EXHIBITED

Proposal For Issuance of A WRIT
As Deemed
Necessary, Applicable and
Authoritative

The United States Tribunals TEST

INCORPORATED INTO THE
MAIN PLEADING,
WITH DEMAND TO TAKE JUDICIAL
NOTICE, INCORPORATED HEREWITH

I

The Timeless True Meaning And The Lawful And Legal Applicability Of - "Tribunal," Also Inherently Binding Upon The Proposed Constitution For The United States.

1. Upon one's first reading the word "Tribunal" in the Constitution at Clause 9 of Section 8, Article I, it is commonly, but wrongfully, concluded that such word, having as a part of its prefix the word "Tri" meaning "three," that the Tribunal must be a court of three (3) judges.

2. While this is in fact the correct basic number of a Tribunal, it has nothing to do with the "Tri" portion of it, but rather goes to "Trib" as in Tribe.

3. In our efforts to trace backwards in time the truest meaning that we can find of any word's most correctly applicable definition for legal purposes, we often trace words back to the ancient Roman law, since it was the Roman law itself that was associated with the senate and the representation of citizens' votes within that senate, a political and legal structure somewhat similar to that of the United States and the several States today.

4. However, it is not to the Roman empire and law alone that we owe our current interpretation of words in laws, or the meaning of certain words and practices in law that are relied upon to this current day. Some of our practices can be traced back to the ancient Greeks, the ancient Egyptians, and to the ancient Hebrews, or Jewish people, as well.

5. It would be no less proper or fundamentally correct to rely upon, or deny, the interpretations of Roman law, considering that the Romans, as a nation, observed certain religious practices and beliefs of its own, as it would to rely upon or deny any other nation's contributions to our law *without* particular respect to such nation's religious practices and beliefs, so long as those contributions to our law fit with established practices as

we see them today, or the day that the Constitution was first ratified into its own being.

6. Except that the foregoing statement be found to be unreasonable or a form of legal-illogic in its reasoning, by a sound demonstration proving that it is not so, then our right to examine ancient Hebrew law as well, and how certain parts of it have been engrafted into the Law as evidenced in the Constitution itself, cannot be denied such prudent reasoning, any more than the examination and inclusion of Roman law would be denied.

7. Bringing forth certain ancient Hebrew law practices found in practice in certain United States courts, our focus is drawn to a study and dissertation on the Talmud as it pertains to the writing of the Rabbis, in "Ethics Of Our Fathers." At 4: 8, therein, we find the Rabbis stating, as it pertained to their understanding of a court of justice established under Torah law:

> 1) "In the courts of Torah law that were established [shortly after the time of the liberation of the Hebrew nation's enslavement in Egypt] — and which Torah law courts continue to serve us to this day — cases are heard by a tribunal (bet din) of three judges.
>
> 2) "Why three judges? Because, as the Talmud expresses it, 'You should not judge alone, for there is none qualified to judge alone, only the One.' Nor can two judges form a bet din: because the Torah commands to "rule in accordance with the majority," the bet din *must* consist of an uneven number of judges, so that in the case that there is disagreement between them, there will always be a majority opinion. Hence the *requirement* for *three* judges" . . . *in a tribunal* according to the concept established by ancient Hebrew *judicial practices.*
>
> 3) Summarizing the above: The word Tribunal, in its most basic, original meaning, means three, not because of the letters "Tri," which does mean three, the correct term being "Trib," as from "Tribe," which is found historically as arising from the law of the

nation of ancient Israel, as it pertained to the judicial courts thereof, as recorded anciently in its Talmud, going to its Torah as Torah Law, wherein it denied the qualification of a single judge to judge alone, as not having the necessary level of perfection or wisdom and understanding to do so; that two judges in judging could create a deadlocked decision, and therefore three judges were required to break a potential deadlocked vote.

8. It must be understood at this point that it has been considered acceptable by the United States supreme Court, when reviewing cases involving Indian tribes, that it is a proper source for purposes of determining the truth as to what constituted an Indian tribe, how it believed, and what those beliefs meant, to officially recognize the testimony of aging Indian persons brought before its justices to so testify of tribal affairs and ancient and existing Indian heritage.

9. No less a standard than this is expected of a review of the statement involving the writings of these Rabbis, where it deals with the matter of the makeup of that nation's courts themselves, dealing with their own educated knowledge on the matter, for there can be no history so far reaching back in time, to determine what modern organization consisted of from the beginning of recorded, certifiable history, not speculation, than that of the Hebrew people themselves.

10. The Talmud, in its recognition that a judgment of a judge of one alone is not qualified to be considered a just judgment, speaks volumes in truth as far as justice goes, and denies by its very nature the existence of one judge only in any law creating the same, in the United States government of America.

11. In modern support of the incorporation of the ancient Hebrew judicial law into the Constitution's true meaning as it lays upon the word, Tribunal, we studiously review the following along with it:

12. According to the Hutchinson-Farlex Dictionary, the meaning of the word, “tribunal,” is as follows:

> “Strictly, a court of justice, but used in English law for a body appointed by the government to arbitrate in disputes, or investigate certain matters. Tribunals usually consist of a lawyer as chair, sitting with two lay assessors.”

13. The composition, or make up, of a tribunal, or body, as we see here, not the appearance of one by its overall representation, relies upon three persons, not one or two as a “usual” constituency for functioning purposes. The term, “body,” itself, according to its meanings at Webster’s 5, means:

> “a group of individuals organized for some purpose.”

14. Considering that under English law, where it is held that much, even if not all, of the de jure laws of the United States government owes itself to, as a matter of source, an appointed institution, or Tribunal “body,” is determined primarily as a unit or body of three, one presiding, two assisting by assessing, matching the ancient Hebrew nation’s rendition of that same judicial body concept, counseling against one judge and favoring the majority of judges in the court’s decision on a matter, we are inclined to regard a Tribunal as pertaining primarily to three judges or justices impaneled, and not one.

15. In further clarification of this review in understanding, we look to the 1913 edition of Webster’s dictionary, and find that:

> Webster's 1913 Dictionary:
>
> Definition: \Tri`bu*nal"\, n. [Sp.]
>
> > “In villages of the Philippine Islands, a kind of town hall. At the tribunal the head men of the village met to transact business, prisoners were confined, and troops and travelers were often quartered.” (emphasis added)

\Tri*bu"nal\, n. [L. tribunal, fr. tribunus a tribune who administered justice: cf. F. tribunal. See {Tribune}.]

1. The seat of a judge . . . on which a judge and his associates sit for administering justice. (emphasis added)

2. Hence, a court or forum; as, the House of Lords, in England, is the highest tribunal in the kingdom. (emphasis added, see below)

16. The word, "forum," is defined by Merriam-Webster's dictionary, Eighth:

Edition, as: "2. a judicial body or assembly." The word, "body," leads us back to the previous definition of Merriam-Webster's, illustrating that the word body went to "a group of individuals organized for some purpose."

II.

1. NOT MEANT TO BE BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS IT ARISES TO A LEVEL of that which is real as against that which is ***not*** real, that there was never meant to be, by the Constitution's Framers, any United States court below or inferior to the one supreme Court itself (also construed to be a Tribunal court) **Other Than** the **Tribunal** courts of Clause 9, of Section 8, Article I;

2. Except there be found any specific and express Power providing for any other, all other United States courts, irrespective of their history, alleged purpose, or time in service, are UnConstitutional, and the laws that created them are compelled to be regarded, and under such conditions are so Nugatory, or invalid, from their beginning.

3. It was by the passing of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that a derelict and errant Congress chose to ignore the actual reading of the Constitution itself, failed to use its own Powers alone, failed to employ the legal principle, In Pari Materia, for its proper discernment of the Law in the Constitution, and to thereby create 13 alleged districts and district courts

over 11 States, such alleged district courts being limited literally to one (1) judge authority in each case therein, while at that same time creating the alleged circuit courts, specifically three of them, as courts of appeal, over the 13 districts overlaid upon unpurchased properties and places of the named States of the several States of the United States.

4. The creation of these alleged United States districts and the one-judge district courts therein, along with the three circuit courts, not Tribunal courts, became the first major Jurisdiction Fraud and Ultra Vires against The Clause 18 TEST constraints, committed by the Congress of the United States.

III.
THE CREATION OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE INFERIOR COURTS THERETO

JUNE 4, 1787

1. **"**It was then moved & 2ded. to proceed to the consideration of the 9th. resolution submitted by Mr. Randolph-when on motion to agree to the first clause namely "Resolved that a National Judiciary be established" It passed in the affirmative nem. con. It was then moved & 2ded. to add these words to the first clause of the ninth resolution namely-"to consist of one supreme tribunal, and of one or more ***inferior*** **tribunals**," which passed in the affirmative-**"** (emphasis added).

2. IN THE REVIEW OF THIS PARTICULAR PASSED RESOLUTION, Which Appears in the Constitution as Article III, Section 1, We Find That It Was The Original Intent of the Constitution's Framers That The supreme Court itself Be Established as a Tribunal Court, Which It Is Recognized To Be, AND That The Courts "Inferior Thereto" Consist Also As ONLY Tribunal Courts.

3. As To The Will of the Constitution's Framers in the Application of the said Passed Resolution, it is to be understood that while the makeup of the supreme Court itself was to have been provided thereafter, the Consistency of the Courts "Inferior Thereto" WAS ***NOT*** to be given a later distinction. The Line Over The Required Consistency of the "Inferior" Courts, as the Actual Provided Power of The Congress to Establish Them, Was Held By The Constitution's Framers At Clause 9, of Section 8, of Article I, and NOT Elsewhere.

4. By our reading of the words at Article III, Section 1, wherein it extends, in relation to the establishment of the supreme Court itself, "the judicial Power *of the United States*" to "such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," we discover that, if the Congress were to be allowed to use that same Power, or that is, the "judicial Power" itself and not its "own Power" (see The Clause 18 TEST), then it, the Congress, might have total liberty, not **constraint**, to define the words "inferior Courts" to mean anything that it wanted, or wants, them to mean.

5. This, however, is not how the separation of Powers works; the Congress has its "own powers" (see Exhibited The Clause 18 TEST) and is not entitled to use the Powers belonging to either of the Other Two Branches of government to discern those Other Two Branches with; it must use "its own powers," else be regarded as dishonest, as a thief, committing unlawful acts against the unsuspecting and hapless victims that it has designed to commit those acts against.

6. Thus, in addition to the application of In Pari Materia to both Article III, Section 1 AND Clause 9, of Section 8, of Article I, we find that as on Monday, June 4, 1787, it was the Will of the Constitution's Framers that the Courts "inferior" to the to-be-established supreme Court were to be, themselves, Tribunals, or Tribunal Courts, just as the supreme Court itself, being recognized as a Tribunal, is a Court, and not otherwise, which Enactment of Lower or "inferior" Courts requirement was expressed, as a

Power of the Congress for so establishing same, at said Article I, Section 8, Clause 9, as aforementioned.

7. ON TUESDAY, JUNE 5, 1787, the Constitution's Framers again undertook the principle of the Only Kinds of Courts to be established as "inferior" to the supreme Court, by causing to be inserted in its minutes for the day that:

> The words, "one or more" were struck out before "inferior tribunals" as an amendment to the last clause of Resoln. The Clause-"that the National Judiciary be chose by the National Legislature," being under consideration.

8. AGAIN, ON JUNE 5, 1787, the matter of National Tribunals is pressed forward, as recorded:

> "Mr. WILSON & Mr. MADISON then moved, in pursuance of the idea expressed above by Mr. Dickinson, to add to Resol: 9. the words following "that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals." They observed that there was a distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not establish them. They repeated the necessity of some such provision.
>
> "Mr. KING remarked as to the comparative expence that the establishment of inferior tribunals wd. cost infinitely less than the appeals that would be prevented by them."

9. ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 13, 1787, the Constitution's Framers Resolved:

> "12. Resold. that the Natl. Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior Tribunals." Note. "Resold" = Resolved.

10. ON TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 1787, we find that the concept of the national Tribunal was to be considered for Direct Appeal from State Tribunals, or Courts, in that:

> "It gave to the federal Tribunal an appellate jurisdiction only-even in the *criminal cases enumerated, The necessity of any such provision supposed a danger of undue acquittals in the State tribunals. Besides in most if not all of the States, the Executives have by their respective Constitutions the right of pardg. How could this be taken from them by a legislative ratification only?"
>
> "12 Resolved. That the national Legislature be empowered to appoint ***inferior*** **Tribunals**." (*referring to the Writ of Habeas Corpus - **only**, now being errantly applied to alleged "district courts" instead of the Tribunal Courts of Clause 9, Section 8, Article I).

11. ON TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1787 we discover as to the Tribunal, that:

> "Mr. MADISON, considered the negative on the laws of the States as essential to the efficacy & security of the Genl. Govt. The necessity of a general Govt. proceeds from the propensity of the States to pursue their particular interests in opposition to the general interest. This propensity will continue to disturb the system, unless effectually controuled. Nothing short of a **negative** on their laws will controul it. They can pass laws which will accomplish their injurious objects before they can be repealed by the Genl. Legislre. or be set aside by the National Tribunals. Confidence can not be put in the State Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and interests."

12. ON WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 1787, it was again resolved as to the National Tribunals, "inferior" to the One (1) National supreme Tribunal, i.e., supreme Court, that:

> "12. Resol: "that Natl. Legislature be empowered to appoint ***inferior*** tribunals." (emphasis added)

> **"**Mr. GHORUM. There are in the States already federal Courts with jurisdiction for trial of piracies &c. committed on the Seas. No complaints have been made by the States or the Courts of the States. Inferior tribunals are *essential* to render the authority of the Natl. Legislature effectual." (emphasis added).

13. **..1** The Attestment to the Tribunals' exclusive existence is further seen by its reference at Clause 9, of Section 8, of Article I, as "inferior Tribunals." The adjective "inferior," by its very definition, concludes that there must be that Tribunal which it is ***inferior*** to, otherwise, why "inferior Tribunals?" This of course is True, without dispute, because it actually reaffirms that very pronouncement as we have already covered within the Constitution's Planning Meetings on June 4, 1789, wherein it the United States supreme Court was designated as to be recognized as the "supreme Tribunal."

..2 This means that, even though it has become hard for us to grasp today as to its intended implications and ramifications, the only thing that was to be considered to be "inferior" to the "supreme [Tribunal] Court was the [national] "inferior Tribunal [Courts] under that one "supreme [Tribunal] Court.

..3 Consequently, in addition the principle of "in pari materia" between Article III, Section 1's "inferior Courts," we now have the ability to use the full intended language as would be actually construed from that very use of the word "inferior," at all, with the word "Tribunals, at Clause 9 of Section 8, of Article I, by rewriting said Article III, Section 1's pertinent description of the Courts alluded to thereby, as conclusively logical as follows:

..4 Rewriting from the discerned "Inferior" position, recognizing that such term could only lead one to the discovery of the one supreme Tribunal Court above the "Tribunals" same below that one Court, we Read, more Thoroughly, more Legally Revealing:

..5 **Article III**

> "**Section 1.** The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme [Tribunal] Court, and in such inferior [Tribunal] Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."

..6 From the above rendering we find that Section 1 of Article III, having been given its thorough and conclusive meaning, not only from the question for an "**in pari materia**" application between Article III, Section 1 TO Clause 9 of Section 8, Article I, but **also** by virtue of the **comprehensive** meaning of the term "'inferior' Tribunals" goes instantly, ***without reversal or revocability***, to the one supreme **Tribunal** Court, known today as the Supreme Court itself.

..7 This Becomes, and IS, a Second Attestment, at the least, to this Conclusive Fact, arising to the level of the principle of a Conclusive Presumption, from which there can be No Turning Back, and **DENIES** Even the Idea that the proposed Congress was entitled to make, and make-up, any kind of court that it wanted to, just because of the term "inferior Courts" as found in Article III, Section 1's phrase - explaining the Constraints and Benefits that were to Apply to the Courts described therein, though NOT the nature or origin for the actual **Founding** Source of Authority of such Courts (the supreme Court's organizing being from Article II, Section 2, Clause 2; the national Tribunal Courts' organizing being from Clause 9 of Section 8, Article I – as to their respective Creational Authorities), being contained in other parts of the Constitution, as shown within the parenthesis heretofore this assertion.

14. ON THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1787, the requirement for Tribunals, "inferior" to the One supreme Tribunal, or Court, stated that:

> "XV. RESOLVED, That the national legislature be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals."

15. ON MONDAY, AUGUST 6, 1787, it was entered more officially as to the kind of courts to be established as "inferior" to the supreme Court, to be made, as one of the specific and limited Powers of the Congress to do so, the "inferior" courts inferior to the same said supreme Court:

> "To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;"

16. ON TUESDAY MAY 29, 1787, as to the term "Tribunal" and its position as a Court of the United States, "inferior" to the supreme Court, it was stated:

> "that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance."

PROVIDING US OUR INSIGHT AS TO PRECISELY WHERE IN THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL LINEUP THESE TRIBUNAL COURTS WERE SUPPOSED TO EXIST AT.

17. IN ALL ACCOUNTINGS AS IT PERTAINS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATION'S COURTS, Only One Form of Court was ever discussed by the Constitution's Framers, to be established as "inferior" Courts to the supreme Court itself, and those Courts were, and are, the Tribunal Courts of the United States.

18. ON WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 1787, IT WAS PROPOSED THAT:

> "Mr. RANDOLPH observed that the Courts of the States can not be trusted with the administration of the National laws."

19. JUNE 18, 1787. While there was much discussion as to districts for voting purposes during the Constitution's formal planning meetings, and many different thoughts and positions on that subject, On June 18, 1787, Mr. Founder Hamilton, for his first time speaking in the Constitution's Formal Planning Meetings, spoke, as recorded, by Mr. Founder Madison, in the second large paragraph of his speaking, in reference to a "district" which might be connected to a tribunal, as follows:

> "Subordinate authorities he was aware would be necessary. **There must be district tribunals: corporations for local purposes**." (emphasis added)

20. This use of the word "tribunal" followed by "corporations for local purposes" represents a strong similarity to the heretofore-referenced definition above of the word "tribunal," restating it here as:

> "Strictly, a court of justice, but used in English law for a body appointed by the government to arbitrate in disputes, or investigate certain matters. Tribunals usually consist of a lawyer as chair, sitting with two lay **assessors**."

This "local" "district **Tribunal**" "**corporation**" concept by Hamilton, for any "federal" purpose, did not make it into the proposed Constitution by September 17, 1787, nor at any time after it.

21. Considering that all other mention of the term "districts" in the Constitution's planning meetings were in regards to voting districts and not otherwise, that irrespective of the number of times the word "districts" was mentioned, in any context, therein, such word "district" made its way into the Constitution itself only one time, at Clause 17 of Section 8, Article I, such tribunals as pertains to local questions necessary to be arbitrated, where a lawyer and two lay assessors might be utilized in a corporate form and purpose, would have been the more definable application of Mr. Founder Hamilton's use of the term "tribunal" in conjunction with the word "districts," meaning the same thing that it came down to, everything said, when the Constitution itself was finally competed and ratified; the "districts" were to be local or State districts, and the tribunals, as referred to by Mr. Hamilton in the same context, were to be associated with such local districts as State local tribunals, not for the United States.

22. This fact is further bolstered by the fact that not only do we find no other place in the Constitution's planning meetings where a tribunal is ever mentioned in the same breath with a district, not only the fact that if we *were* to consider such an arrangement to be one for the United States it

would have demanded that the judges in such districts proposed by the Judiciary Act of 1789 NOT be singular in position but rather be impaneled in three (3) or more judicial offices, which they were not, but at No Time thereafter did even Mr. Founder Hamilton himself reassert the two words together, which on such an important motive and intent, would have well been the heat of the issues, considering that the structure of a nation's court system is one of the most exigent principles of government upon which its people must be made to rely; there can be no mistake as to that – at no time during the Constitution's planning meetings was there ***any*** proposal for a United States district court of one judge, but of Tribunal Courts, consisting of three (3) or more judges thereof to be required, and not otherwise.

IV.
ADDITIONAL PROOF AS TO THE TRIBUNAL COURTS AS THE ONE AND ONLY LAWFUL COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, "INFERIOR" TO THE SUPREME COURT ITSELF

HOW SECTION 9 AND SECTION 10, OF ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION WORKS IN CONJUNCTION WITH SECTION 8.

1. Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 – Habeas Corpus . . . goes to Tribunal Courts, not any other alleged as "district" court. As stated elsewhere in this TEST, **No** Judiciary Act of 1789 **existed** on September 17, 1787, **or at any time prior** to such 1789 Act as aforementioned.

2. The Five (5) Purposes or Functions of the Nation's intended Tribunal Courts, "inferior" to the supreme Court itself, as the first United States courts to exist directly above the States' courts themselves, for any appeals or other purpose, are set forth herein as being (1) To make effectual the nation's laws; (2) To issue writs of habeas corpus, when and where applicable, over the criminal authority of a State government's prosecution; (3) To serve as a national court of jurisdiction and venue for State court cases, where the State case has been exhausted as to remedy; (4) To serve as the national court through which cases may be narrowly appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court through Article III, Section 2, Clause

2, Phrase 2 as applicably provided for at Article III, Section 2, Clause 1; (5) To serve citizens of different States in cases of diversity, providing for a tribunal for such cases, — not an opinion of one judge only.

3. As we examine and understand the particular Extended Powers of Article III, Section 2, Clause 2, contained for the judicial branch of the United States, we discover that, all laws by the Congress being required to pass all Constitution TESTS that they may be found as required to comply to, and no law of the Congress being instantly supreme merely by its passing, we discover that the only Extended Power (see The Extended Powers TEST) which the judicial Power may rely upon for use out in any of the several States as pertains to the individual people themselves, the Sixth Extended Power having been amended to nullification by the Eleventh Amendment, is the Seventh Extended Power and the Eighth Extended Power, and none other.

4. Such Seventh and Eighth Extended Powers contained in Clause 1, of Section 2, of Article III, go strictly and exclusively to Civil Powers for Enforcement Only, to be ultimately enforced by State courts, having direct Powers over such citizens, and not existing as any form of criminal power for prosecution whatsoever (see the Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 TEST as well as The Clause 15 TEST). Thus, the right for Civil cases only, out in the States, as an Extended judicial Power of the United States over any citizen of any State; NO criminal power for the United States – for any use out in the several States, either provided or provided for within the Seven (7) net **Extended** Powers at Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 – as such, exists.

5. It was the intent and design of the Constitution's Framers to provide to the Tribunal courts a particular and direct Power over the States' own criminal prosecutions, when any such prosecution should violate the Constitution itself. This particular defining of Power, which must be compelled to be applied to such Courts as may be found in Section 8 of Article I, is grounded at Clause 2, of Section 9, Article I, preserving to the United States the direct Power, when going to the Tribunal courts at

Clause 9, of Section 8, Article I, to invoke Habeas Corpus as a necessary intervention over an unlawful, or UnConstitutional criminal prosecution, if there should arise any question of one.

6. In consideration of the fact that Section 9 of Article I is *that* Section whose purpose was to further define the specifically expressed Powers of Section 8 where such Powers were to be considered concurrent to the United States itself in particular, the question of what Court the Power for Habeas Corpus should go to in Section 8 can only reveal itself to one specific court, the Tribunal court(s) of the United States, and none other.

7. This agrees with the recognition of the position for national Tribunals as being those national Courts to be directly available for appeal from State courts, as stated to that end purpose on Tuesday, June 19, 1787, "It gave to the federal Tribunal an appellate jurisdiction only-even in the criminal cases enumerated, The necessity of any such provision supposed a danger of undue acquittals in the State tribunals." Also note the like-applicable language on the Constitution's planning meeting, Tuesday May 29, 1787, "that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance."

8. Recognizing that the appellate power over the criminal question and concern for Habeas Corpus was to be the Power of the Tribunal courts in connection to State tribunal courts, the Tribunal courts were and are to be empowered directly over the Question of Habeas Corpus, the only Courts specifically and literally provided, inferior to the supreme Court itself, on September 17, 1787, found as such in Section 8 of Article I itself.

9. RECOGNIZING ALSO that on September 17, 1787, the date of the first ratification of the Constitution itself, there existed **NO** Judiciary Act of 1789, and thusly, inescapably, NO "district court" upon which to proclaim or connect the extended or associative Power of Habeas Corpus at Clause 2 of Section 9, Article I, to, demanding, by Right for Due Process, a Right Inherent to a People of a Republican Form of Government, that such Habeas Corpus associative or dependent Power at said Clause 2 **connect to** a particular Power **contained in** Section 8 of

Article 1, leaving us to find only One Court's form therein, the Tribunal Court of **Clause 9, of Section 8, Article I**, and none other form of court to be claimed for.

10. The further defined Power for Habeas Corpus at Clause 2 of Section 9, Article I, necessarily arising from ***some*** United States court ***visibly existent***, ***at that time***, ***in Section 8***, the **Tribunal** courts of Clause 9 of Section 8 being **the only** such **courts** to expressly be given their **exist**ence ***at that time***, **Habeas Corpus** only being a Power **belonging to the Tribunal courts *and none other***, the existence of any alleged as other than de facto, U.S. district courts to hold such power is an **error in Constitution[al] discernment** of the applications of Article I's Section 9 to Section 8, and **is a False Power** belonging to a falsely established United States [alleged] district court.

11. On the date of Wednesday, July 18, 1787, we find that it was to be the perceived purpose of the Tribunal courts that they, such said Tribunal courts, be the one "courts" necessary for the proper discernment and enforcement of the Nation's laws, wherein all particular Constitution TESTS could be presented and considered, and not any other court alleging to have the power to so engage in any discernment of the national laws in the Tribunal courts' stead: "Mr. GHORUM. Inferior tribunals are *essential* to render the authority of the Natl. Legislature ***effectual***." (emphasis added).

12. To uphold, sustain, and enforce, that great constraint of law, for both States and United States forms of government, required and warranted to pass through The Great Portal for all laws of the both of them, at Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, Warranting, or Guaranteeing, to the States and to the people thereof, a Republican Form of Government, and nothing less than that to be Guaranteed to.

13. In our understanding of this last statement by Mr. Founder Ghorum, it is the Tribunal whose purpose is essential to the rendering of authority of the national legislature; no other court below or inferior to the supreme Court itself was to be empowered to serve in this capacity.

14. The saturation of all discussions and proposals for United States courts, throughout the duration of the Constitution's Planning Debates, with the proposal for U.S. Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court, the supreme Court itself to be construed to be a Tribunal court, we find no mention of any claim for an alleged "district" court for any purpose, which was to make its way into the Constitution to that end thereafter.

15. This, taken in conjunction that Clause 17 of Section 8, Article I, provides the Congress NO Power (it must STILL use Its Own Established Powers, EVEN in the Territory of Washington, the/such District of Columbia, for if NOT its Own Powers Therein, Whose Powers Would it Use?) to create a "district" court, not in or as an overlay of power in any State, not even in the District of Columbia itself (or any other alleged district, even less); the establishment of an alleged "district" court, or any other court than a Tribunal court, **Fails** The Clause 18 TEST – (see the Exhibited The Clause 18 TEST) – **altogether**.

16. For IF it be contended that the Congress *had* the Power to establish *any* "district" court due to the existence of the word "district" in said Clause 17, then such a professing raises, for the United States judiciary, and the Congress thereof, a problem, insurmountable, as it applies to those courts currently known or called the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, for whichever numbered Circuit the same has been designated to be identified by;

17. For WHEN we check for the words contained in the Constitution, we do find the word "district" as referred to as "such district," going to the same meaning as "one district," in **Clause 17**, as aforementioned;

18. Where the Congress cannot call or name a United States court after any name that it alone chooses (if so, Show Forth The Power to do so, either before or after **Clause 18**), denying it the Power to name a court a Star Chamber Court, a Royal Court, a Dictator's Court, a Chancery Court, a Co-Supreme Court, a King's Court, or a Lord's Court, IF the use of the word "district" to be applied as a name of a court of the United States is to

be based upon its existence, ***somewhere*** at least, in the Constitution itself, then;

19. By Checking or Searching throughout the Constitution, from the date of its initial ratification to this current date, we find that the word "Circuit," the critical description for the "U.S. appeals courts" themselves, does NOT Exist – ***Anywhere*** IN the Constitution.

20. Failing, **Utterly**, The Clause 18 TEST for the 1789 creation of the "Circuit Courts," the ramifications and the legal dilemma that this represents arises to a staggering reality:

21. Either the United States [alleged] district courts are de facto in their entirety, from the date of their 1789 creation, and the alleged Circuit Courts of the United States are in fact nothing less or more than the Tribunal courts established and provided for at Clause 9, of Section 8, Article I, OR . . .

22. . . . The "Circuit" Courts of Appeals Must *Cease to Exist* Altogether, instantly, forthwith, permanently, from this realization, and the alleged U.S. district courts, still not being a lawfully empowered court of the United States to be overlaid over the several States by, must Cease to Exist along with them, leaving the necessity of now calling for the establishment of the United States Tribunal courts as provided for at Clause 9, of Section 8, Article I of the United States Constitution itself.

23. Except there be found any specific Power involving, expressly and not impliedly, the establishment of a United States court, found expressly stated as to its, court's, existence, either **before** Clause 18 or **after** Clause 18, other than the **Tribunal** courts of Clause 9 of same Section 8, Article I, then the Power by the Congress to create or establish any other such court does not exist, and has at no time existed since the unlawful acts of the Judiciary Act of 1789, except as a Jurisdiction Fraud by the United States.

24. As though the Congress of 1789 consisted of some bad, spoiled "children" (*actually most members of the Congress simply could not Read, as could not most of the voters for them, and had to rely upon the claims of hopefully honest others who could to tell them what the Constitution did and did not say or mean*) the Judiciary Act of 1789 was as "legally" and Constitution[ally] **flawed** as there were words contained in it.

Whether sufficient members of the said Congress, that could actually read at all, ever read Clause 9 of Section 8, Article I, or read any of the Constitution's Planning Convention Meetings Minutes prior to proposing said 1789 Judiciary Act, it is certain that there was no association of said Clause 9's "Tribunals inferior" to Article III Section 1's "inferior Courts" as simple legal reasoning as per In Pari Materia would have held that they do, in order to make a proper and true assessment of just what kind of "Courts" that they, the Congress, were **entitled** to make with their "own Powers" granted them.

25. NO entitlement at Article III, Section 1's clause for "such inferior Courts as the Congress may . . . establish" granted to anyone, not even the senatorial authors of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the authority to abandon or avoid application of the legal principle of ***in pari materia***, to compare Article III, Section 1's language of "such inferior Courts" with any other claim, within the same [Constitution] law, for a court, such as a Tribunal would have been, and was *prima facie*, known to be;

26. And thereby abandoning all responsibility to look to *other* parts of the Constitution in order to determine what *other* constraints might exist as to the *kind of courts* those "inferior Courts" might have to be, and to, instead, loosely allow their minds to wander on the subject, as though children in a candy store, unable to contain their desires for whatever they saw before them, as though to go, "*whee*, whoopee, we can make ***Courts***, and we can have ***Courts***, and we can do ***Courts*** up anyway we want 'em. And we can make this kind of ***Court***, and we can make that kind of ***Court***, and we can make that other kind of ***Court*** there, and we can make lotsa and lotsa ***Courts***, any kind of ***Courts*** we wanna make, because we were

"told" that we could make ***Courts***. And that's it. And We can make ***Courts***. Wheeee!"

27. Reckless, Loose, Cracked and Flawed, Defective Lawmaking, Foolish, Childish, Irresponsible. Unlawful, UnConstitution[al],

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28. **The United States Appeals Court**. There is Evidence that there was to have been a recognized Appeals Court for the United States; this intention by the Constitution's Framers is made clear to us by a genuine reading of the Constitution itself, however the reading takes a different turn or outcome than what is expected, for the words are plain in what was intended to have been the sole United States Court of Appeals, being also recognized to be a Tribunal Court in the same sense that the United States Tribunal Courts, errantly miscalled or named as "courts of appeal," except that the One (1) United States supreme Appeals Tribunal Court was never to have existed outside of the boundaries of the Territory of Washington, District of Columbia, have its proclamation as the Appeals Court of the United States at Article III, Section 2, Clause 2, Phrase 2, wherein it plainly states as to that Court's design to be the United States Appeals Court to which all cases of subject matter jurisdiction were to be filed with, by and through the National Tribunal Courts "inferior thereto," not having direct subject matter jurisdiction over such particular cases that it was to be constrained to, prescribing that:

29. Article III, Section 2, Clause 2, Phrase 2: **In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.** (*refers to those particular Extended Powers contained in Clause 1 above same).

30. Except for the certain Constraint that the Clause 9 of Section 8 National Tribunal Courts be the ones to whom State Criminal Cases could be appealed to by way of Clause 2 of Section 9 **Writ** of Habeas Corpus, NOT to any alleged "district court instead thereof, *Since* we find no other place in the Constitution to lay a claim for a "court of appeals," The

Clause 18 TEST taking hold of us on this matter once more, we are necessarily constrained to regard that this particular Court, the United States supreme Tribunal Court, was to be the actual United States Court of Appeals, of a final Appeals Jurisdiction Character, once the National Tribunal Courts, inferior thereto, had exhausted their own efforts, as indicated for them, Tribunals, to exercise July 18, 1787, to properly discern and adjudicate as being "*essential* to render the authority of the Natl. Legislature effectual." (emphasis added).."

31. There being no other mention of an appeals concept – in the Constitution itself – than this, we are compelled to wonder just how such a simple application of concept could have been so easily missed; we would thus ask why was this not caught by those members of the Congress of 1789? Could they not ***read*** these very same words for themselves?

32. It is only when we ask the question in this manner that we realize, possibly for the first time, that the answer for a number of those who took part in government of those times, is and was "NO." "NO," they could not read, literally, or that is to say, **they did not know how to read**, either at all or very little, for this condition was not uncommon in those times, just as we find with people in government of many decades, in fact, over two centuries later, who could not read, *requiring* that there be greater emphasis put on the importance of knowing how to – **read** – in these later days, now more *painfully* obvious to us than ever, as we realize just how badly the Congress of 1789 **erred** in its lawmaking of that time.

33. In this, we are thus to understand that much of the lawmaking that went on, being in great error of understanding, was not because all of those contributors thereto were in some malicious sense – evil, or wicked, though there is no doubt that some of those present were, but that those who could not read were at the disadvantage to those who could and did, as to what exactly was said within the Constitution, and "what did it mean," when it came down to it, "was to be the law" as the Constitution supposedly had provided for the same, or not.

34. Nor, not only could a number of those within the Congress not read, or else r*ea*d and wrote very poorly (according to one Alexis de Tocqueville, a well educated minor court official from France visiting the United States, in one of his notebooks, ridiculed Congressman Davy Crockett as a man "...who had received no education, could read only with difficulty," the history of the times also records of de Tocqueville and his view of others of the time that: "De Tocqueville wondered how American citizens learned about the law and their rights. Public schools, even at an elementary level, hardly existed outside of New England. Newspapers helped to inform the public, but the majority of Americans could not read.") as a matter of fact, but neither could many of the voters – read, or write, it also being understood common law of the times that many could and would only sign their own names with an "X" instead of an actual signature, so illiterate were the masses of the time, that it simply was not hard to put anything over on the people – from a corrupt legislative standpoint, by those in Ill Control of the Constitution itself, by the weight of the sheer ignorance of the people, majority of the times, by every wind of legal doctrine, good or bad, as the case was to be, and is certain to have been, which this TEST now Affirms.

35. Combine the number of those who could not read, or scarcely read at all, both inside and outside of government, with those who did read and write – other languages than English, and you had a mix in which eager tyrants, ready and willing, and able to Mislead the people anywhere that they desired, even if it be to the eventual ruin of all of them, for little do Tyrants ever care more than about serving themselves, of which fact we are painfully aware, throughout history, to have been the case.

36. This is to help explain, not just the fact that there was to be established – the United States Court of Appeals, being also the One United States supreme [Tribunal] Court itself, and none others "inferior thereto" were intended to be such same, but why such plain language was missed entirely – by the honest at heart – who simply could not read the words for themselves to know for sure what was said and what was intended .. by the Constitution's Framers themselves.

37. Consequently, the *errant* and grossly **UnConstitution**[al] Judiciary Act of 1789 caused that the openly prescribed existence of a "court of appeals, to be so characterized by that particular name description, was moved, for direct "federal" appeals purposes, one level down, but without authority to do so. Raising our conscientious awareness, one more, and yet further, that the currently existing, alleged "circuit" courts of "appeal" exist as misnamed or titled courts, having been misdirected by an errant, and likely largely ignorant – as to what the Constitution actually stated therein, with some corrupt wickedness mixed therein – Congress, Senators and Representatives alike, by creating the first of them, alleged "circuits," as "3" ("three") of them, recognizing by that same wording within the aforementioned 1798 Judiciary Act as signifying THREE or more judges, but NEVER 1 (one) judge only, within that same said Act.

38. It has been brought to Plaintiffs' attention that there is, as though there be a claim existing within the United States judicial branch system, whether claimed by the Congress or else any other faction of the United States central government, that the United States district courts are, in reality, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 courts, empowered by Article III, Section 1 Judges therein, and not Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 courts empowered by Article III, Section 1 Judges therein.

39. If considering such a proposal, in any wise, to be true, it is to be proven to *this* State Court that any such claim for an alleged Article IV U.S. court is not **another fraud** committed by the United States central government's factional operatives, in either law and fact.

40. Except there be such uncontestable evidence certified before this Court showing otherwise, the door to any such claim that the authority of the existence of a district court of the United States exists under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution, is closed by the following, even for a claim of existence of such an alleged district court, within the Territory of Washington, District of Columbia itself.

41. At Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, we find the Congress being established as the legislature to pass all laws for the United States

central government. This becomes step one in the establishment of the separation of powers. We understand by this that neither the executive nor the judicial branch may pass laws for the United States; no such power was at any time granted to either of such other branches to do so.

42. The executive branch has no power or authority of itself to pass a law or act to create any court ("executive orders" notwithstanding). The judicial branch has no authority of itself to pass a law or act to create any court. Case law, if any, in this respect is Not Law.

43. At Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, we recognize that the Congress is empowered to exercise exclusive legislation over the one district of the United States, which becomes known thereby, thereafter, as the District of Columbia. We understand that the power of legislation therein is the same power identified as belonging to the Congress at Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution.

44. It is recognized and understood that ***neither*** of these other two branches of United States government are so empowered by Clause 17 to execute legislation in or for the Territory of Washington, District of Columbia, nor for any other part of the United States; each of the two other separate branches have functions in their respective capacities as the Constitution prescribes for them, precisely as written.

45. Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 indicates that the Congress has been empowered to make "Rules for the Government." While the Congress was not given the power to make "the" Rules, but only "Rules," indicating that the other governments, such as State governments, *could also be* empowered to make "Rules" as well, neither the executive nor the judicial branches of government were Extended their own power to make rules, even for themselves.

46. Using the same compelling, constraining legal reasoning as goes to The Clause 18 TEST (see the Exhibited - The Clause 18 TEST), if one proposes that either of such other branches have the power to do so, then, under the Missouri principle, it is not to be said that such a power exists; the contender must **Show** The Power *specifically, expressly,* to exist, ***or***

else the authority of the branch of government who the alleged power is proposed for, Does **Not** Exist.

47. Without alternate conclusion being feasible, it is asserted to a certified degree that only a legislature may make actual law, neither of the other two branches being, at any time, duly empowered to do so *along the same line* of Power *as the legislature itself*.

48. While "rules and regulations," in some nations may, if *officially* permitted to do so, be made by other than a legislature, the making of such "rules" and/or "regulations" do not equate to the making of any law at all, and in a nation that requires that its legislature be the one to make rules for "**the** government as it does say in Clause 14 of Section 3, Article I," recognizing as before that the word "**the**" goes to "one" and "one only" and "one in specific," the use of the word "**the**" in front of "government" Constrains the Rulemaking Power of the Congress to require that IT make "rules" for all 3 (three) branches, the judicial, the Executive, as well as for itself, prohibiting any duplication of any rule that IT has the fiduciary responsibility to provide for- for Uniformity purposes and for "Equal Protection Under The Law" (14th Amendment), current practices of "local rulemaking" among the alleged district courts and other equal level alleged "U.S." courts notwithstanding;

49. From laws we may have the establishment of rules and regulations for government, but, where the **chains** of a Constitution exist, we have no ability to make laws from rules and/or regulations. Simply put, it just doesn't work that way. Laws, where first empowered to do so, rendering the establishment of either Rules or Regulations, or both, are procedurally sound and effectual, where the empowering of either Rules or Regulations, or both, in order to have the competent ability to produce a single law of any kind, or even half a law, if such a thing as a half a law could possibly exist in any jurisdiction at all, Is Procedurally Defective, and Fails, without possibility for any power thereby to proceed on a legitimate course therefrom, altogether.

50. Such as this being the case, of course, eliminates the concept of making "Rules" as being equal to executing "legislation," or that is to say, lawmaking, for to do so would be to equivocate those other two branches of the federal government as though each, if having the power to "legislate," i.e., the making of "Rules" as law, would make them unequal to the Congress by making them greater than it, the Congress, having their own rights as prescribed, PLUS the rights of the Congress itself. Plainly stated, there is no way, within the constraints of the Constitution, that such a condition for rules-to-law authorization was ever provided for, under any of the Powers, before or after Clause 18, anywhere in the Constitution itself, at all.

51. To expose still further the fatally flawed reasoning for those who have placed their belief in the idea that the United States central government could erect alleged district courts – out in the States – through a claimed "loophole" in Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, such a claim also Fails by definition, for Webster's plain dictionary defines, and several volumes of Black's dictionary concur by one definition or the other, as one of the applicable definitions of the word, "Rule," defined as:

> "Rule" . . . (b) "the laws or regulations prescribed by the founder of a religious order for observance by its members."

52. Among the various definitions provided, this appears to be the only definition that is closely associated with ANY form of "lawmaking," for the term "rule" otherwise is not recognized as a form of actual "lawmaking" at all, but rather "a prescribed guide for conduct or action," or else at - d (1), "a usually written order or direction made by a court regulating court practice or the action of parties."

53. In neither case does the term "rule" go to the concept of "making laws" or "enacting legislation." A court cannot issue an order to create another court any more than it can to create itself. The term "rule" is eliminated altogether as a grant of any "power" to pass or enact laws for any reason, and its use in Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 grants the

Congress no power to create a district court of or for the United States as a result of the use of the word "Rule" therein.

54. As with the term, "rule," the term "regulate" does not come within the greater power of being able to enact laws of any kind, such as the power to pass laws that would establish the creation of a court, such a claim for a district court existing within the boundaries of Washington, D.C.

55. The term "regulate" goes to "to make regular," or from the "ate" + "regul," means literally "to cause to become regular," and would be a necessary function for dealing with such a thing as the disposing of rules and regulations only, as provided for in Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, and therefore its use in such said Clause 2 of Article IV, Section 3 grants the Congress **NO** power to create a district court of or for the United States central government as a result of the use of the word "regulate" therein.

56. **Closing the door** on each of the two described words above, both "Rule" and "Regulate," as granting ***any*** power or authority, whatsoever, within Article IV of the Constitution, such elimination of the application of the only two words in Article IV, section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution, the words of "rule" and "regulate," it becomes impossible to sustain a claim that any United States district court, even if existing in the **Territory** of Washington, **District** of Columbia, itself, is an Article IV court;

57. The limits on the kind of court that the United States central government is authorized to employ being at Article I, Section 8, Clause 9, as empowered thereby – and as to *tenure* of judges or justices and capacity by which such judges or justices shall maintain their seats therein, as well as the empowerment as to number of courts, inferior to the supreme Court, that such judges may be established to adjudicate in – is provided for by Article III, Section 1; **not** a Power belonging to the Congress itself for its ***own*** use to any extent or degree.

58. Exposing these things for the same Jurisdiction Frauds that they in fact are, the provision, as though "lawful law," in Title 28, Chapter 5, the first sentence thereof, that a new or different district of the United States may exist as a part of, or in connection to, a "possession" of the United States "within" any county of any State, it is hereby charged that the United States central government itself, in any form thereof, is not authorized to be considered as being located, legally, within any county of any State, except that such a claim be recognized as an attempt to circumvent certain irrevocable Constitution[al] constraints against the United States central government's doing so, as further examined by this Case under The Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 TEST (see said Exhibited TEST), as Jurisdiction Fraud, Power Fraud, and Ultra Vires, even for the making of the said claim itself.

—— V. ——

The Clause 4 Uniform Bankruptcy Laws TEST

THE APPLICABILITY OF TRIBUNAL COURTS TO THE MATTER OF THE UNLAWFULNESS, OR ILLEGALNESS, OF THE ALLEGED BANKRUPTCY COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES

1. The UnConstitutional History, Being Also The UnLawful or Illegal History of the "United States Bankruptcy Courts" (and their subsequent "United States Bankruptcy Judges") is set forth as to its original commencement and its slow and corrupt evolvement into what it has become known as, and is, today, as follows:

> 1) The U.S. bankruptcy courts are units of the district courts established by statute, in violation of The Clause 18 TEST and this, The United States Tribunals TEST. Although the Constitution grants the Congress authority to establish uniform bankruptcy laws, there was no grant of Power to establish Any United States Bankruptcy Court for much of the nation's history, because the federal courts did not have any bankruptcy jurisdiction.

2) In an Act of 1800 (2 Stat. 19, repealed in 1803) authorized judges of the district courts to appoint commissioners who would oversee the discharge of debts in each bankruptcy case. In an 1841 Act (5 Stat. 440, repealed in 1843), allegedly granted U.S. "district" courts "jurisdiction in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy" and charged such courts – NOT the Congress, in Violation of The Clause 14 Rules TEST, with formulating rules for bankruptcy proceedings.

3) The Act (14 Stat. 517) governing federal bankruptcy from 1867 to 1878, referred, UnConstitution[ally], and therefore UnLawfully, or Illegally, to alleged district courts as "constituted courts of bankruptcy," with original jurisdiction in all bankruptcy matters.

4) The 1898 Bankruptcy Act (30 Stat. 544), designated Alleged or Illegal U.S. district courts to serve as courts of bankruptcy. The Act established the position of referee: referees were appointed by Illegally Established "district" judges to oversee the administration of bankruptcy cases and to exercise certain judicial responsibilities referred by the district court. Subsequent acts Illegally Expanded the referees' judicial powers.

5) The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (92 Stat. 2657), in Violation of The Clause 18 TEST and The United States Tribunals TEST, and Other TESTS, UnLawfully and therefore Illegally conferred original bankruptcy jurisdiction on the already Illegally Operating, Alleged "district" courts and established an Illegal bankruptcy court in each Illegal judicial district, established under the guise of lawful law January 1, 1945, to exercise bankruptcy jurisdiction.

6) The Bankruptcy Reform Act provided that the new and Illegally Created bankruptcy courts be considered adjuncts of the already Illegal, Alleged "district" courts, to be presided over by alleged "bankruptcy judges" appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate for fourteen-year terms, beginning in 1984.

7) In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. (458 U.S. 50), the "Supreme" Court in 1982 declared unconstitutional the grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction to independent courts composed of judges who did not have life tenure and the other protections of Article III of the Constitution.

8) In response to the U.S. Supreme Court's Errant, UnConstitution[al] Recommendations that Congress restructure the U.S. bankruptcy courts (not eliminate them and defer bankruptcy proceedings to the State Courts of the Several States), the subsequent Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (98 Stat. 333) [allegedly] conferred bankruptcy jurisdiction on the Illegal "district" courts and authorized the Illegal "district" courts to refer any or all matters falling within that jurisdiction to the Illegally Established bankruptcy judges for the Alleged U.S. "district."

9) The 1984 Act also UnLawfully provided that bankruptcy judges be appointed by the Misnamed or Errantly Designated "courts of appeals," the said same being, *as a matter of* ***Constitution***[*al*] **Law**, **Clause 9 Tribunal** Courts instead.

10) Under current practice, Illegally Established and Operating, alleged district courts automatically refer bankruptcy cases and proceedings to the alleged U.S. bankruptcy court.

11) An alleged U.S. bankruptcy court is allegedly authorized to decide all referred business, except in limited matters known as "non-core" proceedings.

2. The foregoing essential substance of historical U.S. bankruptcy information is made available by the alleged United States central government's Internet postings.

3. The alleged United States Bankruptcy Courts, having been, allegedly, created under claims therefor, under the proposed Constitution's Clause 4 of Section 8, Article I, which reads:

> The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

4. By a careful examining of the TESTS referred to and incorporated herein, we determine that the "United States Bankruptcy Courts" Exist in Utter UnLawfulness to the Same Extent As Do United States Alleged District Courts.

5. Certain of the Flaws In The Law come from the Errant Reasoning Pronounced in Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824), and the Failed Recognition as to Certain Fundamental Points of Applied Law and the Connective Acts of Planning within The Proposed Constitution's 1787 Planning Meetings, Commenced May 14, 1787, and Continuing to September 17, 1787 Thereafter.

4. On June 6, 1787, as to be made a part of the Proposed Constitution, the Constitution's Framers proposed that: "Sect. 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have **the** power." The Very Powerfully Constraining "the" word, meaning or going to the Constraint of **One**, and **One Only**, and **One In Specific**, was included *before* the word "power," signifying that the United States central government, if agreed to, would have sole or exclusive power to do all things that were to follow in the Section itself in which such proclaimed singular power was to be contained.

5. Realizing, most apparently, that the use of the Powerfully Constraining "**the**" word *would strip* from the Several States their own Unique and Sovereign Powers to which they, Several States, relied upon for their own rights to the internal affairs and business thereof, on September 4, 1787, the Powerfully Constraining "the" word was taken out, rewording the proposed Constitution's wording to say, "The legislature shall have power," – not any longer "The legislature … shall have the power."

6. This distinction, being finalized in the proposed Constitution on September 17, 1787 by the words, "The Congress shall have Power," brought to the confirmation of knowledge of all those learned in

understanding of law, and of the English language in which the American law was established, that, except there were any further constraint to mandate that it to be otherwise, Section 8 of Article I was to be regarded in its entirety as involving Concurrent Powers between both the United States central government and the governments of the Several States, such basic Expressed (*not implied*) Powers already having existed for the Several States as Sovereign Powers within the Same, and thus being Extended Powers to the "federal" or United States central government **BY** the Several States, and not the other way around, **except** for the two (2) Internal Amendments to the Constitution at Section 9 and Section 10 of Article I that might demand that it be otherwise;

7. In order to understand this matter exposing the United States Bankruptcy Courts as ***being*** Illegal Courts of the proposed United States, we begin with the first part of Clause 4 of Section 8, Article I, and find that it pertains to the issue of Citizenship and Naturalization, NOT to be used in any manner to set aside or circumvent Article IV, Section 4's mandatory application of a Republican Form of Government within the Several States, but granted unto the Congress for a different, ulterior, ultimate purpose, found evident at said Section 8's own subsequent Internal Amendment (pertaining to the "federal" government) at Section 9, Clause 1 thereof, which Reads:

> "The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year of one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person."

8. Within the Internal Amendment proclaimed and laid at said Section 9, Clause 1, we discover the Constitution Framers' concern for the then-existing practice of slavery of black persons being imported from other ports throughout the world, with the emphasis being on the year of 1808 as to when the Congress would be in power and position to rely upon its one (1) established Rule to bring such inhuman importing practices to an early end, ***except*** there be any further corruptions that would prevent it;

9. There can be no denying that the wording contained in said Clause 4, first phrase thereof, goes to the Congress to have had use of Only **1 (ONE) uniform Rule** for its Authority over the Naturalization matter, for the use of the words "an uniform Rule" (but **NOT** "**laws**), in the face of the use of the words "**and uniform Laws** on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States" contained in the next phrase of the very same Clause ("uniform Laws" is **plural**; "an uniform Rule" is **singular**, or IS NOT **plural**), leave us with **No Uncertainty** or Doubt as to the Singularity of the **One Rule** To Be Granted the Congress, leaving us only to ponder what this One Rule was to have been, as provided for by its only applicable associative wording, or *in para materia*, in Internal Amendment Section 9, at Clause 1 thereof;

10. Which **1** (one) **Rule** (NOT Law), considering the nature of the subject matter contained within said Clause 1 of Section 9, to come into its full Power in 1808, would have been that there be no more Importations of **slaves** from any other country or port throughout the world, ending thereby, permanently, the "slave trade" itself, and constraining the remainder of the inhuman slavery issue to within the borders of the Several States themselves, to be eventually stamped out by the fundamental nature of a Republican Form of Government that would have made it so, based upon the principles of what a Republican Form of Government actually is (see The Republican Form of Government TEST);

11. With the Application of Section 9, Clause 1's upcoming 1808 Power, to be Associated, In Para Materia, with its Section 8, Clause 4's counterpart for the making of that 1 (One) Rule involving the concern for Naturalization of Persons coming into the Several States of the United States, we discover through The Clause 18 TEST that there was to exist No Power or Authority for the United States central government to actually Import Persons from any other place but rather to "prohibit" such Persons, whether alleged as Migratory or as Imported, the latter being, indubitably, slaves and not free persons;

12. Which **Proves Indubitably** to us also that, there being **Only** the Power to **Prohibit** Importations and **NOT** the Power to Actually **Import** ANY Person(s) (Again – NOT Disputable), there Also Existed NO Actual Power to Deport ANY Person(s) from One State to Another, or to out of Any of them, the past practices of an INS department or the current Homeland Security department in doing so, NO Matter the Reason for Allegedly Doing So, NotWithStanding;

13. That It Yet Remains That NONE of the Several States Have Given Up This **Sole Power** – Of Deportation – Except By Their Own Ignorance On The Matter, The Exclusive **Power** To Deport – (but Not To Import) – "Persons" from out of their immediate Borders;

14. NOR has the United States central government ever established a "United States Naturalization Court" by the mere wording contained within Clause 4, Section 8, as though it has some "implied" or "exigently necessary" reason for doing so, not the same as its Errant Act and Practice of creating the UnLawful Bankruptcy Courts for the alleged United States central government, being also Recognized Hereby, Most Correctly, As "Trojan Courts" of the United States central government, *as are Others*;

15. Whereas Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 provides a grant for the Congress to "make Rules for the Government," there is no doubt that the granted Power at Clause 14 was to go directly for the use of the three branches, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial, in order to provide for the proper and necessary internal functions thereof. In recognizing the concept of applying "Rules" to the internal functions of each and all of the three (3) branches, aforementioned, we are not confused to believe that said Clause 14 was meant to grant the Congress Power to . . . "Make Rules *for* the Law(s)" that were to be Passed in accordance to the procedures in Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 for doing so, for it is Utter Nonsense to suggest that "Laws" would be subject to be "Governed By Rules" in any Instance or Sense and not the other way around; that is, Laws are made to oversee and dictate the inferior Rules, and not the other way around as though it were possible to have "Rules Govern Laws" or have "the Lesser to govern the Greater" instead.

16. In Short, if one has a grant of Power that grants "the Power to make uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcy" and one is not actually granted the Power to make any Rule (no "an Rule" or No Rule there) at all on the subject of Bankruptcy, then one has **not** been **granted**, *expressly* or *otherwise*, the "**Power to Form**" **any** sort of **Court** – **as was and is the case at Clause 9** – **at all**, and one has **not** been granted the "**Power to Form**" **any** sort of "Bankruptcy Court," even as though a "Department" of another [alleged] United States Court,- whatsoever, no matter what is going on in the proposed nation at any given time.

17. This is further seen to be the case at Article IV, Section 4 where the Warrantor or Guarantor **–** being the very same Guaranteeing Institution that is, instead, desirous to push its own form of government into the Several States, each and all of them **–** is **required** by the very Republican Form of Government Constraint to be Guaranteed by it, to **Insure** that the "uniform Laws" making Power granted it are first Pulled Through The Great Portal of Lawmaking by applying those "uniform Laws" **to** STATE Courts, State by State, thereby Keeping Local-Affected-People State Government Local as Required or Made Mandatory by Article IV, Clause 4 (see The Republican Form of Government TEST).

18. Although if one, such as the "Guarantor" seen at Article IV, Section 4, is desirous that IT should be the Power inside of the Several States and does not want to further the Power of the Several States themselves - in favor of Itself - then it becomes Clear as to why – in 1800 – there was no attempt to pass Uniform Laws to be applied to the Already Existing STATE Courts as was the [alleged] Congress' Clause 4, Section 8, Article I DUTY to do so, for such would have solidified the Lawful and Rightful Power of the Several States STATE Courts, even, or perhaps especially, against the alleged United States central government immediately in doing so.

19. Accordingly, we better understand the reason behind both the attempts made in 1800 and in 1841 and in 1867 to establish a permanent "U.S. bankruptcy court" or system, and not simply pass Uniform Laws to govern the already existing State Courts by and under, and why, in the

beginning at least, those same attempts were destined to **FAIL**, as they at those times **DID**.

20. It Is **CLEAR** that "Laws" and "Rules" are Majorly DIFFERENT (NOT Disputable) From One Another, **Eliminating**, ***Prohibiting***, **Denying**, Constraining **any** alleged U.S. Bankruptcy Court From Making or Providing For, **Directly or Indirectly**, **Even 1** (One) **Rule** (Rule-making Power at ***this*** juncture DENIED) On The Subject of Bankruptcy, **PROVING CONCLUSIVELY**, INVARIABLY, Again, that Clause 4 of Section 8, Article I Contained **NO Hidden** or **Unspoken** or **Implied Necessity** for Authorizing ANY United States Court to Adjudicate Bankruptcy Matters or Cases arising among the People Actually Residing IN the Several States, or Any of Them;

21. For **Already Existing** State Courts Were In Position To Make Rules of Procedure, **and** IN FACT **Already Had Them At The Time** that THEY, The Several States, Extended to the proposed United States central government *any* Power and Authority over the subject of "Uniform Laws" (noting, NOT "Uniform Rules") as they were to relate to the subject of "bankruptcy" *throughout* the Several States of the United States;

22. Having first commenced its UnLawful Attempt of Creation in 1800 ***as though Gifts*** to the Several States for bankruptcy purposes, Ignoring the FACT that NO part of the wording of said Clause 4 yields any Evident, Expressed Claim for a Dire Necessity (upon which an "implication" or "implied" condition *must* be based), then;

23. The Lack of the Creation of "United States Naturalization Courts" (yet creating alleged "United States Bankruptcy Courts" from the same Clause 4 source instead), such being a Violation of the Inner Working of the Several States, Each Individually among them, EXTENDS as Proof Substantial and Inescapable that the alleged "United States Bankruptcy Courts" were a thing **Never Meant To Happen**, Never Set Forth By Section 8, Clause 4 Design to have been perpetrated upon the People Actually Residing within the Several States, but "Given" them ***as though*** doing so would Not VIOLATE, Ultimately, the Certain Guaranteed

Constraints for an Article IV, Section 4 **Republican Form** of Government, Said GUARANTEE (or Warranty) Being Violated **by** the Very Guarantor Responsible for Its Enforcement, **the alleged United States central government itself**, and none other;

24. **Noting Further Again** that the Several States were to have had, and had, all 3 branches thereof and not just the legislative branch only, **Concurrent Power** within the retained principles of Clause 4 of Section 8, of Article I, regarding the subject matter of the bankruptcy of any of the people, as citizens therein, of each of them (States), as we find witness for in the 1824 case, Gibbons v. Ogden, wherein on page 36 it was recognized that:

> "This Court has held, that the use of an analogous term, 'uniform laws,' in respect to the associated subject of bankruptcy, does not imply an exclusive power in Congress over that subject,"

25. Although that is EXACTLY what we have today, alleged "**Exclusive**" United States Bankruptcy Courts and Laws, giving the alleged United States central government ALL alleged Power and alleged Authority to have those same Courts and Laws be SLANTED in Favor of itself, and thereby allowing the alleged United States central government to "**Rob Blind**," under one pretext or superimposed institution or another, the various People of the Several States, with No Protective Power **against** that Illegally Interloping, Intervening Same, as would be the case by case potential with a State (Bankruptcy) Court having the Same Concurrent Power and Uniform Laws Applied to Already Existing IT, *except* it have first been UnLawfully "Pummeled" into believing that it has No Unique Concurrent Authority of its own to grant financial Relief to its own local People, whether against or especially against the alleged United States central government itself;

26. But which on page 164 of Gibbons v. Ogden, aforementioned, it was Errantly and with Misleading, Reasoned That:

> "the power of establishing uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, is clearly an exclusive power from its nature."

27. This first part being reasonably True; the second part conveys some semblance of what is True so far as the matter of chronological procedures are concerned, and so continuing:

> "The Court has, indeed, determined, that until Congress thought fit to exercise the power, the States might pass local bankrupt laws, provided they did not impair the obligation of contracts;"

28. But it is the **third part** that is **Patently Misleading**, for it decides the matter **only** for the legislative branch, or the Congress and the Several States' legislatures, while leaving the matter involving the judicial powers within each of the Several States, as well as the Executive Enforcement Rights of the States Governors themselves, UnAnswered, **for it portrays Not One Word** on the subject of *what* has "ended" as a matter of States' Rights beyond the fact that the States' legislatures can no longer pass laws on the subject of bankruptcy where there have been "Uniform **Laws**" passed by the United States Congress, to be Applied to the Rights of the People within the Several States, and Each of Them, But **NOT** Against The **Existing** STATE Courts Themselves, Thereof:

> "but, that as soon as Congress legislate on the subject, the power of the *States is at an end,"
>
> (*all inclusive, and misleading)

29. This **Misstatement** , or else straight-up **Lie** for the sake of **Power**, by **Statement**, ***claiming*** that "the power of the States '**is** at an end'" ***tries*** to give, or else Illegally Gives, the ***Impression*** and **False Conclusion** that All 3 Branches of State government have somehow been summed up and included in the one word "legislature," ***as though*** the denying or prohibiting a State's legislature from passing laws on the subject of bankruptcy would somehow "end the rights" of State Courts (under the guise of "the States"), themselves, on adjudicating cases of their own State citizens so long as the State Courts were willing and competently following the United States Uniform Bankruptcy Laws themselves, and not by way of any form of any State legislature passed law on the subject whatsoever.

30. There Is **Not One** (**1**) **Element** of Truth in the assumption that the prevention of State legislatures in passing laws on a particular subject denies **State** Courts **all** necessary and fundamental judicial authority and Power over that same subject, **Not One**, particularly when the State Court's Power and Authority over the Subject Matter Preceded that of the "federal" or alleged United States central government, and the Power over the subject matter was Extended BY The Several States to the United States central government, not the other way around, where **Not One Word** in the Constitution' Supreme Law - stipulated to or mentioned - the suppression or ending of State Judicial Authority over the Subject Matter in Focus, as is Exhibited by Clause 4 of Section 8, Article I as NOT Expressly Granting Unto "the Congress" That Same Alleged Denial or Ending of State Judicial and Executive Authority Power ASSUMED By IT, and IT'S Own Alleged Judicial Authorities Along With IT;

31. For the making of "uniform Laws" was not granted so as to be taken as a way of "Ending" the Judicial Powers of the State Courts of the Several States themselves, any of them, **NOR** to "End the Executive Authority" coming under the Governors of the Several States - to Enforce, Absolutely, the **Orders** of the State Courts in regards to ***their*** own ***use*** of the "Uniform Laws" of the United States, PASSED, ***allegedly***, for THEM, State Courts, NOT as a Means to "get themselves, the Congress, MORE Power over them," as the **Errant** 1824 Gibbons v. Ogden brought about thereafter by its **PARTIAL Reasoning**, the way that **half-truths** always mislead those unfortunate enough to be made subject to their *mysteries*, instead of the **Whole Truth** as the Common Law itself, Still Not Amended Away from the United States Constitution, but Ever Within It;

32. Showing Forth That the Granting of the Power to Make "uniform Laws" - for the People – "on the subject of Bankruptcies" – were to have been **Adjudicated BY** the **State Courts** themselves, ONLY, as Demanded of them BY the Incorporated Mandate of the Article IV, Section 4 - Republican Form of Government;

33. With NOT **One Word** Contained in Clause 4 of Section 8 of Article I to have been Construed as giving the Congress **the** Power, or ANY Power, to "Create" *or* Establish Actual Courts, much less to VEST Actual Power in such alleged Courts, for alleged bankruptcy purposes, No More Than its being Granted the Power to make AN Rule gave it the Power to Create an "INS" or a "Homeland Security," etc., for the purpose of "deportation" or deporting" people found ***anywhere*** (outside of the "an Rule" to be imposed in 1808, it being, instead, that the States were to be left to determine this Right of Migration of People inside of their State borders entirely for themselves), in ANY State, from one State to another, or within the Same State, or out of the Several States altogether, WHATSOEVER;

34. SIMPLY PUT, The ONLY Requirement of a State Court to be Ordained to Its Own Right to Receive Unto Itself and to Adjudicate Any and Every Case for Bankruptcy Coming Before It IS that it Follow the Uniform Laws of Bankruptcy found in the United States Bankruptcy Code, ignoring all parts thereof that pertain to references to "United States Bankruptcy Courts" except as those references may be reasonably inferred a being applicable to themselves as State named courts only, and to move forward with all lawfulness, claims for any **Trojan** [alleged] U.S. Bankruptcy **Courts** of the United States Not*With*Standing;

35. **DULY NOTICING ALL STATE COURTS THAT**: There having been NO Decision, Reasoning, or Ruling in the 1824 Gibbons v. Ogden case *that would* Prevent or Deny Any State's State Court of ITS Original Jurisdiction over the Financial Condition or Status of one or more of its, State's, Own Citizens from providing Bankruptcy Relief to those same, so long as such State Courts were willing to follow the Uniform Laws, NOT "Rules" - **and also** - NOT "Forms," on Bankruptcy as might be established by the United States Congress, Utilizing their own State Rules of Procedures, and their own State uniform form-making (the Congress may dictate what the forms for use must and must not contain, but seeing to their actual local production and use – in Violation of Article IV, Section 4 – **NEVER!**), in place of any acclaimed "federal" rules of procedure (and use of "federal forms") in the place or stead thereof; . .

36. . . . **SERVES AS A "FEDERAL" ADMISSION OF STATE JUDICIAL RIGHTS TO PROCEED IN CASES OF BANKRUPTCY** IN THE PLACE OF OR STEAD OF ANY AND EVERY [Alleged] BANKRUPTCY COURT OF THE UNITED STATES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, UNDER THE ARTICLE I, SECTION 8, CLAUSE 4 "UNIFORM LAWS" IN DOING SO – AT ALL TIMES – AS MAY BE APPLICABLE THERETO;

37. THEREFORE HOLDING FAST TO THAT WHICH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED HERETOFORE ABOVE, THAT THE ONE AND ONLY FORM OF UNITED STATES COURTS THAT WERE TO EXIST "INFERIOR TO THE SUPREME COURT," WERE AND ARE – THE NATIONAL UNITED STATES "TRIBUNAL" COURTS STIPULATED TO BY CLAUSE 9 OF SECTION 8, ARTICLE I, AND TO NO OTHER FORM OF UNITED STATES COURT, EXCEPT IT BE A CONSTITUTION FRAUD AND A CONTEMPT OF CONSTITUTION, AN INHERENT OFFENSE AGAINST THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN DOING SO, AND NOT OTHERWISE THAN THIS.

THE DE FACTO DEPARTMENT OF BANKRUPTCY OF THE ALLEGED UNITED STATES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

38. In addition to the foregoing material evidence exhibited and showing forth the Errant Reasoning that has lead to the UnLawful Creation *and* Establishment of alleged "United States Bankruptcy Courts," there is yet another plethora, or superseding or prevailing reality, of evidence that Equally, *minimally*, **DENIES ABSOLUTELY** the very **existence** of "United States Bankruptcy Courts" and "United States Bankruptcy Judges" altogether, set forth in particular detail as follows.

1. It is certifiably known and understood that alleged "United States Bankruptcy Courts" are not courts coming under the scope of authority of Article III, Section 1, nor are they a creation under Clause 9, Section 8, Article I, nor do they come

under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, but are claimed to have been created (from somewhere) under "Article I" instead;

2. NOTING that aforementioned Clause 2's presidential authorization for appointment, not a loose and uncertain end to itself, is able to come about ONLY under the Constraint of **"**and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in … any … Officer thereof**"** part of **The Clause 18 TEST**, **Part II TEST;**

3. Recognizing that Clause 4 of Section 8 grants No Express Power to Create or Establish a "United States Bankruptcy Court" as a matter of Formed Institution or Department, we turn to the one place in Article I that goes to the forming of such as the alleged United States Bankruptcy Courts are found to be, that is, a Department of the alleged United States district courts themselves;

4. Not only is there NO Power, **before** *or* **after** Clause 18, to provide for creating a Department for and within the Judicial Branch itself, but the latter part of Clause 18 reveals that Each and *Every* "Department" *Sought After* by the Alleged United States central government was Required to have received, BEFORE its Vested Power Creation, the original Constitution's **Article V** Ratified Amendment – Ascertaining **Its** (Particular "Department's") Very Existence and Particular **Vested** Power, and "Head of Department" (see **The Clause 18 TEST**, **Part II**), or Else IT, "Department," being ONLY VESTED **by** the [alleged] Congress and NOT **by** the proposed Constitution (didn't get the permission of 3/4 of the Several States before Forming and Vesting Same), was NOT to Exist whatsoever, *and so*, as a matter of proposed Supreme Law, **Does NOT**.

5. Therefore, the De Facto Department of Bankruptcy, a De Facto Department of the alleged (or Illegal) United States district courts, whether directly asserted or sustained ipso facto (or by the surrounding conditions and circumstances), still coming

under the entitlement of a "Department" of the alleged United States central government, **FAILS** **The Clause 18 TEST**, **Part II**, and therefore and thereby Additionally **FAILS** as a lawful court of the alleged United States central government, *along with* the alleged United States district court(s), also exposed within this TEST for their fraudulent (and therefore invalid) creation under the decadent Judiciary Act of 1789.

6. And were it to be proposed that an alleged United States bankruptcy judge, whose very existence defies and breaks the Mandatory Warranty or Guarantee of the Article IV, Section 4 Republican Form of Government, existed as an added Officer of the alleged United States central government, **FAILING**, without question, **The Clause 18 TEST**, **Part II** **TEST** thereby, it would be a Clause 18 Requisite to FIND an Article V **Ratified** Amendment providing for such an added Officer of the alleged United States central government **BEFORE** an Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 "presidential appointment" could be, Lawfully, and Legally, considered.

7. In consequence of all of these things foregoing, then, we come to find from every direction, from every description and suggestion, that the very existence of [alleged] "United States Bankruptcy Courts" and/or "United States Bankruptcy Judges" are, each and all, UnConstitution[al], UnLawful, Illegal, and have served only to the extent of being the resultant commission of acts of **Power** Fraud, of **Jurisdiction** Fraud, of **Breach** of Warranty or Guarantee of Republican Form of Government, **being**,- supplied to the Several States as Trojan Courts in order to FAVOR in adversarial proceedings against the alleged United States central government itself,- a **Breach of the Peace**, and of **Contempt of Constitution**, a **sovereign criminal offense**, going also to **Seeded** **Treason**, no less.

39. THIS CLAUSE 4 TEST ALSO **INCORPORATES** The Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 TEST,- with all supporting TESTS Thereto;.. The Clause 15 TEST,- with the Ramifications Relative to the Enforcement of United States alleged criminal bankruptcy law proclaimed to "January 1, 1945 and thereafter legally exist" thereunder; and The Article 18 TEST, Part II,, these, minimally, **barring and denying all claims** in favor of any Lawful and Legal, or Constitutional, existence, or continued existence, of any [alleged] "United States Bankruptcy Court" and/or [alleged] "United States Bankruptcy Judges," **permanently**, **otherwise**.

DE JURE: The United States Tribunals TEST

The above named TEST is to establish the following standard, criteria, and objective for Constitution[al] purposes. Any law that is to be considered to be a supreme Law of the United States as provided for at Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, in order that it shall be determined, for any and all enforceable purposes by any State Court of the Several States of the United States, as well as on the part of the lawfully acting actors of, for, and within the proposed United States central government itself:

1) Shall not uphold, sustain, or recognize the existence of any Court of the United States to be a valid and lawful court thereof, for any purpose whatsoever, except it be recognized that such Court be regarded as a United States Tribunal Court, inferior to the United States supreme Court, of whatever designation of number that the United States Congress may have given unto the same for identification purposes.

2) Shall not recognize an alleged United States district court as a court coming under the Constitution of the United States, but as a court whose existence was established entirely outside of the constricted Powers of the United States Congress to establish it so, that such a court of "one judge" only therein violates the requirement for a Tribunal Court, that such Tribunal Courts of the United States were and are to consist of a minimum of three (3) or more judges when

subscribing to the meaning thereof as provided to the United States from the laws of England, and a minimum of three (3) judges only when subscribing to the meaning thereof as provided to the United States from the laws of ancient Israel, the nation under which the term "Tribunal" as a judicial practice first arose.

3) **Shall** recognize that in matters of a Writ of Habeas Corpus as be petitioned for before a United States court, that such Writ is to be construed as lawful and legal only before the same Court that was provided for by the Constitution on September 17, 1787, at Clause 9, of Section 8, of Article I, or "Tribunal" courts "inferior to" the United States supreme Court itself.

4) Shall Not recognize that in matters of a Writ of Habeas Corpus as being petitioned for, that such Writ may be presented or made to an alleged "district" court of the United States.

5) That there exists **NO** court of the United States as an alleged "Article IV" court, that Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 provides **NO** power *or* authority therein sufficient to prescribe the establishment of a legislative power, sufficient in any manner or to any extent to establish any court of or for the United States thereunder.

6) Shall Not Recognize the Continuation of "United States Bankruptcy Courts" as legitimate or lawful courts of the United States, nor any "United States Bankruptcy Judges" as being legitimate judges of or for the alleged United States central government, or having any power and authority within the Several States themselves, for the reasons above stated, the Courts of the Several States, or Either of them, being sufficiently empowered from the beginning to adjudicate the same when following the Uniform Laws, not Rules, as passed on the subject of bankruptcy and published as such throughout the United States.

7) Shall Not Recognize the Continued Lawfulness or Legalness of alleged United States Tax Courts, for the reasons above stated, the existence of which flies in the fact of the Seventh Amendment itself.

8) Shall Not Recognize the alleged United States Court of Federal Claims, the Tribunal Courts of the Several States having all due authority to consider offenses or wrongdoings committed by officials or actors of the alleged United States central government against one or more of their own State's citizens, the claim of the alleged United States Court of Federal Claims over the discernment of the Constitution as any part of a Constitution[al] Review of same NotWithStanding.

9) That the Tribunal Courts of the proposed United States, whether or not in their original organic form, are the ONLY courts for this said nation, as a Union, of the Several States of the United States having Right to exist at all, except as to the Court known, correctly, as the supreme Court over such national Tribunal Courts – when the Justices thereof shall have received their appointment by a lawfully existing president of the alleged United States central government – and over such State courts when, at any time, such "supreme Court" has lawfully competent jurisdiction over the same as required of it in Article III, Section 2, Clause 2, Phrase 1, in conjunction with Article III, Section 2, Clause 1.

10) That where it be claimed by any court, State or United States, that an alleged "U.S." alleged district court has any right whatsoever for its being, based upon the existence of the term district as contained in Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, the United States Congress not being empowered to establish "royal courts" or "sovereign courts" or "chancery courts" or "parliamentary courts" or "brotherhood courts" or "demesne courts," or simply "any other name for court" that it happens to choose, any such claim failing instantly The Clause 18 TEST, both Part I and Part II, then there shall be a search throughout the Constitution for the United States to find the term or word "circuit" by which to justify the 1789 alleged law establishing the same, and if it be found that such a word be found therein said Constitution, then the alleged Circuit Courts of the United States shall continue as they are, but if not found therein, the Circuit Courts shall cease, forthwith, to exist altogether, except that they confess or

admit that they are, and always have been, the true existence of the Tribunal Courts of Clause 9, of Section 8, of Article I, on which basis they must prepare to accept cases over which they would have sole National Court jurisdiction in the place of the ***alleged*** district courts, and that it is the alleged "**district courts**" of the United States instead thereof that must cease to exist, and not THEY.

11) That Tribunal Courts of the United States be recognized as the only Court inferior to the United States supreme Court in the Constitution's Planning Convention or Meetings commenced May 14, 1787 to September 17, 1787, to be provided, and provided, in the Constitution for the United States as first Ratified on September 17, 1787, there being no other court of other description or purpose titled before that time.

AFFIRMING: **Cease** To Ignore The **Law**; **Disobey** **The Fraud.**

DULY SUBMITTED AND INCORPORATED

This TEST and Exhibit Is SEALED, And INCORPORATED, Against That Which Is Found To Be Untrue In The Constitution For The United States, And For That Which Is True In The Said Same Constitution, Into This Case, Now *ARISING*, Before The Lawful Courts of the Several States of the Union of "them," And Not Lawfully Concurrently Elsewhere.