THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
THE HISTORICAL BLACKOUT

By Harry Elmer Barnes
(1889–1968)

1950
(Fifth, revised and enlarged edition)
Contents

I. Note on Revisionism Then and Now

II. The Ways of the “Blackout Boys”

III. Chameleon Historiography

IV. Lewis Mumford’s Iron Curtain

V. Goebbels, Our Totalitarian Liberals and the Permeation of Totalitarian Ideas

VI. The United States Enters the “1984” Pattern
Tribute to
CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD

Great eagle, knower of the skies,
Of windy portents, eclipses and the dust-blown mantracks
Crossing and recrossing in quicksands and stone.
Under his scrutiny the revealed bones
And girth of the past; the string-led figures; the gods in the machine.
The great spirit flies, sifting the air, translating earth shapes against the
moving screen.

Tame pronouncers, parrots, gulls and shamans utter cries,
Communicate their shrill distress; declare him less than the familiar apes.
But the shadow of the spirit enfolds them all,
And here and there with shielded eyes
People have seen the steady wings and far light striking them,
And here and there recall how long ago the fire was brought,
The vultures and the rock, and will remember him.

Eugene Davidson
I.

Note on Revisionism Then and Now

One of the more notable contrasts in the intellectual atmosphere of today, as compared with that which followed the First World War, is the far greater opposition to the dissemination of truth with respect to the causes of the Second World War. While the wartime mythology lasted for years after 1918, nevertheless, leading editors soon actually craved contributions which set forth the facts about the responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1914. Professor Sidney B. Fay began to publish his revolutionary articles on the causes of the First World War in the American Historical Review in July, 1920. Today, it is next to impossible to get any leading publishing house or any serious newspaper or periodical to print anything which upsets the conventional fictions about the responsibility for the coming of war in September, 1939, and for our entry in December, 1941.

My two brief contributions to Neo-Revisionism offered later on are symptomatic of the contrasting situation mentioned above. In 1924, the editors of the New Republic and The New York Times Current History Magazine veritably importuned me to write the articles which first launched Revisionism on any general or popular scale in the United States. In 1948, I prepared the review of Walter Millis’ This Is Pearl at the request of one of our leading academic journals. I later submitted it to one of our best liberal periodicals. It was rejected by both, though it had been read and highly praised by the foremost American historical authority on Pearl Harbor and its antecedents. My comment on Lewis Mumford’s resignation from the National Institute of Arts and Letters was submitted to the New York Herald-Tribune, the New York Times, and the Chicago Tribune. The Herald-Tribune did not even acknowledge its receipt. The Times declined to print it on the ground of lack of space. The Chicago Tribune published it almost without change. The latter paper is virtually unique in
opening its columns to Neo-Revisionist contributions today.

Even at this time, it may be safely stated that the need for searching Revisionist scholarship is overwhelmingly greater than after 1918 and that the results, if such scholarship is forthcoming, will be vastly more shocking to the American public than the material published in the 1920’s. Indeed, the little that has already been published on the Second World War is probably more dismaying than the totality of Revisionism relative to 1914 and 1917.

But the difficulties in getting any truth published about the responsibility for World War II are all but insuperable. Although one important New York publisher brought out a veritable library of Revisionist books between 1925 and 1930, virtually no leading commercial publisher will touch a book today which promises to tell the truth in this field, no matter how great the possible sales prospect. None of Dr. Beard’s previous commercial publishers would have considered his book on the antecedents of Pearl Harbor, but he was able to turn to the courageous, friendly head of a university press. Mr. Morgenstern was compelled to publish his book through a small, fearless firm. Not all publishers are personally opposed to letting in the light, but even those who are friendly to Neo-Revisionism are in business to make money. Powerful pressure groups see to it that publishers who defy the ban on Neo-Revisionist books meet with difficulty in marketing books through the usual outlets. The leading popular Book Clubs are controlled by the same pressure groups that operate the blackout and would never remotely consider distributing or recommending a book which departs from the accepted lore on world affairs and war responsibility.

Even when such a book squeezes through the publishing ban, editors set the reviewing hatchet-men from the *Smearbund* immediately to work to murder the book. Aside from reviews by Edwin M. Borchard, Harry Paxton Howard and Admiral H. E. Yarnell, Morgenstern’s brilliant book did not get one fair and honest review when it appeared, and Professor George A. Lundberg found it impossible to locate an editor who would print his review until May, 1948, thereby delaying its appearance until eighteen months after the book was published. Despite his eminence in the historical profession as the dean of American historians, the same treatment has been accorded Dr. Beard by the hatchet-men of the *Smearbund*. Even men who made their historical reputation in part by using Dr. Beard’s personal historical materials have not hesitated to
attempt to smear his book and his historical reputation.

Indeed, the “blackout boys” have not rested content with smearing those who have sought to tell the truth about the causes of the Second World War. They have now advanced to the point where they are seeking to smear those who told truth about the causes of the First World War. At the meeting of the American Historic Association in Boston in December, 1949, two papers were read that endeavored to undermine the established Revisionist writings regarding the prelude to that conflict. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has even gone so far as to attack those who have written in a revisionist tone on the causes of the Civil War. The next step will be to attack the revision of historical opinion relative to the causes of the American Revolution and find that, after all, “Bog Bill” Thompson was right in his views of that conflict and his threat to throw George V into the Chicago Ship Canal. In other words, Revisionism, which only means bringing history into accord with facts, now seems to be rejected by the blackout boys as a mortal sin against Clio—the Muse of their subject.

The extent to which the determination to shut off the truth in this field has gone is revealed by the Annual Report of the Rockefeller Foundation for 1946 (p. 188), where it is frankly stated that a large sum of money has been granted to frustrate and check the rise of Revisionism after World War II. There is to be a lavishly subsidized “official” history directed by men who played an important role in the propaganda and intelligence work of the British and American Governments during the War. This is supposed to settle the matter for all time.
II.
The Ways of the “Blackout Boys”

The historical blackout of our day takes, as we shall see, several forms and manifests itself in a number of ways, but in all cases there is a determined effort to evade the facts and logic of the situation. The reasons for the extent and ferocity of the attempt to restrain and suppress the truth about responsibility for the World War II and our entry therein are obvious.

The vested national political interests of the last 15 years have their reputation deeply involved in maintaining intact the myth of the superb ability and impeccable integrity of their Chief, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. And, today, the maintenance of the Roosevelt Myth is far more closely tied up with the wisdom and honor of Mr. Roosevelt’s foreign policy than with the soundness of the New Deal social and economic program.

This aspect of the matter is illustrated by the lyrical and delirious rhapsodies showered on the Roosevelt Papers dealing with the war years, especially by Paul H. Douglas in the *New York Times*, February 19, 1950, and by Henry Steele Commager in the *New York Herald-Tribune* of the same date, and by the ludicrous, irresponsible and grotesque whitewash of Pearl Harbor by Jonathan Daniels in *The Aspirin Age*. Moreover, many Republicans who detest the far more defensible New Deal domestic program have even heatedly espoused the ardent internationalism and Globaloney that led un into war and the world into ruin or near ruin.

Further, the interventionists who aided and abetted Mr. Roosevelt and his entourage in his war program must defend the wisdom and outcome of their war-mongering. The special pressure groups which strove ardently for war must likewise justify their works, however calamitous the ultimate results for themselves and others.

Finally, and very important, American leadership and policies were directly
and deeply involved in the outbreak and the extension of the Second World War, which was conspicuously not the case in 1914. We had no guilt in cover-up in 1914. The Revisionist controversies of the 1920’s related chiefly to the deeds and policies of foreign countries and leaders.

In addition to the opposition of public groups to the truth about responsibility for World War II, many of the professional historians and other social scientists have a vested interest in perpetrating the pre-war and wartime mythology.

One reason why the historians very generally opposed the truth relative to responsibility for the First World War was that so many of them had taken an active part in spreading the wartime propaganda and had also worked for Colonel House’s Committee in preparing material for the peace-making, some considerable number of them going to Paris with Mr. Wilson on his ill-fated adventure. Naturally, they were loath to admit that the enterprise in which they played so prominent a part was both a fraud and a flop. Today, this situation has been multiplied manyfold. Historians and other social scientists veritably swarmed into the various wartime agencies after 1940, especially the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services. They were intimately associated with the war effort and with the shaping of public opinion to conform to the thesis over the pure and limpid idealism and ethereal innocence of the United States and our sole and exclusive devotion to self-defense and world betterment through the sword. Hence, the opposition of historians and social scientists to truth about war responsibility and obvious results of the War is many times greater today than it was in the years following the close of the First World War. Not since the decline of paganism and the rise of Christianity have there been so many powerful pressure groups alerted against the discovery and exposition of truth in history as is the situation today.

How far this precautionary and protective vindictiveness can go is well illustrated by the current reaction to books by the author of this brochure. When his History of the Western Civilization appeared in 1935, it was glowingly reviewed on the front page of the New York Times Book Magazine, of the Herald-Tribune “Books,” in the Saturday Review of Literature. The American Historical Review gave it a long and favorable review by the foremost American authority in the field. When his Society in Transition was published in 1939, the Times accorded it the unique honor of reviewing a textbook on the first page of
its Book Magazine. But when the author’s *Survey of Western Civilization* was published in 1947, and his *Historical Sociology* in 1948, none of the above-mentioned publications, so far as could be discovered, gave either of them so much as a book note. And the author has written nothing on Revisionism relative to the Second World War except this slender brochure. Apparently, the movement has gone so far that authors are being suppressed or given silent treatment for fear that they might later on publish some little truth on world affairs. The author of this brochure was, naturally, suspect because of his writings on the First World War.

The methods followed by the various interested groups in seeking to blackout historical truth about world affairs since 1933 are numerous, but, aside from subterranean persecutions of individuals, they fall mainly into the following patterns:

1) ignoring or obscuring the material which is producing the unwelcome facts;

2) smearing the authors of books revealing such facts;

3) contending that, whatever the devious deceptions practiced by Mr. Roosevelt and his supporters from 1937 to 1941, all this was more than justified in the interest of veritable national self-preservation; and

4) maintaining the successful deception of the populace is the cornerstone of sagacious statecraft under our system of government.

They are all astutely combined in Basil Rauch’s *Roosevelt: from Munich to Pearl Harbor*.

The obscuring of the Neo-Revisionist material may be illustrated by the space and position assigned to the reviews of Charles Austin Beard’s *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932–1940* and George Morgenstern’s *Pearl Harbor* in the *American Historical Review* and in leading newspapers and periodicals. Despite the revolutionary nature and vast importance of the Beard book, it was given only a page in the *American Historical Review*, but amusingly enough, the reviewer used the brief space at his disposal to praise the book. This was not allowed to happen again. Though Morgenstern’s book was perhaps the most important single volume published in the field of American history in the year 1947, it was relegated to a book note and was roundly smeared. Of all the book-reviewing columnists in New York City papers, only one reviewed
Morgenstern’s book and he smeared it. *The Saturday Review of Literature* ignored it completely, and so did most of the leading periodicals. Though many infinitely less important books, from the standpoint of both timeliness and intrinsic merit of content, received front page position therein, neither the Morgenstern book nor the Beard volume was given this place in the Sunday book review section of the *Times* or *Herald-Tribune*.

The same was strikingly true of Dr. Beard’s book on *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941*, easily the most startling and exciting historical work which was published in the year 1948. Had these books ardently defended the Roosevelt legend, they would assuredly have been assigned front page position. As Oswald Garrison Villard remarks of the first Beard volume: “Had it been a warm approval of FDR and his war methods, I will wager whatever press standing I have that it would have been featured on the first pages of the *Herald-Tribune* ‘Books’ and the *Times* literary section and received unbounded praise from Walter Millis, Allan Nevins, and other similar axemen.”

The attitude of editors who seek to suppress public knowledge of Neo-Revisionist literature is well illustrated by an anecdote related by Mr. Villard:

“I myself rang up a magazine which some months previously had asked me to review a book for them and asked if they would accept another review from me. The answer was ‘Yes, of course. What book had you in mind?’ I replied: ‘Morgenstern’s *Pearl Harbor*.’

‘Oh, that’s that new book attacking F.D.R. and the war, isn’t it?’

‘Yes.’

‘Well, how do you stand on it?’

‘I believe, since his book is based on the records of the Pearl Harbor inquiry, he is right.’

‘Oh, we don’t handle books of that type. It is against our policy to do so’.”

While the papers and periodicals are closed to Neo-Revisionist truth, they are, of course, wide open and eager for anything which continues the wartime mythology. If the authors of such mythology did not feel reasonably assured that answers to their articles cannot be published, it is unlikely that they would risk printing such an amazing whitewash as that by General Sherman Miles on “Pearl Harbor in Retrospect,” in the *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1948, and Captain Samuel Eliot Morison’s vehement attack on Beard in the August issue.
Now, Captain Morison is an able historian of nautical matters and a charming man personally. But his pretensions to anything like objectivity in weighing responsibility for World War II can hardly be sustained. In his Foreword to Morison’s *Battle of the Atlantic*, the late James Forrestal let the cat out of the bag. He revealed that as early as 1942 Professor Morison suggested to President Roosevelt that the right kind of history of naval operations during the War should be written and modestly offered his “services” to do the job so as to reflect proper credit upon the Administration. Mr. Roosevelt and Secretary Frank Knox heartily agreed to this proposition and Morison was given a commission in the Naval Reserve to write the official history of naval operations of World War II. If Roosevelt and Knox were alive today, they would have no reason to regret their choice of an historian. But, as a “court historian” and the “hired man,” however able, of Roosevelt and Knox, Captain Morison’s qualifications to take a bow to von Ranke and pass judgment on the work of Dr. Beard, whom no Administration or party was ever able to buy, are neither impressive nor convincing.

The smearing device used almost universally in discrediting Neo-Revisionist books is a carry-over of the propaganda strategy perfected by Charles Michelson in political technique, and extended by Joseph Goebbels and John Roy Carlson, namely, seeking to destroy the reputation of an opponent by associating him, however unfairly, with some odious quality, attitude, policy or personalities, even though this may have nothing to do with the vital facts in the situation. It is only a complex and skillful application of the old adage about “giving a dog a bad name.” This is an easy and facile procedure, for it all too often effectively disposes of an opponent without involving the onerous responsibility of facing the facts. The “blackout boys” have not hesitated to maintain that the effort to tell the truth about responsibility for World War II is downright wicked. Professor Samuel Flagg Bemis declares that such an excursion into intellectual integrity is “serious, unfortunate, deplorable.”

Since the Morgenstern book was the first to shake the foundations of the interventionist and wartime propaganda and because Morgenstern is not a professional historian of longtime academic standing, his work was greeted with an avalanche of smears. Indeed, as we have pointed out above, virtually the only fair reviews of the Morgenstern volume were those by Professors Borchard and
Lundberg, Mr. Howard, and Admiral Yarnell. There was rarely any effort whatever to wrestle with the vast array of facts and documentary evidence which, both Dr. Beard and Admiral Yarnell maintained, bore out all of Morgenstern’s essential statements and conclusions. Rather, he was greeted with an almost unrelieved volley of smears.

Some reviewers rested content with pointing out that he is a young man and, hence, cannot be supposed to know much, even though the New York Times handed over to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a much younger man, the responsibility for reviewing Dr. Beard’s great book on President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941. Another reviewer asserted that all that needed to be said to refute and silence the book was to point out that Morgenstern is employed by the Chicago Tribune. Others stressed the fact that he is only an amateur, dabbling with documents, without the training afforded by the graduate historical seminar, though Morgenstern was an honor student of history at the University of Chicago. It was not emphasized that most of the professors who reviewed his book departed entirely from any seminar canons of research and criticism which they may have earlier mastered. Morgenstern surely worked and wrote in closer conformity to von Ranke’s exhortations than his professorial reviewers. Others sought to dispose of the book by stating that it was “bitterly partisan,” was composed in a state of “blind anger,” or written with “unusual asperity,” though it is actually the fact that Morgenstern is far less bitter, angry or blind than his reviewers. Indeed, the tone of his book is more one of earnest and practical humor and urbane satire than of indignation. Few books of this type have been freer of any taint of wrath and fury.

The attitude of such reviewers is a good example of what the psychologists call the mechanism of “projection.” The reviewers attributed to Morgenstern the “blind anger” that they themselves felt when compelled to face the truth. In reviewing the book for the Infantry Journal, May, 1947, Professor Harvey A. DeWeerdt declared that it was “the most flagrant example of slanted history” that had come to his attention “in recent years,” but he failed to make it clear that the uniqueness in the slanting of Morgenstern’s book was that it was “slanted” towards the truth, something which was and still is quite unusual in historical writing on this theme.

The most complete smearing of the Morgenstern book was performed by
Walter Millis in the *Herald-Tribune* “Books,” though, with all the extensive space at his disposal, he made little serious effort to come to grips with the facts in the situation.

Professor Gordon Craig of Princeton, reviewing the book in the *New York Times*, February 9, 1947, held that the book was no more than anti-Roosevelt “mythology” and completely “inbelievable,” though he adduced no relevant evidence in support of either of these assertions.

One of the most remarkable attacks on the book was made by Professor Oron J. Hale in the *Annals of the American Academy*, July, 1947. After smearing the book with the charge of bitter partisanship and asserting that the author made only a fake “parade” of the “externals of scholarship,” Hale sought manfully but futilely to find serious errors in Morgenstern’s materials. He then concluded that all or most of the statements in the book are correct but that the book as a whole is a “great untruth.” This reverses the line of the current apologists for the Roosevelt foreign policy, who now agree that most of Roosevelt’s public statements thereupon were untrue but that the program as a whole was a great truth which exemplified the desirable procedure of the “good officer”—the conscientious public servant.

Due to the fact that Dr. Beard was a trained and a venerable scholar and, hence, obviously not a juvenile amateur in using historical documents, that he had a world-wide reputation as one of the most eminent and productive historians and political scientists the United States has ever produced, that he served as president of the American Political Science Association and the American Historical Association, and that he was awarded in 1948 the Gold Medal of the National Institute of Arts and Letters for the best historical work of the last decade, it required a little more gall and trepidation to apply the smear technique to him and his two splendid books on American foreign policy.

Yet Dr. Beard did not escape unscathed, though his facts and objectivity cannot be validly challenged. As Professor Louis Martin Sears pointed out in the *American Historical Review* (April, 1947, p. 532): “The volume under review is said to give annoyance to the followers of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. If that be true, their faith is scarcely founded upon a rock, for no more objective treatment could readily be conceived. The author nowhere injects a personal opinion.”

Hence, the only feasible line of approach for critics lay in an assault upon Dr.
Beard’s attitude towards our entry into World War II and his standing as an historian. Any testimonials as to Dr. Beard’s historical prowess are, therefore, a red flag to the *Smearbund* bull. Only this consideration makes such things as Lewis Mumford’s resignation from the National Institute of Arts and Letters or Harry D. Gideonse’s explosion in the *New Leader* of June 12, 1948, at all explicable.

The difficulty of attacking Dr. Beard on the basis of his standing as an historian has diverted most of the smearing of him into the allegation that his work is invalidated and unreliable because he was an “isolationist.” The absurdity of this charge I shall deal with later on in my comment on Lewis Mumford. Dr. Beard did, from 1937 onward, courageously and sanely warn against the manner in which the Roosevelt policies were edging us into a foreign war against the will of the overwhelming mass of the American people in what was supposed to be a democratic system of government. Beard’s stand may or may not have been wise, though the facts today overwhelmingly prove its soundness, but such an attitude has nothing whatever to do with any literal isolationism, unless one defines internationalism as chronic meddling abroad and unwavering and invariable support of our entry into any extant foreign war. I was present at a conference on foreign affairs attended by about forty leading savants. Most of them wrung their hands about the sorry state of the world today, but only two or three were frank and candid enough to discern and admit that the majority of the conditions which they were so dolorously deploring stemmed directly from the foreign policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt, from the Chicago Bridge Speech of October, 1937, to the Yalta Conference of early 1945. Dr. Beard was assailed for his “isolationism” and “cultural lag” by both the chairman and the chief participant for no earthly reason save that he opposed the policies which had led to the chaos over which the conference was holding the coroner’s inquest but with no intention of declaring it a homicide or seeking the culprit. They vented their spleen on the man who had advised against risking the ambushade which led to the murder. Indeed, the whole issue of “isolationism” and the epithet “isolationist” has been only a very effective phase of the smearing technique invented and applied by the interventionists between 1937 and Pearl Harbor, and so naively exposed and betrayed by Professor Walter Johnson in his book, *The Battle Against Isolation*. 
It is both vicious and silly to brand a person an “isolationist” merely because he opposed our entry into World War II. Personally, I opposed our entry with all the power at my command—just as vigorously as did Dr. Beard. But it happens that I also wrote one of the longest chapters in the first important book ever published in behalf of the League of Nations and have ever since supported any move or policy which seemed to me likely to promote international good-will and world peace. Sane internationalism is one thing; it is something quite different to support entry into a war likely to ruin civilization mainly to promote the political prospects of a domestic leader, however colorful and pleasing, to satisfy the neurotic compulsions of special interests, and pull the chestnuts of foreign nations out of the fire. The preposterous character of the whole process of smearing via the method of alleging “isolationism” has been devastatingly revealed by Professor George A. Lundberg in his article on “Semantics in International Relations” in *American Perspective* (June 12, 1948, pp. 127–132).

Actually, the current vintage of internationalists—the Globaloney crowd that have taken over internationalism in this country since about 1936—have not served the cause of internationalism and peace. The internationalists of the earlier era, for whom I wrote and lectured from coast to coast for twenty years after 1918, were true believers in international good will and peace and worked to secure these objectives. The Globaloney and interventionist crowd, while prating about internationalism and peace, have done more than anybody else except the totalitarian dictators to promote nationalism and revive and direct the war spirit. They have created an unprecedented spirit of nationalism, militarism and imperialism in the United States and have helped to provoke a similar development in Soviet Russia. While blatant nationalism was checked very temporarily in Germany and Italy, it has been stimulated elsewhere, from England to Indonesia, the East Indies and South Africa. The United Nations have steadily become more nationalistic and less united and the world trembles and shivers on the brink of the third world war before the peace treaties have all been negotiated to conclude the second. There is all too much truth in the statement of an eminent publicist that Alger Hiss’ long continued and admitted activities as an aggressive internationalist did far more harm to the United States than handing over any number of secret State Department documents which he could have transcribed and transmitted to the Russians.
Though Catholic circles have been unusually fair in tolerating the truth about the causes of World War II, the pressure on the editors was so great that even the enlightened *Commonweal* permitted Mason Wade to smear Dr. Beard in its columns. But the most irresponsible attempt to smear Dr. Beard as an “isolationist” came with almost uniquely bad taste from the pen of Harry D. Gideonse, who reviewed Dr. Beard’s *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941*, in the *New Leader*, June 12, 1948.

Dr. Beard was a native-born American who had labored mightily for some fifty years to improve many phases of American intellectual and public life. No American historian, past or present, had a more honorable record as an active and effective intellectual patriot. He had never written a word which placed the interests of other nations above those of our country. Mr. Gideonse, on the other hand, is Dutch-born, surely an honorable paternity. But there is little evidence that he has ever become completely immersed in Americanism or has taken on a thoroughly American point of view. In his public statements over many years he has always given evidence of a robust internationalism which has little primary regard for American institutions or precedents. His internationalism appears to have a twofold basis: a hangover of the Dutch imperialism of the Dutch East India Company tycoons of the 17th and 18th centuries and the virus of current American Globaloney. Anyhow, it has paid off remarkably well, for Gideonse was summoned from Chicago to Columbia University and then, to the amazement even of his friends, suddenly catapulted into the presidency of Brooklyn College in 1939.

While Gideonse finds other non-factual grounds for assaulting Dr. Beard, he holds that Beard’s alleged isolationism is all that is needed to brush the book aside. Indeed, all that is required for that is the fact, as Gideonse tells us twice in the course of his review, that it has been praised as a very great book by the “isolationist” *Chicago Tribune*. It might be cogently observed that the *Tribune* has also praised the Bible, Shakespeare’s works, and Einstein’s writings on relativity. But Gideonse has not laughed this off as yet. If praise by the *Chicago Tribune* were not enough to destroy the validity of Dr. Beard’s book, then, in Gideonse’s view, it would be amply disposed of by the fact that he quotes even relatively sparingly statements by eminent “isolationists” like Senators Burton K. Wheeler and Gerald P. Nye. Not even the fact, which Gideonse concedes, that
he also cites Eleanor Roosevelt frequently and with respect can redeem Dr. Beard after he revealed any acquaintance with the effusions of allegedly nefarious “isolationist” personalities.

Though, as we have made clear, reviewers have, naturally, been a trifle hesitant in daring to minimize Dr. Beard’s status as an historian, Walter Millis and Gideonse have not been dismayed or sidetracked even here. In his review of Dr. Beard’s President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941, in the Herald-Tribune “Books,” April 11, 1948, Millis contended that Beard is not entitled to rank as an objective historian according to academic fictions, but really belongs back with Tertullian, Orosius, St. Bernard and other “Dark Age” exemplars of the “Devil theory of history.” But it remained for Gideonse to sail in and seek to divest Dr. Beard of all claims to any standing as an historical scholar. Just why Gideonse should presume to pass on questions of historiography and to grade historians is not quite evident, though he has been doing so for some years. Professionally, though admittedly a very talented classroom orator and an effective “rabble rouser” of the student body, he was only a somewhat obscure economist when he strode into Flatbush with his mace. But Gideonse does not hesitate to administer a sharp slap to the members of the American Historical Association who elected Beard to their presidency in 1933 by pooh-poohing the general scholarly opinion that Dr. Beard was the “dean of living American historians.” This notion and pretension, says Gideonse, is purely “fictitious.” Actually, according to Gideonse, Beard has only been a lifelong political pamphleteer and his books on Roosevelt’s foreign policy are cheap journalism.

In the light of all this, one could read with considerable amusement and sardonic humor an announcement in the New York Times of September 8, 1948, that Gideonse opened the college year at Flatbush with an address to entering freshmen in which he gravely and sternly asserted that “truthfulness” is a main and indispensable qualification of a college teacher; one which does not, perhaps, extend to college presidents.

There were many other attacks on Beard’s last two great books. They usually took one of two forms. The first were efforts to dispose of them by brief and casual Jovian and flippant smears, without giving any attention whatever to the facts or meeting the arguments of the books. Such were Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.’s smear in the Partisan Review, implying that Beard sought to justify
collaboration with the Nazis, Max Lerner’s slur to the effect that they were “two rather weird affairs,” Percy Miller’s description of them as “two frenetic indictments of Franklin Roosevelt” (implying, if Miller knew the meaning of the words he was using, that Beard must have been insane), Peter Levin’s tossing them off as “old-hat, anti-Rooseveltian mud,” or Quincy Wright’s even briefer disposition of them as “a strange argument” (strange, presumably, to Wright, in that the argument was based on facts).

The other type of approach has been to smother the book under a vast welter of side issues, non sequiturs, and irrelevant scoldings. This was well illustrated by the procedure of Charles C. Griffin, an expert on Latin American history, who was selected to review Beard’s last book for the *American Historical Review* (January, 1949). He buried the book under 4½ pages of impenetrable, irrelevant and disapproving fog, rarely coming to grips with the essential facts and arguments. About the only fair and scholarly review that the book received was by the chief authority in the field, Professor Charles C. Tansill, in the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, December, 1948 (pp. 532–34).

We shall reserve for a later and more elaborate edition of this brochure an analysis and description of the howlings of the “jackals” and “hyenas” around the body of the dead lion, an especially obscene performance which followed Dr. Beard’s death and was well exemplified by the articles of Max Lerner, of all persons, in the *New Republic*, October 25, and November 1, 1948; of Percy Miller in the *Nation*, September 25, 1948; and of Peter Levin in *Tomorrow*, March, 1949.

In addition to smearing and obscuring Neo-Revisionism and Neo-Revisionists, the shocktroops of the “historical blackout” fall back upon the assertion that, whatever the numerous deceptions and public immorality of Mr. Roosevelt’s foreign policy, all this is trivial and beside the point, because it was a matter of national self-preservation for the United States to enter the second World War and crush Hitler before the Nazi *Blitzkrieg* engulfed us. One recalls Mr. Roosevelt’s fearsome reference to “Hitler’s timetable” to invade Iowa, the official talk about the ease of invading the United States via Dakar and Brazil, though such a movement of troops and supplies would have compelled the Nazis to traverse about three times the distance from Berlin to New York City, and about the frequent discovery of secret Nazi plans for the invasion of the United
States, despite the fact that the Nazis were not able to cross the less than 20 miles of the Dover Strait, when Britain was virtually helpless. Professor Samuel Flagg Bemis of Yale University has described the American situation late in 1941 as “the most awful danger that ever confronted our nation,” and Walter Lippmann has written of “our mortal peril” at this time.

Even such documentary material as has already appeared, most of it official, has completely blasted the myth that Hiller had even the most remote notion of invading the United States at any predictable period.

General George C. Marshall, in his official Report as Chief of Staff at the end of the War, clearly stated that the Nazis had no actual plan of world domination. Indeed, he says, they did not have any plan for effective collaboration with the other two members of the Axis. In fact, they had no good long-range program for the best deployment and utilization of Nazi military forces to conquer Europe. Marshall further confirmed this in his deposition for use in the Tokyo trials. Further information to the same effect is contained in the Nuremberg and other revelations relative to Hitler’s orders to the Nazi navy and in the documents on Nazi-Soviet Relations released by our Government in 1948–49.

More precise is the information contained in an official Report to the Secretary of the Army on “Foreign Logistical Organizations and Methods” submitted in October, 1947, and summarized in an article on “The Mobilization of German Economic Reserves,” in the May-June (1948) issue of the Quartermaster Review by Col. A. G. Texley. This material shows that the German economic program and military organization were laid out only for short and decisive campaigns on one front at a time—and all fronts to be in Europe or North Africa. Germany was not even prepared to conduct the war she actually had to wage with Russia. Hitler expected a short, whirlwind victory. There was nothing in the German military program which remotely envisaged an invasion of the United States, even in the event of a German victory in Europe. The lack of German economic preparation for any war of world conquest, or even for a long European war, is documented in detail by Dr. Burton Klein in an article on “Germany’s Preparation for War; a Re-Examination,” in the American Economic Review, March, 1948. Indeed, in the years prior to 1939, Germany did not spend much more of her national income for preparedness than France and Britain, which have been commonly regarded as almost criminally negligent in respect to war
preparations before 1939.

Hence, the whole silly notion of “most awful danger” and “mortal peril” falls apart completely. Not only did we have nothing to fear in the way of a Nazi invasion, but the situation in Europe and the world situation today would, in all probability, be far more favorable for us if we had kept out of the conflict. Hitler could not have destroyed Russia, the two great totalitarian powers would have bled each other white and would have maintained some balance of power in the Old World. There would have been no such economic chaos in Europe as there is today and no need for the Marshall Plan or the more than 25 billion dollars we have futilely poured into Europe since V-J Day. Likewise, in the Far East, Japan would have remained potent to checkmate Russian expansion and the growth of Communism in that vast region. Now, we have raised Russia to a position of complete domination in the Old World, destroyed for generations any balance of power, and brought about a situation where we can check Russian expansion only by a third World War which will finish off what remains of civilization. There is little basis for the current hysterical fear of Russian aggression, but surely Russia is stronger than Nazi Germany could ever have become and has far more robust plans for further expansion of territory and hegemony. Further, our entry into war was what ultimately made possible the victory of the Chinese Communists, adding 400 million orientals as Soviet satellites, with the possibility that tens of millions more in southeastern Asia may fall into the same orbit. The Nuremberg Trials made it certain that the third world war will be waged with unprecedented savagery.

Akin to the argument for national self-preservation and even more of a hollow sham is the charge that Revisionism after the First World War lost the fruits of peace and promoted the rise of Hitler, and that the Neo-Revisionism of today will lose the present “peace” and possibly bring on a greater and worse Hitler. This is the argument developed at length by Professor Bemis in his review of Morgenstern’s book in the *Journal of Modern History*, March, 1947. Here he states that Revisionism after the First World War lost the peace of Versailles and “assisted the rise of Hitler to power and his onslaught on Western civilization.” Then, he goes on to ask: “Will the new revisionism help to lose the second peace as the first revisionism helped to lose the first peace?”

One could counter this argument at once by asking Professor Bemis what
peace there is today that Revisionists or anybody else could help to lose? But we will pass this by and consider the issue of Revisionism, Hitler and peace. Since Professor Bemis is a man of normal mental equipment and was alive and active in the 1920’s, he cannot help knowing that his above-quoted assertions are a complete misstatement of the facts and are precisely contrary to the truth. The fact is that such Revisionist scholars as had any interest beyond establishing historical truth sought to get a decent revision of the Treaty of Versailles and allied pacts primarily so as to assure justice for the conquered nations and to prevent the rise of Hitler or anybody like him. I made this crystal-clear in all of my writings on responsibility for the First World War and so did all the other Revisionists who made any effort to indicate the practical implications of their writings. It was the historians and public figures who rejected the facts and relentlessly refused adequately to modify the harsh post-war treaties who “helped to lose the peace” after the First World War and to bring in Hitler to revise the treaties by bluster, threat and force. And the writers, publicists and public figures who are today trying to blackout the facts relative to responsibility for World War II and its consequences are the persons who are getting the world ready for the third World War, world chaos, and the inevitable triumph of world Communism if any considerable number of people survive the war.

The most active group in this field of endeavor is an organization which, with characteristic brazenness, designates itself as the Society for the Prevention of World War III, though it might more accurately be called “The Society for the Inevitable Assurance of World War III” and of Russian victory therein. It operates behind such respectable “fronts” as Mark Van Doren, but the active forces are the same old war horses who espouse doctrines similar or comparable to those of Dr. Richard Brickner, who implied that the German nation must be exterminated because it is incurably warlike—Edgar Ansel Mowrer, L. M. Birkhead, Louis Nizer, William L. Shirer, Rex Stout, William B. Ziff, Clifton Utley, and the like. In their publications they follow the line of Lord Vansittart, Paul Winkler, and others of their stripe, who contend that Germany has launched most of the the wars in western society since the days of Tacitus and Arminius. They not only attack and smear authors who seek to throw some light of truth on past and current history but also assail governmental measures which might restore the Continental economy and polity West of Russia and make it an
effective bloc against Russian expansion in this area. Any civilized attitude towards Germany in the post-war period, such as that recommended in Freda Utley’s *High Cost of Vengeance*, is especially anathema to them. The following readily accessible facts expose the hollow sham in their whole frame of reference.

There have been two outstanding studies of the frequency of wars in modern times and of the degree of participation of the leading nations therein — Part II of Volume III of Pitirim Sorokin’s *Social and Cultural Dynamics*; and Chapter IX of Volume I of Quincy Wright’s *A Study of War*. Both of these authors are rather intensely anti-German and vehemently interventionist. Let us see how well they bear out Vansittart’s persistent obsession that Germany is “the mother of war.”

Covering the period from the twelfth century to 1925, Sorokin presents the following list of percentages of the total years studied in which the leading nations have been at war:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percent of years at war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Sorokin concludes (page 352), the figures show “that Germany has had the smallest and Spain the largest percent of years with war.” Of all the nations politically and militarily important in recent times, Vansittart’s own England stands at the head of the list for warlike activities. Even Holland, “the mother of peace,” has participated in war far more frequently than Germany.

In his effort to estimate the relative bellicosity of the leading countries, Professor Wright deals with the period from 1480 to 1940. He finds that there were some 278 wars involving the European countries during this period. The percentage of participation by the principal states is as follows:

“England, 28; France, 26; Spain, 23; Russia, 22; Austria, 19; Turkey, 15; Poland, 11; Sweden, 9; Italy,
This shows that, in modern times, England has been out in front in point of relative bellicosity among the nations, while Germany and the Netherlands stand at the bottom of the list, next to Denmark. Even this list by Prof. Wright does not reveal the full responsibility of England for wars in modern times, for it has been the wise and shrewd policy of British diplomacy to get other nations to fight Britain’s wars, when possible.

We now come to the fourth and final line of defense of the shocktroops of the blackout. The Army, Navy and Congressional Reports on Pearl Harbor, Morgenstern’s book, and particularly Dr. Beard’s volume on President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941, have made it impossible any longer to deny the fact that, as Clare Boothe Luce put it at the Republican National Convention of 1944: “President Roosevelt lied us into war.” So, instead of continuing the former argument for the unswerving integrity and veracity of the Chief, the defenders of the Roosevelt legend now take the line that: “Sure, President Roosevelt lied about his foreign policy, but just think what a noble cause he lied for!” This line of defense has been developed, among others, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert E. Sherwood, Gideonse, Henry Steele Commager, Paul H. Douglas, and Professor Thomas A Bailey. The latter states the idea most clearly and succinctly on pages 11–12 of his The Man in the Street (1948):

“Franklin Roosevelt repeatedly deceived the American people during the period before Pearl Harbor. When he warned them against the aggressors, he was branded a sensationalist. When he pointed to the perils of storm-cellar neutrality, he was branded an interventionist. When he urged adequate armaments, he was branded a warmonger. He was faced with a terrible dilemma. If he let the people slumber in a fog of isolation, they might well fall prey to Hitler. If he came out unequivocally for intervention, he would be defeated in 1940, or shelved for a candidate more willing to let the masses enjoy their fool’s paradise. If he was going to induce the people to move at all, he would have to trick them into acting for their best interests, or what he conceived to be their best interests. He was like the physician who must tell the patient lies for the patient’s own good. Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce missed the point entirely when she violently charged in the campaign of 1944 that Roosevelt ‘lied us into a war because he did not have the political courage to lead us into it.’ The latter course would have been foolhardy rather than courageous. The country was overwhelmingly non-interventionist to the very day of Pearl Harbor and an overt attempt to lead the people into war would have resulted in certain failure and almost certain ousting of Roosevelt in 1940, with a consequent defeat for his ultimate aims.”

In his vastly popular wrestlings with the wraith of Harry Hopkins, Sherwood appears to vindicate and approve the political lie as a sound technique of
statecraft, admitting that President Roosevelt would probably have been impeached if the public and Congress had known the truth about his foreign intrigues. The main requirement is the Machiavellian test, namely, that he must succeed; in other words, it must be plausible enough to be accepted by the people at election time. One is reminded here of Hitler’s famous eulogy of the lie in political strategy and of his classic statement that, if the lie is big enough, it is very likely to succeed, well borne out by probably the greatest and most successful political lie of all history: Winston Churchill’s whopper—“Give us the tools and we will finish them off”—made when Britain stood alone against Hitler’s military might. This put over lend-lease. When the “finishing off” came, American troops actively in battle against the Nazis outnumbered the British by more then ten to one.

We may illustrate the technique and ethics of the political lie as utilized by President Roosevelt in his conduct of foreign affairs by reference to perhaps the most dramatic and crucial case of all. On September 2, 1940, a secret agreement was reached with Great Britain by the terms of which we gave Britain fifty Destroyers and received a ninety-nine year lease of naval and air bases from Newfoundland to British Guiana. An official conference of Government lawyers was held, at which it was fully agreed and conceded that this act put the United States into the War, both legally and morally. One of the ablest of the lawyers present cynically but cogently observed that times and methods had changed: in olden times, when war was decided upon, a herald was sent out on a white horse and with a trumpet to announce the news to the populace. But now, when war was determined upon, the fact and supporting documents were locked in a safe and the people were assured that war was more remote than ever.

There has been much debate as to when we actually entered the war—at the time of giving the English munitions after Dunkirk, at the time we stripped our air defenses for Britain, at the time of the Destroyer Deal, when convoying was begun in the spring of 1941, at the time of the embargo on Japan in July, 1941, or after Pearl Harbor. The fact is that the top circles in official Washington had decided we were in the war when the Destroyer Deal was consummated. Two months later, President Roosevelt was declaring in his campaign speech at Boston:

“And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this
before, but I shall say it again and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.”

Indeed, we actually committed flagrant acts of war when we gave the British a vast quantity of military materials immediately after Dunkirk, and when we stripped our airplane defenses to send planes to Britain, the act which led Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring, as a patriotic public servant, to resign in protest.

In the full knowledge of all this, Judge Robert H. Jackson, who, as Attorney-General in 1940, put the rubber stamp of legal approval upon the ignoring of Congress in this decisive Destroyer ruse which put our country into the war, could later go with a straight face to Nuremberg and demand the death penalty for the Nazi leaders because of their aggressive policies and the deception of the German people.

Even if we accept the thesis that Mr. Roosevelt lied for a great and noble cause, including national self-preservation, this idea of executive leadership via deception and contrary to the will of the people raises a serious issue relative to democratic government. The conception of an irresponsible “Fuehrer” deceiving his people, even for their own good, would have received hearty approval from Hitler and is the essence of the totalitarian technique in foreign policy—exactly what we were supposed to be fighting against in the late war. Not only Hitler or Stalin, but an absolute monarch like Louis XIV, would have warmly commended this procedure and diplomatic ethic. All of which goes to show how far totalitarian ideals permeated the ranks of those who were ostensibly organizing our power and morale to battle against Nazism.

But the nobility of the “cause” is speedily fading out. The cornerstone of the “cause”—national self-preservation—is now a crumbled illusion. Roosevelt himself admitted that the Atlantic Charter was a synthetic fraud and a quasi-forgery. None of the Four Freedoms has been realized and the situation in regard to most of them is worse than before 1939. There is neither freedom, peace, nor plenty, but intolerance, censorship, wrangling, war-mongering, frantic and lavish military outlays in preparation for World War III, and world-wide hunger, starvation and disease. The United Nations was already in a worse state of disintegration before the cornerstone had been laid for its headquarters than the League of Nations was as late as the Ethiopian debacle.
There is no space here to elaborate on this sorry theme of the utter collapse of Mr. Roosevelt’s ostensible war program, but such Human Events Letters as those by Henry Beston (April 9, 1947, and October 29, 1947), by Felix Morley (May 21, 1947, August 13, 1947, October 1, 1947, March 24, 1948, and May 12, 1948), by William Henry Chamberlin (April 16, 1947, October 22, 1947, December 17, 1947, and June 30, 1948), and by Edna Lonigan (January 1, 1947) amply uphold and establish the unwelcome and disheartening thesis that the “noble cause” for which Mr. Roosevelt is admitted to have lied so profusely is as much a fiction as the earlier dogma of his unimpeachable veracity. And for the present sorry state of the world, with civilization hanging in the balance, we have to thank more than anything else Mr. Roosevelt’s policies at Casablanca, Teheran, Quebec and Yalta. All this is set forth with devastating force in Mr. Chamberlin’s forthcoming book on The Second Crusade. William Neumann’s Making the Peace tells how we lost the peace.

Indeed, there is fairly conclusive evidence, drawn from authentic captured Polish documents, Roosevelt’s assurances to Anthony Eden on his visit to Washington in December, 1938, his statement to Edward Benes at Hyde Park in May, 1939, that the United States would surely enter any European war against Hitler, what we know of the Tyler Kent case, and the like, that, but for Mr. Roosevelt’s pressure on Britain, France and Poland, and his commitments to them before September, 1939, especially to Britain, and the irresponsible antics of his agent provocateur, William C. Bullitt, there would probably have been no world war in 1939, or, perhaps for many years thereafter.

Further, Professor Hans Rothfels’ book on German Opposition to Hitler (1948), and A. W. Dulles’ Germany’s Underground (1947), revealing Roosevelt’s adamant refusal to have anything whatever to do with the German Underground forces, taken together with the utterly ruthless, irresponsible, and disastrous Casablanca unconditional surrender program, afford good ground for believing that Mr. Roosevelt was only incidentally interested in speedily overthrowing Hitler, but was more concerned with provoking, entering, and prolonging a war which would add to his personal lustre and prolong his tenure of political power.

The same assumption is borne out by the Japanese situation, because President Roosevelt had in his hands before he left for Yalta much the same
Japanese terms of peace which we accepted in August, 1945. This was before several of the bloodiest engagements in the Pacific and over six months before the “atomizing” of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At Yalta Roosevelt made incredible concessions to Stalin with respect to both Europe and the Far East in order to induce Stalin to declare war on Japan, though Roosevelt knew at the time that the Japanese craved peace as a beaten nation and that there was not the slightest need for Russian intervention to crush Japan.

It will be interesting to await the next redoubt which will be thrown up by the “blackout boys,” other than to step up the traditional program of slander, intimidation and persecution by the Smearbund. It may take the line adopted by Edmund Blair Bolles in his review of Dr. Beard’s book in the New Republic of July 5, 1948, namely that it is unfair to attack Mr. Roosevelt, whatever the extent of his “dissembling,” for we would have been bound to enter the War “no matter who was President.”

There is little doubt that we would have entered the war if Wendell Willkie had been elected President, for he admitted when testifying on Lend-Lease that all his opposition to war during the campaign of 1940 was only deceptive “campaign oratory.” But there is little reason to believe that we would have entered the War if Robert A. Taft had been elected President. Taft was virtually offered the Republican nomination by the same personalities and forces which later put over Willkie if he would sell out to the seaboard interventionist and Anglophile interests. This, as a good patriot, Senator Taft refused to do.

The thesis that we cannot elect a President who will put the interests of his country ahead of his personal political ambitions and the importuning of pressure groups at home and supplicant foreign nations is an assertion that I am still too old-fashioned and optimistic to accept. Indeed, the example of President Hoover disproves this argument. In January, 1932, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson openly played his Lucifer hand in Far Eastern diplomacy. He took Hoover to the mountain top and, even if he did not promise him “all the kingdoms of this world,” he did make it evident that Mr. Hoover could recoup his political fortunes and have every prospect of reelection in the autumn if he would make war on Japan. But Hoover would have nothing to do with the idea. A year later, Mr. Stimson had a rendezvous with Mr. Hoover’s newly-elected successor at Hyde Park and had no difficulty in selling his bill of goods. From
that time onward, Mr. Roosevelt had an “ace in the hole” whenever he needed a foreign war to rehabilitate his political prospects at home. He played the ace in the summer and autumn of 1941.

Some idea of the factors, forces, pressure groups, and personnel responsible for restraining the publication and discussion of the truth with respect to the causes of the second World War, as well as the methods employed by the shocktroops of the blackout, can be obtained from John T. Flynn’s brochure, *The Smear Terror* (obtainable from the author, 15 East 40th Street, New York City); from the concluding pages of my chapter on “Twentieth-Century American Historians” in the book on *Twentieth Century America*, edited by Joseph S. Roucek and published by the Philosophical Library (New York, 1950); from Dr. John H. Sachs’ booklet on *Hatchet Men* (obtainable from Lincoln Way Booklets, New Oxford, Adams County, Pennsylvania); and from Oswald G. Villard’s article on “Book-Burning—U.S. Style” in the *Progressive*, April 28, 1947. Most of these blackout organizations are offshoots, affiliates, or post-war successors of the War Writers’ Board, which was presided over by Rex Todhunter Stout, a writer of detective stories, whose claims to competence in historical matters equal those of a dishwasher in a Bowery restaurant to a mastery of hydraulic engineering.

It has been contended by some readers of earlier editions of this brochure that there is, really, no conspiracy to prevent the truth from being known about the responsibility for the Second World War—it is just a matter of honest difference of opinion. Nobody who has been through the reactions and techniques employed by opponents of Revisionism in both world wars can take this argument seriously. There was some smearing in the 1920’s and there is *some* honest difference of opinion today. But the situation is a difference in kind as well as in degree. In the 1920’s, editors and book publishers welcomed Revisionist opinions, articles and books, even though they might criticize them. Revisionism was attacked by counter arguments and at least alleged facts. Not even so devious a sophist as Bernadotte Schmitt would have tried to toss off Sidney Fay’s work as “two weird volumes,” nor would even such diehards as William Stearns Davis, Charles Downer Hazen, Frank Malloy Anderson, or E. Raymond Turner have dared to dispose of Charles C. Tansill’s volume as “a frenetic attack” on Woodrow Wilson. There was a fairly wholesome give-and-
take in the Revisionism of the 1920’s, and it was rare that a person’s character and heredity were impeached because of his views on 1914 and 1917. Michelson, Goebbels, Winchell, Carlson, and others, had not yet perfected the smear technique, and some of the more powerful pressure groups now conspiring to prevent the disclosure of truth were then the most ardent and powerful supporters of Revisionism. Further, and this is very important: in the 1920’s writers on war responsibility were mainly expressing opinions on the deeds and motives of foreign statesmen, publicists and scholars. The opponents of Revisionism in the 1920’s had no need to lie and smear to cover up their own delinquencies and mendacity in regard the causes and conduct of the First World War. The reverse of this is true today. There are few of the apologists or members of the present-day Smearbund who did not have some responsibility for bringing on the war, for directing or lauding it, for public lying during the war, or for generating and disseminating the war-time mythology.
III.

Chameleon Historiography


As a contribution to historical knowledge and perspective, this book does not deserve serious notice. In the reviewer’s opinion, it does not faintly compare with George Morgenstern’s book on Pearl Harbor from the standpoint of integrity of purpose, thoroughness of documentation, or logic and clarity of conclusions. But, since it will probably be exploited by the myth-mongers for years, the nature of the book should be clearly revealed. Here, this exposure must, necessarily, be brief and inadequate, for any thorough revelation and refutation of all of Mr. Millis’ errors, evasions, and tricks of the trade would require as much space as the book itself.

The reviewer has no desire to handle this review as an *argumentum ad hominem*, but Walter Millis is the sort of writer whose books of the moment can be properly appraised only against the background of his past literary products and shifting ideologies. In the 1030’s, he stood forth as probably our leading popular debunker of recent American wars, and in this work he performed a most commendable task of public intellectual sanitation. In 1931, he brought out *The Martial Spirit*, which removed the halo of heroism from the Spanish-American War and its leading participants. In 1935, his *Road to War* did an equally fine job on Woodrow Wilson, Colonel House, and the First World War.

In a smaller book, *Viewed without Alarm: Europe Today*, published in 1937, Millis pursued the same skeptical line. This book, it is pertinent to note, is not now listed among his publications in his entry in *Who’s Who in America*. In it, he vigorously attacked the war-mongers and alarmists, thoroughly commended British appeasement of Hitler and the Axis, and looked forward sympathetically and hopefully to the future Nazi unification of Central and Balkan Europe. In a
chapter significantly entitled “How to Stay Out of War and Like It,” we find the following remarkable statement: “If the Nazis can create a going economic and social system in Central Europe, it will be—however unpleasant for the lesser nations which it swallows—not a menace, but a market and a stabilizing force for the rest of the world” (p. 53). The main danger, Millis goes on to point out, is that the Nazis, through rashness or impatience, may fail in this benign mission of unification and thus lay Europe open to war and anarchy.

All this was written, it is instructive to recall, after Hitler had withdrawn Germany from the League of Nations, after he had set up his concentration camps and carried on his worst persecution of the Jews, after he had begun the sweeping rearmament of Germany, after he had defied the Treaty of Versailles, after he had occupied the Rhineland, and after he had started to intervene in the Spanish Civil War and put on his dress rehearsal for World War II. Indeed, Millis envisages in the commendable Nazi program of unifying Central and Eastern Europe the possible occupation of Czechoslovakia and Poland (p. 54); in other words, virtually everything which Hitler actually did down to and including the outbreak of war.

Apparently, as the Nazis proceeded to follow up the program of unification and stabilization praised and recommended by Millis, he became alarmed and, when the Nazis invaded Western Europe in the spring of 1940, Millis turned violently against them, and became one of those most fervently demanding our armed intervention to stay the Nazi tide. The “benevolent” Nazi scheme of unification and stabilization, as of 1937, then became the greatest menace to civilization since the days of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. So, in the same year (1940), there appeared Millis’ Why Europe Fights, interpreting the battle against the Axis as a struggle of pure and limpid idealism against stark brutality and barbarism. Millis continued his propaganda work during the war, culminating in his The Last Phase: The Allied Victory in Western Europe (1946). In reviewing this book in the American Historical Review (January, 1947), Professor J. D. Hill gave an excellent succinct appraisal of Millis’ career and achievements as a writer on world affairs:

“With The Martial Spirit (1931) and The Road to War (1935), both of them book club selections, Walter Millis proved himself to be a careless historian but a competent propagandist for the isolationist idea. Came Munich, and he was one of the first publicists and journalists to do a flipflop. His Why Europe Fights (1940) will probably be viewed by some future historian as a factor in America’s new
This is Pearl! is conceived in the same spirit as that which motivated Why Europe Fights, and The Latest Phase. It is an unabashed effort (1) to glorify the war which resulted so disastrously for us that we are already on the verge of the third World War to eradicate its allegedly unfortunate results; (2) to whitewash the Roosevelt Administration and our military and naval authorities at Washington by clearing them of any serious responsibility for Pearl Harbor; and (3) to saddle most of the blame that can be assigned to Americans on the unfortunate and deliberately neglected commanders at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter Campbell Short.

In executing this task of whitewashing, Millis resorts to every known device of evasion, propaganda, and smearing. The book would provide a Roman holiday for Clyde Miller and his technique of propaganda analysis.

Japan is invariably portrayed as the sinister aggressor. There is no recognition of the material basis for Japanese expansion in Asia, of her dangerous position in front of Communist Russia, of our past encouragement of Japan, or of the fact that we ever fought a Mexican War. China, a giant with vast territory and a population of 400,000,000, which could have driven Japan into the sea at any time it could have curbed public venality and anarchy in Chinese national affairs, is pictured as the pitiful and hapless victim of overwhelming Japanese aggressive power.

The United States appears always as the benevolent patron of peace and justice in the Far East. It is not made clear that we helped to set Japan on her feet as a military and imperialistic power and encouraged her earlier deeds of valor, including condoning her “sneak attack” on Port Arthur in 1904. There is no revelation that the “Stimson doctrine” was a menace and persistent obstacle to peace in the Far East from 1932 to 1941, that this doctrine was faithfully followed by Roosevelt from his inauguration to Pearl Harbor, or that we lent no aid to the efforts to arrive at a decent settlement of Sino-Japanese friction—all too often frustrating the efforts made by others.

Millis invariably interprets Japanese moves to preserve peace with the United States in 1941 as a hypocritical and contemptible smoke-screen to hide their
determination to attack the United States as soon as practicable. This he does though he knows that we had cracked the Japanese code and were certain that the Japanese peace moves, such as the Konoe gestures, were sincerely designed to bring about an adjustment of interests. Even Tojo was willing to halt the fleet steaming to Pearl Harbor if some understanding could be reached which would permit Japan to save its face in negotiations for an agreement with China.

There is no adequate recognition that we really opened war on Japan by the oil embargo of July, 1941, and that American Army and Navy leaders both recognized this to be the case, though even Millis does not try to deny the critical importance of the embargo move. Nor is it made clear that war with Japan was actually envisaged at the Newfoundland meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in August, 1941, a fact which Davis and Lindley inadvertently blurted out in their supposedly quasi-official defense of the Roosevelt war policy (How War Came, pp. 9–13). Secretary Hull’s ultimatum of November 26, 1941, which high Administration officials and the Army and Navy chiefs were fully aware meant war with Japan, is dismissed as if it had no real influence upon events from November 26th to December 7th (p. 115).

Millis smears the American opponents of war from 1939 to 1941 as traitors to American interests and safety, men of low mentality, anti-Semites, and pro-Fascists, though it is doubtful whether any leading figure among the so-called Isolationists ever went as far in praise of Hitler and his objectives as Millis did in 1937. Our Interventionists, on the other hand, are warmly hailed as far-sighted patriots, who wisely understood that only war could save us from a literal invasion by the Axis and the total destruction of the American way of life. It is interesting to note that, in 1937, Millis wrote of British “Isolationism” and “Appeasement”: “It is an example, it seems to me, which the United States might well emulate.”

When Millis specifically comes to Pearl Harbor, he adds to this overall quasi-Persian “light and darkness” frame of reference, the age-old cavillious technique of “dust-throwing” and diverting the discussion to irrelevant and extraneous matters. When it becomes difficult for him to face the specific facts about Pearl Harbor, he distracts the reader’s attention to public events all over the world and, when even these are not sufficient, to the more glamorous and exotic doings in the New York theaters and night clubs.
Though even Millis reveals that, in January-February, 1941, Roosevelt and his entourage, Ambassador Grew, Secretaries Knox and Stimson, and the high Army and Navy officials, recognized that, if the Japanese ever should spring a surprise attack on the United States, it would probably take place at Pearl Harbor, he goes on to assume and assert that, when the attack actually became imminent in late November, 1941, none of them could possibly have imagined that the Japs would strike at Pearl Harbor. Indeed, for them to have done so would, he tells us, have been “incredible.” This, despite the fact that, hours before the attack came, we had picked up and decoded a Japanese message indicating that an attack would be likely to fall on Pearl Harbor—to say nothing of a mass of other earlier evidence as to Japanese intentions on Pearl Harbor. Millis tells us nothing of the dastardly effort to compel officers to change their testimony relative to the crucial “East Wind Rain” message which revealed the impending Japanese attack as early as December 4th, or the deliberate attempt to destroy the evidence that such a message had ever been received.

Yet, according to Millis, although nobody in top official circles in Washington, elaborately informed almost hourly about Japanese attack plans and developments, could have expected that the Japanese would make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, nevertheless, Kimmel and Short, who had been deprived of all this information from intercepted Japanese secret messages, should certainly have foreseen the Pearl Harbor attack and taken all possible precautions against it, without having any definite orders from Washington to do so. Short is portrayed as having fallen into his own “trap,” but the trap actually turns out to be the action which Washington suggested that he take at Pearl Harbor and was implicitly approved by both Marshall and Stark.

We would not learn from Millis that high military authorities in Washington knew, at least fifteen hours before the Japanese struck, that war was immediately imminent, but failed to communicate with Kimmel and Short and even hushed up this information, as if afraid that it would leak out, arouse public excitement, and force action which might warn the Japanese and halt their attack.

Though Kimmel and Short could and should have been warned in time to have saved Pearl Harbor from the complete disaster which it suffered, Millis holds that General Marshall’s message to Short would have been “too late anyway,” when sent at noon on the 7th. He does not reveal that it could have
been sent early in the morning of the 7th, long before dawn at Pearl Harbor. Indeed, if General Marshall and Colonel (now General) Walter Bedell Smith had maintained the alertness and efficiency which they knew the crisis warranted, it could have been sent on the night of December 6th. Nor does Millis offer any explanation of why Marshall, with his allegedly fabulous memory, could not remember where he was on the night of Saturday, December 6th, the most dramatic and critical night of his life, why he was not easily accessible early Sunday morning, or why he did not send his belated warning message to Short immediately by quick telephone instead of by ordinary commercial radio, not even marked “urgent”—just as he might have sent a birthday message to his grandmother.

Though we were once led to believe that our defense was paralyzed because of bacchanalian festivities among the officers and men at Pearl Harbor the night before the Japanese attack, Millis cannot produce evidence to substantiate this. But he does reveal that much of official Washington was gaily cavorting on the night of December 6th, even those who had good reason to fear that the Japanese would probably strike at Pearl Harbor early the next day. There is no hint in Millis’ book that Mr. Roosevelt’s appeal to the Japanese Emperor to help preserve peace, dispatched at 9 p.m. on December 6th, was unsurpassed for deliberate and cynical hypocrisy in the whole history of human diplomacy.

Even the Democrat majority of the Congressional Committee on Pearl Harbor, despite its straining to present a clean bill of health for Roosevelt and Hull, makes no such exculpation of the Administration as Millis here attempts. A study of the majority report alone, leaving aside the caustic Republican minority’s report, shows how shallow and misleading is Millis’ essay in apologetics.

It is fortunate for such of the American public as wish to be informed about one of the most dramatic and critical events in all our history that Charles Austin Beard’s definitive work on *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941*, has now been published, and that at least three other books by distinguished historians are in active preparation on the same subject.

In the New York *Herald-Tribune* “Books” Magazine of April 11, 1948, Millis reviewed Dr. Beard’s book. He made no attempt to meet or refute the vast array of facts assembled by Beard. Instead, he sought to discredit the book by
smearing it as a product of the “Devil theory of history,” though Beard’s handling of Franklin D. Roosevelt is a masterpiece of frigid historical objectivity compared with Millis’ treatment of Wilson and House in his *Road to War*. Otherwise, Millis only shadow-boxed with Beard, mainly concerning Beard’s criticism of Roosevelt and Hull for not making public our negotiations with Japan in 1941. Millis made a great ado over the allegation that the Japanese had requested secrecy on this matter. This is an admirable example of Millis’ technique of dust-throwing and distraction from the real point at issue. Here, what mattered was not whether the Japanese requested secrecy, but the undeniable fact that Roosevelt and Hull knew from the cracked Japanese code that the Japanese peace efforts were sincere and reasonable but, nevertheless, rebuffed them and provoked the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. There is no hint of this basic fact in Millis’ review.
The Editor of the *New York Times*:

It is not my practice to write letters to newspapers, but the announcement in your columns that Lewis Mumford has resigned in protest over the award of a Gold Medal to Dr. Charles Austin Beard by the National Institute of Arts and Letters for the best historical work by an American during the last decade raises some important issues regarding the freedom of writing and historical truth.

It is obvious that Dr. Beard needs no defense, nor will he be harmed by Mumford’s ill-conceived onslaught. Indeed, I have written Dr. Beard congratulating him more heartily upon Mumford’s resignation than upon the receipt of the medal. Nor do I have any unfriendly feeling for Lewis Mumford personally. Quite the contrary.

I first met him back in 1919, when he had just returned from the feet of Geddes and Branford in England and I was one of the younger “founding fathers” of the New School for Social Research. I have always admired his writings when he limited himself to the fields in which he has high professional competence: ecology, urban planning, the history of technology, and applied aesthetics. I am indebted to him for a fine chapter on Geddes and Branford in the *History of Sociology*, which I recently edited. I have only been irked by his pontifical, dogmatic, and intolerant pronouncements on American institutional history and international relations, fields in which he has not the slightest claim to more than superficial and amateurish knowledge.

Mr. Mumford’s presumption in assailing Dr. Beard for work in the realms of American history and world affairs reveals an interesting cleavage and contrast in his mental patterns. In ecology and urban planning, where Mr. Mumford is a recognized world authority, he approaches the works and dicta of such masters as Geddes and Branford with hushed reverence and worshipful obeisance. Yet,
when he enters the arena of American history and world politics, where he is a
naive tyro, he has no hesitation in damning audaciously the works of Beard, who
is as great a master here as are Geddes and Branford in urban planning and
social ecology. There is much more reason for Mumford to approach the works
of Beard with bated breath than those of Geddes.

Any assertion by Mumford, or anybody else, that Dr. Beard is an
“Isolationist” is palpable nonsense. Few Americans have been associated more
thoroughly with international thought and experiences. As a young man, Beard
helped to found Ruskin College, Oxford. He has travelled with great prestige and
influence, as an “elder statesman” and official adviser, from Tokyo to Belgrade.
He has visited and been held in high esteem in about as many foreign centers as
Lewis Mumford has ever even read about. The worst that can be said about Dr.
Beard is that he understands that a sound international attitude and policy can be
warmly supported without descending to idiocy or treason or abandoning those
American traditions upon which our strength and national prestige have been
constructed. The Beard *Basic History of the United States* was written mainly to
clarify and elucidate these traditions and to expose the perversions of historical
facts embodied in such books as Walter Lippmann’s *U.S. Foreign Policy.*
Personally, I was amazed at the restraint shown by the Beards in this book, in the
light of the provocation to polemics.

There is much excitement here at present over the “Iron Curtain” and the
blanketing of truth in Soviet Russia, which even liberal well-wishers of Russia
must deplore. But it is even more important that we should battle against the
errection of any iron curtain against truth here in the United States. And that is
just what Mumford and his like, wittingly or unwittingly, are seeking to set up
right here in our midst.

As I see it, the main difference between Mumford and Hitler and Stalin is that
the latter two have had the physical power to do what Mumford would like to do
but cannot, as yet, namely, to shut off the free play of ideas. Nevertheless, if we
do not have concentration camps and barbed wire, we already have the
*Smearbund*, the activities of which are well represented by Mumford’s recent
outburst. Any American historian or publicist who risks letting in ever so slight a
ray of truth on the American or world scene today places in jeopardy not only
his professional reputation but even his livelihood as well. This is a strange
outcome of a world crusade in behalf of the “Four Freedoms.”

My only personal quarrel with Mr. Mumford is that he apparently does not have the courage of his emotions. In 1939, he wrote a book entitled *Men Must Act*, the perusal of which revealed that what he meant by acting was fighting. In other words, “men must fight.” Accordingly, one would have expected that, when war broke out in 1939, Mr. Mumford would, if he could not be accepted for active combat duty, have at least insisted upon ambulance or Red Cross duty at the extreme front lines. Instead, he accepted a very safe and pleasant post as professor of humanities at Leland Stanford University, a point about as remote as possible from the European battlefields. There is no doubt in my mind that Mumford did more good for the human race at Stanford than he could have achieved operating a tank or bomber, but his behavior failed to accord with his ideological program or his heated exhortations to fellow-Americans. While we may not approve the ideas or behavior of war-mongering renegade pacifists, like Paul H. Douglas, we can at least admire their consistency in getting out on the battle-line and exposing themselves to enough gunfire to give them a military record that would be a real political asset in post-war days.
V.
Goebbels, Our Totalitarian Liberals and the Permeation of Totalitarian Ideas

It is said that Joseph Goebbels once boasted that, even though the Nazis were overcome on the field of battle, they would conquer the victors in spirit. In other words, the conquerers of the Nazis would, in victory, take over the ideals and practices of the Nazis. This is what Goebbels boasted of and it was what I feared. I elaborated on this theme as a main reason why we should not enter the Second World War in an address delivered before the Institute of Politics at the University of Virginia in June, 1940, and embodied the idea in an article in the Virginia Quarterly Review (Autumn, 1940). There is much evidence that Goebbels’ ominous boast is proving all too true. Our so-called Totalitarian Liberals, who formed the spearhead of the drive to involve this country in the Second World War, have espoused all too many of the totalitarian notions which we were mobilized to combat.

We have just noted the totalitarian taint in the attitude of Lewis Mumford towards freedom of thought and writing, but perhaps the best example of the way in which Totalitarian Liberals have, consciously or unconsciously, espoused attitudes strikingly similar to those of the Nazis is afforded by Gideonse’s review of Dr. Beard’s President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941, in the New Leader of June 12, 1948, to which we have made reference earlier.

In the first place, the attitude of Gideonse towards President Roosevelt strikingly resembles the frame of mind that Goebbels manifested towards Hitler in his recently published Diary, namely, that the “Fuehrer” could do no wrong, even though deceiving his people and thwarting the will of the overwhelming majority of them. There is in Gideonse’s review a strong undercurrent of the same contempt for the intelligence of the masses which Goebbels frequently
expressed. While any policy which a Fuehrer adopts to save the dumb masses from themselves and their folly appears to be praiseworthy, Gideonse smears the conduct of those who sought between 1937 and 1941 to preserve the American constitutional system and democratic practices as foul “skullduggery.”

Nothing stands out more strongly in the Gideonse blast against Dr. Beard than his impatience with legislative restraints on the executive. The removal of such restraints is an invariable accompaniment of totalitarian politics. Despite the fact that Gideonse has prospered exceptionally well personally under our constitutional system, he recurs frequently all through his long review to such expressions of impatience with the American Constitution as: “the weakness of our domestic and constitutional position,” the inadequacy “of our constitutional principles governing the war power,” “our own constitutional weaknesses,” and “our obsolete constitutional provisions.” It is evident even from the context that what Gideonse means by our obsolete and outworn constitutional system is the limitations imposed by our Constitution upon the irresponsible use of power by the President in foreign relations. What Gideonse wishes is a removal of the restraints upon the freedom of the President to do just as he desires without being hampered by the opposition of an impliedly stupid and patriotic Congress. In this matter I do not have to rely on the context or upon reading between the lines, for I personally listened to Gideonse as he elaborated this theme at great length and with much heat. To this proposal of complete executive irresponsibility in handling foreign affairs, Hitler would have cried “Bravo,” and it was in this spirit that Goering burned down the Reichstag buildings.

Believing as I do in the complete freedom of speech and writing, I have no objection to the holding or expression of such political opinions by Gideonse. But I do submit that such a political philosophy is strangely unsuitable and incongruous on the part of a person who throws his weight and influence around as promiscuously at Freedom House as does Gideonse. Freedom House, of which Gideonse is currently the president, is supposed to be conspicuously devoted to combatting all phases of Fuehrer philosophy and practice. Gideonse’s warm devotion to executive irresponsibility and absolutism was, of course, developed without any conscious imitation of Nazi philosophy and may be a result of the fact that, as Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes points out: “Political democracy made slower and more halting progress in the Netherlands than in
any other country of Western Europe. Down to 1917, only a bare majority of the male population over twenty-five years of age was privileged to vote or hold public office, and the sovereign still exercised the right of initiating and vetoing legislation.” At any rate, it would not be inappropriate to remind Gideonse that Holland, though occupied by the Nazi legions, bravely resisted the infiltration of the Nazi system and that loyalty to this Dutch example as well as to American constitutional precedents would demand a sweeping rejection of the whole Fuehrer principle of irresponsible and unrestrained leadership, either in domestic affairs or in foreign relations.

The fact that many of our Totalitarian Liberals are American-born shows that the genesis of their attitudes cannot be attributed in such instances to foreign influences and traditions. World Wars inevitably breed totalitarian tendencies and it is hard to shuffle them off in peacetime. As Professor George A. Lundberg cogently points out, our Totalitarian Liberals approve totalitarian ideals and practices when carrying out projects dear to their hearts but are “horrified” when such ideals and practices are followed by other countries. They “surround us with a mythical and paranoid view of our international relations which can only lead to further war.” Their ethical levity is well revealed by Sherwood’s book on *Roosevelt and Hopkins* in which Sherwood exultantly claims credit for the “again and again and again” lines in Roosevelt’s Boston speech of 1940, though he was obviously in a position to know that we were already irrevocably committed to war, were admittedly legally in the war, and were making arrangements for the landing of American troops on foreign shores. The attitude of current intellectual America towards extreme lightheartedness in such matters, which were once taken with some seriousness, is well illustrated by the fact that Sherwood was elected to membership in the august American Academy of Arts and Letters in December, 1949.

If the constitutional impact of our entry into World War II means a surrender of the principles of Jefferson and an adoption of those of Hitler, the outcome will have been deplorable indeed.

This brings us to the heart of the whole significance of Revisionism in connection with the second World War. It is not merely an exercise in intellectual integrity and public sanitation; it involves the exposure of policies and methods which threaten to undermine the American way of life, libertarianism, and the
possibility of building plenty and security on the basis of our impressive technological equipment of the mid-twentieth century. To this subject we shall devote the remaining section of this brochure.
VI.
The United States Enters the “1984” Pattern

Probably the most disastrous effect of our “Second Crusade” is the fact that the United States is slipping irrevocably into the pattern of economic life and political strategy portrayed by the late George Orwell in his ominously prophetic book, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. This book was lightly passed off by American journalists, editors and reviewers alike, as a satirical condemnation of Soviet Russia today, or of what Britain might become under a Labor Government. But its main significance resides in the fact that it is an alarmingly accurate forecast and description of the system of society and mental attitudes into which all the major countries of the world seem to be drifting as a result of the Second World War and its aftermath in the cynical but universally popular cold war. For Americans, its importance lies in warning us to avoid such a calamity, if it is not already too late.

The system described in “1984” rests upon the technique suggested by the words which Shakespeare put into the mouth of Henry IV, who advised his son to “busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels,” so that his subjects might be distracted from errors and mistakes at home, both past and present. This pattern in American political and economic strategy was set by President Roosevelt when he rehabilitated his sinking political fortunes after 1937 by turning to an aggressive foreign policy and war to assure a third and fourth term. The stages and devices by which this momentous transformation has been made were the abolition of neutrality, armament, interventionism, war, the Truman doctrine, the cold war, the bi-partisan foreign policy, and Secretary Acheson’s “total diplomacy.”

The basic pattern of “1984”—all else is incidental—is to use perpetual and phony war to deprive the masses of the ever greater benefits of our advancing technology, lest the people have the prosperity, security, leisure, and education
which would enable them to do some constructive thinking and demand leadership compatible with the complex problems of our era. All the censorship, thought-policing and terror-mongering are incidental and designed solely to hold society inflexibly in this pattern of life and philosophy. (See Orwell, op. cit., pp. 185 ff.)

It is obvious that we have already gone far along this line, and all trends suggest that we shall continue to pursue it. The three great warring groups of “1984”—Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia—have now taken shape. Our prosperity since 1940 has been based upon a war and quasi-war economy. As Norman Thomas well said: if the Lord should send the Angel Gabriel to the world with the announcement that the Deity had forbidden all further wars, we would at once enter the greatest depression of our history. Hot and cold wars have kept the Democrats in power since 1939 and promise to do so indefinitely even if a hot war breaks out. With even President Truman asking for only 6 per cent of the federal budget for welfare purposes—and getting only half of that—and requesting over 75 per cent for wars, past, present, and future, and getting nearly a billion more than he asks for, we have already taken great strides towards depriving the masses of the benefits of more profuse mechanical production. Point IV imposes only a planetary limit on current and future “operations rathole.”

The hate campaign, so terrifyingly portrayed in “1984,” is well under way, as is also the thought policing which Bernard DeVoto assailed in Harper’s Magazine, October, 1949. Two Supreme Court decisions, in 1947 and 1950, destroyed the cornerstone of our basic civil liberties—that which guaranteed our freedom from the search of our homes and offices without a search warrant. This was a right demanded by the English pioneers of civil liberty in their battles against the Stuart tyranny in the 17th century and by our colonial forefathers in their struggles for liberty on the eve of the American Revolution. It was supposed to be firmly secured by the Fourth Amendment. Its elimination opens the door to just the type of totalitarian snooping and invasion of privacy which prevail in “1984” society. It is characteristic of the new or “totalitarian liberalism” that the 1950 decision was handed down by supposedly the most radical member of the Court.

The preceding pages of this brochure make it plain how difficult it is to get
any material before the public which might check the trend here towards the “1984” pattern of life, even though our ignorance is as yet caused by what Harold Ickes once called “voluntary servitude.” This means that, in this respect, we are worse off than those in “1984,” where it was necessary to hire and intimidate servile bureaucrats to falsify history. In the United States, today, many of our most eminent historians are effectively performing this function quite voluntarily and mostly without expense to the government. We have thus far remained content to arrest and convict Communists, for the Socialists are now impotent and there is little point in arresting Republicans so long as the Republican party heartily supports the “1984” trends that keep the Democrats in power. Men like Arthur Vandenberg and John Foster Dulles are worth more politically to the Democrats than the whole Democratic National Committee. If we enter a depression and things tighten up, it may be quite a different story.

The governing bureaucracy of “1984,” as pictured by Orwell, is made up of just the groups who are now controlling American public policy: “Bureaucrats, scientists, technicians, trade-union organizers, publicity experts, sociologists, teachers, journalists and professional politicians … whose origins lay in the salaried middle class and the upper grades of the working class… As compared with their opposite numbers in past ages, they were less avaricious, less tempted by luxury, hungrier for pure power and, above all, more conscious of what they were doing and more intent on crushing opposition.” It will be evident to discerning readers that what Orwell is describing here is precisely our Totalitarian Liberals who have been taking over power since 1933 and especially since 1939. It is interesting and significant that in its issue of February 19, 1950, the New York Times published a survey of our current “government types,” which fully confirms this diagnosis of our present-day “public servants.”

We have already richly developed the “Newspeak” and “Doublethink” semantics of “1984.” Witness such popular and virtually unassailed slogans as:

“War, waste and inflation spell prosperity. Double prices and we double the national income. National prosperity may be assured by giving away money and goods, to be paid for by the American taxpayer. Our great national debt is a blessing in disguise because we owe it to ourselves. We are setting up a welfare state by spending 3 per cent of the budget for welfare. Cold war is peace. The United Nations, split right down through the middle by the cold war, is still united and the hope of the world. ‘Peace-loving nations’ are the nations which made war between 1939 and 1945. Aiding the socialist nations of Europe under the Marshall Plan is a bold stroke to promote free enterprise abroad. Aiding the confirmed Communist, Tito, promotes the American way of life abroad. Launching an atom bomb race
One could continue this list almost indefinitely, but the above will be sufficient to drive home the point that our public opinion is now being overwhelmingly shaped by the semantic ruses so familiar to readers of “1984.”

Some who agree to all the facts just set forth will, nevertheless, raise their hands in horror and maintain stoutly that Americans will never permit such a development to take place. The most cogent answer to this is that it has happened in basic essentials already, without more than a handful of Americans realizing it. The developments are all camouflaged behind a blanket of pseudo-libertarian “Newspeak.” If the trend moves on as rapidly and inexorably from 1950 to 1984 as it has from 1937 to 1950, we shall have achieved the “1984” pattern completely, with such variations in details as circumstances and American culture produce.

Equally relevant is the question as to who will arise to expose the trends and make us retrace our steps before it is too late? The Democrats surely will not, for they are the immediate beneficiaries of the trend. Vandenberg, Dulles, Dewey, et al. have made it impossible for the Republicans to do so. The business classes will not, because they enjoy the false prosperity engendered, with its lessening of competition, and have concentrated upon a campaign against a fictitious Santa Claus—attacking the bogus 3 per cent welfare state as a leap into socialism, and ignoring the fact that the cold, and ultimately hot, war is what will bring drastic and rigorous socialism. Labor will not oppose, because it, also, is enjoying its “cut” in the temporary “gravy” produced by the cold war and armament. The radicals are impotent, and most of the old-time pacifists are either dead or, like Edward Meade Earle, have gone over ardently into the interventionist and cold war camp.

As to who will be the American “Big Brother” is anybody’s guess, but the writer’s opinion is that the most likely candidate is Senator Paul H. Douglas. He is well cast for the role physically and in demeanor. He has ambition. The fact that he adroitly transformed himself from probably the most uncompromising professorial pacifist in the United States, in the late 1920’s and early 1930’s, into surely one of the most vehement of our academic war-mongers shows that he has the mental and moral flexibility, adaptability, and opportunism to enable him to operate a War Department as the “Department of Peace,” and the thought police,
espionage and torture chambers within a “Department of Love.” His lush commentary on the Roosevelt war period shows that he is admirably prepared semantically for the responsibilities of “Big Brother,” and will be able to administer his “Department of Truth” so as to interpret the new system as a movement in behalf of libertarianism, world peace, and social justice. But the writer is not insistent on any personal choice for the post. Other nominations are in order and fit candidates can be produced, now that “Doublethink” has become the basic strategy of political rhetoric.

Some may think that the above picture is overdrawn, but in reality it is an understatement. In “1984,” the rulers have the good sense to keep the wars perpetually phony and with little fighting or destruction. The munitions which deprive the masses of prosperity are either allowed to rot and rust, or are secretly sunk in mid-ocean. We are all too likely to move into a hydrogen-bomb hot war instead of an adroit, if cruel, harsh, and unnecessary phony war. This will produce conditions which will make “1984” seem like a joint picnic of anarchists and pacifists, with Roger Baldwin as the host.

The ominous precision with which we are now duplicating the road to war of 1937 to 1941 is well illustrated by the fact that a Committee to Defend America by Aiding anti-Communist China has just been formed (shades of William White and his Committee). It is most appropriately headed by the Treasurer of the National Casket Company.