S.2d 240, 165 Misc. 631, reversed on other grounds 2 N.Y.S.2d 150, 253 App.Div. 369.

    (83) Cal. – Newby v. Times–Mirror Co., 160 P. 233, 173 Cal. 387, Ann. Cas.1917E, 186.

    (84) N.Y. – Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 71 N.E. 739, 179 N.Y. 144.

    (85) Cal. – Newby v. Times–Mirror Co., 160 P. 233, 173 Cal. 387.

    N.Y. – Corrigan v. Bobbs–Merrill Co.. 126 N.E. 260, 228 N.Y. 58.

    (86) U.S. – Mullenmeister v. Snap–On Tools Corp., D.C.N.Y., 587 F.Supp. 868.

    N.Y. – Salomone v. Macmillan Pub. Co., Inc., 411 N.Y.S.2d 105, 97 Misc.2d 346.

    (87) N.Y. – Salomone v. Macmillan Pub. Co., Inc., 411 N.Y.S.2d 105, 97 Misc.2d 346.

    Wis. – Hanson v. Feuling, 152 N.W. 287, 160 Wis. 511.

    (88) Pa. – Lukehart v. Byerly, 53 Pa. 418.

    (89) Ind. – Ruble v. Bunting, 68 N.E. 1041, 31 Ind.App. 654.

    Mass. – Clarke v. Zettick, 26 N.E. 234, 153 Mass. I.

    S.C. – Warner v. Rudnick, App., 313 S.E.2d 359, 280 S.C. 595.

    (90) U.S. – Smith v. McDonald, D.C.N.C., 562 F.Supp. 829, affirmed 737 P.2d 427 and 105 S.Ct. 2787, 472 U.S. 479, 86 L.Ed.2d 384– Hayes v. Irwin, D.C.Ga., 541 F.Supp. 397, affirmed 729 F.2d 1466, rehearing denied 733 F.2d 908, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 185, 469 U.S. 857, 83 L.Ed.2d 119.

    Ark. – Rachels v. Deener, 33 S.W.2d 39, 182 Ark. 931.

    Cal. – Peabody v. Barham, 126 P.2d 668, 52 C.A.2d 581.

    CoIo. – Knapp v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 144 P.2d 981, 111 Colo. 492.

    Conn. – Ventresca v. Kissner, 136 A. 90. 105 Conn. 533.

    Del. – MacDonough v. A. S. Beck Shoe Corporation. 10 A.2d 510, 1 Terry 318, 40 Del. 318.

    D.C. – Sullivan v. Meyer, 91 F.2d 301, 67 App.D.C. 228.

    Fla. – Budd v. 3. Y. Gooch Co., 27 So.2d 72, 157 Fla. 716.

    Ga. – Morrison v. Hayes, 335 S.E.2d 596, 176 Ga.App. 128.

    Ill. – Sivulich v. Howard Publications, Inc., 1 Dist., 466 N.E.2d 1218, 81 Ill.Dec. 416, 126 Ill.App.3d 129.

    Ind. – Jacobs v. City of Columbus By and Through Police Dept., App. I Dist., 454 N.E.2d 1253.

    Ky. – Jones v. Grief, 131 S.W.2d 487, 279 Ky. 579.

    Me. – Chapman v. Gannett, 171 A. 397. 132 Me. 389.

    Mass. – Lyman v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 190 N.E. 542, 286 Mass. 258.

    Minn. – Church of Scientology of Minnesota v. Minnesota State Medical Ass'n Foundation, 264 N.W.2d 152.

    Miss. – Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 25 So.2d 572, 200 Miss. 44.

    Mo. – Buller v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., App., 684 S.W.2d 473.

    Mont. – Keller v. Safeway Stores, 108 P.2d 605, 111 Mont. 28.

    Neb. – Silence v. Journal Star Printing Co., 266 N.W.2d 533, 201 Neb. 159.

    N.M. – Dillard v. Shattuck, N.M., 11 P.2d 543, 36 N.M. 202.

    N.Y. – Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 73 A.D.2d 276.

    N.C. – Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 212 N.C. 780.

    Okl. – Jones v. Hill, 146 P.2d 294, 193 Okl. 653.

    Or. – Reinian v. Pacific Development Soc., 284 P. 575, 132 Or. 82.

    Pa. – Sarkees v. Warner–West Corporation, 37 A.2d 544, 349 Pa. 365.

    49


    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 14 53 C.J.S.

    ance and meaning may not be placed on the words (91) unless particular facts are alleged to lend credence to the alternative construction claimed. (92)

    So, words must not be accorded a forced and unnatural meaning which might make them libelous, nor should the words be interpreted according to their mildest and most inoffensive sense in order to find them nonlibelous. (93) Where the words used are capable of having two or more different meanings, they are ambiguous and the plaintiff may allege the meaning with which he claims they were published. (94)

    For a statement to be defamatory, it must be understood as defamatory by those who heard (95) and it is not the intention of the speaker or writer, (96) or the understanding of him (97) or of any particular hearer or reader, (98) by which the actionable quality of the words is to be determined. It is the meaning that the words in fact conveyed, (99) and the test is the effect the language is fairly calculated to produce and the impression it would naturally engender in the minds of the average persons among whom it is intended to circulate. (1) Not only is the nature of the intended audience a critical factor in consider–

    R.I. – Ross v. Providence Journal Co., 154 A. 562, 51 RI. 318.

    S.C. – Stokes v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 23 S.E.2d 823, 202 S.C. 24.

    S.D. – Springer v. Swift, 239 N.W. 171, 59 S.D. 208.

    Tenn. – Stone River Motors, Inc. v. Mid–South Pub. Co., App., 651 S.W.2d 713.

    Tex. – Southern Pub. Co. v. Foster, Com.App., 53 S.W.2d 1014.

    Vt. – Kinsley v. Herald & Globe Ass'n, 34 A.2d 99, 113 Vt. 272.

    Va. – Cook v. Patterson Drug Co.. 39 S.E.2d 304, 185 Va. 516. Radio or television broadcasts

    Ala. – Gray v. WALA–TV., 384 So.2d 1062.

    (91) U.S. – Lorentz v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures, C.C.A.Cal., 155 F.2d 84, certiorari denied 67 S.Ct. 81, 329 U.S. 727, 91 L.Ed. 629. N.Y. – Polakoff v. Hill, 27 N.Y.S.2d 142, 261 App.Div. 777.

    (92) Mich. – Ledsinger v. Burmeister. 318 N.W.2d 558, 114 Mich.App. 12.

    (93) U.S. – Rudin v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., D.C.N.Y., 510 F.Supp. 210.

    Cal. – Forsher v. Bugliosi, 163 CaI.Rptr. 628, 608 P.2d 716, 26 C.3d 792.

    Conn. – Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 477 A.2d 1005, 193 Conn. 313.

    Fla. – Byrd v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., App. 4 Dist.. 433 So.2d 593, petition for review denied 443 So.2d 979.

    Neb. – Silence v. Journal Star Printing Co., 266 N.W.2d 533, 201 Neb. 159.

    N.Y. – Aronson v. Wiersma, 483 N.E.2d 1138, 65 N.Y.2d 592, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1006.

    Okl. – Sellers v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 687 P.2d 116.

    Pa. – .Dobson by Dobson v. WBRE–TV, Inc., 500 A.2d 1226, 347 Pa. Super. 612.

    (94) Ga. – Brooks v. Stone. 317 S.E.2d 277, 170 Ga.App. 457, affirmed 322 S.E.2d 728, 253 Ga. 565.

    (95) Ga. – Sigmon v. Womack, 279 S.E.2d 254, 158 Ga.App. 47.

    Wash. – Funderburk v. Bechtel Power Corp., 698 P.2d 556, 103 Wash. 2d 796.

    (96) Miss. – Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 25 So.2d 572, 200 Miss. 44.

    N.Y. – Polakoff v. Hill. 27 N.Y.S.2d 142, 261 App.Div. 777.

    S.C. – Hospital Care Corporation v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 9 S.E.2d 796, 194 S.C. 370.

    Tex. – Dean v. Snyder, Civ.App., 57 S.W.2d 338.

    Va. – Cook v. Patterson Drug Co., 39 S.E.2d 304, 185 Va. 516.

    (97) U.S. – Walgreen Co. v. Cochran, C.C.A.Mo., 61 F.2d 357. Ill–Owen v. Carr, 4 Dist., 478 N.E.2d 658, 88 III.Dec. 343, 134 III. App.3d 855, affirmed 497 N.E.2d 1143, 100 Ill.Dec. 783, 113 Ill.2d
    273.

    Tenn. – Stones River Motors, Inc. v. Mid–South Pub. Ca., App., 651 S.W.2d 713.

    Tex. – Koehler v. Sircovich, Civ.App., 269 S.W. 812.

    (98) U.S. – Albert Miller & Co. v. Cone, C.C.A.Ala., 107 F.2d 432, certiorari denied Carte v. Albert Miller & Co., 60 S.Ct. 890, 309 U.S. 688, 84 L.Ed. 1031.

    Miss. – Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 25 Sa.2d 572, 200 Miss. 44.

    S.C. – Hospital Care Corporation v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 9 S.E.2d 796, 194 S.C. 370.

    Person with extrasensitive perception

    The fact that some person with extrasensitive perception might understand a defamatory meaning does not warrant a finding of liability for defamation.

    Cal. – Forsher v. Bugliosi, 163 Cal.Rptr. 628, 608 P.2d 716, 26 C.3d 792.

    (99) Cal. – Harris v. Curtis Pub. Co., 121 P.2d 761, 49 C.A.2d 340.

    Mo. – Grossman v. Globe–Democrat Pub. Co., 149 S.W.2d 362, 347 Mo. 869.

    S.C. – Hospital Care Corporation v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Cc., 9 S.E.2d 796, 194 S.C. 370.

    Tenn. – Stones River Motors, Inc. v. Mid–South Pub. Co., App., 651 S.W.2d 713.

    (1) U.S. – Davis v. Ross, C.A.N.Y., 754 F2d 80, on remand 107 F.R.D. 326. Barger v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., D.C.Cal.. 564 P.Supp. 1131, affirmed 732 F.2d 163, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 175, 469 U.S. 853, 83 L.Ed.2d 110–Miller v. Lear Siegler, Inc., D.C.Kan., 325 F.Supp. 46.

    Cal. – Kilgore v. Younger, 180 CaI.Rptr. 657, 640 P.2d 793, 30 C.3d 770.

    Colo. – Knapp v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 144 P.2d 981, 111 Colo. 492.

    Conn. – Ventreaca v. Kissner, 136 A. 90, 105 Conn. 333. Fla. – Perry v. Cosgrove, App. 2 Dist., 464 So.2d 664.

    Ill. – Catalano v. Pechoua, 387 N.E.2d 714, 25 Ill.Dec. 838, 69 Ill.App. 3d 797, affirmed 419 N.E.2d 350, 50 III.Dec. 242, 83 Ill.2d 146, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 1981, two cases, 431 U.S. 911, 68 L.Ed.2d
    300.

    Ind. – Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211, 175 Ind.App. 548.

    50


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 14

    ing whether a communication is capable of a defamatory meaning, (2) but so is the temper of the times and the current of contemporary public opinions, with the result that words which are harmless in one age and in one community may be highly damaging to reputation at another time or in a different place. (3)

    The alleged defamatory statement should be construed not only as to the expression used but also with respect to the whole scope and apparent object of the writer. (4)

    In determining whether the challenged language falls within one or more of the recognized categories of defamation per se the courts follow the rule of innocent construction. (5) Under the innocentconstruction rule, a written or oral statement is to be considered in context, with the words and the implications therefrom given their natural and obvious meaning; (6) if, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted or reasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff it cannot be actionable per se. (7) A writing's susceptibility to innocent meaning does not in itself preclude a finding that an ordinary reader would understand it in a libelous sense. (8)

    The "innocent interpretation" rule does not alter the basic determination to be made of whether after considering the article in its entirety as to its thought, idea, impression, or opinion conveyed to the reader, does the article engender in the mind of the average lay reader a conclusion, impression, or opinion of the plaintiff that is defamatory. (9)

    Ky. – Sweeney & Co. V. Brown, 60 S.W.2d 381, 249 Ky. 116.

    La. – Bradford v. Murray, App. 4 Cir., 467 So.2d 1297, writ denied 469 So.2d 988.

    Mass. – Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 400 N.E.2d 847, 379 Mass. 745.

    Miss. – Conroy v. Breland, 189 So. 814, 185 Miss. 787.

    Mo. – Grossman v. Globe–Democrat Pub. Co., 149 S.W.2d 362, 347 Mo. 869.

    Mont. – Woolston v. Montana Free Press, 2 P.2d 1020, 90 Mont. 299.

    N.J. – Karnell v. Campbell, 501 A.2d 1029. 206 N.J.Super. 81.

    N.Y. – James v. Gannett Co., Inc., 353 N.E.2d 834, 40 N.Y.2d 415. 386 N.Y.S.2d 871, reargument denied 359 N.E.2d 4.40, 40 N.Y.2d 990, 390 N.Y.S.2d 1027.

    Ohio – Matalka v. Lagemann, 486 N.E.2d 1220, 21 Ohio App.3d 134, 21 O.B.R. 143.

    Okl. – Sellers v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 687 P.2d 116.

    Pa. – Thomas Merton Center v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 442 A.2d 213, 497 Pa. 460, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2961, 457 U.S. 1134, 73 L.Ed. 2d 1351.

    S.C. – Hospital Care Corporation v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co.. 9 S.E.2d 796, 194 S.C. 370.

    Tenn. – Black v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 141 5.W.2d 908, 24 Tenn. App. 137.

    Wash. – Henderson v. Pennwalt Corp., 704 P.2d 1256, 41 Wash.App. 547.

    Wis. – Fields Foundation, Ltd. v. Christensen, App., 309 N.W.2d 125, 103 Wis.2d 465.

    (2) Pa. – Wendler v. DePaul, 499 A.2d 1101, 346 Pa.Super. 479, appeal denied.

    (3) Hawaii – Beamer v. Nishiki, 670 P.2d 1264, 66 Haw. 572.

    Mo. – Schupmann by Schupmann v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., App., 689 S.W.2d 101.

    N.Y. – Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 73 A.D.2d 276.

    (4) U.S. – Browder v. Cook, D.C.Idaho, 59 F.Supp. 225.

    Cal. – Harris v. Curtis Pub. Co., 121 P.2d 761. 49 C.A.2d 340.

    N.Y. – .Cassidy v. Gannett Co., IS N.Y.S.2d 729, 173 Misc. 634.

    (5) Ill. – Heying v. Simonaitis. I Dist., 466 N.E.2d 1137, 81 Ill.Dec. 335, 126 IlI.App.3d 157–Levinson v. Time, Inc., 411 N.E.2d 1118, 44 Ill.Dec. 752, 89 I1l.App.3d 338.

    (6) Ill. – Chapski v. Copley Press. 442 N.E.2d 195, 65 Ill.Dec. 884, 92 Ill.2d 344. Grisanzio v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 2 Dist., 477 N.E.2d 805, 87 Ill.Dec. 679, 132 Ill.App.3d 914, appeal denied–Cartwright v. Garrison, 2 Dist., 447 N.E.2d 446, 69 Ill.Dec. 229, 113 Ill.App.3d 536.

    (7) U.S. – Paul v. Premier Elec. Const. Co.. DCIII., 581 F.Supp. 721.

    Ill. – .Chapski v. Copley Press, 442 N.E.2d 195, 65 Ill.Dec. 884, 92 Ill.2d 344. Costello v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 13, 67 Ill.Dec. 721, III III.App.3d 1009, appeal after remand 505 N.E.2d 701, 106 lll.Dec. 154, 153 Ill.App.3d 956, appeal allowed 511 N.E.2d 426, 110 IlI.Dec. 454, 115 IIl.2d 539.

    Attorney's memorandum

    Where allegedly defamatory portion of letter was statement that memorandum prepared in connection with corporation's private placement of securities contained number of false and misleading statements relating to corporation's research activity, and letter explicitly indicated that attorneys who prepared memorandum did not know that it contained allegedly false or misleading information, letter was susceptible of reasonably innocent construction with respect to attorney who had prepared memorandum and therefore did not give rise to action for defamation.

    U.S. – Pruitt v. Chow, C.A.Ill., 742 F.2d 1104.

    Two or more meanings

    Doctrine of innocent construction prevents statement from being found defamatory as a matter of law if it has two or more meanings, one of which is nondefamatory.

    D.C.. – Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 242 U.S.App.D.C. 301 (per Starr, Circuit Judge, with four judges concurring), certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 2662. 471 U.S. 1127, 86 L.Ed.2d 278.

    (8) CaI. – Okun v. superior Court of Los Angeles County. 175 Cal. Rptr. 157, 629 P.2d 1369, 29 C.3d 442, certiorari denied Maple Properties v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 102 S.Ct. 673, 454 U.S. 1099, 70 L.Ed.2d 641, appeal after remand 205 Cal.Rptr. 532, 158 C.A.3d 997, certiorari denied Norminton Levy & Norminton Court of Appeal of California, 105 S.Ct. 1758, 470 U.S. 1054, 84 L.Ed.2d 820.

    Pa. – Raffensberger v. Moran, 485 A.2d 447, 336 Pa.Super. 97.

    (9) U.S. – Miller v. Lear Siegler, Inc.. D.C.Kan., 525 F.Supp. 46.

    51


    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 14 53 C.J.S.

    Oral defamation is generally more strictly construed than is libel; (10) but in determining the meaning the words conveyed to the one to whom they were published there is no distinction between defamation per se or defamation per quod. (11)

    Slang and provincial terms.

    An actionable imputation may be made by the use of cant or slang words or provincialisms which, according to their ordinary meaning, are not defamatory. (12) However, where the actionable quality of the words depends on their covert meaning or on their use as slang or cant terms, no action lies unless the words were understood by those to whom they were addressed in the same sense as that in which they were used by the speaker or writer. (13) In some cases such words have been held actionable by reference to public history of which the court has taken judicial notice. (14)

    b. Construction as a Whole

    In determining whether a publication is libelous, the allegedly defamatory language must be construed as a whole and in connection with other parts of the publication.


    Since words may have different meanings according to the connection in which they are used, (15) in determining whether a publication is libelous the language alleged to be defamatory must be construed as a whole and the words construed in connection with other parts of the conversation or published matter, written or printed. (16) The meaning of the statement should be gathered from the context and not from the words read singly. (17)

    (10) Ga. – Whitley v. Newman, 70 SE. 686, 9 Ga.App. 89.

    N.M. – Dillard v. Shattuck. 11 P.2d 543, 36 N.M. 202.

    (11) Tex. – West Texas Utilities Co. v. Wills, Civ.App., 164 S.W.2d 405.

    (12) Iowa – Wimer v. Allbaugh, 42 N.W. 587, 78 Iowa 79.

    (13) Cal. – Edwards v. San Jose Printing & Publishing Soc., 34 P. 128, 99 Cal. 431.

    Miss. – Morehead v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 192 So. 300, 187 Miss. 55.

    (14) Wis. – Kraus v. Sentinel Co., 19 N.W. 384, 60 Wis. 425.

    (15) Ariz. – Central Arizona Light & Power Co. v. Akers, 46 P.2d 126, 45 Ariz. 526.

    (16) U.S. – Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Carp., C.A.Cal., 611 F.2d 781.

    Ala. – Alabama Ride Co. v. Vance, 178 So. 438, 235 Ala. 263.

    Ariz. – Kinsey v. Real Detective Pub. Co.. 80 P.2d 964, 52 Ariz. 353.

    Ark. – Rachels v. Deener, 33 S.W.2d 39. 182 Ark. 931.

    Cal. – Selleck v. Globe Intern., Inc.. 212 Cal.Rptr. 838, 166 C.A.3d 1123, review denied.

    Colo. – Bums v. McGraw–Hill Broadcasting Co., Inc., 659 P.2d 1351.

    D.C. – Meyerson v. Hurlbut, 98 F.2d 232. 68 App.D.C. 360, certiorari denied Hurlbut v. Meyerson, 59 S.Ct. 69, 305 U.S. 610, 83 L.Ed. 388.

    Fla. – Brown v. Tallahassee Democrat. Inc., App. 1 Dist., 4.40 So.2d 588.

    Hawaii – Beamer v. Nishiki, 670 P.2d 1264, 66 Haw. 572.

    Ill. – Costello v. Capital Cities Media. Inc., 445 N.E.2d 13, 67 Ill.Dec. 721, 111 Ill.App.3d 1009, appeal after remand 505 N.E.2d 701, 106 Ill.Dec. 154, 153 IlI.App.3d 956, appeal allowed 511 N.E.2d 426, 110 Ill.Dec. 454, 115 Ill.2d 539.

    Ind. – Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211, 175 Ind.App. 548.

    Kan. – Brinkley v. Fishbein, 8 P.2d 318, 134 Kan. 833.

    Ky. – Smith v. Pure Oil Co., 128 S.W.2d 931. 278 Ky. 430.

    La. – Weatherall v. Department of Health and Human Resources, App. I Cir.. 432 So.2d 988, writ denied 437 So.2d 1150.

    Md. – Phillips v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 472 A.2d 98, 58 Md.App. 30, certiorari denied 475 A.2d 1201, 309 Md. 89.

    Maas. – Pritsker v. Brudnoy, 452 N.E.2d 227, 389 Mass. 776.

    Minn. – Morey v. Barnes, 2 N.W.2d 829, 212 Minn. 153.

    Miss. – Miller v Mix, 137 So. 742, 161 Miss. 681.

    Mo. – Hagler v Democrat–News, Inc., App., 699 S.W.2d 96.

    Mont. – Keller v. Safeway Stores, 108 P.2d 605, 111 Mont. 28.

    Neb. – Morearty V. Strunk, 226 N.W. 329, 118 Neb. 718.

    Nev. – Branda v. Sanford, 637 P.2d 1223, 97 Nev. 643.

    N.H. – Morrissette v. Cowette, 449 A.2d 1221, 122 N.H. 731.

    N.J. – Molnar v. Star–Ledger, 471 A.2d 1209, 193 N.J.Super. 12.

    N.Y. – Aronson v. Wiersma, 483 N.E.2d 1138, 65 N.Y.2d 592, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1006. Duci v. Daily Gazette Co., 3 Dept., 477 N.Y.S.2d 760,102 A.D.2d 940.

    N.D. – Ellsworth v. Martindale–Hubbell Law Directory, 289 N.W. 101, 69 ND. 610.

    Okl. – Winters v. Morgan, 576 P.2d 1152, appeal after remand 594 P.2d 1220.

    Or. – Kilgore v. Koen. 288 P. 192. 133 Or. 1.

    Pa. – Dobson by Dobson v. WBRE. – TV, Inc., 500 A.2d 1226, 347 Pa. Super. 612.

    S.C. – Galloway v. Cox. 172 SE. 761, 172 S.C. 101.

    S.D. – Springer v. Swift, 239 N.W. 171, 59 S.D. 208.

    Tex. – Musser v. Smith, App. 14 Dist., 690 S.W.2d 56, affirmed 723 S.W.2d 653.

    Vt. – Kinsley v. Herald & Globe Ass'n, 34 A.2d 99, 113 Vt. 272.

    Wash. – Carey v. Hearst Publications, 143 P.2d 857, 19 Wash.2d 655.

    Wis. – Denny v. Mertz, 267 N.W.2d 304, 84 Wis.2d 654, appeal after remand 302 N.W.2d 503, 100 Wis.2d 332, affirmed 318 N.W.2d 141, 106 Wis.2d 636, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 179, 459 U.S. 883, 74 L.Ed.2d 147.

    Wyo. – Sylvester v. Armstrong, 84 P.2d 729, 53 Wyo. 382.

    Different editions of newspaper

    Ga. – Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Gilreath, 235 S.E.2d 633, 142 Ga.App. 297.

    (17) Colo. – Burns v. McGraw–Hill Broadcasting Co., Inc., 659 P.2d 1351.

    D.C. – Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., D.C., 433 F.Supp. 600, affirmed 578 F.2d 442, 188 U.S.App.D.C. 200.

    Ill. – Allen v. Au, 435 N.E.2d 167, 61 Ill.Dec. 678, 105 IIl.App.3d 887.

    52


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 15

    Thus, in determining whether an article implies a defamatory message, it is necessary to consider the place and position of an item in the publication, (18) as well as the headlines of the article, (19) the character of display of the headlines, (20) or cartoons or pictures used to illustrate the text. (21)

    Conversely, in order to determine whether a headline is libelous, the headline should be construed together with the text of the article. (22) If a headline is not a fair index of the article with which it appears, the headline must be examined independently to determine whether it is actionable under general principles of libel. (23) The fact that the defamatory meaning of a headline may be dispelled by a reading of the entire article is of no avail to the publisher, (24) since a headline is often all that is read by the casual reader and therefore carries a potential for injury. (25)

    § 15. As to Person Defamed

    a. In general
    b. Error as to person defamed
    c. Publication affecting a class

    a. In General

    Defamatory words, in order to be actionable, must refer to some ascertained or ascertainable person, and that person must be the plaintiff.
    Library References

    Libel and Slander 21.

    Defamatory words, in order to be actionable, must refer to some ascertained or ascertainable person, and that person must be plaintiff. (26) If

    Ind. – Martin v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Inc.. App., 415 N.E.2d 759.

    La. – Boyd v. Community Center Credit Corp., App., 359 So.2d 1048.

    Mont. – .Wainman v. Bowler, 576 P.2d 268, 176 Mont. 91.

    N.J. – Karnell v. Campbell, 501 A.2d 1029. 206 N.J.Super. 81.

    N.Y. – Gaeta v. New York News, Inc., 465 N.E..2d 802, 62 N.Y.2d 340, 477 N.Y.S.2d 82.

    Okl. – Sellers v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 687 P.2d 116.

    Pa. – Ruts v. Bethlehems' Globe Pub. Co., 484 A.2d 72, 335 Pa.Super. 163.

    Wis. – Westby v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 691, 81 Wis. 2d 1.

    Television broadcast

    Wash. – Sims v. Kiro, Inc., 580 P.2d 642, 20 Wash.App. 229, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 2164, 441 U.S. 945, 60 L.Ed.2d 1047.

    (18) Ind. – Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211, 175 Ind.App. 548.

    (19) U.S. – Dupont Engineering Co. v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co.. D.C.Tenn., 13 F.2d 186.

    Ariz. – Central Arizona Light & Power Co. v. Akers, 46 P.2d 126, 45 Ariz. 526.

    D.C. – Lane v. Washington Daily News, 85 F.2d 822, 66 App.D.C. 245.

    Fla. – Byrd v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., App., 433 So.2d 593, petition for review denied 443 So.2d 979.

    Ga. – Constitution Pub. Co. v. Andrews, 177 SE. 258, 50 Ga.App. 116.

    Hawaii – Fernandes v. Tenbruggencate, 649 P.2d 1144, 65 Maw. 226.

    Ill. – Antonelli v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 1 Dist., 450 N.E.2d 876, 71 Ill. Dec. 188, 115 Ill.App.3d 432.

    Ind. – Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211, 175 Ind.App. 548.

    Kan. – Jerald v. Houston, 261 P. 851, 124 Kan. 657.

    Miss. – Miller v Mix, 137 So. 742, 161 Miss. 681.

    Mo. – Hylsky v. Globe Democrat Pub. Co., 152 S.W.2d 119, 348 Mo. 83.

    Neb. – Fitch v. Daily News Pub. Co., 217 NW. 947, 116 Neb. 474.

    N.Y. – Brown v. Johnson Newspapers Corp., 444 N.Y.S.2d 493, 84 1 A.D.2d 636.

    Okl. – Wiley v. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co., 233 P. 224, 106 Okl. 52.

    Tenn. – Black v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 141 S.W.2d 908, 24 Tenn. App. 137.

    (20) Ga. – Constitution Pub. Co. v. Andrews, 177 SE. 258, 50 Ga.App. 116.

    Mich. – Gustin v. Evening Press Co., 137 N.W. 674, 172 Mich. 311.

    (21) Cal. – Blake v. Hearst Publications, App., 170 P.26 100, 15 C.A.2d 6.

    Fla. – Byrd v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., App. 4 Dist., 433 So.2d 593, petition for review denied 443 So.2d 979.

    (22) U.S. – Gunder v. New York Times Co.. DeNY., 37 F.Supp. 911. Ariz. – Central Arizona Light & Power Co. v. Akers, 46 P.2d 126, 45 Ariz. 526.

    Ill. – Kulesza v. Chicago Daily News, 35 N.E.2d 517, 311 lll.App. 117.

    N.Y. – Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 73 A.D.2d 276.

    Okl. – Wiley v. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co., 233 P. 224, 106 Okl. 52.

    Headline accurately reflecting text

    In action by state senator, who was candidate for certain political party's nomination for certain congressional district, against state chairman of another political party for alleged libel from publication and distribution of brochure stating that state senator had voted for decriminalization of marijuana and legalization of homosexuality, no error occurred in not finding headlines contained in brochure to be separate from text of letter, and libelous even if text was not, since headlines and introductory material accurately reflected content of following text.

    Kan. – Hein v. Lacy, 616 P.2d 277, 228 Kan. 249.

    (23) N.Y. – Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 73 A.D.2d 276.

    (24) Kan. – Brinkley v. Fishbein, 8 P.2d 318, 134 Kan. 833.

    N.Y. – Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 73 A.D.2d 276.

    (25) N.Y. – Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 73 A.D.2d 276.

    (26) U.S. – Lowry v. Credit Bureau, Inc. of Georgia. D.C.Ga., 444 F.Supp. 541.

    Ariz. – Hansen v. Stoll, App., 636 P.2d 1236, 130 Ariz. 454.

    Cal. – Aguilar v. Universal City Studios. Inc., 219 Cal.Rptr. 891, 174 C.A.3d 384.

    Colo. – Dare v. C.B. Johnson, Inc., App., 660 P.26 517.

    D.C. – Mosrte v. Trussell, App., 467 A.2d 475.

    53


    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 15 53 C.J.S.

    the words used contain no reflection on any particular individual, no averment or innuendo can make them defamatory. (27)

    It is not necessary for an alleged defamatory statement to refer specifically to plaintiff, (28) provided the words used in describing the person meant can be shown to have referred to him and to have been so understood (29) by others. (30) However, when extrinsic facts are relied on to prove the reference to plaintiff, he must show that the conclusion that the publication refers to him is reasonable and that the extrinsic facts upon which that conclusion is based were known to those who read or heard the pub1ication. (31)

    It is not necessary that all the world should understand that the charge referred to plaintiff, since it is sufficient that those who know plaintiff can make out that he is the person meant; (32) but the liability of defendant depends on whether the defamation was calculated from its intrinsic quality to lead other persons to believe that it referred to plaintiff. (33) In determining the identity of the person or persons defamed, the rules governing the construction of defamatory re–

    Ga. – Fiske v. Stockton, 320 S.E.2d 590, 171 Ga.App. 601. Ky. – Louisville Times v. Stivers, 68 S.W.2d 411, 252 Ky. 843.

    La. – Cavalier v. Houma Courier Newspaper Corp., App. I Cir., 472 So. 2d 214.

    Mass. – New England Tractor–Trailer Training of Connecticut, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 480 N.E.2d 1005, 395 Mass. 471.

    Minn. – Brill v. Minnesota Mines, 274 NW. 631, 200 Minn. 454.

    Miss. – Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So.2d 271.

    Mont. – Campbell v. Post Pub. Co., 20 P.2d 1063, 94 Mont. 12.

    N.J. – Durski v. Chaneles, 419 A.2d 1134, 175 N.J.Super. 418.

    N.Y. – Howard v. Buffalo Evening News, Inc., 453 N.Y.S.2d 516. 89 A.D.2d 793.

    N.C. – Arnold v. Sharpe, 25! S.E.2d 452, 296 N.C. 533.

    Okl. – Holway v. World Pub. Co., 44 P.2d 881, 171 Okl. 306.

    Tex. – Carter Publications v. Fleming. 106 S.W.2d 672. 129 Tex. 667.

    Va. – Ewell v. Boutwell, 121 SE. 912, 138 Va. 402.

    Wash. – Sims v. Kiro, Inc., 580 P.2d 642, 20 Wash.App. 229, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 2164, 441 U.S. 945, 60 L.Ed.2d 1047.

    Wis. – Ogren v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., App.. 350 N.W.2d 725, 119 Wis.2d 319.

    Connecting defamatory matter with plaintiff in pleading see infra § 137.

    Evidence to show reference to plaintiff see infra § 168.

    Persons entitled to sue see infra § 112.

    (27) U.S. – Turner v. Crime Detective, D.C.Okl., 34 F.Supp. 8.

    Ga. – Fiske v. Stockton, 320 S.E.2d 590, 171 Ga.App. 601.

    N.C. – Arnold v. Sharpe, 251 S.E.2d 452, 296 N.C. 533.

    Tex. – Harris v. Santa Fe Townsite Co., 125 S.W. 77, 58 Tex.Civ.App. 506.

    (28) U.S. – Avins v. White, C.A.Del., 627 F.2d 637, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 398, 449 U.S. 982, 66 L.Ed.2d 244.

    (29) U.S. – National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., C.C.A.Mo., 20 F.2d 763, certiorari denied Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co. v. National Refining Co., 48 S.Ct. 157, 275 U.S. 570, 72 L.Ed. 431.

    Cal. – Dewing v. Blodgett, 11 P.2d 1105, 124 Cal.App. 100.

    Ill. – Kulesza v. Alliance Printers & Publishers, 47 N.E.2d 547, 318 Ill. App. 231.

    Iowa – Boardman & Cartwright v. Gazette Co., 281 N.W. 118, 225 Iowa 533.

    Ky. – Cole v. Commonwealth, 300 S.W. 907, 222 Ky. 350.

    Miss. – Conroy v. Breland, 189 So. 814, 185 Miss. 787.

    N.Y. – Jackson v. Consumer Publications, II N.Y.S.2d 462, 256 App. Div. 708.

    Pa. – Harris by Harris v. Easton Pub. Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 335 Pa.Super. 141.

    Wash. – Hollenbeck v. Post–lntelligencer Co., 297 P. 793, 162 Wash. 14.

    (30) Ill. – Beresky v. Teschner, 381 N.E.2d 979, 21 11l.Dec. 532, 64 111. App.3d 848.

    Ky. – E. W. Scripps Co. v. Cholmondelay, App., 569 S.W.2d 700.

    N.J. – Dijkstra v. Westerink, 401 A.2d 1118, 168 N.J.Super. 128, certification denied 407 A.2d 1203, 81 N.J. 329.

    N.Y. – Giaimo v. Literary Guild, 434 N.Y.S.2d 419, 79 A.D.2d 917.

    Ohio – Woolf v. Scripps Pub. Co., 172 N.E. 389, 35 Ohio App. 343.

    Tenn. – Stones River Motors, Inc. v. Mid–South Pub. Co., App., 651 S.W.2d 713.

    Va. – Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d 713, 229 Va. 1, certiorari denied Fleming v. Moore, 105 S.Ct. 3513, 472 U.S. 1032, 87 L.Ed.2d 643 and Lewis v. Port Packet Corporation, 105 S.Ct. 3528, two cases, 473 U.S. 905, 87 L.Ed.2d 633.

    Wash. – Sims v. Kiro, Inc., 580 P.2d 642, 20 Wash.App. 229, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 2164, 441 U.S. 945, 60 L.Ed.2d 1047.

    Necessity of publication to third person see infra § 50.

    Owner of business referred to in consumers' magazine

    Owner of business manufacturing fireplace grate, although not mentioned by name in consumers' magazine article critical of fireplace grate, was nevertheless entitled under law to bring libel suit in his own right, since those who knew or were acquainted with owner understood from reading publication that it referred to him.

    U.S. – Cranberg v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., C.A. 5 (Tex.), 756 F.2d 382, rehearing denied 763 F.2d 416, two cases, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 148, 474 U.S. 850, 88 L.Ed.2d 122, rehearing denied 106 S.Ct. 872, 88 L.Ed.2d 911.

    Book labeled "novel"

    Fact that book containing allegedly defamatory matter was labeled as being a "novel" did not bar any claim that writer or publisher could be found to have implied that character in book was a factual representation not of a fictional character but of sit actual nonfictional person in that test was whether a reasonable person, reading book, would under. stand that fictional character therein portrayed was, in actual fact, plaintiff actually as described.

    Cal. – Bindrim v. Mitchell, 155 Cal.Rptr. 29, 92 C.A.3d 61, certiorari denied 1(X) Set. 490, 444 U.S. 984, 62 L.Ed.2d 412 and Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. Bindrim, 100 S.Ct. 490, 444 U.S. 984, 62 L.Ed.2d 412, rehearing denied 100 S.Ct. 713, 444 U.S. 1040, 62 L.Ed.2d 674.

    (31) N.Y. – Bee Publications. Inc. v. Cheektowaga Times, Inc., 4 Dept., 485 N.Y.S.2d 885, 107 A.D.2d 382.

    (32) U.S. – Ousler v. Petricelli, C.A.N.Y., 616 F.2d 636.

    Miss. – Conroy v. Breland, 189 So. 814, 185 Miss. 787.

    (33) Ill. – Ball v. Evening American Pub. Co., 86 N.E. 1097, 237 Ill. 592.

    54


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 15

    marks generally have been applied. (34)

    Defamation of relatives.

    A libel or slander of one member of a family does not constitute a defamation of, or give rise to a cause of action in favor of, other members of the family. (35)

    Defamation of deceased person.

    The maligning of the memory of a deceased person does not give rise to a cause of action for damages in a favor of his relatives where it does not affect their reputation. (36)

    b. Error as to Person Defamed

    Generally, if the public may understand that the words used referred to the plaintiff it is immaterial that the defendant had no such intention.


    Generally, if the public may understand that the words used referred to plaintiff, it is immaterial that defendant had no intention to refer to plaintiff, (37) since defamation consists in the apprehension of the hearers, not in the mind of the author of the statement, (38) and the person whom the author has in mind when he publishes his article is not determinative of the issue of his liability. (39) It is immaterial that defendant mistakenly identified plaintiff as someone else, (40) or, if the publication was of and concerning plaintiff, that plaintiff was described by a wrong name, (41) or that defendant did not know plaintiff as the person defamed. (42)

    Where a publication is defamatory per Se, the fact that it is made to apply to plaintiff, although there is a mistake as to the initials of the person intended, will be no excuse. (43) On the other hand, the name used in a publication is not conclusive, (44) and if the publication viewed in connection with the publicly known circumstances is such that it could refer to one personally, no other person would have a right of action, (45) even if, by reason of identity of name with that used in the publication, he might sustain injury thereby. (46)

    c. Publication Affecting a Class

    Where a defamatory publication affects a class of persons without any special personal application, no individual of Chat class can maintain an action for the publication, but a class may be defamed, so as to authorize any member of the class to sue, where the defamatory matter is applicable to every member of the class.


    Where a defamatory publication affects a class of persons without any special personal application, no individual of that class can maintain an action for the publication. (47) However, a class may be defamed, so as to authorize any member of the class to sue, where the defamatory matter is applicable to every member of the class. (48) This is particularly so where the statement is directed toward a comparatively small group of persons or a restricted portion of a general class; (49) and if the charge is against a class, and is, or may be, made of definite application, any one of that class may maintain an action on

    (34) Ill. – Latimer v. Chicago Daily News, 71 N.E.2d 553, 330 Ill.App. 295.

    (35) N.Y. – Feinstein v. Kaye, 57 N.Y.S.2d 54, 185 Misc. 185, affirmed 59 N.Y.S.2d 277, 269 AD. 1044. appeal denied 59 N.Y.S.2d 628, 270 A.D. 765.

    (36) U.S. – Wright v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures. D.C.Mass., 55 F.Supp. 639.

    N.Y. – In re Fleming, 228 N.Y.S. 544, 223 AD. 849.

    Tex. – Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, Civ.App., 144 S.W.2d 417.

    Persons entitled to sue see infra §§ 112–114.

    (37) U.S. – Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp., D.C.Pa., 561 F.Supp. 404.

    Mo. – Coats v. News Corp., 197 S.W.2d 958. 355 Mo. 778.

    Immateriality of defendant's intent in defamation actions see infra § 43.

    (38) Mont. – Granger v. Time, Inc., 568 P.2d 535, 174 Mont. 42.

    (39) Mont. – .Granger v. Time, Inc., 568 P.2d 535, 174 Mont, 42.

    (40) Ga. – Minday v. Constitution Pub. Co., 182 S.E. 53, 52 Ga.App. SI.

    N.C. – Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 212 NC. 780.

    (41) Pa. – Clark v. North American Co., 53 A. 237, 203 Pa. 346.

    (42) U.S. – Dexter v. Spear, C.C.R.L, 7 F.Cas.No. 3,867,4 Mason 115.

    N.Y. – Corrigan v. Hobbs–Merrill Co., 126 N.E. 260, 228 N.Y. 58.

    (43) D.C. – Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy, 3 F.2d 207, 55 App.D.C. 162.

    (44) U.S. – Lowry v. Credit Bureau, Inc. of Georgia, D.C.Ga., 444 F.Supp. 541.

    La. – Cavalier v. Houma Courier Newspaper Corp., App. I Cir., 472 So. 2d 274.

    (45) Mont. – Shaffroth v. Tribune, 201 P. 271, 61 Mont. 14.

    (46) Mass. – Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 34 N.E. 462, 159 Mass. 293.

    (47) U.S. – American Civil Liberties Union v. Kiely, C.C.A.N.Y., 40 F.2d 451.

    Ga. – Constitution Pub. Co. v. Leathers, 172 SE. 923, 48 Ga.App. 429.

    Ky. – Louisville Times v. Stivers, 68 S.W.2d 411, 252 Ky. 843.

    (48) U.S. – American Civil Liberties Union v. Kiely, C.C.A.N.Y., 40 F.2d 451.

    Ky. – Kentucky Fried Chicken of Bowling Green, Inc. v. Sanders, 563 S.W.2d 8.

    (49) U.S. – Arcand v. Evening Call Pub. Co.. C.A.Mass., 567 F.2d 1163.

    D.C. – Service Parking Corporation v. Washington Times Co., 92 F.2d 502, 67 App.D.C. 351.

    Ga. – Constitution Pub. Co. v. Leathers, 172 S.E. 923, 48 Ga.App. 429.

    Ky. – Louisville Times v. Slivers, 68 S.W.2d 411, 252 Ky. 843.

    Mich. – Lins v. Evening News Ass'n, 342 N.W.2d 573, 129 Mich.App. 419.

    Mont. – Granger v. Time, Inc., 568 P.2d 535, 174 Mont. 42.

    55


    LIBEL AND SLANDER § 15 53 C.J.S.

    showing that the words applied especially to him. (50)

    As the size of the class increases it becomes more and more difficult for one to show that he was the one at whom the statement was directed, (51) and a claim cannot come within the principle of group libel merely by denominating a small subset of a large group of plaintiffs unless the small group so defined reasonably appears to have been identified by the statement. (52) If the group is so large, or the statements so indefinite, that the objects of the defamatory statements cannot be readily ascertained, the statements are not actionable. (53)

    § 16. – Imputations of Crime

    If allegedly defamatory words in their natural and ordinary signification fairly import a criminal charge, it is sufficient to render them defamatory as containing an imputation of crime.


    Library References

    Libel and Slander 22.
    In accordance with the general rules as to the construction of alleged defamatory words or language, considered supra §§ 13, 14, words used in imputing crime should be weighed and considered in the light of the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time, (54) should be construed, together with the rest of the publication of which they are a part, as a whole, (55) and should be given the effect they would probably produce on the average person (56) of common and reasonable understanding (57) who reads or hears them. The intent of the defendant is not a governing factor in the construction. (58)

    In order to be actionable as charging a crime, it is not necessary that any particular words be used to denote the crime, (59) or that the words

    N.M. – Poorbaugh v. Mullen, App., 653 P.2d 511, 99 N.M. 11, certiorari denied 653 P.2d 878, 99 N.M. 47.

    N.Y. – Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 84 A.D.2d 226.

    Or. – Cushman v. Day, 602 P.2d 327, 43 Or.App. 123.

    Va. – Eweil v. Boutwell, 121 SE. 912, 138 Va. 402.

    W.Va. – Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentinel Co., 26 S.E.2d 209, 125 W.Va. 731.

    Wis. – Ogren v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., App., 350 N.W.2d 725, 119 Wis.2d 379.

    (50) D.C. – Service Parking Corporation v. Washington Times Co., 92 F.2d 502, 67 App.D.C. 351.

    Ky. – Louisville Times Co. v. Emrich, 66 S.W.2d 73, 252 Ky. 210.

    Mich. – Lins v. Evening News Ass'n, 342 N.W.2d 573, 129 Mich.App. 419.

    Or. – Patzer v. Liberty Communications, Inc., 650 P.2d 141, 58 Or.App. 679.

    Wis. – Ogren v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., App., 350 N.W.2d 725, 119 Wis.2d 379.

    (51) Ky. – Kentucky Fried Chicken of Bowling Green, Inc. v. Sanders, 563 S.W.2d 8.

    Factual inquiry necessary

    There must be a factual inquiry to determine the degree that the defamatory comments or accusation of the group focuses on each of the individual members of the group.

    N.Y. – Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 84 A.D.2d 226.

    (52) U.S. – Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., D.C.Mass., 489 F.Supp. 481.

    (53) U.S. – Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, A Division of CBS, Inc., C.A.Mich., 665 F.2d 110.

    Ariz. – Hansen v. StoII, App., 636 P.2d 1236, 130 Ariz. 454.

    Mont. – .Granger v. Time, Inc., 568 P.2d 535, 174 Mont. 42.

    N.Y. – Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 84 A.D.2d 226.

    Attack on governmental operations

    In the absence of sufficient evidence that the attack focused on the plaintiff, an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations cannot be utilized to establish a libel of those administering the operations.

    U.S. – Rosenblatt v. Baer, N.H., 86 S.Ct. 669, 383 U.S. 75, 15 L.Ed.2d 597.

    Alleged defamation of persons of particular national derivation

    Mass. – Mikolinski v. Burt Reynolds Production Co., 409 N.E.2d 1324, 10 Mass.App. 895.

    Class of doctors of osteopathy

    Doctor of osteopathy's libel action was not maintainable, where publication constituted impersonal reproach of indeterminant class of doctors of osteopathy of which there were 19,686 in United States, there was no particular or personal reference made to particular plaintiff and whatever aspersions were cast by publication fell upon profession of osteopathy, and not upon small or identifiable group within class of osteopaths.

    Okl. – McCullough v. Cities Service Co., 676 P.2d 833.

    (54) Ga. – Horton v. Georgian Co., 157 SE. 892, 43 Ga.App. 19.

    Tex. – Burkhiser v. Lyons, Civ.App., 167 SW. 244.

    (55) U.S. – Cantrell v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., D.C. III., 529 F.Supp. 746,

    Ill. – Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 415 N.E.2d 434, 47 Ill.Dec. 429, 91 lll.App.3d 735.

    (56) Del. – Gordon v. News–Journal Co., 176 A. 657, 6 W.W.Harr. 396, 36 Del. 396.

    Ga. – Horton v. Georgian Co., 157 SE. 892, 43 Ga.App. 19.

    S.C. – flowers v. Price, 6 S.E.2d 750, 192 S.C. 373.

    Tex. – Burkhiser v. Lyons, Civ.App., 167 SW. 244.

    (57) U.S. – Cantrell v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., D.C. Ill., 529 F.Supp. 746.

    Ill. – Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 415 N.E.2d 434. 47 Ill.Dec. 429, 91 IlI.App.3d 735.

    (58) Del. – Gordon v. News–Journal Co., 176 A. 657, 6 W.W.Harr. 396, 36 Del. 396.

    (59) Mo. – Kirk v. Ebenhoch, 191 S.W.2d 643, 354 Mo. 762.

    Ohio – Schoedler v. Motometer Gauge & Equipment Corp., 16N.E.2d 958, 134 Ohio St. 78, 11 O.O. 487.

    56


    53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 17

    should impute the offense with the technical accuracy required in an indictment or that they should make the charge in express terms, (60) provided the essential elements of the crime are included within the fair meaning of the words spoken. (61)

    It is sufficient if the allegedly defamatory words, taken in their natural and ordinary signification, fairly import a criminal charge. (62) Therefore, words not actionable in themselves may express a criminal charge by reason of their allusion to some extrinsic fact, or in consequence of being used and understood in a particular sense different from their natural meaning and thus become actionable. (63) Moreover, if words charging a crime are spoken with reference to some transaction not amounting to the crime charged, the hearers must understand the reference in order to render the words harmless and not actionable. (64)

    However, where the plain import of the words spoken impute no criminal offense, they cannot have their meaning enlarged by innuendo so as to support a cause of action, (65) nor are words actionable, although ordinarily importing a crime if they are spoken or written in a different sense and understood in that sense by the person addressed. (66)

    In order for a defamatory oral utterance to be slanderous as imputing a crime, the statement must be not only such as may convey to the hearer the impression that the crime in question is being charged, (67) but it must be couched in such language as might reasonably be expected to convey that meaning to anyone who happened to hear the utterances; (68) it is not enough that the person to whom the remark is addressed may unwarrantably reach the conclusion, from the language used, that a crime is being imputed to the person to whom the speaker refers. (69)

    Words calculated to induce suspicion.

    There is authority that words conveying a mere suspicion that a person has committed a crime are not actionable per se. (70) However, there is also authority that, where the obvious tendency of a publication is to fasten suspicion of the commission of a crime on plaintiff, it is actionable. (71)

    (60) Ill. – Gasanzio v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 2 Dist., 477 N.E.2d 805, 87 I1I.Dec. 679, appeal denied 132 1ll.App.3d 914. La. – Martin v. Markley, II So.2d 593, 202 La. 291.

    Mo. – Starnes v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power Co., App., 22 S.W.2d 73, affirmed 52 S.W.2d 852, 331 Mo. 44.

    Mont. – Keller v. Safeway Stores, 108 P.2d 605, 111 Mont. 28.

    N.Y. – Caffee v. Arnold, 2 Dept., 478 N.Y.S.2d 683, 104 A.D.2d 352.

    S.C. – Flowers v. Price, 6 S.E.2d 750, 192 S.C. 373.

    Tex. – Rednick v. Messimer, Civ.App., 181 S.W.2d 1014.

    Utah – Malouf v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 283 P. 1065, 75 Utah 175.

    Wash. – Tennant v. F.C. Whitney & Sons, 234 P. 666, 133 Wash. 581.

    (61) Tex. – Rednick v. Messimer, Civ.App., 181 S.W.2d 1014.

    (62) Ill. – Zurawski V. Dziennik Zjednoczenia Pub. Corporation. 2 N.E.2d 956, 286 Ill.App. 106.

    La. – Martin v. Markley, II So.2d 593, 202 La. 291. Minn. – .Larson v. P. B. Wrigley Co., 235 NW. 393, 183 Minn. 28.

    (63) S.C. – James v. Western Union Tel. Co., 126 SE. 653, 130 S.C. 533.

    Mont. – KelIer v. Safeway Stores, 108 P.2d 605, 111 Mont. 28.

    N.Y. – Kammerer v. Sachs, 227 N.Y.S. 641, 131 Misc. 640.

    S.C. – Flowers v. Price, 6 S.E.2d 750, 192 S.C. 373.

    Tex. – Elder v. Evatt, Civ.App., 154 S.W.2d 684.

    Utah – Malouf v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 283 p. 1065, 75 Utah 175.

    Wash. – Tennant v. F. C. Whitney & Sons, 234 P. 666, 133 Wash. S81.

    (64) S.C. – Hubbard v. State Co., 37 S.E.2d 503, 208 S.C. 176.

    (65) Ga. – Burrow v. K–Mart Corp., 304 S.E.2d 460, 166 Ga.App. 284.

    Ky. – Molt v. Ashby, 160 S.W. 810, 150 Ky. 612.

    Mo. – Hunt v. Gerlemann, App., 581 S.W.2d 913.

    (66) Ill. – Parker v. Kirkland, 18 N.E.2d 709, 298 lll.App. 340.

    S.C. – James v. Western Union Telegraph Cc., 126 SE. 653, 130 S.C. 533.

    (67) Ga. – Jones v. Poole, 8 S.E.2d 532, 62 Ga.App. 309.

    (68) U.S. – Walgreen Co. v. Cochran, C.C.A.Mo., 61 F.2d 357.

    Ga. – Jones v. Poole, 8 S.E.2d 532, 62 Ga.App. 309.

    (69) Ga. – Whitley v. Newman, 70 S.E. 686, 9 Ga.App. 89.

    (70) N.C. – Burns v. Williams, 88 N.C. 159.

    (71) S.C. – Turner v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 163 SE. 796, 165 S.C. 253.

    57


    Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 53, pp. 25 – 57.


    Corpus Juris Secundum Index