EXHIBITED

Proposal For Issuance of A WRIT
As Deemed
Necessary, Applicable and Authoritative

The Clause 15 TEST

INCORPORATED INTO THE MAIN PLEADING, WITH DEMAND TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE, INCORPORATED HEREWITH

The Clause 15 TEST.

1. In law, as with other things of discovery, a great event, a deep and true thing of fact, may be passed over with but small mention, yet be of great of monumental importance to the people, and to their governments, in the very entirety of their nation itself.

2. The word "The" means or goes to "one," "one only," and "one in specific."

3. The word "Provide" means or goes to "To make available, for the voluntary use of, on a direct basis;" "Provide For" means or goes to "To make or have made available, or provided –indirectly, or on an indirect basis."

4. The word "execute" means "to enforce."

5. "The Militia." The one Militia that the United States is entitled to, under the authority of the Constitution, to utilize, comes from and is made up of parts of the different militias of the several States, and does not exist solely of itself without the Militias of the different States being made a part thereof.

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6. Question. Where are the people in the various Militias located at? Or that is, where do the Militias, or the people of them, ordinarily live?

7. The Answer Is:

> Out in the States themselves, and not in Washington, D.C. at all. At least, certainly, they, Militias, did NOT exist in Washington, D.C. before there was a Washington, D.C., before there was the Constitution itself.

8. This means that the concept of the one Militia for the United States, or the States' Militias themselves being used, a part of each one, by the

United States in a singular form, exists out in the very States themselves, and NOT elsewhere.

9. The word "Union" means, in its most basic form, "an unincorporated association." Noted. An association, such as a union, whether or not in a compacted form, may have for its operational purposes, a form of government constructed to form such union, by way of contract, not as a matter of law.

10. Even if it should be claimed that a Union, once formed, can be thereafter "incorporated," it nevertheless exists as an invariable pre-requisite for doing so that all elements of the "association" be involved in such "incorporation," which, if there were any part of such association having the independent agency of consent, to do so would require such element's knowledge and consent to the incorporation itself, or else, if not consenting, would have the right to disassociate itself from the Union to be incorporated altogether, for it is the nature of an association to recognize that it is not a compelled condition, but rather a voluntary one.

11. This would mean that in order for the United States, being that same Union, or unincorporated association, that we see at Clause 15, of Section 8, Article I, at any time, and by a *particular* procedure for doing so, to, incorporate the United States, or "the Union," into a corporate form, no matter what the claim for reason or purpose in doing so, would require that the United States central government itself both inform the several States that it was moving to incorporate the Union, inclusive of each and all of them, and that it needed their consent to do so, or else their uncontestable right to disassociate themselves (not secede) from "the Union" by legal and lawful right, it being where the execution of due process of law is concerned that the right of disassociation is lawful, where just cause and right to do so is proven in a court of law, of competent jurisdiction, whereas the act of merely seceding straightforward would not be lawful, or legal.

12. Has the United States central government, at any time in known, recorded history, ever engaged the several States with the proposition that the Union of the several States, being embodied in associative form as the United States itself, become incorporated for any purpose at all, such as to give to its operators or actors therein any form of immunity from any wrongful or unConstitutional acts that they might do, at all?

13. So far as has been known in either recorded law or history, there has existed NO such act of engagement or notification to the States themselves that the United States, or Union, was to be made into, or as an "incorporated Union," and so therefore, it ISN'T, and its employees, representatives, operators, operatives, functions, and actors, as to any claim for immunity, have immunity – NOT.

14. Even if some kind of corporate immunity could be claimed, it would merit nothing to the insider actors thereof as against other insiders thereto, which, since the States themselves are made up of the people within them, as recognized for "U.S." purposes at Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 – "Citizens of the United States," and such people, as "Citizens of the United States" would automatically exist as "insiders" themselves as well, against whom the other "insiders" of the United States "corporation," if any, would have no immunity to be erected against to any actual or real extent. Nor does a corporation have Immunity" against any of its insiders, any of them, for a corporation is constructed to protect its insiders against outsiders, never to protect its own insiders against its own insiders, nor to protect itself against its own insiders as well.

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15. Question. Does Clause 15, of Section 8, of Article I, read, or mean, as follows:

> "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the several States."

16. Answer. NO. Clause 15 does NOT read that way. It reads, instead:

> "To provide for calling forth the Militia to ***execute*** the Laws of the Union." (emphasis added)

17. The word "Union" as it applies historically and legally to the United States, as it came to be recognized at Article I, Section 8, Clause 15, refers to the United States itself, as a nation, as THE nation to be recognized, in an associative form of the States to form it, with its federalized government to represent it, THE Union, to be regarded as the legal representation of that very Union, the United States, itself.

18. This means, that in our particular case, the word "Union," as it was recognized to be during the Civil War, goes to the term, United States, which is our nation. The laws of the United States are this nation's laws. The word "Union" goes to the United States, which goes to the word, "nation." The word "Union," in our specific case, goes to the word "nation."

19. Therefore, "the laws of the Union" stated at Clause 15 means or goes to "the laws of the nation," or, "the nation's laws."

20. Going to Clause 15: When we understand that the words, "the laws of the Union" means the same thing as "the nation's laws," we discover the legal fact that the body of laws, produced by the national government of that same Union, or the United States, to be enforced (executed) thereby, are to have, as their total means of enforcement, the use of "the Militia," which the Militia is the one Militia only, that the Congress alone can call upon in order to enforce its "the laws" of this "nation,"

21. You will note that the wording at this point establishes that the Congress is to have power to "provide for," not "provide," the calling forth the Militia.

22. This can be understood better by regarding what the construction of these words is not. What Clause 15 does NOT say is, "To call forth the Militia," nor does it provide or establish anything akin to it.

23. The laws of this nation, or The Nation's the Laws, or one set of the Nation's laws as they were to exist out in the States themselves, were to be enforced by some manner of enforcement. The question would ordinarily arise, what manner of enforcement did the Constitution's framers intend to bring about the enforcement, or execution, of this Nation's Laws?

24. Fortunately for all of the people everywhere, that mode of enforcement is already determined, and expressed, within the same Constitution itself, at Clause 15, of Section 8, of Article I, and that single form of enforcement, for all of this nation's laws, made by its central government, and to be found applicable to the people out in the several States, is known as The Militia – comprised of the Militias of each of the States themselves.

25. Now, in this, question? Would it be the idea that "the Militia" whose purpose it would be to "execute" or enforce "the Nation's laws" as would be applicable to the people out in the several States, replace, say, the sheriff's departments of each and all counties of those same States? To replace all forms of local law enforcement with the specially established "the Militia" as could only be used by the Congress itself? Would that be the idea of using "the Militia" to enforce the nation's laws? Yes or No?

26. If we were to conclude that as being the case, we would be claiming that it was the intent of the Constitution's framers that we, the people in the several States, all exist, immediately upon the ratification of the Constitution, all be subject to a kind of ongoing military – even though as a single nationally called Militia – government – if we decided that the purpose of this one nationally called Militia was to replace all forms of local law enforcement, of the cities, towns, counties, and State.

But that is not what the purpose of this one Militia form, this mode of **Enforcement** of THE laws of THE nation, or Union, or United States, was for.

27. By knocking away the idea that The Militia might be used to execute or enforce any kind of violation or offense occurring inside of any State's boundaries, and THE Militia being the only form of enforcement EXPRESSLY incorporated into the Constitution for the purpose of enforcing the Nation's Laws – out in the States themselves, we are forced, indisputably, to look to the kinds of things that such Militias could be called upon to enforce for or against, and we find, right in that same Clause 15, only two, which are, Insurrection and Invasion, the only kind of purposes for which any military body can ever be formed for, inclusive of all Militias themselves. This kind of power would be considered to be Inherent to the very nature of the Militias themselves.

28. And as we look to Clause 17, of Section 8, two Clauses later, we find that this is exactly the kind of law making power, out in the States themselves, that the Congress has been given for law making purposes out in the States, defined and determined by the KINDS of places, and the inherent purposes of the same, stated therein, as forts, dockyards, magazines, and arsenals and so forth, all the kinds of places and purposes that a Militia could utilize for enforcing such Nation's Laws, should there ever be a need to.

29. Since there are only two types of enforcement actions that a Militia can possibly engage in, or be engaged in, being either insurrection or invasion, and since the Militia is the only kind or mode of law enforcement that the United States Congress was ever given to enforce this Nation's Laws by, as a matter of law-enforcement jurisdiction, the United States will have an impossible time of explaining how it created any other form of law enforcement at all, in order to enforce the Nation's Laws outside of the use of The Militia, which it was authorized to employ for such a purpose.

30. To explain, just how, any Militia at all, inclusive of its own, could and would be used to enforce a law involving regulatory agencies, any and all of them, to enforce any law against uses of any form of drugs, carry or having of weapons – an impossibility considering who, meaning the Militias themselves, would be enforcing such an idea – to enforce laws alleging any such things as "wire fraud," "mail fraud," immoral acts on the internet, wrongful use by way of the Internet, unlawful use of airwaves for either radio, or television, or any other such form of scientific energy, or any claim for enforcement of taxes, any kind at all, alleged as owed to the national government – by the very people themselves, inclusive of any and all forms of commerce taking place within the States or across any States' boundaries, even if claimed, by the United States, at Title 28, Sections 81 – 131, or by Section 7604 of the IRS code, to be in a "U.S. district."

31. To explain how, the Congress, would use the one and only form of law enforcement for this Nation's Laws, the word "the Laws" being singular and comprehensive of all of its laws – which were and are to be applied to the people – out inside of the States themselves.

32. To explain how, the Congress, with the pure constraint as to the one and only kind of law enforcement ever provided, Expressly, to the Congress, could ever create the U.S. Marshals by the corrupt act called The Judiciary Act of 1789, wherein the authors of that infamous Bill, created them in the face of Clause 15, as though the United States had suddenly been given a new power to enforce wrongs against its own nation's laws, even within its own borders as described at Clause 17 itself.

33. For even in said Clause 17, in the District of Columbia, Territory of Washington, being where "The Nation's Laws" would also be found to be, the United States could only use a called "The Militia" therein to enforce the Nation's laws *there*, as in contrast to the local moral laws, as with the common law, that would be needing to be enforced therein.

34. Consequently, not even with the fraudulent use of any claim for a "U.S. district" does the United States incur any authority to enforce this Nation's Laws using any other form of law enforcement than the one established for it to use at Clause 15, of Section 8, of Article I.

35. If so otherwise, point to it; which of the powers found under The Clause 18 TEST is it to be found – for enforcing the Nation's Laws as were and are to be applicable – out in the several States themselves, in spite of all the supreme Court can do as though it had the power or authority to make a single rule, for anybody, anywhere, not pertaining to government itself. In actuality, the judicial branch of government has no power or authority to make a single rule of any kind, not even for the government of the United States, for that power exists for the Congress alone at Clause 14 of Section 8, Article I, and would add, unConstitutionally, an Extended Power to the 7 net Extended Powers at Clause 1, of Section 2, of Article III, which 7 net Extended Powers it, the entire judicial branch, is absolutely constrained, or chained, to.

36. From all of this, we find that The Clause 15 TEST of Section 8 now demands that we determine, in the execution of any national law of this nation, as is to be regarded for enforcement purposes against the people out in any of the several States, exactly how any Militia at all is to be utilized for engagement purposes for any such wrong alleged to have been committed against the United States, or the Nation, or the Union, as all of such terms, interchangeably, are known to be.

37. And if we find that such any alleged form of United States law cannot be engaged in by "The Militia" of the United States, such law, for any law enforcement purpose, must be, and so is, UnConstitutional, altogether, and actions in a State court of record jurisdiction must be ensued, to rise to the United States supreme Court, to demand that such form of UnConstitutional, and so Unlawful, law enforcement be withdrawn from the several States, inclusive of the State in question in particular, without delay, lest it be regarded as an act of Treason and/or Jurisdiction Fraud, by the United States itself, and subject to Qui Tam

Action Prosecutions, for the benefit of the State government wherein the UnConstitutional wrong first had its seeding, or planting, therein.

38. One of the critical elements in the current acts of Article III, Section 3, Clause 1 **Treason** underway by named, unknown actors of the United States central government, one or more illegally operating factions thereof, is the employment of the proposed United States central government's alleged Department of Justice, or that is, the "U.S. Attorney General," which under The Clause 15 TEST would be found to have been unConstitutionally Established, or to be an Unlawful existing Department of the United States central government, there being no lawful use therefor.

39. This fact alone, when discovered by any potentially materially affected party of the United States central government, in either of the three branches thereof, was ENOUGH to establish the motive for Murder, Mass Murder, in order to suppress even the very idea of it.

40. Oklahoma. April 19, 1995. Now, for the first time, as we begin to see the uttermost and absolute importance of the Militias in our lives, all of them, as demanded by Constitutional duty to be organized and administered at Clause 16 of Section 8, Article I, with the power and strictly limited duty found at Clause 15 itself, for exclusive and strictly limited enforcement of national law purposes, rendering as being UnConstitutional and thus unlawful all forms of federal law enforcement in the wake of such learned understanding, why it was the vile necessity of the corrupt and evil part of those who have served, and are yet serving, in our nation's government, to commit such an act, so heinous and dastardly, as to murder their very own, including little children, to bring about the Oklahoma incident in such a way that the very word Militia would be looked at with disdain, with ill repute, in order to try to disparage the very mention of the word Militia, even though, and especially, in the Constitution itself, in order to distance the people from this very truth, now revealed, in order to continue the undeniable take-over of the States, and the people in them, as it, the United States, did,

commencing minimally on January 1, 1945, at Title 28, Sections 81 – 131 – against "them," as found at Article III, Section 3, Clause 1.

41. THE Militia. The Militia referred to at Clause 15 of Section 8, Article I, refers to the United States Militia, under the direct authority of the Commander In Chief, when called into Actual Service pursuant to The Clause 18 TEST, going STRICTLY to Clause 11 of Section 8, Article I, the same one as referred to in the Fifth Amendment, also in its reliance upon the States' Militias within the scope of the Second Amendment, a part of which is empowered by Clause 16, of Section 8, Article I, as an ongoing State DUTY to employ for the defense of the people of the United States largely and the State itself specifically.

42. The important role which "the Militia" was to have played in the proposed United States nation's defense, as well as its many forms of illegally existent law enforcement, when The Clause 15 TEST became realized by named, unknown parties approximately five decades ago, became the underlying motivation which lead to the Oklahoma Bombing itself.

43. The evidence for this statement is as amazing to realize as the evidence itself; over a period of some 30 to 40 years, Covert political operations existing centrally, with the greatest likelihood that the same originated, at least on the surface, in the Territory of Washington, District of Columbia, brought about a subtle change in All 50 States as to the existence of the use of the term "Militia" or "the Militia" therein.

44. Not one, not just a few, but ALL fifty States gradually, over several decades, abandoned their original use of the term State Militia altogether, though still existing on the books of law of such States, converted to such usages, for public descriptive purposes, as "State NATIONAL Guard," converting the State's ORGANIZED Militia into the "federal" "the Militia" only.

45. The incredible Task of getting fifty (50) State legislatures to do this, to cover up the use of the term "Militia" from the public eye, could have been no small political task, for such illegally operating Faction, as a part of the United States central government, to accomplish, but that such a final condition was accomplished exists today as a matter of State by State, State Militia gone from the public eye, FACT (and this FACT is here, and now known, and isn't going to go away).

46. The danger that someone might carefully, eventually scrutinize the full import and meaning of Clause 15 of Section 8, Article I, The Clause 15 TEST, and come to know that ALL proposed United States forms of law enforcement were all illegal, all unConstitutional, every one of them, could not be allowed to stay on the surface, where anyone in an ever more educated public might have ability to discern the matter more correctly for the first time, and place the entire proposed United States central government, in all of its Treasonous plans, at jeopardy for being sanctioned, and possibly even politically dismantled altogether as well.

47. THE Militia as the United States Militia has been provided for in law at:

> **Title 10**
> **Section 311. Militia: composition and classes**
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> (a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.
> (b) The classes of the militia are -
> (1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and
> (2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.

48. While there will be no discussion of this matter here, as a matter of Constitution[al] error, the Ninth Amendment's Doctrine of The First Generation TEST will deny the requirement of female citizens as being a required part of any Militia, State or United States.

49. The issue of the Militia and its use in the Enforcement of the Nation's Laws is a serious one, the "army" provided for at Clause 12 of Section 8, Article I, being as a matter of fact, was to be made up of members of each State's Militia as called for, but only for a period of two years, unless an extension of time was needed beyond that time, limited to the non-aggressive purpose of suppressing insurrections and repelling invasions, denying the United States central government and its President from ever invading any other country (the President is NOT the Commander In Chief – at any time, no matter the occasion or claim by congressionally passed law otherwise, – merely by his being sworn in to office as President), for a government in its design to make war is limited to the kind of war that it is empowered to make according to the Law that Constrains it. Thus, if an organized army were made up of girl scouts whose power to make war was limited to their ability to make and bake cookies, nothing beyond that power would be available to that government. Where the only two (2) Powers provided to the Congress by which The Militia would be empowered to act are defensive only, as we see existent in The Clause 15 TEST, no Power exists, or ever has, to extend the Nation's Power to make War outside of the Nation itself, wherever it exists as a matter of Statehood, as a joined part of the proposed United States itself.

50. These are certainly powerful political issues, if true, and they are true, meaning that The Clause 15 TEST, in addition to the fact that it would deny and require the abolishment of the legal existence of every "federal" form of law enforcement ever established, from the U.S. Marshals in 1789, to Homeland Security as present today, would also serve as a severe constraint against the alleged right of the United States central government to make aggressive, imperialistic war, by illegal or unlawful use of its non-Commander-In-Chief President, for such The

Clause 18 TEST failed usages as “military action” or “police action,” etc., neither of which equate to The Clause 18 TEST passing Clause 11 Power to “declare War” only, and nothing less, affecting every unlawful act for the making of not-true-WAR by any fraudulent “Commander In Chief,” commencing from President Truman’s threat for the use of the naval fleet to the current Non-Commander In Chief use of military (the Militia) powers by President George W. Bush (And Further Others).

51. It being recognized that the Militia for the United States is the ONLY form of Lawful law enforcement for this Nation, or for “the [Nation’s] Laws,” and there being no need for a permanent standing army once a State’s own Militia, from which the National Militia was and is to be partly derived, and to be dismantled altogether as required of it at Clause 12, of Section 8, of Article 1, raising the questions, for the first time.

52. Since The Militia is limited to being called for the purpose of “executing” or enforcing The Nation’s Laws, and the enforcement of the Nation’s Laws cannot be done on foreign shores, and while it is recognized that a called army could be used to counter-attack another country’s invasion of the United States, or either of them, and since the Navy, the only fighting force ever enabled by the Constitution itself, having established within its own Constitutional authority for taking war to another country, the division thereof known as the Marine Corp, such division being entirely competent, so long as it have enough Marine troops to engage an enemy on foreign shores for a true Clause 11 purpose, and there being no lawful purpose for creating a dual operation of the same fighting force on a foreign shore, except for the fraudulent purpose of keeping the enlistment of the army alive outside of and beyond the 2 year constraint at Clause 12, it has now been found that the United States government, outside of a needful calling forth of a Clause 15 Militia, in such an occasion where the same might be needed, if any, only has the Constitutional Power, in the case of any war NOT within the United States itself, to only employ its Navy, for any military attack at all, if any, on any foreign shore, if any.

53. Leaving ALL other forms of military forces not just mentioned to be dismantled, permanently, altogether, leaving the balance of the nation's future ahead to only involve the Navy, (the alleged Marine Corp itself fails The Clause 18 TEST and the further TEST for Procedural Due process, having been Dismantled several years PRIOR to the proposed Constitution's 1787 ratification, the "army," as any standing army, fails The Clause 12 TEST, combined with The Clause 11 TEST, and the Commander In Chief TEST at Article II, Section 2, Clause 1) UNLESS there should be a need, at any time, for there to be a use of "the Militia," being organized into a two year, none permanent army, in order to "suppress insurrections and repel invasions, as the non-imperialistic nation the proposed United States was meant to be.

54. Recognizing further that the ONLY time that a Clause 12 army might be a necessary usage was to have been during times when a new State and the new State's Militia was being organized with sufficient strength that the claim for a standing army within such new State could be dispensed with, and the 2 year army there**in** dismantled, altogether, forever.

55. In consideration of this incontrovertible evidence now, as the honorable U.S. supreme Court's Mr. Justice Johnson (1824) discerned as that which, in or about the Constitution, is "discovered," we must regard that the acts of U.S. Senator William Paterson in his structuring and sponsoring of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to establish the office of the U.S. Marshals as to enforce this Nation's Laws, to act with alleged authority in alleged U.S. districts, were acts of fraud and betrayal of the American people; were acts unconscionable, UnConstitutional, and thus Unlawful and Illegal, or else, irrevocably, were acts of legislative error to the highest degree possible, and can be give no further regard as to any legal law of the United States.

56. While the latter may have been possible, in consideration of the pure recklessness by which the Judiciary Act of 1789 was written or concocted, the greater weight of knowledge substantiates that it was in

fact the former reason that caused the misguided and gross Act by the U.S. Congress to be passed, much worse to be carried out by men in high places as though in compliance to the Constitution in the remotest sense at all.

EXECUTIVE ORDERS – REITERATING THE CLAUSE 15 TEST FOR THE UNLAWFUL ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMANDER IN CHIEF

57. As a matter of vital necessity to the Discovery set forth in this, The Clause 15 TEST, it is necessary to truthfully unveil what has now been realized as the UnConstitution[ality] of ALL [alleged] "Executive" Orders as they are proclaimed over any State of the Several States of the United States, and Showing Forth the Indisputable Why that such [alleged] "Executive" Orders are in legal fact UnConstitution[al], Why this State Court must Recognize its Own Duty To Resist Any Further Intervention by the United States central government in its Prescribed State Duties to Act under its True Revealed Right of Duty at Article III, Section 2, Clause 3, **nothing else** except that same ***with*** **Standing**.

58. It has too long been erroneously thought that the President of the United States is, from the moment that the same has been sworn into that office, the Commander in Chief of all of the "armed forces" of the United States. Not So, as we will now Discover.

59. An Order of an official authority has the weight of law behind it. A bona fide Order of the President of the United States could hardly be perceived as being any "local" law, nor any "State" law. Such an Order by the President of the United States would be, and so is, the Requirement for the Enforcement of National Law.

60. But the President cannot "Enforce" this Nation's Laws except by the Use of the One Form of Law Enforcement that the Congress is granted the Power to "provide FOR the calling forth" for such Nation's Laws to be Enforced by, and ***that*** Form of Law Enforcement IS the

[National] Militia, comprised of parts of the various State militias of the Several States of the United States, not belonging originally or solely to the United States itself.

61. A President has No Power, and therefore No Authority, to Enforce a National Law at all, Where No Constitution[al] Power to do so is provided, but is instead Constrained Against the same having any such Power.

62. The requirement at Clause 15 of Section 8, Article I, or as examined by this, The Clause 15 TEST, requires, as the chief Authority over "the [National] Militia" that the Constitution's Framers put Over the Project of Enforcing the Nation's Laws IS the Commander in Chief of and over "the [National] Militia," which Authority is distinctly different, in law and in fact, from the Office of the President of the United States.

63. Being Carefully Constrained by The Clause 18 TEST (see The Clause 18 TEST), in order to determine under what conditions the Congress may provide an actual basis in National Law for the President to be engaged as a Commander in Chief for any legitimate purpose, we turn first to Clause 11, of Section 8, of Article I, and find there that the Congress has been granted the Power to "declare War."

64. "War," unlike Acts by Tyrants, Sovereigns, and Dictators, is a very specific thing, and does not exist as a trivial *or lesser* act of aggression as Tyrants, Sovereigns, and Dictators have been known to wield against a populace at any given point in time that they might decide to act viciously against any hapless people for whom they were given alleged authority over.

65. Because of this necessary difference between an actual "War" and anything else less than that, such things as a "police action" or a "military action" and so forth do not come under the specifically granted Constraint laid at Clause 11 of Section 8, Article I. As stated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in U.S. v. Lopez, the Power at Clause 11 of Section 8

has [already] been "defined," and that definition does not include any other form of Power except the Power to "declare War."

66. The question has been raised, and wrongfully exists in the minds of the public at large, as to when, or at what particular time, does the President actually become the Commander in Chief, if he ever does at all during his term of Office. Assumptions are not Law, and in order to determine precisely When a President may be engaged as the single Authority to Enforce this Nation's Laws, we turn again to that Supreme Law which tells us, and Under which Supreme Authority we are compelled to believe in and hold to, lest the Inherent Crime of Contempt of Constitution be at our very doorstep.

67. We move now to Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, which will disclose precisely When that moment in Time begins, and not one moment sooner, IF any moment in Time at all.

68. At Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, we Comprehend its words Carefully, but Fully, as stating, indisputably, that:

> "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, **when called** into the **actual Service** *of* the United States;" (emphasis added)

69. Here, we See When and How the President becomes the Enforcer of the Laws of the United States, or "the [Nation's] Laws," and that is, by the Use of "the [National] Militia," but Only ***When*** Actually ***Called***, by the Use of one of the Actual Powers Findable, before or after Clause 18, by the Congress in order to do so.

70. Realizing that The Clause 18 TEST Power by which the Congress may Call the President into Actual Service is found at Clause 11 of Section 8, Article I, and otherwise only at Article IV, Section 4, in Still Constrained Circumstances, wherein its States:

> "and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."

71. We are startled, yet compelled, to realize that the President of the United States is Never the Commander in Chief at any time when the same has not been officially Called, either by the Congress, or else by a State's legislature or else Governor, by which the President may engage "the [National] Militia" by such actual Calling, and by no other party than these two government forms may the President be made a Commander in Chief, for even one day of Time, no matter what "the [Nation's] Law" to be enforced for the benefit of "them" (Article III, Section 3, Clause 1) may happen to be.

72. Understanding this realization of Constitution[al] Law recognizes that (1) President Truman had no lawful authority, at all, to order even a single sailor to travel any distance anywhere, much less order a single ship halfway around the World to be left there except the Congress fund its travel to there and back by the other side of the World, by which proposed Act President Harry Truman committed the known Crime of Extortion (not a political act, considering the gravity of the issue); (2) that *No* President who has *ever* served for any term of Office – where the same was neither "called into the actual Service" by way of the Congress' Clause 11 declaration of War or by a State's petition for such assistance as is provided for at Article IV, Section 4 – has Ever existed, Constitution[ally] as a Commander in Chief – of anything; (3) No right for any picture of any President, as *though* a Commander in Chief, to hang – on any wall of any veterans' hospital, nor in any alleged as lawful military base, nor any State or unlawfully or pre-called National Militia, no matter how popular that President may, in the media, be, and no matter how "right" it might appear to be to do so to the contrary – exists; (4) No right or Power or Authority of the President of the United States exists, when not being actually Called into the Service of being Commander in Chief over (but not of) the army, where the existence of the same constitutes no dual, unneeded empowerment of military force,

over (but not of) the Navy, and over (but not of) "the [National] Militia," to order a single of its personnel to do – anything, at all, whatsoever, and constitutes an Act of Jurisdiction Fraud by the United States central government each and every time that a President, by such an alleged authority, does otherwise.

73. While the President may be, when "called into actual Service" as stated in Clause 1 of Section 2, Article II, the Commander in Chief of the "army" and the "navy," being such "Commander in Chief over the same does not entitle such Commander in Chief to "Enforce [Execute]" "the Nation's] Laws" by their use; only by use of "the [National] Militia" may the President officially Act to Enforce "the [Nation's] Laws," whatever they may be, from whichever of the three (3) branches thereof they may lawfully arise from.

74. Though there are despots that might vainly argue otherwise, it is an impossibility for any President to "call himself" into "actual Service," except he be Constitution[ally] established as a monarch, capable of doing such an Act of his own accord.

75. Because of the unlawful tendency toward monarchism that the United States central government has been moving toward for many decades, its such Acts have created within the public domain a devolving to the common belief that the President is the Commander in Chief of all, or any, of the [military forces] at any and all times other than when called into actual service in time of War, is given greater Confirmation of this Constitution[al] fact, exposing just the opposite to be the case, by the Fifth Amendment itself, for those who might be lead to believe that the calling into actual Service could just exist "at any time" that the Congress, outside of The Clause 18 TEST, might choose, we find that the Fifth Amendment informs us otherwise:

Fifth Amendment:

> "except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger,"

76. Thus, here, in the Fifth Amendment itself, it covers as to the "when" the President can be considered to be, at all, as any "Commander in Chief" (not any actual "general" or "admiral"), and shows that such an actual calling goes to both Clause 11 of Section 8, Article I, and to Article IV, Section 4.

77. ALL FORMS OF UNITED STATES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LAW ENFORCEMENT, REGARDLESS OF THEIR PURPOSE AND HISTORY, EXCEPT THEY FALL UNDER THE ONE FORM OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PROVIDED THE CONGRESS UNDER THE CLAUSE 15 TEST, BEING SUBJECT ITSELF TO THE CLAUSE 18 TEST, ARE ILLEGAL, AND NO STATE'S GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS THE UNITED STATES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, HAS EITHER RIGHT TO AUTHORITY TO ATTEMPT TO ENFORCE THE NATION'S LAWS, OR THE NATIONAL LAWS, EXCEPT THEIR AUTHORITY AS OFFICERS FOR SUCH ENFORCEMENT IS DERIVED BY THAT ONE FORM OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, NO LONGER, BY THESE LEGAL REVELATIONS, TAINTED BY THE HEINOUS OKLAHOMA BOMBING, THE [UNITED STATES] CLAUSE 15 MILITIA ITSELF, AND NOT OTHERWISE.

The Clause 15 TEST

The above named TEST is to establish the following standard, criteria, and objective for Constitution[al] purposes. Any law that is to be considered to be a supreme Law of the United States as provided for at Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, in order that it shall be determined, for any and all enforceable purposes by any State court of the Several States of the United States, must pass The Clause 15 TEST set forth above, inclusive of the Requirement that all acclaimed

United States officials claiming authority for any enforcement (or execution) of the United States (Union's / Nation's / National) law, must be found as deriving such claimed authority under Title 10, United States Code, Section 311 thereof, and not less than the requisites of the same U.S. Law, providing their official rank and standing therein, else the same fails utterly The Clause 15 TEST in conjunction with the Article VI, Clause 2 TEST, which latter TEST does not make all United States central government laws "supreme" merely by their making.

THE FINAL APPLICATION OF THIS TEST IS TO:

Cease To *Ignore* The LAW; DISOBEY The Fraud(s), . . . AND The T R E A S O N.

DULY SUBMITTED AND INCORPORATED;

This TEST and Exhibit Is SEALED, And INCORPORATED, Against That Which Is Found To Be Untrue In The Constitution For The United States, And For That Which Is True In The Said Same Constitution, Into This Case, Now *ARISING*, Before The Lawful Courts of the Several States of the Union of "them," And Not Lawfully Concurrently Elsewhere.