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THE ANCIENT GREEK AND LATIN WRITINGS WHICH CONTAIN RELIGIOUS OR PHILOSOPHIC TEACHINGS ASCRIBED TO HERMES TRISMEGISTUS
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THE ANCIENT GREEK AND LATIN WRITINGS WHICH CONTAIN RELIGIOUS OR PHILOSOPHIC TEACHINGS ASCRIBED TO HERMES TRISMEGISTUS

EDITED WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES

BY

WALTER SCOTT

VOLUME III

Notes on the Latin Asclepius and the Hermetic Excerpts of Stobaeus

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PREFACE

THE manuscript of this volume was revised, and some of the proofs read, by Mr. Scott before he died. I have endeavoured to carry out his intentions. Some additional notes have been inserted, though sparingly; these are distinguished by square brackets.

Mr. F. Ll. Griffith allowed me to draw freely upon his knowledge of Egyptian antiquities. The officials of the Clarendon Press met, or anticipated, my needs. The task of picking up the threads in so large a work was lightened by one of the readers of the Press, Mr. S. Dixon, who has given me invaluable help. I wish to thank them and others who have advised me.

A. S. Ferguson.

Armstrong College,
Newcastle-on-Tyne,
1st March, 1926.
HERMETICA

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THE LATIN ASCLEPIUS

Title. The incipit and explicit of the MSS. of the Latin Asclepius show that the title which the translator found at the head of his Greek text was 'Ερμοῦ τριμεγίστου βιβλίον ἤ ἡλία πρὸς 'Ασκληπίων προσφωνήσεως. But the Greek document was known to Lactantius and Lydus by the title 'Ερμοῦ τριμεγίστου λόγος τέλειος.¹ Lactantius quotes under this title both from Ascl. I and from Ascl. III; and one of his quotations is taken from the Epilogue (i.e. the narrative passage appended at the end of Ascl. III), which is connected with and presupposes the Prologue prefixed to Ascl. I. It appears therefore that the λόγος τέλειος as known to Lactantius included all that is contained in our Latin Asclepius; and the title λόγος τέλειος may have been given to the document by the redactor who joined together Ascl. I, Ascl. II, and Ascl. III.

Stobaeus, 4. 52. 47, quotes the Greek of Ascl. III. 27 e (vol. i, p. 364) under the heading "Επίστολος τῷ Αὐτῷ." It is possible therefore that the Greek original of Ascl. III, as a separate document, was included in the Hermes to Asclepius collection, and that Stobaeus knew it in that form, and not as a part of the larger whole to which the title λόγος τέλειος was applied. Cyril (c. Julian. 4. 130 e) quotes from Hermes Trismegistus ἐν τῇ προσφωνήσεως τῷ Αὐτῷ a passage which appears to be a lengthened form of Ascl. III. 29 b init.; it is possible that the original of Ascl. III was known to him also as a separate document.

The full title of the composite document was probably 'Ερμοῦ τριμεγίστου βιβλίον ἤ ἡλία πρὸς 'Ασκληπίων προσφωνήσεως, ἡ ἐπικαλομένη λόγος τέλειος.² The title λόγος τέλειος means 'a discourse in which the teaching is brought to completion'; i.e. one which follows on


³ Reitzenstein (Hellenist. Mysterienrel. pp. 96 and 166) assumes that the word τέλειος is intended to suggest τελετη; and he takes the title to mean 'a discourse
and completes the instruction given in earlier discourses. It may be translated ‘the crowning discourse’. It implies that this document is to be regarded as containing the most advanced teaching of Hermes, and as representing the final stage of the pupil’s religious education. The discourse reported in it is ‘omnia antea nobis factorum divinior’, says Hermes, ch. 1 a; and he who has grasped its meaning will be ‘omnia bonorum tota mente plenissimus’. In other words, he will have attained to complete gnosis; he will ‘see God’, or be united with God.

Below the Greek title stands the short title Asclepius; and this is followed in the MSS. by the words ‘Asclepius iste pro sole mihi est’,—a note written by some admiring reader. The man who wrote it meant ‘This dialogue is a source of light and life to me’.

Prologue

1 a, 1 b. Deus, deus . . . orsus dicere. The narrative passage 1 b, Tu vero . . . orsus dicere, has almost certainly been added by a redactor, and probably by the person who joined the three documents together. The similar narrative passage 41 a, at the end of Ascl., refers back to 1 b, and was presumably written by the same hand. In most of the extant Hermetica, the text consists wholly of speeches in oratio recta, and contains no narrative; and in nearly all of them, Hermes speaks to a single hearer alone. 1 In Ascl. 1 b, concerned with initiation. But I do not think that this interpretation can be accepted. The Asclepius has nothing to do with initiation; it contains no trace of theurgy or sacramentalism (except so far as the defence of the established temple-cults in Ascl. III may be taken to imply approval of the use of such methods in the worship of the di terrrens). The relation of Hermes to Asclepius in this dialogue is not that of a hierophant to the mystes whom he initiates, but that of a teacher to the pupil whom he instructs. It is true that in Ascl. III. 19 a Hermes says ‘divina (tibi) nudo mysteria ’; but this merely means ‘I reveal holy truths to you’; and it no more implies that a sacramental operation is taking place, than do the words of Paul in 1 Cor. 15. 51, Ιδον μυστήραν ὑμῖν λόγον πάντως οὐ κομψάσαμεθα, πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγματισθαντες κ.τ.λ. Moreover, the proper word for ‘concerned with initiation’ is not τέλειος, but τελεστικός. The adjective τέλειος is indeed sometimes used with reference to initiations; e. g. Plato (Sympos. 210 A) describes the ‘greater mysteries’ of Ερός as τὰ τέλεα καὶ ἐποτικά; and Hippolytus (Ref. haer. proem., Duncker and Schn., p. 4), speaking of the mysteries of heretical sects, says μονοΰσι, τὸ τέλειον τῶν κανῶν παραδότες . . . ὁ γὰρ ὑπομείνα . . . παραλαβεῖν τὰ τέλεα αὐτῶν μυστήρια κ.τ.λ. But such instances do not suffice to prove that the word could be used in this sense as an epithet of λόγος, ‘a discourse’; and it is difficult to believe that the title can have been understood by Greek readers to imply that the discourse is, or has to do with, a τελεστικός.

Eusebius (Hist. eccl. 10. 1. 3) calls the tenth and last book of his history (i. e. the book in which he celebrates the final triumph of the Christian Church over its Pagan opponents) τὸν τέλειον . . . καὶ παγγειαν τῆς τῶν εἰκοσιονεντάκοντα λόγων.

1 The plural ‘you’ occurs however in Hermes ap. Cyril. c. Julian. i. 536; and
two other pupils besides Asclepius are introduced; and in Ascl. 41 a, the presence of one of these two is mentioned, and that of the other is to be presumed. But in the greater part of the dialogue, Hermes addresses Asclepius alone, and shows no sign of consciousness that others are present. Hence it may be inferred that Ascl. I, Ascl. II, and Ascl. III, in their original form, mentioned no pupil except Asclepius, and that the passages in which the presence of other listeners is mentioned or implied have been added or altered by the person who put the separate documents together to make a larger whole. The redactor intended the composite document to be regarded as a Λόγος τελείως,—the consummation of Hermes' teaching; and he may have thought it fitting that the privilege of receiving the crowning revelation of the inspired teacher should not be restricted to a single disciple, but should be shared by the three men who were known by tradition as pupils of Hermes.

The passages in which the presence of other hearers besides Asclepius is implied are the following. Prologue, 1 b. Ascl. I. 6 c: 'vobis exponam.'—'vobis expediam.'—7 a: 'vobis praeestabo rationem.' Ascl. II. 16 a: 'Ne ergo dix(eri)(tis), o Asclepi et Hammon.'—'vestri tamen causa.' Ascl. III. 24 b: 'istud vos ignorare fas non est.' 25: 'mihi credite.' 32 b: 'et vos, o Tat et Asclepi et Hammon, ... mysteria silentio tegite.' 34 b: 'o Asclepi et vos qui adestis, scitote.' Epilogue, 40 d: 'Dictum est vobis de singulis.' 41 a. In the case of some of these passages, there are grounds for suspecting interpolation, apart from the question of the number of listeners.

In the following passages, Asclepius appears to be the only hearer:—Ascl. I. 2 a: 'O Asclepi' (bis).—'Curato meminisse.' 2 b: 'meministi.' 3 b: 'Nunc mihi adesto totus,' &c. 6 a: 'O Asclepi.' 7 a: 'O Asclepi.' 8 init.: 'Audi ergo, Asclepi.' 9 init.: 'O Asclepi, animadverto ut ... festines audire. ... Audi itaque, O Asclepi.' 10 init.: 'Rationem ... o Asclepi ... cupio te ... percipere.' 11 b: 'Talem quo munere credis esse munerandum?' 12 b: 'Tibi quasi praedivinans dixero.' 13 init.: 'O Asclepi.'—Ascl. III. 19 a: 'Magnar tibi pando ... mysteria.'—'tu, si intendas, poteris pervidere.' 20 a init.: 'o Asclepi.' 20 b: 'Haec ergo ratio, o Asclepi, tibi sit reddit; ' 21: 'Asclepi.'—recte poteris nuncupare.' 22 b: 'Audi itaque.' 23 b: 'o Asclepi, ... cognoscere.' in the introductory sentence of Corp. X it is assumed that Asclepius is present as well as Tat, to whom the discourse of Hermes is addressed.
ASCLEPIUS

— 'Miraris, o Asclepi, an . . . et tu diffidis?' 24a: 'o Asclepi. Videsne quatenus tu ipse diffidas?' 24 b: 'An ignoras, o Asclepi?' 25: 'Quid fles, o Asclepi?' 26 a: 'o Asclepi.' 26 b: 'o Asclepi.' 27 a: 'o Asclepi, ut ego te docebo.' 28: 'Audi ergo, o Asclepi.' —'cavendumque esse cognoscere.'—'Asclepi.' 29 c: 'crede, o Asclepi.' 32 b: 'Vides ergo, o Asclepi.' 33 c: 'Asclepi, inane nihil dixeris.' 34 c: 'Quae si intellegeris, o Asclepi, gratias acturus es deo.' 35: 'o Asclepi.' 36: 'Vides ergo, o Asclepi, tibi' &c. —'hoc vis dicere.' 37: 'Avus enim tuus, Asclepi.'—'o Asclepi.' 38 a: 'o Asclepi.' 38 b: 'ne putassis . . . o Asclepi.' 39: 'o Asclepi.' Some of these passages prove little; but there are some of them which could hardly have been written by one who assumed that other pupils besides Asclepius were present. E.g. Hermes could hardly have said 'I reveal great mysteries to thee' (19 a), if he was revealing them to two other persons at the same time. It seems more likely that in the original documents Asclepius alone was addressed, and that the redactor changed a singular into a plural here and there, but did not think it worth while to alter the words of address throughout.

It is more difficult to decide whether the words of Hermes (1 a, 'Deus . . . cognosces') which precede the narrative of 1 b were also added by the redactor, or whether they formed the beginning of the original Ascl. I. But I am inclined to think it more probable that the whole of ch. 1 is the redactor's work, and that the original Ascl. I began with the words 'O Asclepi, omnis . . . anima' in ch. 2 a; for these words open a fresh topic, and are not in any way connected with 1 a. Besides, the inflated language in which the superiority of this discourse to all earlier Hermetica is asserted in 1 a seems to me to be hardly in keeping with the sober sincerity of the writer of Ascl. I; whereas it agrees better with the attitude of the redactor, who appears to have thought that, by stitching together different documents, he could produce a complete and final exposition of Hermetic doctrine, a Λόγος τῆλειος, in a single treatise.

1 a. divino sermone. The discourse of Hermes is 'divine' (θειός), in the sense that the speaker is possessed or inspired by God; it is the voice of God that speaks through the lips of the human teacher. Hermes adds that the discourse he is about to utter will be 'more divine' than any that he has uttered before; that is, he
feels himself to be more completely or more intensely possessed by the deity. (This is the writer's way of saying that the Asclepius is superior to all Hermetic treatises that have been written before it. Cf. Corp. XVI. i a : μέγαν οὐ (τούτον) τὸν λόγον . . . δεσπαμάγην, πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ὀσπερ κορυφήν καὶ ὄπόμημα. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. VI. i : ὁ κυριώτατος πάντων λόγος καὶ κορυφώτατος οὕτος ἄν εἶη). And Hermes infers from the opportuneness of his pupil's arrival that God wills Asclepius to hear the impending revelation, and has therefore prompted him to come at this time. Cf. Hermes in Cyril c. Julian. i. 556 B: εἶ μὴ πρόνοια τις ἢν τοῦ πάντων κυρίου ὥστε με τὸν λόγον τούτον ἀποκαλύψαι, κ.τ.λ.

 omnum . . . divinior. This is one of several instances in which the translator has rendered a Greek genitive by a Latin genitive, though Latin usage requires an ablative. For the genitive after a comparative, cf. Ascl. III. 22 b fin., 'meliorem et diis . . . et omnium mortalium.' (The same construction occurs in Apuleius De Platone i. 9 init. : 'Animam . . . omnium gignentium esse seniorem.') Genitive absolute, Ascl. III. 27 e, 'numeri completi': 29 c, 'viventis . . . partis'. See also Ascl. I. 5, 'accedit . . . daemonum'.

 vel nobis divino numine inspiratorum. Hermes corrects the phrase a nobis factorum; for his discourses are not composed by him, but by God, who speaks through him. He is ἔνθεος.

 On the subject of inspiration, Egyptians, Hebrews, and Greeks thought much alike, from the earliest times to which we can trace back their thoughts; and in the time of the Roman Empire, Pagans, Jews, and Christians spoke of it in similar terms. See Philo Quis rer. div. heres 52. 259 sqq., quoted in note on Corp. XVIII. 3.

 The Hermetists, when they ascribe their own compositions to the inspired teacher Hermes, are employing a literary artifice; but it does not follow from this that there is no serious meaning in their assertions that the teaching comes from God. There can be little doubt that some of them at least felt themselves to be ἔνθεοι, and were sincerely convinced that both in their oral teaching, and in the writings in which they reproduced that teaching, God spoke through them. A similar belief in his own inspiration was held by Philo; e. g. De Cher. 9. 27, Cohn I, p. 176 : ήκουσα δὲ ποτε καὶ σπουδαιοτέρων λόγου παρὰ ψυχῆς ἐμῆς, εἰσβονός τὰ πολλὰ θεολογικά καὶ περὶ διὸν οὐκ αὐτὸ παρατείνεσθαι δὲν, ἢν δυναμίαν, ἀπομνημονεύσας ἐρω. De somn. 2. 38. 252, Wendland III, p. 298: ὑπηχεῖ δὲ μοι πάλιν τὸ εἴσωθος
In a similar sense Christian writers spoke of themselves as inspired by the πνεῦμα θεοῦ or ἄγιον πνεῦμα.

religiosa pietae. I suppose these words to be dependent on videatur; it is the fervent piety of Hermes' utterance that proves it to be divinior. If this is the meaning, the words are awkwardly placed; but perhaps they have been shifted.

Quem (sc. sermonem) si intellegens (deum) videris. It seems necessary to insert an accusative, in order to provide videris with an object; for sermonem videre is hardly a possible phrase.

eris omnium bonorum tota mente plenissimus. Cf. Corp. IX. 4 a: ὁ (τὸν θεὸν) ἐπιγρούς, πληρής γενόμενος πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὰς νοστρὲς θείας ἵππει. It is assumed that the gnosis of God involves the actual presence of God in the soul. And God is τὸ ἀγαθὸν; in him all goods are comprised.

Alterum enim alterius consentaneum esse dinoAscenscitur. What are the two things which are inseparably joined together? Are they deum videre and bonorum plenissimum esse? Or omnia bona and unum bonum? Or omnia and unum? For omnia and unum, cf. Corp. XVI. 3.

[omnia unius esse, aut unum esse omnia.] These words may be a misplaced duplicate of omnia unum esse et unum omnia in ch. 2 a; or possibly the remains of a marginal note on unum in quo sunt omnia.

1 b. ad eius nomen multa meminimus a nobis esse conscripta. The writer of this passage knew a large body of Hermetic writings. Among those known to him were a large number of documents entitled Hermes to Ammon; a large number entitled Hermes to Tat and described as φυσικὰ; and a very large number entitled Hermes to Tat and described as διεξοδικά. The φυσικὰ are presumably identical with the documents elsewhere called ὁ γενικὸς λόγος. From the words 'omnia antea a nobis factorum' addressed to Asclepius in 1 a, it may be inferred that the writer also knew numerous documents entitled Hermes to Asclepius. Thus it appears that, at the time when the Prologue was written, the greater part of the body of religious Hermetica known in the fourth century A.D. and later was already in existence. We have found reason to conclude that the original of Asci. III, as a separate document, was written in or about A.D. 270; and the composite λόγος τέλειος was known to Lactantius about A.D. 310. The redactor who joined the
several documents together must therefore have done his work at some time between A.D. 270 and A.D. 310; the Prologue, if written by him, must have been written between those dates; and by that time the collection of Hermetica must have been nearly completed.

Hermes is here made to speak of himself as the writer of the documents in which his conversations with his pupils are recorded (‘a nobis esse conscripta.’—‘Tractatum hunc autem tuo inscribam nomine’¹). Are we intended to suppose that Hermes, after discourseing to his pupils, sat down and wrote out a verbal report of the discussion? It looks as if the writer wished to take advantage of the veneration with which the ancient books supposed to have been written by Thoth were regarded in Egypt, and sought to represent the document which he was writing as one of the same class, abandoning for the moment the fiction of a spoken dialogue.


On the other hand, the writer of Ascl. I (12 b) speaks bitterly of the invidia and malignitas of teachers who exclude men from ‘the true philosophy’. In Corp. I, the prophet is bidden to preach to all who will listen; and in Corp. VII we have a specimen of preaching addressed to the many.

adytum. What sort of place is the ‘sanctuary’ (αδυτον) in which Hermes instructs his disciples? It cannot be the ‘Holy of Holies’ of a public temple; for it does not appear that the teacher is specially concerned with the cult of any particular ‘terrestrial god’. If the writer had wished to connect him with some temple-worship, he might have represented him as a priest occupied in the service of his grandfather, the god Thoth-Hermes (Ascl. III. 37); but he has not done so. Probably therefore we are meant to understand by the adytum a private cell or chamber set apart for solitary prayer and contemplation, to which the teacher now and then admitted a few select companions for religious conferences. It is possible that the Hermetists of the writer’s circle made a practice of thus reserving a chamber for private adoration of the supreme God. Such a chamber would correspond to that which is described by Philo in his account

¹ This is as if, in Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates were made to say ‘I will write your name, Phaedo, at the head of this dialogue as its title’.
of the Therapeutae, De vita contempl. 3. 23, Cohn VI, p. 52: oliafjia
Itpov, Ο Ἐκάκια CTiUlVtia /xoviHTTrjpwv, iv Ϋj.ovovj.evoito. tov cr/fuvov
PCov jixoTTipia TtXoxrvrai.

sanctoque illo quattuor virorum religione et divina [dei]
completo praesentia. Divina and dei are probably alternative
translations of τοῦ θεοῦ. Sanctum might be used as a substantive, in
the sense of τερον, 'a holy place'; (it is thus used in the Vulgate ;)
but if this were the meaning, we should have to take completo with it,
and translate ' that holy place being filled with the pious awe of the
four men'. As completo is hardly an appropriate word in this con-
nexion, it seems better to take sancto as a participle, in the sense
' having been consecrated' (ἀγιασθέντος τοῦ ἅγιου).

((ex ore Hermu)) divinus Cupido sic est orsus dicere. The
phrase divinus Cupido (ὁ θεῖος ἐρως) is a reminiscence of Plato's
Phaedrus and Symposium. 'The étros of God' means man's yearning
for union with God. But this desire is implanted in man by God ;
it is regarded as a manifestation of the deity,— a δύναμις of God,
indwelling and operative in the human soul ; and as such, it is here
personified. (See Plotinus 3. 5 : περὶ ἐρωτος, πότερα θεός τις ἡ δαίμων
ἡ πάθος τι τῆς ψυχῆς, κ.τ.λ.) It is not the merely human teacher that
speaks ; a higher power speaks through him. Accordingly, ' Eros
spoke thus through the lips of Hermes ' is substituted for the more
obvious phrase 'Hermes spoke thus '. But the statement would be
incomplete without an express mention of Hermes ; I have therefore
transposed the words ex ore Hermu to this place.

Asclepius I

2 a. omnis humana inmortalis est anima: sed non uni-
formiter cunctae . . . ; non enim [ ] omnis unius qualitatis
est anima. The meaning of this obscure passage appears to be
that the souls of men are immortal, and differ in that respect from
the souls of the lower animals, which are mortal. (Cf. Herm. ap.
Stob. Exc. IV A. 5 : ιδεΐ δὲ ψυχῶν, θεία, ἀνθρωπίνη, ἀλογος.) The
merely animal life or soul (the anima of ch. 2 b fin. and 3 a) is spoken
of as a thing distinct from the four corporeal elements; but it is
included, together with them, under the sway of φύσις ('anima et
mundus a natura comprehensa agitantur'); it is conveyed into or
generated in the individual organism by the entrance of the two
finer elements, fire and air, into a body composed of the two grosser
elements, earth and water; and at the dissolution of the material
organism, the individual animal ceases to live. Man also, as long as he is embodied on earth, possesses a quasi-material and perishable soul, of the same nature as that of the beasts (the ῥήτωρ ἄλος ψυχὴς spoken of in Pl. Timaeus); but to this mortal soul is added, in man, the νοῦς, which is imperishable; (see ch. 6 b, 'quae quinta pars soli homini concessa est', and ch. 7 b, 'solum enim animal homo duplex est', &c.); and the human soul, in virtue of its possession of νοῦς, is immortal. (Cf. Herm. ap. Stob. E Ξ. ΞI. 2. (8): ψυχής τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικήν ῥήτωρ, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν διάναστον.) If this is the writer's view, his doctrine of the soul must have been arrived at by a blending of Platonic and Stoic theories.

The inappropriate words 'vel tempore' may have arisen out of a variant reading χρόνου for τρόπου (more).

In the MSS., the words 'non enim, o Trismegiste, omnis unius qualitatis est anima' are given as a question asked by Asclepius. 'Is not all soul of one quality?' 'No; for all things have been created by God.' But that is nonsense; the answer has nothing to do with the question. The reproachful reply of Hermes ('O Asclepi, ut celeriter', &c.) must have been called forth by some remark of Asclepius which has fallen out of the text. The point on which Hermes insists in his reply is that all things without exception have been created by God; Asclepius then must have suggested that there is something which has not been created by God, but exists independently of him. And as the thing of which Hermes has been speaking is anima, it may be conjectured that Asclepius said 'Is not anima uncreated (ἀγήρρητος)?' or something to that effect. But if Asclepius asked this question, there must have been something in the preceding speech of Hermes to suggest it; and the needed suggestion might be supplied by inserting the words createae sunt animae after aliae alio more, where there appears to be a lacuna in the text.

hoc dixi, omnia unum esse et unum omnia. In ch. 1 a, something is said about unum and omnia; but that passage contains nothing to the effect that all things have been created by God, which is the point here emphasized. The words in ch. 2 a therefore cannot very well be explained as a reference to ch. 1 a; and we must conclude that Hermes is here referring to previous dialogues in which he has taught this doctrine to Asclepius. The writer, no doubt, found it repeatedly expounded in the Hermes to Asclepius documents in his possession. If the Prologue was added by the redactor, he
must have had ch. 2 a before him when he wrote it, and his statements about omnia and unum in ch. 1 a may have been suggested to him by what he read in ch. 2 a.

The Hermetists who repeat the old saying that ‘all things are one’, or assert that ‘the One (i.e. God) is all things’, mean thereby that all things in the Kosmos derive their being from the one supracosmic God, or are manifestations of his energy. Thus the writer here makes use of the statement omnia unum esse et unum omnia as implying that all things have been created by God, and consequently, as excluding the hypothesis that anima exists independently of God. Cf. Ascl. I. 9: ‘qui solus omnia aut pater est omnium.’ Ascl. III. 19 c: ‘ex uno etenim cuncta pendentia ex eoque defluentia, cum distantia videntur, creduntur esse quam plurima, adunata vero, unum.’ Corp. V. 9. Corp. IX. 9: αὐτὸς ἀπαντά ἐστιν. Corp. X. 2. Corp. XI. ii. 14 a: αὐτὸς δὲν ὁ ποιητὴς. Corp. XIII. 2 sqq. (God is τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ πάν; and accordingly, he who is ‘born again’, and thereby identified with God, becomes, like God himself, τὸ πάν, ἐν παντὶ.) Corp. XVI. 3 and 19.

The Hermetists, even when they use such phrases as these, do not identify God with the Kosmos in the sense in which the Stoics did; they still hold fast to the Platonic doctrine that the supreme God is incorporeal and supracosmic; and when they assert that ‘God is all things’, they mean by this merely to emphasize the dependence of the Kosmos on the supracosmic God. On the other hand, there are some among them who insist rather on the distinction between God and the Kosmos; see e.g. Corp. VI (God alone is good, and all else is devoid of good). But the strongest contrast to ἐν τὰ πάντα is to be found in Ascl. II, where θεός and ἃ λη are spoken of as co-existent and almost co-equal ἄρχαι of the universe.

The saying ‘All things are one’ occurs first in Heraclitus, Diels fr. 50: οὐκ ἄλλα τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ἰδολογεῖν σοφὸν ἐστιν ἐν πάντα εἶναι. As used by him, it might be taken to mean either that all things are formed by the changes of one living material substance, viz. fire, (Heracl. fr. 10, ἐν πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς πάντα,) or that all changes are determined by one unchanging law (Heracl. fr. 30, κόσμον τόδε τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπάντων). The same words were employed by Plato to summarize the Eleatic doctrine of changeless being. Pl. Thææt. 180 ε: ὃς Μέλισσοι θα καὶ Παρμενίδαι...διωχυρίζονται, ὡς ἐν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἐστηκαν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ. Ib. 183 ε: Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοὺς οἱ ἐν ἑστῶς λέγουσι τὸ πάν. Pl. Parmen. 128 α: σὺ μὲν
ASCLEPIUS I: 2a, 2b

γάρ (Parmenides) εν τούς πολύμασαν ἐν φόρες ἑναύ τὸ πᾶν. The nearest approach to this in the extant fragments of Parmenides is fr. 8. 5 Diels: oδοὶ τοῦ ἤν ὀδοὶ ἐσται (sc. τὸ ἄν), τετεὶ νῦν ἐστιν ὑμὸν πᾶν, ἐν, συνεχείς. Cf. Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 303: Μέλασσος καὶ Ζήρων τὸ ἐν καὶ πᾶν (sc. θεὸν ἑναὐ). Cic. Acad. 2. 118: 'Xenophanes ... unum esse omnia, neque id esse mutabile, et id esse deum.'

The saying of Heraclitus and Parmenides, ἐν πάντα ἑναὐ, became widely current, chiefly through the mediation of the Stoics; and it was adopted by the Hermetists, in a sense modified to suit their doctrine.

tupote quae in creatore fuerint omnia, antequam creasset omnia. Since all things which exist have been brought into being by God's will, they must have existed in his thought and purpose before they came into being in the world of sense. Similarly, it might be said that things which do not yet exist in the world of sense, but will come into being in the future, exist already in God's thought; and that the universe as a whole, before it came into being as a κόσμος αἰσθητός, already existed, as a κόσμος νοετός, in God's mind. Thus Philo, De opif. mundi 4. 17 ff., compares the νοετός κόσμος to the plan of a city, which exists in the architect's mind before he builds the city. Cf. Corp. V. 9 and Corp. XI. ii. 20 a.

A similar thought was expressed in mythical form in the Orphic Theogonia (Ptolemaic period?), where it was said that Zeus prepared himself for his task of generating the sensible universe by 'swallowing' all that pre-existed. Abel, Orphica, §§ 119–124.

2b. De caelo cuncta (. . .) in terram et in aquam, et in aera ignea. Hermes begins his exposition by explaining how all living things are brought into being. The life of all organisms on earth results from movements and interactions of the four corporeal elements.

The meaning of De caelo cuncta . . . may perhaps be inferred

1 See the section headed Ex ἐν τὸ πᾶν in Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 301, where it is said that this question was answered in the affirmative by the Stoics and Plato. Cf. Philo Leg. alleg. 1. 14. 44, Cohn I, p. 72: καὶ ἵκανος αὐτῶς ἐνσωτὲρ ὁ θεὸς, τὸ μῖν ἅλλα, ἐπὶδιὰ καὶ ἐκκαί καὶ κακὰ δώτα, πληρῶν καὶ περιέχων, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν ὀδούς ἄλλου περιχώμος, ἀτε ἐλ καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτῶς ἐν. Sen. Nat. quaest. I. Prolog. 13: 'Quid est deus? Mens universi. Quid est deus? Quod vides (τὸ δρατὺ) totum et quod non vides (τὸ δόματων) totum. Sic demum magnitudo sua illi redditur, . . . si solus est omnia, opus suum et extra et extra tenet.'

from the words *caelum* . . . *administrator est omnium corporum* in ch. 3 c. The interactions of the elements, through which living organisms are brought into being and maintained in existence, result from the movements of the heavenly bodies.

The beginning of the sentence *in terram &c.* is lost; but the writer's meaning seems to have been that fire, the vivifying element *par excellence*, enters into and vivifies air, and air vivified by fire enters into and vivifies the two grosser elements, earth and water.

This theory of the elements and their relation to life closely resembles that of the Stoics; and the Hermetist must either have derived it directly from a Stoic source, or taken it from some syncretic Platonist who had borrowed from the Stoics.

_Solum quod sursum versus fertur vivificum_; _quod deorsum, ei deserviens_. *Quod sursum versus fertur* is *τὸ ἀνωφερές*; and *quod deorsum* (*fertur*) is *τὸ κατωφερές*. The terms *ἀνωφερής* and *κατωφερής*, as applied to the elements, are of Stoic origin; they are not employed by Aristotle, who uses in a corresponding sense the words *κούφος* and *βαρός*. Chrysippus (Plut. *De Stoic. repugn.* 42, 1053 e: Arnim *Stoic. vet.* II, p. 143) *τὸ τε πῦρ, ἀβαρᾶς ὄν, ἀνωφερές ἐναι λέγει, καὶ τοῦτῳ παραπλησίω τὸν αέρα*. The *ἀνωφερή* then are the two light elements, fire and air; the *κατωφερή* are the two heavy elements, earth and water. *Cf. Corp. XIII. 6: τὸ μὲν ἀνωφερές [ὡς πῦρ] καὶ κατωφερές [ὡς γῆ].*

We are here told that fire and air alone are _vivificum_; in ch. 6 b, we are told (in a clause which I have bracketed) that *spiritus* (_πνεῦμα_), _permixtus cunctis, cuncta vivificat_. It appears then that _πνεῦμα_ must be identical with fire and air; it must be air into which fire has entered, or in other words, it must be a mixture of fire and air. And this is precisely the Stoic doctrine. Alexander Aphrod. *De mixlione* p. 224 Bruns: *τὸ πῦρ . . . καὶ ὁ ἀέρ, . . . ἐξ ὧν μεγινυέων τὸ πνεῦμα γίνεται* (according to the Stoics).¹

¹ *Arius Didymus* (Diels *Doxoegr.* p. 459), reporting Zeno, uses *ἀνώφοιτα* in the same sense: ἀβαρῆς ἐναι ἄρα καὶ πῦρ . . . φύσει γὰρ ἀνώφοιτα ταύτα ἐναι διὰ τὸ μηδὲνας μετέχειν βάροις.

² *Cf. Ar. Gen. an.* 736 a 1: *τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ἐκεῖ θερμός ἄρρ.

With regard to the portion of _πνεῦμα_ which is contained in an individual living body, the Stoics seem to have held that the fire in it (*τὸ θερμὸν*) is that in which the power of self-movement (the essence of life) resides, and the air in it (*τὸ ψύχον*) is that by which *τὸ θερμὸν* is detained within the organism, and prevented from flying up to its natural place above. (See Galen *De tremore, palpit., commun.* 6, vol. vii, p. 616 K, Arnim II, p. 147.) And in this way the statement of Chrysippus quoted in Plut. *De Stoic. repugn.* 43, p. 1053 σ, (οὔ ποτὲ τὸ τε ἐξει υἱὸν ἄρεις ἑιλα
quicquid de alto descendit generans est; quod sursum versus emanat, nutritum. The things which 'descend from on high' are fire and air. They are ἀνυφερή by their own nature; but by the operation of the heavenly bodies they are sent down from their natural place above to enter bodies composed of earth and water, and generate life in them. (An obvious instance of these generantia may be seen in the light and heat radiated by the sun.) Earth and water are the nutritia; they 'issue from below' (e.g. in the form of plants which grow up from the soil, and water-springs which rise out of the earth), and serve as food and drink to build up the bodies of men and beasts. Cf. 6 b: 'corpora ex aqua et terra, inferiori(bu)is mundi elementis, augescunt.'

The words ἀνυφερής and κατοφερής are differently applied in Herm. ap. Stob. Exe. XI. 2. (40): οἱ εὔρεγειαν οὐκ εἶσαν ἀνυφερεῖς, ἀλλὰ κατοφερεῖς. The εὔρεγεια there spoken of are the life-giving operations of the heavenly bodies, or of the fire and air which are sent down to earth by the action of the heavenly bodies; and κατοφερεῖς, as applied to them, corresponds, not to quod deorsum (cōrtur) in Ascl. I. 2 b, but to quicquid de alto descendit.

Terra, sola in se ipsa consistens, omnium est (gener(anti)-cum) receptrix, omniumque [generum] quae acceptit restitutrix. The contradiction between quod sursum versus emanat (as applied to earth) and in se ipsa consistens is merely verbal. Portions of earth are taken up into the bodies of plants, beasts, and men; but the solid mass of the earth stands fast at the centre of the universe, and receives on its surface the generantia (i.e. portions of air and fire, or πνεῦμα, from above,) by which these bodies are vitalized. At the dissolution of the individual organism, the generantia which had entered into its composition return to their natural place above; and this is what is meant by saying that the earth 'renders them back'.

Hoc ergo totum, . . . quod est omnium vel omnia, (constat ex anima et mundo). It is necessary to complete the sentence φαινεται ἐν τοῖς γῆς σωματα μεῶσαι τα σώματα) may be reconciled with the numerous passages in which τὸ σωμάτωv is said to be the πνεῦμα, i.e. air and fire mixed together.

For the contrast between the pair of light elements (vivificia) and the pair of heavy elements (ēis deservientia), cf. Nemesius De nat. hom. 5, p. 126: the Stoics say τοις στοιχείον τὰ μὲν ἐννī δραστικα, τὰ δὲ ψαθητικά· δραστικα μὲν ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ, ψαθητικά δὲ ἐν καὶ ὕδωρ. Cic. Acad. Post. 1. 7. 36 (from the Stoicizing Platonist Antiochus): 'sēr et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram.'
thus, in order to make it agree with what follows. The universe is made up of *mundus* (ὅλη, i.e. the sum of the four elements,—see ch. 3 a,—) and *anima* (ψυχή, 'life'). In the Stoic system, ψυχή is merely πνεύμα πῶς ἕχων (Plotinus 4. 7. 4), i.e. a mixture of fire and air in a certain special condition; and in the Stoic authority whence the Hermetist's theory is derived, the universe must have been described as consisting of the four corporeal elements and nothing else. But the Hermetist adheres to the Platonic view that ψυχή is incorporeal, and modifies the Stoic statement accordingly. As he regards it, ψυχή is produced in the individual body, or conveyed into it, by fire and air, but is not identical with them; and he consequently speaks of it here as an incorporeal substance which exists beside them. In ch. 7 b, however, he does not expressly recognize the existence of the θυρτών εἴδος ψυχής (i.e. the life which is generated in the individual by fire and air, and ceases to exist in the individual at the dissolution of the body), as a thing distinct from the corporeal elements; for he there speaks of man as consisting solely of immortal νοῦς and perishable body, including the θυρτών εἴδος ψυχής under the term 'body'.

The Greek word here rendered by mundus must have been ὅλη, and not κόσμος. Cf. ch. 7 b : 'quod υλικῶν Graeci, nos mundanum dicimus.' Ascl. III. 17 a : 'ὅλη autem (vel mundus).

sicut meministi : again a reference to previous dialogues.

*Anima et mundus a natura conprehensa agitantur*. The writer, following the usage of Aristotle and the Stoics, here employs the word φύσις to signify the force which operates in and through all vivifica or generantia, i.e. the force which brings all individual living beings into existence. 'Nature', in his view, is not a separate entity distinct from God; it is merely the sum of God's ἐνέργεια operating in the material world; it is God's will, working through the agency of the heavenly bodies, and thereby directing the movements and interactions of the elements to the production of living organisms. But for the moment, he personifies this force, and speaks of it as though it were a living and rational agent, distinct from God, but subordinate to him,—a servant who knows her Master's will, and works with a view to his good pleasure (3 cf. fin. : 'natura . . . producit cuncta dei visibus placitura').

1 Cf. Arist. De an. 2. 2, 414 a 19: καὶ δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ὃς δοκεῖ μήτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶπα μήτε σώμα τι ἡ ψυχή· σώμα μὲν γὰρ ὁμοίως, σώματος δὲ τι. The Hermetist's conception of ψυχή (i.e. of the merely animal life, apart from νοῦς,) somewhat resembles that of Aristotle.
ut infinitae qualitatum ex intervallo species [esse] nascantur. Nature so varies her operations, that no two of the individual living beings which she produces are alike. Cf. Ascl. III. 35: 'impossible est formam unamquamque alteri simillimam nasci.'

Qualitas, here and elsewhere in Ascl., must be a translation of poiótis or poión. Plato, Theaet. 182 A, says that poiótis is a strange word (τὸ σῶν ἢ poiótis ἀλλόκοτον φιότεται ὄνομα). In Aristotle, poión is one of the categories; and he uses poiótis more freely than Plato, but not very frequently. In the writings of the Stoics, poión and poiótis are terms in constant use.

Species (eidos), as used here and in chs. 3 c and 4, means (1) the group of qualities by which the individual is characterized, and (2) the individual, regarded as characterized by those qualities. (It must be taken in the first of these two senses in ‘mundus (ὤη) . . . praeparatus est . . . receptaculum omniformium specierum’; and in the second sense, in ‘species enim pars est generis, ut homo humanitatis’.)

Plato 1 frequently uses the word eidos (or its equivalent ἰδέα) in the general sense of ‘form’; but he also employs it in a special sense, to signify eternal and changeless types or patterns (παραδείγματα) substantively existing in separation from sensible things. In Tim. 52 A, he distinguishes two different kinds of eidos, viz. (1) the νοητὸν eidos, which is changeless and eternal, and (2) the αἰσθητὸν eidos, which is ὀμώνομον ὅμων τε ἐκεῖνῳ (οὗ τῷ νοητῷ eidei), but is ever in motion, γεγομένῳ τε ἐν τοῖς ἐν τοῖς καὶ πάλιν ἐκείνῳ ἀπολλύμενον.2 The ἰδή of Ascl. I correspond to the αἰσθητὸν eidos of Tim. 52 A.

Aristotle’s eidos is not χωροτόν (i.e. has no substantive existence apart from the individual things in which it manifests itself), but in other respects resembles Plato’s νοητὸν eidos. In Aristotle’s system, the term eidos, as used in logical classification, means (1) the group of essential qualities common to all individuals of a class which is included in a larger class (the γένος), and (2) the class characterized by those qualities; and in his physics, the group of essential qualities to which the word eidos applies is regarded as the type of the kind,—a type which φώς aims at realizing, by

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1 The usage of the words eidos and ἰδέα before the time of Plato is very fully discussed by Prof. A. E. Taylor, Varia Socratica, 1911, pp. 178-267.

2 In Tim. 50 C, the αἰσθητὰ ἰδή are described as ἐιδοῦσα (εἰς τὸν ὑποδόχην) καὶ ἄνοιγτα, τῶν ὑπονόμων αὐτῶν τῶν νοητῶν eidoων) μμήματα, τυπωθήσατα ἀπ' αὐτῶν τρόπων τὴν δύοφραστον καὶ θεαμαστὸν.
the processes of birth and growth, in each individual of the kind. The *infra species* of Aristotle is still a class, and not an individual. E.g. 'man' is an *infra species*. A man differs *eiδι* from a horse; but a black man does not differ *eiδι* from a white man, nor a man from a woman (*Metaph.* 9, 9, 1058 a). That which constitutes the individuality of this or that man is not the *eiδος*, but the *υλη* (*Metaph.* 6, 8, 1034 a 7); Callias and Socrates are identical *eiδι*, but differ διά τίνς υλήν, i.e. owing to the fact that the *eiδος* is imposed on two different portions of *υλη*. Aristotle was of course aware that the individuals of a class or kind differ among themselves in form or quality; but he dismisses these individual differences as mere συμβεβηκότα, which cannot be made a subject of 'knowledge'; for *έπιστήμη* is concerned solely with universals.1

Seneca, *Ep.* 58, giving an account of Platonic doctrine, distinguishes (1) the *cogitabile* (*νοητόν* in the sense of general concept of a class or kind); (2) the *ίδεα*, which is 'eorum quae natura sunt exemplar (παράδοξαμα) aeternum' (i.e. the *νοητόν* *eiδος* of *Pl.* *Tim.* 52 α); and (3) the *eiδος*, which is 'forma ab exemplari sumpta (copied from the *ίδεα*) et operi imposita' (i.e. the *αιθέτησιν* *eiδος* of *Pl.* *Tim.* 52 α). *Ib.* § 16: 'quod generaliter est, tarnquam homo generalis (δ' γενικός *άνθρωπος*), sub oculos non venit; sed specialis (δ' εικός *άνθρωπος*, i.e. the individual man) venit, ut Cicero et Cato.'

The Platonist Albinus, in his *Epitome*2 of Plato's doctrines, distinguishes τά *eiδη* tά ἐπί τῆς υλῆς from the *ίδεα*. In c. 4, he says ἐπί τῶν νοητῶν τά μὲν πρῶτα ὕπαρχει, ὡς αἱ *ίδεαι*, τά δὲ δεύτερα, ὡς τά *eiδη* τά ἐπί τῆς υλῆς, καὶ νόησες ἐσται διητήτη, ἢ μὲν τῶν πρῶτων,

1 See Zeller, *Aristotele*, Eng. tr. vol. i, p. 369. Zeller does indeed note a few passages of Aristotle in which 'that which constitutes the difference between individuals of the same species seems to be included in the conception of their *eiδος*'; and to these may be added *Περί μακρόθ. 1. 625 α 4*: λέγω δὲ κατὰ γένος μὲν διαφέρειν εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον πρὸς τὸν, . . . κατ' *eiδος* δ' ἄνθρωπον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον. But Bonitz remarks on this passage 'non videtur concinere cum reliquis usus Aristotelico'; and Zeller's conclusion is that 'Aristotle's system leaves no room for individual Forms of sensible things'.

The Aristotelian commentator Asclepius (Brandis, *Scholia in A./*, ed. Boruss. IV. 626 a 4) speaks of the individual form, and distinguishes it from the universal form: ἡμιδ' δὲ φασμὶν ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν καθό ἄνθρωπον ὀδηγὸν διαφερομαι, πρὸς δὲ τούτως τὸ κατατεταγμένον *eiδος* τὸ θατ' ἄρμαν ὕπαρχον δαφοροί εἰ στώ* ἄλλο γὰρ *eiδος* τοῦ Σωφρόνου καὶ ἄλλο τοῦ Πλάτωνος. τὸ δὲ ἀκατάστατον ὡς ἄρμαν ἐν ἐπι καὶ μονοιδία, καὶ διὰ τήν γένεσιν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν καὶ μονοιδία ὕπαρχον δαφορά καὶ πολλὰ ἀνογεννεί. The κατατεταγμένον *eiδος* καὶ ἀκατάστατον *eiδος* of that passage correspond respectively to the *eiδος* and γένος of *Ascl. I.*; and the statement that the one 'generates' the other may serve to illustrate the Hermeticist's statement, 'genus deorum ex se deorum facit species'.

2 Printed in vol. vi of Hermann's edition of Plato, but there wrongly ascribed to 'Alcinous'.

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η δὲ τῶν δευτέρων. Ἡ. c. 10: πάν σώμα συνδύασμα τι εἶναι ἐκ τε ὑλῆς καὶ τοῦ σιν αὐτῇ εἴδους, ὅτερ εξωμοιότατοι ταῖς ἴδεαις καὶ μετέχει αὐτῶν δύσφραττον ὅτι τρόπων. The last phrase shows that he was thinking of the ἐιδούντα καὶ ἐξώμοιτα in Pl. Tim. 50c; but since he describes the εἴδη τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς ὑλῆς of which he speaks as δευτέρα νοητά, they must be universals (the cogitabilia of Sen. Ep. 58), and must, as such, correspond to Aristotle’s εἴδη, and not to the individual εἴδη of Ascl. I.

The Stoics, having freed themselves more completely than Aristotle from the influence of Plato’s doctrine of the substantive existence of νοητά εἴδη, gave fuller recognition to the differences by which individuals of the same kind are distinguished. In opposition to the Academics, they asserted with emphasis that no two individuals are exactly alike; (see note on Ascl. III. 35;) and they extended the meaning of the term εἴδος so as to make it include those qualities of the individual in which it differs from others of its kind, as well as those which it possesses in common with them.

‘The Stoics’ in Diog. Laert. 7. 61: εἴδος δὲ (in extension or denotation) ἐστὶν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ γένους περιεχόμενον, ὅσ ὑπὸ τοῦ ζῷου ὁ ἄνθρωπος περιέχεται. γανικότατον δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ, γένος ὁν, γένος οὐκ ἔχει (i.e. is not contained in any wider γένος), οἷον τὸ ἔνειδωματον δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ, εἴδος ὁν, εἴδος οὐκ ἔχει (i.e. contains no narrower εἴδος), ὡσπερ ὁ Σωκράτης. The εἰδωμάτατον εἴδος of this passage is not the infima species of Aristotle, but the individual. And this use of the word εἴδος was adopted from the Stoics by men of other schools. In Philo De aeternit. mundi 8. 69, Cohn VI, p. 94, τὰ ἐν εἴδει is used in the sense of ‘individuals’: τὰς δὲ φύσεως, ... ὅτερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν λαβεῖν ἡμῶν ἐκαστὸς, τοῦθ᾽ ἀπαντή τῷ γένει δωρησαμένης, τὸ ἀθάνατον. μᾶνε γὰρ εἰς ἐς (τὸ γένος), φθειρομένων τῶν ἐν εἴδει. (Cf. Ascl. I. 4 fin.) Philo De mut. nom. ii. 78, Wendland III, p. 170: τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἴδος καὶ βραχύ καὶ φθαρτόν, τὸ δὲ γένος πολὺ ἐν αὖ καὶ ἀφθαρτόν. An exact parallel to the Hermetist’s use of εἴδος occurs in Philo Vita Mos. 2. ii. 61, Cohn IV, p. 214: ἤδει γὰρ (Noah) ... καὶ εἷς τὰ εἴδη (i.e. the individuals of each race of animals) φθείρωτο, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τῆς ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν ἀφθαρσίαν ... διαμένονταν. ... μετὰ δὲ τῆς εἰδοθοῦν ἀπάντων (into the ark) εἶ τις θεάσατο τὸ πλήρωμα, οὐκ δὲν διήματεν εἰπὼν ἀντίμαμον εἶναι γῆς ἀπάντης, ἐν δεσποτὶ φέρον τὰ ζῴων γένη, ἐν καὶ ἡ σύμπασα γῆ [τὰ] εἰδη (individuals)

1 τὰ seclusi. The article would imply that the individuals produced after the Flood are identical with those produced before it, which is absurd.
ASCLEPIUS

καὶ πρῶτον ἦν γένικα καὶ ἰδιός αὐθεντικὸς. Contrast with this the Aristotelian use of ἔδος in Ar. Gen. an. 2. 1, 731 b 31: ἐνεί γὰρ ἄδυνατός ἡ φύσις τοῦ τουτοῦτον γένους (sc. of animals) ἔδος εἶναι, καθ' ἐν ἐνδέχεται τρόπον, κατὰ τούτον ἐστὶν ἄδικον τὸ γνωμένον. ἄριθμῳ μίν οὖν (i.e. in the case of the individual) ἄδυνατον, . . . ἐνεί δ' ἐνδέχεται. διὸ γένος αἰεὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ζῴων ἐστὶ καὶ φυτῶν. Here Aristotle's ὕδωρ corresponds to the γένος of Philo and Ascl. I, and Aristotle's ἄριθμῷ corresponds to their ἔδος.

The writer of Ascl. I makes no mention of νοητὰ ἔδος in the Platonic sense, i.e. substantively existing and 'separate' παραδιάματα of things. The writer of Ascl. III (17 b and 35, vol. i, p. 328) differs from him in recognizing a species incorporalis, quae divina est (Plato's νοητὰ ἔδος), but discriminates from it the forma visibilis (αὐθρυθὸν ἔδος, the sensible and transitory form of the individual), which corresponds to the species (ἕδος) of Ascl. I.

3 a. elementa sunt quattuor . . . : mundus unus. Here again, mundus stands for ὅη. Cf. Philo Quaest. et solut. in Exodum 2. 88 (p. 527 Aucher): 'quamvis terra ab aqua distincta sit et aqua ab aere et aer ab igne et ignis ab istis singulis, nihil minus tamen omnia sunt concinnata ad unam formam determinatam. Quae enim ex tot et tantisperfectum fuit materia, una convenit esse, maxime quod et elementorum mutua inter se commutatio communionem eorum evidenter arguit.' The Hermetist does not here speak of the 'elementorum mutua inter se commutatio', but perhaps assumes it to be known. The doctrine that all the four elements change into one another was taught by Aristotle and the Stoics, and by Plato in Tim. 49 b; but in Tim. 54 c, earth is excepted.

mundus unus, anima una, et deus unus. Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 9: μᾶς οὖσας τῆς ἑλκύσι καὶ μᾶς τῆς ψυχῆς. All individual souls or lives are, no doubt, one in the sense that 'all things are one', as having been created by the one God, or existing only as dependent on him; but something more than this must be meant. It seems to be implied that there is one stock or reservoir of life, from which the life of every individual living being is drawn. Cf. Corp. X. 7: ἀπὸ μᾶς ψυχῆς τῆς τοῦ παντὸς πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἔσων . . . ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπονεμημένου. In the Stoic system, the μᾶς ψυχῆ is the living fire which pervades the universe, and is identified with God. The writer of Ascl. I diverges from the Stoic doctrine in distinguishing ψυχῆ both from God and from the material elements; but his conception
of its relation to the elements is somewhat obscure. If life is separately generated in each individual organism by the entrance into it of portions of fire and air, what can be meant by saying that all soul is one? Perhaps he might have said that there is 'one soul' residing in (though not identical with) the whole body of fire and air, or πνεῦμα, and that the νινήφσια in the individual, which are temporarily separated portions of πνεῦμα, serve as vehicles for portions of that one soul or life; but the point is not clearly explained.

The words et deus unus somewhat awkwardly anticipate the contents of the next paragraph; and it is possible that they have been added by a later hand.

3 b. Nunc mihi adesto totus. In the preceding passage, Hermes has been speaking of ἄλη and ἕφα, i.e. of the material universe and the living beings which it contains; and his mentions of God have been merely incidental. But at this point, he passes on to speak of God, as the ultimate source of all life in the universe. Here then begins his teaching about God (divinitatis ratio, = theolογία); and he introduces it with a solemn preface. Compare Ascl. III. 19 a, 'sublimis etenim ratio' &c.

divina sensus intentione noscenda. Man cannot apprehend God except by God's aid; it is only by virtue of the divine νοître implanted in him that he can attain to knowledge of God. Some degree of inspiration or divine possession in the hearer as well as in the teacher is needed to make the teaching of the gnosis effective.

ut intentionem nostram . . . velocitate praetereat. The teacher is the instrument through whom the divine νοître speaks. His human faculties may be inadequate to keep pace with the rush of inspiration; and he himself, as well as his hearers, may fail to attain to a full comprehension of the truths which the power of God impels him to utter.

3 c. Caelum ergo, sensibilis deus. The οὐρανός is called θεός αἰσθητός, in contrast to the supracosmic God (θεός νοητός or ἀόρατος). Elsewhere, the term θεός αἰσθητός is applied to the Kosmos; e.g. Ascl. I. 8 init. : εἰς τὸν δεύτερον ἐποίησε, θεόν ὡρατόν καὶ αἰσθητόν. The phrase is derived from Pl. Tim. fin.: εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεοῦ αἰσθητοῦ . . . εἰς οὐρανός ὃς. In that passage, οὐρανός means 'the sphere of heaven with all that it encloses', and is equivalent to κόσμος. Cf. Ar. De caelo 1. 9, 278 b 11: ένα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὐρανόν
In the growth and decay of all living organisms on earth,—i.e. in those movements and interactions of the elements by which living bodies are composed and decomposed,—the immediate agents are here said to be the Sun and the Moon. (The fixed stars and the remaining planets, which in some of the other Hermetica are spoken of as sharing in the administration of the lower world, are not here expressly mentioned.) In Corp. XI. ii. 7, the chief functions in the administration of the world are assigned to the Sun and the Moon. Cf. Seneca Benef. 4. 23: 'num dubium est quin hoc humili generis domicilium circuitus solis ac lunae vicibus suis temperet? quin alterius calore alantur corpora...alterius tepore efficaci et penetrabili rigetur maturitas frugum? quin ad huius cursum fecunditas humana respondet?' As to the Sun, cf. Cic. Nat. deor. 2. 19. 49 (probably from Posidonius): 'Sol, qui astrorum tenet principatum, quia ex quattuor temporum mutationibus (i.e. the changes of season caused by the oblique movement of the sun) omnium, quae terra marique gignuntur, initia causaeque ducuntur.' Cic. Somn. Scip. 4. 2: '(sol) dux et princeps et moderator lumen et relictum, mens mundi et temperatio.' In Corp. XVI, the Sun is (in subordination to the supracosmic God) the supreme administrator of the Kosmos. As to the function of the Moon, cf. Ar. Gen. an. 4. 10, 777 b 26: (ἡ σελήνη) συμβάλλεται εἰς πάσας τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τελεύσεις. Cic. Nat. deor. 2. 19. 50: 'multaque ab ea (sc. luna) manant et fluunt, quibus et animantibus alantur augescantque, et pubescent maturitas frugum quee orientunt e terræ.' Plut. Is. et Os. 41, 367 D: τὴν μὲν γὰρ σελήνην, γόνιμον τὸ φῶς καὶ ὄγροισί κεχοομαι, ἐγώνυ καὶ γονάς σοι καὶ φυτῶν εἰς βλαστήσουσι. Plut. Fac. in orbe lunae 25. 18, 939 f. Catal. Codd. Astrolog. Graec. IV, p. 82, ex Heliodori (about...
A.D. 500) commentario in Paulum Alexandrinum: (郤 σελήνη) μάλλον τῶν ἄλλων διότι ὁ ἐγγυτέρω ὕσσα τῆς γῆς αὐξεί καὶ μειοὶ τα ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορά πράγματα: δ' ὧ καὶ ταύτῃ τὸν κλήρον τῆς Τύχης προσφείσαντεν ὁ θείατασ τεκίων ἀνήρ, λέγω δὲ τὸν τραμέγιστον Ἑρμῆν. Heliodorus is here referring to an astrological treatise entitled ‘the Panaretos of Hermes Trismegistus’; see Bouché-Leclercq, L’Astrologie grecque, p. 307.

The belief that the growth and decay of living things on earth are influenced by the moon was based in part on a fancied connexion of these processes with the waxing and waning of the moon itself. Aul. Gell. 20. 8: ‘De iis quae habere συμπάθειαν videntur cum luna augescente et senescente.’ Sext. Emp. Math. 9. 79: κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῆς σελήνης αὐξήσεις καὶ φθόσεις πολλά τῶν τε ἐπιγείων ζώων καὶ θαλασσίων φθειέται καὶ αὐξηται.

Caeli vero . . . per rerum naturam. A badly corrupted passage. I have tried to express what I suppose to have been the writer's meaning, by a rearrangement of the words. Frequentatio needs a dependent genitive; and a suitable genitive may be supplied by transposing animae. A genitive seems to be wanted with effector also; I have therefore placed with it the words omnium generum et omnium specierum per rerum naturam, which are unintelligible where they stand in the MSS. Cf. Ascl. III. 27 a: ‘deus omnibus speciebus vel generibus, quae in mundo sunt, dispensator distributorque est . . . sensus, animae, et vitae.’

With ⟨animae⟩ frequentatio fertur influens per mundum, compare ch. 6 b, ‘spiritus . . . permixtus cunctis cuncta vivificat.’ πνεῦμα is the vehicle of ψυχή; and the vital element of πνεῦμα is fire. The heavenly bodies are no doubt considered to be composed of fire, as in the Stoic system; and the writer's view seems to be that they send forth vitalizing fire, which coalesces with the upper air to form πνεῦμα, and that a ceaseless stream of this πνεῦμα descends to the surface of the earth, and vitalizes the bodies into which it enters there. The ἔδη are the organic forms of these vitalized bodies, or (in the alternative use of the word) the bodies themselves, regarded as portions of matter endued with organic forms, and vitalized by πνεῦμα.

What are the supradicta omnia? They ought to be the heavenly bodies, if it is by the operation of the heavenly bodies that organisms

1 Even to this day, some people in Devonshire believe that ‘apples picked at wane of moon do shrivel and scrimp up cruel’ (Eden Phillpotts).
on earth are vitalized. But in the text of the MSS., only three such things have been recently mentioned, viz. caelum, sol, and luna; and the word 'all' could hardly be applied to these three alone. The meaning required may, however, be obtained by striking out mundo in the sentence 'Caeli vero et ipsius et omnium quae [mundo] insunt ipse gubernator est deus', and taking this to stand for τού δὲ οὐρανοῦ αὑτόν τε καὶ πάντων τῶν ἔννοτων κ.τ.λ. The supradicta are πάντα τὰ ἐνότα (ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ), i. e. the heavenly bodies; and it is of them that the writer repeats what he has already said above, viz. that their operations are governed by God ('quorum idem gubernator deus omnium').

Mundus autem præparatus est a deo receptaculum omni-formium specierum. ἡλη has been made ready by God as a ὑποδοχή for all manner of ἔδη.—ἡλη ἀμορφος or ἄπως is first clothed with the qualities of the four elements; and then the elements (which in their turn are ἡλη relatively to the ἔδη imposed upon them) are worked up into living organisms.

The word ὑποδοχή comes from Pl. Tim. 49 a, where it is used to signify the substrate of forms. The word ἡλη was not used in this sense by Plato, but was introduced by Aristotle, and adopted from him by the Platonists and Stoics.

The Hermetist seems here to assert that ἡλη has been created by God. (Cf. Corp. III init., where it is said that God is ἄρχη ἡλης). Abammonis Responsum 8.3.g: ἡλη δὲ παρήγαγεν ὁ θεός. Iamblichus ap. Procl. in Tim. 116 f–117 d, Testim.) In this respect, he departs from the doctrine of the Timaeus and the Platonists in general, according to which the ὑποδοχή, or ἡλη, existed independently of the Demiurgus, who reduced it to order, or imposed forms on it, but did not create it. See Ascl. II; also Corp. VIII. 3 and XII. ii. 22, and Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. IX. We are told however that Eudorus, a syncretic Platonist of Alexandria in the time of Augustus, held that ἡλη is derived from 'the One', i. e. from God (Zeller, Eclectics, Eng. tr. p. 103 n. 7). In the Roman period, the doctrine that ἡλη was created by God or derived from God tended to supersede the

1 Aristotle (Metaph. 1. 6.988 a10), summarizing Plato's view, says τὰ γὰρ ἔδη τοῦ τι λεγοντα τῶν ἄλλων, τοῖς δ' εἴδεσι τὸ ἔν. But Alex. Aphrod. ad loc. (Brandis, Scholia in Ar., ed. Boruss. IV, p. 552 b) says that in some copies the words καὶ τῇ ἡλη were added after τοῖς δ' εἴδεσι τὸ ἔν, and that Aspasiaeus said that this alteration of the text had been made by Eudorus and Euarmostus. This appears to imply that Eudorus held the One to be the cause of the existence of ἡλη as well as of that of the ἔδη.
earlier Platonic doctrine of its pre-existence. Seneca, *Nat. quaest. Prolog. 16*, states the question ‘materiam (deus) ipse sibi formet an data utatur’; and Numenius, as reported by Chalcidius, *Comm. in Tim. 293*, Mullach *Fr. Ph. Gr. II*, p. 244 a, said that some Pythagoreans held that the ‘indefinite dyad’ is generated by the ‘monad’ (that is to say, that matter is derived from God),—an opinion which Numenius himself rejected.

*natura... ad caelum usque product cuncta dei visibus placitura.* The words *ad caelum usque* appear to imply that every part of the sublunar world is occupied by living beings, and that each stratum of the universe has its appropriate inhabitants. Cf. ch. 4: ‘supradicta autem generat inhabitant usque ad loca (deorum).’ Men, beasts, and plants are produced on the earth, and fishes in the water; but what kind of living beings are produced in the air? Compare Apuleius *De deo Socr.* 8. 137: ‘Nam cum quattuor sint elementa... sintque propria animalia terrarum, (aquam,) flamma- marum,—siquidem Aristoteles (*Hist. an.* 5. 19, 552 b) auctor est in fornicibus flagrantibus quaedem parvula animalia pennulis apta volitare; cur hoc solum quantum elementum aeris... desertum a cultoribus suis natura pateretur?’ Apuleius dissents from those

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1 Possibly Jewish influence may have contributed to the acceptance of this new doctrine. The writer of *Genesis 1 init.*, no doubt, meant by his words, not that God created the world out of nothing, but that God fashioned the world out of a pre-existing chaos (Gunkel ad loc.); and Hellenizing Jews sometimes identified this chaos with the Greek *άμορφος* *όλη.* This was the view held by the writer of *Sap. Sal. 11. 18*: *δια παντοθέναμός σου χείρ καὶ κύσια σας τὸν κόσμον ἐξ ἀμόρφου όλην.* It was also held by Philo; *De orig. mundi* 2. 8, Cohn I, p. 3: ὁ μὲν εἶναι δραστικὸν αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ καθύτων... τὸ δὲ καθύτων ἄφυξεν καὶ ἀκίνητον ὡς κατοικοῦν, κυνηγεῖ δὲ καὶ σχηματισάτων καὶ ψυχωύν ἐκ τοῦ νου, μετίβαλεν εἰς... τόις τῶν κόσμων. *ib. 5. 21*, Cohn I, p. 6: ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῶν κατέρ οὐκ ήτοι καὶ ποιητὴν... ἀφ’ χάριν τῆς δράσεως αὐτοῦ φώνεσιν οὐκ ἐνθονεύσαν οὐκὶ μὲν ἐκ αὐτῆς ἱσχίσαν καλῶν, δυναμὴν δὲ κάτω γίνονται. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ αὐτῆς ἄτακτος ἄποιος ἄφυξεν κ.π.λ. Philo *De plant.* Νοε 1. 3, Wendland II, p. 133: ἱπεδὴ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἄτακτον καὶ συγκεχωνίμην οὐσίαν ἐκ αὐτῆς, εἰς τάξιν ἐκ ἄταξιος καὶ ἐκ συγχώσεως εἰς διάκρισιν ἄγων ὁ κοσμοκλάστης μορφῶν ἔργατο. The Christian Justin also adhered to the Platonic view; *Apol. I. το. 2*: πάντα τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἀγαθόν ὀντα (Πλ. *Tim. 29 E*), δημιουργήσα (τοῦ θεοῦ) ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὄλης ἐν ἀνθρώποις δεδαγμένα. *ib. 59. 1*: Plato learnt from Moses οὕνες ἄμορφον οὐσίαν στρέφαντα τὸν θεόν κόσμον κοισέων. *ib. 67. 8*: ὁ θεὸς τὸ σκότος καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τρέψας κόσμον κοισέως. But on the other hand, a creation *ex nihilo* is asserted in *κοισέως κόσμον κοισέως*. But on the other hand, a creation *ex nihilo* is asserted in *2 Mac. 7. 28* (οὐκ ἐξ ὄντων κοισέως αὐτὰ τὸ θεός); and this view was generally adopted by the Christians. e.g. Lactantius, *Div. inst.* 2. 8. 8: Nemo querat ex quibus ista materias... deus fecerit: omnia enim ille fecit ex nihil. *ib. 27 sqq.*: ‘Deus vero facit sibi ipse materiam.... Facturus mundum deus prius materiam de qua faceret praeparavit, et praeparavit ex eo quod non erat.’ (Lactantius had read the Hermetic ἄγων τίλλων, and may have borrowed from it the phrase *materiam praeparavit*.)

2 On the other hand, Aristotle *Meteor.* 4. 4, 382 a 6 says that ἐν γῇ καὶ ἐν ἕδαιμον μῶν ἠτίν, ἐν αἰρῇ δὲ καὶ πνευμάτω ἠτίν.
who assign birds to the air;¹ and his conclusion is that the air is inhabited by daemons. Cf. Pseudo-Pl. Epinomis, where the ἄηρ and the δήρ (i.e. the upper and lower atmosphere) are said to be occupied by different orders of daemons; and Philo De gigant. 2. 6 ff., Wendland II, p. 43.

Does the writer of Ascl. I include the daemons among the beings produced by the natural processes which he is here describing? Such a view would not be quite impossible; for according to Apuleius and other Platonists, they have bodies composed of air; and in Plut. Defect. orac. 11. 415 c ff., they are described as mortal. But perhaps he is not thinking of daemons here; and the words ad caelum usque might be applied to birds.

4. Omnia autem (...) desuper pendentia in species dividuntur hoc . . . (modo). The vivifica or generantia are sent down into the sublunar world by the operation of the astral gods, and are in that sense 'dependent on the powers above'. Cf. 'quicquid de alto descendit generans est' in ch. 2 b. The meaning might be made clearer by reading omnia autem (vivifica), desuper pendentia, &c.; but it is possible to make sense of the words as they stand, if we take omnia desuper pendentia to represent πάντα τὰ άνωθεν ἐγγρημένα.

The vivifica are so distributed in the sublunar world, that each individual organism receives life only for a time, but the permanence of the race is maintained by the production of successive individuals. In contrast to the individually mortal beings of our world below, the writer speaks also of the gods, who are individually immortal. (By 'the gods' we must understand the astral gods; the anthropomorphic gods of Greek and Egyptian cults and myths are either ignored, or identified with daemons.) It must be presumed that the individual gods have been created once for all by the supreme God, and thenceforward continue to exist for ever. They cannot be said to be produced by the operations of φύσις, which have been described in the preceding sentences ('natura per species imaginans mundum' &c.). Their bodies presumably consist of unmixed fire, and cannot be vitalized by πνεῦμα, which is a mixture of fire and air; and γένος, which, in its application to mortal beings, means a race maintained by reproduction, must be taken in the sense of 'class' or 'order' when applied to the astral gods, among whom there is neither birth nor death.

¹ Philo (De plantations 4. 14, Wendland II, p. 136) locates in the air both birds and unembodied 'souls' of three different ranks.
Genus ergo deorum ex se deorum faci[et] species. The writer cannot have meant that astral gods are generated by others of their kind; he must mean merely that there is a common type, or group of qualities, which manifests itself (with individual differences) in all individual gods,—or perhaps, that the individual form may be generated in thought from the generic form, by adding other qualities to it. He does not seem to have held that the γένος is an entity existing apart from the individuals (an idea in the Platonic sense), and that the individuals are generated by this entity; for there is no trace of such a notion elsewhere in Ascl. I. His position in this respect rather resembles that of Aristotle, who regards the class-form as the 'formal cause' of the individuals, though not as actually existing in separation from them.

Est et aliud animalis genus, sine anima quidem, et tamen non carens sensibus. This genus is the vegetable order. In ch. 6 b, animals are called animalia (ζωντα or ζωη), and vegetables are called inanimalia (άφυσικα). But animalis here, (if it is not a mistake for inanimalium, 'another race, viz. a race of soulless things'), stands for the wider term τοιοι ζωντος οι ζωην ζωντος, which includes both animals and vegetables. Cf. Ascl. III. 35 init. : 'Unnumquodque enim animal (ζωη ζωντος... sive sit animans (ζωνταζωη, animal) sive sine anima (άφυσικα, vegetable).'

On the question whether the life in plants is to be called ψυχη, opinions differed. Plato (Tim. 77 b) and Aristotle (De an. 2. 5, 413 b 7 and elsewhere) said yes; the Stoics said no. Aetius (Diels DoxoGr. p. 438): Πλατων... καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ζωντα ζωηα... 'Αριστοτέλης έμμαμα μέν, οὗ μὴν ζωηα τὰ γάρ ζωα όρμητικα εἶναι καὶ αισθητικά... οἱ Στοικοὶ δὲ καὶ 'Επικορίειοι οὖν ζωηα... τὰ δὲ φυτα αυτομάτως πωσ κινεωθαί, οὗ διὰ ψυχης.' Sext. Emp. Math. 9. 81:

1 Plato ib. says that vegetables may with perfect fitness be called ἡξα.
2 Seneca Ep. 58. 10 follows Aristotle: 'sunt quaedam quae animam habent (ζωντα) nec sunt animalia (ζωηα). Placet enim satis et arbuscis animam inesse: itaque et vivere illa et mori dicimus. Ergo animantia superiorem tenebunt locum, quia et animalia in hac forma sunt et sata.' I.e. both animals and plants are included under the wider genus animantia (ζωηα).
3 Cf. the so-called 'Pythagorean' document quoted from Alex. Polyhistor in Diog. Laert. 8. 28, which contains a large ingredient of Stoicism: καὶ ζωηα μὴν πάντα δοα μετέχει τοι θερων... διο καὶ τα φυτα ζωηα (ζωηα) εἶναι: ψυχης μὴν τινι μὴ ζωην πάντα.
According to the Stoics, τῶν ἤρωμένων σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψυχῆς ἔξως συνίσταται, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ φύσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ ψυχής καὶ ἔξως μὲν ὡς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα, φύσεως δὲ καθάπερ τὰ φυτά, ψυχῆς δὲ τὰ ζώα. Thus in saying that plants are sine anima (ἀμυνα), the writer of Ascl. I follows the authority of the Stoics against that of Plato. Yet at the same time, he says that plants have αἰσθήσεως;

Sensation was attributed to plants by Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus. Pseudo-Arist. De plantis 1, 815 a 14: πότερον ἔχονσι ἡ τούτων φυτὰ ψυχῆς καὶ δύναμιν ἐπιθυμιακήν ὁδήγησι τε καὶ ἱδρύσει καὶ διακρίσεως. Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν οὖν καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐπιθυμιακῇ ταύτῃ κινοῦσθαι λέγοντο, αἰσθάνεσθαι τε καὶ λυπώσθαι καὶ ἰδέασθαι διαβεβαιώνται. οὐκ ἦν μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ ζώα εἶναι (τὰ φυτὰ) καὶ ἱδρύσθαι καὶ λυπώσθαι εἴπε, τῇ τε ἀπορροῇ τῶν φύλλων καὶ τῇ αἰέξῃ τούτῳ ἐκλαμβάναν. ... τὸν Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ ὁ Δημόκριτος καὶ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ νοῦν καὶ γνῶσιν ἔστων ἔχειν τὰ φυτὰ. Plato expresses a similar view, Timaeus 77 b ff.: the plant μετέχει ... τοῦ τρέχουν ψυχῆς εἴδους, ... ὧν δοξής μὲν λογισμῷ τε καὶ νοῦ μετέτησε τὸ μυθέν, αἰσθήσεως δὲ ζώεις καὶ ἀλγείης μετὰ ἐπιθυμιών.

1 The writer of Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. III. 17 attributes αἰσθήσεως to ἀμυνα, but apparently only a sort of αἰσθήσεως in which feelings of pleasure and pain are not included.


3 The early philosophers did not clearly distinguish νόησις from αἰσθήσεως, and applied the same words to both processes. Cf. Sext. Empir. Math. 8. 286: οὐ δεὶ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ... πάντα δόξοι λογικά τυγχάνειν, καὶ οὐδὲ δόξα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φυτὰ, ρητός γραφόν "Πλάτων γάρ οὐδεὶς φρονήσας ἔχειν καὶ νόματος αἰσθάνεται." Sextus is wrong in taking this verse to mean that plants are 'rational'; Empedocles probably meant merely that they have some sort of consciousness of their condition, and feel pleasure and pain.

4 The Manichaean doctrine suggests that in the early days of their existence, it was a matter of controversy whether trees had souls.
hand, Diogenes of Apollonia (Theophrast. De sensu 4,4), in the age of Pericles, said τά φυτά, διὰ τὸ μή ἐναὶ κόσμα μηδὲ ἀναδέχεσθαι τῶν ἀέρα, παντελῶς ἀφφησθαι τοῖ φυτεύν (in which sensation is doubtless included); and Aristotle\textsuperscript{1} and the Stoics\textsuperscript{2} denied that plants have αἰσθήσεις.\textsuperscript{3}

*Ipsud caelum . . . quarum omnium rerum [in]mortales sunt species.* There is little doubt about the writer’s meaning here, though the exact wording is uncertain. *Specierum* appears to have been written instead of *deorum* by a copyist’s blunder; and *deo* in the preceding line may have arisen out of *deorum* written above *specierum* as a correction.

*Supradiota genera* ought to mean all *genera* other than that of the gods; viz. plants, beasts, men, and daemons. But did the writer intend to assert that daemons are mortal? Such a statement would not be unexampled (see Plut. *Defect. Orac.*); but when ‘mortals’ are spoken of, daemons are not commonly included; and it seems more likely that for the moment he ignores the daemons, and is thinking only of plants, beasts, and men. Similarly below, ‘reliquorum genera (i.e. all except the gods) nascedi secunditate servantur’; this cannot have been meant to apply to the daemons.

*quam (sc. speciem) necesse est sequi qualitatem generalis sui.* This is verbally inconsistent with the following statement that immortality is a quality possessed by the *genus*, but not by the *species*; but the meaning is clear. ‘The human race is immortal’; that is, the succession of individual men never fails. Yet ‘mortality is a quality of the human race’; that is, every individual man must die.

and therefore whether they might lawfully be injured. Orthodox Buddhism decided against the tree-souls, and consequently against the scruple to harm them, declaring trees to have no mind nor sentient principle. . . . Buddhists also relate that a heterodox sect kept up the early doctrine of the actual animate (and sentient?) ‘life of trees.” There may possibly be a historical connexion between this Indian doctrine and that of Maní.

Porphyry, *De abst.* I. 18 and 21, ascribes a similar view to ‘the Egyptians’: εἰ δὲ, ὠς φασί, καὶ τὰ φυτὰ φυσικὴ ἢ χει, ποίος ἀν εἴη ὁ δίσος, μὴ τε ὡσὶν μὴ τοῖ φυτῶν ἡμῶν ἀτομεμόρητος; . . . καὶ τῶν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων λόγον σειρήκα, διὶ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν ἀλισκόμενν αὐτόμονον. Does this refer to Egyptian Manicheans, or to indigenous Egyptian taboos by which the eating of certain plants was prohibited?

1 *Ar. Peri nom. καὶ γῆς, 467 b 23: τὰ γὰρ φυτὰ ὡς μὲν, ὡς ἤχει δ' αἰσθήσιν, τῷ δ' αἰσθανόμενοι τὸ φυτὸν πρὸς τὸ μή ἱσοῦν διορκῆσαι.*


3 Wordsworth agreed with the author of *Ascl. I:* ‘Tis my faith that every flower enjoys the air it breathes.’
genera, . . . quamvis per species occidat(n)t, nascendi
feunditate servaturs. This thought occurs in Pl. *Sympos.* 206 ε: 
ἀνεγένεσ ἐστι καὶ ἄθανατον ὡς θνητὸν ἥ γέννησις. *Ib.* 208 β: ταύτῃ 
τῇ μνηχατῇ . . . θνητὸν ἄθανατίας μετέχει. Aristotle speaks to the same 
effect, e.g. *Gen. an.* 2 *init.* , 731 b 31; and the statement frequently 
recurs in writings of the Roman period. To the instances given 
above in the note on *elos* (ch. 2 b) may be added Ocellus Lucanus 
4. 2 (Mullach Fr. Ph. Gr. I, p. 402); ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἀμήχανον ἦν 
θνητὸν φύστα θείον βίου κοινωνίασαι, τὴν τοῦ γένους ἄθανασιάν φθειρο-
μένην καθ’ ἰκαστον ἀνεπλήρωσεν ὁ θεός, ἀκατάληκτον πουρᾶσαι καὶ 
συνεχῇ ταύτῃ τὴν γένεσιν. Apuleius *De deo Socr.* 4: ‘homines 
. . . singillatim mortales, cuntim tamen universo genere perpetui.’ 
Aelius Aristides (Keil) *Or.* 43. 21: θνητὸν δὲν ἥμων τὸ γένος κατὰ 
μίρος ἄθανατον εἶναι τῇ διαδοχῇ. *Lactantius* *Div. inst.* 7. 5. 15. 
The Stoics, however, could not assert the immortality of the 
race without qualification, as according to their system all in-
dividual beings are absorbed in God (= πύρ νοερόν) at the 
expyrosis.

ut homo mortalis sit. Man, regarded as a living organism on 
earth, is mortal. He dies, in the sense that the organism is broken 
up, and the elements of which it was composed, including the 
portions of fire and air by which life was generated and maintained 
in the organism, are dispersed. In another sense, man is immortal 
(ch. 2 a, ‘omnis humana inmortalis est anima’); i.e. there is a part 
of him which is imperishable, and survives the dissolution of the 
body; and it is in this part that his personality resides. According 
to the writer of *Ascl.* I, the immortal part of man is the *νοῦς*, or the 
*ψυχή* as endowed with *νοῦς*; and this part must be distinguished 
from the merely natural or animal life (the *θνητὸν εἶδος ψυχῆς*), 
which perishes with the body. But in this paragraph, man is regarded 
merely as a product of cosmic nature; only the body and the 
*θνητὸν εἴδος ψυχῆς* are taken into account; and accordingly, he 
is spoken of as a perishable being. His imperishable *νοῦς* is dealt 
with later, in ch. 6 b ff.; and in ch. 9, we are told that man is only 
‘*ex parte* mortalis’.

5. *Sunt omnes simillimae generibus suis species;* omni-
bus tamen &c. The meaning of this chapter appears to be as 
follows. Every individual man possesses the qualities which 
characterize the genus man; but in addition to these, he possesses 
other qualities also, by which he is differentiated from his fellow
men. (Cf. Ascl. III. 35.) And these distinctive qualities of the individual are determined, in part at least, by his association or intercourse with individuals of other genera. Thus, by communion with gods,—i.e. by worship and contemplation,—a man may come to possess (in addition to the qualities of the genus man, which he possessed from the first and still retains,) the qualities of the genus god.

But seeing that the qualities of a genus are precisely those by which its individuals are distinguished from those of other genera, how is it possible for the qualities of two different genera to be present together in the same individual? How can a man become a god, or 'like a god', without ceasing to be a man? This question the writer leaves unanswered.

(Sunt res) quaedam quae ante factae sunt . . . non possunt. This passage has nothing to do with the topic discussed in the rest of the chapter, and is evidently a detached fragment. The meaning of the first sentence may be inferred from a similar passage in Cic. Acad. Poster. i. 7. 26 (taken from Antiochus): 'earum igitur qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt unius modi et simplices; ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes. Itaque aer . . . et ignis et aqua et terra prima sunt: ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum quae gignuntur e terra.' The res quae ante factae sunt of Ascl. I. 5 must be the prima or qualitates principes of Antiochus, i.e. the four elements; and the quae de his fiunt of Ascl. I. 5 must correspond to the ex his ortae of Antiochus, which are animals and vegetables. The operation of creative force is divided into two distinct stages. First, the four elements are formed, by the imposition of the primary physical qualities (heat and cold, fluidity and dryness) on diroiosv; and then, portions of the elements thus constituted are worked up into living organisms. Compare the account of the Creation which is given by Hippolytus, Ref. haeres. 10. 32: διαφόρους δὲ τοὺς ἐνομένους ἀρχὰς πρῶτον ἐδημούργησ (ὁ θεός), πῦρ καὶ πνεῦμα (i.e. air), ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, ξέ ὄν διαφόρων τὴν ἀντικτίσων ἐποίη. The notion may be traced back to the Timaeus; but the form of expression seems to be derived from Antiochus.

1 The word qualitas is here used inaccurately, in the sense of quale, i.e. πολύ τι, 'a thing possessing qualities'. Thus we are told (ib. § 24) that qualitas is equivalent to corpus. The πολύ τι is constituted by the imposition of qualities on ἄνωτος ἔλη. See Reid's note ad loc.
Corpora enim impossiibile est (ad genus) conformari sine nutu divino. The function of making living organisms is assigned partly to the gods (i.e. to the heavenly bodies), and partly to the daemons, who may be regarded as personifications of the physical forces at work in the sublunar world. Similarly, in Corp. XVI, the operations of nature are carried on by troops of daemons, working in obedience to the several planet-gods, who are themselves commanded by the Sun-god. But how is the work divided between the gods and the daemons? The word species suggests that the contrasted phrase corpora conformari has reference to genus; probably therefore the meaning is that, in the formation of the individual organism, the generic form (i.e. the group of qualities common to all individuals of the genus) is imposed by the direct influence of the heavenly bodies, and the distinctive qualities of the individual are added by the more minute and detailed work of the daemons. An analogous division of functions occurs in Ascl. III. 38 b: 'caelestes dii catholicorum dominantur, terreni (god of a lower order, who correspond in some respects to the daemons of Ascl. I) incolunt singula.'

inanimalia institui et coli sine hominibus non possunt. The inanimalia are the things made by human hands, e.g. a statue, or a house. The things made by the gods and daemons, i.e. the works of nature, are living organisms; the things made by human art are lifeless.

If this fragment formed part of the original text, the most suitable place for it would be somewhere in the preceding passage which deals with the elements, e.g. at the end of ch. 3 c. But as it is at variance with that passage in assigning to the gods and daemons the function which is there assigned to 'nature', it seems more likely that it is a marginal note inserted by a later hand.

Quiunque ergo daemonum &c. As the text stands in the MSS., daemons are divided into two classes only, viz. (1) those who have attached themselves to some god, and are called ἱεροῦκασ, and (2) those who retain the qualities of their own genus unaltered, and are called φιλάνθρωποι. But it is evident from the context that the character of 'man-loving daemons' must be altered by their association with men, and consequently that they cannot be identical with those who 'in qualitate generis sui perseverant'. The writer must therefore have distinguished three classes of daemons, viz. (1) those who associate with gods, (2) those who keep to themselves,
and (3) those who associate with men. What special name he assigned to the daemons of the second class, we do not know. It is to be presumed that they dwell apart in the upper atmosphere, and neither descend to earth nor ascend to heaven. The daemons of the third class probably correspond to the *di terreni* of Ascl. III. 37–38 b, i.e. the gods of the temple-cults, who take up their abode on earth, and assist mankind by giving oracular responses, healing sickness, &c. (The writer makes no mention of *maleficient* daemons, such as are spoken of elsewhere in the Hermetica, e.g. Corp. IX. 3; see also Ascl. III. 25, *nocentes angelii.*) As to the first class, Platonists may perhaps have assumed the existence of ‘godlike daemons’, in order to reconcile with their own daemonology passages in early Greek literature, where δαιμονία is used as a synonym for θεός. But we are here told that daemons of this class attach themselves to some one particular (astral) god. I do not know how this statement is to be explained; and I have met with no exact parallel elsewhere. In Corp. XVI, the daemons are divided into troops or regiments, each of which is under the orders of one of the planet-gods; but they are employed in the administration of the sublunar world, whereas it seems to be implied in Ascl. I that the ‘god-like daemons’ are remote from men, and dwell with the astral gods in heaven. Possibly the writer had in mind the myth in Pl. *Phaedrus* 246 E ff., where it is said that ‘Zeus, driving a winged car, leads the way in heaven, and there follows him an array of gods and daemons, marshalled in eleven bands’, each of which bands is led by one of the chief gods. *Ib.* 250 b, ‘When we (philosophers) following in the train of Zeus, and others in the train of other gods’, saw the beatific vision. In the latter sentence, ‘we’ and ‘others’ are human souls; but a reader might apply the words to daemons also.

*a genere suo defluentes.* The meaning of this is indicated by the clause *in qualitate generis sui perseverant*, which stands in contrast to it. These daemons separate themselves from their own kind. For ἀπορρέω in the sense ‘to dissociate oneself from’, cf. Pl. *Legg.* 776 a, κατακροῆς ἐκ συνουσία . . . ἀπορρέων ἄλληλων τοιοῦ. *et ipsa *[a praedictae] desuper veniens. Cf. ch. 6 a, ‘utpote qui isdem se ortum esse cognoscat.’ Men are sprung from the same source as daemons; and that source is above. The meaning of this seems to be that daemons and men resemble one another,
and differ from the lower genera, in possessing νοῦς,¹ and that the νοῦς in them comes directly from the supracosmic God. If this is what is meant, the writer in this phrase identifies the man with the νοῦς in him, or assumes that the νοῦς is that in which his personality resides; whereas in the preceding chapters the man is identified with the living organism formed by the operations of nature,—i.e. with that part of him which is not νοῦς, and does not in the same sense ‘come from above’. We have indeed been told that the portion of πνεῦμα (fire and air) by which physical life is generated in the organism ‘de alto descendit’, i.e. comes down to earth from the higher regions of the Kosmos; but neither this portion of πνεῦμα nor the physical life which it generates in the organism is a pre-existent individual soul. From what has hitherto been said, it would appear that the life of the individual man begins only when he is born on earth; and the generation of life in the individual could hardly be described by saying that the man himself ‘comes from above’. Moreover, the words desuper veniens must be applicable to daemons as well as men; and there is no reason to suppose that the preceding description of the process by which living organisms are generated on earth is applicable to daemons. On the other hand, it is applicable to beasts and plants as well as men; that process therefore could not be spoken of as a thing by which daemons and men in common are distinguished from the lower genera.

I cannot account for the words a praedictae (al. a praedicto); perhaps they have been wrongly placed here, and belong to some other sentence.

consortio [omnium] aliarum specierum. E.g. the man in question worships a god, or a daemon; he marries a wife; he keeps a herd of cattle; he grows a crop of wheat. But he cannot be said to connect himself with all the individuals of the several genera; therefore omnium must be struck out.

qui se mente, qua diis iunctus est, ... diis iunxerit. The clumsiness of iunctus ... iunxerit must be ascribed to the translator. He ought to have written qua diis cognatus est. Cf. ch. 6 a: ‘diis cognata divinitate coniunctus est.’ Ascl. III. 22 b: ‘homo diis cognatione coniunctus.’

¹ Of course the Δι καυλεστες also possess νοῦς, and possess it in a higher degree. It is in virtue of his νοῦς that man is ‘akin’ to them; cf. ‘mente, qua diis iunctus est’, and ‘diis cognata divinitate coniunctus est’. 
The religion of 'those who attach themselves to the gods' is called divina; perhaps the epithet is intended to distinguish it from the lower religion of 'those who attach themselves to daemons'.


daemonum is an unintelligent translation of a Greek genitive, dependent on ἐγγίζει (accedit). See note on ch. r"a, omnium . . . divinior. The 'approximation' to gods or daemons (prope deos accedit) is distinguished from 'attachment' to them (qui se diis iunxerit), and follows upon it as a result; it must therefore mean approximation in character, or assimilation.

The daemons to whom men attach themselves must be those of the third class, called φιλάνθρωποι. They seem to be the 'gods' of the popular religion, i.e. the beings who are worshipped in the temple-cults and mysteries; and the men who attach themselves to them are those who devote themselves to a cult of this kind, but have no religion of a higher sort. The writer of Ascl. I probably considers these 'daemons friendly to man' to differ from the astral gods (whom alone he calls 'gods') in much the same way that in Ascl. III. 37-38 b the di terreni are represented as differing from the di caelestes. If so, the difference may be described thus. The 'gods' are ἀπαθεῖς; they operate by invariable law; they cannot be moved by prayers or offerings; their worship does not admit of sacrificial rites, but consists solely of reverent contemplation and hymns of praise;8 and their worshipper, so far as he becomes like them, will attain to ἀνάθεμα, and will live a life as steadfast and untroubled as are the movements of the heavenly spheres. On the

1 This position is similar to that of the writer of Ascl. I, who implies that the pious alone 'se diis ingent'. The Stoics did not thus limit the koumwnia; they said that all men, as rational beings, are included in one community with the gods.

2 Cf. ch. 9: 'hominum enim admirationibus, adorationibus, laudibus, obsequulis caelum caelestesque delectatur.' The word delectantur, if taken in its literal sense, would, no doubt, imply that they are subject to ἐδή; but this incidental phrase must not be interpreted too strictly.
other hand, the ' daemons friendly to man ', i.e. the beings worshipped in the temples, are ἱεραθηνίσ; their favour can be won, and their anger averted, by sacrificial rites and initiations; and their worshipper, if he becomes like them, will indeed rise above the average level of humanity, but will not be wholly freed from disturbing passions.

**humani vero, qui mediate generis sui contenti sunt.** This class of men corresponds to the class of daemons who ' in qualitate sui generis perseverant '. Those who do not aspire to rise above their earthly condition, or in whom the divine νοῦς is dormant, and the θυγτών ἔλαος ψυχής alone is operative, are called *humani*. Such are the men who have no religion, (not even that lower religion which consists in pious worship of ' daemons '), to raise them above their natural selves. For *humanus* in this sense, cf. ch. 6 a, ' humanae naturae partem in se ipse despicit. ' Ch. 11 a: ' homo hactenus esse debuit ' &c.

*his similes erunt, quorum se generis speciebus adiunxerint.* A man who is wholly occupied with things of a lower order than himself will be degraded to the level of the things he deals with, whether his occupation with them is practical, as in agriculture (see ch. 9), or theoretical, as in physical science (11 a fin. and 13). But perhaps the form of 'attachment' to these things which is specially in the writer's thought is that of private ownership (ch. 11 a). He who takes these things into his own exclusive possession will be dragged down by them; e.g. the owner of cattle will grow like the beasts he owns. At the present stage of his argument, however, the writer merely touches on man's lower connexions for a moment, and passes on to emphasize the higher.


*daemonum genus novit.* ' He is acquainted with the daemons', —especially with the φιλάνθρωπον δαίμονες, i.e. the gods of the temple-cults. The word *novit* (γνωσθείς) implies social intimacy, or friendship, as well as intellectual knowledge. Similarly, γνῶσις (θεοῦ) is not merely intellectual knowledge of God, but involves union with God.

*hominum quanto est natura temperata felicius.* With what other beings is man here contrasted? Especially, I think, with the

1 Cf. *Ecclusiasticus* 38. 25: ' How can he get wisdom . . . that driveth oxen, and is occupied in their labours, and whose talk is of bullocks? ' 
daemons. Cf. eo amplior in ch. 5, and felicior loco below. The writer is unwilling to accept the Pythagorean and Platonic view that man's embodiment on earth is a calamity, and seeks to represent it as a positive advantage to him (provided that he adapts himself rightly to his 'intermediate position'). Man's embodiment does not cut him off from connexion with the higher world; and it gives him, in addition, connexions with the things of the world below. These latter connexions are here spoken of as things to be glad of ('cetera . . . nexu secum caritatis astringit'; and 'ut quae infra se sunt diligit'). On the other hand, we were told in ch. 5 fin. that he who 'attaches himself' to earthly things 'becomes like them', i.e. is degraded to their level. But the two passages may be reconciled, if we take the 'attachment' there spoken of to mean an exclusive devotion to these things, such as would sever him from the higher world, and foster that 'earthly part of his own being' which he ought to scorn. The man whose heart is set on that which is above may none the less find objects of interest and affection here below; for the occupations of his daily life on earth are part of his service to God (ch. 8 ff.), and in his case 'laborare est orare'.

quibus se necessarium esse caelesti dispositione cognoscit. An anticipation of the doctrine set forth in ch. 8.

Suspicet caelum. Cf. ch. 9: 'sortiti sunt caeli suspiciendi venerabiliem curam.' Ascl. III. 25: 'nemo suspiciet coelum'.

Omnia illi liocent. Possibly we ought to read omnia illi (adire) licent. At any rate, the context shows that this must be the meaning. There is no question here of moral freedom; and the resemblance to Paul's πάντα μοι ἐξεωτίν (1 Cor. 6. 12 and 10. 23) is merely verbal.

Man is embodied on earth; yet he is not imprisoned in his earthly body, for his thought (i.e. his νοῦς, the immortal part of him,) is free to traverse the whole universe. Cf. the description of the philosopher in Pl. Theaet. 173 E: τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κεῖται αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια . . . πανταχῆ φέρεται, κ.τ.λ. Pseudo-Aristot. De mundo 1, 391 a 8: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὄχι οἶδον τε τὴν τῷ σώματι εἰς τὸν οὐράνιον ἀφικέσθαι τόπον, καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐκλείποντα τὸν οὐράνιον ἔκεινον χῶρον κατοπτεύει, . . . ἡ γοῦν ψυχῆ διὰ φιλοσοφίας, λαβοῦσα ἐγκυμόνα τὸν νοῦν, ἐπεραιώθη καὶ ἐξεδήμησεν, ἀκοπιστώτων τυν ὄννε λύροσα, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον ἄλλης ἀφεστῶτα τοις τόποις τῇ διανοίᾳ συνεφόνησε, ῥαδίως οἴμαι τὰ συγγενή γνωρίσασα, καὶ θείω ψυχῆς δύματι τὰ θεῖα καταλαβοῦσα. Lactant. De orif. dei
16. 9 f. (quoted in note on Corp. XI. ii. 19). Compare also the Hermes, 1. 6. 40: ὃ ἄνθρωπος . . . ἄλφα μὲν αὐτάρκειας τὴν αὐτήν (τοῦ ἔπει γῆς ψωφιώς) ἑσυχίως, ἑκὼν δὲ τι νοερᾶς οὐδαίας ἐν αὐτῷ πλεον, καθ' ἣν γῆν τε περιπολεῖ καὶ οὐρανόν ἐμβατεύει καὶ βαλάντης ὑγρὰς τίμει κέλευθα καὶ τούτων τὰ μεγάθη μετρεῖ, ἐπὶ τε (τὰς) τῶν ἀστέρων κατὰ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος πορείας ἐπίσταται καὶ τοὺς περίοδους αὐτῶν ἄρισθει.

See Corp. X. 25; XI. ii. 19.

6 b. quae sunt animalia desuper deorsum radices pervenientes habent. The 'roots' of animals are the streams of πνεῦμα (= fire and air intermingled) which descend from above, and maintain life in the animal bodies into which they enter. The notion that animals are 'rooted' above may have been suggested by Pl. Tim. 90 a, where it is said that man is φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγειρον ἄλλος φυταν. But the simile is differently applied by the Hermetist. Plato, in that passage of the Timaeus, is speaking of 'the supreme form of soul' (τὸ κυριώτατον παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχῆς εἶδος), which corresponds to the νοῖς of Ascl. I, and exists on earth in man alone, and not in the lower animals. He says that this divine part of the soul resides in the human head, and 'attaches the head or root of us to heaven, whence was the birth of our souls from the beginning'; and he adds that this is the reason why man alone of all the animals stands erect. Plato's meaning then is that which is highest and most godlike in man draws its sustenance from God. The Hermetist, on the other hand, is speaking of the animal life which exists in men and beasts alike; and his meaning is that this animal life is sustained by fire and air, which are sent down to earth from their natural place above by the operation of the heavenly bodies. Aristotle, De an. 2. 4, 416 a 4, says that ὅπερ ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶν ψυφών, οὗτος αἰ ῥίζαι τῶν φυτῶν' but he is speaking merely with regard to the nutrition of the body. Ib. 2. 1, 412 b 3: αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῷ στόματι ἀνάλογον ἀμφω γὰρ ἐλκεῖ τῆν τροφήν. Ar. Peri makrobi, 467 b 2: τὸ γὰρ

1 This saying of Plato was often quoted. Corp. XVIII. ii as emended: τὰ τῶν ψυχῶν οὐρανία φυτα. Philo De plantations 4. 16, Wendland II, p. 137: τὰ μὲν φυτὰ κατωκέρα αἰτεργάτε, τὰς κεφαλὰς αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς βαθυγεινοταῖς γῇς μῆκας τῆς, ψωφὶ δὲ τῶν ἀλλῶν τὰς κεφαλὰς ἀνελεύασα ἀπὸ γῆς κ.τ.λ. . . . ἐφαύτων δὲ τῆς κατακεκυκτής ἐλεγεν ἄνθρωπος τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων τῶν ἔρεις ἐπίσκεψις εἰς τὰς καφάρ, ἄνθρωπον δὲ ἔμπαλαν ἀνόρθωσιν, ἵνα τῶν οὐρανῶν καταστεῖαι, φυτῶν οὐκ ἐπίσκεψις ἄλλη οὐρανῶν, ὅτι τὸ παλάιος λόγος ἀναρχον. Plut. De Pyth. orac. 12, 400 B: ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐρανίων ἀνάμνες φυτῶν, διότερ εἰ ῥίζαι ἄνθρωπος τῆς ψυχῆς ρηχοῦμεν. Ma'udder (Testim.), who saw the clapper of a Sabian chapel at Harran inscribed with 'a Syrian saying of Plato', comments: Now Plato had said, 'Man is a plant of heaven; . . . he is like an inverted tree, the roots of which are turned towards heaven, and its top towards earth.'
ASCLEPIUS I: 6a, 6b

ἀνω τοῦ φυτοῦ καὶ κεφαλῆ ἡ ῥίζα ἦτο. Περὶ νεοτ. καὶ γήρως, 468 a 1: καθ' δὲ μὲν γὰρ εἰσέρχεται μόρον ἡ τροφή, ἀνω καλοῦμεν.

inanimalia autem de imo in superna ['viva'] radice alvescunt. There is no point in the epithet viva; and to make this clause correspond to the preceding, we require something equivalent to de imo in superna perveniente radice.

Quaedam autem duplicibus aluntur alimentis, quaedam simplicibus. There are two kinds of nutriment, viz. nutriment of the σῶμα, and nutriment of the (animal) ψυχή. The first kind consists of earth and water; the second kind then must consist of the two other elements, fire and air; ignis et aeris must therefore be inserted after anima. And this is confirmed by the phrase quinta pars below, which implies that all the four elements have been mentioned immediately before.

A plant has no ψυχή (ch. 4); it is σῶμα and nothing more,—a living and sentient body indeed, but still a body without ‘soul’; its nutriment is therefore of one kind only, viz. earth and water, which its roots absorb from below. An animal consists of body and ‘soul’, and therefore needs two kinds of nutriment, viz. earth and water (in the form of solid and liquid food) for its body, and fire and air for its ‘soul’.

This theory must have been taken over with little alteration from some Stoic source. It is hardly consistent with the view expressed above (ch. 2 b) that ψυχή is a thing distinct from the four elements; for the statement that fire and air are the food of the soul implies that the soul consists of fire and air. From his own point of view, the writer ought rather to have said that fire and air are the vehicle of the immaterial ψυχή, and convey it into the body, or generate it in the body.

The author doubtless held that it is by the process of breathing that animals take into their bodies ‘the food of the soul’, viz. fire and air (= πνεῦμα); and he might have justified his statement that plants have no ψυχή by saying that they do not breathe. Cf. Ar. De an. 1. 5, 410 b 27: τούτο δὲ πέπονθε καὶ δ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς ἦσσι καλοῦμενοι λόγοι· φησὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἄλου εἰσέλθαται ἀναπνεύσασθαι, φερομένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἄνεμων. οὐχ οἶδα δὴ τῇ τοῖς φυτοῖς τούτου συμβαίνειν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐφόν τῶι ἐνίου, εἰπερ μὴ πάντα ἀναπνεύσαντον. The word πνεῦμα originally meant ‘breath’. It came to be used to signify the ‘life-breath’ or ‘vital spirit’, i.e. the material vehicle of life in an individual living body; and it is thus used in some
passages of Aristotle. The Stoics extended its meaning, and used it to signify also the vehicle of life in the Kosmos as a whole, which they regarded as a single living organism. But the πνεῦμα (‘vital spirit’) of the Kosmos, as well as that portion of the cosmic πνεῦμα by which an individual organism is vivified, was still thought of as a sort of breath; and the Stoics held it to be the very substance which we breathe, viz. warmed air. Cf. Hippocr. De flstu 4: ‘The body is sustained by three kinds of nutriment, ὕπα, πνεύμα, of which the last is by far the most important.’ Ar. Resp. 6 mentions the view that respiration takes place τροφής χάρν, . . . ὁς τρεφομένον τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ ἐντός πυρός, but does not himself accept it. Cic. Nat. deor. 2. 54. 134 (from Posidonius?): ‘cum tribus rebus animantium vita teneatur, cibo, potione, spiritu.’ Ib. 2. 55. 136: ‘In pulmonibus autem inest raritas quaedam et assimilis spongii mollitudo, ad hauriendum spiritum aptissima, qui tum se contrahunt aspirantes, tum in respiratu dilatant, ut frequenter ducatur spiritus animalis, quo maxime aluntur animantes.’ Galen, Us. part. 7. 9, considers that the function of respiration is firstly to keep up the vital heat, and secondly to feed τῷ ψυχίκον πνεῦμα.

[Spiritus, quo plena sunt omnia, permixtus oncutis oncuta vivificat.] The statement that all things (in the sublunar world) are filled with πνεῦμα and vivified by it implies that vegetables as well as animals are vivified by πνεῦμα (= fire and air). But that is inconsistent with the rest of the paragraph. It seems necessary therefore to bracket spiritus . . . vivificat. These words were probably inserted by some one who was accustomed to the Stoic use of the term πνεῦμα to denote the vehicle of life, but mistakenly supposed that term to mean something distinct from the ‘fire and air’ here spoken of by the author of Ascl. I. The interpolator may have been the same person who inserted some irrelevant mentions of spiritus in Ascl. II.

Sensus (sensu addito ad hominis intellegentiam MSS.), quae quinta pars soli homini concessa est ex aethere. At this point Hermes begins to speak of the divine and immortal part of man. We know from Ascl. III. 41 b, where the Greek original is preserved, that the translator sometimes rendered νοῦς by sensus (see also Ascl. II. 16 a, Ascl. III. 18 b, 32 b); and it is evident from the context that the Greek word here represented by sensus must have been νοῦς. But a subordinate phrase (sensu addito MSS.)
is inadequate for the first mention of νοῦς; and there can be little doubt that sensus stood at the beginning of a fresh sentence, in correspondence to the nominatives anima, corpora, [spiritus], with which the preceding sentences begin. The words addito ad hominis intellectiam may be the remains of a marginal note.

νοῦς is here called quinta pars, 'the fifth part of man', in contrast to the four material elements. Similarly, in ch. 7 b, the νοῦς is called pars simplex, in contrast to pars quadruplex. The phrase quinta pars was probably suggested by a reminiscence of the Aristotelian 'fifth substance'; but if so, the suggestion must come, not from Aristotle himself, but from some later writer, by whom the doctrine of Aristotle was presented in an altered form. The Hermetist's νοῦς has little in common with the circularly moving and immutable element of which, according to Aristotle's theory, heaven and the heavenly bodies consist. The νοῦς of Ascl. I is immaterial (οὐσίωδης, ch. 7 b); the 'fifth substance' of Aristotle is material. The νοῦς of Ascl. I is implanted in man on earth; but Aristotle's 'fifth substance' exists only in the heavens, and no portion of it ever descends into the sublunar world.

In Gen. an. 2. 3, 736 b (a passage which Zeller Arist. II, p. 8

1 See Zeller, Aristotle, Eng. tr. I, pp. 471-477. Aristotle says (De caelo 270 b 20, Meteor. 339 b 14) that men had recognized from ancient times that heaven consists of a different substance from all things below, and that they called this substance αἰθήρ; but he does not himself use the word αἰθήρ to denote it. He calls it τὸ κύκλῳ φερόμενον οὐρά (as opposed to the four sublunar elements, the natural movement of which is in a straight line upward or downward)—τὸ πρῶτον τῶν σωμάτων—τὸ πρῶτον στοιχείων—τὸ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείων—and he describes it as τις οὐσία σώματος ἄλλη παρὰ τὰ ἀντανάκλασις, θεωτεία καὶ προτέρα τούτων ἀνάρχων—ἀναγέννησιν καὶ ἀπόρρητον καὶ ἀναμνήσει καὶ αἰσθαλάτασιν. Later writers call it τὸ κυκλοφορεῖν (or κυκλοφορητικὸν) σώμα,—πέμπτη οὐσία,—and sometimes αἰθήρ. Ps.-Aristot. De mundo 392 a 5: οὐρανοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄστρων οὐσίαν μὲν αἰθήρα καλοῦν, . . . διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ κυκλοφορομένη, στοιχεῖον οὐσίαν ἐπερεῖν τῶν τετραγώνων, ἀπρότατον τε καὶ θεόν. Plut. Eἰραδ. Depl. 11, 389 c: The Kosmos is in a sense composed of five κόσμους; one of these consists of earth, another of water, a third of fire, a fourth of air; τὸν δὲ πέμπτον οὐρανοῦ, οἷς δὲ φως, οἷς δ' αἰθήρα καλοῦν, οἷς δ' αὐτὸ τῶν πέμπτον οὐσίαν, θαῖ τὸ κύκλῳ κυκλοφοροῦντι μόνῃ τῶν σωμάτων κατὰ φύσιν ἐστιν. (Plutarch iδ. attributes the doctrine of the 'fifth substance' to Plato as well as Aristotle; in this he follows the authority of Xenocrates, who interpreted as a recognition of the 'fifth substance' the obscure sentence in Pl. Tim. 55 c, ἡτὶ δὲ οὐσία ἐνπράπτει μίας πέμπτης (viz. the fifth regular solid, the dodecahedron), ἐκ τῶν δὲ θεῶν αὐτῆς κατεξεραγμένη δεικτὸν διάγραφον. See Simplicius, in Scholia in Ar., ed. Berol. IV, pp. 427 a and 470 a.). Aetius, Diels Darmgr. p. 388: 'Ἀριστοτέλει . . . στοιχεία δὲ πέμπτα, πέμπτων δὲ τα σώμα τα ὁλόθρια, ἀμετάβλητων. Diog. Laert. 5, 32: εἶναι δὲ παρὰ τὸ πέμπτο στοιχεῖο καὶ ἄλλο πέμπτον, ὥς ὁ τὸν ἀείθρα σωστάναι ἀλλοιῶν δ' αὐτοῦ τὴν κύησιν εἶναι κυκλοφορητικὴ γὰρ. Sext. Emp. Math. 10, 316: εὐμηχανίᾳ γὰρ (Ocellus Lucanus and Aristotle) τοῖς πέμπται στοιχείοις τὸ πέμπτον καὶ κυκλοφορητικὸν σώμα, ὥς ὁ λέγειν εἶναι τὸ οὐράνια.
ASCLEPIUS

describes as 'standing rather isolated'), Aristotle says that there is a certain material substance in which the life of the organism resides; he calls this substance τὸ θερμὸν ('the vital heat'), τὸ πνεῦμα ('the vital breath'), and 'the φύσις (i.e. substance) in the πνεῦμα'; 1 and he says that it is distinct from and more 'divine' than the four elements, and that it is analogous to the element of which the heavenly bodies consist (ἀνάλογον οὖσα τῷ ἄστρων στοιχεῖο). Aristotle did not himself identify this material vehicle of life in earthly bodies with the 'circularly moving' substance of the heavens, and could not have done so without self-contradiction. But in some later accounts of Peripatetic doctrine, the ψυχή (which Aristotle had distinguished from the material vehicle of organic life) was spoken of as a material thing, and was said to consist of the same 'fifth substance' as the heavenly bodies. Iambi. De anima (Stob. i. 49. 32, vol. i, p. 366 W.): τινὲς μὲν τῶν 'Ἀριστοτελικῶν αἰθέρων σῶμα τὴν ψυχήν τίθενται. This view seems to have been first expressed by the Peripatetic Critolaus (about 156 B.C.), who must have been influenced in this respect by the materialistic teaching of the Stoics. Tertull. De anima 5: 'illos . . . qui (animam) de manifestis corporalibus effingunt . . . ut Critolaus et Peripatetici eius ex quinta nescio qua substantia.' Macrobius Somn. Scip. i. 14. 19: 'Critolaus Peripateticus, constare (animam) de quinta essentia.' Cf. Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 303: Κριτόλαος καὶ Διώδωρος ὁ Τύριος (a pupil of Critolaus), νοῦν ἀπ’ αἰθέρος ἀπαθοῦς (τὸν θεὸν ἔων). In Cicero's writings, a similar view is repeatedly spoken of, and is erroneously attributed to Aristotle himself. Cic. Acad. post. i. 7. 26 (from Antiochus): 'quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singularum eorumque quattuor . . . dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur.' Acad. post. i. 11. 39. Tusc. i. 10. 22: 'Aristoteles, . . . quom quattuor nota illa genera principiorum esset complexus, e quibus omnia orerentur, quintam quandam naturam censet esse, e qua sit mens.' Tusc. i. 17. 41. Tusc. i. 26. 65: 'sin autem est quinta quaedam natura, ab Aristotele inducta primum, haec et deorum est et animorum.' De fin. 4. 5. 12: 'num quinta quaedam natura videretur esse, ex qua ratio et intellegentia oriretur.' (In these passages of Cicero, it appears to be νοῦς rather than ψυχή that is said to consist of the quinta natura.) Cicero's

1 Elsewhere, he speaks of the material vehicle of life in the organism as σύμφυτον θερμάτη φυσική,—ἡ δραχή τῆς θερματήτος,—δραχῆ θερμῶν φυσική,—το φυσικὸν πύρ,—το θερμὸν τὸ κοινωνοῦ τῆς ζωῆς,—το σύμφυτον πνεῦμα,—πνεῦμα ζωῆον.
authority for this version of the Peripatetic doctrine of the 'fifth substance' was probably the syncretic Platonist Antiochus; (see Madvig's note on De fin. 4. 5. 12, and Reid's note on Acad. 1. 11. 39;)

and Antiochus must have got it from Critolaus. The same modification of the Aristotelian doctrine occurs in Philo, Quis rer. div. heres 57. 283, III, p. 64 Wendland: tā méν σωματικά ταύτα (viz. earth, water, air, and fire) το δὲ νοερόν καὶ οὐράνιον τῆς ψυχῆς γένος πρὸς αἰθέρα τὸν καθαρότατον ὡς πατέρα ἀφίξεται. πέμπτη γάρ, ὡς ὁ τῶν ἀρχαίων λόγος, ἐστώ τις τοῦτα κυκλοφορητική, τῶν τετάρτων κατὰ τὸ κρείττον διαφέρουσα, ἢ ἢς οἱ τε ἀντιέρει καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὐρανός ἐδοξε γεγεννηθαί, ἢ καὶ ἀκέλουθον θετέον καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν ἀπόσπασμα. ¹ Compare also Philostratus Vita Apollon. 3. 34: Apollonius asked the Indian sages ἐκ τίνων ἤγκεισθαί τὸν κόσμον ἡγοῦντο οἱ δὲ ἔφασαν "ἐκ στοιχείων .. " μῶν .. ἐφὶ .. "τετάρτων .. " οὐ τετάρτων .. " said the spokesman of the Indians, "ἄλλα πάντες .. " καὶ τί ἂν .. ἐφὶ .. "πέμπτων γένοιτο παρὰ τὸ ὑδάς τε καὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὸ πῦρ .. " "δὲ αἰθήρ .. " εἶπεν "δὲ ἐγεννηθαί χρὴ γένεσιν θεῶν εἶναι τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀέρος ἠλκοντα θυτήρα πάση, τὰ δὲ τοῦ αἰθέρος ἁθανάτα τε καὶ θεῖα. The doctrine which Philostratus ascribes to his 'Indian philosopher' was probably derived from Critolaus.

The Hermetist's statement that the νοῦς is quinta pars, and has been bestowed on man ex aethere, doubtless comes ultimately from Critolaus; but it is probable that, as in the case of Cicero, the notion was derived from Critolaus through Antiochus, since a Hermetic writer is more likely to have borrowed from a Platonist than from a Peripatetic. But in what sense did the writer of Ascl. I adopt it? He could not, consistently with his own principles, admit that νοῦς consists of a material substance; ² we

¹ Cf. Philo Leg. alleg. 3. 55. 161, Cohn I, p. 148: δὸς ἐστὶν ἐξ ἐν συνεσταμένῃ, ψυχή τε καὶ σῶμα. τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἐκ τῆς διδασκαλίας, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ αἰθέρος ἐστὶν ἀπόσπασμα θείου (leg. θείου). .. ἡ δὲ αἰθέριον φύσεως μοῖρα ἐστὶν ψυχῇ (τροφῆς ἐκεί) αἰθερίου καὶ θεία. The αἰθήρ of which Philo here speaks, (and which he identifies with the πνεῦμα (νοῦς mentioned in Genesis 2.7,) is probably the 'fifth substance' of the Peripatetics; though it would be possible to take the word in this passage as signifying the celestial fire of the Stoics.

² Cf. Philo De planitiatione 5. 18, Wendland II, p. 137: ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι, τῆς αἰθερίου φύσεως τῶν ἡμετέρων νοῶν μοῖραν εἴκοστε εἰσα, συγγενεῖς ἀνθρώπων πρὸς αἰθέρα συνήθησαν'. δὲ μέγας Μαυρίτης οὖν καὶ τῶν γεγονότων τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς τὸ εἶδος ἀμφοτέρων. The 'others' of whom Philo speaks may be Stoics, who used the word αἰθήρ as a name either for the fire of which the heavens consist, or for the upper atmosphere (with which Posidonius held the soul to be consubstantial); or they may be men who held the doctrine of Critolaus. Philo's Moses here speaks as a Platonist, and maintains the incorporeality of God and νοῦς, in opposition to the materialism of the Stoics, or of Stoicizing Peripatetics and Academics.
must therefore suppose either that he took over the phrase from his authority without noticing what it implied, or that he intended *ex aether* to be here understood in a metaphorical sense, as signifying 'from the incorporeal and eternal'.

**soli homini concessa est.** On God's gift of intellect or reason to man, see Ascl. III. 22 b. Compare also Corp. IV. 3; VIII. 5; XII. i. 2.

**ad divinae rationis intelligentiam exornat.** What is meant here by *divina ratio* (*δ θείος λόγος*)? In ch. 3 b, Hermes spoke of the *divinitatis ratio* (*δ τοῦ θείου λόγος*), in the sense of *ἡ θεολογία*, 'the teaching about God'); but *δ θείος λόγος* cannot mean that. Compare Ascl. III. 22 a: 'ex intellectu enim rationis divinae, qua constituata sunt omnia, . . . medela nascitur vitiorum.' In that passage, *δ θείος λόγος* apparently means the design or ordinance of God, and is nearly equivalent to 'God's will', or 'God's law'; and perhaps the phrase is to be taken in the same sense here (cf. 'quibus se necessarium esse caelestis dispositione cognoscit' in ch. 6 a). For *ratio* (*λόγος*) in the sense of 'purpose', see ch. 9, 'aptius . . . compositus ad certam rationem.' By the gift of *νοῦς*, man is enabled to recognize God's purpose with regard to him, that is, to know the place and function which God has assigned to him; and that is the very knowledge which it is the special aim of Ascl. I to teach. There is no trace here of a hypostatized or personified *Λόγος*.

*Intelligentia* stands for *γνώσις* in Ascl. III. 41 b; and it may very well represent the same Greek word here.

**6 c, 7 a. Sed quoniam de sensu . . . tune totam vobis praestabo rationem.** This paragraph interrupts the argument. If we remove it, *Solum enim animal homo &c.* follows naturally on *Sensus* (*νοῦς*) . . . *humanos tantum sensus* (*αἰσθήμαν*) . . . *sustollit*; but as the text stands, *enim* is meaningless. There is therefore strong reason to suspect that the intervening paragraph did not exist in the original Ascl. I. It may have been inserted by the redactor who made up the composite *Λόγος τέλειος*.

The digression begins with a promise to discuss *sensus* (*νοῦς*) later on. This promise is not fulfilled in Ascl. I; but in Ascl. III. 32 b, *δ θείος νοῦς*, *δ κοσμικός νοῦς*, and *δ ανθρώπινος νοῦς* are dealt with.1 At the end of the digression, the promise is repeated,

1 *In Ascl. III. 18 b also, something is said about sensus* (*νοῦς*), *but hardly enough to amount to a fulfilment of the promise in Ascl. I. 6 c, 7 a*.
with the addition that the teacher means to speak of νοῦς 'when he speaks of πνεύμα also'. Now there is nothing about πνεύμα in Ascl. III. 32 b; and there is no continuous and systematic treatment of πνεύμα in any part of the Asclepius,—nor indeed in any of the extant Hermetica. But Ascl. II (in its present form) begins with the words 'De spiritu autem et de his similibus hinc sumatur exordium' (14 b); it is possible therefore that quando et de spiritu means 'in that part of the composite dialogue which begins at ch. 14 b', and that the redactor, in putting this promise into the mouth of Hermes, meant to say 'a discussion of νοῦς will be found in ch. 32 b'.

It is to be noted that the plural νοῆς, which may be taken as a sign of the redactor's hand, occurs three times in this paragraph.

7 a. Dicebam enim [in ipso initio rerum] de coniunctione deorum. I cannot account for the words in ipso initio rerum. Man's coniunctio with the gods was first spoken of in the latter part of ch. 5.

illum intellegentiae divinae (divinum MSS.) . . . sensum, qui sensus est divinior in solo deo et in humana intellegentia. The meaning seems to be that the νοῦς here spoken of is not the faculty of reason or intelligence which all men alike possess, but a 'diviner sort of νοῦς', which exists only in God and in the elect among men. The distinction may have been suggested to the redactor by Ascl. III. 32 b, where ὁ θεῖος νοῦς is discriminated from two lower kinds or grades of νοῦς. But the words are obscure. Intellegentiae can hardly stand for γνώσεως here; for it is impossible to make sense either of τὸν θεῖον νοῦν τῆς γνώσεως, or of τὸν νοῦν τῆς θείας γνώσεως. Perhaps the translator may have here rendered the single word νοῦν by intellegentiae sensum.

The words in humana intellegentia also are difficult to explain.

1 I was at first inclined to think that this promise was meant to point forward to Corp. IX, the opening words of which (χθις, ὁ Ἀναληπτής, τὸν τέλειον ἀκοφορέα λόγον) imply that it was written as a sequel to the Λόγος τέλειος. But Corp. IX does not deal especially with νοῦς. It is a short treatise ἅπα καλοθέατον καὶ νοητάς; it begins by asserting that αἰσθάνεται and νοητάς are, in man at least, inseparably connected, and it couples them together throughout. Besides, it contains nothing that could be called a discussion of spirĭtus, though νοῦς (§ 7) and πνεύμα (§ 9) are incidentally mentioned in it. I think therefore that the promise in Ascl. 1. 6 c, 7 a cannot have been meant to refer to Corp. IX. On the other hand, the similar promise in ch. 8 init. ('de hoc . . . alio dicemus tempore') apparently refers to Corp. IX; see note at loc.
The 'diviner noös' might be said to exist 'in the human soul' (cf. *Ascl. III.* 18 b, 'sensus autem cum semel fuerit animae com-mixtus humanae'), but not 'in the human gnōsis'. Besides, the following question of Asclepius implies that Hermes has spoken of this sort of noös as present in some men only, and not in all men. Possibly the original may have been something like *ἐν τῷ θεῷ μόνῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐν γνώσει οὕσαι* (*Corp. IX.* 4 b) *τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, and the latter phrase may have been corrupted into *καὶ ἐν τῷ γνώσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων*.

It is to be presumed that the higher sort of noös is present in the astral gods, and in the daemons, as well as in God and in men; but here, that fact is ignored.

*Non enim omnium hominum . . . uniformis est sensus?* *Cf. Corp. I.* 21 fin.: ο.WEST πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι νοὺν ἐχουσιν; *Corp. X.* 23: οὐκ εἰ . . . διὶ πάσας ψυχῆς νοὺν ἔχει; *Ascl. III.* 18 b: 'Sensus (noös) . . . quo dono caelesti sola felix sit humanitas; neque enim omnes, sed pauci' *&c. Pl. Tim.* 51 ε: νοοὶ δὲ θεοὶ (μετέχειν φατέον), ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι.

*Non omnes . . . intellegentiam veram adepti sunt.* *Intellegetia vera (ἢ ἄληθῆς γνώσει;) is here equivalent to 'the diviner sort of noös'. *Cf. Ascl. III.* 41 b: χαρισάμενος ἡμῖν νοοῖν, λόγουν, γνῶσιν ('condonans nos sensu, ratione, intelligetia' Lat. transl.), νοοῖν μὲν, ίνα σε νοησωμεν, . . . γνῶσιν δὲ, ίνα σε ἐπιγνώτες . . . χαίρωμεν.—γνῶσις there appears to be a higher degree of noös, or a faculty superior to noös.


*una pars simplex: viz. the noös.*

*quae . . . ὀφθωνής.* The word ὀφθωνής is here used in the Platonic sense. In Platonic usage, ὀφθωνία means 'true being' or 'reality', as opposed to the unreal appearances of the sensible world; thus ὀφθωνής, 'of the nature of true being', implies 'incorporeal', and is accordingly contrasted with ἐλαχῆ. *Cf. Corp. IX.* 1 b and 5. On the other hand, in Stoic usage, ὀφθωνία means 'corporeal substance', and material things are called ὀφθωνίδης, 'substantial'. Plutarch (*Comm. not.* 49. 2, 1085 δ), in an account of Stoic doctrine, speaks of τὸ μόνιμον καὶ ὀφθωνίδες of earth and water, as compared with the two lighter elements.
ASCLEPIUS I: 7a, 7b

quam vocamus divinae similitudinis formam. Cf. ch. 10, ‘se etiam secundam esse imaginem dei’; and see Corp. I. 12. It is possible that this phrase was derived from a Jewish source. The words of Gen. 1. 26 (καὶ ἐπέν ὁ θεὸς Ποιήσωμεν ἀνθρωπον κατ’
eikóna ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν) gave rise to much speculation. See Philo’s comments on Gen. 1. 26 and Gen. 2. 7, in De opif. mundi 23. 69, Cohn I, p. 23; Leg. alleg. 1. 12. 31 ff., Cohn I, p. 69; De plantatione 5. 18, Wendland II, p. 137. Cf. Lactant. Div. inst. 2. 10. 3 and 14, and ib. 7. 4. 3 (Testim.). The Mosaic Génesis cósmon was, no doubt, known to many Pagans in Egypt under the Roman empire; and the Hermetist may have borrowed from it, or from some predecessor who had been influenced by it, the phrase divinae similitudinis formam. But on the other hand, the notion might have been derived from Plato, independently of Jewish influence. In Pl. Phædo 95 c, for instance, the soul is called theouédé 

Celsius denied that man is ‘an image of God’. Orig. c. Cels. 6. 63: εἶδε φησιν ὁ Κέλας . . . “Ὁδ’ ἀνθρωπον ἐποίησεν (ὁ θεὸς) εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ὅ γὰρ τουσδὲ ὁ θεὸς, οὐ’ ἄλλῳ εἶδει οὐδεὶ δόμοις.” To this Origen replies that Celsius is mistaken in supposing that it is the human body that is said to be made in the likeness of God; εἰ γὰρ
to κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἔστι μόνη, ἑστὲρηται τὸ κρέατον, ἡ ψυχή, τοῦ κατ’ εἰκόνα . . . ἑπερ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν λέγει. εἰ δ’ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ συναμφόηρῳ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀνάγχη σύνθετον ἐκαί τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οἶονε συνεστῶτα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος . . . ἑπερ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν φησι. λείπεται δὴ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς λεγόμενῳ ἐνδόν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἀνακαινουμένῳ, καὶ πεφυκότι γίγνεσθαι κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος, νοεῖσθαι. Thus Origen agrees with the Hermetist in restricting the divinae similitudinis forma to the incorporeal part of man (the pars osoúdhs).

est autem (altera pars) quadruplex, quod υλικὸν . . . dicimus [e quo factum est corpus]. The body is fourfold, in the sense that it is composed of the four elements. It is the fourfold part of man; but it cannot be said to be made of the fourfold part of man. The original may have been τὸ δὲ ἔτερον μέρος τετραπλοῦν, τὸ υλικὸν λεγόμενον, or something of the sort; and e quo factum est corpus may be a clumsy explanation inserted by a later hand.

Man is here said to be composed of τὸ osoúdhes, i.e. the νοῦς, and τὸ υλικὸν, i.e. the body. The mortal part of the soul, i.e. that part of it which is not νοῦς, is not expressly mentioned; we must
therefore understand it to be here included under the term ὐλικὸν, and regarded as corporeal, and composed of the two lighter elements; though in chs. 2 b sqq. it was spoken of as a thing distinct from ὑλη.

cum cognatis suis, id est mentis purae sensibus. I suppose the mentis purae sensus to be the νοήματα. If so, the thoughts which the νοῦς thinks are metaphorically spoken of as a family of which the νοῦς is the head. A man’s thoughts might be said to be ‘generated’ by his mind; and the mind might in that sense be called their parent. Cf. Corp. IX. 3, δὲ νοῦς κύι πάντα τὰ νοήματα κ.τ.λ., where the νοῦς is spoken of as the mother of the thoughts it thinks.

7 c. quae de tota summitate tractantur. We should have expected rather de lotius summitate (περὶ τῆς τοῦ ὀλου κορυφῆς, or περὶ τοῦ πάντων κεφαλαιώτατου;).

8. ὁ κύριος . . . ἐφίλησεν ὄς ἰδιὸν τόκον.—Dominus . . . amavit eum ut divinitatis partum suae. This passage is for the most part derived from the Timaeus. Cf. Pl. Tim. 92 c (the concluding sentence): θνητά γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατα ζῶα λαβὼν καὶ ξυμπληρωθέν ποτέ ὁ κόσμος οὕτω, ζῶον ὀφθαλμῷ τὰ ὀφθαλμά περιέχον, εἰκὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ (αὐτ. τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ‘of its Maker’), θεὸς αἰσθητός, μέγιστος καὶ ἀριστος κάλποτος τε καὶ τελεότατος γέγονεν εἰς οὐρανός ὡς, μονογενὴς ὡς. Tim. 29 E–31 B: ἀγάθος ὄν . . . πάντα τὸ τί μάλιστα γενέωσαι ἐβουλήθη παραπληθεῖσα Δαντῷ . . . οὕτε δύο οὕτε ἄπειρον ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμος, ᾐλλ’ εἰς ὄς μονογενὴς οὐρανός γεγονός ἔστι τε καὶ ζωτ’ ἐσταί. Tim. 37 C: ὅς δὲ κατέθεν αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶον ἔνοιχος τῶν αἰδίων θεῶν γεγονός ἄγαλμα ὁ γεννήθαις πατὴρ, ἡγάσθη τε καὶ εὑρανθέοις κ.τ.λ.

The parenthesis, αἰσθητόν δὲ φημι . . . καὶ εἰς ὀρατόν, points forward to a subsequent answer to the question πότερον ὁ κόσμος αἰσθάνεται. This question is answered in Corp. IX. 6: καὶ γὰρ ὁ κόσμος . . . αἰσθησθαι εἰςαν καὶ νόσησθι έχει. The opening words of Corp. IX inform us that it was written as a sequel to the Λόγος τέλειως; and there can be little doubt that the promise in the text is connected with the fulfilment of the promise in Corp. IX. Hence we may conclude that the parenthesis which contains this promise, together with the resuming words εἰςαν τούτον ἐποίησε, was inserted in the Λόγος τέλειος after the later document, Corp. IX, had been written, and probably by the writer of Corp. IX. The parenthetical note is appended to the word αἰσθητόν, by which it was suggested, and
has separated the words θεῶν ὀρατόν καὶ αἰσθητὸν καὶ μόνον καὶ ἕνα, which were originally intended to be taken together. In insisting that there is only one sensible Kosmos, the writer of Ascl. I is following the Timaeus.

The Latin, as punctuated in my text, agrees with the Greek (as given by Lactantius) in the structure of the sentence. But if the translator understood the Greek thus, why did he not put in aulem, to correspond to δὲ after αἰσθητὸν? And why did he insert the words eum deum secundum? I am inclined to think that he failed to see the construction of the complex Greek sentence, and broke it into two separate sentences, making the first of them end at καὶ εἰς ὀρατόν, and taking αἰσθητὸν δὲ φημι as the beginning of the apodosis. If so, he must have written thus: 'Dominus . . . quoniam a se secundum fecit deum . . . , eum deum secundum sensibilem dixerim, non ideo . . . , sed eo, quoniam videntium sensus incurrit. Quoniam ergo hunc fecit’ &c. 'Seeing that the Master . . . made a God second to himself, . . . I think fit to call that second God sensible’ &c.

ὁ魁 τὸν δεύτερον ἐτοίμασε.—quo(niam) a se secundum fecerit. The Kosmos was the ‘First God’ of the Stoics, but the ‘Second God’ of the Platonists, who differed from the Stoics in recognizing a supracosmic God. Cf. ch. 10, ‘aeternitatis dominus deus primus est, secundus est mundus.’ Ascl. III. 29 c, ‘secundum etenim deum hunc crede.’

ο魁 ὅν τούτον ἐποίησε πρῶτον καὶ μόνον καὶ ἑνα.—quonia ἐργο hunc fecit ex se primum et a se secundum. The translator must have had before him a different reading of the Greek.

καλὸς δὲ αὐτῇ ἐφανῇ (ἂν), καὶ πληρῶστατος πάντων τῶν ἁγαθῶν.—visusque ei pulcher, utpote qui sit omnium bonitate plenissimus. If ἐφανῇ was originally followed by ἂν, we can account for the translator's rendering, by assuming that he divided the Greek words wrongly, and took ἂν καὶ πληρῶστατος to mean utpote qui sit plenissimus.

The thought occurs in the passages of the Timaeus quoted above. But here again, there is a resemblance to the Jewish account of the Creation; compare the recurring phrase καὶ ἦδεν ὁ θεὸς ὁτι καλὸν (Gen. 1. 4, 8, 10, 12, 18); καὶ ἦδεν ὁ θεὸς ὁτι καλά (ib. 21, 25); καὶ ἦδεν ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα ὅσα ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἦδον καλὰ λίαν (ib. 31). It is not unlikely that the first chapter of Genesis, as well as the
Timaeus, was known to the writer of Ascl. I, or to some of his teachers.

The notion that the Kosmos is son of God is borrowed from the Timaeus. The thought was familiar to all Platonists. Cf. Philo De ebrietate 8. 30, Wendland II, p. 176: God mated with his ἐπιστήμη, and she brought forth τὸν μόνον καὶ ἀγαπητὸν αἰσθητὸν νόον, τὸν τὸν κόσμον. In Philo Quod deus sit immut. 6. 31, Wendland II, p. 63, the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος is called the younger son of God, the νοητὸς κόσμος being God's elder son. In Corp. I. 12, the phrases which Platonists were accustomed to use in describing the Kosmos as the son of God are transferred to the Archanthropos: ὁ δὲ πάνων πατὴρ . . . ἀπεκόψεν Ἀνθρωπον . . . ὁ ἡγασθῇ ὁς ἠγασθῇ ὁς ἦλθεν τῶν τῶν. . . . Christian theologians, reading these phrases in the Timaeus or in the writings of later Platonists, took them to apply, not to the universe itself, but to the Ἁγγελος by whom the universe was made, and regarded them as equivalent to the words addressed to Jesus, οὐ εἶ ὁ θεός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός, ἐν σοὶ εἰδόκησα (Mark i. 11, Luke 3. 22). Thus Lactantius quotes the words of Hermes in Ascl. I. 8 as referring to the 'Son of God' in the Christian sense. Interpreted in this way, such passages may have contributed to the formulation of Christian dogma.1 By a similar misunderstanding, Pseudo-Augustine supposes that Ἁγγελος τέλειος, the title of the Hermetic document, means Verbum perfectum, 'The perfect Word of God'.

1 E. g. the epithet μονογενής, which the Christians applied to the Second Person of their Trinity, was taken over by them from the Timaeus, where it is applied to the Kosmos. This word meant primarily 'the only one of his kind' (γένος); and in the earlier Latin versions of the Christian Creed, it was represented by unicus, 'unique', for which unigenitus, 'only-begotten', was afterwards substituted. (Rashdall, Doctrine and development, p. 78.)

See Philo De vita Mosis 2 (3). 14. 134, Cohn IV, p. 231. Speaking of the Jewish High Priest, Philo there says ἀναγεννημένος γὰρ ὠν τούτον ἐπεφέρεν τοῦτο τοῦ κόσμου παρά παρεκλήσει χρήσατο τελειοτάτην τὴν ἀρετὴν υἱός τοῦ τοῦ κόσμου πάντως παρακλήσει χρὴσα τελειοτάτην τὴν ἀρετὴν υἱόν σαρκί παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς. A Christian theologian of the early centuries, reading those words, would almost necessarily assume that the Son of whom Philo spoke was Christ.
ut 'tantus et' bonus. If the Latin words are sound, it would seem that the translator read ὄς τοσοῖτος καὶ ἄγαθός. But the Hermetist cannot have written that. Possibly the true reading was something like ἀν πρῶτος αὐτὸς (ὑπάρχω;?) καὶ ἄγαθός (cf. 'et rationis suae imitatem et diligentiae' below), and -τως αὐτός was corrupted into τοσοῖτος.

qui illum . . . intueri potuisset. The translator repeatedly writes a pluperfect subjunctive where Latin usage requires an imperfect. Ch. 15: 'si locus deesset qui omnia sustinere potuisset' (for posset). Ch. 22 b: 'per quae vitia . . . abalienare potuissent' (for possent). Ch. 37: 'per quas idola . . . vires habere potuissent' (for possent). Ch. 9: 'harmoniae suavitatem defuisset' (for deesset). Ch. 8: 'satis esse debuisset' (?). Cf. ch. 16 a: 'provisum est quantum rationabiliter potuisset' (for poterat or potuit).

Voluntas etenim dei ipsa est summa perfectio. A man needs time and effort to execute his purposes; but with God, 'to will is to accomplish'. The same thought is expressed in other words below; 'voluntatem (dei) comitatur effectus.' Cf. Ascl. III. 26 b: 'et habet omnia quae vult, {{et ea vult quae habet}}. The 'will' of God, as here spoken of, corresponds to the 'word' or 'command' of God in the Jewish account of the Creation: εἴπεν ὁ θεὸς Γεννηθητω φῶς' καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς.'

Cum itaque eum ophióδη (fecisset). Man is first created as an incorporeal being, and afterwards embodied. This may be regarded as a rudimentary form of the doctrine of the Archanthropos, which presents itself fully developed in Corp. I. But we must not conclude on that account that Corp. I is necessarily of later date than Ascl. I.

talesque omnes esse praecessit. These words show that the preceding description of the making of man must be taken as referring to an individual 'first man', and not to men in general. Here then we have another point in common with the Mosaic account of the Creation. Cf. Philo De opif. mundi 51. 145, Cohn I, p. 51: τοὺς δ' ἀτυόνους (of Adam), τής ἑκείνον μετέχοντας ἰδέας, ἀναγκαῖον, ei καὶ ἀμφότεροι, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔτι σώζων τοὺς τύπους τῆς πρὸς τῶν προπάτωρα συγγενείας. ἢ δὲ συγγένεια τίς; πᾶς ἀνθρωπος κατὰ μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν φιλεῖται λόγῳ θείῳ, τῆς μακάριας φύσεως ἐκμαγείων

The Pagan author of the Περὶ ὦνομ (ch. 9) quotes these words, and says that in them 'the lawgiver of the Jews, having formed an adequate conception of the Supreme Being, gave it adequate expression.'
These words picture the process of incorporation differently from the preceding phrase, 'texteum corpore adomo', and can hardly have stood in the same sentence with it. I have therefore transferred them to the following sentence.

Cf. Ascl. III. 22 b: 'hominem... ex utraque natura composuit, divina atque mortali.' Lactantius Div. inst. 7. 13. 3 (Testim.).

Debuisset may have arisen out of quantum debuisset (ὅσον ἦπεῖ?), written as an alternative for quantum satis esset (ὅσον ἤπει?).

[in]colere atque gubernare terrena. Incolere either is a misreading for colere, or is here used in the sense of colere, 'to tend'.

This sentence gives the writer's answer to the question asked above, 'What need was there that man should be embodied?' In the Timaeus, that question is answered only by saying that 'if mortal beings be not created, the Kosmos will be incomplete' (Tìm. 41 b), and that the soul is implanted in the body ἐκ ἀνάγεσις. Some Platonists, following the tradition of Empedocles and the Pythagoreans, spoke of embodiment as a punishment which the soul has incurred by some sin committed in a previous stage of existence; and a similar doctrine is taught in the Kore Kosmu. Others said that the soul descends from the world above and enters the body of its own free will, or that it is drawn down to earth by morbid desire. But the writer of Ascl. I answers the question by saying 'God willed that man should be embodied, in order that he might tend the things of earth'. Cicero, following some Greek authority of later date than Plato, suggests a similar answer; Somn. Scip. 3. 7: 'homines enim sunt hac lege generati, qui tuerentur (φυλάττειν?) illum globum... quae terra dicitur.' Cic. De sen. 21. 77: 'Nam dum sumus inclusi in his compagibus corporis, munere quodam necessitatis et gravi opere perfungimus. Est enim animus caelestis, ex altissimo domicilio depressus et quasi demersus in terram, locum divinae naturae aeternitatisque contrarium. Sed credo deos immortales sparsisse animos in corpora humana, ut essent qui terras tuerentur, quique caelestium ordinem contemplantes imitarentur eum vitae modo atque constantia.' Cic. Nat.
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deor. 2. 39. 99 (probably from Posidonius), in a passage describing the beauties and splendours of the earth: 'Quid iam de hominum genere dicam? qui quasi cultores terrae constitutii non patiuntur eam nec immanitate beluarum effervari nec stirpium asperitate vastari, quorumque operibus agri, insulae litoraque collucent distincta tectis et urbibus. Quae si, ut animis, sic oculis¹ videre possemus, nemo cunctam intuens terram de divina ratione dubitatet.' (No one would doubt that these things are ordained by God's design.) Cf. Sap. Sal. 9. i: thei, ... o ... τῇ σοφίᾳ ... κατασκευάσας ἄνθρωπον ἵνα διεσπόρη τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ γενομένων κτισμάτων, καὶ διέτη τῶν κόσμων ἐν δοικότητι καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ. Philo De opif. mundi 29. 88, Cohn I, p. 31: ἠναγκαίον δὴ τών καὶ κυβερνήτην τήν ἀπαίσιν ὁ ποιητής εὐθυμουργεύει τῶν ἄνθρωπων, ἵνα ἠναγκαίοι καὶ κυβερνητικά περίεργα, ἔρωτα καὶ φυτῶν λαβών τῆν ἐπιμέλειαν, ὁτα τῆς ὑπαρχος τοῦ πρώτου καὶ μεγάλου βασιλέως. The language of that passage closely resembles that of Ascl. I; but the thought was suggested to Philo by Gen. I. 26: καὶ ἀρχέτοσαν (οἱ ἄνθρωποι) τῶν ἐμκῶν τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῶν πετεινῶν τοῦ ὄμορφου καὶ τῶν κτηνῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς γῆς καὶ πάντων τῶν ἔρπτων τῶν ἐρπόντων ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς. Some readers of Genesis may have found a similar meaning in Gen. 2. 15: καὶ ἐλαβὲν Κύριος ὁ θεὸς τῶν ἄνθρωπων δν ἔπλασεν καὶ ἔθετο αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ, ἠργάζεσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ φυλάττεν. (For the word φυλάττεν, cf. Ascl. I. 8: 'qua pars terrena mundi artium disciplinarumque . . . usu servatur.' Ch. iia: 'mundi inferioris necessitate servandi.') Thus here again, the question of Jewish influence arises; and it is not impossible that the Hermetist, in his description of man's earthly function, derived something from the Jewish Cosmogonia, as well as from Pagan writers such as Posidonius.²

For a comprehensive discussion of the descent and embodiment of the soul, see Plotinus 4. 8. Plotinus says, inter alia, that the embodied soul κοσμεὶ τε καὶ διωκεῖ καὶ ἄρχει (τοῦ μέτοικος τῶν καθαρών, i.e. material things); and that it τὸ καθαρὰτον μετὰ περιπτάσεως (with trouble) διωκεῖ, ἐφαπτομένη ἡδονή καὶ θεραπεύουσα τὰ ἐξωθέν.

¹ We see with our eyes one little bit of the earth's surface only. Our mental vision may include the whole; but if we could see it all with our bodily eyes, we should be more strongly impressed.
² It is conceivable even that Posidonius himself may have read the first two chapters of Genesis, and may have been to some slight extent influenced by them. We know that in his time there were Jews of the Diaspora who were eager to communicate their sacred wisdom to their Gentile neighbours.
commodationes alternae, quae est humanitatis inter se firmissimus nexus. An incidental recognition of human society. The mention of social ties between man and man is exceptional in the Hermetica.

artium disciplinarumque cognitio ne atque usu servatur. In other words, the work of φύσις is incomplete until it is supplemented by τίχνη.

[Placitum enim dei . . . multo ante soiverit.] These two sentences are irrelevant in their present context. Voluntatem (dei) comitatur effectus is a repetition of Voluntas dei ipsa est summa perfectio above. The second sentence, Neque enim . . . deo dis- pliciturum esse &c., may be compared with natura . . . producit cuncta dei visibus placitura in ch. 3 c fin. In place of quod placuit, something like quod fiat would have been more intelligible.

9. caeli vel quae in eo sunt dilectum . . . vel cultum. The translator uses dilectus as a synonym for diligentia (θερασία). The Hermetist here speaks of worship of caelum and the di caelestes (sun, moon, and stars), and makes no mention of the deus summus; yet below, speaking of the same sort of worship, he says that 'hominum cantilenis concelebratur laudibus qui solus omnia est'. His view seems to be that hymns addressed to the di caelestes are, in effect, a form of worship of the deus summus. Music such as he describes would probably be employed in congregational worship only; and it may be that, in the gatherings of the Hermetist's community, hymns of this character were sung, not to God himself, but to his ministers, the astral gods. It was probably held that the supreme Deity could be directly approached only in private prayer and contemplation.

In the temple-cults of Egypt, there was much singing of hymns. Among other forms of music employed in Egyptian worship, we hear of a practice of intoning the vowel-sounds in series. Demetrius Περὶ ἐρμηνείας 71: ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ δὲ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς υμνοῦσι διὰ τῶν ἐπτὰ φωνητῶν οἱ ιερεῖς, ἐφεξῆς ἤχοιντες ἀντά, καὶ ἀντὶ αἰλοῦ καὶ ἀντὶ κυθρᾶς τῶν γραμμάτων τούτων ὁ ἥχος ἀκούσαι ἐπὶ εὐφωνίας. Many people (though not the writer of Ascl. I) attributed a theurgic efficacy to such vocal sounds; hence the groups of vowels which occur so frequently amidst the gibberish of the magic papyri. (Dieterich, Abraxas, p. 33.)

Hanc aliud animal non facit (fecit MSS.) nec divinorum
nec mortalium (animalium MSS.). Man is the only living being that worships; the gods do not worship. This statement is contradicted elsewhere in the *Hermetica*. In *Corp.* I. 25, the disembodied soul hears 'the Powers that are above the Ogdoad' singing the praise of God; see also *Corp.* XIII. 15. In the *Kore Kosmu* (*Exc.* XXIII. 69) we are told that Osiris and Isis (deities residing for a time on earth) 'invoked the Monarchos' with a hymn; χαίρε γὰρ ἄμως ὁ θεός. In the documents of the old Egyptian religion, adoration of a god by gods is of frequent occurrence. Moreover, in *Ascl.* I, only a few lines below, there is mention of caelestes laudes, i.e. hymns sung in heaven, either by the di caelestes, or by beatified human souls, or perhaps by both. It would be possible to get rid of the inconsistency by bracketing nec divinorum nec mortalium, and taking animal to refer to earthly beings only; but that is hardly necessary.

*Musarum chorus.* References to the deities of Hellenic mythology,—and indeed, to individual deities of any kind, other than the astral gods,—are rare in the *Hermetica*, with the exception of the *Kore Kosmu*. Here, the writer is using the language of Greek literary tradition; the Muses are, to him, merely a personification of music; and it is probable that he no more regarded them as real living persons, than did Pope, when he wrote 'Descend, ye Nine, descend and sing'.

ne terrenus mundus videretur incultior. Thus even the singing of hymns may, in a certain sense, be included in that part of man's function which consists in terrae cultus.

Aliqui . . . pura mente praediti. 'Pure mind' is νοῆς which is not contaminated by the body in which it is encased, i.e. by the πάθη which the body generates. Cf. ch. 7 b, 'mentis purae sensibus'. Xen. *Cyrop.* 8. 7. 20: ἀλλ' ὅταν ἄκρατος καὶ καθαρὸς ὅ νοῆς ἐκκρηκτὴ (τοῦ ἀφρονος σώματος), τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον αὐτῶν εἰκὼς ἐστι.
men ‘tend the things of earth’. In this passage, men are divided into two classes,—the few, whose function is τὸ τὰ ὀδύναι θεραπεύειν, and the many, whose function is τὸ τὰ ἐπίγεια θεραπεύειν. But in what precedes and follows, it seems to be implied that it is every man’s business to do both.

curandis elementis his quo inferioribus. Does inferioribus mean ‘the things of the lower world’ in general, or ‘the lower elements’, earth and water? If the latter, perhaps quae ought to be struck out.

io. Rationem vero tractatus istius &c. At this point Hermes makes a fresh start (hinc exordiar), and calls on his pupil to listen with exceptional attention. What is the doctrine (ratio, λόγος,) which these prefatory words are intended to introduce? It must be something which has not yet been spoken of; and for this reason, it cannot be anything contained in ch. io, which is little more than a recapitulation of what has gone before. It must therefore be the new doctrine taught in ch. ii a, namely, that in order to discharge his function rightly, a man must renounce private property. The truths stated in ch. io are set forth for the purpose of leading up to this conclusion. The doctrine spoken of is plurimis incredibilis; i.e. it is rejected by the many, but accepted and acted upon by the saintly few who renounce all earthly possessions.


ut sit ipse et mundus uterque ornamento sibi. Man’s function is τὸ τῶν κόσμων κοσμᾶν; and the man who fulfils this function κοσμηται, or becomes κόσμος. The word κόσμος might mean either ‘setting in order’ or ‘beautifying’; the translator took it in the latter sense, and rendered it by ornamentum. Perhaps he was right; cf. ch. ii b: ‘(mundi) pulchritudinem qui diligentia servat atque auget.’

Conpositio perhaps stands for συγκόσμησις; if so, there is here a second play on the word κόσμος.

Is novit se. He fulfils the precept γνῶθι σεαυτόν. Novit et mundum; he understands the Kosmos, and stands in a friendly relation to it; cf. ch. 6 a: ‘daemonum genus novit.’
ASCLEPIUS I: 10

...cuius sunt imagines duae mundus et homo. The Kosmos is els in tov theou. Cf. Ascl. III. 27 a, 'eius imago mundus'; Corp. VIII. 2; XII. ii. 15 b; V. 2; XI. ii. 15 a. In the Timaeus, the sensible Kosmos is described as the son of God, but as an 'image', or visible copy, of the noetos kosmos. Later Platonists regarded the noetos kosmos as constituted by God's thought, and included in his being, and accordingly called the sensible Kosmos an 'image of God'.

Man also is an image of God. See note on divinae similitudinis formam, ch. 7 b. But in that passage, it was the immortal part of man alone that was said to be made in the likeness of God. Here, on the other hand, the writer is speaking of man as a composite being (composito), and the notion that he is an image of God seems to be based on the conception of man as a microcosm. If man is an image of the Kosmos, and the Kosmos is an image of God, man must be 'a second image of God'.

The thought that man is imago mundi is elaborated by Firmicus Maternus the astrologer (about A.D. 340), Math. 3 proem.: 'scire itaque nos ... oportet ... quod ad imaginem speciemque mundi formam hominis ac statum totamque substantiam deus ille fabricator hominis natura monstrante perfecerit; nam corpus hominis, ut mundi, ex quattuor elementorum commixtione compositus, ignis scilicet et aquae, aeris et terrae, ut omnium istorum coniunctio temperata animal ad formam divinae imitationis ornaret; et ita hominem artificio divinae fabricationis compositum, ut in parvo corpore omnem elementorum vim atque substantiam natura cogente conferret, ut divino illi spiritui, qui ad sustentationem mortalis corporis ex caelesti mente descendit, licet fragile, sed tamen simile mundo pararet hospitium. Hac ex causa hominem quasi minorem quendam mundum stellae quinque, sol etiam et luna, ignita ac sempiterna agitatione sustentant, ut animal quod ad imitationem mundi factum est simili divinitatis substantia gubernetur'. The philosophic doctrines of Firmicus are for the most part derived from Stoic sources.

1 The statement that man is a muqrod kosmos is attributed to Democritus (Diels Vorsokr. p. 398). The view that man ought to be a microcosm is expressed in Philo Vita Mosis 2 (3). 14. 135, Cohn IV, p. 231: προδίδασε τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ θεραπευτήν, εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῦ κοσμοτοῦ δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γε κόσμου δηνεκτὸς δεῖν εἶναι περάσθαι, εἰ δὲ μίμημα ἐνδύωμεν ὠφελεῖ, τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ παράλειμμα εὐθὺς ἀγαλματοφορέων, αὐτὸς τρόπον τινά πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου μεθηρμάθει, καὶ εἰ θέμε εἰκὼν, . . . θραχὺς κόσμος εἶναι.
This sentence is manifestly out of place in ch. 11a, where it stands in the MSS.; and it supplies precisely what is needed here to lead on to what follows. In order to establish an analogy between the *pars divina hominis* and the *pars mortalis*, the writer splits up the former into four constituent parts, which he calls *animus* (διάνοια?), *sensus* (νοῦς), *spiritus* (πνεῦμα), and *ratio* (λόγος). It would be useless to ask what precise meaning he attached to each of the four terms, and how he distinguished them from one another; it was enough to serve his purpose that four substantives could be found which were applicable to the higher part of man.

The division of the *divina pars hominis* into four parts is in direct contradiction to the preceding statement in ch. 7b, 'eius una pars simplex'; and for this reason, it seems probable that the passage containing this futile conceit of four quasi-elements of which the mind is composed has been inserted by a later hand, and that the transposition of *nam ut . . . esse formatum* to ch. 11a was subsequent to the interpolation of the passage in ch. 10. The original text may perhaps have run thus: 'se etiam secundam esse imaginem dei. Unde efficitur ut parte divina inscendere posse videatur in caelum, parte vero mundana mortalis resistat in terra' &c. In confirmation of this hypothesis, it is to be noted that a new and different meaning is here given to the word *spiritus*. The 'spirit' spoken of, since it belongs to the *pars divina*, must be *πνεῦμα* in the Jewish and Christian sense, i.e. something nearly equivalent to the Platonic and Hermetic νοῦς, and entirely different from the material *πνεῦμα* of the Stoics, composed of the two elements fire and air, which was mentioned in ch. 6b, and is spoken of in *Ascl. III init.*

11a. *Est autem mensura eius utriusque . . . religio.* *Mensura* (μέτρον) must here be understood in the sense of συμμετρία or ἀρμονία, i.e. the due proportion or right adjustment of the two parts to one another. In the pious man, and in him alone, the *pars mundana* is rightly subordinated to the *pars divina*.

*ab omnibus cognitionis divinae partibus aliena.* What are the 'parts' of the divine kinship? The phrase is obscure, and probably corrupt. Perhaps the original reading may have been *cognitionis divinae* (γὰς θείας γνώσεως).

*quia quaeunque terrena . . . possidentur.* See ch. 12a, 'qui capitur de possessionibus fructus'. He who would live the higher
life must 'scorn earthly possessions'; i.e. he must renounce private property. A man who acted on this principle might maintain life either as a labourer employed by others and earning his keep by daily work, or as a mendicant living on the gifts of others, or as a member of a society which held property in common. It seems most likely that the mode of life which the writer recommends is that of a communistic brotherhood, and that he himself was a member of such a brotherhood. In Egypt, religious societies of this character existed in pre-Christian times; and the Christian monasticism which arose there in the fourth century was a continuation of habits of life which had long been established in that country. The Therapeutaes described by Philo are a communistic brotherhood of Jews living near Alexandria. Philostratus (Vita Apollon. 6. 6 ff.) describes a community of Gymni (Pagan theosophists) living near the southern border of Egypt. His narrative of the visit of Apollonius to the Gymni, though professedly based on the written record of an eye-witness, cannot be accepted as historical; but it is good evidence for the existence of such societies in the time of Philostratus, soon after A.D. 200. A member of the community of Gymni says (ib. 6. 16) μεράκιον γενόμενος τὰ μὲν πατρίδι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἀδήμα, γυμνὸς δὲ Γυμνὸς ἐπεφοίτησα τούτοις, . . . ἢ μὲ δὲ νόον ἥτι . . . ὅποι κατέλεξαν ἐς τὸ αὐτῶν κοινόν. Plutarch (Defect. orac. 21, 421 f.) describes a Pagan hermit, who lived in solitude on the shore of the Red Sea, and held Pythagorean or Platonic doctrines. But as the writer of Ascl. I, while disapproving of private property, at the same time speaks with approval of social ties, and of agriculture and other forms of wealth-producing labour, it may be inferred that he favoured a communistic rather than a solitary life; and the manner of living which he advocates would seem to be something like that of the Essenes of Palestine, who held no property as individuals, but laboured with their hands, and put the proceeds into a common stock. (See Schürer, Gesch. des jüd. Volkes, ed. 4, vol. ii, p. 651 ff.)

Ut enim meum animum rationis ducit intentio. Note the emphasis on meum. The words are hardly appropriate in the mouth of the inspired and infallible teacher Hermes; the writer is here speaking in his own person, and expressing an opinion held by him, but not shared by some of those with whom he has to do.

homo hactenus esse debuit. Homo here signifies medietate
generis sui contentus. The men who thus acquiesce in their earthly condition are called humani in ch. 5. Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. 10. 7: εἰ δὴ θείον δὲ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ δὲ κατὰ τοῦτον βιῶσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον βιῶσθαι ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον δοτα, οὐδὲ θυτητὰ τὸν θυτητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδεξεται ἄθανατες. Aristotle is here in close agreement with Plato; see Pl. Tim. 90 b f., καθ' ὅσον μετασχηματισμὸν ἄνθρωπον φύσις ἄθανατις ἐνδεχεται, κ.τ.λ.

contemplatione divinitatis. The meaning would be clearer if some participle such as confisus (πεποιθώς) were added. Cf. ch. 6 a, 'humanae naturae partem in se ipse despicit, alterius partis divinitate confisus.'

[[Nam ut homo . . . atque suspiciat.] This passage has nothing to do with the context. The first part of it ('nam ut homo . . . esse formatum') seems to have been placed here by mistake. The second part ('manibus . . . suspiciat') cannot have been written by the same person who wrote 'parte (divina), quae ex animo et sensu, spiritu atque ratione est' in ch. 10. It is a second, and still more inappropriate, attempt to find an analogy between the pars divina hominis and the pars mundana. Of the four parts into which the pars divina is here divided, two, viz. ratio and sensus (if my correction is right), are the same as in ch. 10, but the two others are different (memoria and providentia in place of animus and spiritus); and instead of enumerating the four elements of which the pars mundana is composed, the writer enumerates the four members with which it is equipped for its work, viz. two hands and two feet. The passage may be conjecturally accounted for in this way. The words 'nam ut homo . . . esse formatum' were accidentally shifted from ch. 10 to ch. 11 a, and thus separated from the explanation which originally followed them; and a redactor, reading them here, and rightly thinking that an enumeration of four parts of mind and body respectively was needed to complete the statement, tried to supply what was lacking by his own invention.

[Unde efficitur ut . . . non possit.] The contents of this sentence are cognate with those of ch. 13 init., 'in varias . . . et geometriam'. It may have been written by the author of Ascl. I, but transposed from its proper place by some accident.

II b. tali ministerio obsequioque praeposuitum. The ministerium is ἡ τῶν ἐπεγείων θεραπεία; the obsequium is ἡ τῶν ὀφειλιῶν θεραπεία.
parentes nostri. Who are the 'parents' of Hermes and Asclepius? In Ascl. III. 37, we are told that Hermes the teacher is a grandson of the god Thoth-Hermes, and Asclepius the pupil is a grandson of the god Imhotep-Asclepius. But we cannot be sure that the writer of Ascl. I would have given precisely the same account of the matter. Possibly he considered the teacher and pupil to be sons of the gods whose names they bore. At any rate, it is assumed that the parents lived on earth as men before they 'returned to heaven', or became gods. The teacher and pupil are descended from an indefinite series of human ancestors; they are now men such as their parents once were; and if they earn a like reward, they will, after death, be gods, or beatified souls, such as their parents now are. In Corp. X. 5, the teacher Hermes speaks of Uranos and Kronos (i.e. the Egyptian gods Shu and Seb) as his ancestors. See Lactant. Div. inst. 1. 11. 61 (Testim.).

divinae pietati. For pietas in the sense of 'mercy' or 'loving-kindness', cf. Ascl. III. 22 b fin.: 'diique etiam pio affectu humana omnia respiciunt.' Augustine Civ. dei 10. 1: 'pietas quoque prope dei cultus intelligi solet, quam Graeci εὑρίσκεαν vocant. . . . More autem vulgi hoc nomen etiam in operibus misericordiae frequentatur: . . . ex qua loquendi consuetudine factum est ut et Deus ipse dicatur pius; quem sane Graeci nullo suo sermonis usu εὑρίσκη vocant, quamvis εὑρίσκεαν pro misericordia illorum etiam vulgus usurpet'.

exutos mundana custodia. Does mundana custodia mean 'our guardianship of the material world', or 'our imprisonment in the material world'? (For the latter, cf. Lactant. Div. inst. 2. 8. 68: 'corpore quasi custodia saeptum tenetur.') The notion of 'guardianship' agrees better with the prevailing thought of the treatise; and the writer has previously described the body as a shelter (domus) for the νοῦς, and not as a prison. But on the other hand, the following word nexibus comes nearer to the notion of imprisonment.

naturae (dative) superioris partis . . . restituat. We should have expected rather 'in naturalem sedem superioris partis' (i. e. to heaven, the native home of the νοῦς), in contrast to 'reditus denegatur in caelum' below. Cf. Ascl. III. 37, 'reliquus (homo) . . . remeavit in caelum'. If the text is sound, the meaning must be 'restore us to the natural condition of our higher part'. For the dative after restitutam, in place of the more usual in with acc., cf. Plin. N. H. 20. 6, 23. 51, 'ulcera sanitati restituens'. Thomas adopts Kroll's emendation, naturae (gen.) superioris partis, which might be rendered
'to the region of the higher substance'. For *pars* in this sense, cf. ch. 7 c, 'in ea parte, qua deus est, (hominem) in summa beati-tudine degere'. The writer of *Ascl.* I, no doubt, held that God is not in space; but even those who were convinced of this could not avoid using traditional phrases in which God was spoken of as dwelling in or above the highest heaven.

12 a. *in corpora alia, indigna* (neut. plur.) *animo sanato,* [*et*] *foeda* (fem. sing.) *migratio.* The wicked are punished after death by reincarnation in bestial bodies. Beasts have no *vōς*; and those who have not rightly used the *vōς* bestowed on them as men, are condemned to a life devoid of *vōς.* The writer has taken over this doctrine from some Platonic authority, and has failed to notice its inconsistency with the position maintained by him in the rest of *Ascl.* I. Down to this point, we have been given to understand that the *vōς* is the only part of man which is immortal, and that not only the body, but the lower part of the soul also, perishes at death; yet here it appears that there is in man something other than *vōς* which survives death. The soul which is reincarnated in the body of a beast must be wholly deprived of *vōς,* yet in that condition it continues to exist, and retains its personality.

In *Ascl.* III. 28, where punishment after death is discussed, there is no mention of reincarnation. In *Kore Kosmu,* Stob. *Exc.* XXIII. 39, it is said that sinners will be punished by reincarnation in bestial bodies. The same doctrine is asserted in *Corp.* X. 8 a, but denied *ib.* 19 b–22 a. It is derived from Plato, who adopted from the Pythagoreans the theory of the transmigration of human souls into the bodies of beasts. According to Herodotus (2. 123), 'the Egyptians were the first to teach the doctrine that the human soul is immortal, and that when the body perishes, the soul enters some other animal that is born at the time, and having passed through the whole circle of animals of land and sea and air, again enters a human body at birth. It traverses this cycle of births, they say, in three thousand years'. Herodotus adds 'there are certain Greeks, some of earlier and some of later date, who adopted this doctrine, and announced it as their own; I know their names, but I will not mention them'. The Greeks of whom Herodotus is thinking, or at any rate the most prominent among them, must be Pythagoras and Empedocles. But it is not clear from his words whether he had himself met with Egyptians who taught this doctrine, or whether he was only repeating a tradition that Pythagoras had learnt his doctrine.
of transmigration from Egyptians. There is nothing intrinsically improbable in the hypothesis that in Herodotus' time there were some Egyptians who held something resembling the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration; but as far as I know, there is no positive evidence that it was so. By the time when the Hermetica were written, Greek writings in which this doctrine was taught had been known for centuries in Egypt, and it was unquestionably from Greek teachers that the Hermetists learnt it. See Pl. Phaedo 81 e ff.: Phaedrus 249 b: Rep. 10. 620: Tim. 42 c and 91 d ff. In the Phaedo, it is said that the impure soul is drawn into an earthly body by its craving for bodily things, and thus co-operates in its own imprisonment; and in the Republic and the Phaedrus, we are told that the soul is permitted to choose freely the form of its next embodiment on earth. Plutarch, in the earlier part of the Vision of Thespiesus (De sera numinis vindicta 565 ε), agrees with Pl. Phaedo in speaking of reincarnation in an animal body as resulting from the soul's own cravings. In this part of the Vision, Plutarch has probably been influenced by Posidonius. But later on in the same vision (567 ε ff.), where he is following a different authority, Plutarch speaks of wicked souls as condemned to reincarnation in animal bodies by a higher Power, and forged into new shapes by daemons to fit them for this compulsory embodiment.

futurae aeternitatis spe. Aeternitas cannot here mean existence through endless time; for it must be something which is granted to the pious alone. We have just been told that the wicked as well as the pious survive death; and if the soul does not perish at the death of the body, it may be presumed that it continues to exist for ever. If that is so, wicked souls, as well as pious souls, are everlasting; and the 'eternity' which is in prospect for the pious alone must mean a life freed from the limitations of existence in time. Aeternitas is the mode of God's existence, and in this connexion the word is equivalent to divinitas. The pious man will be a god, or will live the life of a god. See Ascl. III. 29 c–32 a.

aliis incredibile, aliis fabulosum, aliis forsit an videatur esse deridendum. How are these three classes of men to be distin-

1 Cf. Plut. Is. et Os. 31, ψυχας ἀνοιας ἀνθρώπων... αἰς ἑτερα μεταμορφομένων σώματα. Plutarch seems to attribute the doctrine to Egyptian priests; but his evidence on such a matter is not of much weight.

2 It is true that this does not necessarily follow; and according to some of the Stoics, individual souls may survive death, but their individual existence will necessarily cease at the epyrosis, if not before. But no such doctrine as that was taught by Platonists.
guished? Perhaps the first sort are those who cannot convince themselves that the doctrine is true; the second, those who hold it to be manifestly false; the third, those who make light of it, because the promise of aeternitas has no attraction for them. These last do not want to live as gods; they prefer the life of beasts.


ut in parte sui qua mortalis est inhaereat (sc. anima). 'The part of the soul in respect of which it is mortal' must be the παθητικῶν μέρος (which is the θυμιτῶν εἴδος ψυχῆς of Pl. Tim.). But if this part is mortal, the wicked soul must be wholly mortal, and could not survive to be reincarnated in the body of a beast. Moreover, it is awkward to say that the soul 'sticks in a part of itself'. The meaning intended might have been better expressed by writing 'in parte hominis qua mortalis est (homo)', i.e. the body and the bodily affections.

12 b. partem divinitatis agnosce. Pars divinitatis is 'that part of man which consists in divinitas', i.e. the divine part, namely, the νοῦς. The aim of philosophic teaching in the true sense is to make men aware of the existence in them of this divine part, and to lead them to recognize its claim to supremacy in their thoughts and lives. But the perverted philosophy of which the Hermetist here proceeds to speak, so far from helping men to attain to the higher life, shuts them off from it. In his indignation against the false philosophers, the writer charges them with deliberately aiming at the evil which he holds to result from their way of teaching; 'they grudge men access to the divine life' (invidens immortalitate malignitas). Immortalitas here means the same as aeternitas above, viz. the life of a god. The meaning might be more clearly expressed by writing (guorumdam) malignitas. The MSS. give immortalitati; but the dative hardly yields the sense required, and it seems better to read either immortalitate or -tatem or -tatis.

quasi praedivinans dixero. The philosophic teaching which the writer is criticizing is that of his own time; and he introduces a reference to his own time into the dialogue by putting a prediction into the mouth of the prehistoric teacher, as in the Prophecy, Ascl. III. 24 b-26 a. In a prediction, the verbs must be in the future tense; we must therefore read efficient, confundent, in place of the presents given in the MSS.
13. in varias disciplinas... eam (sc. philosophiam)... miscentes, arithmetikyn et musicae et geometrian. Cf. Porphyry.

De abst. 1. 29: οὔτε τινι ἡ ἐθνομοσκομὴ ἡμῖν θεωρία λόγων ἄρουσι καὶ μαθηματῶν πλῆθος, ἢ... οὗτο τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῶν λόγων λαμβάνει τὴν ἐπίσειν. οὔτε γὰρ οὔτε ἐν ἑκάστω τοῖς τῶν μάθημα συμβαίνοντας εἶναι ἐθνομοσκομὰς. νῦν δὲ οὔτε πᾶν μάθημα συμπληρώσῃ τὴν θεωρίαν, ἀλλ' οὗτο τοῦ περὶ τῶν ὄντων ὄντων, ἐν μὴ προστῇ καὶ ἡ κατ' αὐτὰ φυσικὰς καὶ πράξις... ἡμῖν τὸ τυχεῖσιν τοῦ ὄντος θεωρίας τὸ τέλος, τῆς τεῦξεως τελοῦσιν τὴν... σύμφωνα χρ' θεώρουντι καὶ θεωρουμένω. Euseb.

Praep. ev. 14. 10. 10: the Pagan philosophers περιφέρουσιν ἄνω καὶ κάτω θρυλοῦντες τὰ μαθηματα, δεῖν εἶ ἄπαντος φάσκοντες τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐν πείρᾳ τῆς τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καταλήψεως γίνεσθαι μεταλθεῖν ἀνθρώποις, ἀριθμητικὴν, γεωμετρίαν, μουσικὴν... τούτων γὰρ ἂν εἴη μὴ δύνασθαι λόγου ἄνθρωπος καὶ φιλόσοφον ἀποτελεσθῆναι, ἀλλ' οὗτο τοῖς τῶν ὄντων ἀληθικὰς φαίνεται, μὴ τούτων ἐν ψυχῇ τῆς γνώσεως πρωτοποιήσῃς· εἰτ' ἐπανατείναμενοι τῇ μαθήσει τῶν εἰρημένων εἴ τ' αὐτῷ μονονοχῆ τοῦ αἰθέρος βαίνει μετεώροι ἀρέσταις οἴονται, ὡς ὅτι τὸν θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς περιφέροντες· ἡμᾶς τε, ὅτι μὴ τὰ δύονα ξηλωμένη, βοσκήματος κατ' οὕτω διαφέρουσι ηγοῦνται, ταὐτὶ δὲ φασὶ νηπίῳ θεὸν μηδὲ τὶ τῶν σεμεὼν ἡμᾶς δύνασθαι εἶδεν. . . . (δ' ἄλληθὰ λόγος) τοὺς μὲν σὺν τοῖς εἰρημένωις μαθηματικοῖς οὔτε τοὺς οὔτε σύφρονα βίον οὐθ' ὅλως τὶ τῶν βελτίστων καὶ συμφέροντων ἐπιγνώσαις ἀποδείξετε, τοὺς δὲ τῶν μαθηματῶν ἕκτος πάντων εὐσεβεστάτους καὶ φιλοσοφοφάτους γεγονέναι. In support of his contention, Eusebius quotes the opinion of Socrates reported in Xen. Mem. 4. 7. 3 ff.: τὸ δὲ μέχρι τῶν δυσφιλίων διαγραμμάτων γεωμετρίαν μαθῶν ἀπεδοκίμαζεν κτλ. The attitude of Augustine towards the physical sciences was similar; e.g. Confess. 5. 4: 'infelix enim homo qui scit illa omnia (sc. astronomy), te autem nescit; beatus autem qui te scit, etiam si illa nesciat. Qui vero et te et illa novit, non propter illa beatior, sed propter te solum beatus est.'

The Hermetist's polemic seems to be directed chiefly against the publicly recognized teachers of Platonism in Alexandria, whom he blames for their adherence to the traditional maxim of the Platonic school, μοιδη ς ἀγωνίστητος εἰσίτω. Compare the saying ascribed to Plato, δ' θεος δ' εἰς γεωμετρία, discussed in Plut. Quaest. conviv. 8. 2. 1, 718 c, where Plato's view of the value of geometry as a preparation for philosophy is thus summarized: ὅπερ αὐτός (δ' Πλάτων) ἐφήκε καὶ γέγραφε πολλακίς, ὡς τὸν γεωμετρίαν, οἷς ἀποστέφασαν προσαχθομένους τῇ αἰσθήσει, καὶ ἀποστρέφουσαν ἐπὶ τὴν νοημὴν καὶ ἄδιαν φύσιν, ἦς θέα τέλος ἐστὶν φιλοσοφίας, κτλ. Diog. Laert. 4. 2. 10 says of Xenocrates,
Theon of Smyrna, a Platonist of the time of Hadrian, wrote a work Περὶ τῶν κατὰ μαθηματικὴν χρησίμων εἰς τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀνάγγειλον. The Platonist Taurus, who taught at Athens early in the second century A.D., spoke with approval of the strict gradation of studies which was said to have been insisted on by the early Pythagoreans, and added (Aul. Gell. i. 9), "nunc autem isti, qui repente pedibus in lotis ad philosophos devertunt, non est hoc satis, quod sunt omnino ἀθεώρητοι, ἁμονοι, ἁγεωμέτρητοι, sed legem etiam dant, qua philosophophi discant. Alius ait "hoc me primum doce"; item alius "hoc volo" inquit "discere, illud nolo". The attitude of Taurus is precisely that which the writer of Ascl. I condemns. Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. 2, says that a Pythagorean teacher, to whom he applied for instruction (about A.D. 125), refused to take him as a pupil, because he had not learnt music, astronomy, and geometry. Cf. Numenius ap. Euseb. Pr. ev. n. 22. 2, quoted in prefatory note on Corp. II.

In speaking of the callida commentatio of this class of teachers, the Hermetist may have had in mind, inter alia, the aberrations of those Pythagorizing Platonists who attached an occult significance to the properties of numbers and geometrical figures. Plato's Socrates, when his Muses revealed the secret of the mystic number, was well aware that they were only joking (ὡς πρὸς παιδας ἡμᾶς παῖζοντας καὶ ἐρειχθυλώνας, Pl. Rep. 8. 545 ε); but the less enlightened followers of Plato were apt to mistake such recondite jests for solemn truths; and even leading thinkers wasted many pages in expounding the holy mysteries of the number ten, and similar matters. The authors of the religious Hermetica, as far as appears from their extant writings, kept themselves free from the influence of this quaint superstition. The writer of Ascl. I must have known it to be widely prevalent in the Neo-Pythagorean and Platonic schools of his time; and his hostility to 'arithmetic' may have been increased by his repugnance to this misapplication of it.

Music here means the scientific theory of music, and has nothing in common with the music employed in hymn-singing, which was spoken of in ch. 9 as a gift from heaven.

ut apocatastasis astrorum . . . numeris constare miretur. This is the right use of arithmetic. As to the word apocatastasis, see Corp. VIII. 4 and XI. i. 2. ἀποκατάστασις is a technical term
of astronomy. It signified, firstly, the return of a particular planet to a position which it had previously occupied relatively to the fixed stars or to some other planet (ἀποκατάστασις ἀστέρων των). It occurs in this sense in Pseudo-Pl. *Axiocbus* 370 c, and in Plut. *Fac. in orbis lunae* 24. 5, 937 ff. Cf. Cleomedes *De motu circ. corp. cael. 2. 7*: 'Ἀφροδίτη δὴ εἰς τοιν σταθεὶς ἀποκατάστασις ἣν ἔληφεν τῷ ἠλλῷ ἄμερῳ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἦλιου'. 'the planet Venus returns to the same position relatively to the sun at intervals of 584 days'. Philo *De opif. mundi* 34. 101, Cohn I, p. 35: the number twenty-eight ἀποκαταστάσις ἐπει δεν κελής i.e. it is the number of days from one new moon to another. Secondly, the term was used to signify the return of all the planets together to the same relative positions as before (ἀποκατάστασις πάνων τῶν ἀστέρων, or ἀ. τοῦ παντός). The period at the end of which an *apocatastasis* in this sense took place was called a 'great year'. See Pl. *Tim. 39 D*; Cic. *Nat. deor. 2. 20. 51*; Cic. *Rep. 6. 22*; Cic. *Hort. fr. 26*; Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 363. The duration of a 'great year' was variously reckoned at 9,977 years (Sext. Emp. *Astron. 5. 105*), 12,954 years (Cicero), 300,000 years (Firmicus Maternus), &c. Some Stoic borrowed from the astronomers the conception of an *apocatastasis* of all the planets together, and combined it with the Stoic doctrine of a periodical *ecpyrosis* and renewal of the universe; and thus in the usage of the later Stoics ἀποκατάστασις came to be equivalent to παλιγγενεσία (τοῦ κόσμου). See note on *mundi regenitura* in Ascl. III. 26 a. 'The Stoics' in Arian Didymus, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 469; Sen. *Nat. quaest.* 3. 29. 1; Nemesius *De nat. hom. c. 38. p. 277* (Arnim *Sto. Vet. II*, p. 190). The phrase ἄριστος ὁρόν ἀποκαταστάσεως πάνων, which occurs in the speech attributed to Peter in *Acts 3. 21*, must have been derived from a Stoic source.

The Hermetist is here speaking of the ἀποκατάστασις of the planets severally, which occur at short intervals, and can be observed within one man's lifetime, and not of the ἀποκατάστασις τοῦ παντός. The observer finds that the movements of the heavenly bodies agree with his calculations (numeris constare), and are thus proved to be determined by invariable laws. The heavenly bodies are the administrators by whose agency God governs the lower world; and to recognize the regularity of their movements is to recognize the immutability of the divine laws by which all corporeal things are governed.

*stationes praefinitas cursu(u)mque commutationes.* These
words refer to the variations in the apparent movements of the planets. Cf. Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 20. 51 (from Posidonius): ‘maxime vero sunt admirabiles motus earum quinque stellarum quae falso vocantur errantes. Nihil enim errat, quod in omni aeternitate conservat progressus et regressus reliquisque motus constantes et ratos. Quod eo est admirabilius in his stellis quas dicimus, quia tum occultatatur, tum rursus aperiuntur, tum adeunt, tum recedunt, tum antecedunt, tum autem subsequuntur, tum celerius movuntur, tum tardius, tum omnino ne moventur quidem, sed ad quoddam tempus insistunt.’ Sen. *Nat. quaest.* 7. 25: ‘quae (sint) stationes (of the planets), quando in rectum ferantur, quare agantur retro, modo coepimus scire.’ The statio (στάτιον) of a planet is the point at which it remains for a time apparently stationary.

**terrae vero dimensiones, ([qualitates, quantitates,]) maris profunda, (aeris ...), ignis vim.** Air must have been mentioned together with the other three elements. Quantitates, in this position, is a superfluous repetition of dimensiones; and there is no reason why qualitates should be mentioned in the case of earth alone, and not in the case of water, air, and fire. I have therefore transposed qualitates, quantitates to the following clause. Horum omnium means, I think, not ‘all these four elements’, but ‘all things around us’. Investigation of the qualitates, quantitates, and effectus of material things may be taken to mean study of natural science in general.

The writer of *Ascl.* I is not wholly hostile to natural science. He recognizes the value of science in its practical applications (‘artium discipinarumque cognitio’, ch. 8), as a means whereby man is enabled to fulfil his function of ‘tending the earth’; and he does not wholly reject the study of theoretic science. He considers it mischievous in so far as it turns men’s thoughts away from God to lower things, and blocks the way to the true gnosis; but on the other hand, he holds that such studies, when pursued in the right spirit, may serve a good purpose, by evoking and heightening religious fervour (‘ut ... cognoscens miretur, adoret atque conlaudet artem mentemque divinam’). This use of natural science is suggested in Pl. *Tim.* 69a; and a similar thought was expressed in a paragraph of Aristotle’s dialogue *De philosophia*, reproduced in Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 37. 95, and summarized in Sext. Emp. *Math.* 3. 20–22. Cf. Philo *Leg. alleg.* 3. 32. 97, Cohn I, p. 134: έλευθεραν οἱ πρῶτοι, τῶς ἀνοίχτακαν τὸ θεῖον. ἐλθ’ οἱ
ASCLEPIUS I: 13

Musicen vero nosse nihil aliud est nisi cunotarum [omnium] rerum ordinem seire &c. Cf. Pl. Tim. 80 b, concerning the consonance of a higher and a lower note in music; the two tones mån εξ δεξιας και βαρειας ἐνεκερέασαντο πάθην· ὅθεν ἦδονὴ μὲν τοῖς ἀσφροσεν, εὐφροσύνην δὲ τοῖς ἀειφροσεν διὰ τὴν τῆς θείας ἀρμονίας μέρους ἐν θυγατέας γενομένην φοράς παρέχον. (Plato is there thinking of harmony in the human soul,—cf. Tim. 47 b-e,—rather than of harmony in the universe; but he is conscious of the analogy between the one and the other.) Philo De opif. mundi 25. 78, Cohn I, p. 26: God prepared the Kosmos for man’s enjoyment by filling it with all manner of θεᾶματά, ὁ καταπληκτικώτατας μὲν ἔχει τὰς οὐσίας, καταπληκτικώτατας δὲ τὰς ποιότητας, θαυμασιωτάτας δὲ τὰς κυρίσεις καὶ χαρείας ἐν τάξεων ἡμισυμφωνίας καὶ ἀριθμῶν ἀνάλογες καὶ περιόδων συμμβολίους· ἐν αἷς ἀπάσας τὴν ἀρχέτυπον καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ παράδειγματικὴν μονοτικὴν οὐκ ἄν ἀμαρτάνοι τις εἴη αὐτὸς λέγων, ἀφ’ ὧν οἱ μετὰ ταύτα ἀνδρῶσα ναυφάμουν οἴνον τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχαῖς τᾶς εἰκόνας ἀναγκαίωτατην καὶ ὀψιλομοτάτην τέχνην τῷ βίῳ παρέδωσαν. Corp. XVIII. 1: ὁ γὰρ τοι κατὰ φύσιν μονοτικὸς θεός κ.τ.λ.
That part of the Asclepius which I have named Ascl. II (viz. chs. 14 b-16 a) was written by a thoroughgoing dualist. The writer's object is to account for the existence of evil without detracting from God's goodness; and he does so by putting matter side by side with God, as a co-ordinate source or cause of things, and attributing the evil in the world to the operation of matter. Metaphorically, matter is the Mother of the universe, as God is the Father; ('διὸν et conceptus et partus in se possidet vim', and 'his omnibus ad concipiendum secundissimos sinus praestat'); and that which is evil in the offspring comes from the Mother.

This doctrine is based on that of the Timaeus; but the writer differs from Plato in ascribing to matter a generative energy, whereas in the Timaeus the ἀνάγκη which resides in the υποδοχή operates as a cause of evil merely by way of passive resistance to the beneficent action of the Demiurgus, or hindrance to the perfect realization of God's good purpose. Seneca, Nat. quaest., Prolog. 16, states the problem thus: 'quanti aestimas ista cognoscere, . . . quantum deus possit; materiam ipse sibi formet an data utatur; . . . deus quicquid vult efficiat, an multis rebus illum tractanda destiuit, et a magno artifice prave multa formentur, non quia cessat ars, sed quia id in quo exercetur saepe inobsequens arti est?' Seneca's second alternative agrees with the Timaeus.

One of the various ways in which this topic was dealt with by the Platonists of the Roman empire may be seen in Plutarch Is. et Os. 45-79 (c. A. D. 100). Plutarch's view is there set forth in the form of a commentary on the Egyptian myth of Isis and Osiris, which he regards as a symbolical presentation of certain fundamental truths. Disentangled from the myth with which he has interwoven it, the substance of his doctrine may be stated as follows.

45. If all things were caused by God (as the Stoics say),1 nothing evil could come to be; and if nothing were caused by God (as Democritus and Epicurus say), nothing good could come to be. But inasmuch as nature, here below, produces good and evil intermingled, we must conclude that there are two opposed first causes,—two conflicting

1 Plutarch says that the Stoics assert ἄνω θεοῦ δημιουργῶν ὡς ἐνα λόγον καὶ μὲν πρόνοιαν . . . περιγνωμὸν ἀνάγκης καὶ κατοίκοις i.e. they maintain that ὡς, being ἄνω, is wholly subject to God's will, and cannot thwart his design.
Powers. Since nothing can come into being without a cause, and the Good cannot cause evil, it follows that, beside the first cause of good, there is a separate and distinct first cause of evil. . . . 48. Plato, in some of his dialogues, hints at this obscurely; but in the Laws, which he wrote in his old age, he says clearly (Pl. Legg. 10. 896 e) that the Universe is moved, not by one soul, but by two at least, one that works good, and one that works evil.

But there is also a third and intermediate entity (viz. Matter). And this third thing is not, as some suppose, devoid of soul and reason and self-movement; it is dependent on both the others, but ever seeks and desires and follows after the better of them.

49. The two opposing Powers of which this Kosmos is the mingled product are not of equal strength. The Power of good has the upper hand; yet the Power of evil cannot be utterly destroyed, for it is largely rooted in the body and soul of the All, and ever maintains a losing fight against the good.

53. There is in nature a feminine principle (viz. Matter), receptive of all generation,—a 'nurse' and 'recipient', as Plato calls it,—which, being wrought on by the divine Reason, takes on itself all manner of forms. This feminine principle has an innate love of the sovereign Good; it yearns for and seeks after the good; it shuns and flees from the evil. It is the place, and the primal matter, of both good and evil; but of itself it ever inclines to the better, and yields itself to God, that he may beget in it effluences and images of himself; and it delights in being thereby made fruitful. For that which is generated is a copy, wrought in matter, of that which ever is.

54. God, or the principle of Good, is eternal and imperishable, but the shapes or images of good,—the stamps impressed by God on matter in the visible world,—are perishable; and in this lower region, they are from time to time destroyed by the Power of disorder and confusion. That maleficent Power is excluded from the world above, but assails this sensible Kosmos, which is generated in the likeness of the Eternal by Matter wedded to the Good.

There was a time when Matter, not yet wrought upon by the divine Reason, produced her first birth of herself alone; and that which then came into being was a thing incomplete,—not a Kosmos,

1 Here follows an account of the dualistic doctrine of Zoroaster concerning the good God Horomazes and the bad daemon Areimanios. 2 Symbolized by Osiris. 3 Symbolized by Typhon. 4 Symbolized by Isis. 5 This first offspring of Matter corresponds to the primeval chaos described in
but a mere shadow of the Kosmos which was to be. 55. But in
the Kosmos as it now is, the Power of evil is not indeed wholly
destroyed, but its strength and vigour are impaired; for the divine
Reason has harmonized the universe, bringing its discordant elements
into concord, and has enfeebled, though not annihilated, the destruc-
tive Power of evil. Here below then, the destructive Power still
works, though but weakly and ineffectually; for it mingles with and
cleaves to the material elements, which are subject to change and
disturbance. And hence arise earthquakes, and droughts, and storms,
and pestilences, and the obscurations of the moon; for the working
of the Power of Evil extends upwards as far as the human sphere.

56. Under the head of good must be reckoned, firstly, the eternal
pattern or ideal (τὸ νοητὸν, i.e. that which is of God); secondly,
Matter (ἄλη,—not ἄροιος, but seeking the good); and thirdly, the
issue of these two (viz. the Kosmos, so far as the good prevails in it).

57. God, or the Good, is that which is perfect, and lacks nothing,—
that which is the object of desire and aspiration. Matter, in herself,
is lacking of the good; but she is ever being filled by the good,—
ever yearning after the good, and receiving of it. And the Kosmos,
produced by the union of God (or the Good) with Matter, is not
indeed eternal,¹—not free from change and corruption,—but is ever
coming into being;² and by means of the cyclic recurrence of
changes, it is enabled to continue ever young, and will never
perish.

58. Matter then is not a body lifeless and devoid of qualities,—
not a thing inert and inactive. Matter is ever partaking of the
supreme God; she ever consorts with Him, loving the good and
beauty that are about Him. She is not opposed to Him; but as a
good wife may be said to yearn for her husband even when she has
him beside her, so Matter yearns for God, even while she is with Him
and is filled with the Divine.

59. Yet here below she needs must mourn; for in this lower
world the Power of Evil makes his assaults, and there is slaying and
tearing asunder. But she receives into herself all things that perish,
and puts forth from herself again all things that come to birth. For

¹ Mlτος. This means, not that the Kosmos as a whole will ever cease to exist,
but only that the individual things in the Kosmos (or rather in the lower part of
it) are subject to dissolution.

² Διάγενς.
the starry heavens, ruled wholly by the potencies of God, abide for ever; but the creatures of land and sea, in which life has been implanted in this lower world, decay and perish and are buried, but spring to life again and again in fresh generations.¹ For in the lowest regions of matter, the Power of Destruction works most strongly; and here, the seeds of life sown by the Power which brings things to birth and maintains them in being (i.e. by God, or the Good) are faint and feeble, so that they would be wholly destroyed by the Power of Evil, but that Matter receives into herself that which is destroyed, and preserves and rears and builds it up again. 60. In short, the generative and preservative force in nature (i.e. the soul of Matter) moves towards God, and tends towards being; while the destructive force (i.e. the soul of Evil) moves away from God, and tends towards not-being.

79. God is far removed from earth; He is pure, and undefiled by anything that admits of decay and death. And human souls, here below, while they are entangled in the body and the bodily affections, have no communion with God, beyond that dim and dreamlike apprehension of Him to which philosophy enables them to attain. But when they are freed from the body, and depart to the region of the unseen, the untroubled, and the holy, then the Soul of Good is their leader and their king; and clinging to Him, they gaze on that unspeakable beauty with insatiate yearning. And it is by desiring without cease and seeking after and consorting with that supramundane beauty, that the soul of Matter fills this lower world with all things fair and good that come to birth.

Plutarch's ἄγαθος then differs from the 'recipient' described in the Timaeus, in that it is not ἀπολογος, but is qualified by the presence in it of a living force which strives towards the good; and the Kosmos is produced and maintained in being, not by the action of God alone on a passive and partially intractable Matter, but by the combined operation of God from above and of Matter from below. The living force in matter which strives towards the good (and which Plutarch finds symbolized in the goddess Isis) is equivalent to Aristotle's φύσις; and Plutarch's view of the function of God in relation to it might be expressed by Aristotle's statement that the Good καὶ ὁ ὁμόρρημον (Ar. Metaph. 11. 1072 b 3).

But if the operation of Matter, as well as that of God, tends

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¹ The Greek of this sentence is corrupt; but the meaning of the original was probably something like what I have written.
towards good, how is the existence of evil to be accounted for? Plutarch's altered conception of Matter makes it impossible for him to accept the explanation put forward in the *Timaeus*, viz. that evil is the result of the ἄναγκη which is inherent in 'the recipient',— or in other words, that evil arises from the intractability of Matter. And accordingly, Plutarch prefers to adopt the suggestion thrown out in Plato's *Laws*; he asserts the existence of a Soul of Evil, distinct from and independent of God,—a living Power, which, in the sublunar region, works against and partially thwarts the tendency of Matter towards the Good.

The evil of which Plutarch is speaking in this treatise is not moral evil; he regards good as equivalent to life or existence, and evil as equivalent to death or non-existence. Thus the joint operation of God and Matter results in the production and preservation of living things; the operation of the Soul of Evil results in the destruction of living things. The sublunar region, where alone the Soul of Evil has power, is the region of mortality; but Matter, ever striving towards God (i.e. towards Good, or Life), counteracts the work of destruction by continual reproduction.

In the concluding paragraph (ch. 79), Plutarch suggests that what he has said concerning the aspiration of Matter towards the Good in the universe at large may be applied also to the aspiration of the human soul; but he has not worked out this thought with equal fullness.

Whether Plutarch's Platonic interpretation of the myth of Isis and Osiris is wholly of his own invention, or whether he had heard of some more or less similar explanation of it that had already been devised by some Egyptian influenced by Hellenic thought, we do not know. But at least it may be said that, in his identification of Isis with the productive power of nature, Plutarch is giving articulate expression to the dim thoughts and feelings which lay at the root of that ancient and widespread worship of the Mother (originally Mother Earth) which in Egypt took the form of the Isis-cult.

A view more nearly resembling that of *Ascl. II* is to be found in the doctrine of Numenius (A.D. 150–200), as reported by Chalcidius, *Comm. in Tim.* 294, Mullach *Fr. Ph. Gr.* II, p. 244: 'Deum quippe esse . . . initium et causam bonorum; silvam (_HISTORY) malorum.'

1 Numenius seems to have held that HISTORY is productive of evil only, and not of any good at all. But the author of *Ascl. II* does not say that; his view is that HISTORY produces both good and evil.
The problem discussed in Ascl. II was similarly dealt with by the heretical Christian Hermogenes, who wrote before A.D. 200. Hippol. Ref. haer. 8. 17: *Ερμογένης δέ τις, καὶ αὐτὸς νομίζας τι καίνων φρονεῖν, ἐφι τὸν θεόν ἐξ ἀλης συγχρόνου καὶ ἀγνηστὸν πάντα πεποιηκέναι: ἀδιάντως γάρ ἐχει τὸν θεόν μη οὐκ ἐξ ὀντῶν τὰ γινόμενα ποιεῖν. εἶναι δὲ τὸν θεόν αἰεί κύριον καὶ αἰεί ποιητήν, τὴν δὲ ἀλης αἰεὶ δούλην καὶ γνω-μένην, οὐ πάσαν δέ. αἱ γὰρ καὶ ἀτάκτως φερομένην ἐκόσμησε τοῦτ' ἐκ λόγου: δικὴν χρυσάνθος ὑποκαιμένην βράζουσαν ἰδὼν ἐξωρίσας κατὰ μέρος, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ παντός λαβὼν ἠμέρωσε, τὸ δὲ εἰάσχεν ἀτάκτως φέροουσα. καὶ τὸ ἡμερωθὲν τοῦτο εἶναι κόσμων λέγει, τὸ δὲ ἀγρόν μένειν καὶ ἀλης καλείται άκοσμων. τούτην οὖσαν εἶναι τῶν ἀτάκτων λέγει, ὡς καίνων φέρων δόγμα τοὺς αὐτοῦ μαθητὰς (though in reality, says Hippolytus, this doctrine was not new, but had been

1 Numenius here differs from Plutarch in his interpretation of Pl. Legg. 10. 896 E. Plutarch's *maligna anima* is not ἔλη (Isis), but Typhon, a Power hostile to ἔλη.

2 What is the meaning of *licet modice fluctuet*? Ought we to read *immodice*?

3 If a thing "moves itself", it must have a θεὑρε, which moves it,—or in other words, it must be alive.


5 ἔλη is σύγχρονον ('coeval') with God; i.e. it is without beginning in time, as God is without beginning in time.

6 *γινομένη* here means, not 'coming into being', but 'being made into σώματα'. It can be said that ἔλη δεὶ γίνεται in this sense, though it is ἄγεννης. See Herm. ap. Stob. Ἔκκ. IX.

7 Perhaps καὶ γάρ.

8 Perhaps τὸ δὲ ἀγρόν μένον [EAL], in contrast to τὸ ἡμερωθὲν.
taught by Plato). Tertullian *Adv. Hermogenem*¹ (Kroymann, *Corp. Script. Eccl. Lat.* vol. 47) c. 1: 'Hermogenis autem doctrina tam novella est... Totum quod est deus aufert (Hermogenes), nolens illum ex nihilum universa facere. A Christianis enim ad philosophos conversus, de ecclesia in Academiam et Porticum,² inde sumpsit [a Stoicis] materiam cum deo ponere, quae et ipsa semper fuerit, neque nata neque facta, nec initium habens omnino nec finem, ex qua deus omnia postea fecerit.' *Ib.* 2: 'ex nihilum non potuisse eum facere sic contendit (Hermogenes), bonum et optimum definiens deum, qui bona atque optima tam velit facere quam sit: immo nihil non bonum atque optimum et velle eum et facere. Igitur omnia ab eo bona et optima oportuisse fieri secundum condicionem ipsius. Inveniri autem et mala ab eo facta, utique non ex arbitrio nec ex voluntate; quia si ex arbitrio et voluntate, [nihil] incongruens et indignum³ sibi faceret. Quod ergo non arbitrio suo fecerit, intellegi oportere ex vitio aliusui rei factum, ex materiae sine dubio.' *Ib.* 6: '(Hermogenes) dicit salvum deo esse et solus sit primus et omnium auctore et omnium dominus et nemini comparandus'; but he has no right to say this (says Tertullian), because, if his statements about matter were true, matter would be on a par with God. *Ib.* 8: 'Solus eam (sc. materiam non natam, coaequalem deo,) Hermogenes cognovit et haereticorum patriarchae, philosophi; prophetas enim et apostolos usque adhuc latuit.' *Ib.* 10: 'Ergo, inquit (Hermogenes), ex nihilum faceret (omnia deus), ut mala quoque arbitrio eius imputarentur? Magna (says Tertullian) caecitas haereticorum pro huiusmodi argumentatione, cum ideo aut alium deum bonum et optimum volunt credi, quia mali auctorem existiment creatorem, aut (as Hermogenes did) materiam cum creatore ponunt, ut malum a materia, non a creatore deducant.... Audiat igitur et Hermogenes... se nihil egisse hac sua iniectione.⁶ Ecce enim, eti non auctor, sed adventator mali inventitur deus, qui malum materiae tanto sustinuit aeone ante mundi constitutionem, quam ut bonus et mali aemulus emendasse debuerat. Aut enim

¹ Harnack puts the date of Tertull. *Adv. Hermog.* at A. D. 193-203.
² Tertullian is hardly right in adding *et Porticum*. The doctrine spoken of is Platonic, not Stoic; and if Hermogenes adopted some Stoic notions, it must have been in subordinate details only.
³ *et indignum secludendum*!
⁴ This refers to those Gnostics (e. g. Valentinus) who distinguished the *δημούργος* (creator) from the supreme God, and made him a being of lower order and character.
⁵ I. c. by his theory of ὁ ἄρχων ἄρχων.
potuit emendare, sed noluit, aut voluit quidem, verum non potuit. (Si non potuit),\textsuperscript{1} infirmus deus: si potuit et noluit, malus et ipse, quia malo favit. Et sic iam habetur (auctor) eius quod licet non instituerit, quia tamen, si noluisset illud esse, non esset, ipse iam fecit esse, quod\textsuperscript{8} non noluit esse. . . Malum pro bono sustinendo et non potius eradicando adsertor eius inventus est (deus); male, si per voluntatem, turpiter, si per necessitatem. \textit{Ib.} c. 13, Tertullian says ‘si dabisimus illi (sc. materiae) aliquid etiam boni germinis, iam non erit uniformis naturae, id est malae in totum et tantum, sed duplex, id est malae et bonae naturae. . . Si potuit . . . duplex natura fuisse materiae, amborum ferax fructuam, iam nec bona ipsa deo deputabuntur, ut nec mala illi imputentur, sed utraque species, de materiae proprietate sumpta, ad materiam pertinebit.’\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Ib.} 15: ‘ceterum si ideo malum (as Hermogenes says) non ex nihilo, ne dei fiat, de cuius arbitrio videbitur factum, sed ex materia, ut ipsius sit, de cuius substantia erit factum, et hic, ut dixi, auctor mali habebitur deus, qui, cum eadem virtute et voluntate debuisset omnia bona ex materia protulisse aut tantum bona, non omnia tamen bona protulit, sed etiam mala, utique aut volens esse mala, si poterat efficere ne essent, aut non valens efficere omnia bona, si voluit et non fecit.’ \textit{Ib.} 15 fin.: ‘Hermogenes expugnat quorundam argumentationes dicentium mala necessaria fuisse ad inluminationem bonorum ex contrariis intellectendorum.’ \textit{Ib.} 35: Hermogenes says that \textit{\\&} is ‘neque corporalis (σωματικῶς) neque incorporalis (ἀσωματικῶς)’. But he also says (c. 36) that it is ‘ex parte corporalis’, and ‘ex parte incorporalis’. ‘Corporale enim materiae vult esse, de quo corpora edantur, incorporale vero inconditum motum eius. “Si enim” ait “corpus tantummodo esset, nihil ei incorporale appareret, id est motus; si vero in totum incorporalis fuisset, nullum corpus ex ea fieret.”’ \textit{Ib.} 37: Hermogenes says that ‘materia’ is ‘nec bona nec mala.’ “Si enim” inquis “esset bona, quae semper hoc fuerat non desideraret compositionem dei: si esset natura mala, non accepisset translationem in melius, nec quicquam compositionis suae adpecuisset illi deus, tali natura; in vacuum enim laborasset.”’ \textit{Ib.} 41: Hermogenes says that ‘inconditus et confusus et turbulentus

\textsuperscript{1} I have added \textit{Si non potuit}. Kroymann proposes \textit{Infirmus deus (si voluit nec potuit)}.

\textsuperscript{2} Perhaps \textit{(eo) quod}.

\textsuperscript{8} Cf. \textit{Ascl. II. 15 fin.} as emended: ‘Sicuti enim natura materiae bonitatis secunda est, sic et malignitatis eadem est aeque secunda.’
fuit materiae motus', like the movement of water boiling in a pot. But elsewhere, 'cum enim vis materiam nec bonam nec malam inducere, 'igitur,' inquis 'subiacens materia, eaequalis momenti habens motum, neque ad bonum neque ad malum plurimum vertit.' *ib. 42: 'Non vis videri deum aequare materiae, et subicis habere illam cum deo communionem: 'impossibile enim' inquis 'non habentem illam commune aliquid cum deo ornari eam ab ipso.' . . . Commune autem inter illos facis, quod a semetipsis moveantur, et semper moveantur. . . . Sed deus composite, materia incondite movetur.' *ib. 44: in explaining how God worked on matter, 'planea philosophis recedis (says Tertullian to Hermogenes) . . . Stoici enim volunt deum sic per materiam decucurrisse, quomodo mel per favos. At tu non inquis 'pertransiens illam facit mundum, sed solummodo apparens et adpropinquans ei, sicut facit (aliqu)quid decor solummodo apparentes, et magnes lapsis solummodo adpropinquans.'

It appears from what Tertullian and Hippolytus say about Hermogenes ('doctrina tam novella,' καυνός, &c.) that he was, as far as their knowledge went, the earliest Christian writer who adopted the Platonic doctrine of ἅλη, and made use of it, in the Platonic way, to account for the existence of evil. *He must have transcribed his statement of it, with little alteration, from some treatise written by a Pagan Platonist; and the Pagan author of Ascl. II, who teaches the same doctrine, must have got it from a closely connected source, if not from the very same treatise.

A doctrine resembling that of Hermogenes, and perhaps derived directly or indirectly from him, is set forth and criticized in the

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1 Τέπην χυτρίον ῥωκαυνοκήνσι βράζουσαν, Hermog. ap. Hippol.
2 Not from the Platonists; but Tertullian here ignores them, and speaks only of the Stoics.
3 decor MSS.: acor conl. Kroymann. But a comparison of God to 'a sour taste' would not seem happy. Why should not decor be right? Decor means κάλλοσ; cf. Ascl. III. 34 c. 'quod totum (sc. τὸ πῶν) est bonum (et) decens (ἀγαθὸν καλ καλὸν)'. What Hermogenes meant was that God is τὸ καλὸν, and, in virtue of his beauty, μυεί ἐκ ἐκλείμενος. In c. 43, Tertullian reports Hermogenes as saying '(materiam) desiderare componi a deo' (see c. 37 quoted above). Compare Plutarch Is. et Os. 53 and 58.
Tertullian, in his comment on these words of Hermogenes, speaks of decor (acor coni. Kroymann) vulnerans amimum. The word vulnerans might there be taken in the same sense as in Ovid's 'amor mea vulnerat arcu pectora'.
The comparison of God to a magnet is to the same effect; cf. Corp. IV fin.
Hermogenes was not quite the earliest; for καυνα in the Platonic sense, had already been spoken of by Marcion, c. A.D. 139—144. (See Harnack, Marcion, 1921, pp. 100, 140, 198.) But Marcion does not seem to have made any large use of this conception; he was comparatively little influenced by Pagan philosophy.
The dialogue Περὶ τοῦ αντρέφουσιον ("Concerning God, matter, and free will"), as it is entitled in the Slavonic translation, written c. A.D. 300 by the Christian Methodius (ed. Bonwetsch, 1891). In that dialogue, an orthodox Christian states and maintains his opinion as to the origin of moral evil, in opposition to a 'Valentinian' Gnostic and a 'companion' who agrees with the Valentinian in the main, but differs from him in holding that the primal ὅλη was not ἄπως.

The Valentinian says (cc. 2-4): 'When I observed the good order of the natural world, I thought μετὰ τῷ θεῷ ἔτερον [τι] παρ' αὑτόν, ἀλλ' εἰς αὐτοῦ (μόνου) τὰ διόντα γεγονέναι. But when I saw cruel and wicked deeds done by men, πόθεν ταῦτα ἀναξιότερα ἡρῴμενη, τῶν δὲ καὶ τῆς κυνήγειας αὐτῶν ἀρχῆς. . . . καὶ τῶν μὲν θεῶν τούτων ποιητὴν λέγειν τολμᾶν οὐχ οὐδὲ τῇ ὑπὲρ. . . . δὲ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ τῶν κρειττών ποιητῆς, τῶν δὲ φαίλων αὐτῷ πρώτεστοι οὖν. . . . ὁδείν ἀλογον ἐδοξεῖν εἶναι μοι ταῦτα προσάπτειν αὐτῷ. . . οὕτως ἐδοξέων μοι συνυπάρχειν τι αὐτῷ, τὸ τούτον ὑλή, εἰς τῇ διὸντα ἐδημοιώθησαν. . . . εἰς τῇ καὶ τὰ κακὰ εἶναι δοκεῖν. ἀποίνοι τὸ γὰρ καὶ ἀκαχματιστόν οὐνάς αὐτῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἀτάκτως φαιμένης, δειμμάθης τῇ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τέχνης, οὐκ ἐφθάνησαν οὖντος, οὐδὲ διὰ παντὸς καταληκτικῶς (Σῆλεν). αὐτὴν οὖν πόρων φέρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δημοιώθηκεν ἡρῴτη, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν χειρότων αὐτῆς τὰ κάλλιστα διακρίνας τοῦ Σῆλεν, καὶ τὰ τοῖς καλλίστας διακρίναι [καὶ] τὸν οἷας τοῖς καλλίστας, ἀρχήν (γὰρ) [εἰς] 7 αὐτῆς ἡμοιότιν θεῶ δημοιώθηκεν. τὰ 8

1 In the editions, this speaker is named Valentinus. But it is strange that Methodius should give a personal name to one of the three disputants only, while the other two are not named, but are denoted merely by the descriptive words ὁρθὸς καὶ ἴκταρος; and for the evidence for the name Valentinus is not such as to exclude doubt. That name nowhere occurs in the text of the dialogue; and in a speech addressed to this man (8. 4), the author writes ὁ ὁδείς, and not (as we should have expected from his practice in other dialogues) ὁ Θεολογός. It may be added that the well-known myth of Valentinus concerning the origin of matter (νομισάμεν οὖσα Σοφία . . . οὔταν δύον καὶ δακταλικόν, Hippol. Ref. ἱερ. 6. 30 fin.; matter is τὸ γεγενημένον τοῦ Σοφία) ἐκτιμώμαι, ib. c. 31) can hardly have been unknown to Methodius; and if he knew of it, he would not be likely to put into the mouth of Valentinus himself the statement that ἄλην is ἀγένετος. It seems probable therefore that Methodius did not give this speaker a name, but merely called him 'a Valentinian', and that the abbreviation ΟΤΑΛ. prefixed to his speeches was mistakenly supposed to mean Valentinus. The term 'Valentinian' may have been loosely used by Methodius to denote a platonizing heretic, such as was Hermogenes; it would not necessarily mean that the man to whom it was applied agreed with Valentinus in all respects.

4 οὖν οὐκ οὔντος: καὶ seclusi. Bonwetsch: 'neidete er nicht, noch liess er sie immer so schweben.' Slav. transil.

5 Σῆλεν οἷας transpositi.

6 There is an inconsistency here. If some parts of ὁλη were better and others worse, it cannot have been wholly ἄπως.

6 διακρίνας scrisi: diakrínas MSS.

7 γὰρ hic transposui: εἰ seclusi.

8 Cf. Methodius Peri τῶν γενητῶν 6 (Bonwetsch p. 343): ἀρδὲ τῶν σοφίων ἡ
In reply to this, the orthodoxus first maintains (cc. 5, 6) that ὁ πάρχειν ἄδονατον ἀγένητα δύο ἁμα; and then (7. 1–8. 2), taking as his starting-point the Valentinian’s assertion that ἀποιοὶ ὐλη συνυπάρχει τῷ θεῷ, and making use of the distinction between οὐσίαι and ποιότητες, refutes him by an argument which concludes thus: οὐκος ἕν ἐν τὰ κακὰ ποιότητες ὑπάρχοντα ὦσιν, ἡ δὲ ὑλή ἄποιος ἡν, τῶν δὲ ποιότητων ποιήτης ἐπίτης τὸν θεὸν ἕναι, ἐστι καὶ τῶν κακῶν ὁμοιορργὸς ὁ θεὸς. οὔτε τούτων οὖσὶν ἀναίτων τῶν κακῶν δυνατόν εἰπῶν τὸν θεὸν, ὑλῆν αὐτῷ προσάπτειν περίτοιν ἕναι μοι δοκεῖ. 

Upon the Valentinian (8. 3 and 4) withdraws his previous statement that κακὰ are ποιότητες, and substitutes for it the statement that κακά are οὐσίαι; but the orthodoxus again refutes him (8. 5–14). Then the ‘companion’ interposes, and says (9. 1–11. 2) ‘your argument holds good against the Valentinian, but not against me; for it is based on his assertion that ὐλη was ἄποιος, and I deny that. ἐμοὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑλή ποιήτης ἄναρχος ἐχεις δοκεῖι οὖσιν γὰρ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐκ τῆς ἀπορροίας αὐτῆς ἐναί λέγω, ἡν τῶν κακῶν δὲ μὴν θεὸς ἀναίτως ἡ, τούτων δὲ ἀπάντως ἡ ὑλή αἰτία. Matter had certain qualities ἀγενήτως, some of which were bad; and God changed them for the better.' The orthodoxus answers (11. 3–8), τῶς τούτων ἄρτων (ἐς τὸν θεόν) τὰς τῶν φαίλων ποιότητας ὡς ἐχον καταλειπότεναι λέγεις; πότερον δυνάμενον μὲν κάκεινας ἀνελείν, μὴ βουληθέντα δὲ, ἡ τὸ δύνασα μὴ ἔχοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον λέξεις ὡς βουληθέντα δὲ, αὐτῶν ἀιτίων ὑλῆ εἰ ἀπαρματικῶν, ἣ ὡς ἄρτων ταύτα βούλεθε αὐσμάξειν ὁμοιάζειν (οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει), τούτων ἀγενήτως προφητεύσκοτον καὶ πλημμελῶν φερομένων, ὁ θεὸς ἀληθῶς ἕγερκε διὰ τᾶς τὰ πάντα. Ἡμ.: τὸν θεόν ἔχεις τοῖς διοικίν ... καὶ κατασκεύαι τὴν πρότερον ἀμορφον ὦσιν ἐλν. 

1 Al. ὡς ὡς εἰς, which Bonwetsch accepts. 
2 ὡς ἐχεις καταλείπεις hic transposui: ὡς addidi. 
3 καὶ στρίψει: κατ’ MSS. 
4 The text of c. 5 ini. is corrupt. It might be emended thus: διὰ μὲν ὁ πάρχειν ἄδονατον ἀγένητα δύο ἁμα, οὐδὲ ἐὰν ἀγορεύση πολλαπλασιασθείν, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα δοκεῖς τούτο προστεθείσιν τῷ λόγῳ. [τὸ] πάντως (γὰρ) ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ ἐτέρω δείκνυ[ν] λέγειν, ἣ δι’ κ.τ.λ., ἢ αὖ πάλιν ὅπι κ.τ.λ. 
5 Bonwetsch gives the text of 8. 4 thus: ὈΡΘΟΔ. παραστηθαί (αλ. παραστηθαίναι) μοι δοκείς (αλ. δοκεῖ) καὶ τὰ κακὰ οὐσίας ὁπάρχειν τινὰς οὐ γὰρ λεγότις οὐσίων αὐτὰ ὑπάρχει. ἐπεὶ τούτων, οὖς οὖς, καὶ τὰ κακὰ οὐσίας ἐναι λέγεις, ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ. 
6 But that is unintelligible. The sense required may be got by writing §§ 3 and 4 thus: ὈΤΑΛ. τὴν μὲν προσφέρειν ... ἀγοραίον σαφέως. περιστρέφει (i.e. to change my position) (οὖν) μοι δοκεῖς (αλ. τὸ) καὶ τὰ κακὰ οὐσίας ὁπάρχειν τινὰς οὐ γὰρ λεγότις οὐσίων αὐτὰ ὑπάρχει. ὈΡΘΟΔ. ἐπεὶ τούτων, οὖς οὖς, καὶ τὰ κακὰ οὐσίας ἐναι λέγεις, ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ.
After some further discussion, the orthodoxus (cc. 16–21) states his own opinion (i.e. that of Methodius himself) concerning the origin of moral evil. Man, he says, is αὐτεχούσος, having been so made by God. It was for man’s good that God endowed him with free will; for man is thereby enabled to win merit by obedience to God. Evil means disobedience to God; and man, having been made αὐτεχούσος, had power to disobey. Man disobeyed; and his first act of disobedience was the beginning of evil. (Evil then is not ἁμάρτια, but came into being at a definite time.)

But how was man induced to disobey? It was the Devil that persuaded him; and the Devil did so because he was envious of man. The first ἀρχή τοῦ κακοῦ then was the Devil’s envy. The Devil’s part in the matter does not, however, relieve man from responsibility; for man was free either to accept the Devil’s advice or to reject it.

But was not the Devil made by God? And if so, was it not God’s fault that the Devil was envious? No; for the Devil, as made by God, was not evil; but (God made him αὐτεχούσον, and) it was of his own free choice that he disobeyed God, i.e. became evil.

But did not God, when he made the Devil, know that the Devil would rebel against him? And if so, is not God responsible for the evil that resulted? God knew; and knowing what would follow, he made the Devil, in order that he might more fully manifest his goodness by the remission of man’s sin. Good could not be known except by contrast with evil;¹ and man would be deprived of the boon of free will if the choice between good and evil were not set before him.

But when the Devil had induced the first man to disobey, why did not God at once destroy the Devil, and so prevent further mischief? Because, if he had done so, God’s goodness would not have been manifested in his dealings with men of all later generations, and men would not have learnt the meaning of good by seeing it in contrast with evil. As it is, ‘a man of God’ can and does overcome the Devil, being taught by God himself to struggle against him. God is like a trainer of athletes; he sends us into the palaestra to wrestle with the Devil, and the man who obeys his Trainer’s instructions wins the crown of victory. The man who neglects them, and does not struggle hard, is overcome; but that is his own fault. Thus, (if we do what God bids us do,) ‘the Devil is trodden down beneath our feet, and lies dead’.

After this, the orthodoxus brings the dialogue to a close by speaking of ἔλη once more (c. 22). If matter, he says, was not co-existent with God from the first, how is it that it now exists? (It was made by God, at the time when he began to make the world.) And why did God make the world? We cannot fully know God’s motives; but I think (says the orthodoxus) that he made it in order to put his skill (τὴν τῆς τέχνης ἐπατήμησιν) in action, and to manifest his goodness, and in order to bring into existence beings (viz. men) who might recognize his skill, and whom he might benefit by his goodness. τὸ μὲν οὖν λοιπὸν τοῦ κόσμου σύντημα διὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον γεγονέναι φημι, πρὸς ὑπηρεσίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων αἰτῶν, (τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον δι’ αὐτῶν τὸν θεόν,) ὡς διδάσκῃ τὸν δεισιδήρον, (καὶ ὡς τὸ ἀγαθὸν (nom.) εἰς τινα ἐνεργήσῃ τοῦ θεοῦ. Moreover, even before God made the world, he was not idle; for he was occupied in designing it and rejoicing beforehand in its beauty.

μηδὲν τοιγαροῦν, ἄνθρωπε, αὐτοσοιότατον εἶναι λέγε (πρὸς) τῷ θεῷ.

1 'Ein Mensch Gottes’, Slav. transl. (this passage is not extant in the Greek); i. e. any and every good man. There is not, I think, any reference to Christ here, nor indeed anywhere in the dialogue.

2 What Methodius says about the Devil is a repetition, on another plane, of what he has already said about man. God is not responsible for the Devil’s misdeeds, just as he is not responsible for man’s misdeeds; because, in making the Devil, God endowed him with free will, just as he did in the case of man. (Methodius asks ‘Quis decepithominem’, and answers ‘Diabolus’; he might, with equal reason, have gone on to ask ‘Quis deceit ipsum Diabolum!’) But he says that the evil produced by the Devil’s and man’s misuse of free will has resulted in greater good.

3 See note on Corp. III. 1 a, σοφίας ἐς δεικνῦν.

4 The word σύστασις, as used by Methodius, means ‘constitution’ or ‘existence’, without any implication that the constituted or existent thing is composite; and αὐτοσοιότατον is equivalent to αὐτοσοιότατον or αὐτογενήτων.

5 πρὸς adīdi: ’mit Gott zusammen’ Slav. transl.
As to what Plotinus says on this subject, see B. A. G. Fuller, The problem of evil in Plotinus, 1912; and Inge, The philosophy of Plotinus, vol. i, pp. 22–24, 90, 131–137, and vol. ii, p. 171 sq.

Ascl. II. 14 b. [Et de his . . . hinc sumatur exordium.]  
This must have been written by the compiler to serve as a connecting-link between Ascl. I and that which he joined on to it. But how are we to account for the words de spiritu et de his (or huic?) similibus (perì pneu'matos kal twv tou'tw dhmiou'gwn)? We should have expected a phrase indicating the subject-matter of Ascl. II. But Ascl. II is not de spiritu; it ought rather to be described as perì árxis kaiwv, or perì 'ylos; and in its original form it probably contained no mention of pneu'ma. The word spiritus occurs four times in the traditional text of it; but these mentions of spiritus are irrelevant to their context.

It is possible that the words de spiritu vero et de his similibus hinc sumatur exordium were followed, in the composite Aògos têlmos, by a passage concerning pneu'ma, which preceded Ascl. II, but has been completely lost. But it is also possible that those words were written by way of introduction, not to Ascl. II, but to Ascl. III. The first paragraph of Ascl. III treats of certain prin-cipalía mundanorum, one of which is spiritus. That paragraph then might be described as ‘concerning spirit and the like’; and we may suppose that the words et de his . . . hinc sumatur exordium were intended to stand at the beginning of Ascl. III, but were separated from it by the subsequent insertion of Ascl. II. The irrelevant mentions of spiritus in Ascl. II may have been added

1 kai inclus.
2 ‘Nicht bloß der Formen Schöpfer seiend, sondern auch die bei ihm seiernde Substanz, wie es passend war’ (= oú schhmatów monon dên poutría, alla kal tivn synoúsaan authō oúsiain prosopou'stov) Slav. transl. Perhaps, oúde synoúsaan authō oúsiain (sc. òlhn dýntwtoan) (poutría) synekhrasen.
3 It appears from Fragm. 24 (Didymus and Cyril) that there was a discussion of pneu'ma in ‘the third of the Discourses of Hermes to Asclepius’.

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afterwards, by some one who thought that the introductory words made it necessary that something should be said on that subject.


Exe. IX. 1: καὶ γέγονεν . . . ἡ ἡλία καὶ (δεὶ?) ἦν.

'quam Graece credeimus mundum.' A clause inserted by the translator, and corrupted by the copyists. The sense required is quam Graeci ἡλία, nos mundum dicitum. Cf. Ascl. I. 7 b: 'quod ἡλίκων Graeci, nos mundanum dicitum.' Ascl. III. 17 a: 'ἡλία autem (vel mundus).

[Et mundo . . . nec deo ( . . .)]. The meaning of these words would seem to be that πνεῦμα 'was with or in' matter in one sense, and 'was with or in' God in another sense. But the past tense of conitabatur and inerat is difficult to explain; for πνεῦμα, if the word is to be understood in the sense in which it was used by the Stoics, cannot be one of the 'first things'; it is warm air, i.e. matter endowed with certain qualities, and must therefore be γεννητόν. But this sentence is an interpolation, and there is no knowing what meaning the interpolator may have attached to the word πνεῦμα. It is possible that he was thinking of Gen. 1.2, πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὁμοίου.

Haec, de quibus mundus, idcirco non erant, quia(n)a n(a)ta non erant. Mundus, since it is said to issue from or to be made of other things, must here mean κόσμος, and not ἡλία, which 'was in the beginning.' The 'things out of which the universe has come into being' are, I suppose, the four elements, which have been formed by the imposition of qualities on ἄποιος ἡλία. The writer is speaking of a time when the elements had not yet been formed, and nothing but God and ἄποιος ἡλία was in actual existence.

in eo iam tunc erant unde nasci habuerunt. They existed potentially in God and matter, whence they were thereafter to be generated. Compare, and contrast, Ascl. I. 2 a: 'utpote quae in creatoru fuerint omnia, antequam creasset omnia'; i.e. all created things pre-existent potentially in God. Matter, as a second creative or generative entity distinct from God, is not admitted in Ascl. I. The view of the writer of Ascl. II would be better expressed if in iiis (sc. God and matter) were written instead of in eo.

For nasci habuerunt ('were to be produced') cf. Tertull. Hab. mul. 1: 'etiam filius Dei mori habuit'; Lactant. Div. inst. 4. 12. 15: 'ut ostenderet quod carne indiui haberet.'

[Non enim ea sola non nata dicitur quae neodum nata
sunt, sed ea (etiam quae . . .) &c.]. The MSS. give the sentence thus: 'non enim ea sola non nata dicuntur quae necdum nata sunt, sed ea quae carent fecunditate generandi, ita ut ex his nihil nasci possit.' We want sed ea (etiam), to answer to non ea sola; but even with that correction, the words would not yield a satisfactory meaning. The writer is apparently distinguishing different senses of the word ἄγεννηρος. Now that word could be used in three senses, viz. (1) 'existing without having been generated' (i.e. 'without beginning', the most frequent sense in philosophic writings); (2) 'not yet generated' (i.e. not yet existing, but destined to come into being at some future time; Soph. O. C. 973, ὥστε ὃντες βλάστησαι τῶν γενεθλίων . . . ἔχων, ἀλλ' ἄγεννηρος τῶν ἦ); (3) incapable of generating (Theophr. C. P. 6. 10. 1). God and matter (and, according to Ascl. II. 15 init., space also) are ἄγεννηρα in the first of these three senses; the material universe and its contents were, before the creation, ἄγεννηρα in the second sense; and space (c. 15 init.) is ἄγεννηρον in the third sense (as well as in the first sense). The statement given in the MSS. amounts to saying 'the word ἄγεννηρος can be used not only in the second sense, but (also) in the third sense', and leaves unmentioned the first sense, i.e. the sense in which it is applicable to God and matter, and with which therefore the writer of Ascl. II is especially concerned. This difficulty may be got over by assuming a lacuna after sed ea; we may suppose that the sentence ran thus: 'not only those things are called ἄγεννηρα which have not yet been produced' (second sense), 'but those things (also which are without beginning)' (first sense). That statement would be intelligible in itself, but is not to the point here; it may perhaps be a marginal note wrongly inserted in the text.

The following words ((. . .) quae carent fecunditate generandi, ita ut ex his nihil nasci possit) have nothing to do with anything that has hitherto been mentioned. The only thing spoken of in Ascl. II that caret fecunditate generandi is space (locus); and that is spoken of only in c. 15. It is possible therefore that these words occurred in the passage concerning space in c. 15, or in a note appended to that passage, and have been accidentally shifted thence.

Quaecunque ergo . . . cuncta nascuntur. The writer is here laying down general propositions concerning ἄγεννηρα (or ἀτογεννηραη), with the intention of afterwards applying these propositions to God and matter.
The word *tametsi* implies that one would at first sight be apt to think that *aistogenneta* cannot be *genntika*, i.e. cannot generate anything. And in what follows, the same thing is repeatedly implied concerning *aigenneta*. (‘*vel*a, . . . quamvis nata non videatur, a principio tamen in se nascendi procreandique vim possidet.’—‘mundus (i.e. *vel*a), quamvis natus non sit, in se tamen omnium naturas habet’ &c.—‘materiae, quae creabilis est, tametsi creada non est.’) But why should any one be inclined to think that *aistogenneta* or *aigenneta* cannot be *genntika*?

Lactantius, *Div. inst.* 2. 8. 42, arguing against the doctrine of uncreated matter, says ‘Materia igitur si facta non est, nec fieri ex quicquam potest’. But that is not a true parallel; for Lactantius’s *fieri ex ea* has a different meaning from the Hermetist’s *nasci ex ea*. The reason which Lactantius gives for his statement is that matter, when something else is made of it, thereby changes into the thing made, and ceases to exist as matter, whereas that which is uncreated must be imperishable. That cannot be the reasoning implied by our Hermetist; for he clearly holds that both God and matter continue to exist after other things have been generated from them. It is possible however that the view hinted at by his ‘although’ is that *aistogenneta* or *aigenneta* must be unchangeable, and that consequently they cannot generate, because the act of generating involves a change in the generator. In that case, the argument implied would resemble that of Origen as reported by Methodius *peri ton* *genntoun* (Bonwetsch, p. 341), viz. that *to* *pavan* must be *anarxon* kai *surnaidion* *to* *theo*, because if not, *alloooisthiai* kai *metaballein* to *apostoton* kai *appaliowton* *sumbyzetai* *theon* ei *gar* *usieron* *petoigke* to *pavan*, *dei* *apó* to *u* *pouin* eis to *pouin* *metebale*. Cf. Tertull. *Adv. Hermog.* 12: ‘(Hermogenes) deum negat ex semetipso facere (= *gennd*?) potuisse, quia non demutetur quod sit aeternum (= *aigenneto*).’ On the same principle, says Tertullian, it could be proved that God cannot have made the world out of *aigennetos* *vela*; for if he did, ‘demutationem admissit materia, et, si ita est, statum aeternitatis amiset’.

*Ex se nata = aistogenneta*. The word *aistogennetos*, ‘generated by or from himself’, was often applied to God, as an equivalent for *aigennetos* in the sense ‘without beginning’, or ‘pre-existent from all eternity’. Cf. *Corp.* VIII. 2 as emended: *đ μαν γαρ πατηρ ὑπὸ ἐτέρου οὐκ ἑγένετο* eī de kai ἑγένετο, ὑπὸ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον de oûstos
ASCLEPIUS II: 14 b

εύνετο, ἄλλα δὲ εὐτυχ. . . . δὲ πατήρ αὐτὸς ταυτῷ αἰτιος. Lactant. Div. inst. 1. 7. 13: ‘quia fieri non potest quin id quod sit aliquando esse coeperit, consequens est ut, quoniam nihil ante illum (sc. deum) fuit, ipse ante omnia ex se ipso sit pro creator; ideoque ab Apolline 1 αὐτοφυής, a Sibylla αὐτογενής et αἷγνητος 2 et ἀτολόγος nominatur. Quod Seneca, vir acutus, in Exhortationibus vidit. “Nos” inquit “aliunde pendemus: itaque ad aliquem respicimus, cui quod est optimum in nobis debeamus. Alius nos edidit, alius instruxit: deus ipse se fecit.”’ Lactant. ib. 2. 8. 44: ‘Solus igitur deus est qui factus non est... Permanebit semper in eo quod fuit, quia non est aliunde generatus, nec ortus ac nativitas eius ex aliqua re altera pendet, quae illum mutata dissolvat. Ex se ipso est.’ Aelius Aristides 43. 7 ff. Keil: Ζεὺς τὰ πάντα ἐτοίμασε... ἐτοίμασε δὲ ἑαυτὸς (legendum πρῶτον) αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔτυμον. . . . ὅπερ οὖν πρῶτος τε καὶ πρωσβύτατος καὶ ἀρχηγήτας τῶν πάντων, αὐτός εἰς αὐτοῦ γενόμενος. ὅποτε δὲ εὖνετο οὐκ ἐστὶν εἰσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἦν τε ἐκ το γέρχος καὶ ἔσται εἰσαεί, αὐτοπάτωρ τε καὶ μείζων εἰς ἄλλον γεγονέναι. Compare the three following passages, quoted from Pagan oracles by Didymus De trinitate, Migne Patr. Gr. tom. XXXII. 788 a: ἀδάνατος δὲ θεός, παναγιρας, ἀυτοφύλακτος, ἀρρητος, 'κρυφίως ὑποθήτευσις 3 αὐτογενέθλος τόκτων αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔτυμον δὲ αὐτός ἀυτοῦ γενέτης, 'σοφός 4 αὐτός ἄλησις. ib. 790 C: αὐτὸς πάντα φέρει θεός ἀμβροσίας τούτων αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔτυμον καὶ γενέτης καὶ ρίζα πέλλει, καὶ τέρμα καὶ νόσος. ib. 792 A: οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' ὀδίνον θεός ἀμβροσίας, οὐδὲ αὖ κόλπον γενναῖον ἐκ λοχίας φάος ἑδρακέν: ἀλλὰ νόσῳ καὶ ἀρήτῳ ἀστροφάλλητα 5 κυκλούμενος, αὐτολόγους γίνεται εἰς ἐδώ αὐτός, τῶν γενέτης τε καὶ νόσος. Oracle of Apollo, quoted in Excerpta e Theosophia (Buresch, Klaros) § 42: αὐτὸς ἀναξ πάντων, αὐτοσκοπός, αὐτογενεθλος, . . . εἰς φῶς ἤγεν ἀπαντα (i.e. created the universe). Oracle quoted in Euseb. Pr. ev. 9. 10 = Ps.-Justin Cohort. ad Graecos II: μοῦνοι Χαλδαιοὶ σοφότεροι λάχος, ἦδ' ἐπ' Ἐβραίοι, αὐτογενεθλον ἄνακτα σεβαζόμενοι θεον ἄγνωσ. The notion that God is 'self-generated' was current in Egypt from early times. Cf. Book of the Dead, Turin copy, ch. xv (Wiedemann, Rel. of anc. Egypt, p. 45): 'Hail to thee, Rā

1 I. e. in a certain oracle ascribed to Apollo.
3 Perhaps κρυφίως λογεύματος.
4 Perhaps οὖ τε ποιήσω.
5 Perhaps μόνος.
6 ἀστροφάλλητα cont. Mingarelli.
Harmakhis, Khepera who art self-begotten.’ (Ib. p. 47) ‘Thou bringest forth thyself without birth’. A document of the XXth Dynasty, c. 1233–1133 B.C. (ib. p. 54) speaks of Ra as ‘the divine god who created himself, maker of heaven and earth, and of the breath of life’. Inscription of El Khargeh, time of Darius (Naville, Old Eg. faith, Eng. tr. 1909, p. 146 f.): ‘He is Ra who exists by himself; . . . he is the good god who rests in his own body and gives birth to himself without coming forth from a mother’s womb.’ The same notion is implied in the phrase ‘the husband of his mother’, which is often applied to Egyptian gods (Wiedemann ib. pp. 104, 111); and the use of the beetle (kheper) as a symbol of Ra is explained (Naville ib. p. 131 f.) as signifying ‘that he reproduces himself by himself,— that he is his own son. To call him Kheper, therefore, is to affirm that he will have no end, since he can be born again unceasingly from his own substance’. The primary meaning of these Egyptian phrases seems to have been that the Sun-god daily renews himself, and is thus enabled to rise in fresh splendour every morning, rather than that he has had no beginning in the past. Did the Greeks borrow from the Egyptians the notion expressed by αὐτρογέννητος as a predicate of the supreme God, or did they invent it independently?

Our Hermetist holds that ὁ θεὸς also is αὐτρογέννητος, in the same sense that God is.

 Deus ergo sempiternus, deus aeternus. The writer of Ascl. III would have said rather that God is aeternus (αἰώνος), and the Kosmos sempiternus (αἰών); see ch. 29 c sqq.

ὥρα autem . . . [et spiritus], quamvis nata non vides[ntur. It cannot rightly be said of πνεῦμα (in the sense in which that word is used in Ascl. III init., and in the Hermetica in general,) that ‘it does not appear to have been generated’; for πνεῦμα in that sense is a corporeal substance, and as such, must have been generated, whether by God alone or (as the writer of Ascl. II would say) by God and ὁ θεὸς together. Hence it may be inferred that et spiritus has been added by an interpolator (presumably the same person who inserted et mundo comitabatur spiritus &c. above), and that the verbs videantur and possident have been accordingly altered from singular to plural. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that in the two following sentences ὁ θεὸς alone is spoken of, and spiritus is ignored.

nascondi procreandique vim . . . atque naturam. The sense
required would be better expressed by omitting nascendi, -que, and atque naturam, and writing procreandis vim alone. But nascendi procreandique may be a faulty translation of γεννήσωσ; and vim atque naturam, both here and in the following sentence, may be the translator's rendering of the single word ἑναμυ.

Fecunditatis etenim initium in qualitate materiae (naturae MSS.) est, quae et concepsus et partus in se possidet vim atque naturam (materiam MSS.). The writer attributes to ἡλη (that ἡλη which 'was in the beginning') the quality of fecundity. He differs in that respect from those Platonists who said that the primal ἡλη is wholly ἀνωσ.

The meaning would have been clearer if fecunditas had been written in place of fecunditatis initium. Perhaps fecunditatis initium (ἀρχη) means 'original fecundity', as opposed to fecundity resulting from the action on matter of some cause or agent other than itself.

**sine alieno conceptu est sola generabilis.** Sine alieno conceptu, in order to suit the context, ought to mean 'without being made capable of conceiving (i.e. of giving birth to things) by anything else', in contrast to quae vim solam concepiendi habent ex alterius commixtione naturae in c. 15 init. But it is difficult to see how that sense can be got out of the words. It is possible that the Greek was ἄνης κυλλήπως ἀλλορίας, 'without the assistance of anything else', and that the translator mistakenly supposed κυλλήψις to be here used in the sense of 'conception'. (In the preceding phrase conceptus et partus, the Greek word translated by conceptus may have been κύησις).

This clause, if taken alone, might seem to imply that Matter is capable of generating even without the co-operation of God. But that cannot be the writer's meaning. He holds that in the generation of things God and Matter co-operate,—God as Father, and Matter as Mother; and what he here means to assert is that (the operation of God as Father being presupposed) Matter is capable of discharging the function of Mother without aid from any other entity. In other words, Matter is not a merely passive 'recipient', but possesses a generative power co-ordinate with that of God. And in this respect, (as the writer proceeds to point out,) Matter differs from Space; for Space is barren in itself, and is capable of 'conceiving',—i.e. of being filled with γεννητα,—only when something else (viz. Matter) is interfused with it. In Pl.
Tim. 52 a, the ἰδροδοχή (i.e. matter) is identified with χάρα. Possibly the writer of Ascl. Η had that passage in mind, and spoke of space here with the intention of expressing his dissent from the Timaeus. Cf. Ascl. III. 17 b as emended: ἡλή 'multis loci instar qualitatemque habere creditur'.

in se vim totius naturae (γενήσεως;) habet. In the traditional text, the subject of this clause is Space. But the purpose of the whole paragraph appears to be to deny this proposition with respect to Space, and affirm it with respect to Matter. I have therefore transposed the words.

15. At vero ea . . . discernenda sunt. This statement is first made in general terms, and is afterwards applied to Space in particular.

ut (. . .). The clause introduced by ut has disappeared; and videatur has probably been substituted for videtur by way of an attempt to patch up the mutilated passage.

The meaning appears to be, that on the one hand ἡλή is both ἀγέννητος and γενήσις, and on the other hand τόπος is ἀγέννητος but not γενήσις.

locus mundi cum his quae in se sunt. In se must be taken to mean in mundo, not in loco. The translator ought to have written, not in se, but in eo. The words locus mundi &c. signify the space in which the whole universe is contained, as opposed to the space in which this or that particular thing is contained. Cf. Ar. Phys. 4. 209 a 32: καὶ τόπος δὲ μὲν κοινός, ἐν ψ' ἀπαντά τὰ σώματα ἐστίν, δὲ δ' ἰδιός, ἐν ψ' πρώτῳ (ἐκαστὸν τῶν σωμάτων). But as the sense in which locus is here spoken of is sufficiently explained by the following sentence (‘locum autem dico in quo sint omnia’), the words mundi cum his quae in se sunt are superfluous; and the passage would read better if they were omitted.

Neque enim . . . sustinere potuisse. Space must be ἀγέννητον, because it must have been already in existence before any (corporeal) thing came into being. Cf. Pl. Tim. 52 b: καὶ φαμέν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ τὸ ἐν ἀπαν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χάραν τῶ, τὸ δὲ μὴν ἐν γῇ μήτη τοῦ κατ' οἰκραν ὁδεῖν εἶναι. Ar. Phys. 4. 208 b 29 ff.: δέξεις δ' ἐν καὶ Ἡσίωδος ὥρθος λέγων ποιήσας πράττων τό χάος, . . . διὸ δὲ τῶν πρῶτων ὑπάρξει χάραν τοῖς οὖσι, διὰ τὸ νομίζειν, ὡσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, πάντα εἶναι ποιοῦ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ. εἰ δ' ἐστι τοιοῦτο, θαυμαστὴ τις ἐν εἴπ' ἡ τοῦ τόπου δύναμις, καὶ προτέρα πάντων· οὔ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων οδοῖν ἐστιν, ἐκείνω δ' ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη πρῶτων εἶναι.
The translator has written potuisset in place of posset; see note on Ascl. I. 8, 'qui illum ... intueri potuisset'.

neo qualitates . . . dinosci potuissent. dinosci is hardly the right word; for it is the existence of things, and not men's knowledge of them, that is in question. The Greek must have been to the effect that things could not have distinct qualities &c. if they were not in space.

With this paragraph concerning space should be compared Ascl. III 34 a, where a different view is maintained, and the independent or substantive existence of space is denied. The two passages cannot have been written by the same person.

Sic ergo et mundus (i.e. ὁ ἡ) quamvis natus non sit. If there is no lacuna between this and the preceding paragraph, sic must be taken as qualifying natus non sit, and not omnium naturas habet; that is, the meaning must be 'Matter then, though it is likewise (i.e. as Space is) ungenerated' &c.; for it is in being ἄγεννη that ὁ ἡ and τόρος are alike. The Latin does not lend itself readily to this interpretation; but the translator may have misunderstood the Greek.

in se tamen omnium naturas (γεννήτους?) habet. Matter contains in itself the power of generating all things.

Hoc est ergo totum qualitatis (diversae, prout natura est) materiae. The All includes both good things and bad things; and this diversity in the quality of the things produced results from the varying operation of the productive force of matter. It seems certain that this was the writer's meaning, though the exact wording is doubtful. Cf. Corp. XIV. 7: μὴ διὰ τὴν ποικιλίαν τῶν γυνομένων φυλάξῃ κ.τ.λ.

16a. Ne ergo dix(er)ti(tis), o Asclepi et (Tat et) Hammon. It may be presumed that in the original Ascl. II as an independent dialogue Hermes addressed his discourse to a single pupil, and consequently, that the earliest form of the Greek would be reproduced by writing ne ergo dixeris here, and tua tamen causa for vestri tamen causa below, and retaining only one of the three names. The plural address was probably substituted by the compiler of the Δόγης τίλεις; and as he can have had no reason for omitting Tat while naming the two other disciples, Tat et must have dropped out by accident.

[[Non poterat deus . . . avertere a rerum natura malitiam.]] The traditional text is meaningless. By interchanging this sentence
with *dicunt enim* ... *a malitias liberare* below, we obtain the sense which the context requires. It is the teacher himself who holds that 'it was impossible for God to exclude evil from the universe'; and the impiety which he condemns consists in finding fault with God for not doing what it was not possible for God to do. Perhaps the two sentences may have been intentionally interchanged by a transcriber who shrank from applying the words *non poterat* to God.


A different view is expressed in *Corp. XIV.* 7–9, where we are told that it is impious to say that God οὐ δύναται. The writer of that *libellus* admits, however, that evil follows on γένεσις 'as rust forms on metal'; and that amounts to the admission of an ἀνάγκη which God cannot overcome.

*Quibus respondendum nihil omnino est.* This phrase implies contempt, such as is more fully expressed by Celsus in *Orig. c. Cels.* 8. 49: ἀλλὰ τοῖς τούτο πειθομένοις οὐκ... ἐξεν [τούτῳ] διαλέγεσθαι ὁδοίς γὰρ εἰσὶν οἱ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἁγροκοι καὶ ἁκάθαρτοι κ.τ.λ.

*quantum rationabileri potiusset.* *Potius* or *poterat* would have been more correct. Cf. *sustinere potiusset* above.

*sensu, disciplina, intellegentia mentes hominum est munerare dignatus.* God’s purpose in bestowing intelligence on men is to give them a protection against evil. Cf. *Ascl. III.* 22 b, where the same thought recurs. The topic is there introduced by these words: ‘dignum est hunc persequi tractatum, atque expedire quare solis hominibus intellegetiam et disciplinam divinitas suam sit inpertire dignata.’ The author of that passage could not possibly have written thus, if he had already dealt with the same question, and given the same answer to it, a few pages before. Here then we have a clear proof that *Ascl. II* and *Ascl. III* were originally unconnected.

In ch. 22 b, God’s gift to men is called *intellegentia et disciplina,* and *ratio disciplinaire.* In ch. 41 b, *condonans nos sensu, ratione, intellegetia* is the translator’s rendering of χαρισμάτων ἦμων νόου, λόγου, γνώσεω. Probably therefore in ch. 16 a also *sensus* is νοῦ (as
frequently elsewhere in the Asclepius), and intellegentia is γνώσις; and disciplina certainly stands for ἐπιστήμη. The three terms may be distinguished thus: νοῦς is the faculty or 'part of the soul', by which man knows; ἐπιστήμη is knowledge in its subordinate branches; and γνώσις is the supreme knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of God, which involves also love of God, and, in its highest degree, union with God. Cf. Corp. X. 10 a: γνώσις δέ συν ἐπιστήμης τῷ τέλος, ἐπιστήμη δὲ... ἀσώματος, ὁράματα χρωμένα αὐτῷ τῷ νοτ.—νοῦς is the mental eye, and ἐπιστήμη and γνώσις are a lower and a higher grade of mental vision.

est divina intellegentia prudentiaque munitus. If a man shuns evil, the intellectual powers by means of which he does so have been bestowed on him by God; and thus it is 'God's wisdom and providence' that has protected him. It would be possible also to translate the words thus, 'he is protected by God-given intuition and wisdom', taking intellegentia prudentiaque to be properties of man (equivalent to sensu, disciplina, intellegentia above), instead of properties of God. But this would be less suitable to the context; for the thing to be proved is that God has done all that could be done to counteract evil.

fundamentum est enim disciplinae in summa bonitate consistens. Here disciplina (ἐπιστήμη) alone corresponds to sensus, disciplina, intellegentia above. Summa bonitas must mean the goodness of God; knowledge is a gift bestowed on man by God's bounty. If he had been speaking of human goodness, the writer would rather have said that goodness is founded on knowledge (of God).

[Spiritu autem ... subiectus est]. This sentence has nothing to do with the subject-matter of Ascl. II. It is probably a displaced marginal appendage to the paragraph concerning spiritus which follows at the beginning of Ascl. III. The words spiritu autem ministrantur omnia et vegetantur in mundo are a doublet of Ascl. III. 17 a init., spiritu vero agitantur sive gubernantur omnes in mundo species.

[Itaque (haec) hactenus a nobis intellegantur.] These words mark the end of Ascl. II. They were probably added by the compiler of the Δόγμα τέκνων, as were the corresponding words (Et de his ... hinc sumatur exordium) at the beginning of Ascl. II.
16 b. Mente sola intellegibilis &c. The interest of the writer of Ascl. III seems to be centred in the question 'How ought we to worship the gods?' With a view to answering that question, he sets forth a system of theology (ratio divinorum, 19 a). The topic of theology is introduced in ch. 18 b, by the mention of νοῦς and θεοί νοητοί; and accordingly, it is at that point (19 a) that Hermes warns his disciple of the sublimity of the truths which he is about to reveal. The words which he there uses (divina nudo mysteria &c.) must be taken as applying to the whole of the discourse which follows. But by way of leading up to the main topic, the writer, before entering on the ratio divinorum, begins by giving a short account of the constitution of the sensible or corporeal universe,—a ratio mundanorum, or cosmology,—which is contained in chs. 16 b, 17 a, 17 c (with chs. 33 a–34 a added as an appendage). The discourse of Hermes begins abruptly with the words Mente sola intellegibilis &c., and it is possible that, in Ascl. III as an independent dialogue, these words were preceded by some introductory sentences, which were omitted by the compiler of the Λόγος τέλεως; but there is no reason to think that anything of importance to the exposition of the doctrine has been lost here.

The contents of this preliminary 'cosmology' are summed up in 17 c, where we are told that it deals with principalia omnium (mundanorum); and these principalia appear to be ὐλή, μορφή, and πνεύμα.

Compare the very similar arrangement of the first part of Ascl. I. In that libellus also, there is a preliminary paragraph on the constituents of the Kosmos (chs. 2 b, 3 a), ending with the sentence 'Totus itaque quibus formatus est mundus' &c., on which follows a solemn introduction of the topic of theology (divinitatis ratio, 3 b). This parallelism of arrangement is in itself enough to prove that Ascl. I and Ascl. III were originally two distinct and unconnected documents; the repetition would be impossible in a single treatise composed as a whole by one author.

In chs. 33 a–34 a, we have a passage treating of Void and Space. That passage, where it stands in the MSS., interrupts the continuity.

1 It is true that the supreme God has already been spoken of in 16 b and 17 a; but what is said about him there is brought in merely because it is needed for the explanation of the Kosmos.
of the discourse, and is manifestly out of place. There is, in fact, no place in Ascl. III where it would be in keeping with the context, except immediately after ch. 17c; and at that point, it fits on perfectly. After speaking of the true principalia mundanorum (viz. ἀληθῆ, μορφαί, and πνεύμα), the writer might very well go on to speak of two things (viz. κενῶν and τόπων) which are erroneously supposed to be principalia mundanorum, and to show that the common opinion about them is mistaken. I conclude then that, if the passage on Void and Space was intended to form part of Ascl. III at all, it must have been meant to stand next after ch. 17c; and I have transposed it accordingly.

But how did it come to be placed in its traditional position? As it is complete in itself, and shows no sign of fracture at the beginning or end, its transference can hardly have been caused by the accidental shifting of a leaf. Possibly its writer (whether the original author of Ascl. III or another) may have written it as a supplement to chs. 16b–17c after the bulk of the treatise was finished; he may have left it lying loose (perhaps appending a note, which was subsequently overlooked, to indicate the position for which he intended it); and a transcriber may have written it in at the point where chance had placed it.

summus qui dicitur. ὅψιωτος, as a designation of God, was in common use among the Jews; it frequently occurs e.g. in the Jewish Oracula Sibyllina. But its use is not to be taken as a proof of Jewish influence; for any Greek who had occasion to speak of the supreme God might easily hit on the word independently. Zeus was called ὅψιωτος by Greeks, from the time of Pindar and Aeschylus downward.

sensibilis dei: i.e. mundi. Cf. Ascl. I. 3c: 'caelum ergo, sensibilis deus.' Id. 8: θεὸν δρατῶν καὶ ἀληθητῶν. The term ἀληθής θεός, as applied to the Kosmos, is ultimately derived from the concluding words of Pl. Tim.

in se circumplecitur [omm. locum]. The writer, who in ch. 34a refuses to admit the substantive existence of locus, would hardly mention it in enumerating the contents of the Kosmos. Moreover, space, if mentioned at all, should be said to contain the Kosmos rather than to be contained in it. Probably therefore the words omnem locum have been inserted by another hand.

omnem rerum substantiam totamque [[gignentium crean-
tiumque] materiam. Cf. 17 b as emended: 'sunt visibles formae ... uniuscuiusque ... tota substantia.' The ovisia of a thing (in the sense in which the term is here used) is the sum of the morphi with which its ήλη is endowed; so that ovisia and ήλη together make up the whole contents of the Kosmos. The words gignentium creantiumque, as a qualification of materiam, yield no satisfactory sense; and on the other hand, quantumcumque est demands a genitive; I have therefore transposed the words. Quantumcumque est gignentium creantiumque may be taken to mean the whole number of living things which possess reproductive power; and in that sense, the phrase describes a part of the contents of the Kosmos, which have already been summed up by the terms ovisia and ήλη. The reproductive energy of every single animal and plant is included in, and is a constituent part of, the vital energy of the Kosmos as a whole, the άληθείας θεός; and that vital energy is diffused through the Kosmos by God, working with πνεῦμα as his instrument.

It is possible, however, that the Greek has been inaccurately translated, and that quantumcumque est gignentium creantiumque stands for something like τζερταντος, or ιερος, in the sense of 'all things that come into being'.

17 a. quasi organum vel machina. Cf. Corp. X. 18: ήργανον τῷ πυρὶ ... χρήσατο. The function here assigned to πνεῦμα (i.e. warm air, the vehicle of life) is there assigned to fire. In 19 b, we are told that 'aer ... organum est vel machina omnium, per quam omnia fiunt.' See note ad loc.

The writer's conception of πνεῦμα and its function in the Kosmos is derived from the Stoics. But he shows some confusion of thought in putting πνεῦμα on a par with ήλη and morphi, as one of the three principalia mundanorum; for πνεῦμα in the Stoic sense is itself ήλη endowed with certain morphi or ποιότητες. It seems as if he here limited the term ήλη to the matter of which gross and ponderable bodies are made, and assumed πνεῦμα to be differently constituted from such bodies. See 18 b init.

Spiritu ... gubernantur omnes in mundo species. The word species cannot here signify either the formae visibiles (αισθητά ειδη) imposed on matter, or the eternal έδεα (species divinae and incorporales, ch. 35), of which the αισθητά ειδη are copies; for of neither of these could it be said that 'God has distributed to each one of them its special φύση'. We must therefore take species (ειδη) to mean in this sentence either 'kinds or classes of beings',

or (as in Ascl. I. 4 f.) 'individuals'. Secundum naturam suam corresponds to ut cuiusque naturae qualitas est inaltata below; and cuiusque there means 'of each individual thing'.

omnium est (formarum) receptaculum. Formarum is required here to complete the sense, and must be understood again with the following omniumque.

omniumque agitatio atque frequentatio (spiritu effloitur (?)). κίνησις (agitatio) is here used in the sense of μεταβολή, i.e. substitution of one form for another; and πύκνωσις (frequentatio) signifies the unbroken succession of the different forms which a thing assumes in the course of its life and growth. πνεῦμα is the instrument by which life and growth are effected; and this may be expressed in other words by saying that πνεῦμα is that by means of which the matter of which the thing consists is endued with a constant succession of different forms. In this way the writer combines the Platonic doctrine of matter and form with the Stoic doctrine of πνεῦμα.

spiritu vero inplet omnia, ut cuiusque naturae qualitas est inaltata. The writer of Ascl. III agrees with the Stoics in saying that πνεῦμα is present throughout the universe, and is the vehicle of life in all things. But he differs from them in recognizing a supracosmic God by whose ordinance the vitalizing πνεῦμα is distributed to all things in the Kosmos; whereas the supreme God of the Stoics is himself a part of the Kosmos, being the πύρ νοερόν inherent in the πνεῦμα by which the Kosmos is permeated.

The Stoic doctrine of πνεῦμα is that which is stated by Virgil,1 Georg. 4. 221 sqq.: '(quidam dixere) deum ... ire per omnes terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum; | hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum | quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.' Virg. Aen. 6. 724 sqq.: 'caelum ac terras camposque liquentes | . . . spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus | mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet. Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitaeaque volantum,' &c.

According to the Stoics, the operations of the πνεῦμα are of three different grades, viz. ζύς (cohesive force), φύσις (vegetable life), and ψυχή (animal and human life). See note on Ascl. I. 4. Diog. Laert. 7. 138 sq.: τὸν κόσμον (διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νόην καὶ πρόνοιαν, καθά φησι Χρύστιππος, τοις Περὶ προνοιας, καὶ Ποσειδώνος τον (τῷ τρίτῳ) Περὶ θεών, εἰς ἀπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος δείκνυσι τοῦ θυόν' (lege

1 Virgil probably got his statement of it from Posidonius.
πνεύματος, καθάπερ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλ’ ἦν δὲ ὅν μὲν μᾶλλον, δὲ ὅν δὲ ἤτοι. δὲ ὅν μὲν γὰρ ὧς ξειδομένη, ὡς διὰ τῶν ὀστῶν καὶ τῶν νεύρων δὲ ὅν δὲ άσθης, δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ. Νεμέσιος Νατ. hom. 2: ζην μὲν λέγουσι καὶ τὰ πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐν ψυχῇ, καθ’ ὅστις ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ τοῦ ἄνδρου ψυχῆς ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι μόνον καὶ μὴ διαλύεσθαι. (All force is a kind of life; and where there is life, there is πνεύμα. Thus even a lump of inorganic matter contains so much of life—and accordingly, of πνεύμα—as is needed to hold it together.) See Arnim Sto. Vet. II, pp. 144-151.

17 c. sunt in his aut per haec aut de his (mundana, ut ita dixerim) omnia. In his refers, I suppose, to ἅλη; per haec, to πνεύμα; and de his, to the morphi, of which the σώμα of all material things consists. This seems to be the best place that can be found for the words mundana ut ita dixerim, which occur as a detached fragment in 18 a. It is probably the translator who, in the words ut ita dixerim, apologizes for here using the term mundana, which, as employed by him, has the two different meanings κοσμικά and υλικά.

In the MSS., and in previous editions, omnia has been detached from this sentence, and taken as the first word of the following sentence, which is assigned to Asclepius.

33 a. inane nee esse aliquid nee esse potuisse. The Pythagoreans (Ar. Phys. 4. 6, 213 b 22: Archytas, as reported by Eudemus, Mullach Fr. ph. Gr. II. 117 b), Democritus, and Epicurus asserted the existence of void; Plato (Tim. 79 b) and Aristotle (Phys. 4) denied it. The Stoics denied the existence of void within the Kosmos, but asserted the existence of infinite void outside the Kosmos. The doctrine of Chrysippus on τόπος and κενόν is reported by Arius Didymus, Diels Doxogr. p. 460. For the Stoic view concerning void, see also Aetius, Diels ib. p. 316; Diog. Laert. 7. 140; Cleomedes 1. 2-8 (from Posidonius). The Hermetist, when

1 νοῦ cannot be right; if we retain it, we get the statement that νοῦς permeates some things as νοῦς, and other things, as something else than νοῦς. For πνεύματος, cf. Alex. Aphrod. De mixtione p. 323 Bruns: (the Stoics say) τὸ πᾶν ἡμῶν τε καὶ αὐτοχθόνι, πνευμάτων τινος δὲ συμφέρεται δόμος ἀλλήλων.

2 Zeller, Eclectics, Eng. tr. 1885, p. 60, says that Posidonius, deviating from his predecessors (of the Stoic school), would only allow so much space external to the world, as would be necessary for the world’s ἐκτίρωσις. Schmeckel, Phil. der mittleren Stoa, p. 240, expresses the same opinion; according to Posidonius, he says, ‘der Raum... ist nicht unendlich, sondern nur so groß als die Raumerfüllung es mit sich bringt; doch ist seine Ausdehnung fast unendlich’. (What is meant by ‘almost infinite’?) ‘Während der Zeit der Weltbildung ist ein Teil desselben ausserhalb der Welt vollkommen leer.’ This view of Posidonius’s doctrine is based on Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 338: οἱ Στοικοὶ εἶναι κενόν, ἐς δ διὰ τὴν ἐκτίρωσιν ἀναλύεται ἡ κόσμως, ἄνευρος ὄσ’ (ἄνευρον ὑπὸ Heeren).—Ποσιδώνιον ἐφέσο τὸ ἔτος
ASCLEPIUS III: 17 c, 33 a

he wrote this chapter, probably had in view the Stoic doctrine of void as expounded by Posidonius. He agrees with the Stoics in denying the existence of void within the Kosmos; and it is the Stoic assertion of the existence of infinite void outside the Kosmos that suggests to him the question which he answers in his own way below, 'nec istud enim quod dicitur extra mundum, &c.

Cf. Corp. II. 10: οὐδὲ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν κενόν, κ.τ.λ. The argument which follows in that document closely resembles that of Ascl. III. 33 a and 33 c.

Omnia enim mundi sunt membra plenissima . . . corporibus. The mundi membra (τὰ τοῦ κόσμου μόρα) are the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, which are thought of as disposed in four distinct strata. Each of these four strata is wholly filled with bodies; and so the Kosmos as a whole is full. Cf. Corp. II. 2: στιβαρός (ὅ
tοῦ κόσμου οὐκ ἀπειρόν, ἀλλ' ὄσον ἀβαρκεὶς εἰς δάπεσιν. But this statement is surely a blunder of Aetius (or of some one by whom his text has been transmitted), caused by a misunderstanding of the passage of Posidonius which is reproduced in Cleomedes 1. a-b (ed. Ziegler, 1861). Cleomedes, at the point where he speaks of the ecpyrosis, is occupied in proving that κενὸν exists, and not in ascertaining its extent. He says that those who accept the ecpyrosis (as Posidonius did) must admit that κενὸν exists outside our present Kosmos, because at the ecpyrosis the Kosmos will be vaporized, and will consequently expand 'to more than ten thousand times its present extent', and there must be room for its expansion; but he then goes on to say that even if you deny the ecpyrosis (as Boethus and Panaetius did), you must still admit the existence of κενὸν outside the Kosmos for another reason, which he proceeds to give. And he afterwards asserts emphatically and repeatedly that this κενὸν is ἀπειρόν. E. g. ὅτι ἄλλα (λέγεται δὴ) ἐξω τοῦ κόσμου κενὸν εἶναι ἀναθεωρητόν γνῶμον διὰ τῶν προαποθεωρητῶν: ὅτι δὲ τούτῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄλλου μέρους αὐτοῦ εἰς ἀπειρόν ἄνθρωπον ἀναθεωρητὸν ἔτει, διὰ τούτου ἀν καταμάθωμεν . . . ἄρ' ὅτι ὡν γνώμον ὡς oὐκ ἐνεχθεῖται του περιούσα τοῦ ἐξω κενοῦ ἀπειροῦ ἐτείνητι . . . ἀναθεωρητὸν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοι ἡμεῖς, ἀπειρόν εἶναι τοῦ τοῦ κόσμου κενὸν.

We are told in the note at the end of Cleomedes' treatment that its contents 'are not the opinions of the writer himself, but have been collected from various writings, old and recent; most of what is said in it is taken from Posidonius'. Diels, Doxogr. p. 21, speaks of Posidonius, 'unde Cleomedis libellus . . . paene totus excerptus est'; and Schmeckel (p. 189) says that 'Cleomedes dies (viz. the passage about the ecpyrosis) aus Posidonius abschriftet'. But if Cleomedes is here reproducing Posidonius, then Posidonius held precisely the doctrine which Aetius, in the words quoted above, attributes to the Stoics in general, viz. 'that there is a void (outside the Kosmos), into which the Kosmos expands at the ecpyrosis, and that this void is infinite'.

Schmeckel himself, ib. p. 188 n. 2, admits this by implication; for he there says 'Mit der periodischen Auflösung der Welt in Feuer hängt bei den Stoikern die Annahme eines unendlichen leeren Raumes ausserhalb des Kosmos notwendig zusammen'. Hirzel, Unters. zu Cíc. 1. 215 ff. (referred to by Zeller and Diels) considers Aetius's statement (that the κενὸν of Posidonius was osw ἀπειροῦ) to be an error. I have not read Hirzel's argument; but I have little doubt that he is right in his conclusion.

Cleomedes 1. 461n, where he is proving that κενὸν does not exist within the Kosmos, says οὕτω, μὴ δὲ ὄνος τοῦτοι συνεχομένου (τοῦ κόσμου), καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος μὴ δ' ὄνος ὄστρα συμφρονῆς, οἷς τ' ἀν ἡ ἣν ὄραν ὄραν ἀκούειν. (For τούτων read τόνων.)

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**Validitate et tenuitate diversa.** Air, for instance, is *tenuis* in comparison with water, and water in comparison with earth. To an atomist, *validitas* and *tenuitas* ('density' and 'rarity') would signify the presence of smaller and larger intervals of void between the particles of which the body is composed. But the writer, since he denies the existence of void, must understand *tenuitas* in a sense compatible with continuity of substance; and he probably means by it 'readiness to yield to pressure'.

[Sicuti enim] is followed by no apodosis, and seems to have been inserted through some misunderstanding.

**Istud . . . quod dicitur extra mundum, si tamen est aliquid.** The writer cannot resist the tendency to speak to *tà νοητά* in terms of spatial relation; he talks of them (as does Plato in the myth of the *Phaedrus* and elsewhere) as if they were located in the region beyond the outermost sphere of the visible and corporeal Kosmos. But he is aware, or half aware, that this is not true in the literal sense of the words; and he consequently puts in the saving clause 'si tamen est aliquid'.

Cf. ch. 27 b: 'deus, supra verticem summi caeli consistens' &c. The 'fullness' of which he is thinking is the *πλήρωμα* of the *δυνάμεις* of God; and he doubtless knows that God is not situated in a particular portion of space (see 34 b); yet he cannot help imagining that it is so. We have not yet left off using the word 'heaven' with a similar implication. Even Plotinus, strongly as he insists that the νοητά are not *ἐν τόπῳ*, cannot avoid the use of spatial terms (*ἀνω, ἐκεί, &c.*) with reference to them; cf. Plot. 4. 3. 17, *ἐν γὰρ οὐρανῷ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τόπῳ ἀμείων*, *ἐν δὲ προσεχῆ τῶν νοητῶν τοῖς ἐσχάτοισι*. For *si tamen est aliquid*, compare Corp. XI. ii. 19: *tà ἐκτός, ἐγὼ τι ἐκτός τοῦ κόσμου*. Corp. IV. 5: *tà ἐν οὐρανῷ, καὶ εὐ τι ἐστιν ἐνπέρ οὐρανῶν*. The topic may have been suggested to the writer by the physical question discussed by Posidonius; but the point of view of the Hermetist, who believes that *tà νοητά* are *ἀσώματα*, though he may fail at times to realize all that is implied in his belief, is different from that of the Stoics, who held that all things real, God not excepted, are corporeal.

**Divinitati suae:** contrasted with *naturae suae et qualitati* below. The θεότης of the abode of God is opposed to the ὀλόγης of the αἰσθητῶν κόσμος. *Naturae suae et qualitati conuentiunium* is equivalent to αἰσθητῶν, as *divinitati suae simulium* is equivalent to νοητῶν.
ASCLEPIUS III: 33 b, c

Corporum et animalium. The mention of ζώα, as a class of things distinct from σώματα, seems to be out of place here. Possibly, however, the Greek was σώματων πλήρης ἔστι... καὶ τούτων ζωήν ἔχοντων, or something of the sort; 'bodies,—yes, and living bodies.' In the view of the writer, all things in the universe are alive, in higher or lower degree; 'spiritu inplet omnia.'

[aut quod aeie sumus obtunsi]. Distance makes a thing look small, by the law of perspective; but why should the timness of our sight make a thing look small? It may prevent us from seeing the thing at all; but it cannot alter the apparent size of the thing, as long as the thing is visible to us. These words then are out of place; their writer must have intended them to stand after propter nimiam brevitatem aut tenuitatem, and to be followed by non videmus. But if placed in that position, they impair the concinnity of the passage; it therefore seems probable that they were added by a later hand.

propter nimiam brevitatem (aut tenuitatem non videmus). A mention of tenuitas is clearly needed here; cf. above, minora vero aut tenuiora aut vix videri aut omnino non possunt. The instance of air, of which the writer speaks below, is an instance of tenuitas, and not of brevitas.

The things with which the Kosmos are filled are all visible ἀπλῶς, i.e. corporeal; but some of them are invisible ἡμῶν. Things which are invisible in the latter sense only must be distinguished from those which are truly or absolutely δόρα, viz. on the one hand ῥὰ νοητὰ, and on the other hand ἠλη ἀμορφὸς (see ch. 17 b).

33 b. [Dico nunc daemonas... commotio.] This sentence is irrelevant to the discussion of void, and must be excised. Assuming that the writer held, as most Platonists did, that daemons are not bodiless, but have bodies composed of air or πνεῦμα, he might possibly have mentioned them as an instance of things corporeal and yet invisible to us; but if this had been his meaning, he would not have introduced his instance with the words dico nunc, which imply that certain kinds of daemonic beings are the sole or chief subject of discussion. See chs. 28, 29 a, with which I take this passage to be connected.

33 c. ut inane ab igni, ab aqua. Cf. Cic. De fato 11. 24 (from Carneades): 'quum vas inane dicimus, non ita loquimur ut physici, quibus inane esse nihil placet: sed ita ut, verbi causa, sine aqua, sine vino, sine oleo vas esse dicamus.'

((spiritutamen et aere,...))...vacuum esse non possit. Accord-
ing to the Stoics, πνεῦμα permeates all things, and is continuous throughout the Kosmos. Cf. Corp. II. 11: ταύτα οὖν, ἐν τούτῳ φησὶ εἶναι κενά, κ.τ.λ. Timaeus Locr. 5: πῦρ μὲν ἄν διὰ τῶν λεπτομερῶν διὰ τῶν ἄκους, ἀνὴρ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξος πυρός, ὕδωρ δὲ διὰ τὰς γάς. ἀπανταὶ δὲ ἐν πλῆρῃ ἄντων, ὑδάτων κενῶν ἀπολείποντα.

quamvis sit breve [vel magnum]. The words vel magnum must have been added by some one who misunderstood the meaning. There is some point in saying that not even the smallest portion of space can be empty; but there is no point in saying that no portion of space, however small or large, can be empty.

34 a. Similiter vero de loco dicendum est. Cf. Ascl. II. 15, where a different and inconsistent account of space is given. According to Cleomedes 1.4, κενὸν is τὸ ὄν τὸ δέξασθαι σῶμα, and τόπος is κενὸν ὑπὸ σωματος κατεχόμενον καὶ πληρούμενον.

18 b. ( . . . ) Mundus itaque nutrit corpora, animas spiritus. In this paragraph the writer passes on from the principalia mundorum to νοῦς. Compare Ascl. I. 6 b as emended, where a like transition is made in very similar language: 'Alimenta autem sunt bina animae et corporis... Anima ignis et aeris... agitatione nutritur corpora ex aqua et terra... augescunt. [Spiritus... cuncta vivificat.] Sensus (novis)... de animalibus cunctis humanos tantum sensus ad divinae rationis intellegentiam... sustollit.'

A connecting passage has probably been lost before mundus itaque &c.; but one or two sentences would be enough to fill the gap.

What is here meant by mundus? According to the parallel passage in Ascl. I, it ought to mean aqua et terra, the two inferiora mundi elementa (in contrast to fire and air, or to πνεῦμα, which is a mixture of fire and air). We must suppose either that the author of the Greek wrote ἄηη, and meant by it 'gross matter', i.e. earth and water (a thing different from the ἄπωος ἄηη spoken of in 17 a and 17 b); or else, that mundus has been wrongly substituted for some other term denoting earth and water.

In the Stoic system, from which the term πνεῦμα is borrowed, the statement animas nutrit spiritus (πνεῦμα ψυχὰς τρέφει) would be strictly correct; for the ψυχῆ of the Stoics is corporeal, and is merely a special modification of the corporeal πνεῦμα. The Hermetist has taken over the statement unaltered, though according to his view the ψυχῆ, being incorporeal, cannot be literally 'fed' by the corporeal πνεῦμα. His meaning would be more exactly expressed
by the phrase used elsewhere (e.g. Corp. X. 13), ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ πνεύ-
ματι (ἐξεῖται). The corporeal πνεῦμα brings the incorporeal ψυχὴ with
it into the organism into which it enters; and during the life of the
organism the supply of πνεῦμα is maintained by breathing.

But it is only the lower and earthly part of the soul,—i.e. such
'soul' or life as men and beasts possess in common,—that is thus
connected with πνεῦμα. The νοῦς, of which Hermes here proceeds
to speak, has no corporeal vehicle, but comes direct from God. In
the following sentence, where νοῦς is called a donum caeleste, ὀφάνιον
must be understood in a metaphorical sense, as a synonym for
θείον. The νοῦς is not, like pneuma, a gaseous substance which
streams down from the higher levels of the Kosmos; nor is it
conveyed from God to man by any such material substance; it is
wholly incorporeal.

Sensus = νοῦς: see Ascl. I. 6 b, Ascl. III. 32 b, and Ascl. 41 b.

neque enim omnes, sed pauci. Here νοῦς signifies a divine
illumination which is not granted to all men, but to the elect alone.
Cf. Corp. I. 22 and Corp. IV. 3; Pl. Tim. 51 e. In ch. 32 b, the
writer speaks of three different grades of νοῦς; and that which he
here calls νοῦς without qualification is there distinguished from the
two lower grades, and called θείον νοῦς. See Ascl. I. 7 a, 'non
omnes ... intellegintiam veram adepti sunt', where it is implied
that all men have νοῦς of some sort, but that there is a sensus (νοῦς)
divinis to which only a few among men attain. Similarly, in
Corp. IX. 5, we are told that all men have νοησίς, οὐ πάς δὲ ἀνθρώπος
ἀπολαῦει τῆς νοησίας and that man's νοῦς gives birth to bad thoughts
as well as good thoughts. Philo habitually uses the word νοῦς in
the wider sense; e.g. Leg. alleg. 1. 12. 32 : οὐ δὲ νοῦς οὗτος γεώθης
ἐστι τῷ ὀντὶ καὶ φθαρτός, εἰ μὴ οἱ θεοὶ ἔπιστεῦσαν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ἀληθινῆς
ζωῆς. Ib. 2. 16. 64, there is a νοῦς ἄλογος. Ib. 3. 9. 29 ; the good
man flees from his ἱδίος νοῦς to God, who is ὁ τῶν ὅλων νοῦς and the
ἱδίος νοῦς is γενητός καὶ θυγήτος.

terrae interiecit ... eius privatur lumine. The words et
lunae, which follow terrae in most of the MSS., must have been
inserted by some one who overlooked the significance of interveniente
nocte, and supposed that the writer was speaking of eclipses. But
eclipses of the sun do not take place at night. Cf. Cic. Nat. deor.
2. 49: 'ipsa enim umbra terrae soli officiis (officientis conj. Gesner)
noctem efficit.'

natura, 'a thing'. The MSS. give materia; but the writer
would not apply the word ἥλιος, even in a metaphorical sense, to an incorporeal thing. Another instance of confusion between the words natura and materia occurs in Ascl. II. 14 b.

Caliginum erroribus might possibly mean 'through wanderings caused by darkness'; but it is more probably an inaccurate translation of a Greek phrase meaning 'by the darkness of error'.

Sensus (sensus MSS.) deorum animam dixerunt. Here again sensus stands for νοῦς. Cf. Corp. XII. i. 8: νοῦς, ἄρχοντα πάντων, καὶ ψυχὴν ὑπατα τοῦ θεοῦ; and iδ. 9: δ' νοῦς, ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ψυχή. (So the MSS.; but ψυχὴ θεῶν is different from ψυχή τοῦ θεοῦ, and that passage is probably corrupt.) Philo De opif. mundi 24. 73: τὰ δ' αὐτὸν κοινωνήκεν ἄρετος, ἀμέτοχα πάντος ὑπατα κακίας, ὡσπερ οἱ ἀστέρες· οὕτω γὰρ ζωὰ τε ἐλευθερωται καὶ ζωὰ νοερά, μᾶλλον δὲ νοῦς αἵτως ἵκαστος, τἀκ' ἀπὸ ἱλίων σπουδαῖος, καὶ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτος κακοῦ. (The νοῦς of which Philo here speaks is the sensus divinior, and not the lower sort of νοῦς which is common to all mankind.) Sen. Nat. quaest. 1, prolog. 14: 'Quid ergo interest inter naturam dei et nostram? Nostri melior pars animus est, in illo nulla pars extra animum est; totus est ratio.'

The souls of beasts and unillumined men are devoid of (ἄ θεος) νοῦς; the soul of the illuminated man is a mixture of that lower soul with νοῦς; the souls of the νοτροι θεοὶ consist wholly of νοῦς, unmixed with anything lower. In Corp. X. 19 a, we are told that the soul of the pious or illuminated man, when released from the body, rids itself of its lower part, and becomes pure νοῦς. In Ascl. I (except in the passage on transmigration into the bodies of beasts, 12 a), it seems to be implied that the νοῦς is the only part of man which is immortal; whence it might be inferred (though the writer does not himself draw this inference) that every human soul which survives the death of the body 'becomes pure νοῦς'.

Neo eorum dioe omnium. The di terreni, of whom the writer speaks in ch. 37 f., are not exempt from πάθη (terrenis etenim diis . . . facile est irasci &c.); consequently, their souls cannot consist of νοῦς alone.

But what of the di caelestes? It might be inferred from what is said about them elsewhere in Ascl. III. that their souls, though incorporated in visible bodies, consist of νοῦς and nothing else; yet in this passage it seems to be implied that this can be said of νοτροι θεοὶ only; for the magni et principales di here spoken of must be the νοτροι θεοὶ.
19a. [vel rerum capita vel initia primordiorum]. These words are out of place here; they are perhaps an alternative for principalia et antiquiora et quasi capita vel initia omnium in ch. 17 c.

Magna tibi pando, et divina nudò mysteria. Hermes here enters on the main subject of his discourse. The solemn introduction marks the transition to a more exalted theme. Hitherto he has been speaking of mundana, and his mentions of God in chs. 16 b and 17 a were merely incidental; he is now about to speak of divina,—that is, to expound the nature of the gods, and explain how they ought to be worshipped.

The word mysteria, as here used, contains no suggestion that a theurgic or sacramental operation is about to take place; it merely signifies a doctrine which is holy, and has hitherto been known to few. The word in itself does not necessarily imply that the hearer is under any obligation to keep the doctrine secret from others; for it was often used (as by Paul, for instance,) when there was no intention of secrecy, or desire for secrecy. But in some of the Hermetica (e.g. Corp. XIII) the disciple is expressly forbidden to reveal to others what he has heard; it is therefore possible that the writer of Ascl. III here intended the word mysteria to suggest such a prohibition. See note on Ascl. i b: 'tractatum (hunc) . . . inreligiosae mentis est multorum conscientia publicare.'

Note the word tibi; Hermes is revealing these 'mysteries' to a single hearer only. I have accordingly altered scitote into scito below.

The first part of the ratio divinorum,—i.e. that which (assuming my conjectural rearrangement of the text to be right) is contained in chs. 18 b, 19 a, (34 b), 19 b, (27 c, b), 19 c, (34 c), (17 b), (35 and 36),—consists of, or includes, an exposition of the Platonic doctrine of νοητά, and their relation to ατοθητά. The writer warns us, through the mouth of Hermes, that his teaching on this subject will not be found easy to understand; and for the modern reader, difficulties of a different order have been added. We have to deal with a text which has been cut to pieces, and shuffled like a pack of cards. I have tried to place the scattered passages in such an order that they will yield a more or less continuous sense; but I can hardly hope that I have been lucky enough to hit on the right place for every fragment. However, some points at least in the rearrangement seem certain; for instance, no one, I think, to whom it has once been suggested, will doubt that 27 c belongs to the list of οὐσιάρχαι, and ought to stand immediately after 19 b.
Deorum... pars intellegibilis, alia vero sensibilis. The aiosthetai theoi are primarily the Kosmos and the heavenly bodies. But it would be possible to apply the term also to the ‘man-made gods’ spoken of in ch. 37 ff., i.e. the gods embodied in statues and worshipped in the temples.

magis enim ipsos sentimus quam eos quos visibles nuncupamus. Does sentimus here stand for aiothetov, or for throuropov? Strictly speaking, the nptoi theoi are v6 or l6g6 theourthetai; but it is possible that the writer here said, by way of an intentional paradox, that they are in reality even more fully aiosthetai than are the gods commonly called aiosthetai or 6patoi.

It may be doubted whether the meaning is that we see these gods with our bodily eyes, as manifested in their visible works, or that we see them with the ‘eye of the mind’, by intellectual intuition. For the former thought, cf. Corp. V. 2 and 5, and Corp. XI. ii. 22 a:

‘Onatas the Pythagorean’ (date unknown; perhaps 50 b.c.-a.d. 50?) in Stob. i. 39, p. 48 W.: ὅ μὲν ἐν θεσὶν αὐτοῦ ὤν ὁ ρατάς ὤν ἀισθηθὼς, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγος μόνον καὶ νῶς θεωρατός· τὰ δὲ ἔργα αὐτῶ καὶ ταῖ πράξεις ἐκατοκάτα τῶν σώματα κόσμων ἐπιστρωφάσεις ἐναργεῖς τε καὶ ἀισθηταὶ ἐντι πάντους ἀνθρώποις. The two thoughts occur together in Philo Leg. alleg. 3. 32. 99 f., Cohn I, p. 135: οἱ δὲ οὖν ἐπιλογιζόμενοι διὰ σκιᾶς τῶν θεών καταλαμβάνοντο, διὰ τῶν ἔργων τῶν τεχνίτων κατανοοῦντες.

ἔστι δὲ τοις τελεότεροις καὶ μᾶλλον κεκαθαρμένοι νοῦς, τὰ μεγάλα μυστήρια μυθείς, ὡσις οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν γεγονότων τὸ αἴτιον γνωρίζει, ὡς ἄν ἀπὸ σκιᾶς τὸ μόνον, ἀλλ’ ὑπερκύψα τὸ γενητόν, ἐμφανίζει ἐναργῆ τοῦ ἀγενήτου λαμβάνει. Of which of these two ways of ‘seeing’ the gods is the writer of Ascl. III here thinking? As he says that we can see them more clearly than we see sensible things, he probably means the second and higher of Philo’s two ways of apprehending God.


suique se fontis liquoribus misebit. The ‘source’ of the teaching is God, or the divine nois, by whom or which the teacher is possessed or inspired.

(‘Haec ergo ipsa (divinorum), ut dicis, (ratio) quae est, o Trismegiste?’) This misplaced fragment, one of the three which have been put together in ch. 18 a, is evidently a question addressed to Hermes; and such a question is appropriate here. The insertion of ratio is suggested by comparison with the subsequent question in ch. 20 a: ‘Alia haec iterum ratio quae est, o Trismegiste?’ If I have
placed the fragment rightly, the ratio mentioned in it must be the ratio divinorum of which Hermes has just spoken; and if we insert divinorum, the words ut dicis become intelligible.

34 b. [Hic ergo sic se habentibus]. I assume these words to have been added by a reviser, in order to give a superficial appearance of connexion with ch. 34 a, after the passage had been shifted from its original position.

Hermes begins his 'revelation of divine mysteries' by speaking of the νοτροι θεοὶ (ch. 19 a); and we find him speaking of them in ch. 19 b also, in which he explains how the world is administered by a hierarchy of νοτροι θεοί, to whom the several orders of αιορθροι θεοί are subject. But the connexion between 19 a and 19 b is obscured by the loss of an intermediate passage.

The writer's exposition of the doctrine of νοτροι θεοὶ would naturally be preceded by some preliminary explanation of νοτρά in general, or of the νοτρὸς κόσμος, in which all νοτρά are included, and of which the νοτροι θεοί are parts. Now in ch. 34 b, the νοτρὸς κόσμος is spoken of, and spoken of in such a manner as to make it evident that, if the passage was in any way connected with a longer and fuller discussion of νοτρά, it must have stood at the beginning of that discussion. An introductory paragraph such as ch. 34 b, in which no previous knowledge of the subject is assumed, is appropriate at the point where νοτρά are first spoken of, but would be out of place later on in the dialogue, after Hermes has long been talking about them. I have therefore transposed ch. 34 b, and placed it in the gap between 19 a and 19 b. If it stood there, it must have immediately followed the question asked by Asclepius at the end of 19 a; but there still remains a lacuna between the end of 34 b and the beginning of 19 b.

The 'mystery', of which Hermes has just said that an intense effort of thought is needed to understand it, is in fact the doctrine of νοτρά,—that is, the Platonic 'theory of ideas' (νοτρά ιδή). The reality and priority of the incorporeal is a fundamental principle of Platonism, and is maintained by the Hermetists in general, at least to the extent of holding God and νότος to be incorporeal; (concerning ψυχή as distinguished from νότος,—the lower ψυχή,—there is some wavering;) but the author of Ascl. III differs from some of the other Hermetic writers in teaching that principle in the special form of the Platonic theory of ideas; and he expounds this theory in
the first part of his *ratio divinorum*. The writer of *Ascl. I*, on the other hand, says nothing about 'ideas' in the Platonic sense;¹ and he would probably have regarded the study of so abstruse a subject as an instance of that *importuna curiositas* by which philosophy is too often sullied (*Ascl. I. 14 a*).

The Platonist Atticus (c. A.D. 160–180: Euseb. *Pr. ev. 15. 13. 2 ff.: Mullach Fr. ph. Gr. III, p. 202) speaks of the theory of ideas in a tone resembling that of our Hermetist: τὸ μὲν οὖν ἄκρον τε καὶ ἐσχατὸν τῶν Πλάτωνος ψιλοθοφήμιστών ἐστὶ τὸ πρέπει τὴν νοητὴν ταύτην καὶ διόνυσον οὐσίαν, τὴν τῶν ἱδεῶν. ἦνθα δὴ πάνω τε καὶ ἄγων ἔσχατος ὑπυκρή προκείται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μετασχῆν καὶ ἐφικόμενος αὐτῆς πάντων εὐθαμίων ὁ δὲ ἀπολυμφθεὶς καὶ ἀδυνατήσας θεωρᾶ τίνος ἄμοιρος εὐθαμίων καταλείπεται, . . . ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν οἷς μάλιστα (ὁ Πλάτων) τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχει. νοσῆσαι γὰρ (τὸν) θεὸν πρὸ ἐσχάτων τῶν ἄπαντων (ὡς) πατέρα.⁴ καὶ δημιουργὸν [καὶ διαπόντην καὶ κηδεμώνα],⁵ καὶ γνωρίζων ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τὸν τεχνίτην πρότερον νοσῆσαι τούτῳ ὁ μᾶλλον δημιουργεῖσθαι, ἀμφὸς οὗτος [[τῷ νοσθέντι]] κατόπιν ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων προσάγει τὴν τῆς νοσθέντης.⁶ ὡμοίωτα, (συνελογίσατο)⁷ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ (πρόσων)³ ταὐτὸ τοῦ θεοῦ νοσμᾶτα προσβυτέρα (ἐναλ) τῶν πραγμάτων. (καὶ ταύτα φησιν εἰναί)⁸ τὰ τῶν γινομένων παραδείγματα, ἀσάματα (ὄντα)¹¹ καὶ νοητὰ, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὧσιῶτα ἔχοντα ἄει, μάλιστα μὲν καὶ πρῶτος αὐτὰ ὁ νότος, παρατία δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ εἶναι τοιαῦτα ἐκατα o ὁ πρὸς ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὰ διαμέτρησα. (ταύτα δὴ)¹² συνιδὼν ὁ Πλάτων ὅτα ὧν βράστα δεθῆναι, οὐ μὲν οὖν δὲ λόγῳ σαφὸς δηλωθῆναι δυνάμεναι, αὐτὸς

¹ In *Ascl. I. 3 c–4*, 'generic forms' are spoken of, but not νοσητα et hoc in the distinctively Platonic meaning of that term.

² Dindorf and Mullach give the whole passage from νοσησα γερ το βιοτη παραγίνεται as one long sentence, so clumsily constructed that it cannot possibly be what Atticus wrote. I have divided it into three sentences, and made such alterations as are needed to get a satisfactory meaning.

³ τῶν θεοῦ προεκτάτω τῶν ἅπαντων ὡς πατέρα σχετίζει: θεὸν πρὸ αὐτᾶ τῶν ἅπαντων πατέρα Dindorf: θεὸν αὐτὸς, ὡς τῶν ἅπαντων πατέρα Mullach.

⁴ καὶ διαπόντην καὶ κηδεμόνα σειστίσει. It is on the word δημιουργὸν that the argument is based; the divine 'craftsman' works in the same way as a human τεχνίτης, first planning or designing in thought the thing which he is about to make, and then making the thing in accordance with the plan which is already present in his mind. The word πατέρα is irrelevant; but Atticus may have taken it over from the *Timaeus* along with δημιουργόν.

⁵ τῷ νοσθέντι λοις ἰσαργυροῖς.

⁶ συνελογίσατο addidi.

⁷ τῶν αὐτῶν δὴ τρόπον σχετίζεται: ταῦτα δὴ MSS.: ταῦτα δὴ τῶν τρόπων Mullach.

⁸ εἰναι addidi.

⁹ καὶ ταύτα φησιν εἰναι addidi.

¹⁰ γινομένων σχετίζει: γενομένων edd.

¹¹ Οὐτα addidi.

¹² ταύτα δὴ addidi.

Atticus then considered that the theory of ideas is indispensable for attainment to happiness, but is difficult to understand; and the writer of Ascl. III seems to be of the same opinion.

Compare the opening words of Porphyry's "Αφορμαί πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ: —Πάν μὲν σῶμα ἐν τῷ πνεύμα, οὐδέν δὲ τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀσωμάτων ἡ τι τοιούτων ἐν τῷ πνεύμα. τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ἀσωμάτα, αὐτῷ ὁ Κριτίαντον παντός ἐστι σῷματος καὶ τῶν πνευμάτων, πανταχὺ ἐστιν, οὐ διαστάσεως, ἀλλ' ἀμέρος.

As to the νοητῶν κόσμων, cf. Timaeus Locr. (about a.D. 150?), Mullach Fr. Ph. Gr. II, p. 39: τέλειος δ' ἔστι καθ' αὐτὴ τὰ αἰσθήματα ἡ πρὸς τὸν παράδειγμα τύνος αὐτῷ, περιέχον πάντα τὰ νοετὰ ζῷα ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς ἀπέλευθεν ἄλλο, ὅπερ ὧν νοετῶν παντελῆς, ὡς δὲ τὸ κόσμου αἰσθήματων. Among these νοητὰ ζῷα must be included the νοητοὶ θεοὶ of whom the Hermetist speaks. According to the view which prevailed among the later Platonists, all ιδεῖα exist in God's thought, and are constituted by God's thinking; (see e.g. Philo Opif. Mundi 4. 19; and in Atticus, quoted above, the ιδεῖα are called τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ νοηματα;) and it is to be presumed that the νοητοὶ θεοὶ are thus constituted. But they are none the less to be regarded as distinct and substantively existent persons; for existence in God's thought is equivalent to reality or substantiality.

((nisiei aut longitudinis . . . addideris . . . signa)). These words have nothing to do with the paragraph about νοετῶν (34 a), to which they are attached in the MSS.; and it seems probable that they belonged to the discussion of τὸ ἀσωμάτων in which I have placed them. But nisi does not give a satisfactory connexion; perhaps some intervening words have been lost.

19 b, 27 c. Sunt ergo omnium &c. A list of οἰδωρχαί. As this passage deals with the higher gods by whom the material universe is governed, the most suitable position for it might seem to be between the account of the deus summus (26 b–32 b) and the account of di terreni (37–38 b); and I was at first inclined to put it there. But against this must be set the fact that in ch. (35), which there is reason to place in the earlier part of the libellus, we find the phrase ille Omniformis quem diximus deus, which appears to be

1 τούτα seclusi.
a reference to 19 b, and therefore to imply that 19 b has preceded; and I have accordingly left 19 b in its traditional position, and placed 27 c next after it. The occurrence of such a passage at this point can be justified; for after stating in general terms the relation between the νοητὸς κόσμος and the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος, the writer may very well have gone on to describe more precisely the system of administration by which the government of the latter is carried on by νοητοὶ θεοὶ, i.e. by members of the former; and if we retain it here, 19 c follows on appropriately.

In this passage (19 b and 27 c) the government of the material universe is described as follows. Each region or stratum of the material world is presided over by a νοητὸς θεὸς, to whom the term οὐσιάρχης is applied. Each οὐσιάρχης governs the αἰσθητοὶ θεοὶ who occupy the region over which he presides; and the αἰσθητοὶ θεοὶ, under the direction of their respective οὐσιάρχαι, carry on all the processes of the material universe, working ‘one through another’. This phrase seems to mean that the αἰσθητοὶ θεοὶ of each stratum operate immediately on those of the stratum next below them, and thus ultimately on all that lies below; the planets, for instance, radiate light into the air, and the air transmits it to the earth.

The scheme may be tabulated thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>αἰσθητοὶ θεοὶ</th>
<th>οὐσιάρχης (νοητὸς θεὸς)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Outermost sphere</td>
<td>Οἰναρός</td>
<td>Zeus (Hypatos?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sphere of the fixed stars</td>
<td>The 36 Decani</td>
<td>Pantomorphos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The 7 planetary spheres</td>
<td>(The 7 planets)</td>
<td>Heimarmene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The atmosphere</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Zeus (Neatos?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Earth and sea</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Zeus Chthonios</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The αἰσθητοὶ θεοὶ are not expressly named, except in the case of the first and second regions; and it may be doubted what names the writer would have assigned to those of regions 4 and 5. Mother Earth at least was recognized as a ‘visible deity’ by most of the nations known to the Hermetist; is it to be inferred that Air and Sea also are αἰσθητοὶ θεοὶ? Or are the ‘visible gods’ of

1 The reference back to 19 b might however be got rid of by altering δίκιμος into δίκιμος; that passage therefore does not prove with absolute certainty that 19 b stood earlier in the libellus than (35)).

the grosser elements rather than the gods of the temple-cults, embodied in statues,—the *di terreni* of ch. 38 b. The atmosphere was usually assigned to the daemons as their special abode; but daemons are not *airodymoi* under normal conditions.

The functions of the several 'Departmental Rulers' (*odaiρχαι*) are described as follows.

1. The Ruler of the outermost sphere 'bestows life on all things', employing the visible *οὐρανός* as his agent or instrument. Using the terms of the theory of forms, as explained in ch. (35), we may say that the function of this god is to transmit to the material world copies of the ideal forms of the several kinds or races of living beings, these copies (the 'generic forms') being as yet unmodified by the differences which distinguish one individual from another of the same race. If so, he must transmit them, not directly to the world below, but to the *odaiρχης* next beneath him, to be modified by individual differences, before they can be imposed on the matter of which individual bodies consist; for the generic form never finds material embodiment until it has been thus differentiated. On the other hand, in terms of the Stoic doctrine of *πνεῦμα*, it might be said that the function of the first *odaiρχης* consists in the constant emission of vitalizing fire from the material substance of the highest heaven, and that this vitalizing element passes down through the lower spheres of heaven, and entering the air, combines with it to form *πνεῦμα*, by which life is conveyed into the bodies of men and beasts on earth. The writer of Ascl. III has found some difficulty in harmonizing the conceptions which he has borrowed from different schools; and perhaps in this passage, as elsewhere, the details of his composite system may not have been thought out with perfect clearness or consistency.

2. The Ruler of the sphere of the fixed stars, working through the Decani as his agents, 'gives to the individuals of each kind their diverse forms'; that is, he modifies the generic form or race-type by adding to it individual differences. In ch. (35), it is explained how these individual modifications of the race-type are effected by the revolution of the sphere over which this god presides. No two individuals are precisely alike, because no two are born under precisely the same aspect of the stars. It is held then that the form which the individual assumes at birth is determined by the influence of the fixed stars,—or rather, of those thirty-six fixed stars or star-groups which are called Decani.
The Ruler of the planets (including sun and moon) is Heimarmene, 'who changes all things according to the law of φύσις'; and by φύσις we must here understand growth (and decay). The birth-form of the individual has been determined by the operation of the fixed stars; the continual succession of changes which this form undergoes in the process of life and growth is determined by the operation of the planets. (As an obvious instance of this, we may take the influence of the sun,—and, according to ancient belief, of the moon also,—in determining the growth of plants.) And since growth proceeds in accordance with fixed laws, and is unalterable by the human will (no man 'by taking thought can add a cubit to his stature'), the power which presides over the process is named Heimarmene, that is, Fate or Destiny. Regarded as the power which determines for good or ill the series of changes in the life-history of the individual, sending eaxvía or δυνατή as the case may be, this deity is also named Τύχη, 'Fortune'.

The region between the lunar sphere (the lowest of the planetary spheres) above, and the earth below, is filled with air; and so the air acts as the medium or 'instrument' by which the vitalizing influences of the heavenly bodies (of which their visible light is an instance) are conveyed to the earth, and to the men and beasts and plants upon the surface of the earth. Accordingly, the function of the Ruler of the air is to transmit and distribute these influences; he is 'the subordinate distributer of life'.

The grosser elements, earth and water, of which the lowest stratum or central mass of the universe consists, are the material of which the bodies of all living beings here below are composed. (Cf. Ascl. I. 6 b as emended: 'corpora ex aqua et terra, inferioribus mundi elementis, augescunt.') Thus the function of the Ruler of earth and sea is that of 'supplying nutriment to (the bodies of) all mortal beings', men, beasts, and plants.

Whence was this scheme derived? The writer must have obtained it either directly or indirectly from a Stoic source; for it is among the Stoics that the nearest analogies are to be found. In particular, the use of the name Zeus to denote the god by whom the Kosmos is administered is characteristic of Stoicism. Cf. 'The Stoics' in Diog. Laert. 7. 88: ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστίν ὁ ὅρθος λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐξόμενος, ὁ αὖτος ἐν τῷ Διί. The name Zeus does not, I think, occur elsewhere in the Hermetica.1 It is used occasionally

1 Except as the name of the planet Jupiter (Kore Kosmu 28).
in mythical passages of Plato, as in the myth of the *Phaedrus*; but the Platonists in general employed other terms in speaking of their supreme God; and most of the earlier Platonists did not, as the Stoics did, take pains to find a place in their system for Zeus and the other deities of the popular cults and myths.

It is true that some traces of a system similar to that of Ascl. III. 19 b occur in the teaching of the Platonist Xenocrates (about 330 b. c.). Plut. *Plat. quaest.* 9. 2: Ξενοκράτης Δία τὸν ἐν μὲν (read τὸν μὲν ἐν) τοῖς κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄσα· τοῖς ἐξουσίων ὑπατον καλεῖ, νεάτον δὲ, τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην. Clem. *Alex. Strom.* 5. 117: Ξενοκράτης δὲ . . . τὸν μὲν ὑπατον Δία, τὸν δὲ νεάτον καλὸν, ἐμφασιν πατρὸς ἀπολάσθει καὶ νιὸν. Aetius, *Diels Doxogr.* p. 304, of Xenocrates: ἄρσκει δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ (θεῖα εἶναι δυνάμεις Zeller) καὶ ἐνδείκνυν τὸς ὑλικὸς στοιχείου. τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν (διέφορος ἐνεργοῦσαν δύναμιν Ἦραν Meineke) [ἀδειή] ("Αἰθην Diels) προσαγορεῖν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τοῦ ὑγροῦ Ποσειδώνα, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς γῆς φυσιστάρων Δήμητρα. ταῦτα δὲ χορηγήσας τοῖς Στοιχείοις κ.τ.λ. Thus we find two distinct schemes of this kind attributed to Xenocrates; and in one of the two, Zeus, with distinctive epithets, acts as departmental ruler in different regions of the universe. (This notion may have been suggested to Xenocrates by Orphic verses such as those in Stob. i. 1. 23, vol. i, p. 29 W.: Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὑπατος ἀργυρέανος, | Ζεὺς κηφαλή, Ζεὺς μέσος, Δίος δ᾽ ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται. Cf. Aesch. fr. 295: Ζεὺς ἔστω αἰθήρ, Ζεὺς δὲ γῆ, Ζεὺς δ᾽ ὀφράνος | Ζεὺς τοι τὰ πάντα χωτί τῶν ὀπέρπερων.) But the Platonists in general, until after the time of Plotinus, were not interested in this method of dealing with the popular theology. On the other hand, the Stoics took the notion over from Xenocrates (ἐ.τ. ταῦτα χορηγήσας τοῖς Στοιχείοις, Aetius l. c.), and developed it further. Chrysippus, in *Philodemus De pietate* (Diels *Doxogr.* p. 545 f.): Χρύσιππος . . . Δία φησί(σιν) εἶναι τὸν ἐπαν(α διωκοὶ)ντα λάγον, καὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ψυχὴν(ν), καὶ τῇ τούτου μετα(χη)τή πάντα (ζην). . . . Δία δὲ τὸν αἰθέρα· τοὺς δὲ τὸν Ἀπόλλων(α) καὶ(ὶ) τὴν Δήμητρα γη(ν), ἡ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ πνεῦμα. . . . (καὶ) Δία μὲ(ν) εἰ(ν)αι(τον πε)ρὶ τὴν γη(ν) ἀέρα, (γ)ρ(ν) Diels δὲ σκο(τε)ρ(ν) (ις. δέρα) "Διδ(ὴν), τὸν δὲ διὰ τῆς γῆς καὶ(ὴ) θαλασσ(της) Πιος(ειδώ). καὶ το(ῦ)ς ἄλλους δὲ θεοὺς ἀφύσος ὡς καὶ τούτους συνουκεὶοι. (Cf. Ascl. III. 27 c: 'aliorum vero vires et effectus per omnia quae sunt distribuuntur.') Diogenes Babylonius (Stoic, about 155 b. c.) in *Philodemus ib.* (Diels, p. 548 f.): τί(ν) με αἰ(ό)μον γράφει τῷ Δι(ῳ) τὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρ(χει), ἡ περιέχει(ῦ)ν τὸν Δῖα, καὶ(ὶ) λατ(ης) ἀνθρωπ(ον ψυχ[η]ν) . . . (ε)τ(ο)ς τοῦ Διὸς τὸ μᾶς ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν διατερ(κ)ος Ποσειδώνα,
According to Diogenes then, Poseidon, Demeter, &c., are merely different parts or aspects of the one world-soul, Zeus; each of them is Zeus operating in some one particular department of the Kosmos. Pseudo-Galen in Diels *Doxogr.* p. 618 (cf. Aetius, *ib.* p. 306): the Stoics *τὸν θεὸν πῦρ ἐντευνή ἦν πνεῦμα νομῆ-ξονον*, ἄδον βαδίζον ἐπὶ κόσμου γένεσιν,... καὶ διήκειν δὲ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνον [τε] κατὰ τὸς τῆς ᾽Ωλης δὲ ὅς κεκάθηκε παραλλάξεις. It would seem that these προσηγορίαι might be either the names Poseidon, Demeter, &c., or the name Zeus with different epithets. See also Diog. *Laert.* 7. 147.

The Hermetist then must have derived his scheme, either directly or indirectly, from a Stoic source. The borrowing from Stoicism must have taken place during the period of eclecticism or syncretism; and that period began in the first century B.C. Now the most prominent and influential exponent of Stoicism in the period of syncretism was Posidonius (100-50 B.C.); it was from him especially that the later Platonists, and among them the Hermetists, took over as much of the Stoic physics as they had a use for; and it is very likely that the scheme of οὐσιάρχαι in *Ascl.* III is derived, with more or less alteration, from the Περὶ θεῶν or the Περὶ κόσμου of Posidonius.† But we need not suppose that the writer of *Ascl.* III borrowed directly from Posidonius; it is more probable that he got the contents of this passage from some later writer, by whom the scheme of Posidonius had been adopted with some modifications.

That the scheme, if originally Stoic, has been modified, either by the Hermetist himself, or by some intermediary through whom it was transmitted to him, is indisputable. The Stoics recognized no incorporeal beings; the departmental gods of a Stoic must therefore have been corporeal; they must have been specialized forms of the all-pervading πνεῦμα or τῷ νοοῦ. Our Hermetist, on the other hand, regards his οὐσιάρχαι as νοητοὶ θεοί, and thus makes them differ in kind from the αὐθεντοὶ θεοί over whom they severally preside. Moreover, the Stoics recognized no supracosmic or transcendent deity; in their system, the sphere of heaven is the...

† There is evidence that in one detail at least the scheme in *Ascl.* III agrees with that of Posidonius. Aetius, *Diels Doxogr.* p. 324: Ποσείδωνος (τὴν εἰμαρμένην εἶναι) τρίτην ἀπὸ Διός πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον (δεύτερον *Diels*) δὲ τὴν φῶν, τρίτην δὲ τὴν εἰμαρμένην. Now in the scheme in *Ascl.* III, Zeus (Hypatos) stands first, and Heimarmene third. The second is 'Pantomorphos'; and this name may have been substituted for the word φῶν used by Posidonius.
The god that consists itself the supreme God. It must have been this deity that, in the Stoic archetype of the scheme before us, was named Zeus Hypatos, and described as ruling in the outermost sphere. The Hermetist has a place in his system for the cosmic God of the Stoics; but he cannot accept him as supreme, for he knows of another God above him. The Hermetic writer then was bound to supplement the Stoic scheme by a mention of the supracosmic God; and the misplaced fragment 27 b gives precisely the supplement required.

What is the origin of the word oio-ιαπχχς? If we could answer that question, we might thereby get a clue to the source or sources of the passage. I have not met with this word elsewhere; but phrases which closely resemble it, and may be considered to imply its existence, occur in Abammonis Responsum 8. 2 (Testim.). In that chapter the author of the Responsum gives a summary of a system of theology which he believes to be set forth in the sacred books of the Egyptians, but which he must have got from some recent writer who interpreted the 'Books of Thoth' in a Neoplatonic sense. He tells us (if I read the passage rightly) that the first God of that system (who corresponds to the ιν of Plotinus) is called νοητάρχης, because he is ἀρχή (source or cause) of τὰ νοητά; and that the second God (who corresponds to the νοῦς of Plotinus) is called αὐτάρχης, 'cause of himself', because he 'produced himself by shining forth', and is also called οὖσιοπάτωρ, because he is ἀρχή τῆς οὐσίας, 'cause of corporeal substance' (or in other words, Demiurgus of the material universe). The terms νοητάρχης and οὖσιοπάτωρ are in that passage used in contrast, and mean respectively 'source or cause of νοητά' and 'source or cause of οὐσία'; and the author might just as well have written οὔσιάρχης in place of οὐσιοπάτωρ. (Compare Abammonis Resp. 8. 1 b, πολλῶν οὐσίων ἔπαρχουσιν, καὶ τοῦτων διαφερούσων παραλθέσει, πολλαὶ παρεδόθησαν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀρχαί, διαφόρους ἔχουσαι τάξεις. Ἰθ. 8. 5 b, εἰσὶ γὰρ ἀρχαὶ πάρ' αὐτῶις (sc. τοῖς Ἀργυτίοις) πλεῖνες καὶ περὶ πλεῖνων οὐσίων, which is equivalent to saying 'there are πλεῖνες οὐσιώδεις'). There can be little doubt that νοητάρχης, αὐτάρχης, and οὖσιοπάτωρ are translations of Egyptian words used in the old writings and in worship as titles or epithets of certain gods; and if so, οὖσιοπάτωρ and οὔσιάρχης are probably alternative translations of one and the same Egyptian word.
The system summarized by Abammon in Resp. 8. 2 differs, however, in some important respects from that given in Ascl. III. 19 b. Firstly, the author of Ascl. III knows nothing of a God who is ἐπάκεινα νῦν; i.e. he ignores Abammon's first God, and his supreme God corresponds to Abammon's second God. (It follows from this that he has no use for the word νοητάρχης, which is used to denote the first God in Abammon's system.) Secondly, instead of speaking, as Abammon does in Resp. 8. 2, of a single οὐσιώπατωρ, who has to do with all οὐσία, he speaks of a number of οὐσιάρχαι, each of whom has to do with one particular department of οὐσία. And thirdly, he seems to use the word οὐσιάρχης in the sense ἀρχῶν οὐσίας, 'ruler over (a department of) οὐσία', whereas in Abammonis Resp. οὐσιώπατωρ is used in the sense ἀρχή οὐσίας, 'source or cause of οὐσία'. These differences make it unlikely that either of the two systems was derived directly from the other; it seems more probable that both were based on or developed out of some earlier system in which the term οὐσιάρχης was employed.

In the list of οὐσιάρχαι in Ascl. III, both the use of the name Zeus and the meaning given to the word οὐσία suggest a Stoic source, and may be taken to point to Posidonius. But on the other hand, that list shows traces of Egyptian influence also. Besides the word οὐσιάρχης itself, there is mention of Decani and Horoscopi, and of the god Pantomorphos; and Posidonius would not be likely to make use of those exotic terms. There is therefore reason to assume an Egyptian intermediary between Posidonius and the Hermetist; and the most probable intermediary is Chaeremon, the Egyptian priest and Stoic philosopher, who wrote his book on Egyptian religion about A.D. 50. (See note on Abammonis Resp. 8. 4 b.)

Thus a hypothesis which would agree well with the facts before us may be stated as follows. Posidonius, in the first century B.C., gave a list of departmental gods, such as was commonly given by the Stoics. The Egyptian Stoic Chaeremon, about A.D. 50, reproduced that list, with some alterations, among which was the mention of the Egyptian star-gods called Decani, and the use of the

1 In Resp. 8. 1 b and 8. 5 b, however, Abammon also implies that there are πλεονεις οὐσιάρχαι.

2 In Porphyry's letter to Anebo (Euseb. Pr. ev. 3, 4) and Abammonis Resp. 8. 4 b, the Decani and Horoscopi are mentioned in connexion with Chaeremon. Owing to corruptions in the texts, there is some doubt whether it was explicitly said there
ASCLEPIUS III: 19 b, 27 c

Egyptian term ὀὐσίαρχαι. The author of Ascl. III, about A.D. 270, adopted Chaeremon's list, with such changes as were needed to make it agree with his own Platonic tenets. An Egyptian Neoplatonist, perhaps about A.D. 280, also made some use of Chaeremon's book in constructing his system of theology; and the author of Abammonis Resp., about A.D. 300, summarized that Neoplatonic system. Hence the points of resemblance between Abammonis Resp. and the list of ὀὐσίαρχαι in Ascl. III. There is no proof that it was so; but it seems probable that something like this took place.

In the usage of the Stoics in general, and of Posidonius in particular, ὀὐσία is equivalent to ἀλη; the two words denote the same thing, and if there is any difference of meaning the difference is merely in the point of view from which the thing is regarded.¹ The Stoic ὀὐσία is 'material substance'. The term might be used to signify ἄνω ἀλη; but ἄνω ἀλη is a mere abstraction, and never occurs in concrete reality. ὀὐσία as actually existing is always invested with the qualities of one or other of the four elements. At the ἔφυρος, all ὀὐσία takes the form of fire; in the διακονία, portions of the total ὀὐσία change into air, water, and earth, while the rest retains the form of fire. Thus the term covers the four elements collectively. Accordingly, in a Stoic document, ὀὐσίαρχαι should mean 'one who presides over (some kind of) material substance'; and that appears to be the sense in which the word is used in Ascl. III. 19 b. The first three ὀὐσίαρχαι preside over different spheres of heaven, i.e. different strata of fire; the fourth presides over air; the fifth presides over earth and water.

19 b. Suff ergo omnium usercontent1 principes divi (intellegibiles), (appellatio) ὀουσιαρχαι.)

It may be inferred from the following mention of divi sensibles in that the Decani and Horoscopi were spoken of by Chaeremon himself; but at any rate it seems to be implied that they were.

¹ Cf. Aries Didymus, Diels Doxogr. p. 457: ζηραως, οὐσιαν δε ειναι την των ουσιων λαιαν την, ταστην δε τασαν αιδιον, και ουλε πλειον γινομενην αιτε διατων τα δε μερη τασην ουλε δε τασα διαμεηνει, οτα διαιρεεαι και συνχεεαι... οθε ει δι το Ποσειδανιον την των ουσιων ουσιαν και ουλην αποιον και αμορφον ειναι, και βαρον ουδεν αποτεταμενον οιον εχει σχημα ουδε ποιητα καθ' αιτην' δει δε εν τοις σχημαι και ποιηται ειναι. διαιρεειν δε την ουσιαν την ουλην, την (αιτην απο. Hirzel) ουσιαν κατ' την υποτοσιν, καινοι μονον.

² An instance of the use of the term ὀλη by Stoics is given in Plut. Sto. repom. 43. 4: the Stoics say την την ολην αρχον. εστην και διεινον ανακεθηναι τατ ποιηται' τα δε ποιηται, πνευματα ουσια και των αρχαιων αρχαιων (i.e. strains or pressures of a gaseous substance), ως δε αγγελοντα μερες την ολην ελευθον εισαντα και σχηματιζειν.
contrast, that the gods here spoken of are _votvot_; I have therefore added _intellegibles_.

The list of _oναιδρχαι_ must have been preceded by some explanation of the term _οναιδρχας_; and it is to be presumed that the explanation needed was given in this sentence. The word _ονεία_ given in the MSS. is almost certainly a remnant of _οναιδρχασ_; for if the translator had read _ονεία_ in the Greek text, he would have translated it into Latin, and written _substantia_. If we assume that _princeps_ has come by duplication from _principes_ above, and has ousted some such word as _appellatio_ (_προσηγορία_), we get the clause _quorum est appellatio oναιδρχα_. (Cf. _quorum est vocabulum Horoscopi_ below.) But it is evident from the contents of the list that the gods called _οναιδρχας_ are _votvot_, not _αισθητοί_; (_τύχη_ and _ειμαρμένη_, for instance, are not _αισθητά_); the antecedent of _quorum_ must therefore be _dii intellegibles_, and we must transpose the relative clause accordingly.

But how is _specierum_ to be dealt with? To suit the context, either _substantiarum_ (_ονείων_) or something like _mundi membrorum_ (_τῶν τῶν κόσμων μορῶν_) seems to be required. We must assume either that _specierum_ has been substituted by error for some other word (_substantiarum_?), or that something which would have made _specierum_ intelligible has been lost. Possibly the Hermetist may have written _πάντων τῶν (τῆς oνείας) εἰδών ἀρχοντες_, 'rulers over all the several kinds of material substance'. That would, I think, be a correct description of the sense in which he uses the word _οναιδρχα_.

_utriusque originis consimiles suae_. A _νοτός_ _θεός_ is soul without body, and that soul is pure _νοτο_, which comes direct from God; a deity of that class has therefore only one _origo_. On the other hand, an _αισθητός_ _θεός_, e.g. the Sun or Moon, consists, like a man, of soul and body (though, in the case of the god, both soul and body are of a more exalted nature); he has therefore _two origines_. His soul, if it is wholly _νοτο_,—or that part of it which is _νοτο_, if it is not wholly _νοτο_,—comes straight from God; his body, being composed of one or more of the cosmic elements, comes from matter,—i.e. also from God, in so far as matter is endued with forms by God, but not directly or immediately.

Is the statement that the _αισθητός_ _θεός_ 'resembles both his sources' meant to imply that his soul is affected by its combination with a body, and includes something other and lower than _νοτο_?
This certainly holds good in the case of the \textit{dii terreni}, but hardly in the case of the \textit{dii caelestes}.

\textit{opus suum inluminans}. The radiation of light is a typical instance of the influences of the \textit{dii caelestes} on the world below. But \(\phi\omega\) is probably here meant to imply \(\zeta\omega\); cf. \(\zeta\omega\) \textit{kai} \(\phi\omega\) in \textit{Corp.} I. 9 \&c.

\textit{Caeli, vel quidquid est quod so nomine comprehenditur}. These words imply that \(\omega\varphi\nu\varphi\oslash\) here signifies something more than the mere material sphere of heaven. This \(\omega\varphi\nu\varphi\oslash\) is in fact the \(\gamma\gamma\mu\mu\nu\kappa\kappa\) or primary seat of consciousness of the living Kosmos. According to the Stoic cosmology in its most usual form (see, for instance, Chrysippus \textit{ap.} Arium Didymum, Diels \textit{Doxagr.} p. 466), the sphere of the fixed stars is the outermost sphere of the universe. But the \(\omega\varphi\nu\varphi\oslash\) here spoken of is distinguished from the region in which the Decani (i.e. certain fixed stars) are situated, and is assigned to a different \(\omega\varphi\nu\varphi\chi\chi\); i.e. the writer assumes the existence of an outermost sphere distinct from and beyond the sphere of the fixed stars,—if indeed he located all the fixed stars, as Chrysippus and most other people did, in the surface of a single sphere. But possibly his conception of the structure of the heavens may have more or less resembled that of the author of Herm. \textit{ap.} Stob. \textit{Exc.} VI, who places the circle of the Zodiac below (i.e. nearer to the earth than) the outermost sphere \(\tau\delta\ \pi\varphi\varepsilon\iota\kappa\tau\kappa\theta\iota\kappa\tau\nu\tau\eta\nu\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\), and makes the Decani float in the space between the outermost sphere and the circle of the Zodiac.

\textit{Iuppiter} \(\varphi\varphi\varphi\oslash\). In the MSS., two of the five \(\omega\varphi\nu\varphi\chi\chi\) are named \textit{Iuppiter} simply, and a third is named \textit{Iuppiter Plutonius}. It is evident that distinctive epithets must have been given to the first Zeus and the second, as well as to the third. Perhaps the translator retained the first two epithets in their Greek form, and a copyist omitted them because he could not make out the Greek letters. I have inserted \(\varphi\varphi\varphi\oslash\) and \(\varrho\varrho\varrho\oslash\), the epithets applied to Zeus in a similar connexion by Xenocrates (Plut. \textit{Plat. quaest.} 9. 2, quoted on p. 111), and I have assumed \textit{Plutonius} to be the translator's rendering of \(\chi\theta\omega\nu\oslash\); that epithet would agree well with the function of making the earth \(\chi\theta\omega\nu\) produce trees and crops, which is assigned to this third Zeus. As to \(\varrho\varrho\varrho\oslash\), it may be objected that the second Zeus cannot be 'lowest' if there is another below him; but perhaps that objection is lessened by the fact that Zeus Chthonios was commonly regarded as a different person from the Zeus of the
upper world. There must have been three epithets, but we cannot be sure what the epithets were.

It may be suspected that in the earliest form of the Stoic list all the departmental gods alike were named Zeus, with distinctive epithets. Τύχη and Ειμιρμένη may have been substituted for the third by a Greek Stoic ( Posidonius?), and Παντόμορφος for the second by an Egyptian ( Chaeremon?).

[Solis o ο ν ι α ρ χ ής lumen est; bonum enim luminis per orbem nobis solis infunditur.] This sentence is irreconcilable with the context. We are told in it that the o νι α ρ χ ής of the sun is the thing conferred on us by the sun, viz. light. But this implies a meaning of o νι α ρ χ ής entirely different from the sense in which it is used before and after. In order to make the preceding statement correspond with this, we should have to rewrite it thus, 'The o νι α ρ χ ής of heaven is life; for life is given to all through heaven'; and so on throughout the list. On the other hand, in order to make the statement about the sun correspond with the rest, we should have to substitute some god-name, e.g. Apollo, for lumen, and alter the sentence into this: Solis o νι α ρ χ ής Apollo est; bonum enim luminis (ab Apolline) per orbem nobis solis infunditur. But even if the text were thus altered, further difficulties would remain. The insertion of the sun at this point, between the outermost sphere on the one hand and the fixed stars called Decani on the other, makes confusion in the otherwise orderly arrangement of the system. Besides, the sun is brought in again below, where it is in its proper place; for one of the seven (planetary) spheres, which have Heimarmene for their o νι α ρ χ ής, must be the sphere of the sun. It is therefore evident that the sentence Solis . . . infunditur has been inserted by another hand; and we must class it with the other 'solar interpolations' which occur in the Hermetica. See Ascl. III. 29 b fin. and 29 c; Corp. X. 2; Corp. XI. ii. 15 a; Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. II A. 14.

(Decanorum) [( ]), id est, eodem loco semper designorum siderum ((XXXVI quorum vocabulum est Horoscopi)), horum o νι α ρ χ ής &c. We need at the beginning of the sentence a substantive to correspond to caeli, [solis], septem sphaerae, aer, terrae in the corresponding sentences; and there is no doubt that the 'thirty-six fixed stars' spoken of are the Decani. Concerning the Decani, see Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. VI.

The number XXXVI, and the relative clause which follows it,
are clearly out of place in the MSS. The traditional text implies that the 'the thirty-six' are identical with the whole number of fixed stars, which is absurd. The phrase *eodem loco semper defixo-rum siderum* therefore needs qualification; and the words *XXXVI quorum vocabulum est Horoscopi*, when placed after it, supply precisely the qualification needed. Moreover, *horum*, which is otiose when read immediately after *siderum*, serves a purpose when the relative clause is interposed.

*quorum vocabulum est Horoscopi.* The word ἰδροσκόπος was used in several different senses. (a) It is probable that the word originally stood for ἰδροσκόπος ἀπτή, and signified a star which was rising at a given hour, and which consequently 'watched over' that hour, and exerted a dominant influence over any event (e.g. the birth of a child) which took place at the hour in question. (b) In astrology, ἰδροσκόπος was used to signify, not a star, but the point of the zodiacal circle which was rising at the moment of a person's birth,—or in other words, the point of the zodiacal circle which was at that moment intersected by the eastern horizon,—whether that point was occupied by a star or not. In constructing the 'theme of geniture' (τὸ θέμα τῆς γενέσεως), i.e. the diagram drawn by an astrologer to indicate the positions of the stars and planets at the moment of a man's birth, with a view to predicting his destiny, the ἰδροσκόπος in this sense was the first point determined, and the whole diagram was dependent on its determination. (c) It seems that the word ἰδροσκόπος was sometimes used as a synonym for δεκαυός. Thus, in an astrological papyrus, the probable date of which is A.D. 95-155, οἱ λαμπροὶ λευθεροὶ ἰδροσκόποι are mentioned. The names of several of these 'thirty-six bright Horoscopi' are given, and appear to be identical with names which occur in the lists of the Egyptian Decani. Similarly, the writer of Ascl. III. 19 b uses

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2 Yet the writer of that document also speaks of δεκαυό, and apparently distinguishes the δεκαυό from the thirty-six λαμπροὶ ἰδροσκόπων. Bouche-Leclercq says that in this respect the document 'pose une énigme dont l'auteur a gardé le clef'. Possibly the same thirty-six stars or star-groups were denoted by both terms, but were used in two different ways for drawing astrological inferences, and were called δεκαυό when used in one way, and λαμπροὶ ἰδροσκόπων when used in another.
3 In Porphyry's *Epistle to Anebo* (Euseb. Praep. ev. 3. 4), and *Abydmonis Resp. 8. 4*, δεκαυό and ἰδροσκόπος are spoken of together, in connexion with Chaeremon.
Asclepius

δροσκόπως as a synonym for δεκανοὶ. This use of the word appears to be derived from sense (a). In the view of those who regarded the influence of the Decani as predominant, the δροσκόπως (ἀστήρ) who presided over a given person's birth would be one of the Decani, viz. that Decanus who was nearest to the eastern horizon at the moment when the child was born. Each Decanus in turn would be δροσκόπως in this sense during a space of forty minutes, and all the thirty-six Decani would successively become δροσκόπως in the course of twenty-four hours. "And since the most important function of the Decanus was that of operating as δροσκόπως in his turn, the word δροσκόπως came to be used as a synonym for δεκανοί."

quam Παντόμορφος (vel Omniformem) vocant. The translator added vel Omniformem. See ch. (35), where the god called Pantomorphos is spoken of again. It seems clear that δ παντόμορφος (sc. κύκλος) properly meant the Zodiac; and the Zodiac was probably called παντόμορφος by reason of the various forms of the ζώμα contained in it, which were thought to determine the forms and shape the destinies of the men born under their influence. In the Stoic-Egyptian source (Chaeremon ?), the Pantomorphos must have been the visible Zodiac itself, regarded as a god who presides over births, and operates: through the agency of the Decani, i.e. the star-gods resident in the thirty-six subdivisions of the Zodiac; but the Hermetist has made him a νοστὸς θεός who rules over the Decani. Cf. Corp. XIII. 12 as emended: the human body εκ τοῦ ζωφόρου κύκλου (i.e. the Zodiac) συνήστη, γεννῶτος φύσεως μᾶς παντομόρφους ιδέας, κ.τ.λ. Corp. XVI. 12 as emended: ό νοστὸς κόσμος, τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσμον περιέχων, πληροῖ τὸν οὐκον πωκίλαις καὶ παντομόρφους ιδίαις. Kore Kosmou (Stob. Exc. XXIII) 20 as emended: God τῶν ζῳδιακῶν ... διάταξι, καὶ τοῦτο παντομορφοῦς χαρακτάνεν δυνάμεις (i.e. powers of producing all manner of forms), γεννητικῶν ἐκλέγοντα τῶν εἰς τῶν μελλόντων ἐσοβεῖ τῶν ζῷων. Porphyr. De abst. 4. 16: ὁ τὸ τὰ λεοντικὰ παραλαμβάνων (in the Mithraic mysteries) περιέβεβαι παντοδαπᾶς ζῳῶν μορφᾶς διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδοθεῖν Πάλλας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ Μιθρᾶ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν ἕορον ἐκτὸς (i.e. the general opinion)

In Clem. Alex. Strom. 6. 4. 35, δροσκόπως is used in yet another sense, as the title of an Egyptian priest (elsewhere called δροσόγος) whose special function is to study the four Egyptian 'Books of Hermes (Thoth)' which treat of astronomy. The word there means a man who 'observes the hours', i.e. notes the positions of the heavenly bodies at certain times.
The word παντόμορφος occurs as a title of a divine person in one of the Coptic-Gnostic documents, C. Schmidt I, p. 344.

In Corp. XI. ii. 16 a, the word παντόμορφος is used in a different connexion, being applied to the Kosmos; and it there means 'taking all (corporeal) forms'. (Similarly, in Plut. Εἰ απὸ Δελφ. 9. 388 ε, the Kosmos is described as παντοδιάτοπος ἐν τῷ μορφᾶς καὶ ἐν πάθει καὶ δυνάμει διαφόροις γεγόνειος.) But in Ascl. III, the word means 'imposing all manner of forms on men and other living creatures (at their birth)'.

The function of this god is more fully explained in ch. (35), and in order to make the following words in 19b agree with that explanation, I have substituted singulis for diversis. The Pantomorphos speciebüs singulis diversas formas facit; e.g. at the birth of each individual of the human kind he assigns to that individual a form distinct from those of all other human beings. And he discharges this function through his agents the Decani; or more precisely, he operates in each case by the agency of the particular Decanus who is ὁ διὸς θεός (i.e. is on the eastern horizon) at the time when the child is born.

αἱ καλοῦμεναι ἐπὶ σφαῖρας ἡχοῦσιν (οὐσί)άρχην τὴν καλουμένην τόχην ἐκείμενην.—Septem sphaerae quae vocantur habent οὐσίαρχην (οὐσίαρχας MSS.), id est sui principem (principes MSS.), quam Fortunam dicit aut Εἰμαρμένην. In Lydus's quotation, ἀρχήν is evidently an error for οὐσίαρχην. The omission of οὐσία was caused by the preceding ἡχοῦσιν. On the other hand, Lydus is undoubtedly right in giving (οὐσιά)άρχην and ήτις ... ἄλλως in the singular; and the plurals οὐσίαρχας, principes, quibus in Ascl. III must have been substituted by some one who misunderstood the passage. Heimarmene presides over the seven planetary spheres collectively, as the Pantomorphos presides over the thirty-six Decani; there is not a separate οὐσίαρχης for each planet. As to the connexion of the planets, or the stars in general, with Heirmarmene, cf. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. XII. 2 and Exc. XIV. 2. See also Ascl. III. 39 f.

In the Greek of Lydus, the words καὶ ἐν τῶν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐκ μένων must be a later addition, because the next words in the Latin, lege naturae &c., which follow appropriately on inmutantur omnia = πάντα ἄλλως, would not be a suitable continuation of οὐκ ἐκ μένων.
In Lydus, the words η δὲ εἰμαρμένη ..., οὐδὲν ἀτακτον, extracted from the Greek original of Ascl. III. 39, follow immediately on εἰμαρμένη here, being written as if they belonged to the same passage. That is, Lydus extracted from the Λόγος τέλειος two different passages concerning εἰμαρμένη, and wrote them down consecutively; but either he omitted to mark where one ended and the other began, or the mark of division has been omitted by a transcriber.

Stabilitate firmissima sempiterna agitatione variata. Stability firmissima variata is ablative absolute (genitive in the Greek); sempiterna agitatione is ablative of manner (dative in the Greek), qualifying variata. The meaning is, that all things in the Kosmos change, but the law by which they change is changeless. Cf. chs. 31, 32 a, and 40 b. Philo, Vita Mosis 2. (3). 12. 125, Cohn IV, p. 229: λόγῳ γὰρ αὐτὸν τροπαί καὶ ἐνίσχυσε δραμα τεταγμένῳ καὶ παγώ συνίσταται, τὸ παραδοξότατον, διὰ τῆς καρδίᾳ μεταβολῆς ἐντεικνύμεναι τὴν διαωὴν οὖσαν αὐτῶν μορφή.

19 b, 27 c. seundus (vitae) || dispensator. It is evident that ch. 27 c is a displaced piece of the list of οὐσίαρχαι, and should follow here. We have been told that Zeus (Hypatos), the first of the οὐσίαρχαι, ‘per caelum omnibus praebet vitam’; he then is the primus vitae dispensator. We have also been told that the air is the instrument by means of which the influences of Zeus Hypatos and his subordinates in the heavens are brought to bear upon the world below; hence it follows that the οὐσίαρχαι who presides over the air is secondus vitae dispensator.

The doctrine that air is the source or vehicle of life was asserted in the age of Pericles by Diogenes of Apollonia. (See Gomperz, Greek thinkers, Eng. tr. I, p. 371 ff.) The function assigned to air in the system of Diogenes was similar to that which was afterwards assigned to πνεῦμα (i.e. warm air) in the system of the Stoics; and the Stoic doctrine of πνεῦμα must have been derived in part from the air-theory of Diogenes. The Stoics held that the vitalizing element in πνεῦμα is ἄρο, or heat; but the ambiguity of the word πνεῦμα, which, in one of its uses, meant wind (i.e. air in motion), and was sometimes used as a synonym for ἄρο, would tend to conceal the difference between the two doctrines. The Hermetist may therefore have been unconscious of any inconsistency between what he here says about air and what he said about πνεῦμα in ch. 17 a.

1 Another point of agreement between Ascl. III. 19 b and the doctrine of Diogenes may be noted. Diogenes said that Zeus is air and nothing but air (Gomperz ib. p. 375); and in Ascl. III, the οὐσίαρχαι of the air is a Zeus.
ASCLEPIUS III: 19 b, 27 c, b, 19 c, 34 c

27 c. animantium mortalium. The beings which are both ἡμῶν and θνητά are men and beasts. The term does not include vegetables, which are here mentioned separately. See Ascl. I. 4, where vegetables are said to be sine anima, i.e. ἀψυχά.

27 b. Deus, supra verticem summi caeli consistens. Cf. ch. 33 a, ‘quod dicitur extra mundum, si tamen est aliquid.’ Ch. 30 init.: ‘in ipsa vitalia aeteritate locus est mundi.’ The Hermetist imagines the boundless space outside the cosmic sphere,—that space which the Stoics called κενόν,—to be filled with the presence of God, who thence watches over the Kosmos from every side (‘ubique est, omniaque circum inspicit’).

19 c. (Hoc modo coniuncta sunt in)mortalibus . . . adunata vero, unum. The text of this passage is badly damaged; but the writer’s meaning was probably not far from that expressed by my attempt at restoration.

(in)mortalibus mortalia. A few lines below, the MSS. give de mortalibus mortalia, which is presumably a misplaced doublet. The phrase et his similia, which follows mortalia here, may be a corruption of sensibilium, which follows mortalia below.

[vel potius duo . . . nutu efficiuntur]. These words are out of keeping with the context, and cannot have been written by the same man who wrote aut potius unum a few lines above. They express a dualistic doctrine of the same kind as that which is set forth in Ascl. II, though not quite identical with it. Both the author of Ascl. III and the author of Ascl. I would have regarded the words vel potius duo as blasphemy.

id est, de materia qua fiunt &c. The meaning intended would be more clearly expressed by writing ‘vel potius duo sunt, (viz.) id unde fiunt omnia, et is a quo fiunt; id est, materia de qua fiunt, et eius voluntas cuius nutu efficiuntur.’ The two ἀρχαί of all things are matter and God’s will.

34 c. quae omnia sine deo vegetari non possunt. Vegetare means ‘to quicken’ or ‘call into life’; and this applies to all corporeal things; for all bodies without exception are alive, in higher or lower degree. God’s creative activity may be described either by saying that he infuses life into matter, or that he imposes forms on matter; for all matter, in so far as it is formed, is vitalized. The νοητά ἐξη, from which the forms imposed on matter are copied, are the archetypes of living beings, and are themselves living beings of a higher order (νοητά ζώα, Pl. Tim.).
ipsi (sc. deo) soli sensibile atque intelligibile. Why sensibile? We must understand totum as including both the αισθητος κόσμος and the νοητος κόσμος. To men, the former is only in part αισθητος, as the latter is only in part νοητος; for each one of us, sense and thought alike are limited to a few objects. To the consciousness of God alone both worlds are present in all their fullness. Cf. Corp. IX. 9: ὅ δὲ θεὸς οὐχ . . . ἀναίσθητος ἐστι καὶ ἀνοητος (i.e. God αἰσθάνεται καὶ νοεῖ).

quantitates . . . omnes mensuras excedentes magnitudinis. The writer says that great and immeasurable magnitudes are from God, and not (as we might rather have expected) all magnitudes, large and small alike, because his object is to exalt the majesty of God. Even the greatest of corporeal things, the outermost sphere of heaven, is ‘from God and in God’.

mundum ipsum sensibilem et quae in eo sunt omnia a superiore illo mundo quasi vestimentum esse contexta (quasi ex vestimento esse contexta MSS.). The superior mundus is the νοητος κόσμος. If we retain the reading of the MSS. (striking out ex), this must be taken as meaning that the δια which is the substratum of the αισθητος κόσμος is ‘clothed’ with visible forms which are copies of the νοητα ειδη. But a more satisfactory sense may be got by reading quasi vestimentum esse contexta; the αισθητος κόσμος is ‘woven out of’ the visible forms which are copies of the νοητα ειδη, i.e. is wholly made up of those forms. This agrees better with what is said in 17 b as emended, sunt visibles formae . . . uniuscuiusque, sicuti est, tota substantia. The visible world thus constituted is the ‘garment’ in which God is clothed. For the simile of a garment, cf. Philo De fuga et inventione 20. 110, Wendland III, p. 133: ἐνδυότα τῇ ὅ μὲν προεβεβληστης τοῦ ὄντος λόγου ὡς ἐσθήτα τῶν κόσμων γῆν γὰρ καὶ ἄθεον καὶ ἀέα καὶ πύρ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων ἐπαιµπότητα. Philo De somniis 1. 35. 203, Wendland III, p. 249: τὸ παµµοικίνου ὑφασµα, τούτοι τον κόσμον.

17 b. Est enim (δια) . . . tota substantia. I have placed this passage here, because the last sentence of 34 c (Sin totum . . . quasi vestimentum esse contexta) serves as a suitable introduction to it. That which I conjecture to have been the original meaning of the paragraph has been hidden by deliberate interpolation. Some person through whose hands the text has passed (possibly the translator himself) completely failed to understand the Hermetist’s doctrine of matter and forms; and finding it stated that δια (which he regarded as equivalent to mundus, the material world,) ‘is invisible
in itself', he took this to mean that you cannot see into the depths of the earth, because it is a solid globe, and inserted several clauses with the intention of explaining and developing that meaning. When the words which I have marked as interpolations are struck out, that which remains yields a satisfactory sense.

[cava mundi rotunditas in modum sphaerae]. I assume that these words have been substituted by the interpolator for the one word ἀλη (translated mundus). It is, however, not quite impossible that the Hermetist described the primary matter as shaped into a sphere, and in that one respect not absolutely formless, though devoid of all visible qualities; see Corp. VIII. 3.

(.ἀλη) multis locis instar qualitatemque habere oreditur. Cf. Plotinus 2. 4. 11: τὸν τινὸς ταῦταν τῷ κενῷ τὴν ἀλην εἰρήκασι. Plato, Tim. 52 a, identifies the ὑποδοχή with χώρα.

Per formas enim solas specierum, quarum imaginibus videtur (〈quasi〉) insculpta, visibilis oreditur. The meaning must be, 'we (mistakenly) suppose that ἀλη itself is visible, because the forms imposed on it are visible'. But it is not clear how this meaning is to be got out of the words. Perhaps formas specierum may be taken to mean 'corporeal forms (ἀληθητὰ εἰδη) derived from the νοητὰ εἰδη'. The Greek may possibly have been διὰ γὰρ τὰς μορφὰς (the visible forms) μόνον τὰς (ἐκ) τῶν εἰδῶν (the invisible and eternal 'ideas') κ.τ.λ. The ἀληθητὰ εἰδη which are imposed on matter are imagines (εἰκόνες) of the νοητὰ εἰδη. We see the ἀληθητὰ εἰδη, but we do not see the ἀλη on which they are imposed.

In the words quasi insculpta we have a different simile from that employed above, quasi vestimentum esse contexta. The notion conveyed by insculpta more nearly resembles, but does not quite coincide with, that implied by Plato's word ἐκμαγεῖον, which suggests that the shapes imposed on matter are like the impressions of a seal on wax.

Plato (Tim. 50 c) says that these visible and transitory copies of the invisible and eternal εἰδη are stamped on matter 'in a fashion hard to declare' (δύσφραστον). The Hermetist has tried to explain the process by introducing a hierarchy of astral and cosmic gods by whom the demiurgic or form-imposing energy of the supreme God is transmitted to the lower world, and by combining with the Platonic doctrine of forms the Stoic doctrine of πνεῦμα. This πνεῦμα, as he conceives it, is a life-conveying material substance, the movements of which are determined by the influences of the heavenly bodies, and which the Powers above employ as their
instrument in the process of clothing matter with forms (or in other words, in working matter up into living organisms), and maintaining that constant succession of changing forms (formarum agitatio atque frequentatio) in which the life of all earthly organisms consists. But it must be admitted that his explanations leave much unexplained, and that the mode of operation by which copies of the νοητὰ εἴδη are impressed on or ‘carved in’ formless matter still remains δύσφραστον. By way of an attempt to express what seems to be implied in his theory, perhaps it might be said that πνεῦμα, operating (like Aristotle’s φῶς) as a vital force within the organism during the process of growth, develops it, by a continuous succession of changes, into something more and more nearly resembling the ideal type (e.g. develops the human embryo, and the human child, into the likeness of the αὐτοκόλλησις). The εἴδος remains νοητὸν,—an unrealized ideal, not a thing visible in the world of sense; but it is the ‘final cause’ of the process. The efficient cause is God; and the νοητὸν εἴδος (the ‘pattern’ which is ‘copied’, or in other words, the end or aim towards which the process is directed) has its existence in the mind of God. With this end or aim in view, God works through the heavenly bodies (or rather through subordinate incorporeal deities,—οὐσιάρξις,—by whom the heavenly bodies are controlled); and the heavenly bodies act on the material elements of which each individual organism is composed, and infuse into it the πνεῦμα by which it is vitalized. (Compare Ascl. I. 2 b–4.)

If this, or something like it, is the writer’s meaning, he has not succeeded in expressing it very clearly, or in harmonizing perfectly the Platonic and Stoic conceptions which he has brought into juxtaposition. But in one respect at least he is clear and consistent, namely, in the expression of his conviction that it is the will of God that works all. In the view of the writer of Ascl. III, as in that of the Hermetists in general, φῶς is a ‘part’ of God (Corp. XII. ii. 21), and all operations of nature are εἰργασεις of God.

1 In 19 b, air, in place of πνεῦμα, is said to be the organum. In some of the Hermetica (e.g. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. IX), the force which operates in the imposition of forms on matter is called simply ἐνέργεια θεοῦ, and no material organum is mentioned. Other Hermetists (e.g. the writer of Corp. XVI), instead of speaking of a material organum, assign to personal agents (the ‘daemons’) the function of executing the will of God in the lower world. As the daemons reside in the air, and have bodies composed of air, this latter notion is not wholly unconnected with the view that air is the organum.

2 His exposition might, however, appear less inadequate if we had his text before us in its original and unmutilated form.
eius imum, ... si locus est (imus) in sphaera. The interpolator is speaking of the place in which Hades was commonly located, i.e. the interior or central part of the earth, and describes this, with some hesitation, as the 'bottom' of the globe. As he twice compares Greek with Latin, the interpolation must have taken place either at the time of or subsequently to the translation of the Greek text into Latin.

quod sunt visibles formae ... tota substantia. The interpolator wrote quod sunt, because he made this clause depend on the preceding dicuntur. But the sense of the uninterpolated original would have been more correctly expressed by quod sunt dependent on est invisibilis. The words specierum omnium quae insunt unius-cuiusque sicuti est tota substantia occur in the MSS. a few lines below (in 18 a), where they are meaningless. Transposed to this place, they give (with the correction quae omnibus insunt for specierum omnium quae insunt) precisely the sense which the preceding context requires. The visible forms (allobregà èôô), which are copies of the νομμα èôô, constitute the whole substance or reality of the individual things in the material universe; if you abstract them, there will be nothing left except unformed (and therefore invisible) άλη, which has a merely potential existence.

Species enim, quae divina est ... incorporalia sint.) This piece, where it stands in the MSS. (in ch. 35), interrupts the train of thought, and must be a misplaced fragment. I have transposed it to this place, because it seems to be connected with the subject dealt with in ch. 17 b as conjecturally emended. The specie quae divina est is the νομμα èôô, the ideal παραδείγμα.

35, 36. Unumquodque enim ... splendore reddentium. These two chapters continue the exposition of the doctrine of forms; I have therefore placed them here. If my rearrangement is right, chs. 33-36 consist wholly of passages which have been accidentally shifted from their right places.

35. Unumquodque enim ... sui dissimilia. With this chapter should be compared and contrasted Ascl. I. 3 c-4, where the word species (èôô) means 'indivduals'.

The species spoken of in Ascl. III. 35 are the forms or types of the several kinds (genera) of living beings. Types of natural genera

1 The words specierum omnium might be retained, if they could be taken in the sense of 'all kinds of things', or 'all individual things'; but in that case it would still be necessary to insert omnibus or some such word before insunt.
(and perhaps of the cosmic στοιχεία spoken of in ch. 36) are the only sort of 'Platonic ideas' that the author recognizes. For instance, there is a single species incorporalis (νομων εἴδους, ideal type) of the human race; and the Pantomorphos (the god of the Zodiac), operating by the agency of the Decanus Horoscopos (i.e. the god of that subdivision of the Zodiac which is on the eastern horizon at the decisive moment), stamps a visible 'copy' of this ideal type upon each child at birth. But each of these visible copies differs from every other; for the positions of the heavenly bodies, by the influence of which the corporeal form of each individual is determined at birth, change from moment to moment. Hence no two men are quite alike.

It might be objected that the same Decanus is Horoscopos for forty minutes in every successive space of twenty-four hours; many men therefore must be born under the influence of the same Decanus; and all men born under the influence of the same Decanus ought to be alike. But this difficulty may be avoided, if we assume that the Decanus Horoscopos collects and brings to bear upon the individual at the moment of birth the influences of all the heavenly bodies together. When the Decanus who is now Horoscopos becomes Horoscopos again to-morrow, each of the planets will have changed its position relatively to the fixed stars; and even within the same forty minutes, the aspect of the heavens is not quite the same at any two moments.

sive sit animans sive sine anima sit. See note on Ascl. I. 4, genus sine anima.

quamvis unumquodque animal[is genus] omnem generis sui possidet formam. It appears from these words that the forma generis is the 'universal', i.e. the group of qualities which all individuals of the genus possess in common. Below, the writer seems to use the word species as equivalent to forma generis. (Species ergo permanet . . . . Sic generum formae sunt permanentes.) Does this imply that he regarded the forma generis (the 'universal' of a natural class) as identical with the species quae divina est, i.e.

1 His theory of ideas resembles that of the Platonist Albinus, who says in his Epitome (ch. 9): ἢ ἴδια, ὑπὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον των ὄντων, νόησε αὐτοῦ. . . . ἀρίστως δὲ τὴν ἴδιν παραδείγμα τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἁλώνων. οὔτε γὰρ τοῖς πλεῖστοις τῶν ἀντὶ Πλάτωνος ἄριστης τῶν τεχνίων εἶναι ἴδια, οἷον ἀστίδας ἢ λύρας, οὔτε μὴν τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, οἷον νυπεροτοι καὶ χολέρας, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ μέρος, οἷον Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος, ἀλλὰ οὖσι τῶν εὐτελῶν τινάς, οἷον ῥίποι καὶ κάρφοις, οὔτε τῶν πρὸς τι, οἷον μείζους καὶ ὑπερήχους· εἶναι γὰρ τὰς ἴδια νόσθεις θεοῦ ἁλώνων καὶ αὐτοτελεῖς.
with the Platonic παράδειγμα (the ‘ideal type’)? If so, he must have failed to think the matter out clearly. The ‘universal’ cannot rightly be identified with the ‘ideal’; the forma generis, which ‘is possessed by every individual of the genus’, cannot be the same as the ideal type, which is never fully or adequately reproduced in any individual in the world of sense. A new-born child, or a man physically and morally deformed, possesses the forma generis, i.e. the group of qualities included under the general concept ‘man’, but is far from possessing the qualities of the ideal man, the αἰτωθοῖος. The Platonist Albinus (quoted in note on Ascl. I. 2 b) saw the necessity of making this distinction, and accordingly discriminated the πρώτα νοητά (ideal types) from the δεύτερα νοητά (universals).

In the parallel passage Ascl. I. 4, the word genus (which corresponds to forma generis in Ascl. III. 35) clearly means ‘universal’, and not ‘ideal type’, or παράδειγμα in the Platonic sense.

impossible est formam unamquamque alteri simillimam nasci. The Stoics insisted strongly on this point, in opposition to the Academics. Cic. Acad. 2. 26. 85: ‘Stoicum est quidem (‘nec admodum credible’ in the opinion of the Academics,) nullum esse pilum omnibus rebus talem qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum.’ Sen. Ep. 113. 15: ‘Nullum animal alteri par est. Circumspice omnium corpora: nulli non et color proprius est et figura sua et magnitudo. Inter cetera propter quae mirabile divini artificis ingenium est, hoc quoque existimo, quod in tanta copia rerum nunquam in idem incidit: etiam quae similia videntur, cum contuleris, diversa sunt. Tot fecit genera foliorum: nullum non sua proprietate signatum. Tot animalia: nullius imago tota cum altero convenit, utique aliquid interest. Exegit a se ut quae alia erant et dissimilia essent et imparia. (Seneca attributes the differences to the ingenuity of the divine Artist; the Hermetist gives an astral explanation of them.) Plut. Comm. not. 36: ἀκούσα τοῖνυ ἔτινν αὐτῶν (sc. the Stoics) . . . πρὸς τὸν Ἀκαδημαίκον διαφερομένων, καὶ βοώτων ὧς (the Academics) πάντα πράγματα συγχέουσι ταῖς ἀπαραλλαξίαις (i.e. by their denial of differences between individuals), ἐτί δυνῶν

Aristotle uses the word ἕδος in the sense of ‘universal’ in his logic; but he uses it in a sense more nearly approaching that of the Platonic παράδειγμα (“ideal type”) in his physics, when he says that ‘nature’ aims at reproducing the ἕδος in the individual, but succeeds in reproducing it only by a gradual process, if at all. In an imperfectly developed individual, the ἕδος in the latter sense may be said to be present potentially, but is not present actually.

3004.2
According to Plutarch, then, the Stoics went against common sense in denying that any two individuals of a kind could be alike, and the Academics agreed with common sense in maintaining the opposite view.

**horarum et climatum distantibus punctis.** A difference in the place of birth (κλίμα), as well as a difference in the time, implies a difference in the aspect of the heavens, and consequently a difference in the resulting form.

**inmutantur totiens, quot hora momenta habet circuli circumcurrentis.** Cf. Corp. IX. 6, 7: "**(φερόμενος δὲ (ὁ κόσμος) πάντα ἔωστει)**"... τὸ δὲ τάξιον αὐτοῦ τῆς φοράς τὴν πουκιλίαν τῶν [του] γενέσεων ἐφαγάζεται. πνοὴ γάρ, ὁδὸν πυκνοτάτην, προτείνει τὰ ποιά τοὺς σώματι. The 'qualities' (ποιὰ) there spoken of are the Stoic equivalent of the *formae visibles* (αἰσθητὰ εἴδη) of Ascl. III. They are produced in bodies by the operation of πνοὴ (= πνεῦμα); and the operation of the πνοὴ varies with, and is determined by, the constantly changing positions of the heavenly bodies. Corp. XVI. 15: "γενόμενον γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκαστῶν... παραλάμβανοι διάμονες οἱ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν (φυτο)μὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἐπηρέται κ.τ.λ.

If it is assumed that small differences in time produce appreciable effects, not even twins will be alike. Augustine (Civ. dei 5. 1–6), arguing against the astral doctrine of Posidonius, discusses the case of twins at some length. *Ib. 5. 3*: 'fustra itaque adsertur nobile illud commentum de figuli rota, quod respondisse ferunt Nigidium hac quaestione turbatum, unde et Figulus appellatus est. Dum enim rotam figuli vi quanta potuit intorsisset, currente illa bis numero de atramento tamquam uno eius loco summa celeritate percussit; deinde inventa sunt signa quae fixerat, desistente motu, non parvo intervallo in rotae illius extremitate distantia. Sic, inquit, in tanta rapacitate caeli, etiamsi alter post alterum tanta celeritate nascatur, quanta rotam bis ipse percussi, in caeli spatio plurimum est: hinc sunt, inquit, quaeacumque dissimillima perhibentur in moribus casibusque geminorum.'

The 'circulus circumcurrens in quo est ille Omniformis deus' is the Zodiac in which are situated the Decani, over whom the Pantomorphos presides.
36. Et mundus speciem mutat, o Trismegiste? The word *species* cannot here signify the *species aeterna et incorporalis* (*υοντόν εἴδος*), i.e. the ideal type; for the ideal type is eternal and unchanging. When the writer speaks of the *species* of the Kosmos or its component parts as changing, *species* must signify *forma visibilis* (*αἰ-οθυρίων εἴδος*); and we must take *speciem mutat* to mean 'exchanges one *forma visibilis* for another'.

The case of the cosmic *στοιχεῖα* differs from that of the *genera* previously discussed in this respect, that each of them is the only one of its kind. In dealing with the human race, the writer says that the *forma visibilis* of each individual differs from that of every other individual, while the *forma generis* (or *species incorporalis*) is common to all individuals of the *genus*. But it is impossible to speak thus of the forms when he is dealing with the *caelum*; for there is only one *caelum*. Accordingly, he says that there is a *species* (*incorporalis*) of the *caelum*, which persists unchanged, but that varying *species* (i.e. *formae visibiles*,—variously modified copies of the unchanging *species incorporalis*,—) are assumed by the one *caelum* at different times: 'in una caeli specie hae sunt quae saepe alternantur species.'

[[atque stationes aut oursus]]. It is absurd to say that earth 'stands or runs'; there must therefore be some error in the text. Since the writer speaks of the changes of *caelum* (i.e. air), earth, and fire, he probably spoke of the changes of water also; and the most obvious difference in water is that between standing and running water. I have therefore altered *atque* to *aqua*, and added *mutat*.

**Solis etenim et lunae.** The sun and moon are made of fire; and since they are gods, it is rightly said that the fire of which they are made assumes *divinas species*.

**sunt enim quasi speculorum nostrorum similares.** I suppose the meaning of this simile to be that the sun and moon 'reflect', i.e. reproduce in visible copy, the *species incorporalis* or ideal type of fire or light. Cf. *Corp.* XVII: ἀντανακλάσεις εἰς τῶν ἀσωμάτων πρὸς τὰ σῶματα. Philo *De opif. mundi* 7. 29–8. 31: πρῶτον οὖν ὁ ποιῶν ἐποίησεν οὐδραν ἀσωμάτων καὶ γῆν ἀδρομον καὶ ἀέρος ἔδραν (i.e. the *species incorporales* of heaven, earth, and air) . . . εἰθ' ἵδαιος ἀσωμάτων φυσιά, . . . καὶ ἐπὶ πάσον . . . φωτός, δ' πάλιν ἀσω- μάτων ἡν καὶ νοητὸν ἢλιον παράδειγμα καὶ πάντων δοσα φωσφόρα ἀοτρα κατὰ τὸν οὐδραν ἔμελλε συνίστασθαι . . . τοσοῦτον γὰρ τὸ νοητὸν (φῶς).
In these chapters (with the exception of the group of misplaced passages 27 b–29 b), the text runs on without a break. The writer deals with several distinct topics, viz. (1) the name of God (20 a); (2) sexual procreation (20 b–21); (3) the divine element in man (22 a–23 a); (4) god-making (23 b–24 a); (5) the Prophecy of Hermes (24 b–26 a); (6) the relation between the eternity of God and the time-process of the Kosmos (26 b–27 a and 29 c–32 b). The passages in which the several topics are treated are linked together by superficial transitions, but have little real connexion. The writer's thoughts do not seem to be guided by any preconceived plan; he passes at haphazard from one subject to another.

20 a. Alia haec iterum ratio quae est, o Trismegiste? In the lost passage which preceded these words, Trismegistus must have announced that he was about to set forth a second doctrine. Compare 19 a fin.: 'Haec ergo ipsa (divinorum), ut dicis, (ratio) quae est, o Trismegiste?' The doctrine of νοητά, expounded in 19 a ff., was announced as divinorum ratio; and here follows alia divinorum ratio. This 'second doctrine' seems to be especially that which is contained in chs. 20 b and 21. (Cf. 20 b fin.: 'haec ergo ratio... tibi sit redditu, quare et quomodo fiant omnia (utriusque sexus).') In this passage, the creative energy of God is regarded in a different aspect. In the first ratio, God was spoken of as imposing forms on matter; in the second ratio, God is spoken of as generating...
the Kosmos and all things in it by a process of which human pro-
creation is an 'image'. The second ratio is quite distinct from
and unconnected with the first, and is, no doubt, derived from
a different source. It is introduced by a paragraph concerning the
name of God (20 a).

quocumque [alio] nomine [ ] nunquapata [quod] inter nos
intellectus nostri causa. If we are to speak to one another about
'the One who is all', we must apply some name to him; we there-
fore call him θεός or πατήρ or κύριος or the like; but all such names
are inadequate. Cf. ch. 41 b: ἀφαστων δνομα ( ... ), τετμημένον ( ἤ )
tη τοι θεοι προσηγορη, ... και ειλογούμενον τη τοι πατρίς.

⟨[ab hominibus sanctius religiosiusque]⟩ debat esse sacra-
tum tanti [ ] numinis contemplative. The grammatical
subject of debet is nomen, understood from quocumque nomine.
There is nothing holy in the name itself; the man who speaks or
hears the name must make it holy, by infusing into it his own
religious emotion.

vox hoc est, ex aere spiritu percusso sonus. A Stoic
definition. Cf. the Stoic Diogenes Babylon., in Diog. Laert. 7. 55: ἠστι δε φωνή ἄηρ πεπληγμένος ... ζηῶν μὲν ἠστι φωνή ἄηρ ὑπὸ ὀρμῆς
πεπληγμένος ἀνθρώπου δε, [ ἡστι ] ἀνάφθρος και ἄπο διανοίας ἐκπεμπό-
μενη. 'The Stoics' in Diog. Laert. 7. 158: ἀκούων δε ( ἡμᾶς ), τοῦ
μεταξι τοι τε φωνούντος και τού ἀκούώντος ἄηρ πληττομένου, σφαιρο-
eιδος έται κυματομένου, και ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπάθητοντος, ὡς κυματονται
quaest. 2. 6. 3: 'Quid enim est vox nisi intentio aeris, linguae
formata percussu?' Cf. Pl. Tim. 67 b, and Ae. 4. 19. 11.

In the writer's time, the statement that a name 'is nothing but
a sound' &c. was by no means a truism. In Egypt, perhaps not
one man in a hundred would have admitted it; for in that country
especially, the belief in the magic or theurgic potency of sacred
names was prevalent among Pagans, Jews, and Christians alike.

Spiritus (πνεῦμα or πνοή) here means 'breath', and has nothing
to do with the cosmic πνεῦμα spoken of in ch. 17 a.

ut esset in homine necessarium vocois suriumque commer-
cium. Each word must be limited to a few syllables; for if words
of unlimited length were admitted, speech would become impossible.

simul ... et sensus et spiritus et aeris (nomina) et omnia
in his aut per haec aut de his nomen est totum dei.
It is necessary to read omnia (sc. nomina) in place of omnium. The writer might have said that the true name of God is made up of omnium nomina, 'the names of all things'; but if that had been his meaning, he could not have added in his aut per haec aut de his. The word his refers to sensus et spiritus et aeris; and it is not all things, but (as we have just been told) all names, that are connected with thought, breath, and air. Names are in sensu (dependent on (?) the thought which they express): they are per spiritum (produced by means of the breath); and they are de (or ex) aere (made of air).

innomine(m) vel potius omninomine(m). Cf. Corp. V. 10 a:

ονόματα ἔχει ἀπαντα ... καὶ ... ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχει. Lactant. Div. inst. 1. 6. 4: (Trismegistus deum) ἄνωνυμον esse dixit &c. Compare Justin Apol. 1. 10. 1: θεῷ ... τῷ μηδενὶ ὄνοματι θετῷ καλομένῳ. Ibd. 2. 5 (6). 1: the demons worshipped by the Pagans have individual person-names; ὄνομα δὲ τῷ πάντων πατρί θετὸν, ἀγνηθρῇ δντὶ, οὐκ ἔστων φ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὄνομα τι προσαγορευτήτα, προσβλητον ἔχει τὸν θέμανον τὸ ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ πατήρ καὶ θέος καὶ κτίστη καὶ κύριος καὶ δεσπότης οὐκ ὄνοματά ἔστων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰποτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐργῶν προσφέρεις. Minucius Felix (Baehrens, 1886) 18. 9: 'Magnitudinem dei qui se putat nosse, minuit; qui non vult minuere, non 'novit'. Nec nomen deo quaeras: 'deus nomen est'. Illic vocabulis opus est, cum per singulos propris appellationum insignibus multitudo dirimenda est: deo, qui (legendum quia?) solus est, 'dei vocabulum totum est'. Quem si patrem dixero, carmalem opineris; si regem, terrenum suspi器械is; si dominum, intellegas utique mortalem. Aufer additamenta nominum, et perspicies eius claritatem.' Clem. Alex. Strom. 5. 12. 82: The One is ἀνωνόμαστον καὶ ὄνομαξωμεν αὐτῷ ποτε οὐ κυρίως καλούντες ἦτοι ἢ τῇ δάγῳν ἢ νοῦν ἢ αὐτό τὸ ἢ τῇ πατέρᾳ ἢ θεῶν ἢ δημογράφων ἢ κύριον, οὐχ ὡς ὄνομα αὐτοῦ προφέρομεν λέγομεν, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀποριάς ὄνομασι καλοῖς προσφήμεθα, ἵν' ἐχῄ διάνοια, μη περὶ ἀλλὰ πλανωμένῃ, ἐπερείδεσθαι τούτοις, οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἐκαστὸν μηνυτικόν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἅθρως ἀπαντα ἐνδεικτικά τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δυνάμεως. The Christian writers and the Hermetists must have derived the thought from a common Pagan source; and perhaps the ultimate source may have been Egyptian. Brugsch (Rel. und Myth. der alten Aegypter, p. 97) quotes from Egyptian documents: 'No man knows how to name him.'—'His name remains hidden.'—'His name is a secret for his children.'—'His names are numberless.'—'Many are his names, no one knows their number.' Isis οὐτῷ τῶν πολλῶν
ASCLEPIUS III: 20b

μυριάνθυμος κέκληται (Plut. Is. et Os. 53); and a dedication Isidii Myrionimae occurs in C. I. L. III. 882 (from Dacia).

20b. solus omni utriusque (solus ut omnia utraque MSS.) sexus fecunditate plenissimus.—ai. Utriusque sexus ergo deum dicas? God is ἄρρενόθηλος. Cf. Corp. I. 9: ὁ δὲ νοῦς... ἄρρενόθηλος ὄν. Ib. 15: ἄρρενοθήλος δὲ ὄν (ὁ Ἀνθρωπος) ἐξ ἄρρενοθήλως ὄν (τοῦ τοῦ) πατρὸς. (The 'bisexual father' of the Archanthropos is ὁ πάντων πατὴρ, the supreme God.)

This notion, as well as that of the 'deus innominis vel potius omnomininis' in the preceding paragraph, may have been derived from Egyptian sources. In ancient Egyptian documents, the progenitor of the universe is described as bisexual. Thus in the cosmogony of Heliopolis (Breasted, Hist. Eg. p. 56) it was told of Tum, the Demiurgus who emerged from the primordial waters, that from himself he begat four children, namely, Shu (the atmosphere) and Tefnut (the twin-sister and consort of Shu), Qeb or Seb (the earth), and Nut (the sky). Wiedemann (Rel. of Anc. Eg., Eng. tr., p. 32, n. 3, where references are given) says that 'this account is most completely preserved in the copy of a papyrus dating 306-305 B.C.; but its main point is alluded to in texts of the Old Kingdom, and of the beginning of the New Kingdom'. Brugsch, Rel. und Myth. p. 423, gives a translation of a text of the sixth Dynasty, about 2500 B.C. (Maspero, Pyr. Unas 465 f.), in which the act of bisexual procreation by which the children of Tum were produced is explicitly described; and a similar description of it occurs in the hieratic papyrus (Brit. Mus. 10188, Budge Pr. 1886, p. 22) quoted by Brugsch ib. pp. 740 and 756. Ikhnaton, 1375-1358 B.C. (Breasted, Hist. Eg. p. 376) called his sun-god

1 The notion of a bisexual deity occurs in the religions of Asia Minor also. See the myth of the bisexual Agdistis, reported by Pausanias (7. 17. 5) in connexion with the Phrygian cult of Cybele and Attis. The notion of an Aphroditos (i.e. a male aspect or counterpart of Aphrodite), whence the 'Hermaphroditos' of Greek plastic art was derived, seems to have been indigenous in Cyprus and Asia Minor (Preller, Gr. Mythologie, p. 509). But the sources of a Hermetic document are more likely to have been Egyptian than Anatolian.

2 According to this document, Tum thus generated Shu and Tafnut, and by Shu and Tafnut were generated Qeb and Nut (earth and sky). Did this primitive myth arise out of a cult-rite, or magical practice, in which an act resembling that which the documents attribute to the god was done (or simulated) by the priest? The god is said to have done the deed 'in the city of On (Heliopolis)'; the meaning of this, as of the many similar localizations of a divine act, must surely be that the god's worshippers were in the habit of doing at his temple in that city something which was explained as a symbolical repetition or commemoration of a deed originally done by the god himself.
Aton 'the father and the mother of all that he has made'. Brugsch ib. p. 197 quotes from ancient Egyptian documents: 'God is father and mother.'—'God begets and is not begotten; he bears offspring, and is not born.'—'He begets himself (as father) and bears himself (as mother).' Ib. p. 314, an inscription in the temple at Esne-Latopolis in Upper Egypt: 'Neith, the ancient, the Mother of God, the mistress of Esne, the father of the fathers, the mother of the mothers, ... that which exists in the beginning.' In a text from Philae (Brugsch ib. p. 113), Khnum, the god recognized as Demiurgus in Upper Egypt, is described as 'the mighty spirit (bai) who has made that which exists, who has fashioned that which reveals itself, the beginning of existing things, the father of the fathers, the mother of the mothers'. Amélineau, Gnost. ég. p. 291 f., quotes or refers to other Egyptian texts to the same effect, and remarks of some of them that 'si du dieu père on dit qu'il enfante, en joignant pour déterminatif à l'idée d'enfanter une femme en travail, on dit aussi de la déesse mère qu'elle engendre, et l'idée de la génération est déterminée par le phallus. Il y a donc identification complète des deux puissances'.

Among the Greeks, the notion of a bisexual progenitor of the Kosmos makes its appearance in the Orphic Theogonia, in which Phanes-Erikepaios (the Orphic equivalent of the Heliopolitan Tum), the Protopagnos who issued from the primordial Egg, was described as ἀρσενόθηλος. Apion, in Clem. Homil. 6. 4, p. 672 (Abel Orphica 38): ἐνδοθεν γὰρ τῆς περιφερίας (of the egg) ζῷον τι ἀρσενόθηλον εἰσεσυμείη τοῦ ἱνότος ἐν αὐτῷ θείῳ πνεῦματος, ὃν Φάντα 'Ορφεῖς καλεῖ. Ib. τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀπειρῆς ὕλης κατ’ ἐπιτυχίαν κράσεως ἀποκεφαληθεὶν ἐμμύριον φῶς, οὐ παγετός κατὰ τινας ἀρσενόθηλας ἐξιθομεν Φάνης. Clem. Recogn. 10. 30: '(Orpheus dicit) ipsum Chaos . . ., quasi ad ovi immanis modum per immensa tempora effectum, peperisse ac protulisse ex se duplicem quandam speciem, quam illi masculofeminam vocant; . . . et hoc esse principium omnium.' Ib. 10. 7. 316: 'aiunt . . . quasi intra ovi testam futom vivificatumque esse animal quoddam, disruptoque post haec immani illo globo processisse speciem quandam hominis duplicis formae,

1 Khnum is described as 'He who in the beginning fashioned this world with his hands', Brugsch ib.

2 The name Ἀρσενάιως occurs, as far as I know, only in late documents. It is probably of Egyptian origin; and the Orphic may have borrowed it from Egyptians in the Ptolemaic or Roman period. There is evidence that the name Phanes was used by Orphici as early as the third century B.C. (Rohde, Psyche, p. 408 f.)
quam illas masculo-feminam vocant. Hunc etiam Phaneta nominarunt.'

Proclus In Tim. 2. 130 f (Abel Orph. 62): καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ πρόσωπό τοῦ θηλί καὶ τὸ ἄρσεν, δὲς ζῴῳ πρόσωπο. "Ωθήλιο καὶ γενέτωρ κρατερός θεός Ἡρμεκταῖος," φησίν ὁ θεολόγος (i.e. Orpheus). Proclus ib. 2. 137 b (Abel 73 and 94). The same deity is named διόψις (i.e. ἀρσενόθηλος) Ἐρως in Orph. Argonaut. 14. The Orphic Zeus, who swallowed Phanes, and generated or created all that now exists, was also described as bisexual. Pseudo-Aristot. De mundo 7. 401 b 2 = Euseb. Pr. ev. 3. 9 (Abel 46 and 123): Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἀμβρότος ἐπετεύ νύμφη. Lactantius (Div. inst. 4. 8. 3 ff.) speaks of the agreement of 'Orpheus' and 'Hermes' as to the bisexuality of God. There can, I think, be little doubt that the Orphic notion of a bisexual progenitor of the universe was derived from Egypt; did the Hermetists take over the conception from the Orphici, or did it pass to them from the Egyptian priests by a more direct route?

Another instance occurs in Philostratus Vita Apollon. 3. 34: (Apollonius:) Ζῷον ἡγόμαι τὸν κόσμον; (Indian sage:) Ἡν γε νῦν γηγνώσχης αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐξωγανεί πάντα. (Apoll.) Θήλιον αὐτῶν καλόμεν, ἥ τῆς ἀρσενὸς τα καὶ ἀντικειμένης φύσεως; (Ind. :) Ἀμφότερον αὐτῶν γὰρ αὐτῷ ξυγγεγόματο τὰ μυθρὸς τα καὶ πατρός ἐς τὴν ἐξωγονίαν πράττει, ἐρωτά τι ἐντούτῳ ἵσχε θερμότερον ἡ ἐτέρον τι ἐτέρου, δὲ ἀρμότερον αὐτῶν καὶ ἐννίστησαν. The doctrine which Philostratus attributes to his Indian philosopher is probably Graeco-Egyptian. But it is the Kosmos (the God of the Stoics), and not the supracosmic God of the Platonists and Hermetists, that is there described as bisexual. Something of the sort may very well have been said, for instance, by the Egyptian Stoic Chaeremon.

Philo, De ebrietate 8. 30, Wendl. II, p. 176, describes the Creation as an act of sexual generation, and comes near to calling the Creator bisexual: τὸν γαῖαν τίδε τὸ πάν ἐγγενόμενον ἐνμικρῆς ὁμοῦ καὶ πατέρα ἔτει τοῦ γεγονότος . . . φύσεως, μητέρα δὲ τὴν τοῦ πεπειράκτου ὑποτήμην, ἡ συνω τὸ θεός, σόν ὡς ἀνθρωπος, ἐστερε γένειν' ἡ δὲ, παραδεξαμένη τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οπέρματα, τελεσφόρος ὁδίοι τῶν μόνων καὶ ἀγαπητῶν αἰσθητῶν υἱῶν ἀπεκιήσε, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον.

The notion that God is bisexual was adopted by some of the Gnostic sects. Simon Magus, in Hippol. Ref. haer. 6. 18: οὗτος ἐστίν ὁ ἐστίς, ὁτάς, στρέμματος, ἐν ἀρσενόθηλε σύναμος . . . ὁς ὁ πάν ἐαυτόν ὑπὸ ἐαυτοῦ προαγάγων ἐφανέρωσεν ἐναύτῳ τὴν ἐναύτῳ ἐπίνοιαν, οὕτως καὶ ἡ φανερὰ ἐπίνοια . . . ἰδῶσα ἐαυτόν, ἐνέκρυψε τὸν πατέρα ἐν ἐαυτῇ . . . καὶ ἐστίν ἀρσενόθηλες σύναμος καὶ ἐ. . .
The writer of Ascl. III seems to have two distinct reasons for asserting the bisexuality of God. In the first place, this passage is a polemic against dualistic doctrines such as that which is set forth in Ascl. II. In that document, the male and female principles are separate and distinct; God is the Father, and ἀληθē is the Mother; the Kosmos issues from the combined productivity of God and ἀληθē; and the evil in it is produced by ἀληθē. On the other hand, in Ascl. III. 20 f., God includes in himself the male and female principles together, so that no productive function is left for ἀληθē.

In the second place, the writer seeks to justify and sanctify by the divine example the usage of human marriage and procreation, in opposition to the ascetic exaltation of celibacy, which was held to be the higher state by many people of his time, especially in Egypt. The disposition to regard sexual intercourse as impure and degrading found support in the dualistic doctrine; for if matter is evil, or the cause of evil, the aim of man must be to sever himself from everything that is connected with the body, and polluted by the taint of matter. The Hermetist then is contending both against a dualistic cosmology, and against the ascetic ideal to which that doctrine gave support.

There is little evidence that abstinence from sexual intercourse was favoured by the official religion of Egypt. Chaeremon (Porphyry. De abst. 4. 6) says that the Egyptian priests abstained from it during the ‘purification’ required of them before and during the course of their turn of temple-service, but not at other times. But he describes the life of the priests as in other respects a life of extreme austerity. That is certainly not true of the Egyptian priests in general; but Chaeremon’s statement may perhaps be

1 A simpler and clearer statement of a similar doctrine occurs in an extract from a heretical document, Clem. Strom. 3. 4. 29: ἐν ἐν τα ἐκεῖ ἔτελ ἐς ταῖς ἀνήγορος τῇ ἐντότε μὴ ἔδει γίνηται καὶ ἑπικοινώνησαι καὶ ἑποίησαι τὸν ἄναψιν.
accepted as evidence that there were among them in his time
(c. A.D. 50) certain groups in which there prevailed an ascetic ideal
which would naturally tend to the rejection of marriage. Philo's
description of the Therapeutae shows that there were in Egypt
communities of Jews who practised extreme asceticism, including
abstinence from sexual intercourse. Philo himself regards their
mode of life with admiration; and he says that Egypt is the special
home of those who live 'the contemplative life', i.e. a life resembling
that of his Therapeutae.1

Among the Greeks, the Orphici and the Pythagoreans, from the
latter part of the sixth century B.C. onwards, held views of which
the rejection of marriage was a logical outcome. (In Euripides,
Hippol. 952, Hippolytus, the scorners of Aphrodite, is described by
his father as an Orphicus.) Plato adopted and formulated much
of the doctrine which underlay the ascetic practices of these sects.
Plato himself, however, was far from condemning sexual inter-
course. In his writings we find, side by side with the σωματικόν doctrine of the Orphici and Pythagoreans, such a passage as
Sympos. 206 c: 'This procreation is the union of man and woman,
and is a divine thing; for conception and generation are an
immortal principle in the mortal creature.' Cf. Pl. Laws 6. 773 ε
and 776 b concerning marriage. But some of the later Platonists
and Pythagoreans developed the ascetic tendency of Plato's de-
preciation of τὰ αὐθηρία into a contemptus mundi which went far
beyond Plato's own position. Plotinus contended against the
extreme views of those who maintained that the material Kosmos
is evil; yet he himself 'seemed to be ashamed that he was in a
body' (Porphy. Vita Plotini init.) 2

1 Philo De vita contempt. 3. 21, Cohn VI, p. 51: θολλαχοῦ μὲν ὅπως τὴν ἀκού-
μένης ἵστε ἐν γίνοι (αὐτῶν θεραπευτῶν),—ἴδε γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τελείον μεταχεῖν καὶ τὴν
Εὐλαβὴ καὶ τὴν Βάρβαρον,—κλεονίζει δὲ ἐν Αιγύπτῳ καθ' ἴκαστου τῶν ἐκκαλουμένων
νομῶν, καὶ μᾶλιν περὶ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν. Philo cannot have meant to say that
communities of men whose way of life was in all details similar to that which he
goes on to describe were to be found in every nome of Egypt, and in Greece and
many other countries. He must be here using the term βιασύνεται in a more
general sense; and his meaning must be that groups of ascetic mystics (such as the
Orphic fraternities, for instance,) were to be found in many lands, but nowhere in
such abundance as in Egypt.

2 A Pagan exaltation of virginity, similar in tone to many Christian utterances
on the subject, occurs in a poem on marriage addressed to a young lady by an
unknown writer named Naumachius (Stob. 4. 22. 32, vol. iv, p. 514 Hense): καλὸν
μὲν δίκαιος. ἀγαν ἐγὼ τῇ δικαιᾳ τῇ μίνες | παρὰναν, καθαροῖ δὲι μελεθήμασι
χαῖρειν, μὴ ἔχειν Ἐβαρναν(1) (Ἐβαρναν) Ἐλευθερίου, καὶ ἄλλ' ἦσθαν βασιλεῖαν ἀμφιμώρων θηλυκῶν ἐ̣
The Stoics, who had no feud with matter, and no aspiration to escape from the world we live in, steadily advocated marriage; see e.g. the extracts from Antipater, Musonius, and Hierocles in Stobaeus 4, cap. 22, Περὶ γάμου, Hense IV, pp. 497–512. But their attitude towards it differed from that of the author of Ascl. III. They regarded marriage as a matter of social obligation,—a duty which a man owes to his family, to his country, and to ‘the city of the universe’.  

The Stoic view is expressed in Ocellus Lucanus (first century B.C.) 4. 3, Mullach Fr. Gr. I, p. 402: μέρος ὑπάρχων (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) οἴκου τα καὶ πόλεως καὶ τὸ μέγατον, κόσμου, συμπληρών ὁφείλει τὸ ἀποικόμενον τοῦτον ἔκαστον, ἂν μέλλῃ μήτε συγγενείας εὐταίας λειτουργίας γίνεσθαι, μήτε πολιτικής, μήτε μήν τῆς θείας. Οἱ γὰρ καθάπας μὴ διὰ παιδοποιίας σύναπτόμενοι δικυκλοῦσι τὰ τιμῶτατα τῆς κοινωνίας συστήματα. The writer of Ascl. III, on the other hand, is, like most of the other Hermetists, little interested in social relations; he speaks of sexual intercourse as a ‘sacrament’, and treats it as a thing which, like all else, derives its significance from the relation between man and God.

Among the Christians, from the second century onwards, if not earlier, there was a strong and increasing tendency to depreciate marriage, and to assert the higher sanctity of a celibate life. Clement of Alexandria discusses marriage in Strom. 2. 23. 137—3. 18. 110. Clement himself holds marriage in high esteem (provided that it is used rightly, and with due regard for σωφροσύνη or ἐγκράτεια), and puts married life and celibacy on a par. But in the greater...
part of this discussion, Clement is occupied in contending against the opposite aberrations of two different classes of heretics,—on the one hand, those who permitted extreme sexual licence, and on the other hand, those who regarded all procreation as evil, and called marriage πορνεία. Among the latter, he speaks especially of Marcion and Tatianus. Clem. Strom. 3. 3. 12: οἱ μὲν ἀκτὸ Μαρκίωνος (τῆς ἐκ τῆς φύσεως) κακοί, ἐκ τῆς unction κακοί καὶ ἐκ δυσκαλού γενομένην δημιουργοῦ· ὥς δὲ λόγῳ, μὴ βουλόμενοι τῶν κόσμων τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γενόμενον συμπληροῦν, ἀπέχεσθαι γάμου βούλουνται, ἀντιτασσόμενοι τῷ ποιήτῳ τῶν σφῶν, καὶ σπεύδουντες πρὸς τὸν κεκληκότα ἀγαθὸν. 3. 3. 21: δεδείχθαι ἡμῖν νομίζω τὰς ἀδικίας τῶν ἐξων δογμάτων τῶν Μαρκίωνα παρὰ Πλάτωνος ἄχριστος τε καὶ αμαθῶς εὐλόγειν. 3. 6. 45: τοὺς δὲ εὐφήμοις δὲ ἐγκρατείας ἀσεβοῦσιν ἐστίν τῇ κτίσει καὶ τὸν ἄγιον δημιουργόν, τὸν παντοκράτορα μονόν θεόν, καὶ διδάσκοντο μὴ δέν παραδέχεσθαι γάμον καὶ παιδοφοβίαν, μηδὲ ἀντευόμενοι τῷ κόσμῳ ὀντουχόμενον εἴρησιν, μηδὲ ἐπιχερσιγενῶν τῷ θανάτῳ τροφήν. 3. 6. 46: μαρατόν δὲ ἐναῖν τὴν συνούσιαν λέγοντες. 3. 6. 49: εἰς θ' οἱ πορνείαι ἀντίκερα τῷ γάμον λέγοντι, καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβόλου ταύτην παραδώσεται δογματίζοντι.' Some of these opponents of marriage quoted in support of their view certain sayings

γάμως κεχρημάτων συφρόνων, τόν τε εὐνοικία ὡς δ' κύριος βούλεται συμβιβάσθαι. 3. 12. 88: ἀμφα γὰρ ἀγαν ἐν κυρίῳ, μὴ γὰρ γενή, ἡ δὲ ἂν παρέθεν. 1 We know little of the teaching of these sects except what is said about them by their orthodox opponents. It is probable that, if we had their own writings before us, we should find that some of them agreed with the author of Ascl. III in regarding sexual intercourse as a 'sacrament',—a view which is not necessarily inconsistent with σωφροσύνη; and statements in which they are accused of profligate excesses should be received with caution.

3 Cf. Irenaeus Adv. haer. 1. 28. 1 (Euseb. Hist. eccl. 4. 29): τὸν γάμον τε ψηφῶν καὶ πορνείας παραπληξίας Μαρκίων καὶ Σατανᾶς διδαχότας (Σατανᾶς). Hippol. Ref. haer. 7. 28: Saturinitus τὸν γάμων καὶ γεννῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Σατανᾶ φησὶν εἶναι. 3 I. e. the material world, and the human body as a part of it.

4 Marcion's Demiurgus (the God of the Jews) was 'just', but not 'good'.

5 I. e. the supreme God, who is 'good'.

That is, Clement regards the teaching of Marcion on this subject (just as Plotinus 2. 9 regards that of the Gnostic 'enemies of the Kosmos' against whom he argues) as a perverted development of Platonism.

7 An extreme repugnance to procreation was taught by Mani, whose doctrine on this subject was probably derived, in part at least, from followers of Marcion and Tatianus, or from Gnostic sects of like character. Augustine Adv. Faust. 15, p. 278, addressing a Manichaean, says 'didicii inimicos deputare parentes tuos, quod te per concubitum in carne ligaverint, et hoc modo utique deo tuo inmundas compedes imposuerint'. Ib. 19, p. 331: 'Opinantur diabolum fecisse atque iunxisse masculum et feminam.' Augustine Adv. Secundum 21: 'Displicet "crescite et multiplicemini"; ne Del vestri multiplicentur ergastula.' Alexander Lycopol. 4: the Manichaens bade men ἀπέχεσθαι γάμων καὶ ἀφροδίσιον καὶ ἀπαντολαν, ἵνα μὴ ἢ δύναμι (the divine life-force) ἐνοικηθῇ τῇ ὑλῇ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους διαδοχήν.
of Jesus reported in the 'Gospel according to the Egyptians' (*Strom. 3. §§ 45, 63, 66, 92*); whence it would seem that the group of Egyptian Christians among whom that Gospel originated regarded marriage with disapproval.

Tertullian (*Exhort. cast.*) said that God tolerates matrimony, but prefers virginity; and the general opinion of orthodox Christians in the third century seems to have been that expressed by Cyprian (*De hab. virg. 21*), who held that virginity cannot be made incumbent on all believers, but is a counsel of perfection. But there were some among the orthodox, and many in the heretical sects, who went to greater lengths in their rejection of sexual intercourse. Probably then the assertion of the sanctity of procreation in *Ascl. III* is directed especially against the Christians, whom in the subsequent Prophecy (ch. 25) the writer describes as 'scorning the Kosmos', and 'preferring death to life'.

Compare *Corp. II. 17 a* (on παύσοποια), and *Corp. XI. ii. 14 a.*

semper [voluntatis] (bonitatis) praegnans suae. Bonitas (αγαθότης) might have been translated 'bounty'. The 'goodness' of which the writer is thinking is that which is manifested in the production of living creatures.

Voluntas eius (eadem) est bonitas omnia. Cf. ch. 26 b: 'Dei enim natura consilium est bonitatis... vult autem omnia bona.'

et futuris omnibus dehinc (sicuti sunt et fuerunt) natura ex se nascendi sufficiat. The reading is doubtful; but it seems clear that the words *sicuti sunt et fuerunt* must be closely connected with *futuris dehinc*. I suppose natura ex se nascendi to mean the power of reproduction which all mortal things possess, and by which the race is maintained in existence, though the individuals perish. It is in virtue of this power that *omnia* (sc. *genera*, not individuals,) *futura sunt dehinc sicuti sunt et fuerunt*. The process by which this reproduction is effected, i.e. the process of sexual procreation, is an 'image', or temporal and cosmic manifestation, of the eternal productivity of God. Compare *Gen. 1. 27 f.*, ἀρσεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐποίησεν αὐτούς, κ.τ.λ. A Jew who had adopted the Egyptian notion of a bisexual God might argue from this text that if the human race is ἀρσεν καὶ θῆλυ, and is (in that

1 Hippolytus, *Ref. haer. 8. 20*, speaks of men who 'call themselves Ἐγυπτιατα', and says that they 'agree with the Church concerning God and Christ', but profess to live a holier life than other Christians, ἵπτοντα διὰ θρησκείας δοξάζειν νομίζουσι, ἀπεθανοῦσιν ἀμύσωσιν, ἑρωτοῦντες, καὶ ταμεῖν καλοῦσιν.

2 See note on *Corp. I. 12.*
respect) made καὶ εἰκόνα θεοῦ, God must be ἄρσεν καὶ βῆλυ. Had the writer of Ascl. III met with an argument of Jewish origin to this effect?

Cyprian De habitu virgin. says that virginity is 'Dei imago, respondens ad sanctimoniam Domini'. That is exactly the opposite of the Hermetist's doctrine.

21. omnia animalia et inanimalia. Inanimalia (ἄψυχα) must mean vegetables; see Ascl. I. 4. The existence of the two sexes, or something corresponding to them, in plants was recognized by some ancient writers, though the mode of reproduction of plants was not clearly understood. Zeller, Aristotle, Eng. tr. vol. ii, p. 34, refers to several passages in De gen. an. and Hist. an., and sums up the view of Aristotle thus: 'The sexes have not attained to separate existence (in plants); . . . they remain in the condition of perpetual union of the sexes.' The question εἰ εὑρίσκεται ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς γένος βῆλα καὶ γένος ἄρσεν is discussed in Ps.-Aristot. Περὶ φυτῶν τ. 2. Theophrastus spoke of male and female plants.

et ἐν nat uram et sensum et naturam. From the following words et mundum &c., it may be inferred that the lost clause which stood here began with et deum or et in deo, and contained some mention of the creative energy of God.

et mundum dico in se connectere naturam. Natura must here mean procreative power; i.e. it must be equivalent to natura ex se nascendi above. Perhaps some word or phrase by which this sense was more clearly indicated has dropped out.

eius utriusque conexio aut, quod est verius, unitas. In God, the two procreative functions are eternally united. In mortal races, they are divided, each individual being either male or female; but in the act of procreation, the separation ceases, and male and female become one, as God is one. Cf. the speech of Aristophanes in Pl. Sypmos. 189 c-193 d: e.g. ἡτιν δὴ οὖν . . . ἦς ἐμφύτου ἀλλήλων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, . . . ἐπιχειρῶν τοῦτον ἐν ἐκ δύον. Gen. 2. 24: ἦσσονται οἱ δύο οἱ σάρκα μίαν. Philo De opif. mundi 53. 152: ἦς δ' ἐπιγενόμενος καθάπερ ἔνος ζώου διὰ τὰ μήματα διεστηκότα συναγαγόν εἰς ταύτων ἀρμόττειν, τόθον ἐνδυσάμενος ἐκατέρω τῆς πρὸς βάτερον κοιμαίας εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὕμων γένειαν. But in what follows, Philo asserts that ascetic doctrine against which the polemic of Ascl. III is directed; for he adds δ ἐν τούτω οὕτως καὶ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ἡδονῆς εὐγνώσας, ἢτις ἔστω ἐδικημάτων καὶ παράνομαμάτων ἀρχή, δ' ἡ ἐπιλαττοῦται τὸν θυγατέρα καὶ κακοδαιμόνα βίον ἀντ' ἀθανάτου καὶ εὐδαιμονος. Elsewhere, Philo, like the writer of Ascl. III, speaks of human
procreation as an imitation of the creative energy of God; e.g. De decalogo 12. 51, Cohn IV, p. 280, speaking of the first five Commandments, he says: εἶναι τῆς μίας γραφῆς τῆς μὲν ἀρχὴν θεοῦ καὶ πατέρα καὶ ποιήμα τοῦ παντός, τὸ δὲ τέλος γονεῖς, οἱ μοιμοίενοι τὴν ἑκεῖνον φύσιν γεννῶσι τοὺς ἐπὶ μέρους. Ιθ. 22. 107: τῶν γονέων ἡ φύσις ἄθανάτου καὶ θυτησὶς οὐσίας δουκεν εἶναι μεθόριος, θυτησὶς μὲν ... , ἄθανάτου δὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ γενέων πρὸς θεον τὸν γανηθήν τῶν ὅλων ἐξομοίωσιν. Ιθ. 23. Ι ΙΙΙ, Philo speaks of human parents as τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δύνοντο εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραγαγόντας, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο μιμηταμένονς θεον. Ιθ. 23. 120: τῶν δ᾽ εὐτομοτέρων ἀποτεθεμένων τῶν γονέων ὀνόμα φασί τυνες, ὡς ἀρα πατήρ καὶ μήτηρ ἐμφανείς εἰσι θεοί, μοιμοίενοι τὸν ἀγένητον εν τῷ ψωφισταίνειν.

Plutarch speaks of love and marriage in a tone not unlike that of Ascl. III; but he dwells on the κοινωνία βίου as well as the act of procreation, whereas the Hermetist here confines his attention chiefly to the latter, and hints at the former only in a passing phrase summa caritas &c.) Plut. Amatorius 5. 9: τῶν γαμῆλιων ἑκείνου (ἐρωτα) καὶ σύνεργον ἄθανασίας τῷ θυτητῷ γένει, σβεννεμένην ἡμῶν τὴν φύσιν εὖθυν ἐξαναπηντα διὰ τῶν γενέσεως. Ιθ. 16. 3 ff.: ἐρως is a kind of ἐνθουσιαμός. Ιθ. 17. 21: Love is an initiation; ἐγὼ δὲ ὧρῳ τοὺς ἀγάμους δραγαστάται καὶ μὸνος ἐν ᾧ ἄδιδ᾽ υλεῖα μοῦραν οὖσαν. Ιθ. 23. 6: ἀλλὰ γνωσίς γε γαμματίας ἀρχαὶ ταῦτα φιλίας, ὑστερ ἱερῶν μεγαλῶν κοινωνίαται. καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς μεκρόν ἦ δὲ ἄπο ταυτοῦ ἀναβλαστάνουσα καθ᾽ ἡμέραν τιμή καὶ χάρις καὶ ἀγάπης ἀλλήλων καὶ πόσις κ.τ.λ. Ιθ. 24. 3: αὕτη γάρ ἔστιν ὡς ἄθλους δὲ δὲ ἄλλων λεγομένη κράτις, ἢ τῶν ἐρωτῶν᾽ (ἡ δὲ τῶν) ἄλλωσ συμβασίαν ταῖς καὶ Ἐπικουροῦν αῖθας καὶ περιπλακοῦς ὑποκειμένης, συγκρούσεις λαμβάνουσα καὶ ἀποτήρυνεσις, ἐνέχειν δὲ οὐ πουσά τοιαύτην, ἦν ἐρως τους, γαμηκυς κοινωνίας ἐπιπλαβόμενος. Ιθ. 24. 5: οὖν γάρ ἐραν μὲν ἐμβρυον γαῖαν οἱ ποιητα λέγουσι, καὶ γῆς ὀφανόν, ἐραν ἡ δὲ ἱερων σελήνης οἱ φυσικοι καὶ συγγενεσθαι καὶ κυνεσθαι. καὶ γῆν δὲ, ἀνθρώπων μητέρα καὶ γονέων καὶ φυσιῶν ἀπάντων γένεσιν, οὐκ ἀναγκαίον ἀπολέσθαι ποτὲ καὶ σβενεθήναι παντάπασιν, ὅταν ο ἐς ἐρας ἡ ἔμερος τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀπολέθη, καὶ πάλαιτερ ποθεύς καὶ δυσκούσα τὴν ἐκείθεν ἀρχήν καὶ κίνησιν; (Plutarch here agrees with the writer of Ascl. III in regarding the operation

1 A technical term of Stoic physics. It was applied to marriage by the Stoic Antipater, about 150 b.C. (Stob. IV, p. 508 Hense): αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλαι φιλίαι ἡ φιλοσοφοργεία δύσκολα ταῖς τῶν ὀνείρων ἢ τινῶν ἄλλων παραβαθῶν κατὰ τὸν παρασκευὴς μέθισιν, αἱ δ᾽ ἀνθρώποι καὶ γυναικεῖς ταῖς δὲ ὅλων κράτεσιν, διὰ οὖνος (ἐγενέμενος οὖν) ὀθαντι... οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῆς οὐσίας (i.e. property) καὶ τῶν φιλίων τἀς ἀνθρώπως τέκνων καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν σωμάτων οὕτως μὲν κοινωνοῦσι.
of productive force throughout the universe as analogous to human procreation; but he works out the analogy differently. Instead of speaking of God as bisexual, he makes God the male principle, and γυνα the female principle; and it is the aspiration of matter towards union with the creative energy of God that he compares with human love. He expresses the same thought at greater length in Is. et Os.) Plut. Coniug. praecepta 20 (cf. Amatorius 21. 9): καὶ ἡ φύσις μέγνυ τῶν σωμάτων ἡμᾶς, ἵνα ἐκ κατάρων μέρος λαβοῦσα καὶ συγκέισα, κοινὸν ἀμφότεροι ἀποδότο τὸ γινόμενον, ὡστε μηδέτερον διορίσαν μηδὲ διακρίνατο ἢ τὸ ἀλλότριον.

hoc ... in aeternum procreandi ... mysterium. Procreation is the means by which a race of mortal beings attains to 'a secondary eternity'; i.e. an everlasting existence in time. The word μυστήριον here means a ritual act by which man is brought near to God. For the notion that sexual union is a 'mystery' or sacrament in this sense, cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. 3. 27: οἰον δ' οἱ τὴν πάνθημον Ἀφροδίτην κοινωνίαν μυστικῆν ἀναγορεύοντον. ... οἱ γε τρισά-θλοι τὴν τε σαρκίνην (....) κατα (leg. καλ;) τὴν συνουσιαστικὴν κοινωνίαν λεοφανοῦσι, καὶ ταῦτα ἀιόνται εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτῶς ἀνόγειν τοῦ θεοῦ. The Valentinians, as reported by Irenaeus Adv. haer. 1. 6. 4, said that they ἴδωσαν ἀνωθεν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄρρητου καὶ ἀνωνυμάτου συν-ζυγίας συγκαταλημμυρίων ἔχειν τὴν χάραν ... διὸ καὶ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου δεῖν αὐτοῦς δὲ τὸ τῆς συζυγίας μελετῶν μυστήριον. This notion of the Valentinians may have been derived from the ιεροί γάμοι of Pagan mystery-cults.

huius tam blandi necessariique mysterii. If the act is both blandum and necessarium, i.e. both desirable and unavoidable, why should it be concealed? The writer answers, because men in general are incapable of recognizing its true sanctity.

ne ... utriusque naturae divinitas ex commixtione sexus cogatur erubescere. Male and female are made one with each other, and thereby are made one with God; hence, if they are put to shame, God himself is put to shame in them. I suppose that ex commixtione sexus is to be connected with utriusque naturae divinitas rather than with cogatur.

22 a—23 a. God's gift of reason to man. Compare the similar treatment of the same topic by a different writer in Ascl. II. 16 a. See also Ascl. I. 6 c—7 a.

The mention of inreligiosi in ch. 21 fin. enables the writer to pass on to what is really a new subject without breach of literary continuity.
The persistence of vice in the many is not caused by the paucity of religious men, but by defectus prudentiae in the many; and the words must be transposed accordingly.

ex intellectu . . . rationis divinae, qua constituta sunt omnia. Cf. Ascl. I. 6 b: '(νοῦς) humanos . . . sensus ad divinae rationis intelligentiam exornat.'

contemptus (⟨mundi totius⟩). Here contemptus mundi is good, and mundus must therefore be evil. Cf. vitia mundi in 22 b. Yet in 27 a, and elsewhere in Ascl. III, the mundus is good. In ch. 25, the error of the Christians is described by the words 'non admirandus videbitur mundus' &c. Mundus in 22 a must mean that which in 22 b is called pars corruptior mundi, as opposed to pars divina. If the Hermetist used the word κόσμος here as well as in ch. 25, he must have used it in a different sense. But perhaps the Greek for mundi totius may have been πάντων τῶν ἁλκῶν, or something of the sort. Even monistic Platonists found themselves compelled to admit that ἡλι is in some sense a source of evil.

perseverante autem inperitia atque inscientia, vitia omnia convalescunt. Cf. Corp. X. 8 b: κακία δὲ ψυχής ἄγνωσία κ.τ.λ.

disciplina et intellectus. The gift of God by which man is enabled to escape from moral evil is in this passage also called prudentia scientiaque rerum omnium quae sunt;—intellectus rationis divinae qua constituta sunt omnia;—intelligenstia et disciplina;—ratio disciplinaque;—prudentia et disciplina. In ch. 41 b, God confers on man νοῦς (rendered by sensus), λόγος (rendered by ratio), and γνώσις (rendered by intelligenstia and cogitatio). The corresponding terms in Ascl. II. 16 a are sensus, disciplina, intelligenstia, which probably stand for νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, γνώσις.

Cf. Philo, Quod deus sit immutabilis, 9. 44 f., Wendland II, p. 66: ἰδού μὲν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὄνων ὑπερβεβληκεν ἄνθρωπος. ἤξαρετὸν οὖσα τοῖνυν γῆς ἡλαχί διάνοια, ἡ τὰς ἀπάντων φύσεων σωμάτων τε ὅμοι καὶ πραγμάτων εἰσὶς καταλαμβάνειν. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ σώματι τὸ ἕγεμον ὄνος ὅστις, . . . τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ κρατιστείν ὁ νοῦς ψυχής γὰρ ὄνος οὖσα. . . . τούτο τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ εἶδος οὖκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων, εἰ δὲ τὰ ἐλλά ἀπετελεῖτο, διεπιστήθη, καθαροτέρας δὲ καὶ ἀμείνονος ἡλαχί τῆς οὖσίας, εἰ ἢς αἰ θείαι φύσεως ὀδημοφυγιούντο. παρὰ καὶ μάλον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν εἰκόνως ἄφθαρτον ἐδοξεῖν εἶναι διάνοια. There the words διάνοια and νοῦς correspond to disciplina et intellectus &c. in Ascl. III. 22 a.
ASCLEPIUS III: 22 a, b

22 b. cum post deos homines efficeret. Compare Pl. Tim. 41 D-43 A. The making of men is described in the Kore Kosmu.

ex parte corruptiore mundi et ex divina pari lance on-
ponderans. Cf. Lactantius Div. inst. 7. 13-16: '(Deus) hominem finxit ex ipsa terra, ... id est spiritum suum terreno corpore induit et involvit, ut compactus ex rebus diversis ac repugnantibus bonum ac malum caperet. ... Nam quia homo ex duabus rebus constat, corpore atque anima, quorum alterum terrenum est, alterum caeleste, duae vitae homini adtributae sunt, una temporalis, quae corpori adsignatur, altera sempiterna, quae animae subiacet.'

We are told that men are made of a mixture of the corruptior pars mundi and the divina (pars mundi); or, as it is afterwards expressed, that God made man ex utraque natura (of either substance), divina atque mortali. On the other hand, the gods are made wholly of the divina pars mundi, which is also called mundissima pars mundi, and immortalis natura. And it is in virtue of the divina pars mundi in his composition that man possesses disciplina et intellectus, and is capable of attaining to immortality, or in other words, of becoming a god. The divina pars mundi then must be the stuff of which the rational and immortal part of the soul is made. Is this stuff corporeal or incorporeal? According to the Hermetists in general (see for instance Ascl. I. 7 b), the rational and immortal soul is incorpo-
real. But in this passage, the writer uses words which seem to imply that the higher part of man, as well as the lower, is corporeal; for mundus (which probably here stands for ὤν) cannot be incorpo-
real. It seems then that, according to this chapter, there are two kinds of matter, the one finer, and the other coarser; the gods (i.e. the astral gods, the di caelestes) and the rational soul of man are composed of the finer kind of matter; the human body is composed of the coarser kind; and it is the coarser kind alone that gives rise to evil passions. In expressing himself thus, the writer has probably been influenced by the language of some Stoic author-
ity (very likely Posidonius); for the Stoics denied the existence of incorporeal soul, and taught that gods are composed of πύρ πνεῦμα, and human souls, of a mixture of fire and air. (Or, his divina pars mundi may be rather the 'fifth element' of the Peripatetics; see note on Ascl. I. 6 b, '(νόσις) quae quinta pars soli homini concessa est ex aethere'.) It does not, however, necessarily follow that the writer of Ascl. III consciously rejected the Platonic and Hermetic doctrine of incorporeality; the truth seems rather to be that he has

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here adopted phrases which were current in another school, without making the alterations which would be needed to bring them into agreement with his own principles. Perhaps, when he speaks of the rational soul as composed of a kind of ‘matter’ or ‘stuff’, he means the phrase to be understood metaphorically. Compare the language of Philo in *Q. d. s. i.* 9. 44, quoted above (οὐκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων . . . διεπλάσθη, καθαρωτέρας δὲ . . . ἠλαχε τῆς οὐσίας, ἦς ἦς θεία φύσεως ἐδημοουργήτο), which, taken literally, would imply that the οὐσία or διάνοια is made of a material substance. In *Kore Kosmu* (Stob. *Exc.* XXIII. 14), the making of souls is described in terms of matter (πνεῦμα γὰρ . . . λαβὼν, καὶ νοερὸ τὸν πυρὶ μίξας, ἀναγώσιοι τοὺν ἐτέρως ὅλαις ἔκφρασον κ.τ.λ.); but it need not be inferred from these words that the author of the *Kore Kosmu* held the soul to be really composed of material elements.

vitia contigit mundi, corporibus commixta, remanere, et alia propter cibos (intrare). Evil passions are caused by the matter in which the soul is entangled during its life in the body. They arise partly from the matter of which the body was originally composed, and partly from the additional matter which is absorbed into the body when we take food. It is apparently only the grosser elements, earth and water, that give rise to evil passions; hence the *di caelestes*, whose bodies are composed of fire alone, are free from them.

Cf. *Pistis Sophia* cap. i11, C. Schmidt, p. 182: ‘the child eats of the τροφαι of the κόσμος of the ἀρχοντες, and . . . the ἀντίμμον πνεῦμα draws to itself the μέρος of the κακία which is in the τροφαί. (And as the child grows,) the ἀντίμμον πνεῦμα seeks after all κακίαι and ἐνιθυμίαι, and all sins; . . . and it seduces the soul, and compels it to do all its ἀνομίαι’ &c. *Ib.* cap. 130, p. 213: ‘Suppose that a man has neglected to pray the prayer which takes away the κακία of the τροφαι which he eats and drinks, and that through the κακία of the τροφαι he is bound to the axle of the εἰμαρμένη of the ἀρχοντες, and through the ἀνάγκη of the στοιχεία he has sinned . . .’

*Diis . . . nullis indigentibus rationis disciplinaeque admini-
oulis. The writer is here speaking of the αἰσθητοὶ θεοὶ, i.e. the *di caelestes* (astral gods), and not of the νοητοὶ θεοὶ. The *di caelestes*, not being affected by the causes which produce evil passions in

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1 Schmidt's text gives τροφαι; but the right reading is evidently τροφαί.

2 The ἀντίμμον πνεῦμα is an appendage which is attached to the soul at the time of its incarnation.
men, have no need of *ratio disciplinaque* (λογισμός and ἐπιστήμη) as a preventive against such passions. God has therefore bestowed λογισμός and ἐπιστήμη on men alone. The *di caelestes* have not received this gift, but are secured against evil in a different and more effectual way. In the first place, they have immortality and perpetual vigour, i.e. they are not liable to physical evil, and have no need of λογισμός and ἐπιστήμη to enable them to guard against that; and in the second place, their actions, (i.e. their movements in the heavens, by means of which they operate on the world below,) are determined by invariable law, so that they do not need λογισμός and ἐπιστήμη to enable them to guard against moral evil. It seems surprising to be told that the gods do not possess 'reason and knowledge'; but the statement may be accepted, if we assume that λογισμός (or διάνοια) and ἐπιστήμη are here distinguished from and contrasted with νοῦς, and that the souls of the gods are pure νοῦς.

Cf. ch. 18 b fin.: 'serisum (i.e. νοῦν) deorum animam dixerunt'1 We must take the words λογισμός and ἐπιστήμη to mean faculties adapted to the state of man on earth. The gods possess the power of directly and intuitively apprehending the true and good; this power man does not now possess; he will acquire it only when he realizes his 'hope of immortality', i.e. when he himself becomes a god. By λογισμός and ἐπιστήμη we must understand knowledge of good and evil, which carries with it the power to choose between good and evil. (Cf. Philo, *Quod deus sit immutabilis*, 9. 47, Wendland II, p. 66, where διάνοια, the faculty by the possession of which man is distinguished from the beasts, is identified with τὸ ἐκοινων.)

Now the gods are secured against the possibility of evil. In place of the human knowledge of good and evil, they have knowledge of absolute and unmixed good; and they are not called upon to choose between good and evil, for they necessarily and inevitably do that which is good. Cf. Philo *De opif. mundi* 24. 73, Cohn I, p. 24: τῶν θεῶν τὰ μὲν οὗτ' ἀρετῆς οὔτε κακίας μετέχει, ὅσπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα ἄλογα, τὰ μὲν οὗτ' ἄνυχά τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀφαιράστως φύσιν διωκεῖται, τὰ δ' οὗτοι νοῦν καὶ λόγον ἐκτέμυται· κακίας δὲ καὶ ἄρετής ὡς ἐν οἷς νοῦς καὶ λόγος (the *ratio disciplinaque* of Ascl. III), ὡς ἐφεύκασθ' ἐνδιαγώνθαι. τὰ δ' ἀδ' μόνη καταλαμώνηκεν ἄρετής, ἀμέτοχα πάσης ὄντα κακίας, ὅσπερ οἱ ἀστέρες· οὗτοι γὰρ ζῷα τε ἐξαι λέγονται καὶ ζῷα νοερά, μᾶλλον δὲ νοῦς αὐτός ἑκατός, ἄλος δ' ἄλον σπουδαῖος, καὶ πάντος

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ASCLEPIUS

atipidecetai kackoi' ta de tis miktesi esti fuisseos, dister andhropou, de eiexketai tawnia, frounqin kai afoousyn, ... kai synelevonti fratan agath kai kak, kal kai aloxraa, areatin kai kaqian. Sen. Ep. 95. 36: 'di immortales nullam didicare virtutem, cum omni editi, et pars naturae eorum est, bonos esse.' Id. 49: 'errat si quis illos (sc. deos) putat nocere nolle: non possunt.'

quamvis immortalitas ... intentionemque protendens. I have rewritten this corrupt passage so as to make it express what I suppose to have been the writer's meaning; but his exact words can hardly be restored.

ordinem necessitatis lege conscriptum aeterna[ ]constituit. Cf. Ps.-Pl. Epinomis 98 a aff.: there are two kinds of ζφα, το μαν εκ πυρος, ... το 6' εκ γης, και το μαν γηνος εν αταξια, το 6' εκ πυρος εν ταξιε παση κινομενον. το μαν ον εν αταξια κινομενον αφρον χρη νομιζειν, δηπ ός το πολ', δρε το περι ημας ζφον, το δε εν ταξει τε και οθεμον πόρον ζηνον μεγα τεκμηριων χρη ποιωθαι του φρονιμος ειναι κατα ταξιε γαρ και και οσαντων πορευμενον αι και ποιον και πασχοι τεκμηριον ικανον του φρονιμου ζην ει τε παρεχομενον. η ψυχης δε αναγκη νοιν κεκτηνης απασων αναγκων πολυ μεγιστη γινοντ τα ναρκωνα γαρ αν ουκ αρχομεν νομοθετει. το δε αμεταστροφον, οταν ψυχη το αριστον κατα των αριστων βουλευσαι νοιν, το τελεον λιβαινε τι δοντι κατα νοιν, και οδη οδιας αν ανου κρειτον οδη αμεταστροφωτερον αν ποτε γένοτο. Cic. Nat. deor. 2. 43 f.: 'sensum autem astrorum atque intellegentiam maxime declarat ordo eorum atque constantia' &c. See Mayor's note ad loc.

The writer of Ascl. III ascribes to the deus summus, and not to the di caelestes themselves, the νοιοι by which the movement or action of the heavenly bodies is determined. But he certainly does not mean that they are mere passive matter, moved by compulsion from without; we must assume that they are νοεροι, and that their νοιο works in perfect and unvarying accord with that of the deus summus. It could not do otherwise; for it is his νοιο that is in them; all νοιο is one.

potuissent stands for possent. See note on Ascl. I. 8, intueri potuisset.

et 'bonum' hominem et qui posset inmortalis esse ex utraque natura compositum, divina atque mortali. The mortalis natura is contrasted with the divina natura; and in place of bonum, we need some adjective which may stand in corresponding contrast to inmortalis. Some such word as terrenum would serve the purpose.
ASCLEPIUS III: 23 b, 24 a


"(hominem) . . . esse meliorem et diis. Cf. Corp. X. 24 b: καὶ ἐπὶ ἑκεῖνος (εἰς τοὺς ἐν οὐρανῷ θεοῖς) ἦσσιν ὁ ἄντως ἄνθρωπος, ἥ πάντως γε οὐσιώδειον ἄνθρωπος. The reason given in that document is that man’s range is wider than that of the di caelestes; for he is at home both in the higher world and in the lower, while the di caelestes are limited to the higher. (A similar thought is expressed in Ascl. I. 6 a, ‘feliciore loco medietatis’ &c. See also Ascl. I. 9 fin., ‘mortalitate auctus’.) Perhaps the writer of Ascl. III might have added that man has freedom of choice between good and evil, and if he chooses rightly, is on that ground ‘better’ than the gods, whose action is determined by necessity. He who might do wrong deserves more credit if he does right.

Compare Pistis Sophia cap. 100, C. Schmidt, p. 162: ‘when you have departed from the body, and ascended to the region of the Archontes, all the Archontes ( = the di caelestes) will feel shame before you (sc. the “saved” or “purified” men), because you are the dregs of the νῦν of which they are made, and yet have become purer light than all of them.’

omnium mortalium represents the Greek genitive after a comparative. Cf. Ascl. Prologue, init., ‘omnium . . . divinior’.


23 b, 24 a. Man is able to make gods. This topic is resumed in ch. 37. Here, the mention of it leads on to the Prophecy, chs. 24 b-26 a. The ‘man-made gods’ are the gods worshipped in the temple-cults of Egypt, which the Christians were seeking to suppress at the time when Ascl. III was written. Jews and Christians had long been accustomed to make it a reproach against the Pagans that they worshipped ‘gods made by men's hands’; the writer defiantly admits the fact, and glories in it.

The notion that a god or daemon could, by certain ritual words and acts, be incorporated in an image or other material object, no
doubt lay at the root of most of the Pagan cults. But the belief
that a statue was a god, or was animated by an indwelling god,
had been discarded by all educated Greeks; and in the higher
Greek literature, from Homer down to the Christian era, few traces
of it are to be found. Heraclitus, fr. 5 Diels, speaks with scorn
of the ignorant people who address their prayers to statues, 'as if
one were to talk to house-walls'. Dio Chrysost. Or. 12 explains
and defends the practice of making statues of the gods from the
point of view of an enlightened Greek, which is very different from
that of the Egyptian writer of Ascl. III: 'Mind and wisdom
(νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν) in their very being, no sculptor or painter can
depict... But knowing that the human body is a receptacle of
wisdom and reason, we ascribe this form to the gods; and having
no model to copy, we seek to represent the inimitable and in-
visible by that which is imitable and visible, using the human form
as a symbol... It cannot be maintained that it would be better
to have no statues or images of the gods set up among men, and
that we ought to look to the heavenly bodies alone. All men of
sense revere the heavenly bodies as blessed gods; but then we see
only from afar; and our conception of the divine produces in all
mankind a strong desire to worship the deity close at hand, drawing
near to the gods and laying hold of them with entreaties, sacrificing
to them, and decking them with wreaths. For just as young
children, when they are parted from their father or mother, often in
dreams stretch out their hands with strong desire and yearning
towards the loved one who is far away, even so do men yearn
toward the gods, loving them, as is but right, by reason of their
goodness to us, and the kinship between god and man, and eager
to meet them and hold converse with them in any way.'

Maximus Tyrius, Or. 2 Hobein, discusses the question ἐὰν θεοῖς
dιάλιματα ἱδρύειν; and his answer is to the same effect as that
of Dio. 'Those men', he says, 'in whom the memory (of the
higher world from which the soul has come) is strong, and who are
capable of uplifting their souls straight to heaven, and meeting
the Divine there,—such men, perhaps, have no need of images.
But men of that kind are rare; and you will never find a whole
community that retains the memory of things divine, and does not
need such help as images give... And so the lawgivers, I think,
dealt with their peoples as with a troop of children, and invented
these images for mankind, as signs to direct them to the worship
of the Divine, and as means of guidance on the road to the recollection of things above. . . . There is no race, Barbarian or Greek, . . . which can do without setting up some visible symbols of their reverence for the gods. . . . God himself, the Father and Maker of all that is,—who was before the sun, and before the heavens, who is mightier than time¹ and all the world of change,—him no lawgiver can name, no tongue can tell of him, no eye behold him; and inasmuch as it is beyond our power to apprehend him in his true being, we seek help in sounds and names, in living creatures, in shapes wrought in gold and ivory and silver, in trees and plants, in rivers and mountain-tops and water-springs, longing indeed to know God,² but compelled by our weakness to give to things of beauty in this world the name which should denote his being. . . . And if the memory of God is awakened in Greeks by the sculpture of a Pheidias, and in Egyptians by their worship of beasts, in some men by a river, and in others by a fire, I find no fault with their disagreement; only let them recognize the Divine, and yearn for it, and call to mind the God their souls once knew.'

Julian, Fragmentum epistolae 293 A, Bidez and Cumont 89 b, p. 133 (Hertlein I, p. 376 sq.).

¹ A Christian reader of this passage expresses his scorn in an inserted note: ἀλλ' ὁδ' ἐχρή, ὃ ἐπιστέφανος ἔφη, τοῦ κατά σὲ ἀκόα τε λεγόμενον ἀναστηλώντας ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸν κατὰ σὲ

² ἐν σώματι, σωματικός ἔδει ποιεῖται τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῶν λατρειῶν, ἀσώματος δὲ οὐκ ἄστοι: πρῶτα μὲν ἔδειξεν ἡμῖν ἀγάλματα τὸ δεύτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν θεῶν γένους περὶ πάντα τῶν υἱῶν κόσμων περιφερόμενον. δύναμις δὲ οὐκ οὖσατο ἀποδίδοντος ἥ τε θρεπτείας σωματικώς ἀπροσδεκτῇ γάρ ἀστοι φύσις τρεῖτον ἔπει γῆς ἐξερήθη γένος ἀγαλμάτων, εἰς δὲ τὰς θρεπτείας ἐπιτελοῦντες, ἑαυτοῖς ἐπεμενεὶ τοῖς θεοῖς καταστήσωμεν. ἄστερ γὰρ οἱ τῶν βασιλέων θρεπτεύοντες εἰκόνας, οὔτε δειμένων, ὡμοὶ ἐφελκόνται τῇ εὐνοίᾳ εἰς εαυτοῦς, οὕτως καὶ οἱ θεῶν θρεπτεύοντες τὰ ἀγάλματα, δεομένων οὕτως τῶν θεῶν, ὡμοὶ παύουσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπαμένειν σφαίρα καὶ κήδεσθαι: δείγμα γὰρ ἑστιν (τῆς) ὡς ἀλλόθυς δυσώνυσεν ἣ περὶ τὰ δύνατα προθυμία, κ.τ.λ.
In Corp. XVII we have a fragment from the end of a dialogue in which the same subject was discussed. The view of its writer seems to have resembled that of Dio Chrysost., Maximus Tyrius, and Julian, rather than that expressed in Ascl. III. See also Plotinus 4. 3. 11.

Plutarch (Is. et Os. 71) expresses his contempt for Greeks who are so foolish as to suppose that a statue is a god: ἄτοπερ Ἑλλήνων οἱ τὰ χαλέα καὶ τὰ γραπτὰ καὶ λίθων μὴ μαθόντες μὴ ἔθυσθέντες ἄγαλμα καὶ τιμᾶς θεῶν ἄλλα θεοῦ καλεῖν, εἰτα τολμώντες λέγειν ὅτι τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν Δαχάρης ἔξεδεν, τὸν δ' Ἀπολλώνα χρυσοῦ βοστρύχου ἐχοντα Διονύσου ἀπέκειεν, . . . λανθάνονσι εὐθελκομενοι καὶ παραδεχόμενοι δόξας πονηρᾶς ἐπομένας τοῖς ἅγιοι. But in Egypt, the belief in the real presence of the god in the statue survived in all its primitive force.

The story of The Possessed Princess of Bekhten (Budge, Egyptian Reading Book, p. xxviii ff.) is a good illustration of the popular Egyptian notion of a statue which is a god. The King of Egypt sent ‘Khonsu-who-performeth-mighty-things’ in a boat, with an escort, from Thebes to the distant land of Bekhten; the Prince of Bekhten came forth to meet the god; and the god went (i.e. was carried) to the place where the Princess was, and drove out the demon of sickness which possessed her. The Prince then said ‘The god Khonsu shall be made to abide in this country, and I will not allow him to depart into Egypt’; and the god tarried there three years and more. But the Prince was then warned by a dream, in which he saw the god come out of his shrine, in the form of a golden hawk, and fly away to Egypt; and when he woke up, he said ‘The god has departed from us, and has made his way back into Egypt; we must now send his vehicle back to Egypt’. Throughout this story, the god is the statue, and the statue is the god, except in the inference which the Prince draws from his dream; the words there used imply that the divine soul hitherto embodied in the statue has quitted it, and flown off to Egypt, leaving the statue lifeless in its shrine.

Strabo (17. 28, p. 805) says that the Egyptian temples contained ἔξωνι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ οὐκ ἀνθρωπόμορφον, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀλάγων ἤφων τινός. But this must be a mistake, caused by the fact that the god himself was never exposed to public view. On the Egyptian cult-images,
see Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, Eng. tr. 1894, p. 275. 'In
the Holy of Holies was a shrine, . . . inside which was a richly
adorned little bark, . . . containing the figure of the god. The
statue could therefore have been only about two feet high; it
probably resembled the little bronze figures of which we possess
such a number. We know no more, for this sacred image of the
god was so strictly guarded from profane eyes that as far as is
known it is never once represented in the temple reliefs' (with one
possible exception of late date). 'Even the pictures of the Holy
of Holies show only the divine bark; in the centre is the deck
cabin, like a little temple', (in which the statue was hidden). 'This
bark was carried round in procession on great festivals, and to the
outside world it was itself the image of the god.' The cult-images
were doubtless deliberately destroyed by the Christians, and no
specimen of them has been preserved. If they resembled the
portraits of the gods which appear on the monuments, many of
them must have taken the form of a human body with an animal
head; but the writer of Ascl. III expressly says that they were in
human shape (23 b fin., 'humanitas deos suos ex sui vultus simili-
tudine figuraret'), and there is no conclusive evidence to the
contrary. The statue of Serapis in the temple of that god at
Alexandria was of foreign origin, and did not conform to the native
Egyptian type.

Wiedemann, *Rel. of the Anc. Eg.*, Eng. tr. 1897, p. 180 f, says
it is a mistake to suppose that 'the Egyptian temple centred round
a statue'; . . . 'generally speaking (in the case of those temples
in which the godhead was supposed to dwell) it was not to statues
that the temple prayers and offerings were made, but . . . to the
sacred animal of the place'. The author of Ascl. III, however,
diffsers from Wiedemann in this. It appears to be implied in ch. 37,
that the deity who resided in a temple was in some cases embodied
in a statue, and in other cases, in a sacred animal. The passage
of Celsus (Orig. c. Cels. 3. 17) quoted by Wiedemann *l.c.* applies
only to those temples in which the god was incarnated in an
animal, and does not exclude the existence of other temples in
which the god was incorporated in a statue. Wiedemann speaks
of 'the numerous statues set up in a temple . . . for the adornment
of the building and the future welfare of the bestower'; but these
must be distinguished from the cult-image in which the god was
embodied. The latter was concealed in its shrine, and only
certain priests (οἱ ἐς τὸ ἄδοντον εἰσπορεύομενοι πρὸς τὸν στόλισμὸν τῶν θεῶν, Decree of Canopus, 238 B.C.) had access to it.

23 b. nobis inducitur sermo. The true reading must surely be inducitur, though indicitur, which is given by the MSS., was already read by Augustine.

inluminat (-nant MSS.). Here, as often, φως is closely connected with ζωή. By means of certain rites, man confers conscious life and intelligence on the statues which he makes.

Nec inmerito miraculo dignus est. Cf. Ascl. I. 6 a init.: 'magnum miraculum est homo' &c.

It may be doubted whether the text of this sentence is sound; we should rather have expected 'nec inmerito (gratulatione?) dignus est, qui est omnium ⟨⟨miraculorum⟩⟩ maximum'.

de mundissima parte materiae (naturae MSS.) esse prognatum. The bodies of the di caelestes are made of fire (or of the 'fifth element' of the Peripatetics). The words which follow (ex utraque natura &c.) seem to imply that the souls of the cult-images are corporeal, and are made of the same material substance as the bodies of the di caelestes (and that those bodies are souls?). If this is the meaning, the writer has here again adopted the language of Stoicism.

signaque eorum sola quasi capita pro omnibus esse. Signa (σήμεια) more commonly means 'constellations'; but it here denotes the heavenly bodies individually.

The astral gods have no trunk or limbs; the bodily form of each of them is that of a human head without appendages. The human head is (approximately) spherical, and is the seat of reason; and the sun, moon, and stars resemble it in both respects. The notion is derived from Plato Tim. 44 d f. Cf. Corp. X. 11: ὁ κόσμος σφαιρᾶ ἔστι, τούτων κεφαλῆ, κ.τ.λ.

ex utraque natura conformatae sunt. A temple-god, like a man, consists of body and soul. His body is a statue carved by human hands; his soul is a daemon, or beatified human soul, incorporated in the statue by means of a prescribed ritual.

ex ea quae infra homines est. We must read infra in place of intra. The wood or metal of which the statue is made is not 'within' man; but it may be said to be 'beneath' man, in the sense that it stands lower in the scale of existence, and is subject to his power.

memor naturae et originis suae. Natura (γένεσις?) here means 'birth'. Man remembers that God is the author and
source of his being, and he therefore imitates God. We have already been told that man imitates God by procreation; we are now told that he imitates God also by making gods in his own image. The thought is far-fetched and fanciful; but a writer who has set himself to maintain the paradox that 'man makes gods' can hardly be expected to keep within the limits of sober reason.

24 a. futurorum praescias, ... in becillitate hominibus facientes easque curantes. The chief functions which the writer ascribes to the temple-gods of Egypt are firstly, the prediction of future events; and secondly, the causing and healing of disease. He distinguishes three methods of prediction, viz. (1) sorte, 'by lot', (2) vate, by the utterance of a person possessed by the deity, and (3) somnis, by dreams.

We hear of oracles worked by the temple-priests under the native dynasties; and in the times when the priesthood was most powerful, e.g. at the end of the XXth dynasty (1090 B.C.), the oracle of Amon at Thebes 'became part of the ordinary machinery of government' (Breasted, Hist. of Egypt, p. 523). The kingdom of Aethiopia, which had been founded by colonists from Egypt, was long dominated by priests, who used the oracle of Amon at Meroe as their instrument. See Hdt. 2. 29. Diodorus 3. 5 describes the method by which the Aethiopian king was appointed; the god was carried round, and chose (ἐλάβε) one of a group of selected candidates. This must mean that the priests who carried the statue in its portable shrine, and whose movements were supposed to be controlled by the god, stopped before the man who was to be appointed. This is the same procedure by which the priests of Amon at Thebes made Thutmès III king of Egypt in 1501 B.C. (Breasted, ib. p. 268). According to Lucian, Dea Syria 38, a similar method of working the oracle was employed in the temple at Bambye; and when a question was asked, the god answered 'yes' by making the priests who carried him move forward, or 'no' by making them move backward. But such a method as this could hardly be described by the word sorte; and when the Hermetist speaks of consulting the oracle 'by lot', he probably means drawing one of a number of tablets on which sentences are written.

Diodorus ib. adds that the Aethiopian priests were able to compel a king to kill himself at the command of the oracle, until King Ergamenes, about 280–250 B.C., defied and massacred them. In Egypt, under the Ptolemies and the Romans, the temple-oracles
had ceased to be of political importance, but were still consulted by many persons who sought a god's advice about their private concerns; though the demand for oracular responses must have been diminished by the increasing competition of the astrologers.

We hear of oracular dreams (somnia) obtained by incubation at the temples of Serapis. Strabo 17. 17, p. 801: Κάνωβος . . . ἔχουσα τὸ τοῦ Χαράπιδος ἱερὸν πολλὴ ἀγιοτέρα τιμώμενον καὶ θεραπείας ἐκφέρον, ὡστε καὶ τοῦς ἀλλογιμωτάτους ἄνδρας πιστεύειν καὶ ἐγκομιαζομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ οὕτων ἡ ἐγερέναι. συγγραφοῦν δὲ τινὲς καὶ τὰς θεραπείας, ἄλλοι δὲ ἀρετῶς τῶν ἐνταῦθα λογίων (ἀρετολογίας Wilcken). The last words refer to the ἀρετολόγου, i.e. professional story-tellers attached to a sanctuary, whose business was to edify the public with tales of wonders worked by the god. Otto Priester und Tempel I. 118, II. 226. There were professional interpreters of dreams (ἐννυνοκρίται) and interpreters of oracles who carried on their business in the Serapeum at Memphis (Otto ib. 1. 118). The god Imhotep-Asclepius likewise prescribed for his patients through dreams. For early instances of oracular dreams, see the story of Merneptah, 1225-1215 B.C. (Breasted, Hist. Eg. p. 468), and that of the priest-king in the time of Sennacherib (Hdt. 2. 141); the god who speaks in the dream is in both these cases Ptah.

An oracle is delivered vate when the god speaks through the mouth of a priest who is possessed by him; as when the priest of the Libyan Ammon 'told Alexander by word of mouth that he was a son of Zeus' (Strabo 17. 43, p. 814). At that temple, we are told, this method was exceptional; as a rule, the priest who 'personated the god' (τὸν Δία ἐπεκρίνατο), and gave the response to the inquirer, did not speak, but merely signified his meaning by gestures. Firmicus Maternus, De err. prof. relig. 13. 4, quotes Porphyry as saying 'Serapis vocatus et intra corpus hominis conlatus, talia respondit'. In such cases, the priest becomes for the time 'a living statue' of the god (see ch. 37 below).

The Hermetist says that the temple-gods not only heal diseases, but also cause them. Cf. ch. 37: 'Isin . . . quantis obesse scimus iratam!' No doubt the sick were sometimes told by an oracle that

1 The story of 'The possessed Princess of Bekhten' is an ἀρετολογία of pre-Hellenic date. Abt, Ein Bruchstück einer Sarapis-Aretalogie, Archiv für Religionswiss. XVIII (1915), 357 sqq., gives the text of a papyrus-fragment in which is told a story of a response obtained from Sarapis by incubation, and of the healing &c. which followed. This papyrus was written 'not later than the third century A.D.'
the disease was due to the anger of this or that temple-god, and were directed to appease the offended deity by offerings.

24b-26a. The Prophecy. See Introduction, vol. i, pp. 61–76, where I have given reasons for holding that this prediction must have been written at the time of the Palmyrene occupation of Egypt in A.D. 268–273.

Elsewhere in the Hermetica we find passing references to the time of the writer, or times recent to him, in the form of predictions spoken by Trismegistus; e.g. Ascl. I. 12b: men will corrupt philosophy by mingling it with profane science. Corp. XVI. 1b: Greeks will translate the books of Hermes into their own language. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. VI. 14: men will give names to stars which are now nameless. Ascl. III. 27d: the city of Alexandria will be founded. But the extant Hermetic literature contains no other prophecy of the same type as that in Ascl. III. In the form of a prediction uttered by a prehistoric teacher, the writer expresses his horror and dismay at the situation of his country. He is deeply moved by the calamities under which Egypt is suffering; but in his view, these calamities are merely a symptom or accompaniment of a yet more terrible evil; and that which distresses him most is the decay of religion. He sees Christianity gaining ground among his countrymen; they are accepting the new doctrine and way of life, and abandoning the old cults; and this, to him, means that religion itself is dying out, since religion, as he understands it, is inseparable from the established forms of worship. If men cease to worship the gods, all kinds of misery and disaster must inevitably follow; not only human society, but the universe itself must fall into confusion. Yet he does not utterly despair; sooner or later God will intervene to save his disordered world from ruin; and so the gloomy prophecy ends in a tone of faith and hope; the writer looks forward to a πολιτεία, when all things shall be made new.

Apocalyptic prophecies were known to the Egyptians from an early period. A document dating from the Middle Kingdom, about 2000 B.C. (Leyden Papyrus I. 344; Lange, Sitzungsber. der Berliner Akad. XXVII. 601–610; Breasted, Hist. Eg. p. 204) contains the utterance of a prophet named Ipuwer, who foretells the coming of a time when 'the social and political organization shall be overthrown, the poor shall become rich and the rich shall suffer need,
foreign enemies shall enter, and the established order of things shall be completely overturned. After predicting frightful calamities, the prophet announces a saviour who shall restore prosperity to the land. A Greek papyrus published by Wessely (Denkschr. d. Wien. Akad. XLII, 1893, p. 3ff.; Bouché-Leclercq, Hist. des Lagides III, p. 25) contains fragments of an Egyptian document, in which it is told how a man of the time of Amenophis predicted the expulsion of foreign enemies and the restoration of the national king; the original was probably written in the time of the Persian rule. Manetho mentions a prophecy which was said to have been uttered by a lamb in the reign of Bocchoris (Bekneranef, 712 B.C.); and the prophecy to which he refers is extant in a demotic papyrus of the time of Augustus (Krall, Festgaben für Büdinger, Innsbruck 1898; Breasted, Hist. Eg. p. 547). The lamb foretells the invasion and conquest of Egypt by the Assyrians. Egyptian documents of this type may have been known to the Hermetist.

He may also have been influenced by Jewish apocalyptic writings current in his time (see Bousset, Religion des Judenthums in Neuest. Zeitalter, Kap. XIII), e.g. the Oracula Sibyllina, the greater part of which originated in Egypt. Orac. Sib. V (about the time of Trajan?) contains several announcements of woe to Egypt, and predicts—but, unlike Ascl. III, with exultation—the overthrow of Egyptian idolatry (ll. 484–500). Predictions of civil war in Egypt occur in Sib. VII. 18–20 and XIII. 74–78; the latter passage is connected with an account of the reign of Philippus, A.D. 244–249. The concluding paragraph of the Hermetic prophecy, in which the writer describes the impending senectus mundi and the subsequent regenitura, is also in some respects analogous to the eschatology of the Jewish and Christian apocalypses. See, for instance, the short summary of Jewish eschatology in Sib. II. 6–14 and 21–33. The Sibyllists agree with the Hermetist in foretelling a time of misery and confusion, which will culminate in the destruction of the impious, and will be followed by a ‘restoration of all things’ in the interest of the pious. But the denotation of the words ‘pious’ and ‘impious’ is reversed; for the Sibyllists are bitter opponents of the old cults to which the Hermetist clings. Moreover, the political aspirations of the Jewish Sibyllists of the first and second

1 The prevalent belief that the end of the saeculum is at hand is expressed e.g. by Tertullian Apol. 32 (A.D. 197): the Christians pray for the Roman emperor, because they know ‘vim maximam universo orbi imminentem, ipsamque clausulam saeculi, acerbitates horrendas comminantem, Romani imperil commeatu retardari'.
centuries A.D.— their thirst for vengeance on their enemies, their confident predictions of the destruction of the tyrant power of Rome, and their assurance that the overthrow of Rome will be followed by the reign of God’s chosen people,— find no analogy in the prophecy of the Hermetist. He deplores the invasion of Egypt by foreigners, partly because it involves the slaughter of Egyptians, and partly because it hastens the decay of the national religion; but he shows no trace of a vindictive temper; bloodshed is revolting to him, and the more revolting when the shedders of blood are his own countrymen; and his patriotism does not take the form of a desire for the political dominance of his own race.

In the concluding paragraph of the Prophecy, the Hermetist seems to be following some authority which spoke of a cyclically recurring renovation of the universe. If that is the case, the source from which he is there drawing cannot be Jewish or Christian; for the Jews and Christians rejected the notion of a recurring cycle, and looked forward to a single and final renovation. (See Orig. c. Cels. 4. 67.) It therefore seems that the writer must have been influenced rather by the Stoic theory of a periodically recurring ecpyrosis and diacosmosis; and the analogies presented by Seneca (see below) make it probable that his description is derived in part from Posidonius. The Hermetist himself, however, lays no stress on the cyclic recurrence of the process; his attention is fixed on the one senectus mundi which he sees to be already in progress, and the one regenitura which will follow it.

The text of the Prophecy has been confused by some interpolations, and probably by some transpositions.

Interpolations:— (a) Ch. 24 b: "sed, quod est durius, quasideslegibus a religione, pietate, cultuque divino statuetur praescripta poena prohibitio." These 'so-called laws' are evidently laws enacted shortly before the words were written. But Pagan worship was not prohibited by law until the middle of the fourth century A.D. See Gibbon, ch. 21 fin.; Boissier, Fin de Paganisme, I, p. 75 ff. and 94 ff., II, p. 339 ff.; Otto, Priester und Tempel, I, p. 404. Constantine forbade divination, confiscated the property of many temples, and suppressed certain particular cults for special reasons; (he is said, for instance, to have taken measures against certain priests of the Nile-god, whose practices were considered morally offensive; see Euseb. Vita Constant. 4. 25;) but it is generally agreed that he enacted no
penal laws against Pagan worship as such. An edict ascribed to Constans, A.D. 341 (?), *Cod. Theodos.* 16. 10. 2, forbids sacrifices in general, and appears to assert (though this is explained away by commentators) that Constantine had forbidden them before him: 'Cesset superstition, sacrificiorum aboleatur insanía. Nam quicunque contra legem divi principis parentis nostri et hanc nostrae mansuetudinis iussionem ausus fuerit sacrificia celebrare, competens in eum vindicta et praesens sententia exseratur.' But Constans did not rule in Egypt. Firmicus Maternus, *De err. prof. relig.*, A.D. 347, urges the emperors Constantius and Constans to enact penal laws against Pagan worship; e.g. c. 16: 'amputanda sunt haec, sacratissimi imperatores, penitus atque delenda, et severissimis edictorum vestrorum legibus corrigenda, ne diutius Romanorum orbem praesumptionis istius error funestus immaculet.' The language of Firmicus implies that no such laws were in force at the time when he wrote. It seems that the earliest law to which the words of the Hermetic text could be applied was the edict issued by Constantius, probably in A.D. 353, *Cod. Theodos.* 16. 10. 4: 'Placuit omnibus locis atque urbis universis claudi protinus templa, et accessu vetitis omnibus licentiam delinquendi perditae abnegari. Volumus etiam cunctos sacrificiiis abstinere. Quod si quis alicud forte huius modi perpetraverit, gladio ultore sternatur: facultates etiam perempti fisco decernimus vindicari: et similiter affligi rectores provinciarum, si facinora vindicare neglexerint.' This was followed by another edict, issued at Milan by Constantius in A.D. 356, *Cod. Theodos.* 16. 10. 6: 'Poena capitis subiugari praeципimus eos quos operam sacrificiiis dare vel colere simulacra constiterit.' These laws would account for the complaint of the Hermetist. They were, however, very imperfectly enforced. For some time longer, Pagan cults were still practised without concealment; and under the rule of Julian, A.D. 361–363, the old religions were once more supported by the favour of the government. It was not until the reign of Theodosius, A.D. 379–395, that a serious and systematic effort was made to stamp out Pagan worship throughout the eastern empire. An edict of A.D. 391, *Cod. Theodos.* 16. 10. 11, addressed to the *Comes Aegypti* and another official, runs as follows: 'Nulli sacrificandi tribuatur potestas, nemo templo circumeat, nemo delubra suspiciat. Interclusos sibi nostrae legis obstaculo profanos aditus recognoscant adeo, ut si qui vel de diis alicud contra vetitum sacr里斯que molietur, nullis exuendum se indulgentiis recognoscat.' And this was followed
by a still more emphatic and comprehensive edict of Theodosius in A.D. 392 (Cod. Theodos. 16. 10. 12). The actual suppression of the open practice of Pagan worship in Alexandria may be dated from the destruction of the Serapeum in A.D. 390.

The sentence in Ascl. III which speaks of penal laws against Paganism cannot then have been written before the middle of the fourth century, and therefore cannot have stood in the Δόγος τῆλεως in the time of Lactantius, who wrote the Div. inst. about A.D. 310. But on the other hand, the Δόγος τῆλεως, as known to Lactantius, must have contained the bulk of the Prophecy; for he quotes part of the Greek text of ch. 26a, and says that the passage which he quotes follows 'post enumerationem malorum'. Hence we must conclude that the reference to penal laws against Pagan worship did not form part of the original text, but was inserted by another hand, at a time not earlier than A.D. 353.

The insertion of this clause seems to have caused some words of the original text to be omitted; this may account for the lacuna after neglectum religionum.

(b) Ch. 25: 'Sed mihi credite, et capitale periculum constitueretur in eum qui se mentis religioni dederit. Nova constituentur iura, lex nova.' For the same reason, this passage also cannot have been written before A.D. 353, and must be an interpolation. The words capitale periculum resemble those of Constantius's edict of A.D. 356, Poena capitis subiugar is praecipimus &c. The inserted passage interrupts the continuity of the text; for 'nihil sanctum ... mente credetur', which follows it, is closely connected in sense with 'anima enim ... putabitur vanitas', which precedes it.

The two references to penal laws may have been inserted at different times, and suggested by different enactments. The first speaks of a penalty, but does not tell us what the penalty is; the second expressly mentions capital punishment. One of the two may very likely have been inserted by the translator. One of them at least was included in the Latin text of the Asclepius as known to Augustine; De civ. dei 8. 24 (A.D. 413-426): 'Dolet (Hermes) venturum esse tempus, quo haec omnia ... etiam legibus iubeantur auferiri.'

(c) Ch. 24 b: 'Divinitas enim repetet caelum, deserti homines toti morientur, atque jta Aegyptus deo et homine viduata deseretur.' This sentence makes nonsense of all the predictions which follow. We are told that, after the Egyptians have perished to a man
'those of them who survive' will be known as Egyptians by their tongue alone; the land of Egypt (i.e. the Egyptians) 'will suffer yet worse things';—worse, that is, than total destruction,—'and will be infected with worse plagues'; these same non-existent Egyptians will furnish an example of cruelty; they will cease to admire the universe, they will prefer death to life, and so on. It is true that in some of these sentences the writer speaks of homines, and does not mention Egyptians by name; but Egyptians are expressly mentioned in 24 b fin. and 25 init.; and it is evident that the Hermetist intends the prophecy throughout to apply primarily to his own country and his own countrymen. If he had once foretold the total destruction of the people of Egypt, nothing more would have been left for him to say. We must therefore conclude that the words 'divinitas enim . . . viduata deseretur' were subsequently inserted by some one who sought to pile up the horrors higher, and disregarded the destructive effect of his interpolation on the prophecy as a whole. Perhaps the translator is responsible for the addition of these words.

Transpositions:—When these interpolations have been struck out, there remains a prophecy in which three distinct things are predicted:—

(a) Egypt will be invaded and occupied by foreigners;
(b) many Egyptians will be slaughtered;
(c) the Egyptians who survive will cease to worship the gods.

But in the traditional text, these three things are intermixed, and the several sentences are wanting in connexion and rational sequence. The contents of the successive clauses, as they stand in the MSS., may be indicated thus:—

Alienigenis . . . complentibus, non solum neglectum religionum—:
   (a) and (c).
Tunc terra . . . mortuorumque plenissima: (b).
O Aegypte . . . facta narrantibus: (c).
Et inhabitabit . . . barbaria: (a).
Te vero . . . totae corrumpentur: (b).
Et vivis . . . videbitur alienus: (b) and (c).
Quid fies . . . crudelitatis exemplum: (c) and (b).
Et tunc laedio hominum &c.: (c).

The confusion has probably been produced, or at any rate

1 The only parallel that occurs to me is the nursery rhyme about the children sliding on the ice: 'It so fell out, they all fell in; The rest, they ran away.'
increased, by transpositions such as we meet with in so many instances throughout the text of the *Asclepius*; and we have to consider whether it is possible to restore the true order. A clue may be found in the words *ipsa Aegyptus, 25 init.* It is clear that in this phrase the Egyptians are contrasted with the foreign invaders, and consequently that it must have followed closely on some reference to the foreigners; and as it is stated in this sentence that the Egyptians will do cruel deeds, the preceding sentence should be one which describes cruel deeds done by the foreigners. Now if we remove 24 fin., 'Et vivis . . . videbitur alienus', we get, as the preceding sentence, 'Te vero . . . totae corrumpentur', i.e. a description of the Nile swollen with blood. If we assume that this blood is shed by the foreigners, a satisfactory connexion is thus obtained. And the displaced words 'Et vivis . . . videbitur alienus' may be appropriately placed after 'crudelitatis exemplum'; in that position, they will supply a desirable amplification of the *crudelitas* spoken of, and at the same time lead on to the following description of the decay of religion.

If the words addressed to the Nile refer to cruel deeds done by the foreigners, they should follow something else on the same topic. Now in the sentence 'Tunc terra . . . mortuorumque plenissima', we are told that the land will be polluted by slaughter; and this would be suitably followed by the description of a corresponding pollution of the water. It is probable then that 'Te vero appello, sanctissimum flumen' &c. should follow immediately on 'Tunc terra . . . mortuorumque plenissima', and that the three intervening sentences should be removed. One of these three sentences, 'Divinitas enim . . . viduata deseretur', has already been excised as an interpolation; but we have still to dispose of the other two, viz. 'et inhabitabit . . . barbaria', and 'O Aegypte . . . facta narrantibus'. Of these, the former, 'et inhabitabit' &c., should come earlier, since the writer would naturally tell us who the foreigners are before he tells us of the cruel things they do; and I have accordingly placed it before 'Tunc terra ista'. On the other hand, the sentence 'O Aegypte' &c., which speaks of the dying out of religion, should come later, after the writer has said all that he has to say about the slaughter; I have therefore placed it immediately before 'Et tunc taedio hominum' &c. in ch. 25.

Thus rearranged, the prophecy may be analysed as follows:—
(a) ‘Alienigenis . . . neglectum religionum . . . barbaria.’ (Invasion by impious foreigners.)

(b 1) ‘Tunc terra . . . mortuorumque plenissima. Te vero . . . corrumpentur.’ (Cruel deeds done by the foreigners.)

(b 2) ‘Quid fes . . . crudelitatis exemplum. Et vivis . . . sepulcrorum.’ (Cruel deeds done by Egyptians.)

(c) ‘superstes vero . . . videbitur alienus. O Aegypte . . . pia facta narratibus. Et tunc taedio hominum’ &c. (The Egyptians abandon their religion.)

It may be doubted whether this rearrangement is in all respects correct; but I think it is indisputable that the traditional text is incoherent, and that by means of the three transpositions which I have proposed we obtain a satisfactory sense and connexion throughout. My conclusions as to the date of the document, however, are in no way dependent on the admittedly uncertain order of the sentences. If the author wrote the passage as it appears in the MSS., he must have been an extraordinarily clumsy writer; but even on that assumption, the things predicted would remain the same, and the same inferences might still be drawn from them.

24 b. quod Aegyptus imago sit caeli. As an individual deity is embodied in a cult-statue, so the di caelestes collectively are embodied in the land of Egypt. Philo, Vita Mosis 2 (3). 24. 192, Cohn IV, p. 245, speaks of the veneration of the Egyptians for their land: μόνοι γὰρ σχεδὸν ἀπάντων ἐθνῶν Ἀλγύπτωι χην ἐπετείχεισαν οὐρανῷ, τὴν μὲν ἱσοθένων τιμῶν ἄξιώσαντες, τῷ δ' οὖδὲν γέρας ἔξαφετον ἀπονείμαντες . . . θεοπλαστοῦσι τῷ λόγῳ τῶν Νίλων Ἀλγύπτωι ὡς ἀντίμιμον οὐρανοῦ γεγονότα, καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας σεμνηγοροῦσιν.

translatio aut descentio omnium quae gubernant atque exercentur in caelo. Cf. Kore Kosmu, Exc. XXIII. 65, as emended: Osiris and Isis πρὸς κάθετον (διμολογούσας) τοῖς ἐν οὐρανῷ μυστηρίοις ἱεροποιαὶς ἀνέστησαν ἐν γῇ. Abammonis Resp. 7. 1: the Egyptians, τὴν φύσιν τοῦ παντός καὶ τὴν δημοφυγίαν μιμομένοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ τῶν μυστικῶν καὶ ἀποκρυπτάντων καὶ ἄφαντων νόησεων εἰκόνας τινὰς διὰ συμβόλων ἐκφάινοντο. The rites performed in the Egyptian temples are eikones of the operations of the Caelestes, through whom the demiurgic energy of the supracosmic God is brought to bear upon the world below. Moreover, the Hermetist holds that the processes of nature which are worked by the Caelestes (‘omnia quae gubernantur atque exercentur in caelo’) are dependent on the due performance of these rites; if certain ritual acts are omitted,
the Nile will not rise, and the crops will not grow; and when the
national cults are abandoned, the universe itself will fall into
disorder. Thus it may be said that the seat of operation of the cosmic
powers has been transferred from heaven to the temples of Egypt.

In the mystic language of the Egyptian priests, the word pet
(‘heaven’) was used as a substitute for ‘temple’. E.g. in an
inscription of the Persian period, it is stated that the high priest
of Khnum at Heracleopolis Magna ‘has entered heaven (i.e. the
temple) to see him who dwells there, namely the god Khnum’
(= 65 f. See also ib. p. 201 f.)

It is often stated in Egyptian documents that this or that cosmic
event took place at a certain temple; e.g. the terrace of the temple
at Hermopolis is described as ‘the place at which Ra, the god of
light, first shone forth, rising from the lotus-flower’ (ib. p. 123);
and Tum engendered the universe ‘in the city of On’.
Such phrases presumably mean that some rite which was regarded
as an ‘image’ of the cosmic operation of the god was periodically
performed at the place spoken of. Compare the account given by
Brugsch (ib. p. 155) of the contents of a papyrus dealing with the
deities of the Fayum (Papyrus ég. de Boulaq, 1870, I–V): ‘Alles,
was sich der philosophirende Gedanke über den Ursprung der
Welt zurecht gelegt hatte, von dem Chaos an bis zur Entstehung
des Lichtes hin, wurde in fassbarer Gestalt auf den durch Men-
schenhand entstandenen “See” übertragen, und “das Seeland”,
das heutige Fajum, gleichsam in einen Schauplatz der Schöpfungs-
geschichte verwandelt.’

terra nostra mundi totius est templum. The Kosmos is
aiotýros θεός; and in this one deity all particular aiotýroii θεοί are
comprehended. He is made up of all the gods by whom the
several departments of the material world are administered;
Egypt, the land in which all these gods ‘have come down to dwell
on earth’, may therefore be called the ‘temple’, i.e. the consecrated
habitation, of the Kosmos; and the cults of the several gods may
be collectively described as the cult of the Kosmos. Cf. mundus
adorandus in 25 and 26 a. The notion of a god whose parts or
‘members’ are also gods was current in Egypt from the earliest
times. The primal God ‘creates his own members, and they are
the gods’ (Book of the Dead).1 In Pl. Timaeus also, the

1 Cf. Abammonis Resp. 8. 3 and 10. 5 sq. (Testim.), on the Demiurgus and his
several dovýmaí.
Kosmos is a god whose parts, e.g. the heavenly bodies, are likewise gods.

futurum tempus est, omum adpareat Aegyptios &c. See Augustine's comments on this passage, De civ. dei 8. 23 sqq. (Testim.). Augustine understands the prophecy in Ascl. III as referring to the abolition of idolatry by the Christians; and in that respect he is undoubtedly right.

Aegyptios . . . pia mente divinitatem sedula religione servasse. This is hardly consistent with the previous statement (ch. 22 a) that the pious are few and far between. Here, the writer assumes that the Egyptians in general have hitherto been pious worshippers of the gods. We are not told why the gods forsake Egypt; but it seems to be implied that they depart from the land because it is desecrated by the invasion of impious foreigners. The Palmyrenes and their allies, the Saraceni and the Blemmyes, were not likely to treat the gods of Egypt with much respect; they may have plundered temples, and confiscated religious endowments; at any rate, the temple-cults must have suffered neglect during the troubles caused by the invasion; and Egypt occupied and dominated by profane barbarians was no longer a fitting abode for the gods.

in inritum casura (est, vel) frustrabitur: probably two alternative translations of a single Greek word or phrase.

regionem istam tertamque. What is the distinction between regio and terra?

quasi de legibus: 'by so-called laws.' Quasi = δήθεν (Bernays). The enactments against the old cults are not true laws, because they are contrary to right.

Compare the complaint of the Pagan writer of Lithica 61–81 (Abel, Orphica, p. ii): ὅ ὁδαγαλέος καὶ ἀπεθανός αὐτίκα πᾶσιν, ἰ ἑλευθερώσω μάγοι. καὶ ὁ ὁ μὲν εν κονίσιν ὑπὸ δορὶ κρατεῖς ἄμερφεις | λεγανελεθανάτω διὸς φως ἐκτετάνωται. οἱ ὁ ἱκέλων θηρεσεῖ, ἀἴδρες ἢ ἀἰδικτοῦ, χήτηι δαμοσίου νοήματος κ.τ.λ. These verses refer to the execution of penal laws against magic; but the Christians were apt to regard all Pagan cults as forms of magic.

terra ista sanctissima. 'The holy land' (ta-sert) was a recognized name of Egypt under the native dynasties. In the hieroglyphic text of the Decree of Canopus, 238 B.C., ta-neterì, 'the divine land', occurs as an equivalent for τῆς Ἀιγυπτίων in the Greek. Cf. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. XXIV. ii: τῆς ιερωτάτης ἡμῶν χώρας.
sepulcrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima. Sepulcrorum does not give the right meaning. Egypt was ‘full of graves’ at all times, and we need some phrase which implies an exceptional number of recent deaths. Sepulcrorum may be a mistranslation of ταφῶν (ταφή = funus); Egypt will be πλήρης ταφῶν καὶ νεκρῶν, i.e. full of corpses on their way to burial, and corpses lying unburied. The word ταφῶν would imply that cries of mourning for the dead are heard on every hand. Cf. the letter of Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, written a few years before Ascl. III (Euseb. Hist. eccl. 7. 22. 3): ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν πρωτοτόκων τῶν Ἀλγυπτίων γέγραται, οὕτως καὶ νῦν “ἐγενήθη κραυγή μεγάλη οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν οἰκία, ἐν ᾗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῇ τεθνηκός” (Exod. 12. 30).

Augustine (Civ. dei 8. 26) mistakenly supposes that the words ‘sepulcrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima’ refer to Christian worship of martyrs. (See note ad loc. in Testim.)

Te vero appello, sanctissimum flumen. The Nile (Ḥapi) was one of the national gods of Egypt; festivals were celebrated in his honour; and he had temples at Nilopolis, at Heliopolis, and elsewhere (Wiedemann, Rel. of Anc. Eg. pp. 145–147). Theologians of the Graeco-Roman period identified Osiris with the Nile, or called the river 'Ὀσίριδος ἀπορροή (Plut. Is. et Or. 32, 33, 38).

25. vivis multo maior numerus erit sepulcrorum. Here again, as above, sepulcrorum must be a mistranslation. The other reading, sepultorum, which occurs only in one or two of the worse MSS., is equally unsatisfactory in meaning. The sense required is that the number of corpses awaiting burial (not the number of those which have been buried in all past time) will be greater than that of the survivors; i.e. that more than half the population of Egypt will perish in the slaughter of which Hermes has just spoken.

superstes vero qui fuerit, . . . actibus . . . videbitur alienus. Down to this point, the Hermetist has been describing, under the form of prediction, events which have taken place before his eyes. Here, he begins to look forward into the future, and foresees the completion of a process, the earlier stages of which he has witnessed; the national religion will soon be extinct. The Egyptians have hitherto been pious; but those who survive the slaughter will be impious,—that is to say, they will turn Christians.
non admirandus videbitur mundus nec adorandus. It is not necessarily implied that a cult of the Kosmos eo nomine existed in Egypt. Men worshipped the Kosmos, firstly, by worshipping the primal God, the Father or Demiurgus (called by different names in different temples) who had generated or fashioned the Kosmos; and secondly, by worshipping the constituent parts of the Kosmos, e.g. the astral gods, the Nile, and Mother Earth in the form of Isis. The writer foresees that, when the Christians get the upper hand, all these cults will be suppressed, and the sentiment which finds expression in them will be extinguished. Cf. Corp. IX. 4 b: ἐνοι ποτε ἐρωτή βλασφημοῦντες that the Kosmos is χαρίον τῆς κακίας.

Some Christian Gnostics maintained that the material universe had been created by an evil power; and many Christians held that it is governed, or partly governed, by the Devil. Cf. Ep. Ephes. 6. 12: (ἐστιν ἡμῶν ἡ πάλη) πρὸς τοὺς κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους τούτου, πρὸς τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπικρατοῦν. The cosmic powers which the Pagans worshipped were those against which the Christians wrestled. Valentinus, in Hippol. Ref. haer. 6. 33: διάβολος, ο ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τοῦτον. Carpocrates, Hippol. Ἰβ. 7. 32: καταφρονήσαι τῶν κοσμοποιῶν ἄρχοντων is the way to gain supernatural power; εὶ δὲ τις (τοῦ Ἰσχοῦ) πλέον καταφρονήσειν τῶν ἡταθά, δύνασθαι διαφοράρκοιν αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχειν. Pistis Sophia (A. D. 250–300?) c. 102, C. Schmidt, p. 164: ‘Renounce (ἀποστάσεσθαι) the whole κόσμος, and all the ἄλη in it, and all its cares and all its sins. . . . Renounce the love of the κόσμος’ &c. Ἰβ. c. 100, p. 161: ‘Preach to the human race, saying, Renounce the whole κόσμος and all the ἄλη in it. For he who in the κόσμος buys and sells, and he who eats and drinks of its ἄλη, and who lives in all its cares and its ὄμιλαι, he gathers to himself fresh ἄλαι in addition to his other ἄλη; for all this κόσμος, and all things in it, and all its ὄμιλαι, are hylie dregs.’ (The Pistis Sophia teaches that man must seek to be purged from his ἄλη, and become pure Light; for thus only can he rise to the Realm of Light above; otherwise, he will have to endure μεταγ- γεμόσ in successive bodies, with intervals of torture, and ultimately, will suffer extinction (?) in outer darkness.) See Bousset, Hauptprobleme der Gnosis, p. 110 ff. These Gnostics changed the ‘Second God’ of the Platonists and Hermetists into a devil; and many orthodox Christians went a long way in the same direction.
Hoc totum bonum. Does this mean 'the Kosmos', or 'the worship of the gods'? Probably the latter; for it could hardly be said here that the Kosmos 'periclitabitur'. It is true that, later on in the chapter, the writer describes the Kosmos as falling into confusion, and appearing to be in danger of utter destruction; but that topic has not yet been introduced.

machina voluntatis dei. Cf. Corp. IX. 6: the Kosmos is ὄργανον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ βουλήτης κ.τ.λ.

in suo opere abaque invidia (hominis) suffragantis. A dative dependent on suffragantis is required. One MS. gives suo operi,— 'fortasse recte', says Thomas,— in place of in suo opere; but the opus dei, i.e. the Kosmos, is here described as the instrument of God's beneficent action, and cannot in the same clause be spoken of as the object of his beneficence. The heavenly bodies especially are the instruments by which God's providence works.

In absque invidia, we have a reminiscence of Pl. Tim. 29 e: ἄγαθος ἢν, ἄγαθος δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενός οὐδέποτε ἐγγίζεται φόβος. The same phrase of Plato is adopted and enlarged upon by Philo, De opif. mundi 5. 21 ff., Cohn I, p. 6 f.

tenebrae praeponentur lumini, et mors vita utilior judicabitur. With this description of Christianity may be compared the verses in which Rutilius Namatianus (1. 440 ff.), about A.D. 416, expresses his disgust at the Christian monks of Capraria: 'Squalet lucifugis insula plena viris. | Ipsi se monachos Graeco cognomine dicunt, | quod soli nullo vivere teste volunt. | Munera fortunae metuunt, dum damna verentur: | quisquam sponte miser, ne miser esse queat. | Quaenam perversi rabies tam stulta cerebri, | dum mala formides, nec bona posse pati? | Sive suas repetunt ex fato ergastula poenas, | tristia seu nigrum visceras felle tument.' Ib. 1. 517, on a Christian hermit living in an island off the Italian coast: 'Perditus hic vivo funere civis erat. | Noster enim nuper, juvenis majoribus amplis, | nec censu inferior coniugiove minor, | impulsus furis homines divosque reliquit, | et turpe latebram credulus exul agit. | In felix putat illuvie caelestia pasci, | sequre premitt laesus saevior ipse deis. | Num, rogo, deterior Circaeis secta venenis? | Tunc mutabantur corpora, nunc animi.' In the view of Namatianus, as in that of the Hermetist, the Christian ascetics are lucifugi, and their life is a vivum funus; they are impulsi furis, and their state of mind is perversi rabies cerebri (cf. 'furiosus fortis ... habebitur' in Ascl. III.
The writer of Ascl. I (see especially ch. xxi) approximates in some respects to the Christian exaltation of asceticism which the writer of Ascl. III rejects with horror; but his tendency in that direction is counteracted by his doctrine that the *cultus terrenorum* is included in man's function.

The view that *mors vita utilior est* may be illustrated from Lactantius *passim*; e.g. *Div. inst.* 7. 11. 3: 'in ea condicione res posita est, ut qui beati sunt in hac vita corporali atque terrena, semper miseri sint futuri: ... deinde qui iustitiam sequentes in hac vita miseri fuerint ... semper beati sint futuri.' In this life, Lactantius thinks, the good man is necessarily miserable.

*nemo suspiciet caelum.* Cf. *Ascl.* I. 6 a: '(homo) suspicit caelum.' *Ib.* 9: 'sortiti sunt caeli suspiciendi venerabilem curam.' As an instance of the feeling with which pious Pagans 'looked up to the sky', cf. Julian *Or.* 4 (*eis ἡλιον*) *init.*: 'From my childhood I was possessed by an impetuous love of the rays of the divine sun. In early youth, I uplifted my soul towards the ethereal light; and I not only desired to fix my eyes on it during the day, but even at night, when the sky was clear, I left all else to admire the beauties of heaven. Absorbed in that contemplation, I failed to hear those who spoke to me, and ceased to be conscious of myself.'

*religiosus pro insano ... putabitur.* Cf. the edict of Constans (?), *Cod. Theodos.* 16. 10. 2: 'sacrificiorum aboleatur insania.'

*furiosus fortis ... habebitur.* The Christians praised the fortitude of those who endured torture and death in their resistance to the government. To the Hermetist, the behaviour of the Christians during the persecutions of A.D. 250–260 must have seemed madness. Epictetus, *Diss.* 4. 7. 6, thought that the fearlessness of death shown by the 'Galilaeans' was due to 'habituation' (*ἐπο θοὺς*); Marcus Aurelius, 11. 3, attributed it to obstinacy (*κατὰ ψυλὴν παράταξιν*). Julian *Ep.* 89 b (Bidez and Cumont, 288 a) said the Christians were driven by evil daemons, who induced them to seek death: ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς οὗ προσώντας τοὺς θεοὺς ἵστι τὸ τῶν πονηρῶν δαιμόνων τεταγμένον φίλον, ὥσπερ δὲν οἱ πολλοί παροιτρούμενοι τῶν αἵων ἀναπελθόνται θανατῶν, ὡς ἀναπτησόμενοι πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅταν ἀπορρήξωσι τὴν ψυχήν βιαίως.

Perhaps some Christians claimed credit also for their courage in defying the Pagan gods, whom many of them believed to be powerful daemons. Cf. Celsus, in *Orig. c. Cels.* 8. 38: the Christians say
ASCLEPIUS III: 25

'Ido, paraostas to aballmati tou Dous, h 'Apollawos, h oton d' pote theou, blasthfiw, kai patiwo, kai oidev me amuntei.

Animenim . . . putabitur vanitas. This sentence is awkwardly constructed; perhaps the Greek has been inaccurately translated. It is not the soul itself, but the Hermetic doctrine about the nature, origin, and destiny of the soul, and its relation to God, that 'will be thought to be false'. Some will treat the subject with contempt (risui), and refuse to listen; others will consider and reject the true teaching (putabitur vanitas). Compare Ascl. I. 12 a: 'aliis incredibile, aliis fabulosum, aliis forsitan videatur esse deridendum.'

The Hermetist does not recognize in the teaching of the Christians any adequate substitute for his 'doctrine of the soul'. He probably knew little of the positive side of their doctrines, and thought of them chiefly as men who scorned and rejected the rites and beliefs which he held sacred; but if the Christian dogma of the resurrection of the body was known to him, he would see in that no promise of abanastia. To him, the resurrection of the body would mean rather the perpetual confinement of the soul in its earthly prison, from which he aspired to be released. Compare the contemptuous language of Celsus, Orig. c. Cel. 5. 14: ἡλίθιον δ' αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ νομίζειν, ἐπειδὰν ὁ θεὸς ὁστερ μᾶγειρος ἐπειγκῇ τὸ πῦρ, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο πᾶν ἐξοπτηθήσεσθαι γένος, αὐτοῖς δὲ μόνον διαμανεῖν, οὐ μόνον τούς ζῶντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πῶλα ποτε ἀποθανόντας, αὐτῶς σαρξὶν ἵκκαίναι ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀναδύναται. ἀτεχνῶς σκαλάκης ἡ ἐλπίς. ποιά γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ψυχή ποθήσεται εἰς σῶμα σοφιστῆς; . . καὶ ψυχῆς μὲν αἰώνιον βιοτὴν δύνατ' ἄν (ὁ θεὸς) παρασχεῖ νέκυς δέ, φησιν Ηράκλειτος, κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι. σάρκα δέ, μεστὴν ἐν οὐδὲ εἰσεῖν καλῶν, αἰώνιον ἀποφήναι παρὰ λόγων οὐτε βουλήσεται ὁ θεὸς οὐτε δυνήσεται. Celsus, ib. 7. 36, calls the Christians φιλοσώματον γένος, and says that they expect to see God with their bodily eyes. Ib. 8. 49: τῶς οὖν ἄτοπα ὑμῶν ταῦτα, τὸ μὲν σῶμα πολεμῶν, καὶ ἐλπίζειν ὅτι αὐτὸ τούτο ἀναστήσεται, οὐ ωδὲν ἦμιν τούτου κρείττον οὐδὲ τιμότερον . . . ἀλλὰ τούτο τούτο πειθομένοις, καὶ τῷ σώματι συντετεκόντως, οὐκ ἄξιον [τοῦτο] διαλέγεσθαι. . . τοὺς μὲν γε τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ τῶν νοῶν, . . . εἶθε δ' ὑμᾶς καὶ [δ' τι] χαίροντον ὄνομά· λοιποῖς, τοὺς τοῦτο ἐλπίζοντων ἥξιν αἰώνιον σὺν θεῷ, τούτοις διαλέξομαι. It might seem indeed that the charge of 'loving the body' and that of 'hating the Kosmos' could hardly be applicable to the same persons; but there were Christians of many kinds, and the Hermetist may have confused the views of different sects. Some of the Christian Gnostics, who held beliefs about the soul which were derived from
Platonism, and resembled those of the Hermetist, went to extremes in their hatred of the material Kosmos; other Christians regarded the present Kosmos as evil and doomed to destruction, but at the same time clung to the non-Hellenic doctrine of bodily resurrection, looked forward to ‘a new heaven and a new earth’ no less material than the present universe, and expected to enjoy therein an everlasting life in the body.

aut in immortalitatem se conseouturam esse praesumit. Cf. ch. 22 b: ‘inmortalitatis sperm intentionemque pretendens.’ The word ἄθανασία has two distinct senses. It may mean ‘imperishability’; and in that sense, all human souls, good and bad alike, are immortal; cf. ch. 28, ‘quod (anima) sit inmortalis sensu aeterno supplicio subiugata’; and Ascl. I. 2 a init., ‘omnis humana inmortalis est anima.’ On the other hand, ἄθανασία may mean ‘the life of the gods’, i.e. a life freed from the limitations to which the soul is subjected during its embodiment on earth,—or in other words, ‘union with God’. In the latter sense, the soul, while in the body, is not yet ἄθανάτος; but it has before it the prospect of attaining to ἄθανασία when released from the body by death, provided that it has received and rightly used God’s gift of νοῦς during its earthly life. For the second sense, cf. Corp. X. 7: αἱ δὲ ἄνθρωπειαί (ψυχαί), ἀρχήν ἄθανασίας σκόνσεα, κ.τ.λ.

The word ἄθανάτος might also bear a third sense, viz. ‘not liable to the separation of soul from body’. In this sense, men are mortal, and the heavenly bodies are immortal. But this third sense has no application in the passage before us.

qui se mentis religioni dederit. The term mentis religio is here used by the interpolator to denote the religion of the Pagans as understood and accepted by him, i.e. the Platonic religion of the Hermetists.

Fit deorum, &c. The transition is abrupt; and it seems probable that some connecting words have been lost before fit deorum.

At this point a fresh start is made. Both the secessio deorum and the wars and crimes of men have been dealt with before (’e terris enim est ad caelum recursura divinitas’, ch. 24 b: ‘crudelitatis exemplum’ &c., ch. 25); but the writer here returns to these topics. This may be accounted for by assuming that from this point onward he is more or less closely following some earlier authority, in which the senectus and regenitura mundi were described as periodically recurring processes. He sees in the calamities of his time the
beginnings of such a senile decay of the universe as his predecessor had spoken of; and he adapts to his purpose the language of his source. The verbs *fit*, *remanent*, *compellunt* seem to have been in the present tense in the archetype, though they have been altered into futures in B; and there is good authority for the presents *mutescit* and *languescit* in the following clauses. As we find the aorist used in the Greek quoted by Lactantius, it may be inferred that the Latin presents stand for Greek aorists; and the aorist might be used to describe a recurring process.

*soli nocentes angeli remanent.* Cf. Lactant. *Div. inst.* 2. 15. 8 : 'uterque vero *(sc. Hermes, in the Δόγος τέλειος (?), and Asclepius, in Corp. XVI) daemonas esse adfirmat inimicos et vexatores hominum, quos ideo Trismegistus ἀγγέλους πονηροῖς appellat.' Lactantius is probably referring to this passage; and if so, the Hermetist here used ἀγγέλοι as a synonym for δαίμονες. Angeli are mentioned again in the Latin *Asci.* III. 37, 'evocantes animas daemonum vel angelorum'; but the words vel angelorum may there have been added by the translator. The term ἀγγέλοι occurs in Herm. ap. Stob. *Exc.* XXIV. 5, where it is said that kingly souls, when they descend into earthly bodies, are accompanied by an escort of ἀγγέλοι καὶ δαίμονες; but the word is hardly to be found elsewhere in the extant *Hermetica*. It was frequently used by Pagan writers from the time of Porphyry onwards, and often occurs in the Magic Papyri. ἀγγέλοι καταχθόνιοι are mentioned in magic tablets found in Attica (Dieterich *Mithraeiliturgie*, p. 49). In *Abammonis Resp.* 2. 6 f., ἄρχων ἀγγέλοι and ἀγγέλοι are spoken of as classes of superhuman beings distinct from daemons. Cf. Tertull. *Apol.* 22 *(A. D. 197): 'Angelos quoque etiam Plato non negavit: utriusque nominis (sc. daemonum et angelorum) testes et magi adsunt.' (Plato does not use the word ἀγγέλοι in this sense; but in *Sympos.* 202 E he describes the daemons as intermediaries or messengers between gods and men.) This Pagan use of the word was doubtless derived chiefly from Jewish sources; but ἀγγελοι may also have been sometimes employed, independently of Jewish influence, as a rendering of a term used by Persians or Chaldaeans.

The notion was old in Egypt, but was, no doubt, reinforced there by the importation of Persian and Babylonian beliefs from the time of the Persian dominion onward.

* Tunc nee terra constabit &c. When men cease to worship the gods, the beneficent action of the gods, which was dependent on the due performance of the rites of worship, inevitably ceases; the material universe is left ungoverned, and falls into disorder.

Tertullian, *Apol. 40*, speaks of those ‘qui adversus sanguinem innocentium conclamant, praetexentes . . . quod existiment omnis publicae cladis, omnis popularis incommodi Christianos esse in causse. Si Tiberis ascendit in moenia, si Nilus non ascendit in arva, si caelum stetit, si terra movit, si fames, si lues, statim “Christianos ad leonem”’. The Hermetist shares the belief that such calamities must necessarily result from the impiety of the Christians. He does not join in the cry for their blood; but he believes that sooner or later God himself will purge his universe by the destruction of the impious, and all will then be well again.

Augustine speaks of the Pagans who maintained that the calamities of the time resulted from the abandonment of the old cults. *Aug. Retractat. 2. 43*: the first five books of the *De civ. dei* ‘eos refellunt, qui res humanas ita prosperari volunt, ut ad hoc multorum deorum cultum, quos pagani colere consueverunt, necessarium esse arbitrentur, et quia prohibetur, mala ista exoriri atque abundare contendunt.’ Cf. *Civ. dei 2. 3*: ‘vulgare proverbium: “Pluvia defit: causa Christiani sunt.”’ Many of the Pagan rites were in their origin devices for influencing the course of nature, and especially for promoting fertility; and a sense of their primitive significance still survived.

Unde hiemis intemperata ferocitas ubertatem terrarum penetrabili frigore sterilitatis laesione damnavit? nisi quod ad impietatis vindictam transit legis suae natura decretum ("nature transgresses the decree of her own law"). Quod ne posthac sustinere cogamur, pacifica ultione, ut diximus, piaenda est superni numinis veneranda maiestas.'

The Hermetist's description of cosmic disorder resembles predictions which occur in many Jewish and Christian apocalypses: e.g. Ethiop. Enoch 80. 2-7, and Orac. Sib. passim.

ne caelum astrorum oursibus (subsistet?), nee siderum oursus constabit in caelo. Compare the vision (apparently of Pagan origin) at the end of Orac. Sib. V, II. 512-531: αστρα μάχην ὀδυνεί: θεός δ' ἐπέτρεψε μάχεσθαι. Then follows a Theomachia, in which the Signs of the Zodiac are the combatants; and at the end, ὁρτο μὲν Οὐρανός αὐτός, ὅσα ἐτίναξε μαχητάς: ὄνυμοθεῖς δ' ἔρρησε καταπηνηθεὶς ἐτὶ γαίαν. | μίμησα μὲν οὖν πλῆγματε ἐν 'Οκεανόιo λοιπά | ἤπαν γαίαν ἄπαισαν ἵμερε δ' ἀνάστερος αἰθῆρ. But the disturbance of the order of nature which the Hermetist anticipates must be less violent than this, since a remnant of the human race will survive it ('hominibus qui tunc erunt' below).

omnis vox divina . . . mutescet. The oracles will be dumb; and the voice of God will be heard no longer in the human heart. The present discourse of Trismegistus is itself a vox divina; cf. Ascl. ib: 'ex ore Hermu) divinus Cupido sic est orsus dicere'. All such inspiration or possession of men by God will cease.

aer ipse maesto torpore languescet. Cf. Philo De provid. (Aucher) i. 18: In proof that the air is not immortal, '(animadverto aerem) varias passiones experiri . . .: unde etiam medicorum iudicio per commutationes eius oriri morbos statuitur, quoniam languescere per hunc dixere corpora in mundo existentia naturali eius participacione. Qui ergo obnoxius est morbo, tempestatī ac corruptioni, quidni ipsa quoque vita non demum privetur?'

26 a. Haeo et talis senectus veniet mundi. This senectus mundi is the end of a period of the cosmic process, to be followed by the beginning of another period (regenitura below). The notion of a cyclical recurrence of disorder in the universe occurs in Pl. Politicus 269 c-274 d.

In the Timaeus, 22 b ff., Plato puts into the mouth of an Egyptian priest a description of periodical destructions of the greater part
of mankind by fire and water alternately; but according to that authority, Egypt, owing to special causes, is exempt from the fires and floods by which all other lands are periodically devastated.

On this passage of the Timaeus is based Philo De aetern. mundi 27. 146, Cohn VI, p. 117: ἠθοραι τῶν κατὰ γῆν, οὐκ ἄθροίς ἀπάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν πλείστων, δυσὶ ταῖς μεγίσταις αἰτίαις ἀνατινεῖται, πυρὸς καὶ ῥάδας ἄλκτοις φοράς. κατακχάπτειν δ’ ἐκατέραν ἐν μέρει φαιν ἐν τάνυ μακραίς ἑναυτῶν περιόδοις. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἐμπρησίς καταλαμβάνῃ, ἥμμα αἰθερίων πυρὸς ἀνωθεν ἐκχοῦμεν πολλάχιη σκεδάννυσθαι, μεγάλα κλίματα τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐπιτρέχον ὅταν δὲ κατακλυσμός, κ.τ.λ.

The same theory occurs again in Philo Vita Mosis 2. 10, Cohn IV, p. 212 f.: God punishes the wicked τῶν τοῦ παντὸς δραστικιστῶν στοιχείων ἐπιθεμένων, ῥάδας καὶ πυρὸς, ὡς καρών περιόδοις τοὺς μὲν κατακλυσμοῖς φθαρῆσαι, τοὺς δὲ καταβελεθῆσαι ἀπολέσθαι κ.τ.λ. (Here, Noah's flood, and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, serve as instances.) Cf. Cic. Somn. Scip. 7: 'eluviones exustionesque terrarum, quas accidere tempore certo necesse est.' Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 333: 'Philolaus' (Neo-Pythagorean) διτηήν εἶναι τὴν φθαρὰν (τοῦ κόσμου), τὸ μὲν εἰς οὐρανὸν πυρὸς ἔνειτος, τὸ δὲ εἰς ῥάδας καλεμακοῦ.

The Stoic ecpyrosis was a cyclically recurring process. But the earlier Stoics described the ecpyrosis as an absorption of all things into God (whom they identified with the cosmic fire), rather than as a calamitous destruction. Plut. Sto. repugn. 39. 2, p. 1052 C: Chrysippus said τῶν Δία αἰδεοσθαι μέχρις ἐν εἰς αὐτὸν ἄπαντα καταναλώσῃ. Diog. Laert. 7. 137: (ὁ θεός) κατὰ χρόνων ποιὰς περιόδους ἀναλίσκειν εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἀπασαν οὐσίαν, καὶ πάλιν ἐς ἑαυτοῦ γενναίῳ.

Plut. Comm. not. 17. 3, p. 1067 Α: ὅταν ἐκπυρώσωσι τῶν κόσμων ὀντού, κακοῖς μὲν ὅσῳ ὑπολείποντα, τὸ δὲ διὰ φρονίμων ἔστι πηγαίνειται καὶ σοφὸν. Some of the later Stoics however modified this doctrine into something more nearly resembling the Jewish predictions of universal ruin. Cic. Acad. 2. 37. 119: the Stoic says 'fore tamen aliquando ut omnis hicmundus ardore deflagret'. Philo De aetern. mundi 3. 9, Cohn VI, p. 75: the Stoics say κόσμων μὲν ἑα (εἶναι), γενέσεως δ’ αὐτῶν θεὸν αἰτίων, φθορᾶς δ’ μηκέτι θεῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν τοῖς θεῶν πυρὸς ἀκαμάτω δύναμιν χρόνων μακραῖς περιόδοις ἀναλύουσαν τὰ πάντα εἰς ἑαυτήν. Seneca, Consol. ad Polyb. 1. 2: 'Mundo quidam minantur interitum, et hoc universum, quod omnia divina humanaque conplectitur, ... dies aliquis dissipabit et in confusionem veterem tenebrasque demerget.' Sen. Consol. ad
ASCLEPIUS III: 26 a 179

Marc. 26. 6: ‘Nihil quo stat loco stabit, omnia sternet abducetque vetustas:’ nec hominibus solum... sed loquis, sed regionibus, sed mundi partibus lude. ... Maria sorbebit, flamina avertet, et commercio gentium rupto societatem generis humani coetumque dissolveret. Alibi hiatibus vasto subducet urbes, tremoribus quietis, et ex infimo pestilentes halitus mittet, et inundationibus quicquid habitatur abducet, necabitque omne animal orbe submerso, et ignibus vastis torrebir incendetque mortaliam. Et cum tempus adverterit quo se mundus renovaturus exstinguat, viribus ista se suis caedent, et sidera sideribus incidunt, et omni flagrante materia, uno igne quicquid nunc ex disposito lucet ardebit.’ So far, the writer of Ascl. III is in close agreement with Seneca; and both may have borrowed from Posidonius, who wrote τῆς γενισίως καὶ τῆς φθορὰς τοῦ κόσμου in his Περὶ κόσμου α’ (Diog. Laert. 7. 142). But the Hermetist could not accept the Stoic doctrine with which Seneca i.c. concludes: ‘Nos quoque, felices animae et aeterna sortitae (i.e. disembodied and beatified souls), cum deo visum erit iterum ista moliri, labentibus cunctis et ipsae parva ruinae ingentis accessio in antiqua elementa vertemur.’

Some of the later Stoics spoke of periodical destructions of the universe by water and fire alternately. This doctrine occurs in the Stoic Heraclitus (time of Augustus?), Alleg. Hóm. c. 25; and it was adopted by Seneca, who gives a graphic description of the impending destruction of our world by a universal deluge (Nat. quaest. 3. 27–30). Seneca ib. attributes these periodical crises to the operation of the stars, and ascribes this doctrine to the Chaldaean Berosus (about 300 B.C.). Sen. Nat. Quaest. 3. 28. 7 f.:

1 Cf. Ascl. III, senectus mundi’. 2 Ascl. III, nec navigabitur mare’. 3 Ascl. III, nec terra constabit’. 4 Ascl. III, aer... languescat’. 5 Ascl. III, πὴ μὲν ἑκατο τῆς κατακλώσας. 6 Ascl. III, πὴ δὲ υἱῷ διωντάνα διακάθοισα. 7 Ascl. III, senectus mundi’ and ‘regenitura’. 8 Ascl. III, nec siderum cursus constabit in caelo’. 9 Yet the author of the De aetennatali mundi (i.e. Philo in his youth!) appears to have known of no Stoic who asserted an exhydatosis corresponding to the expyrosis. He says (11. 107) there are four elements; why then do the Stoics single out one of the four, and say that the Kosmos will be resolved into fire alone! διὸν γὰρ, εἰσέκ τὴν ἀν. . . ἐὰν ἄρα ἡ διομν ἡ γῆ... ἄλλα ὀνειρία ἡ ἐκατέρωθα ἡ ἐπιστροφή τοῦ κόσμου ἐλευν. The early Stoics spoke of a transmutation of all (except a hidden remnant of fire) from fire to water as the first stage of the diacosmesis (see note on Corp. III. 2 a), but not of a periodical exhydatosis corresponding to the expyrosis as winter to summer.
'Utrumque (sc. diluvium et conflagratio) fit, cum deo visum ordiri meliora, vetera finiri. Aqua et ignis terrenis dominantur: ex his ortus et ex his interitus est. Ergo quandoque placuere res novae mundo, sic in nos mare emittitur desuper, ut fervor ignisque, cum alius genus exitii placuit. . . . Berosus . . . ait ista cursu siderum fieri. Adeo quidem adfirmat, ut conflagrationi et diluvio tempus adsignet: arsura enim terrena contendit, quando omnia sida, quae nunc diversos agunt cursus, (i.e. the seven planets) in Cancrum convenerint sic sub eodem positavestigio, ut recta linea exire per orbes omnium possit: inundationem futuram, cum eadem sida turba in Capricornium convenerit. Illic solstitium, hie bruma conficitur. Cf. Censorinus, Di. nat. 18. 11 (about A.D. 238): 'anni (magni) hiems summa est cataclysmus, . . . aestas autem ecpyrosis.' In the allegory of the quadriga reported by Dio Chrysost., Or. 36 fin., there is mention of a periodical predominance of fire and water alternately. Dio says that the doctrine of his allegory was taught by 'Zoroaster and his disciples the Magi'; but the greater part of it is manifestly borrowed from Stoicism.

Some Stoics held that the ecpyrosis would not extend to the whole Kosmos, and that there would be merely partial conflagrations, by which the world would be 'purified'; Hippol. Ref. haer. i. 21: the Stoics prosocheonta ektuposin eisotha kai katharosin to koumos tooton ois men pantos, ois de merous,1 kai kata meros de auton katharethai logosin kai skheon tinh phorain kai tinh eteron ex autheis gennin katharosin enomaxousi. This view approaches closely to that which the Hermetist expresses in the words tiw kaiw ekatharas, pith men undeis pollai kakaklyras, pith de pneumdes katakaiwias. Those who adopted the astral explanation of the ecpyrosis (and exhydatosis) must have assumed that the destruction would extend to the lower world only, and that the stars would remain unaffected by it; whereas the earlier doctrine, taught by Chrysippus, was that the star-gods, like all else, will be absorbed in 'Zeus' at the ecpyrosis. Thus Nemesius, De nat. hom. 38, says that the gods (among whom the stars must be included) are exempt from the general destruction: ois de stoukoi fasion apokathastamounous tovs ploutos eis to auton simeion katta te mikes kai platos, iva tih

1 We are told that the Stoics Boethius and Panaetius abandoned the doctrine of ecpyrosis (Philo Aetern. mundi 10. 76); but they probably admitted partial and purifying conflagrations.
We may conclude then that in his description of the senectus mundi and regenitura the Hermetist has been influenced by some Stoic writer.

The notion that our world is already in its old age, and shows signs of approaching dissolution, occurs in Lucretius 2.1150–1174. It is to be found in the apocalyptic literature, e.g. 4 Esdras 14.16: see Charles, Eschatology, p. 209. In the troubled times of the third century a.D., no doubt it was widely accepted. Cyprian ad Demetrianum 3 (about a.D. 251): 'scire debes senuisse iam mundum: the world has no longer the strength it once possessed. Like the sun at evening, it is tending to its decline; the earth is growing miserly; all things languish.' But this notion does not occur elsewhere in the Hermetica. The Hermetists in general assume that the course of nature is invariable; e.g. Corp. XII. ii.18: ὅν γὰρ ὅμοι σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἀμετάβλητος. And the view here expressed by the writer of Ascl. III is difficult to reconcile with language used elsewhere in the same document; e.g. ch. 22b: 'quamvis inmortalitas et unius semper aetatis vigor ipse sit eis' &c. (sc. diis cælestibus). Ch. 30 init.: 'mundus) nec stabit aliquando nec conrumpetur.' (In Pl. Tim. 33 a, a senectus mundi is expressly denied; the Kosmos is there said to be ἀγάρως καὶ ἀνοσος.) The ordering of the cosmic process by a lex aeterna is not however necessarily inconsistent with recurring variations; for these variations may be ordained by an unvarying law.

Lactantius, in constructing his eschatology, used the Greek original of Ascl. III. 24 b–26 a as one of his sources, combining its data with those supplied by the Oracula Sibyllina and other apocalypses; see especially Div. inst. 7.14.16; ib. 7.15.10; and Epit. 66.3 sqq.

inordinatio, inrationabilitas, bonorum omnium (defectio).
The universe will go back to chaos; the order established by the Demiurgus will be abolished, and nothing but ἀτακτος καὶ ἄλογος will remain. Cf. Pl. Tim. 53 a: καὶ τὸ μὲν δὴ πρὸ τοῦτον, πάντα ταῦτα ἔχειν ἄλογος καὶ ἀμέτρως ὅτε δ' ἐπεχειρεῖτο κοσμεῖσθαι τὸ πᾶν κ.τ.λ. Ἰβ. 69 b: ταῦτα ἀτάκτως ἔχοντα ὁ θεὸς . . . συμμετρίας ἐνεπόθησεν. The words bonorum omnium cannot depend on inordinatio and inrationabilitas; good things cannot be ἀτακτα καὶ ἄλογα. Some word signifying 'cessation' is therefore needed to complete the sense; and perhaps defectio, used by Lactant. (Epit. 66), may be his rendering of the missing word. ἄλογος signifies the design of the Demiurgus, by which all things have been ordered to good ends; ἄλογία therefore necessarily involves bonorum omnium defectio.

ὁ κύριος καὶ πατήρ καὶ θεὸς καὶ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ ἕνὸς θεοῦ δημιουργὸς.—ille dominus et pater, deus primipotens et unius gubernator dei. Both the Greek and the Latin are here corrupt. Some phrase equivalent to τοῦ κόσμου δημιουργός is required; and the Kosmos, being ὁ δεύτερος θεὸς, cannot be called ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ἐὰν θεὸς, or unus deus. The Latin has deus primipotens in the nominative, in place of the genitive τοῦ πρῶτου; hence it is probable that τοῦ πρῶτου is a corruption of 'some such word as πρωτάρχης. In place of ἕνός, some epithet applicable to the Kosmos is needed; and Davis's conjecture, τοῦ πρωταγένους, gives the right sense. The Kosmos is not the first god absolutely; but it is the first god that has come into being, or the first in the sphere of genesis. Cf. Ascl. I. 8: ὁ κύριος . . . ἐπεὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἐποίησε, θεὸν ὅρατον καὶ αἰσθητόν . . . ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦτον ἐποίησε πρῶτον καὶ μόνον καὶ ἕνα ('ex se primum et a se secundum').

Lactantius, in both passages alike, has made the mistake of supposing that the δεύτερος θεὸς of whom Trismegistus speaks is the Son of God in the Christian sense. He seems to have taken the words τοῦ πρῶτου καὶ ἕνὸς θεοῦ δημιουργός to mean 'He whom the first and one God employed as Demiurgus', i.e. the Word by whom the Father made the world; and so he assumes that in Trismegistus' account of the renovation of the world the Son, and not the Father, is the agent ('missuiri a patre tunc filium dei, . . . quod Hermes tamen non dissimulavit'). But this is a mistake. In Ascl. III, the Demiurgus is the supreme God, the 'Master and Father', and not a second god subordinate to him.

1 Or τοῦ πρῶτου καὶ ἕνὸς (αἰσθητοῦ) θεοῦ. See Lact. Div. inst. 4. 6. 4.
It is to be noted that the translator here renders δημομυργός by gubernator (the equivalent of κυβερνήτης or ἡγεμόν), and not by fabricator.

ἐπιβλέψας τοῖς γενομένοις.—intuens in mores factaque [voluntaria]. In facta corresponds to τοῖς γενομένοις. The translator has added in mores; he may have read something equivalent in his Greek text. Voluntaria must be a duplication of the following voluntate.

τῇ ἀραξίᾳ.—vititias . . . et corruptelas omnium. Perhaps the translator read τῇ κακίᾳ (an error caused by τῇ κακίᾳ in the following line) καὶ τῇ πάνων διαφθορᾷ.

ἀνακαλεσάμενος τὴν πλανήν.—errorem revocans. Does τὴν πλάνην mean the aberrations of men, who have ceased to worship, or those of the cosmic gods, who have ceased to discharge their functions regularly? Probably the former, since the following clauses speak of God's dealings with men. It is the impiety of men that has caused confusion in the Kosmos; and when men are recalled to their duty towards the gods, all will again go right. The word πλάνη was habitually used by Christian writers to denote the error of idolatry; here it is used in a corresponding sense by the Pagan writer to denote the error of the Christians.

καὶ τὴν κακίαν ἐκκαθάρας.—malignitatem omnem. The translator has omitted ἐκκαθάρας; perhaps he read πᾶσαν (omnem) in place of it.

τῇ μὲν ἰδατι πολλῷ κατακλύσας, τῇ δὲ πυρὶ διμυτάτῳ διακαθάρας.—vel inuluvione diluens, vel igne consumens. Cf. Orig. c. Cels. 4. 69: ἀλλ' οὖν ὡς ἀνθρώπος τεκτηνάμενος τι ἐθνοῦς καὶ ἀτεχνότερον δημομυργήσας ὁ θεὸς προσάγει διαρθρώσων τῷ κόσμῳ, καθαρώς αὐτὸν κατακλυσμῷ ἢ ἐκπυρώσει, ἀλλὰ τὴν χάριν τῆς κακίας κολών ἐπὶ πλείον νέμεσθαι. . . . θέλει οὖν διὰ κανονέρας διαρθρώσεως διὰ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ἀναλαμβάνειν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τέτακται αὐτῷ πάντα κάλλιστα καὶ ἀμφιλότερα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἡλίων δημομυργίαν, ἀλλ' οὖν ήτοι ἱερικῆς τύπως αὐτῷ ἐδέσθην ἐπὶ τοῖς τῆς κακίας νοσοῦσι, καὶ παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ ὑπ' αὐτῆς ὡστερεὶ μολυνομένῳ. The Hermetist is here in close agreement with Origen.

πολέμους καὶ λοιμῶν ἐκπαίδευσ.—morbis pestilentibus iiisque per diversa loqua dispersis finiens. The translator seems to have read πολυστέρεσι or some similar adjective in place of πολέμους καὶ, and ἐκπαίδευσ in place of ἐκπαίδευσ.

ἣναγεν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχαῖον καὶ ἀποκατέστησεν τῶν ἱερωτὸ κόσμων.—ad
antiquam faciem mundum revocabit. The word ἀποκατάστασις in this connexion is characteristic of the later Stoicism. See note on ἀποκατάστασις in Ascl. I. 13. ‘The Stoics’ in Arianus Didymus, Diels Doxogr. p. 469: ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ προσελθὼν ὁ κοινὸς λόγος καὶ ἕκκοι φύσις (i. e. the πῦρ νοερόν), μείζων καὶ πλαύων γεγομένη, τέλος ἀναξιόσωσα πάντα καὶ εἰς ἐαυτὴν ἀναλαβοῦσα, ἐν τῇ πάσῃ οὐσίᾳ γίνεται, ἐπανελθοῦσα εἰς τὸν πρώτον ῥηθέντα λόγον, καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἐκεῖνην τὴν ποιοῦσαν ἑναντίον τὸν μέγιστον, καθ’ ὅν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς μόνης εἰς αὐτὴν πάλιν γίνεται ἢ ἀποκατάστασις.

Haec enim mundi (re)genitura. The Greek must have been either παλιγγενεσία or ἀναγέννησις. The writer assumes the term ἡ τοῦ κόσμου παλιγγενεσία to be already familiar to his readers, (cf. ‘haec et talis senectus veniet mundi’ above), and applies it to the restoration which is to follow on the ruin caused by the impiety of the Christians. The word παλιγγενεσία was used by the Stoics with reference to the periodical renovation of the universe; e.g. Philo De aetern. mundi 3. 9, Cohn VI, p. 75: δύναται δὲ κατὰ τούτουs (st. the Stoics) ὁ μὲν τις κόσμος ἀ décidος, ὁ δὲ τις φθαρτός λέγεσθαι, φθαρτός μὲν ὁ κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν, ἀ décidος δὲ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐκπόρωσιν παλιγγενεσίας καὶ περιόδους ἀθανατιζόμενος ὀδηγεῖτο ληγεύσαις. (Ib. ἀναγέννησις κόσμου is used as an equivalent term.) Ib. 21. 107: τούτῳ τὰς ἐκπωρώσεις καὶ παλιγγενεσίας θρυλοῦται. Marc. Aurel. 11. 1: τὴν περιοδικὴν παλιγγενεσίαν τῶν ὅλων.

On the Jewish notion of a ‘Weltenneuerung’ (a single and final renovation, not a periodically recurring process), see Bousset, Religion des Judentums, pp. 321–324. The word παλιγγενεσία occurs in Ev. Matth. 19. 28: ἐν τῇ παλιγγενεσίᾳ, διὰν καθὼς ὁ νόος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ θρόνου δόξης αὐτοῦ.

The usual Latin equivalent for παλιγγενεσία is regeneratio. We must read either (re)genitura (I have not found this word elsewhere, but regigni occurs in Lucr. 5. 244), or (nova) genitura.

per(o) αὐτὰ τemporis cursu (dei voluntate), quae est [[ ] ] sempiterna. Sempiterna is here used in the sense of aeterna, and perhaps stands for aiónos rather than dídos. Time appertains to the Kosmos, eternity to God. The writer’s object is to explain that the intervention of God at a particular time to bring about the regenitura mundi does not conflict with the truth that his will is invariable. He wills the good unchangeably; but in the time-process of the Kosmos, his will takes effect in different ways at different times.
26 b-32 a (and 40 b). In this passage the writer treats of the relation between time and eternity. He describes God as exempt from the conditions of the time-process to which the Kosmos is subject; and the timeless and changeless existence of God he denotes by the term *aeternitas* (aiōn).

The earliest Greek writer by whom the conception of timeless and changeless existence was clearly formulated is Plato. Among Plato's predecessors, those who came nearest to it were Parmenides (c. 500-450 B.C.) and his followers. See Parmen., Diels *Vorsokr.* p. 118: ὣς α'γένητον ἄν καὶ ἀνύλεθρον ἐστιν | οὐλον μονογενές τε καὶ ἀπρεμές ἡ' ἀπέλαιτον' | οὔδε ποτ' ἐν οὔδ' ἦσται, ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔστων ὄμοι πάν, | ἐν, συνεχές' ... τῶς δ' ἐν ἑκατά πέλοι το ἄν; τῶς δ' ἐν κε γένοιτο; | εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετ', οὖκ ἐστίν(ι), οὔδ' εἰ ποτὲ μέλλει ἔσεσθαι. 1 Melissus (? about 444-441 B.C.), Diels id. p. 143 ff.: (τό ὄν) ἀέι ἦν δ' τι ἣν καὶ ἀέι ἦσται. ... ἔστι τε καὶ ἀέι ἦν καὶ ἀέι ἦσται. ... ἀείων ἐστι καὶ ἀπεριο τι καὶ ἄν καὶ ὄμοιον πάν. καὶ οὐτ' ἄν ἀπόλυτον οὔτε μετακομμένοτο οὔτε ἀληθεὶ οὔτε ἀλάται. ... οὔδε καίεται. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr. I, p. 206, thus sums up the results attained by the school of Parmenides: 'Nothing was left save the bare conception of Substance, the complexus, that is to say, of the attributes of *eternal persistence* and *eternal immutability*. 2 But in Parmenides, this conception was still obscure and confused; for it is only to that which is incorporeal that these attributes can be intelligibly assigned; and in the time of Parmenides Greek thinkers had not attained to a clear distinction between the corporeal and the incorporeal. 2 He spoke of the eternally existent; but he imagined it as a globular mass of solid matter. Plato was, as far as we know, the first Greek who clearly distinguished things incorporeal from things corporeal, and said that incorporeal things exist; and accordingly, it is only when we come to Plato that we find the conception of timeless and changeless existence fully developed. Expressed by the term τὸ ὄν in contrast

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1 Thus translated by Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* 1892, p. 185: 'What is, is uncreated and indestructible, alone, complete (reading μονόν τ' ὀλομελός τε), immovable and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, all at once, a continuous one. . . . How, then, can what is be going to be in the future? Or how could it come into being? If it came into being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future.'

2 Burnet, id., p. 27, says 'When an early Greek philosopher speaks of τὸ ὄν, he does not mean Being, but Body'. Perhaps it should rather be said that the early Greek philosopher means *both at once*; for he has not discriminated the one from the other. The 'Body' of which he is thinking is not mere dead matter; it is alive; it is at once 'Body' and 'God'.
to tà γιγνόμενα, this conception runs through a large part of Plato’s writings; but it is in the *Timaeus* alone that he uses the word *aión* to express it. It is therefore evident that the doctrine of eternity in *Ascl. III. 26 b–32 a* is derived, directly or indirectly, from the *Timaeus*. See Pl. *Tim.* 37 D sqq.¹

Philo uses the term *aión* as it is used in the *Timaeus*. Philo *Quod deus sit immutabilis*, 6. 31, Wendland II, p. 63: ὅπως καὶ χρόνου θεός καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ πατήρ—πατήρ δὲ χρόνου κόσμος—τὴν κίνησιν αὐτοῦ γένεσιν ἀποφῆμι ἓκείνου· ὅστε νῦν τώ ἑκατέρα φιλοσοφεῖ ἅμα. οὕτως οὖν ὁ νεώτερος ύπὸ τινὸς θεοῦ, ἅτε αἰωθητῶς ὅν· τὸς γὰρ προσβάντων—νοητός δὲ ἓκείνω—προσβείοις ἀξίοσας παρ’ ἑαυτῷ καταμένων διενοηθῇ. οὕτως οὖν ὁ νεώτερος ύπὸ τοῦ αἰωθητοῦ κυρήθησιν τὴν χρόνου φύσιν ἀναλαμβάνων καὶ ἀνασχέν ἐποίησεν· ὅστε δὴν παρὰ τὸ μέλλον, τὸ καὶ τὰ τῶν χρόνων ὑπηργεῖαι πέρατα. καὶ γὰρ τὸ χρόνος, ἀλλὰ τὸ αρχήτυπον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ παράδειγμα αἰῶν ὁ βίος ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἐν αἰῶνι δὲ οὕτω παρελήλυθεν οὐδὲν οὕτω μέλλει, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὡφέληκεν. Philo *De mutatione nominum* 47. 267, Wendland III, p. 202 (on Gen. 17. 21): “ἐνιαυτῶν ἐπερου” οὗ (τὸ) τοῦ χρόνου μνήμων διάστημα, ὅ ταῖς σελήνιαῖς ἡ ἡλιακάς ἀναμετερεῖται περιοδοὺς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκτούποι καὶ ξένων καὶ καινῶν δυνῶς, ἐπερον τῶν ὄρωμένων καὶ αἰωθητῶν, ἐν ἀνωμάτω καὶ νοητοῖς ἔκτεταξόμενον, ὡς τὸ χρόνου παράδειγμα καὶ αρχήτυπον εἶληκεν, αἰῶνα. αἰῶν δὲ ἀναγράφεται τοῦ νοητοῦ βίου κόσμου, ὁς αἰωθητὸς χρόνος. Philo *Quis rer. div. heres* 34. 165, Wendland III, p. 38: αὕτη γάρ μὴν πρὸ τοῦ θείου τρεῖς ἡμέραι (i.e. the first three days of creation in Gen. ch. 1) ταῖς μεθ’ θείου ἱσόθυμῳ γεγόνας, ἐξάδος τυποθείης ὑστεριτὶ πρὸς αἰῶνοι καὶ χρόνου δηλων οὕτωι καὶ καὶ τὸ τρέις ἀνατέθηκε, χρόνῳ δὲ τὰς μεθ’ θείου, ὁς ἐστὶ μίμημα αἰῶνος. (I.e. the first three ‘days’ are assigned to the creation of the νοητὸς κόσμος, and the creation of the αἰωθητὸς κόσμος begins only with the fourth ‘day’.) Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1. 13. 57: ὁ γὰρ αἰῶν τοῦ χρόνου τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ ἐνστός, αὐτὰρ δὴ καὶ τὸ παράχρηκος, ἀκαραιῶς συνιότητι. See also Clem. *ib.* 1. 6. 28.

¹ It is to be noted that in that passage Plato, while drawing a clear distinction between αἰῶν and χρόνος, does not make a corresponding distinction between the adjectives αἰώνιος (‘eternal’) and ἀέριος (‘everlasting’). In the phrase τὴν αἴωνον οὐσίαν, the adjective ἀέριος corresponds to the substantive αἰῶν, and means ‘eternal’; and on the other hand, when he calls time αἰώνων ἐλάβαν αἰῶνος, the word αἰώνων does not mean ‘eternal’, but ‘everlasting’. *Ib.* 38 B, the adjective διατριμων is used in the sense of ‘eternal’. 
There seems to be no evidence that the conception of eternity, as distinguished from endless time, existed in Egypt before the time of Plato. Among the large number of Egyptian texts quoted or discussed by Brugsch in his *Rel. und Myth. der alten Aegypter*, I have found no trace of any such notion. It is true that an *argumentum ex silentio* is never quite conclusive; and there may have been schools of thought in Egypt of which we know nothing. But the extant religious documents are full of references to the cyclic recurrence of the cosmic processes,—the alternations of sunset and sunrise, winter and summer, the fall and rise of the Nile; and if the priests by whom these documents were written had recognized the existence of a supracosmic *διόνυσος* in contrast to the cosmic *κύρος* with which their thoughts were so much occupied, it is hardly conceivable that no mention of it should have survived. Whether Egyptians expressly asserted the *endlessness* of the time-process, seems doubtful. There are two words of frequent occurrence in Egyptian texts, *ḥkb* and *ḥet*, which are commonly rendered by 'everlasting' or 'for ever'; but it appears to be uncertain whether these words signified *infinite time*, or merely *a very long time*. At any rate, there seems to be no evidence that the notion of eternity, as distinguished from endless time, was known to Egyptian thinkers until it was taken over by them from the Greeks; and on the other hand, the growth of this notion on Greek soil can be traced through its successive stages, from the search of the early Ionian physicists for 'what was lasting and abiding in the flux of things' (Burnet, *E. G. P.* 1892, p. 13), down to the paragraph on *αἰων* and *χρόνος* in the *Timaeus* of Plato. It may therefore be asserted with confidence that the conception of eternity in *Ascl. III.* 26 b–32 a is derived wholly from Plato, and not from native Egyptian sources.

The word *αἰων*, to which Plato was the first to assign the special

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1. The nearest approach to it is the following (Brugsch, p. 326). In an inscription of the Casis-temple of Hibis, it is said of the Theban Amon that 'he is the Permanent in all things (*men ḫet nib*), the Living One, in whom one lives for ever' ; and on a stele of the XVIIIth Dynasty, Amon is called 'the Permanent of all things' (*men ḫet nib*). Brugsch concludes that *men ḫet*, 'the permanent of things', was an old name of Amon, and originally referred to 'the immortal quality of the several parts of the whole Kosmos'; but that shortly before the Ptolemaic period the term came to be specially used as a name for the earth. But if so, it cannot have signified timeless and changeless existence; for the earth and the other parts of the Kosmos possess only *secunda aeternitas*, i.e. the property of endless self-renewal by recurrent changes in time. See also Brugsch, *ib.* pp. 681, 690.

2. *Ib.* p. 510, in a Theban hymn to Ptah: 'men watch (or awake) and rest, but thou dost watch in resting' (*m ḫop*). But this is too vague to prove the existence of a conception of eternity.
sense 'eternity' which it bears in Ascl. III, is a word of many meanings. In the common usage of the Greeks, it meant (1) the lifetime of a man, (2) a long space of time, and (3) endless time. Aristotle, De cælo i. 9, 279 a 27, says that αἰῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ δεὶ εἶναι εἰληφε τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν; and it seems probable that many of those who used the word assumed, like Aristotle, that it was derived from δεὶ ὅν. This would help to account both for its use in the sense of endless time (χρόνος δεὶ ὅν), and for its application to a god, or a δύναμις of God.

As a rendering of the Hebrew 'olam, αἰῶν acquired the associations of that Semitic word (as for instance in the contrasted phrases ὁ αἰῶν οἶνος and ὁ μέλλων αἰῶν, 'this world' and 'the world to come'; cf. Ep. ad Eph. 2. 2: τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ κόσμου τοῦτον, opposed to ἐν τοῖς αἰῶναῖς τοῖς ἐπερχομένοις); and in writings affected by Semitic influence, it might signify either a period of time, a region of space, or a mode of existence.

The word was sometimes used to mean Time personified. An early instance of this occurs in Heraclitus fr. 52 Diels: αἰῶν παῖς ἑστὶ παῖζων, πεπτών παῖς ἡ βασιλιγη. αἰῶν there means Time; and the personification is similar to that of χρόνος in Critias, fifth century B.C., Diels Vorsokr. p. 618: ἀκάμας τε χρόνος . . . φοιτὶ τίκτων αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν. Id. p. 621: τὸ τ᾽ ἀστερωπῶν οὐρανοῦ δέμας, χρόνου καλὸν ποίκιλμα, τίκτωνος σοφοῦ.

Among the deities worshipped by the Mithraists of the Roman empire, a prominent place was assigned to a being, sometimes named Κρόνος (understood as meaning Χρόνος), and sometimes Αἰῶν, whose statue took the shape of a lion-headed human figure with a snake coiled round the body. This is probably the Persian god Zerwan, 'Time'.

From this use of the word as the proper name of a certain god, must be distinguished its use as an epithet or predicate applicable to various gods. When employed in the latter way, αἰῶν appears to differ little in meaning from θεὸς; and those who so used it probably meant by it 'an everlasting or ever-living being' (δεὶ ὅν). There are numerous instances of this in the Magic Papyri; e.g. Pap. mag. Par. i. 3168: πλοντοῦσα αἰῶν, ἵστε Ἀγαθὲ Δαιμόν. Wünsch, Sethianische Verfluchungstafeln 101 (Reitzenstein, Poin. p. 270):

1 In the 'Sanchuniathon' of Philo Byblus there was mention of a 'man' (i.e. a euhemerized god) named Αἰῶν; Euseb. Pr. ev. i. 10. 7: έπίθε φησι γεγενηθαι . . . Αἰῶνα καὶ Πρωτόγονα . . . ἔφερεν δὲ τὸν Αἰῶνα τὴν ἀπὸ δινήρων τροφὴν.
aión ἐρωτά, κύριε Σάραπι. In Pap. mag. Lond. 46. 467, the deity invoked is called ὁ ἀπλάντητος αἰών. In Pap. mag. Leid. W, Dieterich, Abraxas, p. 176, ll. 1–13, the supreme God is thus addressed: ἐπικαλοῦμαι σε...باطней θεῶν δύναται ἰδείν τὴν ἀληθινὴν μορφήν, ὁ μεταμορφοφέων εἰς πάντας ἐν ταῖς ὀράσεων ἀράτος αἰών αἰῶνος.\(^1\) Pap. mag. Berl. i. 200: (σ') ἐπικαλοῦμαι, προσάρτω, καὶ δέομαι σου, αἰώνιον αἰών, ἀκονικράτωρ, αἰωνοπολοκράτωρ. Pap. mag. Par. i, Dieterich, Mithrasliturgie, p. 4, l. 18: μέλιοι κατοπτεύουν σήμαρον...τὸν ἀθάνατον αἰώνα καὶ δεσπότην τῶν πυρῶν διαδηματών. Epiphanius, Haer. 51. 22, describes a rite annually celebrated at the Koreion\(^2\) in Alexandria, and adds, ‘If they are asked the meaning of this mystery, they answer, “To-day at this hour Kore gave birth to τὸν αἰῶνα”’.\(^3\) Thus it appears that in Roman Egypt the word aión was habitually applied to a god.

This use of the word was adopted by some\(^4\) of the Christian Gnostics, who employed the term to denote the hypostatized δυνάμεις of God. In the system of Valentinus, for instance, the twenty-eight or thirty personal beings produced from the primal deity by successive emissions are called aiônes. Cf. the Naassene Attis-document, Hippol. Ref. haer. 5. 8: αἰτή γάρ ἐστιν ἡ παρθένος ἡ...τίκτονα υἱόν, υἱὸς ψυχικόν, υἱὸς σωματικόν, ἄλλα μακάριοι αἰώνα αἰῶνων.

In Ascl. III, however, there is no trace of this use of the word. In chs. 26 b–32 a aión is not personified, but retains unaltered the special sense assigned to it by Plato.

On the subject of eternity and time, see Plotinus 4. 4. 15 and 6. 5. 11. Porphyry, 'Αφορμαί πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ 44: οὐδὲ ἀφωτάμενος οὖν τοῦτο ἐν τῷ τόδε μεταβαίνει (ὁ νοῦς, i.e. the divine mind)...εἰ δὲ μὴ

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\(^1\) Probably aiṓn aiṓnων, equivalent to θεῖοι θεῶν (in a sense analogous to that of βασιλεῖς βασιλέων), 'God supreme over all gods'.

\(^2\) The goddess worshipped in this rite was probably the Κόρη who was associated with Sarapis. Cf. Julian Ep. 111 (Bidez and Cumont), 433 D: ὑπάρχοντας ὑμῖν (Alexandrines) πολιούχον θεὸν τοῦ βασιλέως Σαράπιδος ἀμα τῆς παρθένου κόρη. The founders of this Alexandrian cult may have followed, in this part of it, the example of the 'lesser mysteries' of the Eleusinia, in which the birth of the son of Kore was celebrated. Sarapis corresponded to Zeus Chthonios or Pluto, the father of Kore's child.

\(^3\) Here, τῶν αἰῶνων is used to denote the son of Kore (Iacchus or Dionysus); and τῶν θεῶν might equally well have been written in place of τῶν αἰῶνων.

\(^4\) By some of them, but not by all. In the Coptic-Gnostic documents (Pistis Sophia &c.), aiṓn frequently signifies, not a person, but a place. The twelve divisions of the Zodiac are there called aiṓnes; 'the twelve aeons' means the region of the Zodiac, and 'the thirteenth aeon' appears to be a sphere situated above that region. In a Naassene hymn quoted by Hippolytus, Ref. haer. 5. 10, Jesus says καταβθησομαι, αἰῶνα διὸν κοιλιοῦσα ('all the worlds'; i.e. 'I will go down to earth traversing, on my way down, all the celestial spheres'.)
The Platonic notion of eternity is well stated by Boethius, *Philos. consol. 5. 6*: 'That God is eternal, is agreed by all who possess reason. What then is eternity? ... Eternity is the complete and simultaneous possession of endless life in a single whole. The meaning of this will be clearer if we compare the eternal with the temporal. Everything that lives in time moves onward through the present from the past to the future; and no being that is situated in time can grasp all the extent of its life together. Such a being has not yet reached to-morrow; it has already lost yesterday; and even in your life to-day, you live only in one fleeting and transitory moment at a time. Thus that which is subject to the conditions of existence in time, even though it has never begun to be and never ceases to be (as Aristotle held that the universe is without beginning or end), yet is not on that account a thing that can be rightly deemed to be eternal. For though its life is endless, it does not grasp and embrace the whole extent of its life together; it does not yet possess the future, and it has ceased to possess the past. That which grasps and possesses together, in a single whole, all the contents of endless life,—that from which nothing of the future is absent, and nothing of the past has fled away,—that is rightly called eternal. Such a being must hold itself in its own grasp, must be ever present to itself, and must possess the endless course of fleeting time as a thing present to it. There are some who, when they are told that Plato held that this universe has had no beginning in time, and will never have an end, suppose that it follows from this that the created universe is co-eternal with its Creator. But they are mistaken. It is one thing to traverse the course of an endless
life (and this is the mode of existence that Plato ascribed to the universe); it is another thing to hold the whole extent of endless life grasped together in one present; and to do this is clearly a peculiar property of the mind of God. It must not be supposed that God's priority to things created is a matter of length of time; he is prior to them rather in virtue of the peculiar quality of his indivisible nature. The unending movement of things temporal is an imitation of the unchanging present of the life that moves not. The temporal world, since it cannot adequately reproduce the model, falls away from immobility into movement, and declines from an indivisible present to an endless extent of time future and time past. It is unable to hold all the contents of its life in its possession together; but by never coming to an end, it seems to make some attempt at rivalling that which it cannot fully realize in its own being. It binds itself to such a present as the fleeting moment supplies; and that present, since it is a sort of copy of the abiding present, bestows on all beings which possess it an appearance of existence. But since that momentary present could not abide, it hurried forward along the endless path of time; and so it came to pass that it made continuous by its movement a life the whole contents of which it had not power to grasp together by abiding. If then we seek to call things by their right names, we shall use the words of Plato, and say that God is eternal, but the universe is everlasting.

'Now inasmuch as the way in which the judgement apprehends its objects must always be determined by its own nature, and God lives ever in an eternal present, his knowledge transcends all movement of time, and abides in the indivisibility of his present; he grasps the past and the future in all their infinite extent, and with his indivisible cognition he contemplates all events as if they were even now taking place.'

26 b. Voluntas enim &c. The writer here passes on to a fresh topic by a superficial transition. (Compare the transition at ch. 22 a nif.) The mention of God's changeless will introduces the distinction between the changeless and the changing, i.e. between eternity and time, with which the following chapters deal.

Dei enim natura consilium est [[voluntatis]] bonitas(ti)s. In Corp. II. 14 and elsewhere, it is asserted that God, and God

1 This paragraph of Boethius should be compared with the paragraph on the θείου νοῦς in Ascl. III. 33 b.
alone, is good. The writer of Ascl. III expresses a similar thought by saying that God’s nature is θεοῦ οὐγαθὸς. The use of the word θεοῦ to signify God’s purpose or design is as old as Homer (Il. 1. 5, Δίος δ’ ἐτηλίετο θεοῦ). In Corp. I. 8 b, the creative θεοῦ is momentarily personified.

(‘Voluntatis) summa consilium, o Trismegiste? Having used the terms θεοῦ and θεοῦ, the writer pauses to explain the relation between them. θεοῦ is the design, i.e. the determination of the end to be aimed at; (in the case of God’s θεοῦ, that end is necessarily οὐγαθὸς;) θεοῦ is the direction of the will towards the accomplishment of the design; τὸ θεοῦ is the act of willing. Compare the distinction between θεοῦ, θεοῦ, and προαιρετικός in Ar. Eth. Nic. 3. 2–5. The Hermetist’s τὸ θεοῦ seems to correspond to Aristotle’s προαιρετικός; but he differs from Aristotle in making θεοῦ issue from θεοῦ. According to Aristotle’s use of the words, it would be more correct to say that θεοῦ issues from θεοῦ; for ἡ μὲν θεοῦ τῆς τέλους ἐστὶ, . . . θεοῦ ὁμοιόθεν δὲ . . . περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη i.e. we first wish for something, and then deliberate what action we must take to bring about the thing we wish for.

Neque enim ‘inpense’ aliquid vult. According to common usage, inpense veli should mean ‘to wish eagerly’ or ‘earnestly’. This cannot be the meaning intended here; inpense must therefore be either a mistranslation of the Greek, or a false reading of the Latin. Possibly the Greek word may have been ἀκρατώς, in the sense ‘without power to accomplish that which he wills’, and the translator may have taken it to mean impotenter, i.e. ‘immoderately’ or ‘violently’.

est omnium plenissimus. God is οὗτος ἐνδέχεται.

vult autem omnia bona. Cf. 20 b: ‘voluntas eius (‘eadem’) est bonitas omnis.’

habet omnia quae vult. The good, which God wills, is present to him in complete realization. Man, whose life is a time-process, wills that to which he has not yet attained; but God, lives in an eternal present, in which the distinction between aspiration and attainment disappears. Strictly speaking, the words ‘will’ and ‘purpose’ are inapplicable to God; for they imply a process in time. But they may serve to describe that which takes place in the cosmic time-process as issuing from and dependent on God’s eternal being. Cf. Ascl. I. 8: Voluntas etenim dei
ipsa est summa perfectio.' Ib. fin.: 'voluntatem (dei) comitatur effectus.'

eius imago mundus. See note on Ascl. I. 10: 'dei, cuius sunt imagines duae mundus et homo.' In Pl. Timaeus 30 c, the pattern, in the likeness of which the Kosmos is made, is not the Demiurgus himself, but the αὐτὸς θεός (= the νοητὸς κόσμος); and the writer of Ascl. III, in ch. 31 init., probably adopted this alternative; for it seems best to strike out dei there, and read 'huius (sc. mundi insensibilis) imago hic effectus est mundus.' In the concluding sentence of the Timaeus, according to the reading generally accepted, the Kosmos is called εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ (ζύου). But there is a variant, εἰκὼν τοῦ ποιητοῦ, 'the image of its maker'; and it is possible that the latter reading was accepted by some of the Egyptian Platonists. Time (which is the mode of existence of the Kosmos) is in the Timaeus called an εἰκὼν of eternity (which is the mode of existence of God); and it is merely another way of expressing the same thought to say that the Kosmos, being ἀθάνατον ζωοῦ, or ever-living in time, is an 'image' of God, who lives in eternity. Most of the later Platonists regarded the ἰδέα or παραδείγματα, of which the νοητὸς κόσμος consists, as thoughts or designs existing in the mind of God (see for instance Philo De opif. mundi 3. 17 ff.); and from saying that the Kosmos is made in the likeness of God's thoughts, it is not a long step to saying that it is made in the likeness of God.

27 a. Bonus, o Asclepi. God gives that which is really good, viz. life itself, which is incorporeal and imperishable. The Kosmos gives those things which men think to be good, viz. the corporeal means of our transitory life on earth. But are men mistaken in thinking these things to be good? If so, it would follow that it is a mistake to think the Kosmos good. The writer's meaning seems to be rather that the Kosmos and its corporeal gifts to men are good indeed, but in a lower degree,—good relatively, but not absolutely. But he emphasizes the affirmative proposition, 'the Kosmos is (relatively) good'; and in this he differs from the writer of Corp. VI, who lays stress on the negative, 'the Kosmos is not (absolutely) good.' See Corp. VI. 2 a, 4 a, and Corp. X. 10 b, 12. In Corp. VI. 6, the writer of that libellus speaks with contempt of τὰ αὐθεντικαί αἰγαθᾶ, which are the same as the 'omnia quae mortalibus videntur bona' of Ascl. III. 27, i.e. the material means of our earthly life.
In the Prophecy, Ascl. III. 25 ('bonum multiformi imaginum varietate compositum' &c.), where the writer is contending against the Christians who regard the Kosmos as wholly bad, he asserts its goodness without any hint of the reservation suggested in ch. 27 a.

deus . . . dispensator distributore est . . . sensus, animae, et vitae. Cf. Corp. X. 2; and XI. ii. 11 sqq., where it is said that God is life, and that in giving life, he gives himself.

29 c. Secundum etenim deum hunc crede. In the traditional text, these words follow a passage concerning the sun, and hunc consequently appears to mean solem. But there can be no doubt that in the original it was the Kosmos that was called δεύτερος θεός. When the misplaced passages 27 b–29 b have been removed, a satisfactory connexion is obtained; 29 c fits on to 27 a without any breach of continuity, and hunc refers to mundus. As to secundum deum, cf. Ascl. I. 8, ἐπεὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἐποίησε κ.τ.λ. Ascl. I. 10, 'secundus est mundus'. Corp. VIII. 1 b, 2: εἰ γὰρ δεύτερος θεός δύ κόσμος κ.τ.λ. The notion that the Kosmos is the second God is derived from the Timaeus, where the Kosmos is called θεός αἰσθητός, and is described as the son of the Demiurgus. Numenius (quoted in prefatory note on Corp. II) distinguished a first, a second, and a third God. 1 His πρῶτος θεός is ἵστως, i.e. eternal, and is περὶ τὰ νοητά; his δεύτερος θεός, the Demiurgus, is κυνώμενος, and is περὶ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά; his τρίτος θεός (who is presumably περὶ τὰ αἰσθητά alone) is the Kosmos, and thus corresponds to the second God of some of the Hermetists, and to the supreme God of the Stoics. Philo, in Quod deus sit immutabilis 6. 31 (quoted on p. 186), sets forth a system not unlike that of Numenius: he there says that God has an elder son, who is νοητός, (viz. the intelligible Kosmos, or the Logos,) and a younger son, who is αἰσθητός, (viz. the sensible Kosmos). The theology of Ascl. III is in this respect less elaborate than that of Philo and Numenius. In Corp. XI. i, the hypostatized αἰών interposed between God and the Kosmos occupies a position analogous to that of Philo's 'elder son of God', and the 'second God' of Numenius.

[omniaque mundana inlustrantem]. These words were probably inserted after the text had been dislocated; the person who inserted them must have assumed that hunc meant solem. An

1 A suggestion of a system of three Gods occurs in Pl. Ep. 2, 312 B: περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλεία πάντ' ἱστι, κ.τ.λ.
adherent of a solar cult might say that 'sol omnia mundana inlustrat animalia', both literally and metaphorically, i.e. that the sun gives light and life. But it would hardly be said that 'mundus omnia mundana inlustrat animalia'.

animalia sive animantia sive inanimantia: animals and vegetables. See Ascl. I. 4, 'est et aliud animalis genus, sine anima quidem, et tamen non carens sensibus' (viz. vegetables).

Si enim animal mundus vivensque semper et fuit et est et erit. (Vivens semper = αιών, a term applied to the Kosmos in Corp. VIII. 2.) This sentence, taken by itself, would seem to imply that the Kosmos has always been in existence, i.e. that it has had no beginning. But did the writer of Ascl. III hold that view? His language on this point appears to vary. On the one hand, in 40 b we find the words 'nee coepit esse nec desinet'. These words have probably been shifted from their right place; but there can be little doubt that their original subject was mundus, or the movement or time-process of the mundus; and if so, we have in them an express statement that the Kosmos has had no beginning. But on the other hand, the writer repeatedly says that God is the maker of the Kosmos; (e.g. ch. 25: 'hic mundus, dei opus'; ch. 26 a: 'tanti operis effector . . . deus'; ch. 29 c fin.: 'semel dispensata vita'; cf. ch. 31 init., where it is clearly implied that the αἰώνιον κόσμος is γεννητός;) whence it would seem to follow (unless the inference is expressly denied) that the Kosmos has had a beginning.

It would be possible to reconcile the words 'si enim animal mundus vivensque semper et fuit et est et erit' with the view that the universe has had a beginning, by assuming their meaning to be merely that the Kosmos, since it first came into existence, has ever been, and will ever continue to be, a living being; or in other words, that its life, from the time when it first began, has been uninterrupted, and will continue without interruption. On this assumption, the statement is a virtual denial of a periodical φθορά of the Kosmos. (The senectus mundi spoken of in the Prophecy, ch. 26 a, will be stayed before it ends in death.)

In the Timaeus, Plato (or more exactly, the speaker in Plato's dialogue) puts the question whether the Kosmos has had a beginning, and answers 'yes'. (Tim. 28 b: γέγονεν.) Ever since the time of the first readers of the Timaeus, it has been disputed whether Plato meant what he wrote in that passage, or whether,
when he wrote 'yes', he meant 'no'. (See e.g. the opinion of Xenocrates and Crantor on this point, as reported in Plut. De an. procr. in Timaeo 3, p. 1013; Arist. De caelo 1. 10, 279 b 30; Philo De aetern. mundi 4. 13–16, Cohn VI, p. 76 sq.) Aristotle said that the Kosmos has always been in existence; of later Greek thinkers, some agreed with Aristotle in this,1 and others differed from him. Philo De aetern. mundi 3. 7: τρειτεὶ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ζωτοκομίου γεγοναί δόξα, τῶν μὲν ἄδικον τῶν κόσμων φαμένων, ἀνάγνωσι τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, τῶν δὲ ἐξ ἕναντιας γενητῶν τε καὶ φθαρτῶν εἰσὶ δὲ τι . . . μετήν δόξαν ἀπέλευσον, γενητὸν καὶ ἀφθαρτὸν οἰηθέντες αὐτὸν εἶναι. The third opinion,—that the Kosmos has had a beginning, will but never have an end,—is that which (whether Plato held it or not) stands written in the Timaeus; and it seems to be the view accepted by some of the Hermetic writers who touch on the question; e.g. by the writer of Ascl. I, who repeatedly says that the Kosmos has been made by God. See Ascl. I. 3 c: 'mundus (= ὄλη) praeparatus est a deo' &c. Cf. Corp. IX. 9: ὅ δὲ κόσμος, ἀπὸ λαβὼν (ἀλλοθρεύς καὶ νόσθος) ἁμα τῷ γενέσθαι. The contrary opinion however is asserted in Corp. XI. i. 3: ἔργον δὲ τοῦ αἰῶνος ὁ κόσμος, γνώμων οὐσίας, καὶ ἀλλὰ γνώμων ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος. (This instance shows that a writer might call the Kosmos opus dei and yet hold it to be without beginning.) And those Hermetists who said that God 'is ever at his work' (Corp. XI. ii. 14 a), and that God's very being consists in his making things (Corp. XIV. 5), must have held that the world has always been in existence.2

1 The Aristotelian view was held by some at least of the Neo-Pythagoreans; e.g. Pseudo-Philolaus, Stob. 1. 20. 2, vol. i, p. 172 W.: ἕξι δὲ κόσμος ἀλώνων. Ocelius Lucanus, Stob. 1. 20. 3, p. 174 W.: ἀγάνηστος δ ἀλώνως. But in some of the fragments ascribed to Philolaus it is said that the Kosmos has had a beginning; Diels Vorsohr. p. 246: Φιλόλαος Βάηχι, δ κόσμος ἐν λοιπῷ, ἥπερ δὲ γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου. ίδ. p. 242: τὸ πρῶτον ἐρμωθέν, τὸ ἔν, ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τὰς σφαίρας ἀντία καλεῖ. Actius in Diels Dachgr. p. 332: (Φιλόλαος) τὸ γραμματικὸν ἐν τῷ μεγατάτῳ πύρ, ἑπερ τρέχει διαντροπιβάλλει τῷ τού παρόντος (σφαίρας) δ ἐς μορφήνθην θεός. (It is doubtful whether any of these fragments were written by Philolaus himself—on this question, see Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy;—but the views expressed in them must have been held by some Pythagoreans.) Aristotle (De caelo 1. 10, 279 b) expressly says that none of his predecessors had held the oparán to be without beginning. In this statement Philolaus must be included, if any writing of Philolaus was known to Aristotle; and in any case, it must include 'the Pythagoreans' who were known to him.

2 In the last sentence of Corp. XVI, the MSS. give ὁ αἰών ἡ ποίησις αὐτοῦ ἀρχήν ἢ τέλος ἔχει. This would imply that the Kosmos is without beginning. In the printed text, I have bracketed ἀρχήν ἢ, because there is no mention of ἀρχή in the parallel clause which precedes; but it would be possible to write the sentence thus: δισερὸ δ ὀτίς ὅ τε ἀρχήν ὅτε τέλος ἔχει, ὅταν ὁ δὲ ἡ ποίησις αὐτοῦ ἀρχήν ἢ τέλος ἔχει.
nihil in mundo mortale est. Cf. Corp. VIII passim.

Corp. XI. i. 3 : οδὸς ἀπολείπατι τι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. Corp. XII. ii. 15 b : νεκρῶν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐν οὗτε γέγονεν οὔτε ἐστὶν οὔτε ἐστιν ἐν (τῷ) κόσμῳ κ.τ.λ. Philo Leg. allegor. i. 3. 7, Cohn I, p. 63 : γένεσις τε αὐθεντομέμνον ἑτέρων καὶ φθορα γεννωμένων ἄλλων ἀποτελείται, κ.τ.λ. The same doctrine had already been taught by Empedocles, fr. 8 Diels : φῶς (birth) ὁδὲν ἐστὶν ἀπάντων | θνητῶν, οὐδὲ τις ὁλομένου θανάτου τελευτή, | ἄλλα μάνων μίζυς τε διαλλαξίς τε μεγά- | τον | ἐστι. Cf. Anaxagoras, fr. 17 Diels.

Viventis etenim semper uninsouiusque partis: a Greek genitive absolute. See ch. 27 e, numeri completi.

The partes mundi (μέρη οὗ μόρια τοῦ κόσμου) are the στοιχεῖα; and this term may include the heavenly bodies as well as the four elements. The heavenly bodies are of course both living and imperishable; they are di caelestes. The four elements also are here, as well as in Corp. VIII, regarded as living and imperishable. In making them living beings, the writer is in accord with the 'hylozoist' tradition of the early Ionian physicists, which was a survival of the primitive man's instinctive assumption that everything he sees is alive like himself. Empedocles, the first Greek who taught that the universe is composed of four 'roots' or elements, gave to these elements the names of gods, and described them as moved by love and hate. The Stoics, following Heraclitus, spoke of πῦρ νεφῶν; they called it Zeus, and identified earth, air, and water with other deities worshipped by the Greeks.

The Persians, in the fifth century B.C., worshipped (in addition to Heaven, Sun, and Moon) 'Earth, Fire, Water, and the Winds (Hdt. i. 131); and these deities can still be recognized in the Mithraism of the Roman empire. 'Le mithraisme divisait les quatre corps simples qui, suivant la physique des anciens, composent l'univers' (Cumont, Mystères de Mithra 1902, p. 97). The 'Mithrasliturgie' edited by Dieterich (Pap. mag. Par. i. 475 sqq.) begins with an invocation of πνεῦμα (i.e. air), πῦρ, ὄδωρ, and ὀσωτία γεώδης, regarded as deities. The influence of Mithraism may have been felt in Roman Egypt, and may have helped to maintain or revive there the habit of regarding the four elements as living and personal beings.

Attempts have been made to find in the deities of the ancient Egyptian cosmogony personifications of fire, air, earth, and water; and it has been inferred thence that the doctrine of the four elements
was known in Egypt long before the time of Empedocles. (See Brugsch, *Rel. und Myth. der alten Aeg.* p. 190.) That inference can hardly be justified. But to the Egyptians, quite as much as to the early Greeks, it was natural to imagine life and personality in all things; the notion of living parts or members of the living universe was familiar to them from of old; and when they had learnt from Greek teachers that there are four 'parts of the Kosmos', they would be ready enough to identify each of the four with one or other of their native gods. Diodorus (1. 11 f.) has recorded a Graeco-Egyptian theory of this sort:—'The Kosmos is composed of five elements, just as the human body is composed of members; and each of these elements is a deity. The life-giving πνεύμα (the "fifth element" of the Peripatetics) is Zeus (i.e. Amon); fire is Hephaisatos (Ptah); earth is the Μήτηρ (Isis?); water is ὕδωρ (a Nile-goddess); and air is Athena (Neith).' There were doubtless various systems of this kind. An Egyptian instance of the recognition of the elements as deities occurs in the Rhind Papyrus, demotic text, col. 5.2 (Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienrel.* p. 84), where the dead man is addressed thus: 'Thou honourest (dost worship?) the morning sun, and the moon, and the air and the water and the fire.' (In the corresponding hieratic text, 'renewer of life' is substituted for 'water', and 'eye of Horus' for 'fire'.)

In the Kore Kosmu, fire, air, water, and earth are persons, and make speeches. This is perhaps no more than a literary artifice; but it is an artifice which the mental habit of the time made it easy to employ.

The writer of Ascl. III says that the several elements are 'ever-living' or immortal; but it does not necessarily follow from this that in his opinion they are not transmutable,—that water, for instance, always remains water, and air never ceases to be air. The common opinion of his time, at least among the Platonists, was that transmutations of portions of one element into portions of another are continually taking place, but that these transmutations are compensated by other transmutations in the reverse direction, so that each element, regarded as a whole, persists unaltered. According to the Stoics, fire alone of the four elements could be properly said to be ἀεικωνίων; for the other three will be wholly transmuted into fire at the ecyrosis.1

1 Cumont, *Mystères de Mithra*, p. 98, says that the Mithraists also held that the four elements changed into one another. He refers to the 'Zoroastrian' allegory
est sicuti est: i.e. it is \( \Delta \varepsilon \lambda \varepsilon \omega \omega \).

vitae aeternitatisque debet esse plenissimus. I suppose the meaning to be that, in order that the Kosmos may live everlastingly in time, it must be ‘filled with life’, or vivified throughout, by God, whose life is eternal (i.e. timeless and changeless). Compare the phrases in ch. 30, ‘in ipsa aeternitatis vivacitate mundus agitatur’, and ‘(mundus) extrinsecus vivificatur ab aeternitate’. Similarly, in Corp. VIII. 2, it is said that the Kosmos is made \( \Delta \varepsilon \lambda \varepsilon \omega \omega \), \( \delta \varepsilon \Delta \varepsilon \chi \alpha - \tau \iota \zeta \omega \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \) by God, who is \( \Delta \delta \nu \omega \). But if this is the sense intended, it is obscurely expressed; and perhaps there is some corruption in aeternitatisque.

[Sol ergo . . . dispensator est.] This must be one of the ‘solar interpolations’. (See Ascl. III. 19 b, ‘Solis \( \nu \omega \nu \delta \omega \chi \kappa \kappa \lambda \) lumen est’ &c.) The sentence interrupts the context. The writer is speaking of the relation between God and the Kosmos as a whole, and has no reason to digress into a description of the special function of the sun. Moreover, the function here assigned to the sun (\( \gamma \beta \varphi \beta \rho \kappa \mu \beta \rho \alpha \tau \iota \zeta \mu \alpha \) and \( \epsilon \iota \omikron \) . . . \( \delta \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \) ) is the same as that which, in the following sentences, is assigned, in one sense, to the supreme God (\( \text{vitalium} . . . \text{sempiternus gubernator} \), and \( \text{vitae dispensator aeternus} \)) and in another sense, to the Kosmos (\( \text{vitae dispensator his omnibus} \)); and there is no place for a third \( \delta \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \).

Deus ergo viventium vel vitalium, in mundo quae sunt, sempiternus gubernator est. We should rather have expected \( \text{aeternus gubernator} \), in accordance with \( \text{dispensator aeternus} \) in the next line; for \( \text{sempiternus} \), ‘everlasting’, is properly an epithet of the Kosmos as opposed to the eternal God. But perhaps the Hermetist here used \( \Delta \delta \nu \omega \) as an equivalent for \( \alpha i \omega \nu \omega \); compare \( \tau \gamma \nu \) \( \Delta \delta \nu \omega \) \( \nu \nu \) \( \nu \nu \) in Pl. Tim. 37 \( \varepsilon \), and \( \tau \omega \) \( \Delta \delta \nu \omega \) in Corp. VIII. 2. Similarly below, in ch. 30 init., \( \text{sempiternitate vivendi} \) seems to stand for \( \text{aeternitate vivendi} \).

The \( \text{viventina vel vitalia} \) (\( \zeta \omega \nu \kappa \alpha \), in the sense of \( \zeta \omega \gamma \nu \omega \nu \)?) in of the \( \text{quadriga} \) in Dio Chrysost. Or. 36. 39 f. But that allegory is merely Stoic cosmology in a Persian disguise. The supreme God drives a four-horse car; the horses are the elements. There is a series of cyclic changes, in the course of which fire and water alternately predominate. At the end of a long period, fire absorbs into itself the other three elements, and coalesces with the supreme deity; then follows a fresh \( \text{diacosmos} \). The image of the \( \text{quadriga} \), and the picturing of the four elements as horses, may have been derived from a Persian source; but most of the details (which, as Dio himself admits, suit very ill with the allegorical setting) are evidently taken from Greek Stoicism.
mundo quae sunt are, I suppose, the intracosmic sources of life, i.e. the heavenly bodies (and the four elements, regarded as concentric spherical strata?), which receive life from God, and distribute it to all individual things in the world below. If so, they are the same material ‘parts of the Kosmos’ which, in ch. 19 b, were said to be governed by the incorporeal deity Zeus (Hypatos), the oδυνάρχης of the oδρανός, and by the other oδυνάρχαι in sub-ordination to him. (We were there told that ‘per caelum Iuppiter omnibus praebevit vitam.’) It would have been possible to bring the two passages into connexion, by explaining in ch. 29 c that the supreme God employs Zeus (Hypatos) as his agent in transmitting life to the vitalia; but the writer has not done so. In this instance, as in some others, the author of Ascl. III has made no attempt to work up into a single and consistent system the fragments of doctrine which he has taken from different sources.

Semel... dispensata (dispensavit MS.) vita: sc. at the time when the Kosmos was made. These words seem to imply that the Kosmos has had a beginning. It may be difficult to reconcile this with the maintenance of the Kosmos by a lex aeterna; but the same difficulty presents itself in the Timaeus also.

Cf. Corp. IX. 9: πάντων οὖν τῶν ζωῶν ἡ αἰώνια καὶ νόμος (i.e. their conscious life) ἐξωθεὶν ἐπεισίρχεται, εἰσπέπνευα ἀπὸ τοῦ περι-έχοντος (i.e. from the Kosmos around them). ὁ δὲ κόσμος, ἀπαξ λαβών ἄμα τῷ γενέσθαι, ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ λαβών ἔχει.

30. mundus agitatur. The contrast between στάσις and κίνησις corresponds to the contrast between αἰών and χρόνος. God is ἐστός or ἀκατός; the Kosmos is κινούμενον. The word κίνησις means (1) movement in space (φέρεσθαι); (2) change of form, quality, or condition (ἀλλοωθεῖσθαι). Pl. Parmen. 138 b: κινούμενον γε (τὸ ἄν) ἡ φέροντα ἡ ἀλλοωθεῖ τὸν αὖ αὕτη γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις. Arist. De cælo 4. 3, 310 a: τρεῖς αἱ κινήσεις, ἡ μὲν κατὰ μέγεθος, ἡ δὲ κατ’ έἰδος, (these two might be included under ἀλλοωθεῖα,) ἡ δὲ κατὰ τόπον. The Hermetist, throughout this passage on time and eternity, probably has both meanings in his mind together. But κινήσεις in either sense is a process in time; if we say that a thing κυκλῶται, we imply that it is (or that parts of it are) in one place or state at one time, and in another place or state at another time. The vital energy of God is timeless, and accordingly, is motionless and changeless. But the derived vitality of the Kosmos
is extended in time, and accordingly manifests itself in movement and change; the Kosmos 'differt numeris et temporibus cuncta'. Cf. Corp. XI. i. 2: τοῦ δὲ αἰώνος, (οὐδεὶς ἐστὶν) ἡ ταυτότης... τοῦ δὲ χρόνου, ἡ μεταβολή. Corp. X. ii: ἢ δὲ νοητῇ στάσις καὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν κύησον.

in ipsa vitali aeternitate locus est mundi. 'Eternity' or 'the eternal' is here figuratively pictured as occupying the outer space by which the spherical Kosmos is enclosed. Cf. ch. 27b, 'Deus, supra verticem summi caeli consistens' &c.; and ch. 33 a, 'quod dicitur extra mundum' &c. The same notion is more fully developed in Corp. II, where τόπος (i.e. the motionless space by which the moving Kosmos is surrounded) is substituted for αἰών. Compare also Corp. XI. i. 2: ὁ σῶν αἰών ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ὁ δὲ κόσμος ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι' i.e. Aeon and Kosmos are, as it were, concentric spheres; and Aeon, the larger sphere, is itself contained by God, who fills the boundless space without. Ib. 3: τοῦ κόσμου ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἀμπεριεχομένου.

Ipse mundus vitae dispensator est his omnibus quae in se sunt. The Kosmos includes or consists of the vitalia spoken of above, i.e. the heavenly bodies (and the elements?); it might therefore be said with equal truth that life is received from God and dispensed to individuals by the Kosmos collectively, or by the vitalia severally. But it would destroy the consistency of the passage to single out one of the vitalia, viz. the sun, and say that life is dispensed by that alone, as is said in the 'solar interpolation' above.

Cf. Corp. IX. 6: the Kosmos ὁμοῦ τόπος ἐστὶ καὶ δημιουργὸς ζωῆς. See note on Ascl. III. 25, 'machina voluntatis dei'.

et locus est omnium quae sub sole gubernantur. Perhaps this may be another 'solar interpolation'. But it is also possible that the original writer used the phrase 'beneath the sun' to signify the lower or earthly region of the Kosmos, the place of γάιας and φθορά. This region is more commonly called 'sublunar'; but the moon, being subject to apparent growth and diminution, was sometimes regarded as belonging rather to the lower world.

vivificatur ab aeternitate. If ab stands for ἀπὸ, we may see in these words a slight tendency towards that hypostatization of αἰών which is fully carried out in Corp. XI. i. For the moment, the writer speaks of αἰών as if it were a person, and capable of
independent action; but he does not really so regard it. (Or, does *ab* stand for *ἀνα*,—‘the Kosmos draws its life from the eternal’?)

*terrenum* [[ ]] *tempus* . . . *caeleste vero* . . . We mark off days and years, and thus measure the lapse of time, by noting either the periodic changes which take place on earth below (e.g. the daily alternation of light and darkness, regarded as *qualitas aeris*, and the yearly alternation of summer heat and winter cold), or the periodic movements of the heavenly bodies (e.g. the diurnal and annual revolutions of the sun).

*mundus est receptaculum temporis*. Cf. *Corp.* XI. i. 2 : ὁ δὲ *χρόνος ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ*. To us, it would seem more natural to say that the Kosmos is in time, than that time is in the Kosmos. But the Greeks, from Plato downwards, were in the habit of saying that time is not merely measured, but constituted or brought into being by the cyclic movement of the heavenly bodies; and this movement is a process which takes place within the Kosmos.

*ordo et tempus innovationem omnium rerum . . . per alternationem faciunt*. The writer, by a figure of speech which is common in all periods, speaks of time as an agent; but his meaning is rather that the *ἀνανέωσις* of all cosmic things is effected by a series of changes which take place in regular temporal succession. This ‘renovation’ takes one form in heaven above, and another form on earth below. The heavenly bodies are imperishable, but are in ceaseless motion; and they are ‘renewed’ in the sense that each of them, after a fixed interval of time, comes back to the same place at which it was before. On the other hand, in the lower world, the process of renovation takes the form of *γένεσις* and *φθορά*; that is to say, all composite bodies are decomposed into their elements, and out of these same elements other like bodies are composed; or in other words, the elements are temporarily combined in composite bodies, and are ‘renewed’ by the dissolution of these bodies. Thus, in the one way or the other, ‘all things in the Kosmos’,—‘both things in heaven and things on earth,—‘are renewed by alternation’.

nihil inmobile [neo] nascentium, neo cælestium neo terrenorum. The heavenly bodies may be included among nascentia (= τὰ γεγονότα), because they have come into being in the past, though, having once come into being, they are imperishable. Moreover, according to some Greek systems, their substance is perpetually renewed by evaporations from the world below.

(deus) a se est. Cf. Ascl. II. 14 b: 'haec ergo est, quae ex se tota est, natura dei', and notes ad loc.

circum se totus est (αὐτὸς ἐπὶ αὐτὸν ὅλος ἐστι). Cf. Numenius, Euseb. Pr. ev. 11. 18. 20 (quoted, p. 80 of Vol. II): ὁ μὲν ὁν πρῶτος (θεὸς) ἐπὶ τὰ νοητά. If the νοητά are regarded as God's thoughts, ἐπὶ τὰ νοητά differs little from ἐπὶ αὐτῶν.

Inasmuch as God 'is in all things', and 'all things are in God',—or, as we are elsewhere told, 'God is all things' (e.g. ch. 20 a, 'siquidem is sit unus [et] omnia'),—there is nothing beside him, to which he could be related. Yet, in another aspect, he is distinguished from the Kosmos, and stands in a certain relation to it; indeed, the very purpose of this passage is to explain that relation.

nisi aliquis andeat dicere ipsius commotionem in aeternitate esse. Eternity is to God as time is to the Kosmos. The word κινητός, since it implies a process in time, is not properly applicable to God, who is not in time; but we may think fit to use it, for want of a better, to describe that function of God in eternity which corresponds to and produces the movement of the Kosmos in time. The so-called 'movement' of God is that timeless energy of God, the effect of which is seen in the 'movement' of the Kosmos, i.e. in the temporal and changing life of the Kosmos and all things in it; it is that function of God which, in ch. 20 b above, was described as everlasting procreation. God is ἀκίνητος; but when this is asserted, there is need to guard against the mistaken inference that God is inactive or inert. Similarly below, in ch. 31, 'sic et deum agitari credibile est in se ipsum eadem immobilitate'. Cf. Numenius, Euseb. Pr. ev. 11. 18. 21: αὐτὶ γὰρ τῆς προσοψύχης τῷ διατέρῳ (θεῷ) κινήσεως, τῇ προσοψύχῃ τῷ πρώτῳ στάσιν φημὶ ἐναι κίνησιν σύμφωνον, κ.τ.λ.

aeternitas, in quam omnium temporum agitatio remeat, et ex qua omnium temporum agitatio sumit exordium. The process of mundane things in time may be said to issue from 'eternity', i.e. from the life or energy of the eternal God. But what is meant by saying that all temporal processes 'return into' eternity? Possibly remeat in stands for ἀναφέρεται εἰς, i.e. 'is relative
to', or 'dependent on'. Cf. 'temporis . . . in aeternitatem semper revocatur agitatio' in ch. 31 below.

31. mundum non natum, quem recte (in)sensibilem dicoimus, intra se habens. Here aión is brought into connexion with the νοῦς κόσμος. The νοῦς κόσμος 'is in' eternity, in the same sense that the αἰωνίος κόσμος is in time (though, from another point of view, we were told above that time is in the αἰωνίος κόσμος).* See ch. 34 b: 'scito[te] intelligibilem mundum . . . esse incorporalem' &c.

Seeing that the translator frequently renders νοῦς by sensus, he may possibly have rendered νοῦς by sensibilem here; but it seems more likely that in- has been accidentally omitted.

The νοῦς κόσμος is described as non natus (ἄγεννητος), in contrast to the αἰωνίος κόσμος; and this implies that the latter is γεννητός.

The writer doubtless regards the νοῦς κόσμος (i.e. the aggregate of the νοῦς εἶδος or παραδείγματα) as existing in and constituted by God's thought, rather than as a self-subsistent entity distinct from God; it is thus comprehended in the being of his πρῶτος θεός, and accordingly, the αἰωνίος κόσμος is, in his view, δεύτερος θεός, not τρίτος.

Huius [dei] imago hic effectus est mundus. Dei must be cut out. The writer would hardly speak of the supreme God as huius dei; and the preceding mention of the νοῦς κόσμος would be pointless if nothing further were said about it. Huius then must be taken as referring to the mundum insensibilem (τὸν νοῦν κόσμον); and hic mundus is the αἰωνίος κόσμος.

ea ipsa in se revertendi necessitate. We are accustomed to picture the time-process as a rectilinear movement; we speak of the 'progress' of time. But the Greeks, connecting their conception of time more closely with the revolutions of the sun and moon, frequently pictured its movement as circular. The sun retraces the same path again and again; and so they thought of the time-process as coming back to the same point, or 'returning into itself', at the termination of each year or other fixed period. We still retain the Greek usage when we speak of the 'recurrence' or 'return' of summer or winter.

The 'stability' of time (i.e. its δικαιοσύνη, here understood in the sense of 'changelessness') consists in this, that its circular movement persists unchanged, being determined by necessitas (ἀνάγκη), i.e. by changeless law. The same thought is expressed below, in the words 'efficitur ut . . . temporis mobilitas stabilis fiat fixa lege currendi'.
temporis... in aeternitatem semper revocatur agitatio.

I suppose this to mean that the movement of time is dependent on eternity; i.e. that the movements of the heavenly bodies are worked by the will or energy of the eternal God. Though God himself is not in time, yet the cosmic processes in which his timeless energy takes effect are processes in time; and when we think of him as acting on the Kosmos, we cannot avoid speaking of him in words which seem to imply that his existence is extended in time. If God made the sun rise yesterday, and makes it rise again to-day, his action is extended over a space of time,—or at any rate, appears to us to be so; and thus 'eternity (the mode of God's existence), though motionless in itself, appears to be in motion, on account of its relation to time; for eternity enters into time (lit. "is in time", which I take to mean "operates in time"), and it is in time that all movement takes place'.

It must have been for the purpose of evading this difficulty that Numenius introduced his 'second God', who is πρῶτη τὰ νοματὰ καὶ τὰ αἰωθηρά (i.e. is concerned with, or in relation to, the eternal on the one hand, and the temporal on the other,) and thereby enabled himself to say that his 'first God' is πρῶτη τὰ νοματὰ (i.e. is concerned with or related to the eternal alone).

The statement that eternity 'is in' time seems to correspond to the statements which occur elsewere, that 'God is in all things' or 'is all things'. God is in the Kosmos, in the sense that he operates in the Kosmos; all life, all action in the Kosmos is, or is derived from, God's life and action. Yet in another sense, God is above and distinct from the Kosmos.

[[seque mobilitas ratione temporis vertitur]]. I can make no sense of these words as they stand; and the sentence appears to be complete without them. I have found a suitable place for them at the end of ch. 40 b.

Sic et deum agitari credibile est in se ipsum eadem immobilitate. Since eternity is God's life or mode of being, that which has just been said of eternity, (viz. that it is stable, and yet seems to be mobile,) may with equal truth be said of God. Agitari in se (abl.) ipsum probably stands for αὐτῶν ἐν ἀληθὴ κινῶθαι. The Kosmos moves 'within God' (i.e. enclosed in and surrounded by God, so to speak), or 'within eternity'; but God, since there is nothing above or beyond him, must move 'within himself', if he moves at all.
Stabilitas etenim ipsius [in] magnitudine est inmobilis agitatio; ipsius enim magnitudinis inmobilis lex est. This is obscure. *Ipsius in magnitudine* seems to be analogous to *in se* in the preceding sentence. The principle assumed as the basis of the argument appears to be ‘that which is great is necessarily motionless’; but it is not clear on what grounds the writer considered himself justified in making that assumption. Perhaps the thought is similar to that expressed in ch. 30 above, ‘nec alicuius impulsu [nec] loco moveri potest, cum in eo sunt omnia et in omnibus ipse est solus’; that which is all-comprehensive cannot be moved from without.

‘The μέγεθος of God’ is a term in frequent use in the theology of the period. Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 20 b: σωφαίζησον σκεατνόν τῷ ἀμετρήτῳ μεγάθει.

*sive deus, sive aeternitas, sive uterque.* The writer here shows clearly that his aiōn is not, like that of Corp. XI. i. 2, an entity distinct from God. θεός and aiōn alike are merely words by means of which we attempt to describe the supreme Being; and all words applied to the supreme Being must necessarily be inadequate. Cf. ch. 20 a.

The words ‘sive deus ... utroque sunt’ are evidently misplaced in the traditional text; and they are appropriate in the sentence to which I have transferred them. The only doubt is whether it is better to place them before or after ‘quod est tale quod non subicitur sensibus’.

*sive alter in altero.* In one sense, it may be said that eternity is in God; for eternal existence is an attribute or property of God. Moreover, it was said above that time is in the Kosmos (‘mundus est receptaculum temporis’); and eternity is to God as time is to the Kosmos. Corp. XI. i. 2: ό δὲ aiōn εν τῷ θεῷ, ... ό δὲ χρόνος εν τῷ κόσμῳ. But in another sense, it may be said that God is in eternity, as the Kosmos is in time.

*tempus ... per ambitionem reditus aeternum est.* Time is endless or everlasting; and endless time is, in common usage, called ‘eternal’ (aiōnos or eis aiōna).

The writer seems to regard the endlessness of time as resulting from or conditioned by the circularity of its movement. This may be accounted for as follows. He pictures the process of time as the movement of a body along a line; but he is not accustomed to the notion of a line of infinite length, and consequently assumes that
a movement cannot be endless unless the line of movement re-enters itself. Given this condition, but not otherwise, the moving body may continue to move for ever; for it may retrace the same finite path unceasingly. Compare 'ea ipsa in se revertendi necessitate' above; and ch. 40, 'sic est enim rotundit(i)s volubilis ratio' &c. See Aristotle on circular motion, Phys. 8. 7ff.; e.g. 261b 27, ὅτι δ' ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τινα ἀπειρον (φοράν), μίαν ὀσάν καὶ συνεχῆ, καὶ αὐτὴ ἔστιν ἡ κύκλῳ, λέγομεν νῦν. Ib. 265a 17: ἀπειρον μὲν γὰρ ὀκὺ ἔστων εὕθειαν φέρεται: τὸ γὰρ ὀκὺ ἀπειρον ὀκὺ ἔστων.

32a. Mundus . . . non habet principatum. The Hermetist rejects the Stoic doctrine that the Kosmos (or a part of the Kosmos) is the supreme God. This is the fundamental difference between the theology of the Platonists and that of the Stoics.

stabilitatem suam in lege agitationis sempiterna. Cf. 40b: 'fixa inmutabilis lege currendi.' 19b: 'Εἰμαρμένην, (a) quae inmutantur omnia lege naturae, stabilitate firmissima sempiterna agitatione variata.'

{(aeternitas quae seunda est)}. This misplaced scrap, when inserted here, suits well with what has preceded, and at the same time supplies a satisfactory explanation of 'Haec . . . aeternitas' at the beginning of 40b, which I have placed next after it.

40b. Haec ergo est aeternitas {((in omnibus (quibus) mundus iste perfectus est)); [[ ]] quí, fixa inmutabilis lege currendi, sempiterna commotione versatur. I have tried to reconstruct this badly damaged passage in accordance with the sense required by the context. It is evident that the subject of sempiterna commotione versatur cannot be aeternitas, and must be mundus; it is therefore necessary to alter quae into qui, and to insert, before qui, some phrase containing mundus. Now there occurs in ch. 39 the phrase in omnibus mundus iste perfectus est, which is evidently out of place where it has been put, and which contains the word mundus needed here as an antecedent for qui; and if we transpose the phrase to 40b, and insert quibus, a satisfactory meaning can be obtained. 'This sort of eternity' (i.e. the secunda aeternitas, which consists in the regular and endless process of things in time) is to be found in all the component parts of the universe; that is to say, they are all (as we were told before) imperishable, and all in constant movement determined by unchanging law.

{(quae nec coepit esse nec desinet)}. The clause is certainly
m. placed in the MSS. It is doubtful where it ought to stand; but it seems to be appropriate where I have placed it. Whether the subject of the words nec coepit esse nec desinet was commotio mundi, or lex currenti, they seem to imply that the writer holds the view that the Kosmos has had no beginning; see note on 29 c.

"vivensque semper et fuit et est et erit".

oriturque et oecidit alternis [[saepe]] per membra. The writer seems to be here thinking especially of the sublunar part of the Kosmos, the region of γένεσις and φθορά; and the terms 'rising' and 'setting', which in their literal sense refer to the movements of the heavenly bodies, are metaphorically applied to the changes which take place in this lower region. The movement (or temporal life) of the Kosmos 'rises and sets' in its several 'members' (the elements); that is to say, portions of the elements are combined to form individual bodies, and are restored to their former state by the dissolution of those bodies. Both processes are continually going on; but with regard to any given portion of earth or water, the two processes alternate. Individual bodies 'rise' and 'set', i.e. are composed and dissolved; or, to put it the other way, certain portions of earth and water 'set' or disappear when an animal body is formed by their combination, and 'rise' or reappear when the body is broken up.

((saepe)) is dem quibus ocoiderat membris oriatur. The same portion of earth or water enters into the composition of many different bodies in succession.

Sio est enim rotunditas(ti)s volubilis ratio &c. The process of γένεσις and φθορά, (or rather, of μεταβολή, since the writer would deny the existence of φθορά in the strict sense of the word,) is cyclic or recurrent, and is in that respect analogous to the movement of the heavenly bodies, which literally travel in a circle. There is, so to speak, a κύκλος γενέσεως, in a different sense from the 'circle of births' spoken of by Orphici and Pythagoreans; for the process by which things change into one another may be described as a circular movement; A, by a series of changes, passes into B, and B, by a further series of changes, passes into A. The Hermetist goes on to explain, much as Aristotle had done before him, that a circular movement differs from other movements in this respect, that it is (or at any rate may be) without beginning or end. If a body is moving in a circle (or in any curve which re-enters itself), you cannot say that the
movement begins at any one point in its path (ut initium quod sit volubilitatis ignors). 'All points in the orbit both precede and follow one another' ; that is to say, the moving body arrives at the point A both before and after it arrives at the point B. Cf. Corp. I. 11 a : ἀρχέται γὰρ οὐ διήγει ἡ [ἡ] τοῦτων περιφέρει.

〈〈Esque mobilita(ti)e ratione tempus vertitur.〉〉 The movement of time is circular, and accordingly, is without beginning or end. Cf. ch. 31, 'tempus . . . per ambitionem reditus aeternum est'.

32 b. Omnis ergo . . . luminasti lumine. Having spoken of time and eternity, the writer here proceeds to speak of the faculties by which things temporal and things eternal are apprehended. In correspondence with the series deus, mundus, homo he distinguishes three kinds or grades of voüs, viz. sensus divinus (ὁ θεῖος νοῦς); sensus mundanus (ὁ κοσμικὸς νοῦς); and sensus humanus (ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς). Things eternal are apprehended by the divine νοῦς; things temporal, by the two other kinds of νοῦς.

What is the meaning of the adjective θεῖος in this connexion? Does ὁ θεῖος νοῦς correspond to ὁ θεῖος νοεῖ, and mean (1) God's faculty of thought? Or does it correspond to (ὁ ἀνθρώπιος) τῶν θεῶν νοεῖ, and mean (2) man's faculty of apprehending God? Or does it correspond to (ὁ ἀνθρώπιος) ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν φωτισθεὶς νοεῖ, and mean (3) a faculty in man which comes from God? I think the primary meaning of the term in this passage is the third of these. 'The divine, the cosmic, and the human νοῦς' are three grades of νοῦς as it exists in man. All men have in them 'the (merely) human νοῦς'; some men have in them 'the cosmic νοῦς'; a few men have in them 'the divine νοῦς'. The divine νοῦς is a faculty possessed by the elect among men; and it is divine, in the sense that it comes from God. But though this seems to be the primary meaning, the other two meanings are not excluded, and may have been combined with it in the writer's thought. The God-given νοῦς is employed, by those men who possess it, in contemplating God and the things of God; thus it is divine in sense (2), as well as in sense (3). Moreover, it is 'consubstantial with God' (consistens, ut ita dicam, cum deo); i.e. it is the very mind of God himself, or an ἀντίκειμα of God's mind, implanted in or communicated to man. Not man as a mere thing

1 It is evident that sensus here stands for νοεῖ, as in Ascl. I. 6 c, 7 a, II. 16 a, and III. 18 b, 41 b.
of earth, but God in man, 'sees God'. And thus 'the divine νοῦς' is divine in sense (1) also.

The 'cosmic νοῦς' should be related to the 'second God' as the divine νοῦς is related to the supreme God; and if so, what has been said about the divine νοῦς may be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the cosmic νοῦς. It seems to follow then that the cosmic νοῦς is primarily a faculty in man, which he derives from the Kosmos; that it is employed, by the man who possesses it, in investigating the Kosmos; and that it is 'consubstantial' with the mind of the Kosmos. The writer, since he calls the Kosmos ζῷον and θεός, must necessarily regard it as a νοερὸν ζῷον, i.e. as possessing νοῦς; and though in this passage the 'cosmic νοῦς' is spoken of chiefly as a faculty implanted in man, the conception of 'the mind of the Kosmos', i.e. the faculty of thought which the Kosmos possesses, and from which the faculty in man is derived, is probably not wholly absent from the writer's thought.

With reference to 'the mind of the Kosmos' and 'the mind of God' (if and so far as these conceptions are present in the passage before us), we may compare Corp. IX, which contains a discussion of the αἰσθήσεως καὶ νόησις (i.e. the conscious life) of the Kosmos, and the αἰσθήσεως καὶ νόησις of God. But the point of view is different; the writer of Corp. IX is speaking of will and action, whereas the writer of Ascl. III is speaking of thought and knowledge. See also Abammonis Resp. 8. 4d (Testim.): 'The Egyptians' καθαρὸν τε νοῦν ἐπὶ τὸν κόσμον προσθηκέασι, καὶ ἐνα ἀμέραστον ἐν δόξῳ τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ διηρημένον ἐπὶ πᾶσας τὰς σφαίρας ἐπερ. The first and second of these three kinds or grades of νοῦς correspond to the θειὸς νοῦς and the κοσμικὸς νοῦς as existing in God and the Kosmos respectively, but not as faculties implanted in man. (The third, ὁ νοῦς ὁ διηρημένος ἐπὶ πᾶσας τὰς σφαίρας, is comparable to the οὐσιάρχας of Ascl. III. 19 b.)

How does the 'cosmic' νοῦς, regarded as a faculty in man, differ from the 'human' νοῦς? Both alike have to do with things corporeal and temporal, and are in that respect contrasted with the 'divine' νοῦς, which has to do with things incorporeal and eternal. But the knowledge correlative to the 'cosmic' νοῦς is larger than the knowledge correlative to the 'human' νοῦς; and the distinction appears to consist in this, that the knowledge to which the 'human' νοῦς attains is that partial and limited knowledge of the sensible world which the individual man con-
structs out of the memory of his own past sense-impressions; while the knowledge to which the 'cosmic' νοῦς attains is a knowledge which goes beyond the individual man's experience, and embraces (or would, at its utmost extent, embrace) all the phenomena of the sensible world. We might perhaps construct in more modern terms a scheme analogous to that of the Hermetist by distinguishing a faculty or organ of merely empirical cognition (the human νοῦς), a faculty or organ of science (the cosmic νοῦς), and a faculty or organ of religion (the divine νοῦς). But it would be more in accordance with the Hermetic writer's mode of thought to state the matter as follows. The man who possesses only the 'human' νοῦς is incapable of passing beyond the narrow limits of his earthly self; he is wholly sunk in the body, and differs from other animals only by the fact that he retains a memory of his past. The man who possesses the 'cosmic' νοῦς is capable of attaining to a γνώσις τοῦ δευτέρου θεοῦ; i.e., he may come to 'know' or 'see', and thereby be united with, the cosmic and temporal God. He is in some degree raised above his limited and separate self; he has a religion, but it is still only a lower sort of religion. (Compare the distinction made in Ascl. I. 5 fn. between 'communion with the daemons' and 'communion with the gods'.) The man who possesses the 'divine' νοῦς, and that man alone, is capable of attaining to a γνώσις τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ, i.e. to knowledge of and union with the supracosmic and eternal God.

The Hermetist's triple division of νοῦς may be compared with the triple division employed by some of the Gnostics, who distinguished between the ψυχικός or χοικός ἄνθρωπος, the ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος, and the πνευματικός ἄνθρωπος. The distinction between the ψυχικός and the πνευματικός was already known to Paul; and his use of the terms may serve to illustrate the Hermetist's distinction between the 'human' and the 'cosmic' νοῦς together on the one hand, and the 'divine' νοῦς on the other. See

1 The process by which a man rises from the level of the cosmic νοῦς to the higher level of the divine νοῦς may be illustrated by what is said about the right use of the sciences in Ascl. I. 13; see Philo Leg. alleg. 3. 32. 97, quoted in the note on that passage.

2 The Naassenes, according to Hippolytus Ref. haer. 5. 6, said that ἐστὶν τοῦτου τιτ. τοῦ ἄνθρωπον ... τὸ μὲν νοητὸν, τὸ δὲ ψυχικόν, τὸ δὲ χοικὸν. In that statement, νοητὸν takes the place of πνευματικόν. Compare the tripartition of man into σώμα, ψυχή, and νοῦς, in the doctrine set forth in the speech of Sulla in Plut. Fac. in orbis luminis 26, where the word ψυχή denotes a 'cosmic' and perishable part of man, as opposed to the νοῦς, which is divine and immortal.
1 Cor. 2. 14: ψυχικὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπως οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ... τὸ γὰρ ἐγένετο νῦν Κυρίων;... ἡμεῖς δὲ (καὶ οἱ πνευματικοὶ) νῦν Χριστὸν ἔχομεν. The θεός νοῦς of the Hermetist corresponds to τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ in the language of Paul.¹

The Hermetist's notion of the stage attainable by the man who possesses the cosmic νοῦς may be illustrated by Philo Vita Mosis 2 (3). 14. 135, Cohn IV, p. 231: προδιδάσκαλος τοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ θεραπευτήν, εἴ καὶ μὴ τοῦ κοσμοποιοῦ δυνατών, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γε κόσμου διηνεκῶς ἄξιον εἶναι πεισάσθαι, οὔ τὸ μὴμνήμα ἐνθύμουμεν, δήθεν, τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ παράδειγμα (i.e. τὸν κόσμον) εὐθὺς ἀγαλματοφόρον, αὐτῶς τράπεζην τοιαύτῃ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν εἰς ἀνθρώπων μεθηρμόσθαι, καὶ... βραχύν κόσμου εἶναι. Philo is here employing the language of Stoicism, and speaks for the moment as if he held that man may be content with assimilation to the Kosmos (the aim of the religion of the 'cosmic νοῦς' in the Hermetist's system); but in the words εἴ καὶ μὴ τοῦ κοσμοποιοῦ (ἄξιον εἶναι) δυνατών, he hints at the higher religion of the 'divine νοῦς'.

In Ascl. III. 18 b &c., as well as in other Hermetica, (see e.g. Corp. IV. 3 ff.,) the word νοῦς without qualification is used in the sense assigned to δ θεὸς νοῦς in Ascl. III. 32.

in ipsa veritate consistens. ἀλήθεια means either 'truth' or 'reality'. Here, it is 'reality'; τὸ ἀληθὲς = τὸ ὄντος ὅν in the Platonic sense. The eternal alone is real.

plenissimus omnium (in) sensibilium. It is necessary to write insensibilium; for we require a word which may stand in contrast to sensibilium below. The verbal inconsistency involved in speaking of a sensus which is full of insensibilitia is due to the translator, who has rendered νοῦς by sensus.

Sensus vero mundanus receptaculum est sensibilium omnium specierum et disciplinarum. The cosmic νοῦς is per ἀλοθραυτά or σωματικά, in contrast to the divine νοῦς, which is per ἀλοθράυστον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου and τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου (in contrast to τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ); these may be compared with the 'human' νοῦς and the 'cosmic' νοῦς of the Hermetist; but Paul does not seem to have made a clear and definite distinction between the two. ¹ Cor. 2. 11: τὸ γὰρ ὁδεῖν ἄνθρωπον τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἴ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ; οὕτως καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδεὶς ζητοῦσιν εἴ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ, ἡμεῖς δὲ εἰ σοὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐν τοῦ θεοῦ, οὕτως ἐλάβομεν τὰ ἐν τοῦ θεοῦ χαρακτητὰ ἡμῶν.

Paul's use of the term πνευματικός is discussed by Reitzenstein, Die heil. Mysterienrel., 1910, p. 43 ff. and 160 ff.
ASCLEPIUS III: 32 b

τὰ ἀναίσθητα (= νοητά in the Platonic sense) or ἀσώματα. In this respect the 'cosmic νοῦς' differs from the ψυχή τοῦ κόσμου in Pl. Tim. 37 B, which is both περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν and περὶ τὸ λογοσθμών.

On sensibiles species, see ch. 34 c.

Sensibilium must be understood again with disciplinarum (ἐνσπουδήμων); for a qualifying word is needed to distinguish these disciplinae from the disciplina of the sensus divinus. The sensibiles disciplinae (or sensibilium disciplinae?) are the several branches of the scientific knowledge of αἰσθητά.

The word omnium is to be noted; compare 'ex omnibus quae in mundo sensibilia sunt' below. It seems to be a distinguishing mark of the 'cosmic νοῦς', as opposed to the 'human νοῦς', that it embraces, or is capable of embracing, all αἰσθητά as its objects.

Humanus vero (sensus ...). There is certainly a lacuna after vero; and it seems probable that the lost words contained an explanation of the distinction between the sensus humanus and the sensus mundanus.

ex memoriae tenacitate, quod memor sit omnium quas gesserit rerum. Compare what is said below: 'the knowledge which corresponds to the nature of the human νοῦς tota in memoria est præteritorum.' The man who possesses only the lowest of the three grades of νοῦς is capable of acquiring such knowledge only as can be constructed out of his recollection of his own experiences in the past. The acquisition of this sort of knowledge may qualify him for dealing with the practical concerns of earthly life; ('per eam memoriae tenacitatem et gubernator effectus est terræ'; e.g. he has learnt by experience how to grow a crop;) but he cannot even attain to a comprehensive knowledge of the things of the sensible world; much less can he rise above the world of sense, and attain to the vision of the divine. On the other hand, the 'divine νοῦς' sees all things sub specie æternitatis. In the divine life there is neither past nor future; consequently, in the divine consciousness there can be no place for memory. The man in whom the divine νοῦς is implanted is capable of thus seeing things, at least by glimpses (per caliginem); though, as long as he is imprisoned in an earthly body, he is compelled to employ the 'human νοῦς' and the 'cosmic νοῦς' also in dealing with the earthly things around him.

The memoria spoken of in this passage has, of course, nothing to do with the Platonic doctrine of ἀνάμνησις; it means the man's memory of his past sense-impressions in his earthly life.
sensus divinitas is equivalent to sensus divinus.


Intellegentia enim sensus humani, quals aut quanta sit, tota in memoria est praeteritorum. We have here a series of parallel phrases:

(1) intellegentia sensus humani, quals aut quanta sit.
(2) intellectus naturae et qualitatis sensus mundi.
(3) intellectus qualitatis sensus summi dei.

It is impossible to make sense of this form of words as it stands in the Latin; and its recurrence excludes the hypothesis of corruption of the Latin text. It must therefore be a case of mistranslation; and the question is, whether we can guess the Greek which the translator has misrepresented.

A clue to the meaning may perhaps be found in the similar passage below (ll. 17-20):

'thinkus noster ad (2') qualitatem sensus mundi intellegendam et dinoscendam mentis pervenit intentione,
intellectus autem mundi pervenit ad (3') aeternitatem et deos no-scendos qui supra se sunt.'

In (2'), we have again the same unmeaning form of words which occurs in (1), (2), and (3). In (3'), however, we arrive at something which has a meaning; the writer speaks of attaining to 'knowledge of eternity and of the supracosmic deities'. But (2') and (3') are clearly parallel; hence it may be inferred that (2') ought to be equivalent to 'knowledge of temporal and mundane things'.

Let us assume that the Greek original of (2') was something like 

(φθάνει μέχρι τῆς γνώσεως τῆς κατὰ τὸ ποιόν τοῦ κοσμικοῦ νοῦ: 'such knowledge as corresponds to the character of the cosmic νοῦς'; or in other words, 'such knowledge as the cosmic νοῦς is qualified to acquire'. That sort of knowledge is precisely a knowledge of temporal and mundane things; and thus the sense we wanted is obtained. The translator, we may suppose, mistook the meaning of κατὰ; he thought that ἡ γνώσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν was equivalent to ἡ γνώσις τοῦ ποιοῦ, and so he rendered it by qualitatem intellegendam. (The Greek word for 'knowledge' here was probably γνώσις; in ch. 41 b γνώσις is rendered by intellegentia. For the use of κατὰ, cf. Corp. I. 32: αλτουμένο τὸ μή καθότιν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς κατ' οἷών.)

Now (2') closely resembles (1), (2), and (3) above; let us assume
then that the translator has made the same mistake in (1), (2), and (3) also. On that assumption, the Greek may have been somewhat as follows:

(1) ἡ γνώσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπεῖον νοῦ ποιῶν καὶ ποσῶν:
the knowledge which corresponds to the character and extent of the human νοῦς;
mistranslated by
‘intellegentia sensus humani, qualis aut quanta sit’.
(The translator, besides misunderstanding κατὰ, presumably thought that τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπεῖον νοῦ was much the same as τὸν ἀνθρώπειον νοῦν, and took ποιῶν and ποσῶν to be dependent questions.)

(2) ἡ γνώσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιῶν τοῦ κοσμικοῦ νοῦ:
the knowledge which corresponds to the character of the cosmic νοῦς;
mistranslated by
‘intellectus naturae et qualitatis sensus mundi’.
(For naturae et qualitatis, cf. ch. 33 a, where it is said that the sensibilis mundus is ‘plenissimus corporum...naturae suae et qualitati convenientium’. Perhaps natura is φύσις; but it is also possible that natura and qualitas together stand for ποιῶν.)

(3) ἡ γνώσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιῶν τοῦ νοῦ τοῦ ὑψίστου θεοῦ (or possibly, τοῦ ὑψίστου without θεοῦ):
the knowledge which corresponds to the character of the νοῦς of God supreme;
mistranslated by
‘intellectus qualitatis sensus summi dei’.

On this hypothesis, a satisfactory sense may be got out of this paragraph, which is meaningless in the Latin. (It cannot, however, be considered certain that the sense thus obtained is that which the writer intended.)

[aeternitas quae secunda est]. These words are certainly out of place here. It is probable, though not certain, that their original place was that to which I have transposed them.

[ex sensibili mundo sensus (mundi) natura qualitasque dinoecitum.] This is probably an alternative for the preceding sentence, ‘Intellectus...poterit providere’. The translator seems to have made a second attempt to render the Greek sentence which puzzled him. The sensus datus qualitasque of the MSS. may be a corruption of sensus (mundi) natura qualitasque; and this may have been meant to represent τὸ ποιῶν τοῦ κοσμικοῦ νοῦ.
Ubi... quid temporum dimensione dinositur, ... ubi generat...: i.e. in the region of ἥρων and γένεις. The things in this region are the objects of the 'human νοῦς' and the 'cosmic νοῦς', which are accordingly incapable of apprehending the real, or attaining to absolute truth. See the discussion of ἀλήθεια in Herm. ap. Stob. Exe. II A.

["Vides ergo... taciturnitate aestato"]. This must have been intended to be the conclusion of the paragraph. In the MSS., the passage 'hoc autem differunt... conscientiae', which continues the discussion of the different kinds of νοῦς, is placed after this conclusion; but it must have been so placed by an error.

Hoc autem differet intellectus a sensu. What are the Greek words which are here rendered by intellectus and sensus? We have found reason to think that in the preceding sentences intellectus stands for γνώσις, and sensus for νοῦς. It is not to be assumed that a Latin word in the translation always represents the same Greek term; but as the phrase qualitatem sensus mundi intellegendam corresponds closely with the form of words which was three times used above, we can hardly be wrong in deciding that in this place, as before, sensus mundi stands for ὁ κόσμιος νοῦς, and intellegendam et dinoscendam represents γνώμαι or γνώσις. But what is intellectus noster? If we take intellectus to stand for γνώσις in this phrase, we get the statement that 'Our γνώσις attains to a γνώσις which corresponds to the nature of the cosmic νοῦς'. But that is not satisfactory; it must be something other than γνώσις that attains to a certain kind of γνώσις. Nor again can intellectus noster be 'our νοῦς'; for it is here said that our intellectus can attain to a kind of knowledge to which it was previously said that the human νοῦς can not attain (viz. the kind of knowledge which is correlative to the cosmic νοῦς). Intellectus then must here stand for some Greek word other than γνώσις, and other than νοῦς; and the most likely word seems to be διάνως.

On the assumption that intellectus here stands for διάνως (or at any rate, for some Greek word other than νοῦς or γνώσις), the words 'Hoc autem different intellectus a sensu' admit of a satisfactory explanation. 'Diánoia differs from νοῦς in the following way; our διάνως is capable of attaining, by mental effort, to that kind of γνώσις which is correlative to the cosmic νοῦς.' And that kind of γνώσις, as we were told above, is a comprehensive knowledge of αἰσθήτρα,—i.e. a kind or extent of knowledge which is beyond the reach of 'the human νοῦς'.
Some such statement as this was needed to complete the treatment of the subject, and prevent misunderstanding. If the writer, having described the narrow limitations of what he calls 'the human νοῦς', had left the matter there, it might have seemed that he held it impossible for man to rise above those limitations. But he here makes it clear that the term ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς signifies only the lowest grade of human intellect, and is not co-extensive with all thought of which man is capable. The wider term, which includes higher grades of human thought, is 'our διάνοια'.

But there is something wrong in intellectus autem mundi. As the words stand, it looks as if intellectus mundi were parallel to intellectus noster, and must consequently mean 'the διάνοια of the Kosmos' (i.e. the thought which the Kosmos thinks), as opposed to 'our διάνοια' (i.e. the thought which man thinks). The sentence would then amount to this,—that our (human) thought can attain to a comprehensive knowledge of αἰσθητά, and 'the thought of the Kosmos' can attain to a knowledge of eternity. But this cannot have been the writer's meaning; for it is evident from what follows ('sic contingit . . . ut . . . quae in caelo sunt videamus' &c.) that he meant to say that we can attain to a knowledge of eternity; and the question whether the Kosmos can do so or not is beside the point. We are thus forced to the conclusion that intellectus noster was intended to be the subject of the second clause (pervenit ad aeternitatem &c.) as well as of the first clause. (Probably mentis intentione also was meant to apply to the second clause as well as to the first; see haec autem intentione below.) Consequently, intellectus autem mundi must be a misreading or a mistranslation. The Hermetist may have written something to this effect: ἢ δὲ διάνοια τοῦ νοῦ διαφέρω· ἐπιταχθώσα γὰρ ἡ διάνοια ἡμῶν φθάνῃ μέχρι τῆς γνώσεως τῆς κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν τοῦ κόσμου νοῦ, τὰ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ἐκείνης γνώσεω, φθάνει μέχρι τὸν αἰῶνα γνώσεως. Starting from the low level of 'the human νοῦς' (i.e. from the narrow range of personal sense-experience), man's thought may rise to the higher level of 'the cosmic νοῦς' (i.e. to a comprehensive knowledge of the sensible world), and again, from this fresh starting-point, may rise to the vision of the eternal.

If the traditional text is retained, I can see no way of escaping from this difficulty except to assume that the writer identifies the man at this stage with the νοῦς of the Kosmos which has entered into him, and intends us to understand that what the Kosmos thinks, the man thinks also. But on this interpretation, the meaning would be far-fetched and obscurely expressed.
Something like the sense required might be obtained by altering *intellectus autem mundi* into *intellecto autem mundo* (τὸν δὲ κόσμον γνωσόν); but the exact words of the original can hardly be recovered.

*Deos . . . qui supra se sunt.* The 'supracosmic gods' are the incorporeal and eternal Powers, the hypostatized δυνάμεις of God. In speaking here of *θεοὺς* in the plural, and not *θεῖον* in the singular, the writer of *Ascl. III* suggests, by an incidental phrase, the possibility of a more elaborate theology than he has himself cared to formulate,—such a theology as is implied, for instance in *Corp. I. 26 a*, where we are told that the disembodied and purified soul hears the δυνάμεις 'singing their hymn to God'. He is conscious of the futility of all attempts to describe the Absolute (see 'sive deus, sive aeternitas, sive uterque' &c. in ch. 31, and cf. ch. 20 a); and whether the Supreme, 'qui unus est omnia', is imagined by men as a Trinity, or (as in some Gnostic systems) as an Ogdoad, or a Triacontad, would be to him a matter of indifference.

The *di intelligibiles* of ch. 19 a may be compared; but I do not think that the *οὐσιάρχαι* of ch. 19 b are here in the writer's thought.

*Ut quasi per caliginem quae in caelo sunt videamus.*

*In caelo* here means 'in the region of the incorporeal and eternal', not 'in the corporeal sky'. It is possible that the original Greek was *τὰ ἐπιρυστὰ*.

The phrase 'per caliginem . . . videamus' recalls the words of Paul, 1 *Cor. 13. 12*: ἐνίακα ἐκπομεν γὰρ ἅρτι δὲ έκπομεν ἐν αἰνίγματι, κ.τ.λ. But there is not the slightest reason to think that the Hermetist has been either directly or indirectly influenced by Paul. Platonic parallels are to be found in abundance.

*Quantum possible est per conditionem sensus humani.* Even in the 'illuminated' man, the 'human νοῦς' is still at work, and thwarts and hampers the divine νοῦς which has been superimposed upon it. The writer is here regarding man as a soul encumbered by an earthly body, and does not consider the case of a disembodied soul. But as the 'human νοῦς' evidently pertains to man as an earthly being, it is to be presumed, though it is not here expressly said, that the disembodied soul may rid itself of this hindrance, and become wholly θεῖος νοῦς. Cf. *Corp. X. 19 a*: καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη (sc. εἰδοβῆς) ψυχή . . . δι λ νοῦς γίνεται. (The νοῦς of that passage corresponds to the θεῖος νοῦς of *Ascl. III. 32 b*.)
Hae autem intentio ... angustissima est nobis. Cf. Ascl. I. 3 b: ‘divinitatis ... ratio, divina sensus intentione noscenda.’ ‘This intentio’ must be the mentis intentio spoken of above, by which our &dquo;attains to higher levels. But the phrase ‘this effort is narrow’ is hardly intelligible; and there is probably some error of reading or translation.

[Et vos, o Tat et Asclepi et Hammon, ... taciturnitate oelata.] There is reason to think that in the earliest form of the document Asclepius was the only pupil present, and that all passages in which Tat and Ammon are mentioned have been inserted or altered by the compiler by whom the Prologue was added. (See note on Prologue.) Here, the address to the three pupils together follows awkwardly after o Asclepi a few lines above.

On the injunction of secrecy, see Ascl. 1 b and Corp. XIII fin.

Mystery’ here means ‘secret doctrine’. There is no suggestion that rites of initiation were employed in the writer’s circle; and I have found no trace of anything of that nature in the Hermetica. In Ascl. III. 21, sexual union is described as a mysterium, i.e. a ‘sacrament’. In ch. 37, the rites by which daemonic souls are incorporated in cult-statues are called mysteria.

37-38 b. The Hermetist here speaks of the di terreni (οι ἐπίγειοι θεοὶ), that is, the gods worshipped in the Egyptian temples. The di terreni are ‘made by men’. The writer has already touched on the topic of the making of gods by men, in chs. 23 b—24 a; and he here refers back to that passage (‘iterum ad hominem ... redeamus’).

The form of words with which the paragraph is introduced (‘sed iam de talibus sint satis dicta talia’) tells us nothing as to the contents of the passage which it followed in the original text. When the misplaced chapters 33—36 have been removed, ch. 37 is left standing next after the passage on eternity and time, and the faculties by which things eternal and things temporal are apprehended (26 b—32 b). But there is no connexion of thought between the contents of 37—38 b and those of 26 b—32 b; and it is possible that something which has been lost or misplaced originally stood between these two passages. If so, the interval between the section which treats of the eternal being of the supreme God (26 b—32 b) and that which deals with the terrestrial
god (37–38 b) would seem to be a suitable place for the list of
obσαρχει (19 b), i.e. for a description of the hierarchy of νοητοί
θεοί by which the material universe is governed. But the author
or compiler of Ascl. III pays little attention to systematic arrange-
ment; and we should hardly be justified in transposing 19 b to
this position merely on the ground that a more orderly sequence
would be obtained by so doing.

37. rationemque . . . ex quo divino dono. The mention
of god-making in ch. 23 b followed on the mention of God’s gift
of ratio disciplinaque to men in ch. 22 b.

Minus enim miranda . . . quae de homine diota sunt
(oetera). It is necessary to insert cetera; for without it, the
words would imply that god-making has not been previously
spoken of.

Quoniam ergo proavi nostri multum errabant, . . . in-
venerunt artem qua efficerent deos. Quoniam is a mistrans-
lation of τρέι; ‘after our ancestors had for some time been godless,
they invented an art of making gods.’ Augustine misunderstood
this passage, being misled by the word quoniam; see Aug. De
civ. dei 8. 23 ad fin.–24 (Testim.).

In the writer’s view, Hermes Trismegistus the teacher is a
mortal man, and is descended from mortal ancestors. It is true
that he is a grandson of the god Thoth-Hermes (see below);
but that personage also was once a man on earth, and became a
god only after his death. Similarly, the god Asclepius (Imhotep),
the goddess Isis, and apparently all the ‘terrestrial gods’ (i.e.
the gods worshipped in the Egyptian temples) were mortals living
on earth before they became deities.

This doctrine was no novelty in Egypt. In the Decree of
Memphis (Rosetta Stone), 196 B.C., it is said that Ptolemy V has
subdued the rebels in the Busirite Nome ‘as Hermes, and Horus
the son of Isis and Osiris, subdued those who revolted in the
same place before’; that is, Horus is there spoken of as an early
king of Egypt, who, with the help of his counsellor Thoth, waged
war against the rebel Set. And not only in the time of the
Ptolemies, but long before the Hellenistic period, one of the
various methods of interpretation by which Egyptians explained
their myths had been to treat them as records of historical events
on earth, and to regard the gods who figured in them as ancient
rulers of the land. Re or Ptah was the first king of Egypt, and was succeeded by his descendants, down to Horus the son of Osiris; and the dates and deeds of this dynasty of god-kings were recorded in the annals (Brugsch, Rel. und Myth. der alten Aeg., pp. 30-32). In a country where the kings, both living and recently deceased, were worshipped as gods, it was natural to assume that the gods had once been kings. The theory of Euhemerus, which came into vogue among the Greeks soon after the time of Alexander, must have been derived, in part at least, from these Egyptian traditions; and perhaps his book was written with the object of giving support to the newly instituted cult of the Ptolemies, or preparing the way for it (Otto, Priester und Tempel, II, p. 274, n. 3).

The temple-gods then, according to the writer of Ascl. III, are deified men; or more exactly, the souls of the temple-gods are deified souls of men. But a disembodied soul is not yet a temple-god. The deus terrenus or temple-god is a deified human soul embodied in a statue, and operating on earth; and it is by the action of men that this combination of soul and body is brought into existence. When the man Imhotep died, his soul "went back to heaven", and had no dealings with earth. But men in some Egyptian town made a statue of Imhotep, placed it in a sanctuary, and by means of appropriate rites induced the soul of Imhotep to migrate from heaven to earth, and enter into the statue they had made; and this animated statue is a deus terrenus. This is the meaning of the paradox that "man makes gods".

Is Imhotep then henceforth deprived of the bliss of heaven, which is elsewhere promised to the souls of the pious after death? Must he renounce his "union with God", in order to work as a medical practitioner in an Egyptian town? If embodiment in matter is a descent to a lower grade of being, as we are elsewhere told, how can the beatified soul be induced to submit to it? The writer of Ascl. III, in his eagerness to defend the established cults, seems to have overlooked this difficulty; but if the question had been put to him, he might perhaps have answered that the soul of Imhotep is still "in heaven", though at the same

1 There may have been some truth in that belief. It is known that Imhotep was a deified man; and it is possible that some at least of the chief gods of Egypt—e.g. Osiris—were deified rulers of pre-dynastic date. See Budge, Osiris and the Egyptian resurrection, 1911.
time it animates a statue upon earth; for an incorporeal being may very well be in two or more places at once. At any rate, this principle must necessarily be applied in cases where two or more statues of the same deity are worshipped in different temples.

It is here assumed that the first age of mankind was an age of ignorance and savagery, and that religion, with all other civilizing influences, was subsequently introduced. In the Kore Kosmu (Stob. Exc. XXIII fin.), a similar view is expressed, and the civilizing of mankind, including the introduction of religious worship, is ascribed to Isis and Osiris, who 'came down from heaven to earth' (i.e. were incarnated as human beings) for this beneficent purpose.

\(<\textit{de mundi natura conveniente}\>[m])>. It is clear that these words were intended to go with \textit{effici} \textit{erent deos}, and not with \textit{ad iu} \textit{nxerunt virtutem}. The writer speaks first of the material body which men make (viz. the statue), and then of the \textit{virtus} (\textit{a} \textit{pe}\textit{r} in the sense of 'supernatural efficacy') which they add to it by introducing an \textit{anima} into the statue. The statue is \textit{de mundi natura} (i.e. is made of wood or stone or metal); the added \textit{virtus} is not \textit{de mundi natura}. Compare Augustine's paraphrase, "spiritus invisibiles...visibilibus rebus corporalis materiae copulare" (\textit{Ib. 8. 23 init.}). The words \textit{de mundi natura} are equivalent to \textit{corporalis materiae}.

\(<\textit{per quam (quas MSS.) idola et bene faciendi et male vires habere potuissent}>). Some qualification of \textit{virtutem} is needed; and this clause, when transposed, precisely meets the need. On the other hand, where it stands in the MSS., it is an awkward appendage to a sentence which would end better at \textit{mysteriis}. \textit{Potuissent} is used by the translator in the sense of \textit{possent}. See note on \textit{intueripotuisset}, Ascl. I. 8.

\textit{Evocantes animas daemonum vel angelorum}. \textit{Evocantes} probably stands for \textit{\epsilon\kappa\kappa\alpha\lo\iota\nu\eta\tau\epsilon\nu\varepsilon}. Cf. Plut. \textit{Quaest. Rom. 61, 278 F}: Why is it forbidden to utter the name of the tutelar deity of Rome? \textit{πότερον...ἐκκλησίους εἰσὶ καὶ γοητείαι θεών; αἰσ νομίζοντες καὶ αὐτοὶ (sc. the Romans) θεοίς τινας ἐκκαλήθησαν παρὰ τῶν πολέμων καὶ μετακηρέων πρὸς αὐτούς, ἐφοβοῦντο τὸ αὐτὸ παθεῖν ὡς ἐτέρων.} Thus the process by which Juno of Veii, for instance, was induced to migrate to Rome would be called an \textit{ἐκκλησίου}; (the word \textit{evocare} is used in the same sense by \textit{I.ivy, 1. 55. 4 and 5. 21. 5}; and the same term
is here applied to the process by which a deified soul is induced to migrate from heaven to earth, and take up its abode in an Egyptian temple.

The disembodied and beatified souls of men are here called δαμοῦν ψυχαί. The beings formed by the embodiment of these souls in cult-statues are called ἐπίγειοι θεοί.

The words vel angelorum have probably been added by the translator. See ch. 25, nocentes angeli.

Avus enim tuus, Asclepi, medicinae primus inventor. The grandfather of Hermes' pupil Asclepius is the god Imhotep (Ἰμωθής), whom the Greeks identified with their god Asklepios. See Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. XXIII. 6 and Exc. XXVI. 9. The Hermetist seems to have been right in believing this god to be a deified man. Imhotep was an ancient Egyptian proverb-maker, physician, and architect; he is said to have lived under king Zoser, of the IIIrd dynasty (fourth millennium b.c.); and he is mentioned as a well-known sage in 'The Song of the Harper'. The cult of Imhotep as a god was probably first established in the time of the Saite dynasty (633-525 B.C.), and was further developed under the Ptolemies. See Sethe, Untersuchungen II (Imhotep, der Asklepios der Aegypter); Reitzenstein, Poimandres, p. 120; Breasted, Hist. of Egypt, 112 f., 206, and 575; Otto, Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Aegypten, II, p. 214. The god Imhotep was regarded as a son of Ptah. The chief seat of his worship was Memphis, where he had a temple near the Serapeum; and in the fourth century a.d., he had almost eclipsed his father Ptah, and become the chief deity of Memphis (Ammian. Marcell. 22. 14. 7: 'Memphim, urbem frequentem praestantiaque numinis Asclepii claram').

Like his Greek namesake (on whom see Aelius Aristides passim), the Egyptian god Imhotep-Asclepius prescribed for his patients through dreams obtained by incubation. The grandson, Hermes' pupil, must have been evolved from the god by duplication, just as Hermes the teacher is a duplicate of the god Thoth-Hermes, whom the writer of Ascl. III calls the teacher's grandfather.

in monte Libyae circa litus crocodillorum. The 'Libyan mountain' is the desert table-land which bounds the Nile valley on the West. The only inhabited district of Egypt (apart from oases) which is situated in the Libyan mountain, and the only place in the Libyan mountain where a 'shore' and crocodiles could be found, is the

1 'In the great plateau of the Libyan Desert, which rises 300-400 feet above the sea-level, is situated the province of the Faydīm' (Baedeker's Egypt).
Fayum. Consequently, the place indicated must necessarily be in the Fayum, and is probably at or near the chief city of that district, viz. Crocodilopolis, also called Arsinoe. The writer says that in this place the body of the man Asclepius (the elder) was buried, and that a temple stands there, in which the god Asclepius is worshipped. We should rather have expected him to name Memphis, which, according to other authorities, was the chief place of worship of this god, and presumably the place where his cult was first established; but Memphis is not 'in the Libyan mountain'. There were temples of Asclepius at Thebes and at Philae as well as at Memphis (Otto, Priester und Tempel, Index III, s.v. Imhotep-Asklepios); but the description cannot be made to apply to either of these places. There seems to be no record, except in the passage before us, of a temple of Asclepius in the Fayum; for no such temple is mentioned either by Otto, or by Bouché-Leclercq, who, in his Histoire des Lagides, III, p. 214, gives a list of deities worshipped in the Arsinoite Nome. But on this point the evidence of the writer of Ascl. III is sufficient; and we may take it on his authority that in the third century A.D. Asclepius (i.e. Imhotep) was worshipped in a temple at or near Arsinoe, and that those who frequented the temple supposed him to have been buried there; though the people of Memphis may have been equally convinced that his burial-place was in their city. It is possible that one of the old pyramids of the XIIth dynasty near Arsinoe, the original occupant of which had been forgotten, had by this time come to be regarded by the inhabitants of the district as the tomb of Imhotep-Asclepius.

Sobk (Σώϊχος), one of the chief deities of the Fayum, was embodied in a crocodile, and Arsinoe-Crocodilopolis was the most famous place of crocodile-worship in Egypt. See Hdt. 2. 69; Diodorus 1. 89. Strabo 17. 38 f., p. 811 f.: πάλιν ἐστὶν Ἀρσινόης κροκοδίλων δὲ πάλιν ἐκαλεῖτο προέρουν οὐφόρα γὰρ ἐν τῷ νομῷ τούτῳ τιμῶσι τὸν κροκοδίλων, καὶ ἐστὶν ἵερός παρ' αὐτῶς ἐν Λύμνῃ καθ' αὐτὸν τρεφόμενος, χειροθήσις τοῖς ἱερεῖσι καλεῖται δὲ Σώϊχος. ... The people of Arsinoe τοὺς κροκοδίλους τιμῶσι, καὶ διὰ τούτο ἦ τε διώροις αὐτῶν ἔστι μεστή τῶν κροκοδίλων καὶ ἦ τοῦ Μαϊράδος Λύμνῃ. It is true that crocodiles were held sacred at several place in Upper Egypt also, viz. Diospolis Parva, Chenoboscia, Coptus, a Crocodilopolis south of Thebes, and Ombos (Parthey on Plut. Is. et Os. p. 267), as well as at Thebes (which was almost depopulated in Roman times); but none of these places answer to the description in the text; and the words 'in monte Libyae circa
litus crocodillorum' would certainly be understood by readers in the third century A.D. as referring to Arsinoe beside Lake Moeris.

reliquus enim, vel potius totus, ... remeavit in caelum. The disembodied soul, if it has lived a pious life on earth, returns to heaven, whence it originally came. See Ascl. I. 11 b. Sometimes this was asserted especially of the souls of great men and beneficent rulers; e.g. Cic. Somn. Scip. 3: 'sic habeto, omnibus qui patriam conservaverint, adiuverint, auxerint, certum esse in caelo definitum locum, ubi beati aevo sempiterno fruantur: ... (civitatium) rectores et conservatores hinc profecti huc revertuntur.' With vel potius totus may be compared Sen. Consol. ad Marc. 24. 5 ff.: 'Imago dumtaxat filii tui perit et effigies non simillima; ipse quidem aeternus meliorisque nunc status est, despoliatus oneribus alienis et sibi relictus: ... Proinde non est quod ad sepulcrum filii tui curras: cessima eius et ipsi molestissima istic iacent, ossa cineresque, non magis illius partes quam vestes aliaque tegumenta corporum. Integer ille, nihilque in terris relinquens sui, fugit et totus excessit.' The Hermetist has learnt from Greek philosophy to disregard the corpse, which the ancient Egyptians took so much pains to preserve. He thinks that the body of Imhotep lies buried at the place of which he speaks; but he holds that the god is present there, not because the corpse is there, but because his countrymen have set up a statue at that place, and called down the soul of Imhotep from heaven to animate the statue. He must have been aware that there were cult-statues of the same god in other places also; but of that he says nothing.

The notion that the soul, on its departure from the body, 'goes to heaven', was current in Egypt (side by side with other and inconsistent notions) from early times. See Erman, Life in ancient Egypt, Eng. tr. 1894, p. 343 f., where the general sense of a very ancient passage in the Book of the Dead is given as follows: 'The deceased stands at the gate of heaven, he feels that he has become a god, and boasts of his divine nature. He esteems himself the equal of each of the ancient gods... He has forsaken his earthly house in order to enter the heavenly one; he has cleansed himself from all impurities, and now enters the gate of heaven, and the glorified spirits reach out to him their hands, and conduct him to his father the Sun-god.' Perhaps originally kings alone were thought to 'go to heaven'; but the doctrine was afterwards extended to men in general, or at any rate to pious or righteous men. In the stele of Mendes (Bouché-Leclercq, Hist. des Lagides I, p. 180,) the death of
Arsinoe the wife of Ptolemy II is thus described: 'This goddess departed to heaven; she rejoined the members of (Ra or Harmachis).’ Maspero (Bouché-Leclercq &d) says: 'This is the formula employed from the earliest times to indicate by a euphemism the death of a king. The deceased Arsinoe is treated in the same way as Amenemhát I or Thoutmósis III, or all the other Pharaohs of whom it was said that they have departed or flown up to heaven, and have united themselves with the Sun-god, the father of their race.' The soul which 'went to heaven,' or became a celestial god, was described sometimes as admitted to the company of the Sun-god, and sailing with him in his boat; or sometimes (at least in Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt), as attached to a star, or visible in the form of a star. Plut. Is. et Os. 21: oú mónoν de toútv (sc. of Osiris) oi ẹ̄ṛạs lẹ̄γ̣ọṇṇẉ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν δοὺς μὴ ἀγώννητοι μὴ δ’ ἀφθαρτοὶ (i.e. of the gods who once were mortal men), τὰ μὲν σώματα παρ’ αὐτῶν καθάμην καμόντα καὶ θεραπεύοντο, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἐν οὐρανῷ λάμπουσιν ὄστρα, καὶ καλεῖσθαι κύνα μὲν (the dog-star) τὴν Ἰσίδος κ.τ.λ. Compare the Egyptian funeral prayer translated in Porphy. De abst. 4. 10: δέσποτα ἡμαὶ καὶ θεοὶ πάντες οἱ τὴν ζωὴν τοῖς ἄνθρώποις δόντες, προσ-δέσποτε με καὶ παράδοτε τοῖς ἀδώνισθεοῖς σύνοκοιν.

The early Egyptians said that the soul of the deceased king goes to heaven; but they did not say that it returns to heaven. If any such notion existed among them, it existed in the form of a belief that the king, who is a son of the Sun-god, is in some sense one with his divine father. The doctrine that the individual soul pre-existed in heaven before its sojourn on earth first makes its appearance in Egypt in the Hellenistic period, and must have been derived from Platonism. It was acclimatized in that country in the time of the Ptolemites; and when Horace (Od. 1. 2. 45) says to Augustus 'Serus in caelum redeas,' he speaks of the Roman princeps as Egyptians were already in the habit of speaking of their rulers. Similarly, Velleius (2. 123), speaking of the death of Augustus, says 'animam caelestem caelo reddidit'; and the writer of the Vita Marc. Aurel. (about A. D. 300), c. 18, says that 'tantus illius amor . . . claruit, ut nemo illum plangendum censuerit, certi omnibus quod ad dis commodatus ad deos rediisset.' A divine soul comes down from heaven to earth, and is incarnated in a human body; when its work on earth is done, it quits the body, and returns to the place whence it came. Cf. Plutarch Vita Romuli 28, where the disembodied Romulus says θεοὶ ἐδοξέαν . . . τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς γενέσθαι μετ’ ἀνθρώπων χρόνον, καὶ πόλιν
ASCLEPIUS III: 37

The Roman Romulus-Quirinus, like the Egyptian Imhotep-Asclepius, 'has returned to heaven', but none the less continues to render services to men on earth.

What does the Hermetist here mean by caelum? If he is true to his principles, he ought to hold that the ultimate destiny of the pious soul is union with the supracosmic and eternal God; and the word 'heaven' might be used metaphorically or symbolically to signify that consummation. But it is possible that he recognized intermediate stages on the way to the final union with God; and he may have thought of the disembodied soul as resident for a time at least, if not permanently, among the di caelestes in the corporeal sky,—or even as detained for a time at a lower level, among the daemons of the upper air; this might account for his calling the souls in question animas daemonum.

Adiumenta præsta/ infirmis. The 'terrestrial god' Asclepius (i.e. the dead man's soul, embodied in the cult-statue at Arsinoe,) still carries on the medical practice with which the living man was occupied. Harpocration of Alexandria (second century A.D. at latest) tells a story of a medical revelation given by Asclepius at Diospolis (Magna, i.e. Thebes?): Cumont in Klio, Bd. IX, Heft 3, 1909. Naville, The old Egyptian faith, Eng. tr. p. 204, summarizes as follows a story which is told on a funerary stele of the Ptolemaic period. The wife of the high priest of Ptah bore no son. 'Then the pair addressed their petition to the god Imhotep, son of Ptah, who hears prayers and grants sons to those who have none. The god appeared to the priest in a dream, and ordered him to do certain pieces of work in the god's sanctuary, in return for which he (the god) would give him a son. . . . The work was accomplished, and . . . the priestess gave birth to a son, who was called Imhotep.'

As an instance of corresponding beliefs among the Greeks, compare Maximus Tyrius (A.D. 180-200) 9. 6 f. Hobein: When the soul has departed from the body, and has become a ' daemon ', εποτετείχε μὲν αὐτῇ τὰ οἰκεῖα θεάματα, . . . αὐτὸ κάλλος αὐτοῖς ὄφθαλμοι δρόσα καὶ γανυμένη, οἰκτείρουσα μὲν αὐτήν τοῦ πρόσθεν βίον, μακαρίζουσα δὲ τοῦ παρόντος, οἰκτείρουσα δὲ καὶ τάς συγγενεῖς ψυχὰς αὐτὰς συνειλαξάσθαι, καὶ ἐπανορθῶν σφαλλομένας προστέτακται δὲ αὐτῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιφοιτῶν τὴν γῆν, καὶ ἀναμίγνυ-
σθαι πάση μὲν ἀνδρῶν φύσει, πάση δὲ ἀνθρώπων τύχῃ καὶ γνώμῃ καὶ τέχνῃ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χρηστοῖς συνεπλάμβανεν, τοῖς δὲ ἀδικομένοις τιμωρεῖν, τοῖς δὲ ἀδικοῦντι προστιθέναι τὴν δίκην. ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ δαμόνων πᾶς πάντα δρῇ, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῖς διακέρτως κάκει τὰ ἔργα, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο. . . ὠς γὰρ εἶχον φύσεως ὤν περὶ γῆν ἔσται, οὐκ ἔθελον συναυχῆς παντάπαυμαν ἀπαλλαττοῦνθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸς (the Greek Asklepios, not the Egyptian Imhotep,) ἵπται νῦν, καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἰγκρυῖσται, καὶ Δίωνυσος βαπχείας, καὶ Ἀμφίλοχος μαντεύεται, καὶ οἱ Διόσκουροι ναυτίλλονται κ.τ.λ. Ηε adds, 'I myself have seen the Dioskuroi, in the form of bright stars, settle on a ship and steer it in a storm; I have seen Asklepios, and not in dream; I have seen Herakles with my waking eyes.' Maximus' notions about the disembodied human souls which have become 'daemons' differ little from early Christian beliefs about the 'saints'. He does not, like the Hermetist, suppose them to be embodied in statues or living animals; he assumes that they move about freely among men; but his view of their functions agrees closely with the Hermetist's view of the functions of the 'terrestrial gods'.

Hermes . . . in sibi cognomine patria consistens. The patria (i.e. native city) of the god Thoth-Hermes is presumably Hermopolis Magna, an important town about half-way between Memphis and Thebes. But there was also a Hermopolis in the Delta, capital of the Hermopolite Nome, which was of great religious importance and might well be counted the patria of Hermes equally with Hermopolis Magna.

It is implied, though not expressly said, that the deities Hermes and Isis, as well as Asclepius, once lived on earth as mortals.

quantis obesse . . . iratam. The punishment of evil-doers, by disease or otherwise, may be regarded as a good to human society (cf. Kore Kosmu sub fin.), and may thus be included among the benefits obtained by god-making.

Terrenis etenim diis . . . facile est irasci. The dieaeaelestes are ἀπαθεῖς, and incapable of anger; cf. 40 a, 'nec ira etenim commoventur nec flectuntur gratia'. And the same might be said of disembodied and beatified human souls. But the deus terrenus,

1 Compare, for instance, the stories of miracles of healing worked at the tombs or sanctuaries of the martyrs, which are told by Augustine, Civ. dei 23, 8.

The Christians who believed that a dead saint worked miracles by means of his own bones or other relics must have thought that the disembodied soul was in some sense present in the material things to which they ascribed a supernatural power; and in this respect, they approximated more closely than Maximus to the Egyptian doctrine of Ascl. III.
like man on earth, is made *ex utraque natura*, i.e. not of incorporeal substance alone, but of incorporeal and corporeal substance together. (Cf. *Ascl. III. 22 b*: 'hominem . . . ex utraque natura compositum, divina atque mortali.') He has a body, viz. the statue; and in virtue of this body, he is liable to πάθη. It is true that the sun, moon, and stars, which are *di caelestes*, have bodies; but their bodies are made of pure fire, the noblest sort of matter. It seems to be implied that it is only bodies composed of base and earthy matter that give rise to πάθη.

Apuleius (*De deo Socr. 12 f.*) makes a corresponding distinction between *daemons*, who are subject to πάθη, and *di caelestes*, who are ἄπαθεῖς. 'Ex hoc ferme daemonum numero poetae solent haudquaquam procul a veritate osores et amatores quorundam hominum deos fingere: . . . igitur et misereri et indignari et angi et laetari omnemque humani animi faciem pati: . . . quae omnes turbelae tempestatesque procul a deorum caelestium tranquillitate exulant. Cuncti enim caelites semper eodem statu mentis aeterna aequabilitate potiuntur, qui numquam illis nec ad dolorem versus nec ad voluptatem finibus suis pellitur. . . . Quapropter debet deus nullam perpeti velit odii velit amoris temperamentum perfunctionem, et idcirco nec indignatione nec misericordia contingi, . . . sed ab omnibus animi passionibus liber nec dolere numquam nec aliquando laetari nec aliquando repentinum velle vel nolle. Sed et haec cuncta et id genus caetera daemonum mediocratati rite congruunt. Sunt enim inter nos et deos ut loco regionis ita ingenio mentis intersiti, habentes communem cum superis immortalitatem, cum inferis passionem. Nam proinde ut nos pati possunt omnia animorum placamenta vel incitamenta, ut et ira incitentur et misericordia flectantur et donis invitentur precibus leniantur . . . aliisque omnibus ad similum nobis modum varient.' It is these daemons, he says, that are propitiated by the rites of worship in the temples. But the *daemons* of Apuleius differ from the *di terreni* of *Ascl. III* in two respects: they have bodies composed of air, whereas the body of the Hermetist's *deus terrenus* is either a statue or a living animal; and they are not beatified human souls, but beings of a different order from mankind.

Plut. *Is. et Os. 25*: βέλτιον οὖν οἱ τὰ περί τὸν θυσίαν καὶ Ὁσιρι καὶ Ἰσιὼν ἱστοροῦμεν μήτε θεῖων παθήματα μήτε ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ δαμόνων μεγάλων ἦνι πολυτροπείς, οὐς καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Πυθαγόρας.
Maximus Tyrius 8. 8: θεος μὲν οὖν αὐτὸς κατὰ χώραν ἰδρύμενος οἰκονομεῖ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ τάξιν· εἰς δὲ αὐτῷ φύσεις ἄθανατοι δεύτεροι (λέγε -rai), οἱ καλούμενοι δεύτεροι (λέγε δαίμονες), ἐν μεθορίᾳ γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ τετεγμένοι, θεοῦ μὲν ασθενέστεροι, ἄθροισων δὲ ἰσχυρότεροι, θεῶν μὲν ἐπηρέατα, ἄθροισῶν δὲ ἐποιτάτα. ... τούτῳ γὰρ (ἐκ τῶν δαίμονών γένος) ἐστὶν τὸ ἄθροισί τοι προσφευγόμενοι, καὶ φανταζόμενοι καὶ ἐλεύθεροι ἐν μέσῃ τῇ θνητῇ φύσει, καὶ ἀπωφελούν (ἐπὶ -Reiske) ὅσα ἀνάγκη δεῖον βιών τὸν θνητὸν γένος. ... οἱ μὲν ἱεροὶ νοοματῶν, οἱ δὲ τῶν ἀπόρων σύμμουλοι, οἱ δὲ τῶν ἀφανῶν ἀγγελοί, οἱ δὲ τέχνης συνεργάται, οἱ δὲ ὀδὸς συνέμποροι. Ιβ. 9. 2: τίθεσι θεὸν μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἀπαθῆς καὶ ἄθανατον, δαίμονα δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἄθανατον καὶ ἐμπάθεις, ἄθροισων δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐμπάθεις καὶ θνητὸν. Ιβ. 9. 4: λείπεται δὴ τὴν δαίμονον φύσιν ἐμπάθει τε ἐϊναι καὶ ἄθανατον, ἢν τοῦ μὲν ἄθανατον κοινωφή τῇ θεῷ, τοῦ δὲ ἐμπάθος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. Maximus says that daemons are souls which have put off the body, —i.e. the earthly and corruptible body (9. 5: εἶπερ ἐστὶν τὸ δαίμονον αὐτῷ ψυχῇ ἀποδοσαμένη τῷ σῶμα); but as he also says that a soul which has become a daemon is θρίμμα αἰθρῶν (9. 6), he seems to have thought that a soul in this condition is not immaterial, but is composed of αἰθήρ, i.e. of pure bright air. If that is his meaning, he is probably following Posidonius in this part of his theory.

haeco sancta animalia. In some Egyptian temples, the thing worshipped was a statue; in others, it was a living animal. These animals the writer of Ascl. III holds to be ‘terrestrial gods’; a beatified human’s soul has entered into or ‘possessed’ the beast, and is embodied in it, just as in the other case a beatified human soul is embodied in the statue. Thus the people who worship the beast are really worshipping the soul of one of their townsmen who
died long ago. This is the Hermetist's explanation and defence of the Egyptian practice of beast-worship.

In Philostr. Vita Apollonii 6. 19, the head of the society of Ἱερουσαλήμ at the border of Upper Egypt gives a different explanation of the practice: σοφῶν γὰρ, ἑπερ τι Αἰγυπτίων, καὶ τὸ μὴ θρασύνεσθαι ἐς τὰ τῶν θεῶν εἰδῆ, ἔμμεθλικὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ποιεῖσθαι καὶ ὑπονοούμενα· καὶ γὰρ ἄν καὶ σεμνότερα οὕτω φαίνοντο. I.e. the practice of the Egyptians, who employ an animal as a symbol of the god, is more reverential than that of the Greeks, who presume to represent the divine being by a statue intended to resemble him. But this is philosophic reflection. In the popular consciousness of the Egyptians, the god was not merely symbolized by the beast, but was incorporated in it.

Plutarch, Is. et Os. 71 ff., says that the majority of the Egyptians 'worship the beasts themselves, and treat them as gods'; but this he regards as a contemptible and mischievous superstition. He mentions certain 'mythical' and 'historical' explanations which have been put forward to account for the usage; and he speaks of a theory (which he holds to be 'equally incredible'), that 'those human souls which continue to exist after death can be born again only by becoming incarnate in the sacred animals'. Plutarch mentions also the explanation based on 'usefulness' (i.e. the theory that cows, for instance, are held sacred because they are serviceable to men). But he himself (like the naked philosopher in Philostratus) prefers to regard the sacred animals as symbols of deity; and living things, he says, are better symbols of deity than things without life. ἰγαπητῶν ὅσον οὐ ταύτα τιμῶνται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτων τὸ θεῖον, ὡς ἐναργείτέρων ἴσοτρέπων· καὶ φύσει γεγονότων (c. 76). Plutarch's view is that of an enlightened Greek. He thinks it absurd to suppose that a beast is a god; but at the same time he is unwilling to condemn an established religious usage, and seeks to show that a man may reasonably continue to practise the rites, provided that he rejects their ostensible meaning, and interprets them in his own way. The position of the Hermetist is nearer to that of the
mass of the Egyptian worshippers of a bull or a crocodile; in his view, the beast, as well as the statue, is an actual god, though a god of lower grade than the di caelestes.

Diodorus i. 84 mentions some of the beasts worshipped in Egypt in his time; among them are the bull Apis at Memphis, the bull Mnevis at Heliopolis, a he-goat at Mendes, a crocodile at Lake Moeris (Arsinoe), a lion at Leontopolis, καὶ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἥτερα. See also Philo De decalogo 16. 76 ff., Cohn IV, p. 286, Orig. c. Cels. 3. 17. Parthey, in his edition of Plut. Is. et Os. p. 261 ff., gives a detailed list of sacred animals.

The early Egyptians no doubt regarded certain kinds of animals as 'holy', and abstained from certain kinds of animal food as 'unclean';¹ and they associated certain species of animals with certain gods; but the actual worship of individual beasts as gods, if not wholly unknown,² at any rate occupied a comparatively small place among the cults of Egypt until near the end of the national independence. The worship of beasts, in the sense in which the practice implies a belief that the god is incarnated in the body of a particular living animal, first became prominent in the Saite period 663-525 B.C.), and was carried to great lengths in Ptolemaic and Roman times. In these late times, the sanctity of the individual animal in which the deity was believed to be incorporated was extended, in greater or less degree, to other animals of the same species; and if some sort of veneration for the species had existed before, it was now intensified. Any one who killed an animal of a species held sacred in an Egyptian town was liable to severe legal penalties, and was likely to be lynched by the mob. Cf. Diodor. i. 83: ἀποτείναντος Ἁρμαῖον τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τῶν πλῆθων συνδραμόντος ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ πράξαντος, οὕτω εἰς πεμφθέντες ὕπε τοῦ βασιλέως ἄρχοντες ἐπὶ τὴν παραίτησιν οὗθ' ὁ κοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἡραμής φῶσιν ἵσχυον ἐξέλθαι τῆς τιμωρίας τῶν ἀνθρωπον, καὶ περ ἀκούς τὸ στὸ πεπραγμένο. καὶ τοῦτο ὅσον ἦμεις ἱστοροῦμεν, ἄλλοι αὕτοι κατὰ τὴν γεγονημένην ἡμῖν ἐπιθεμέναν καὶ Ἀγαμητον ἐορακότες.

¹ At an early stage of culture, the conceptions 'holy' and 'unclean' are hardly distinguishable; the common notion underlying both is that the thing in question is charged with a potent force, and that precautions must therefore be taken in dealing with it.

² Breasted, Hist. of Egypt, p. 60, says that 'the animal-worship, ... as a cult, is a late product, brought forward in the decline of the nation at the close of its history', and that until then 'it was unknown'. (He refers to Erman, Handbuch, p. 25.)
eorum animas, quorum sunt consecrata (sc. hæc animalia) (quasi imagines) viventes. In the text of the MSS., viventes is meaningless. By inserting quasi imagines, we get a meaning which exactly suits the context. The beast is a ‘living image’ of the deified man, in the same sense that the statue is a lifeless image of him; and the ‘terrestrial god’ is in this case constituted by the combination of a disembodied human soul with the living body of an animal, as, in the other case, by the combination of a disembodied human soul with a lifeless statue. Cf. Plut. Is. et Os. 43: τὸν δὲ Ἀπειρόν ἐκόνα μὲν Ὄσιριδος ἐμφυχυν ἐναι. Hyginus Astronom. 2. 28 says that Egyptian priests tell a story about gods who changed themselves into beasts; ‘quibus de causis Aegyptios ea genera violari non sinere demonstrant, quod deorum imagines dicantur.’ Porphyry, De abst. 4. 9: κάνθαρον δὲ ... Ἀγάπητοι ... ἐσέφθησαν ὡς ἐκόνα ἥλιον ἐμφυχυν. (The context shows that Porphyry here understands εἰκόνα in the sense of ‘a symbol’; but the phrase is taken from common usage, and the popular notion would rather be that the Sun-god, or a divine soul which is an ἀπόρροια of the Sun-god, is embodied in the beetle.)

A man, as well as a beast, might become in this sense a ‘living image’ of a god. In the Decree of Memphis, 196 B.C. (Mahaffy, Egypt under the Ptoles., p. 316), Ptolemy V is called εἰκόνα ζῶσα τοῦ Δίως (i.e. of Amon). The votary in Apuleius Metamorph. ii. 24, at the end of his initiation in the mysteries of Isis at Corinth, has become an embodiment of the Sun-god Horus, the son of Isis, and is accordingly exhibited to the worshippers as an ‘image’ of that deity (‘in vicem simulacri’). Porphyry (De abst. 4. 9) mentions a place in Egypt where the object of worship (i.e. the thing in which the god-soul was embodied) was not a statue or a beast, but a living man; ἔτει καὶ ἀνθρώπον σέβονται κατὰ Ἀναβιν κώμην, ἐν ἤ καὶ τοῦτο θύεται καὶ ἐπὶ βωμῶν τὰ ἱερεῖα κάσται. ὅ δὲ μετ’ ἄλγον φάγοι ἐν τὰ ἴδια αὐτῷ ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ παρετεκνησμένα.

Ita ut et eorum legibus incolantur (sc. civitates). It is assumed that the man whose soul is incarnated in the beast worshipped in the town (e.g. Thoth-Hermes, embodied in an ibis at Hermopolis,) had governed the town during his human life, and was the founder of its local ordinances,—especially, perhaps, of its religious usages, and such laws as that which made it a penal offence in that town to kill an animal which was freely killed and eaten in other places.
et eorum nominibus nuncupentur. In some cases the town was named after the local god (e.g. Hermopolis); in other cases it was named after the beast in which the local god was embodied (e.g. Crocodilopolis).

propterea bellis se lacesere Aegyptiorum solent civitates. This does not necessarily imply that in the writer's own lifetime Egyptian towns were in the habit of waging war against one another on behalf of their sacred animals. The speaker is the prehistoric Trismegistus; and traditions of such fighting would suffice to account for the statement which is put into his mouth. There may have been legends of actual wars waged on this ground in the past; and the mimic fighting which formed part of the ritual at some Egyptian festivals (see e.g. Hdt. 2. 63) might easily give rise to such legends. But there is evidence that even under Roman rule a riot or faction-fight was sometimes provoked or aggravated by insulting treatment of a sacred animal by men of a neighbouring town; just as in India the slaughter of a cow by Mohammedans is now and then the cause of a riot, or an incident in a riot. An instance of war between neighbouring towns in the Ptolemaic period occurs in certain Greek papyri (Grenfell and Hunt, Archiv für Papyrussforschung, Bd. I, 1901, p. 57 ff.) describing a bitter quarrel which broke out in 123 B.C. between the priests of Hermonthis and those of Pathyris and the adjacent Crocodilopolis (a little way above Thebes) concerning the possession of an island; the dispute lasted for some years, and led to fierce fighting between the people of these towns. One of the fights described took place at the sacred island of the crocodile-god Sobk; and during this engagement, 'a number of priests (?) who were assisting the Crocodilopolites, and were probably inhabitants of the island, were routed and fled to the river, where many of them were drowned'. There is no express mention of sacred animals here; but when the assailants attacked the island of the crocodile-god, they probably did not spare the crocodile or crocodiles maintained there. Diodorus 1. 89. 5: some say that one of the early kings, acting on the principle 'Divide et impera', introduced the practice of animal-worship, ὅπως ἐκάστων τὸ μέν παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς τιμῶμεν σεβομένων, τῶν δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀφερωμένων καταφρονοῦτων, μηδὲντε ὀμονοίησαι δύνονται πάντες οἱ κατ᾽ Ἀγνυττόν.1 καὶ τούτο ἐκ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων φανερὸν εἶναι: πάντας γὰρ τοὺς πλησιόχωροι πρὸς ἄλληλους διαφέροντας, προσκόπτοντας τὰς εἰς τὰ προερθέ-

1 The same story is told in different words in Plut. Is. et Os. 72.
ASCLEPIUS III: 27 d 235

... cena parantomias. Plut. Is. et Os. 72: oi di 'Oxeiruxyntai kath' hma (about A.D. 100), ton Kynopoiov ton oxeiruxhon xibon赵wn, kinau synllaBontes kai thonautes ois iereion katężagouv ek de toytov katastatantes eis polemon allolous te diethken kakos, kai xoterov upo 'Pormawon kolaxmevoi dieiBhsean. Juvenal (Sat. 15) describes a similar fight between two Egyptian towns; 'Inde furor vulgo, quod numina vicinorum odit uterque locus, cum solos credat habendos esse deos quos ipse colit.' The people of one of these towns, he says, began the quarrel by jeering at those of the other, who were holding a religious festival (i.e. worshipping their special beast-god). Juvenal's details are not to be trusted; he names the towns Ombos and Tentyra, but these places are so far apart that a fight between them would not be possible; and his story of cannibalism is hardly credible. Some such incident as he speaks of must however have occurred shortly before he wrote. Dio Cass. 42. 34 (about A.D. 220): 'The Egyptians make war on one another on behalf of the objects of their worship; for with regard to some of these cults, they are not agreed among themselves, but are strongly opposed to one another, as well as to other races.'

27 d. consecrabituntur (distribuentur MSS.) vero . . . in monte Libyco. This is one of the detached fragments which have been thrown together in ch. 27. There can be little doubt that it originally followed and continued the account of the di terreni in ch. 37. After speaking of gods whom he holds to have been prehistoric chiefs and sages, the writer proceeds to speak of another class of gods worshipped in Egypt, viz. the present and recent rulers of the land. It is possible that some intervening words or sentences have been lost; but the gap, if there is one, is probably not large.

The verb with which the fragment began must have been mutilated; and its place was supplied by repeating (with a change of tense) distribuentur, the last word of the preceding fragment in ch. 27. The sense required may be obtained by writing consecrabituntur.

Celsus (Orig. c. Cel. 8. 63) similarly speaks of the cult of the rulers in conjunction with that of other 'terrestrial gods': τη το δινον τοις ςυνδεται ευμηνιζονται, τους τε άλλους (sc. the 'dae-

1 There was an Ombos near Tentyra; but Juvenal probably had in mind the famous centre of crocodile-worship farther south.
conlocabuntur in civitate in summo initio Aegypti. The deified rulers of Egypt, unlike the local town-gods previously spoken of, must have been recognized as gods throughout the land; but their worship was centred in a single city; and this city the writer indicates by a description, as he indicated Arsinoe before. It is a city which, in the time of Trismegistus, had not yet been founded; it is situated at the western extremity of Egypt; and since men of all races flock to it by land and sea, it must be a maritime city, and a great commercial port. The only city which answers to this description is Alexandria; and there cannot be the slightest doubt that Alexandria is meant.

Alexandria was the seat of the worship of its founder Alexander; it was also the chief (though not the only) seat of worship, first of the Ptolemies, and afterwards of the Roman emperors. See Otto, Priester und Tempel, Index I, s.v. Herrscherkult; and Bouche-Leclercq, Histoire des Lagides, III. 1-68.

The body of Alexander was conveyed from Babylon to Memphis in 322-321 B.C. Ptolemy II transferred it from Memphis to Alexandria, and deposited it in a magnificent tomb-temple, called the Σῆμα, which had been built there to receive it. The transference was certainly subsequent to the death of Ptolemy I in 283 B.C.; its exact date is not recorded, but Otto (I. 144-153) gives reasons for thinking that it probably took place in 274 B.C. At the time when the body was placed in the Σῆμα, an official cult of Alexander was instituted there.¹

A cult of Ptolemy I was established, after his death in 283 B.C., by his son and successor, who deified him under the name of θεὸς Ξωτῆρ. Ptolemy I was buried beside Alexander in the Σῆμα (as were all the other Ptolemies after him), and must, from the time of his death, have been honoured there by rites of worship; but the special seat of his cult was at first not Alexandria, but Ptolemais, a Greek city which he had founded in Upper Egypt, and of which he became the town-god after his death.

So far, divine honours had been rendered by the Greeks in Egypt

¹ The τῶν θεῶν of Alexandria was Sarapis (Julian Ep. 111, Bidez and Cumont, 432 d); but Alexander was worshipped there as the deified founder of the city. Cf. Julian Ep. 60 b and c, 378 c (to the Alexandrians): ei μὴ τῶν Ἀλέξανδρου τῶν ὁληστὴν θρύμων καὶ αὐτὸν γε τοῦτον τῶν θεῶν τῶν μέγαν τῶν ἁγιάστων Χάρατεν ἀλβεῖνς.
to dead rulers only, and not to the living. But Ptolemy II, on the
death of his sister and wife Arsinoe in 270 B.C., took a further step.
He deified not only her, but himself beside her (Otto II. 273); and
the dead queen and the living king, under the name thei Άδελφοι
(afterwards Φιλαδελφοι) were associated with Alexander at the Sema
as σύννεφοι θεοί, and were worshipped there in conjunction with him.
The successors of Ptolemy II followed his example, and went beyond
it in making the living queen a deity as well as the living king. The
dynastic cult was systematized in 215–210 B.C. by Ptolemy IV, who
completed the series of royal couples by inserting Ptolemy I and his
wife, the θεοὶ Σωτῆρες, between Alexander and the θεοὶ Άδελφοι; and
from that time onward, each succeeding royal couple in turn was
added to the list of deities worshipped at the Alexandrian Sema.
Thus in the Rosetta Stone (196 B.C.) the chief priest of the
Alexandrian cult of the rulers bears the title ἱερεὺς Άλεξάνδρου καὶ
θεῶν Σωτῆρων καὶ θεῶν Άδελφῶν καὶ θεῶν Εὔεργετῶν καὶ θεῶν Φιλο-
πατόρων καὶ θεοῦ Ἐπιφανοῦς Ἐγγαρίστου (the last-named being the
reigning king, Ptolemy V, who was not yet married). At Ptolemais,
the worship of the succeeding Ptolemies was similarly added to that
of the founder and town-god, Ptolemy I.

The cults so far mentioned, though strongly influenced by the
religious atmosphere of Egypt, were Greek in form; the rites were
performed by Greek priests, who were unconnected with the corpora-
tion of the Egyptian priesthood; and it was chiefly the Greek
subjects of the Ptolemies, massed together in Alexandria, that took
part in the worship, and thereby expressed their loyalty to the
reigning dynasty, probably for the most part without any serious
belief in the divinity of their very human kings and queens. The
attitude of the native Egyptians towards their rulers was different.
From the earliest times, the kings of Egypt had been regarded as
divine; they were sons of the Sun-god, and incarnations of Horus;
and at least since the time of the New Kingdom, 1500 B.C. (Otto II,
p. 270), the living king was worshipped as a god. When he had
died and 'departed to heaven', he was of course still a god. The
people in general might be less directly concerned with a deity who
had ceased to dwell among them in the flesh; but a temple or
mortuary chapel was usually built in connexion with his tomb; the
duty of performing the customary rites there was committed to a
body of priests endowed for the purpose; and the cult of a dead
king sometimes lasted for many centuries. Even in Ptolemaic times,
some of the kings of the earliest dynasties still had priests assigned to them. (For details as to the worship of dead kings, see Petrie Hist. of Egypt, passim.) The Ptolemies succeeded to the position of the native kings, and were regarded in the same way by their Egyptian subjects. In their eyes, the ruler was necessarily an incarnate god; and the ceremony of coronation by the Egyptian priests (which is called ἀνακλητήρια, i.e. 'proclamation-ceremony', by Polybius,) did not change the man into a god, but was a formal recognition of the fact that he was a god already (ἐπάρχων θεός ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ θεᾶς, Rosetta Stone), and a declaration that he was henceforth to be worshipped. The Rosetta Stone (Mahaffy, Empire of the Ptolemies, p. 316 ff.) is a decree enacted by the synod of the Egyptian priests on the occasion of the coronation of Ptolemy V at Memphis; and the operative clauses of the decree are those by which the worship of him is instituted or augmented. It is resolved (1) that in every Egyptian temple shall be set up a piece of sculpture representing 'the god Epiphanes Eucharistos' (i.e. the god-king Ptolemy V) and the chief god of the temple side by side, and that the priests shall do reverence (θεραπεύειν) to these portraits (εἰκόνες) thrice a day; (2) that in every Egyptian temple shall be placed a cult-image (εἰκών) of the god-king, enclosed in a portable shrine (ναός); that this shrine shall be set up as an object of worship (καθεύδοντες) in the most holy place of the temple, together with the shrines of the other gods; and that at the great festivals, when the shrines of the gods are carried in procession, that of the god-king shall be carried with the rest; (3) that at every Egyptian temple certain monthly and yearly festivals shall be celebrated in honour of the god-king, who shall on these days be worshipped with 'sacrifices and libations and all other customary rites'; and (4) that the priests of the other gods shall add to their titles the fresh title 'priest of the god Epiphanes Eucharistos'.

The εἰκών there spoken of corresponds to the 'man-made god' of Ascl. III; and the rites prescribed imply a belief, or at least the simulation of a belief, that one and the same divine soul is embodied in all the numerous εἰκώνα, as well as in the human body of the living king.

The contrast between the attitude of the Greeks in Egypt towards their rulers and that of the native Egyptians tended to diminish as time went on; and the Ptolemies deliberately sought to assimilate the different usages by which the two races expressed their reverence
for their kings. It was no doubt chiefly with this object that the practice of worshipping the living king, long established in the Egyptian cult, was adopted in the Greek cult. On the other hand the Egyptian priests, who were accustomed to worship the living king as a σώματος θεός in all their temples, took over from the Greek cult the practice of associating the queen with the king, and also that of including the deceased royal couples among the deities worshipped in every temple. And besides the kings and queens, some other members of the royal family were added to the number of the gods worshipped by the Egyptians. The Decree of Canopus (Mahaffy, Empire of the Ptolemies, p. 229 ff.) is a resolution passed by the synod of Egyptian priests in 238 B.C. A young daughter of the reigning king, Ptolemy III, has recently died (μετήλθεν εἰς τὸν δαναον κόσμον,—εἰς θεοὺς μετήλθεν); and the priests announce that they hereby resolve to pay her everlasting honours in all the temples of the land. She is to be worshipped by the celebration of a yearly festival at every Egyptian sanctuary; a cult-image of her (ιερὸν ἀγαλμα,—a 'man-made deity'), is to be placed in each of the chief temples; and in all religious processions, this image is to be carried in the arms of a priest, 'in order that it may be seen and honoured and worshipped by all men'. The little princess was not a deity in her lifetime. She has become a deity at death; but this, according to Egyptian notions, might be said of every beatified soul, whether of royal race or not. She is already a deity; but by the setting up of the cult-images in the temples, and by the rites of worship instituted, she is made a 'terrestrial' deity.

Some of the Ptolemies not only received divine honours in their own names, but identified themselves with some recognized Greek or Egyptian deity, and received worship in that capacity. Thus at Ptolemais there was a priestess of 'Cleopatra (I), the mother of Amon, the resplendent Isis' (Otto I. 159, n. 2). There is mention of a priest of 'Ιεις μεγάλη μὴ τηρθεὸν; and this goddess is probably Cleopatra III (ib. p. 158). Ptolemy XIII was officially styled νιός Διόνυσος. The belief, real or feigned, which underlies this practice is that the deity in question is incarnated in the living man or woman. Similarly Horace (Od. i. 2. 41) hints that Augustus is perhaps an incarnation of the god Hermes.

After the annexation of Egypt by Augustus, Alexander was still worshipped with Greek rites at the Sema as before; and under Roman rule, the festival of the deified founder of the city long continued to
be celebrated in Alexandria. Julius Valerius 3. 35 (about A.D. 300): 'obitus eius (sc. Alexandri) diem etiam nunc Alexandriam sacratissimam habent.' This cult of Alexander was probably maintained until the abolition of Paganism (Otto I, p. 154). But the cult of the Ptolemies, both in its Greek form at Alexandria, and in its Egyptian form in all the temples of the national religion, was abandoned on the downfall of the dynasty; and in its place was instituted the cult of the Roman rulers.

On the deification of the principes at Rome and in the provinces, see Marquardt, Staatsverwaltung III. 463 ff., and Boissier, Religion romaine I. 109-186. In instituting the worship of deceased rulers, the Roman government gave official expression to beliefs and sentiments which had spread to Italy from the Greek kingdoms of the East, and above all from Egypt; though some foundation for the practice might also be found in native Italian usages, such as the family worship of the Di Manes and the Lares. At Rome, an official cult of the living ruler was never instituted; and of the earlier principes, only a few (e.g. Caligula and Domitian) demanded divine honours from their subjects. Aurelian (A.D. 270-275) was the first Roman emperor who styled himself deus on his coins (Schiller, Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit I. 867). Towards the end of the fourth century, Vegetius (2. 5) writes 'Imperatori, cum Augusti nomen accepit, tamquam praesentii et corporali deo fidelis est praestanda devotione.'

The first man who was worshipped after death by order of the Roman government was Julius Caesar, who had already been recognized as a god 'persuasione vulgi' (Suet. Julius 88), when in 42 B.C. the Senate established a cult of Divus Julius. The precedent was followed in the case of Augustus and others; and thus came into existence a new class of Roman state-gods, the Divi and Divae. In A.D. 224, twenty of these deities were officially recognized; in the time of Constantine, the number had risen to about thirty-seven.

1 The word 'deification' is apt to suggest a wrong notion. The process is correctly described in Tac. Ann. 1. 10: '(Augusto) templum et caelestes religiones decernuntur'; and in a calendar quoted by Marquardt (III. 467): 'eo die Augusto honores caelestes a senatu decreti.' The senators did not claim power to change a dead man into a god; but they professed belief that he had become a god, and instituted a priesthood, a temple, and an annual festival for his worship. It is true that Manilius (4. 927) says, with reference to Divus Julius and the anticipated apotheosis of Augustus, 'iam facit ipse (homo) deos, mittitque ad sidera numen'; and Tacitus (Ann. I. 73. 3) quotes Tiberius as writing 'decretum patri suo caelum'; but such phrases are not to be taken literally.
But in the East, the cult of the living ruler, which was indigenous in Egypt and in some parts of Asia, had, since the time of Alexander, been adopted by the Greeks, and was almost universally accepted among them long before the Roman annexation of Egypt. Even under the Republic, Roman proconsuls had frequently received divine honours in these regions; Marcus Antonius was only accepting a part which was thrust upon him when he appeared in public in the character of a present god in Alexandria, Ephesus, and Athens; and when Augustus had established peace and prosperity, temples and priesthoods for his worship sprang into existence in all the eastern provinces. In this movement the Greeks in Egypt took part together with the rest of the Greek-speaking East. In the reign of Augustus, a Kaisareion was built in Alexandria; and it is to be presumed that it was first used for the worship of the Divus Iulius and the living Augustus; that the successors of Augustus also were worshipped there during their lives; and that those of them at least who were added to the official list of the Roman Divi continued to be worshipped there after death. Later on, a Hadrianeion was built in Alexandria, and must have served as an additional temple for the worship of the rulers in that city. Some members of the imperial family were, like some of the Ptolemies before, identified with particular deities; e.g. Plotina, the wife of Trajan, was honoured as Αφροδίτη θεᾶ νεωτέρα (Otto I. 159, n. 2).

The example of the Alexandrian Greeks was followed by the Greeks settled in other parts of Egypt; we hear of Kaisareia or Sebasteia at Arsinoe, Oxyrhynchus, Hermopolis, and Elephantine, a Hadrianeion at Memphis, and perhaps a Hadrianeion at Arsinoe (Otto I. 11). At the same time, the native Egyptian priests transferred to the Roman rulers the divine honours which they had previously rendered to the Ptolemies; and it appears that both the living princeps and the Divi were associated as σύνναι θεοί with the local gods in the temples under the

1 Plutarch (I. τ. O. 24) speaks with strong disapproval of the cult of living rulers: οἱ δὲ τῶν ζωτάριτων ἵπποι μεγαλαυχίς, ἡμεῖς γυναικεῖς καὶ φρεάτες φλέγοντας τὴν ψυχὴν, μεθ' ὑπερασπίσεως θεῶν ἱερομανίας καὶ ναῶν θεότητος, βραχὶν γυθίζως ἡ δόξα χρῶν. But among the Pagan Greeks of that period, such a decided condemnation of the practice is exceptional.

2 There is direct evidence of a Greek cult of the living Augustus in the Sebastaeion at Philae in 13-12 B.C.; and the cult of Augustus had probably been established earlier in Alexandria (Otto II, p. 279).

3 Philo, Leg. ad Gaium 22. 151, VI, p. 183 Cohn, describes the Sebastaeion at Alexandria as a magnificent building. Was this Sebastaeion identical with the Kaisareion, or was it a distinct and separate temple?

4 There are mentions of ἄρχοντες Σεβάστων in Alexandria, and also in some other Egyptian towns. Otto I. 61, 136, II. 190.
control of the Egyptian priesthood throughout the land.\(^1\) But the local rites, whether Greek or Egyptian, with which the emperors were worshipped in the other towns of Egypt must have been of small importance compared with the central Greek cult of the Roman rulers in Alexandria; and it is of the latter alone that the Hermetist speaks. In A.D. 270, the approximate date of Ascl. III, the dead ‘rulers of the land’ who were officially worshipped in Alexandria must have been Alexander and some thirty Roman Divi. During the Palmyrene occupation of Egypt, the living emperor Claudius, in whose name Vaballathus ruled the country, may also have been worshipped there; but in those troubled times the cult of the living ruler may perhaps have been suspended.

\textit{Modo tamen hoc in tempore ubi isti sunt?} \textit{Isti} must mean \textit{qui terrae dominantur}, i.e. the rulers, dead or living, whom the writer supposes to have been worshipped as gods in the time of Trismegistus; and \textit{ubi isti sunt} must mean ‘what city in Egypt is the seat of their cult?’ Perhaps conlocati (καθεδριμένοι) may have dropped out before \textit{sunt}.

As Trismegistus lived in the time of ‘King Ammon’, it would seem that the rulers here spoken of must be Amon and other gods of the same class, whom the writer assumes to have been ancient kings of Egypt. It is strange that Asclepius should need to be told where the deified kings of his own time are worshipped; but perhaps the writer has inserted this question merely because he wishes to give his own answer to it.

\textit{in maxima civitate in monte Libyco}. What city is this? Apparently, Arsinoe again; for that is the only important town in Egypt which is ‘in the Libyan mountain’. But if \textit{isti} are national gods such as Amon and Osiris, how can it be said that their cult is established in one particular city or nome alone?\(^*\) We should rather have expected to be told either that they are collectively worshipped in all parts of Egypt, or that the chief seat of the cult of each of them is in a different city.

\(^1\) Otto I. 11. There is evidence of worship of the living ruler in Egyptian temples, in the case of Augustus, Tiberius, Claudius, Nero, and Trajan. An Egyptian priest at Heliopolis in A.D. 210–211 bears the title \textit{δρυιωροφήτης τῶν κυρίων Αὐτοκράτωρας Ζεβαστῶν} (ib. II. 278, n. 6). The birthdays of the Roman emperors were celebrated as festivals (and this implies that the emperors were worshipped) at the temple of Socnopaeus in the Fayum (ib. II. 9, n. 3). These birth-festivals were called \textit{ημέρα ζεβασταλ} (ib. 10, n. 1). Similar festivals were celebrated in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus at Arsinoe; and the cult in this temple appears to have been Egyptian, and not Greek (ib. I. 10).

\(^*\) See vol. IV, Addenda.
Perhaps we might account for this answer to Asclepius' question by assuming that the writer is an inhabitant of the Arsinoite nome (which is also suggested by the fact that he localizes the cult of Imhotep-Asclepius there), and that he believes some famous sanctuary in his own neighbourhood to have been the chief seat of the cult of the rulers in ancient times, just as Alexandria is the chief seat of that cult in his own day. It is possible that the sanctuary of which he is thinking is the Labyrinth, which was situated at the entrance to the Fayum, about twelve miles from Arsinoe. The Labyrinth was still one of the famous sights of Egypt in the second century A.D.; Aelius Aristides, 36. 1, speaks of it as such, and mentions it next to the pyramids. Herodotus (2. 148) was told that it had been built by the twelve kings who reigned over Egypt in the time of Sennacherib, and was intended as a memorial of the twelve together (καὶ δὴ σφι μνημόσυνα ἠδοξε λατέσθαι κοινῇ). Herodotus is mistaken about the date, but his story indicates the existence of a tradition that the Labyrinth was a national memorial of ancient kings, and therefore a place where ancient kings were likely to have been worshipped. Strabo, 17. 37, p. 811, says that the number of courts in the Labyrinth was the same as the ancient number of the Egyptian nomes; Pliny, Nat. Hist. 36. 13, also says that its divisions corresponded in number with the nomes, and adds that it contained 'temples of all the gods of Egypt'. It is therefore not unlikely that in the third century A.D. the people of the district believed the Labyrinth to have been in ancient times the centre of the national life, and the common meeting-place of all Egyptians for political and religious purposes, among which the cult of the rulers would be included. Some of the kings of the XIIth dynasty had been buried in the neighbourhood of the Labyrinth, and must have been worshipped in that district after their deaths; and a tradition of this cult may possibly have survived down to the time when Ascl. III was written.

38 a. Et horum... (evocatio) cuiusmodi est [qualitas]? The meaning of this question is determined by the answer which follows; Asclepius must have asked by what means beatified souls are induced to enter the bodies prepared for them in the Egyptian temples, viz. the cult-images. As the verb evocare was used above to describe this process, I have inserted evocatio. Perhaps qualitas may have arisen out of qualis est, an alternative for cuiusmodi est.

Constat... de herbis, de lapidibus, et de aromatibus divinitatis naturam in se habentibus. In Egyptian rites of divinitatis naturam in se habentibus.
public worship, as well as in the private practice of magicians, much use was made of sacred plants and stones, and the burning of incense and other fragrant substances. Compare the doctrine of the Egyptian priest in Adammonis Resp. 5. 23: οὐδὲ τὴν ὕλην οὖν ἀφλοτησμον οὖν τοῦ θεού μετονομαζεῖς οὔτε ὅσα τῆς θεοῦ θέλει καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ ἀγαθικὴ καὶ ἀνάρμοστος, ἀπὸ τοῦ οὖν καταβοῦσα ή θεουργικὴ τέχνη, κοινῶς τε οὐτωσὶ (καὶ) καὶ οἰκεύοντα ἐκάστῳ τῶν θεῶν τὰς προσφορὰς ἐποδόσων ἀνευρίσκωσα, συμπλέκει πολλάκις λίθους βοσάννας ζών ἀρώματα ἄλλα τε τοιαῦτα ἱερὰ καὶ τέλεια καὶ θεοεύθη, κατέπετα ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων ὑποδοχῆν ὅλοτηλη καὶ καθαρὰν ἀπεργάζεται. 'There is nothing to hinder matter from participation in the divine; so that all matter which is perfect, pure, and good is not unsuited to serve as a receptacle of gods. In view of this, the theurgic art discovers the receptacles which are appropriate to the gods in general and to each god in particular, and often combines together stones, plants, animals, and spices, and other material things that are holy, perfect, and godlike, and out of all these, constructs a complete and pure receptacle (into which a god may enter). Origen, c. Cels. 8. 61, describes the Pagan worshipper as τον περιεργαζόμενον δαιμόνον ὁ νόμιμα καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ πράξεις καὶ ἐπίφανες, καὶ βοσάννας οἰκεῖας δαίμονας καὶ λίθους καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς γλυφάς, καταλήλους ταῖς παραδεδομέναις εἶτε 'συμβολικάς' (lege -κώς) εἶτε ὅπως ἀπειράμψα μορφᾶς δαιμόνων. Plutarch, Is. et Os. 52 and 80, speaks of certain fragrant substances (βητὺν, σμύρνα, and κόψι), the burning of which forms part of the daily Egyptian worship of the Sun-god.

In the process of 'god-making', no doubt certain sacred herbs and stones were attached to the image or placed near it, and certain fragrant substances burnt before it, in order to attract the divine soul which was to be embodied. The evocatio must have included other rites as well, which are not here mentioned; there must at any rate have been a verbal invocation of the divine being.

Having spoken of the rites by which the beatified soul is induced to enter the image, the writer goes on to speak of the rites by which it is induced to remain there, and to dwell permanently in the temple. These are the ordinary rites of Egyptian temple-worship; they consist chiefly, he says, of sacrifices and hymns. If these rites are discontinued, the divine souls embodied in the images will quit them, and

1 See vol. IV, Addenda.
depart from earth to heaven; and thus, when the Christians abolish the temple-cults, 'e terris est ad caelum recursura divinitas', and '(Aegyptus) numinum praesentia destituetur' (ch. 24 b): there will no longer be 'terrestrial gods'.

The Hermetist's view of the effect produced by the temple-rites was shared by many of the Christians of the time, with the difference that they believed the beings attracted and gratified by the rites to be devils. Origen (c. Cels. 8. 60) quotes Celsus as saying χρή γὰρ ἵνα οὐκ ἀπιστεῖν ἀνδράσι σοφοῖς, οὐ δὴ φασί διότι τῶν μὲν περιγείων δαιμόνων τὸ πλεῖστον, γενέσει συντετηκός, καὶ προσηλομένον αἰματι καὶ κινήσει καὶ μελαδίας, καὶ ἄλλοι τοῖς τοιούτοις προσδεδεμένοι, κρείττον οὖθεν δύνατι' ἐν τοῦ θεραπεύει κύκλοι καὶ μέλλουσαν τίχην ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ πάλιν προ- ειτέκες κ.τ.λ.1 Commenting on this, Origen (ib. 63) says Κέλσος εἰτε μὲν ἐν τῷ περὶ κινήσεως καὶ αἰματος, ἐν χρήσει δαίμονες, τάληθεν. Ἰδ. 7. 64, Origen implies his agreement with the view that daemons τοιοῦτος παρακαθέτονται σχῆμασι καὶ χωρίσις (sc. altars, temples, and images), ἐπὶ τῶν τῶν μαγγανείων κατακαλληθέντες (e. g. by the use of herbae, lapides, and aromata), ἐκ καὶ ἄλλους δυνηθέντας προκαταλαβεῖν λαυτοὺς τόπους, οὐ τῶν τῶν φυσικῶν ἀποφορὰς λύχνων μεταλαμβανόντες παράνομον ἴδοντως καὶ παρανομὸς θαρσοῦνται. Firmicus Maternus De err. prof. rel. 13. 4 (A. D. 350): 'Sed et in ipso simulacro (of Sarapis), sicut in ceteris, ex assiduis sacrificiis immundi daemonum spiritus colliguntur. Nihil enim operantur victimae et cruor ex assidua pecudum caede profusus, nisi ut daemonum substantia, qui diaboli procreatione generantur, ex isto sanguine nutriatur.'

Porphyry, De abst. 2. 38 ff., distinguishes between beneficent and maleficient daemons, and agrees with the Christians in holding that it is the maleficient daemons alone that take pleasure in animal sacrifices; οὕτωι οἱ χαῖροντες "λοβῆ τε κίνησιν τε", δὲ δὲν αὐτῶν τὸ πνευματικόν2 καὶ σωματικὸν πιάνεται. ξῆ γὰρ τὸτε ἄτομοι καὶ ἀναθυμάσσει πουκίλως διὰ τῶν πουκίλων, καὶ δυναμότατα ταῖς ἐκ τῶν αἰματῶν καὶ σαρκῶν κινήσεως. διὸ συνετὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ σώφρων εὐλαβηθήσεται τοιαύ- τας χρήσεις θυσίας, δὲ δὲν ἐπιστάσαι πρὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦς τοιούτους.

in modum caelestis harmoniae. This may be a reference to the Pythagorean 'music of the spheres'. But in the old Egyptian documents, there is frequent mention of gods adoring a higher god; and this notion also may be in the writer's mind. Cf. the hymn

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1 Celsus however added (ib. 8. 63) μᾶλλον οἰητόν τοῦ τε ψάλλοντα μηδενὸς χρῆμαν, μηδὲ διεισθαί τοὺς, ἀλλὰ χαῖρειν τοῖς τε ἑστερβεὶς δρῶσι πρὸς αὐτῶν.
2 πνευματικὸς here means 'gaseous'
sung by the δυνάμεις in Corp. I and XIII. Ascl. I. 9: God sent the Muses down to earth, 'ut . . . cælestibus laudibus nec in terris harmoniae suavitas defuisse'.

39-40 a: concerning Heimarmene. The functions of the di caelestes and the di terreni, as described in ch. 38 b, together include the whole administration of the universe; no separate function therefore is left for Heimarmene. But the term εἰμαρμένη was too prominent in the philosophy of the time to be ignored; the writer therefore felt himself obliged to find a place for this power, and did so by identifying it with the agency of the di caelestes collectively, or with a certain part of that agency. Similarly, in ch. 19 b we were told that Heimarmene presides over the movements of the seven planetary spheres, and thereby puts in operation 'the unchanging law of change' in the sublunar world. But in ch. 19 b, Heimarmene was described as one of the οὐσίαρχαι, i.e. as a personal deity, of the same order as Zeus Hypatos; in ch. 39, the personality disappears, and the word εἰμαρμένη is used as an abstract term, on a par with ἀνάγκη and τάξει. It seems that in his two accounts of Heimarmene (19 b and 39) the writer was following two different authorities, and took no pains to harmonize them.

ἡ εἰμαρμένη (sc. μοιρα) as a substantive occurs several times in Plato (e.g. Gorg. 512 e, where ἔγερε τὴν εἰμαρμένην οὐδ' ἄν εἰς ἱκφύοις is quoted as a proverbial saying), and once in Aristotle Poet. 1455 a 11). But the Stoics were the first to bring the word into current use as a substantive with a definite cosmologic meaning; and it is manifest that the account of εἰμαρμένη in Ascl. III. 39 f. is derived from Stoic sources. Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, defined εἰμαρμένη as δύναμις κινητὴ τῆς ὀλης κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὁσαυτῶς, and said that it might equally well be called πρόνοια and φύσις (Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 322). Chrysippus wrote a book Περί εἰμαρμένης, and spoke much of εἰμαρμένη throughout his writings. (See Diels ἰβ., and Arnim, Sto. vet. fragm. II, pp. 264–298.) He said that εἰμαρμένη is ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος (the design or plan of the universe); that it is λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διακομμένων; and that it is λόγος καθ' ὅν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε τὰ δὲ γεγονότα γίνεται τὰ δὲ γεγονότα γενήσεται. Elsewhere, in place of λόγος, he spoke of ἡ διήθεω (meaning,
perhaps, the predetermined truth concerning future events), ἢ αἰτία, ἢ φύσις, and ἢ ἀνάγκη as equivalent to εἰμαρμένη. He said that ἡ ὀσία τῆς εἰμαρμένης is δύναμις πνευματική (i.e. a power inherent in the material πνεύμα which pervades the Kosmos), τάξιν τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικῆς also (Theodoret, supplemented by Stobaeus, Diels iib.) μηδὲν διαφέρειν τοῦ εἰμαρμένου τὸ κατηγορικαιμένον, εἶναι δὲ τὴν εἰ- μαρμένην κίνησιν ἄδικον συνεχῆ καὶ τεταγμένη, || καὶ εἰπωλοκὴν μερῶν συνεργισμένην. Aul. Gell. 7 (6). 2. 3: εἰμαρμένην esse dicit (Chrysippus) φυσικὴν τινα σύνταξιν τῶν ὁλων, εἰσάγειν τῶν ἐτίων τοῖς ἐτίως ἐπακολουθοῦντων, ἀπαραβάτου ὀδοῦ τῆς τωμαίης ἐπιπλοκῆς. Plut. Stoic. repugn. 47. 4: Chrysippus said μηδὲν ἰσχυθαι μηδὲ κινεθαι μηδὲ τοιλάχιστον ἄλλως ἡ κατὰ τῶν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον (design), διὸ τῇ εἰμαρμένῃ τοῦ αὕτου εἶναι. Ἰθ. 47. 5: τὴν εἰμαρμένην αἰτίαν ἀνίκητον καὶ ἀκόλουθον καὶ ἀτρέπτων ἀποφαίνων.

In his cosmology, Chrysippus postulated an unalterable destiny (that is, an all-including system of invariable ‘laws of nature’, or sequences of cause and effect, such as is assumed by modern science); but in his ethics, he asserted the free will and responsibility of man; and he was much occupied with the problem of reconciling the one with the other. Cf. the fragment of Cic. De fato quoted by Aul. Gell. 7 (6). 2. 15: ‘Chrysippus, aestuans laboransque quonam (pacto) explicet et fato omnia fieri et esse aliquid in nobis, intricatur hoc modo.’ His somewhat obscure teaching on this subject was vigorously attacked by Carneades; and the substance of Carneades’ criticism (or rather, of the report of it transmitted by Carneades’ pupil Clitomachus, 129–111 B.C.) is preserved in Cic. De fato, and Plut. Sto. refugn. 47. (Schmekel, Phil. der mittl. Stoa, pp. 155–184.)

Ex quo intelligitur ut fatum sit . . . causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea quae praeterierunt facta sint, et quae instant fiant, et quae sequentur futura sint.’ Seneca, who drew largely from Posidonius, speaks of fatum to the same effect, and insists strongly and repeatedly on the immutability of destiny, but also recognizes free will in man; Nat. quaest. 2. 38. 3, ‘cum de ista re agetur, dicam quemadmodum manente fato aliquid sit in hominis arbitrio.’

39. [ante] [[caelestes dii . . . singula]]. The sentence 'caelestes . . . singula' is obviously out of place between the question about εἰμαρμένη and the answer to that question. When transposed, it serves as a suitable conclusion to ch. 38 b. But the meaningless word ante remains to be accounted for. Is it possible that it is a corrector's note, intended to indicate that the sentence to which it is prefixed ought to be placed 'before' Asclepius' question?

semper sibi catenatis (necessitatis) nexibus vincta(e). εἰμαρμένη can hardly be said to be 'bound to itself'; it is the events produced by εἰμαρμένη that are bound together in the chain of causation; i.e. each necessarily results from another which precedes it. We must therefore read vinctae in place of vincta. For the notion of a chain of causes, cf. (in addition to the passages quoted above) Cic. De fato (discussion of the doctrine of Chrysippus) 20, 'causarum series sempiterna': 27, 'ex aeternitate causa causam serens': 31, 'omnia naturali conligatione conserte contextue sunt'. Seneca, Dial. 12. 8. 3: 'inmutabilis causarum inter se cohaerentium series.'

ἡ αὐτὸς ὁ θεός, ἡ ἡ μετ’ ἐκεῖνον τεταγμένη (ἐνέργεια).—aut deus summus, aut ab ipso deo qui secundus effectus est. Destiny may be either identified with God, or described as that ἐνέργεια (of God) which ranks next to God himself, i.e. as the highest of God's ἐνέργεια. For the identification of destiny with God, cf. Chrysippus, in Philodemus, Diels Doxogr. p. 545: καὶ πρόνοια (?) ὄνομαξεσθαι τὸν Δία, καὶ τὴν κοινὴν πάντων φύσιν, καὶ εἰμαρμένην, καὶ ἀνάγκην. Sen. De benef. 4. 7. 2: 'hunc eundem (sc. deum or Iovem) et fatum si dixeris, non mentieris. Nam cum fatum nihil aliud sit quam series inplexa causarum, ille est prima omnium causa, ex qua ceterae pendent.' Ib. 4. 8. 3: naturam voca, fatum, fortunam; omnia eiusdem dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate.' Nat. quaest. 2. 45: 'vis illum (sc. Iovem) fatum vocare: non errabis: hic est, ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa causarum.' ‘The Stoics’ in Arius

Posidonius is reported by Aetius, Diels *Dox.* p. 324, as saying *(τὴν εἰμαρμένην εἴναι) τρίτην ἀπὸ Διός* πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἴναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν φύσιν, τρίτον δὲ τὴν εἰμαρμένην. The Hermetist, in Ascl. III. 19 b, agrees with this statement of Posidonius in making εἰμαρμένη 'third from Zeus'; but in ch. 39, he assigns to it either the first place or the second. It is possible that Posidonius in one passage distinguished εἰμαρμένη from Zeus and φύσις, and placed it below them, but in other passages identified it (as Seneca does) with either or both of them.

The words καὶ ἡ εἰμαρτή, which follow ἡ δὲ εἰμαρμένη ἔστι in Lydus, cannot be right. The rare adjective εἰμαρτός occurs in Plut. *Vit. Alex.* 30 fin. (εἰμαρτός χρόνος); but it serves no purpose here. A clause inserted by a later hand must have been corrupted into this meaningless phrase. The original form of the interpolation may perhaps be inferred from Cornutus (first century A.D.) *Theologiae Graecae compendium* (C. Lang) 13: εἰμαρμένη δὲ ἔστι καθ ἣν μέμαρτται καὶ συνείληται πάντα ἐν τάξει καὶ στοῖχῳ μὴ ἔχοντι πέρας τὰ γεγομένα. It seems probable that some one inserted this Stoic explanation of the word εἰμαρμένη in Lydus' text of the *Țelios λόγος*, and that καθ ἣν μέμαρτται (πάντα) was subsequently altered into καὶ ἡ εἰμαρτή.

καὶ πάντων οὐρανίων τε καὶ ἐπιγείων μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης (κατὰ θείων νόμων) τάξεις.—*et omnium caelestium terrenarumque rerum firmata divinis legibus disciplina.* The translator's reading of the Greek seems to have differed from that of Lydus. τάξεις (which is rendered by *ordo* below) is satisfactory in sense. *Disciplina,* which stands in place of τάξεις here, is used by the translator elsewhere as a rendering of ἐπιστήμη; but the Hermetist cannot have called εἰμαρμένην ἐπιστήμην. It is possible that the original word was σύνταξις, and that the translator took this to mean a system of science.

There is nothing in Lydus' Greek to correspond to *divinis legibus.* But a mention of God's ordinance is needed; for the writer's object in this passage is to explain that εἰμαρμένη is not an independent power, but is either identical with or immediately dependent on the will of God. (*Cf. ch. 40 a *init.*) I have therefore inserted κατὰ θείων...
nómos. The superfluous words καὶ νόμος which occur below in Lydus may have arisen out of a transposition of κατὰ θεῖον νόμον.


Hæc itaque εἰμαρμένη et necessitas . . . conexae sunt glutino. This clause is omitted in Lydus; but it must have been present in the original, because an explicit mention of εἰμαρμένη and ἀνάγκη together is needed to make the following ἡ μὲν . . . ἡ δὲ intelligible.

ἡ μὲν αὐτὰς κύκει τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν πραγμάτων, ἡ δὲ καταναγκάζει καὶ τὰ τέλη γινέσθαι.—quorum prior εἰμαρμένη rerum omnium initia parit, necessitas vero cogit ad effectum quae ex illius primordiis pendent. What is the meaning of ἀρχαῖ and τέλη here? It might be supposed that ἀρχαῖ means 'causes', and τέλη (= ἀστεοτελάματα) means 'effects'. But how are 'the causes' and 'the effects' to be distinguished? If we regard the succession of events as an unbroken chain of cause and effect ('rerum omnium quae geruntur semper sibi catenatis necessitatis nexibus vincatae'), every event is at once an effect of other events which have preceded, and a cause of other events which will follow; and the only ἀρχή which is not also a τέλος is the original creation of the Kosmos. It seems therefore that the writer must here be thinking, not of the cosmic process as a whole, but rather of the lives of individual men. The course of a man's life is predetermined once for all, at the moment of birth, by εἰμαρμένη, or in other words, by the operation of the heavenly bodies (in ch. 19 b, εἰμαρμένη presides over the planets). As it is expressed below, 'εἰμαρμένη') iacto velut semine futurorum omnium (in the individual man's life) sufficit prolem'. This predetermination is the ἀρχή. The τέλη are the events of the man's life, which result from the ἀρχή by necessity (ἀνάγκη), and succeed one another (τάξις) in a continuous chain of causation. Cf. Sen. Dial. 1. 5. 7: 'quantum cuique temporis restat, prima nascentium hora dispositum. Causa pendet ex causa.' Iamblichus, Stob. 1. 5. 18, vol. i, p. 81 W.: ἀρχαὶ τε αἱ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τέλη [καὶ τοιχοστεῖς;], καὶ αἱ τοιχοστεῖς συνδέσεις πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τε ἀχρώ τοῦ τέλους διέξοδον, συμπληροῦσι τὴν εἰμαρμένην. (In Iamblichus, τέλη seems rather to mean the conclusion of the process, i.e. the death of the individual.
The ἁρχαὶ correspond to the Hermetist's ἀνάγκη, and the διάδοσις to the Hermetist's τάξις.

— **Has ordo consequitur.** Above, we were told that εἰμαρμένη is πάντων... τάξις; yet here, τάξις is distinguished from it as a separate entity. The two statements are probably derived from two different sources.

In this passage, the writer distinguishes three constituent parts of destiny, which he names respectively εἰμαρμένη, ἀνάγκη, and τάξις, restricting to the first member of the triad the term εἰμαρμένη, which was more commonly used (as in Iamblichus above) to include all three together.

The origin of this triad is probably to be found in the old notion of the three Μοῖραι, who are mentioned and named in Hesiod, *Theog.* 905 f.: Κλωθῶ τε Λάξεσιν τε καὶ Ἀτροπόν, αὐτὴ διδότα | θυγατέρας ἀνθρώπων ἕξειν ἀγαθὸν τε κακὸν τε. Plato, *Rep.* 10. 617, assigns a separate function to each of the three: τρεῖς... θυγατέρας τῆς Ἀνάγκης, Μοῖρας, ἔτι... ὡμείν... Λάξεσιν μὲν τὰ γεγονότα, Κλωθὸς δὲ τὰ ἄντα, "Ἀτροπόν δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα. The disembodied souls are brought first to Lachesis, under whose superintendence each of them chooses the life into which it is to be born at its next embodiment; when the souls have made their choice, they are led to Clotho, and 'brought within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, whereby the destiny (μοῖρα) which each has chosen is ratified'; they are then brought 'to the spinning of Atropos, whereby the thread of destiny (τὰ έκπελασθέντα) is made irreversible'. This passage of Plato was frequently quoted, and commented on in later discussions of fate and free will; see e.g. Porphyry *peri τοῦ ἕφ' ἡμῖν,* in Stob. 2. 8. 39, vol. ii, p. 163 sqq. W.

The Stoics followed Plato's example in speaking of the three Fates. Chrysippus, in Aetius, *Diels Dox.* p. 323: Μοῖρας δὲ καλεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ κατ’ αὐτὰς διαμερισμὸν Κλωθῷ καὶ Λάξεσιν καὶ "Ἀτροπόν· Λάξεσιν μὲν, ὅτι δὲν κλήρον λελόγχασιν ἐκαστὸς κατὰ τὸ δικαίον ἀπονέμεται Ατροπὸν δὲ, ὅτι ἀμετάθετος καὶ ἀμετάβλητος ἦστιν ὁ καθ’ ἐκαστὰ διωρισμὸς ἐξ ἄδιδον χρόνων" Κλωθῷ δὲ, ὅτι ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἰμαρμένην διανέμησι καὶ τὰ γεννώμενα τοὺς κλωθομάνους παραπλησίως διεξάγεται. Ταῖς Αρρητήθαις, *Theologiae Graecae compendium* 13 (after speaking of Εἰμαρμένη and Ἀνάγκη): κατ’ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τρεῖς Μοῖραι παρεσφαλγοῦσαν κατὰ τὸ τριστὸν τῶν χρόνων" καὶ Κλωθῷ μὲν ἀδιάφορα μία αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ κλάσει ἐρωτοῦν ἑοικέναι τὰ γενώμενα, ἄλλων ἄλλως ἐκτιτιτῶντον, ἄλλων ἄλλως ἐκτιτιτῶντον, Λάξεσις δὲ ἄλλη ἀπὸ τοῦ τῇ κατὰ τῶν κλήρων λήξει τὰ ἀποδιδόμενα...
A tripartition of destiny, corresponding to Plato's distribution of functions among the three Moirai, is implied in Chrysippus' statement that εἰμαρμένη is λέγος καθ' ὑμᾶς τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γενόμενα γίνεται, τὰ δὲ γεγονόσιμα γεγονέσται, and in Cic. De div. i. 55. 126 (from Poseidonius), 'causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea quae praeterierunt facta sint, et quae instant fiant, et quae sequentur futura sint'. Cf. Ps.-Aristot. De mundo 7. 5. 401 b 14: τὰ τε περὶ τὰς μοῖρας καὶ τὸν ἄτρακτον (Pl. Rep. 10) εἰς τούτῳ πῶς νεῦει. τρεῖς μὲν γὰρ αἱ μοῖραι κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους μεμερισμέναι, νῦμα δὲ ἄτρακτον τὸ μὲν εὐφραγομένον, τὸ δὲ μέλλον, τὸ δὲ περιστρεφόμενον: τέτακται δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ γεγονός μία τῶν μοίρων, Ἀτρόπος, ἐπεὶ τὰ παρελθόντα πάντα ἄτρεπτα ἐστὶν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέλλον Δάχεσις, εἰς πάντα γὰρ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἑπεὶ λήξεις (the functions assigned by Plato to Lachesis and Atropos are here interchanged), κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐνεστὸς Κλωθώ, συμπεραινοῦσα τε καὶ κλάθοντα εἰκάστῳ τὰ οἰκεία. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐστὶν οἷς ἀλλὰ τι πλὴν ὁ θεός. Lactant. Div. inst. 2. 10. 19 ff.: 'omnia enim tribus temporibus continentur necesse est, praeteritum praesens futurum. Praeteriti est origo, praesentis substantia, futuri dissipatio. Quae omnia in singulis hominibus apparent; et incipimus enim cum nascimur, et sumus cum vivimus, et desinimus cum interimus. Unde etiam tres Parcas esse voluerunt, unam quae vitam hominis ordiatur, alteram quae contextat, tertiam quae rumpat ac finiat. The writer of Ascl. III has substituted abstract and impersonal terms for the names of the three Moirai, but has retained the distinction of their functions. His εἰμαρμένη, which 'generates the ἄρχαλ', or 'sows the seed', is Lachesis, who has to do with the past, and has determined the course of the man's life before or at the moment of birth; his τάξις, which 'arranges the events in succession', and 'maintains their interconnexion', is Clotho, who has to do with the present, i. e. with the events of the man's life as they occur one after another, and spins the thread by which they are connected; his ἀνάγκη, which 'compels the τέλη to follow', is Atropos, who has to do with the future, i.e. with the results which will issue from the

1 A different application of the names of the three Moirai occurs in Plut. Fac. in orbis lunae 30. 13. There, Atropos is connected with the sun, and τὴν ἀρχήν ἕνδιδε την γενεσίαν (i.e. of the birth of the individual man) by supplying the νους; Clotho is connected with the moon, and 'combines and mixes' νοῦς with ψυχή; Lachesis is connected with the earth, and supplies the body. In Plut. Gen. Secr. 591 b (Vision of Timarchus) there is a different scheme again.
ASCLEPIUS III: 40 a

and whose name (= ἀτρεπτος) of itself suggests necessity. He
probably did not get the notion of the three Fates directly from Plato
or Chrysippus, but followed the lead of some later writer who was
influenced by them.

The words καὶ νόμος have been wrongly inserted in Lydus. Each
of the three members of the triad must be represented by a single
word, and τάξις must therefore stand alone.

id est textus et dispositio temporis rerum perficiendarum.
This clause is omitted in Lydus; but as the terms ἐιμαρμένη and
ἀνάγκη have been explained, a corresponding explanation of τάξις is
needed.

vel totus constat ex ordine: an allusion to the primary meaning
of the word κόσμος.

iacuto velut semine. The Stoics habitually spoke of στέρμα
(and στερματικοί λόγοι) in a similar sense. Cf. Zeno in Arius
Didymus, Diels Dox. p. 458: διὰ ταῦτας δὲ (sc. τῆς ἔλεης) διαθεῖν
τὸν τοῦ παντὸς λόγον, ὅν ἔνας ἐιμαρμένην καλοῦσιν, οἶν ἔργο καὶ ἐν τῇ
γονῇ τὸ στέρμα. Sen. Nat. quaest. 3. 29. 2: 'sive anima est mundus,
sive corpus natura gubernabile ut arbores et sata, ab initio eius usque
ad exitum quicquid facere, quicquid pati debeat, inclusum est. Ut
in semine omnis futuri hominis ratio (= λόγος, plan or design)
comprehensa est, et legem barbae canorumque nondum natus infans habet,
totius enim corporis et sequentis actus in parvo occultoque linea-
menta sunt; sic origo mundi (after each ecpyrosis) non minus solem
et lunam et vicessiderum et animalium ortus quam quibus mutarentur
terrena continuit.'

40 a. dei nutu sunt effecta. Cf. Plutarch in Stob. 1. 5. 19,
vol. i, p. 81 W.: τὸ γὰρ ἐιμαρμένων ἢτρεπτον καὶ ἀπαράβατον, "χωτέρ
μόνον ὀφρύνι νεόση, | καρτερὰ τοῦτο κέκλωστ' ἀνάγκα" (lyr. fr. adesp.
143 B) καὶ πεπρωμένη.

sua lege et ratione divina. Ratio stands for λόγος, which is
here used as the Stoics habitually used it. It means the plan,
purpose, or design of God. It is no more hypostatized or personified
than νόμος, with which it is coupled.

In place of the νόμος καὶ λόγος of God, the writer might equally
well have spoken of the πρόνοια of God; and in some other
Hermetica (e.g. Stob. Exc. XII. 1) the same thought is expressed
by saying that ἐιμαρμένη is subject or subordinate to God's πρόνοια.
tὰ δ' αἰτία τὰ δεύτερα τοῖς προηγουμένοις αἰτίοις συνήρτηται, καὶ τὸ ἐν
neon ira etenim commoventur nee flectuntur gratia. έιμαρμένη, ἀνάγκη, and τάξις are not persons; but as they are component parts or aspects of the operation of the di caelestes, the personal deities by whom the Kosmos is administered in subordination to the will of the supreme God, the writer here speaks of them in terms which would more properly apply to the di caelestes themselves. The di terreni may be moved to anger, and propitiated by prayer and sacrifice; but the di caelestes are απαθεῖς. At the same time, the Hermetist's language has perhaps been influenced here by the traditional personification of the three Moirai. The thought that the Fates are inexorable was a commonplace of Greek literature; (cf. Eur. Alc. 962 ff.: κρείσσον οἴδεν 'Ἀνάγκας ήτορον' . . . μόνας δ' οὕτ' ἐπὶ βωμοὶς ἐστίν οὕτε βρέτας θεᾶς ὕλθειν, οὐ σφαγίων κλείει') but it was specially emphasized by the Stoics, who expressed in these terms their conviction that the laws of nature are immutable. Cf. Sen. Dial. 11. 4. 1: 'accusare fata possimus, mutare non possimus: stant dura et inexorabilia. Nemo illa convicio, nemo fletu, nemo causa movet. Nihil umquam ulli remittunt.' Sen. Nat. quaest. 2. 35: 'Fata inrevocabiliter ius suum peragunt, nec ulla commoventur prece. Non misericordia flecti, non gratia sciunt. . . si sacrificiis . . . exorari iudicas, divina non nosti.'

serviunt necessitati rationis aeternae, quae [aesternitas] inaversibilis, immobilia, insolubilis est. The writer here says that necessitas servit necessitati; but this is a not unnatural inadvertence.

It is not eternity, but the eternal ordinance of God, or the destiny which God ordains, that is inaversibilis &c. Aesternitas must therefore be excised. Quae may be taken to refer either to necessitati or to rationis; the meaning is much the same in either case.

40 b. [Haec ergo est aeternitas . . . et sequi.] It might be possible to take this passage as a digression suggested by the words rationis aeternae above. But its contents have no direct bearing on the subject of eιμαρμένη, the di caelestes, and the di terreni; and on the other hand they are closely connected with the discussion of time and eternity in chs. 26 b–32 a. It seems probable therefore
that the passage is a misplaced fragment, and originally followed ch. 32 a.

40 c. Eventus autem vel foris insunt omnibus permixta mundanis. Mundanis, whether it stands for κοσμικοὶς or ὅλικοῖς, must here be taken as applying to the sublunar region of the Kosmos alone. The heavenly bodies are both κοσμικά and ὅλικά, in the wider sense of those terms; but there cannot be any admixture of eventus vel foris in their movements. Possibly mundanis may be a misreading for humanis.

In the traditional text, the teaching of Hermes ends with these words, and he proceeds to say (40 d) 'dictum est vobis de singulis' &c., i.e. 'I have finished'. But his discourse cannot have ended thus abruptly; the original conclusion must therefore have been lost or misplaced.

It is also apparent that the discussion of ἐμαρμένη is incomplete. The sentence 'eventus autem . . . permixta mundanis' must have been the beginning of a paragraph in which τύχη was dealt with, and its relation to ἐμαρμένη explained. The writer has been insisting on the immutability of ἐμαρμένη, i.e. of the operation of the di caelestes; and in order to find scope for the agency of the di terreni, to show that their effectus are not irriti, and to justify the temple-cults by which men seek to influence them, he must necessarily have proceeded to explain that there are after all some things which are not immutably predetermined. The single sentence on foris which has survived is not sufficient for the purpose; it must have been followed by a passage, now lost, which contained the explanation needed. And in dealing with this subject, he can hardly have failed to touch also on the topic of human free will (τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, or τὸ αὐτεξούσιον), which was inseparably connected with ἐμαρμένη in the discussions of the Stoics. His immediate business was to find room for freedom of action on the part of the di terreni; but in this respect, the di terreni stand on the same footing as mankind. If all things without exception are determined by an immutable destiny administered by the di caelestes, nothing remains to be done either by di terreni or by men.

The existence of foris is denied by Iamblichus, Stob. 2. 8. 46, vol. ii, p. 175 W.: εἰ δὲ τις ταὐτόματον καὶ τὴν τύχην ἐπισάγων ἀναρέων οἴεται τὴν τάξιν, μαθετῶ ὅσε οὐδὲν ἠστιν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἐστάσιν, οὔτε ἐπεισοδιώκει, οὔτε ἄνεν αἰτίας, οὔτε ἀόριστον, οὔτε εἰκῇ οὐδὲ ἀπὸ
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tou μηδενὸς ἐπεισιῶν, οὐδὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. οὐκον ἀναιρεῖται ἡ
tάξει καὶ συνέχεια τῶν αἰτιῶν, καὶ ἡ τῶν αρχῶν ἐνωσις, καὶ ἡ δὲ
όλων διατένουσα τῶν πρῶτων ἐπικράτεια. βελτιων οὖν ἄφοροςθυμαι
ἡ τύχη (λεγε τὴν τύχην;) (...). τῶν (δὲ) πλειόνων τάξεων ἡ
καὶ ἄλλων δὴ τινων η₁ (λεγε καὶ ἄλλων ὑποτίνων δὴ (αιτίων;) ἐστιν
ἐφορος καὶ συναγωγὸς αἰτία, προεβυτέρα τῶν συνιάτων, ἢν τότε
μὲν θεὸν ἐπικαλέμιην, [ἡ] (τότε δὲ δαίμονα Heeren) παρειλήφαμεν.
ἡμᾶς μὲν γὰρ ἐν τὰ κρείττονα αἰτία τῶν συνιάτων ἢ, θεὸς ἐστιν
αὐτῶν ἐφορος, ἀπόταν δὲ τὰ ἐν τῇ φύσει, δαίμων. δὲι οὖν μὲν
αἰτίας πάντα ἐπιστελέται, καὶ οὐδὲ ὑποτι ἄτακτον ἐν τοῖς γεγομένοις
ἐπεισέχεται. (Cf. Ascl. III. 39: οὐδὲν ἄτακτον.) That is to say,
nothing takes place without a cause; events which men call
‘accidental’, as well as all other events, result from a process of
causation which is operated by a personal agent; and that agent
is either a god or a daemon. The writer of Ascl. III would
have regarded ῥὰ ἐν τῇ φύσει (the operation of the laws of nature
in the corporeal Kosmos) as the sphere of action of the di
caelestes; and perhaps he would have said that the beneficent
working of those laws is sometimes perverted by forσ vel eventus
(ἡ ἄτακτος φύσις τῆς γενέσεως), and that it is the function of
the di terrenti to remedy the evils thence resulting.

27 e-29 a. This passage is described in its opening words as
a discussion of ‘the mortal and immortal (parts of man)’. Its
central interest lies in the account which it contains of that
which awaits man’s immortal part after its separation from the
mortal part, i.e. in the description of the lot of the soul
after death.

In the MSS., this passage has been inserted into the discus-
sion of time and eternity, 26 b-32 a, where it is obviously out
of place. The subject with which it deals, viz. the life after
death, is a suitable topic to conclude with; (compare the position
of the myths in which the same topic is dealt with in the
Gorgias, Phaedo, and Republic of Plato;) and as I have failed
to find any other place in the treatise where the passage could
be appropriately introduced, I think that it probably stood where
I have put it.¹

¹ I am here assuming that chs. 27 e-29 a formed part of the dialogue which I
call Ascl. III, and that the only question is, in what position in that dialogue they
originally stood. But it is not impossible that the compiler of the Δύοσ εἶθενos
got this part of it from another document, which might be called ‘Asclepius IV’.
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27 e. τοὺς γὰρ πολλοὺς ὁ θάνατος φοβεῖ ὡς κακον μέγιστον.—
multos enim spes timorque mortis exoruciat. The translator
must have had before him a different reading of the Greek. The
text of Stobaeus is to be preferred.

θάνατος γὰρ γίγνεται διαλύσει (—οις MSS.) καμάντος σώματος, καὶ
to Ian μοι πληρωθέντος τῶν ἄρμων τοῦ σώματος ἄρμον γὰρ ἔστιν
ἡ ἁμογην τοῦ σώματος.—Mors enim efficitur dissolutione
corporis labore defessi, et numeri conpleti quo1 corporis
membra in unam machinam ad usus vitales aptantur. The
genitive numeri conpleti apparently stands for the Greek genitive
absolute, το ἄρμον πληρωθέντος. Cf. ch. 29 c, viventis . . . partis.
The number which ‘is completed’ must be a number of units
of time. If we read numeri conpleti (annorum ad) quo(s) corporis
membra &c., or something to that effect, the Latin yields a satis-
factory sense.

In the Greek of Stobaeus, τῶν ἄρμων κ.τ.λ. is meaningless. The
words ἄρμων τοῦ σώματος may have come by duplication from
ἁμογην τοῦ σώματος; and ἄρμον γὰρ ἔστιν looks like a remnant
of an explanatory note on τοῦ ἄρμον πληρωθέντος. There is
nothing in the Greek, except ἡ ἁμογη τοῦ σώματος, to correspond
to corporis membra in unam machinam ad usus vitales aptantur.

There is some awkwardness in the coupling of the gen. abs.
numeri conpleti (τοῦ ἄρμον πληρωθέντος) with the ablative dis-
solutione (διαλύσει). This might be avoided by punctuating differ-
cently, and writing ‘Mors enim efficitur dissolutione corporis labore
defessi; et numeri conpleti (annorum ad) quo(s) corporis membra
. . . aptantur, moritur [enim] corpus, quando hominis vitalia
ferre posse destiterit’.—θάνατος γὰρ γίγνεται διαλύσει καμάντος
σώματος καὶ τοῦ ἄρμον πληρωθέντος τῶν [ ] ἔτους ἐφ’ ἄ διαμένει (?)
ἡ ἁμογη τοῦ σώματος, ἀποθησκει [δὲ] τῷ σῶμα, ὅταν μηκετί
dύνηται φέρει τον ἀνθρώπ(υ)ν (βίον).

Compare the description of death in Pl. Tim. 81 d: τέλος δὲ,
ἔπειδ᾽ ὅ ἄρμα τὸν μνελὸν τρεγώνων οἱ ἓναμοροσθέντες μηκέτι ἀντέχοις
dεσμοί, τῷ τόνω διαστάμενοι, μεθαλεί τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐ ἀδειμοῦ, ἢ
dὲ λυθέσαι κατὰ φύσιν μεθ’ ἥδονοις ἐξέπτατο.

moritur enim corpus: it is the body that dies, and not the
soul. Cf. Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 436, where opinions are collected
on the question Ποστέρου ἐστὶν ὤπνος καὶ θάνατος, ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος:
e.g. Ἀραστότελης, . . . θάνατον δὲ εἶναι μόνον σώματος, οὐ ψυχῆς.
καὶ τούτῳ ἐστι θάνατος, διάλυσις σώματος καὶ ἀφανισμὸς αἰσθήσεως

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The word οἴοη is that kind of sensation which depends on the use of the bodily organs of sense. When the body ‘is dissolved’, this kind of sensation necessarily ceases. But there must be another kind of sensation, which is independent of the bodily organs, and continues after death; for the writer says in the following chapter that the soul possesses an imperishable faculty of sensation (ἄθανατον οἴοη), and is thereby rendered liable to suffer endless pain. The disembodied soul which is tortured by air-storms must be no less capable of receiving sense-impressions from material things than the embodied soul.

On the question what part of the man survives death, Plato’s language varies. In Phaedo 66 he says that ἐγώνες, ἐνειδημίας, φόβοι and the like (i.e. the πάθη which accompany οἴοη) are caused by the union of the soul with the body, and speaks of death as a way of escape from them; but it is only he who has practised the separation of soul from body during his earthly life that is released from these πάθη by death; for (ib. 81) the soul which has given itself up to bodily desires and pleasures is still, after its departure from the body, tainted and clogged by an intermixture of that which is bodily, and therefore cannot rise from the earth, but flits about it, as a troubled ghost, until it enters another body. Similarly, the Hermetist appears to assume that those souls at least which merit punishment retain after death something analogous to σωματική οἴοη.

In the Timaeus (69 b ff.) Plato says that man has both an immortal soul and ‘another kind of soul, which is mortal’ (ἄλλο ἔδος ψυχής, τὸ θνητὸν); and in this ‘mortal soul’ reside pleasure and pain, confidence and fear, anger, hope, οἴοης ἄλογος, and reckless desire, (i.e. οἴοης and the πάθη which go with it).
See also Tim. 42 a, d, e, and 61 c (ψυχής δοςν θνητών). It is implied in the Timaeus that τὸ λογιστικόν (which corresponds to the θεός νοῦς of the Hermetist) alone is immortal, and τὸ ἀλογον (including both τὸ θυμοειδὲς and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν) is mortal. But if the soul is in part mortal, it does not necessarily follow that its mortal part always perishes at the moment of the separation of soul from body; these passages of the Timaeus do not therefore necessarily exclude the possibility of a bodily taint of passion persisting in some souls after death, as is asserted in the Phaedo, and with it, a corresponding liability to pain. In the myths of the Gorgias, Phaedo, and Republic, which the Hermetist would probably accept more literally than Plato intended, the persistence of αἰώνιος after death is necessarily assumed.

As to the notion of a mortal part of the soul, cf. Abammonis Resp. 8. 6 a (Testim.), where it is said that the doctrine that ‘man has two souls’ is taught in ‘Hermetic writings’.

In the story told by Sulla in Plut. De facie in orbe lunae, ch. 28, the term ψυχή is restricted to the lower part of the soul, and it is said that this part survives the dissolution of the body for some time, but perishes later on.

28. summi daemonis. The ‘supreme daemon’ must be the chief or ruler of the daemons who dwell in the region of the air. Paul, Eph. 2. 2, mentions τὸν ἀρχοντα τῆς ἔεονίας τοῦ ἄρος (a notion presumably derived from Pagan sources), and identifies him with the Devil. Cf. Lactant. Div. inst. 2. 14. 5 (Testim.): ‘immundi spiritus, . . . quorum . . . diabolus est princeps. Unde illum Trismegistus daemoniarchen vocat.’ Lactantius is probably referring to the Λόγος τέλειος; and if so, the Greek term here translated by summus daemon must be δαίμονιαρχης.

Porphyry De abst. 2. 41 fin. mentions a ‘president’ of the maleficent daemons (τὸν προεστῶτα αἰτῶν). Iamblichus, as reported by Lydus (De mens. 4. 25, quoted in note on ch. 33 b below), said that there is μέγιστος τις δαίμων who is chief or commander of all the daemons, and that he is Πλαοντων. But I have found no exact parallel elsewhere to the statement that ‘the chief of the daemons’ acts as judge of the dead. In Pl. Gorg. 524 a, souls from Asia are judged by Rhadamanthus, and souls from Europe by Aeacus, but Minos is superior to both, and acts as judge of appeal in doubtful cases. In Pl. Rep. 10. 614 c, the souls which have quitted the body come εἰς τοῦν τινα δαμόνων (a reader might take this to mean
'a place belonging to the daemons'), where there are two openings hard by each other in the earth below, and two openings over against them in the sky above; and judges (unnamed) are seated 'between these', i.e. between earth and sky, or in other words, in the air. In the myth of the *Phaedo* (107D, 113D), the dead man is conducted by 'his own daemon' (i.e. his guardian Genius) to 'a certain place', where he 'is judged', but we are not told by whom. These passages of Plato were probably known to the Hermetist; and he may have been thinking also of Osiris, who, according to the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*, presides over the court of forty-two judges by which the dead are tried (Wiedemann, *Rel. anci. Eg.*, Eng. tr. p. 249 ff.). But he might have given to the *summus daemon* (whom he makes judge of the dead) the same name that Iamblichus did, and called him Pluto. In Propertius 4. xi, the deceased Cornelia is uncertain whether the judge by whom she is to be tried is *pater* (i.e. Dis or Pluto), or Aeacus with his brothers (Minos and Rhadamanthus) as assessors.

in *sibi constentibus locis*: i.e. in the higher and untroubled stratum of the atmosphere.

*Sin autem delictorum in litam maculis vitiasi oblitam viderit.* Cf. Pl. *Gorg.* 524D (Jowett's tr.): 'When a man is stripped of the body, all the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to view.' And when there comes before the judge one who 'has no soundness in him, but his soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of perjuries and crimes with which each action has stained him, ... him' the judge ' beholds, ... and despatches him ignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment which he deserves'. The notion that the stains and scars of sin are visible in the disembodied soul is adopted and amplified by Plutarch in his 'Vision of Thespies', *De sera numinis vindicta* 22.

desuper ad ima deturbans. As the judge flings the guilty soul *downward* into the region of troubled air, the place of judgment must be in the untroubled air above. All souls alike ascend to that level to be judged; the pious are permitted to remain there; the wicked are flung down thence to the lower air.

*aeris igni et aquae saepe discordants*. Storms are caused by conflicts of the air with water or fire, or with both at once. Cf. ch. 33b below. It is assumed that the atmosphere consists of two distinct strata, an upper stratum in which the air is pure, and
consequently untroubled, and a lower stratum, in which it is intermingled with watery and fiery exhalations from the earth below, and is consequently disturbed by frequent storms. The water and fire manifest themselves in the form of rain and lightning.

An early suggestion of this notion may be seen in the myth of the *Phaedo*, where the abode of the blest is situated on the ‘true surface of the earth’, which rises above the air into the aether, so that the air is to them as the sea is to us, and the aether is to them as the air is to us; for we live, not on the true surface, but ‘like frogs round a pond’, in hollows of the earth, ‘into which the water and the mist and the air have flowed together’.

If a reader of the *Phaedo* took the ‘aether’ of that dialogue to mean ‘pure air’, and assumed the ‘yet fairer mansions’ mentioned in 114 c to be situated in the region of celestial fire above the pure air, he would get an atmospheric system analogous to that of Ascl. III.

A scheme resembling that of the Hermetist somewhat more closely occurs in the *Epinomis*, written soon after Plato’s death. We are there told (981 b ff.) that there are five corporeal elements, viz. πυρ, αἰθήρ, ἄηρ, Ὀφώρ, and γῆ. Above the earth, the four other corporeal elements lie in successive strata, πυρ being the highest. Soul is incorporeal; and by the combination of soul with bodies in which one or other of the five elements predominates, five different orders of ζωά are formed. Men, beasts, and plants together constitute the lowest of the five orders; they have bodies composed mainly of earth, and dwell on earth. The astral gods are the highest order; they have bodies composed mainly of πυρ, and dwell in the stratum of πυρ. Between these extremes are three other orders of living beings, corresponding to the three intermediate elements, viz. αἰθήρ, ἄηρ, and Ὀφώρ. The beings who have bodies composed of αἰθήρ, and dwell in the αἰθήρ, are called δαίμονες.1 The beings whose bodies are composed of ἄηρ have their abode in the ἄηρ, but

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1 984 D: μετὰ δὴ τοῦτον (sc. τοῦ ὑπερτοῦ θεοῦ, the astral gods,) καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦτον ἑξῆς δαίμονας. (The comma after δαίμονας in Stallbaum’s edition should be altered to a full stop.) These words, as they stand in the traditional text, must necessarily be taken to mean that the ‘aetherial’ beings alone are called daemons. But it is probable that there is a lacuna here, and that the passage originally ran somewhat as follows: ‘Next after the astral gods come the daemons.’ (Of these there are three orders, having bodies composed respectively of αἰθήρ, ἄηρ, and Ὀφώρ. The αἰθηριῶν γένεσις of daemons dwells in the second region of the universe;) the Ὀφώρων γένεσις, occupying the third and middle region; &c. In support of this, it should be noted that Chalcidius, whose daemonology (Comment. in *Timaeum* 128 ff.) is based mainly on the *Epinomis*, adopts the theory of the five cosmic strata and their occupants unaltered (except that he substitutes ἱμμετακτα substantia quam Graeci ἵπποιαν appellant for Ὀφώρ, and says that this signifies the dense air which men
travel to and fro between the higher and lower strata; they act as 'interpreters' or messengers between those above and those below (cf. Plato's 'daemons' in Sympos. 202 D ff.), and we ought therefore to 'honour them with prayers'. (The writer of the Epinomis assigns no distinctive name to these 'aerial' beings, but describes them as τὰ μέσα τῶν ζωῶν.) The beings whose bodies are composed of water are called ἡμίθεοι; they are sometimes visible, and differ in this respect from the 'aetherial' and aerial' beings, whose bodies are transparent and always invisible.

The scheme of the elements in the Epinomis agrees with that of Plato, and with the system of the Stoics, in making fire the highest element; but it differs in dividing the air into two distinct substances, named respectively αἰθήρ and ἄηρ, and thus making a list of five elements, in place of the four of which Empedocles had spoken. The αἰθήρ of the Epinomis has no connexion with the 'fifth substance' of Aristotle; for it is not the celestial element, but is situated below the fire in which the heavenly bodies are placed. It corre-

breathes), but includes the occupants of the three intermediate strata, aether, aer, and ὕπατα, under the common name daemons. Perhaps Chalcidius had before him a less damaged text of the Epinomis.

1 Epinomis 985 b: τὸ δὲ ἰδανος τοῖς μεσοῖς ἐν ἡμίθεοι μὲν ἀνεκάθαρτοι ἐν τοῖς ὀρθῶς ἀνεκάθαρτοι [ἐκ αὐτῶν γεγονοὶ], καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ὀρθῶς, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἀνεκαθάρτοι ἄνθρωποι γεγονοὶ, θαμοὸ κατ' ἀληθώς ἄνθρωποι παρεχόμενοι. The text is corrupt. The watery kind ought to be called the fourth, and not the fifth; there is nothing to answer to μὲν; and the words ἐκ αὐτῶν γεγονοὶ are meaningless. The abode of the watery beings is not clearly indicated; but they are evidently phantoms which appear to men on land; and the writer seems to have regarded them, not as inhabiting the waters, but as hovering in the moist air near the ground (the ὕπατα of Chalcidius' paraphrase). It is the watery or misty substance of their bodies that makes them faintly visible.

The word ἡμίθεος, in its primary use, was applied to the Homeric 'heroes', who were called 'half-gods' as being sons or near descendants of a god and a mortal woman. In Pl. Apol. 27 D, Socrates says that the word ἄθλος, if it does not mean gods, must mean being half-gods. τὸ δὲ ἰδανὸς τοῖς μεσοῖς ἐν ἡμίθεοι, καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ὀρθῶς, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἀνεκαθάρτοι ἄνθρωποι γεγονοὶ. The text is corrupt. The watery kind ought to be called the fourth, and not the fifth; there is nothing to answer to μὲν; and the words ἐκ αὐτῶν γεγονοὶ are meaningless. The abode of the watery beings is not clearly indicated; but they are evidently phantoms which appear to men on land; and the writer seems to have regarded them, not as inhabiting the waters, but as hovering in the moist air near the ground (the ὕπατα of Chalcidius' paraphrase). It is the watery or misty substance of their bodies that makes them faintly visible.

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2 Maximus Tyrius, A.D. 130-200, uses the word αἰθήρ in the same sense as the writer of the Epinomis; e.g. Max. Tyr. (Hobein) 39. 4: οὔ τις δὲ τὸν ἐπὶ τὸν ἕπειρα ναυτή τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀγέρα, καὶ τὸν τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀθρόα, καὶ τὸν τὴν ἄρα; Ἡβ. 11. 12: τούτο μὲν κατ' οὐσίαν αὐτῆραν φύσεις, τοῦτο τὸ ἀθρόα κατ' αἴθρα αὐ
sponds to the upper air of the four-element scheme, as the ἄηρ of the Epinomis corresponds to the lower air of that scheme.

The writer of Ascl. III agrees with the Epinomis, firstly, in dividing the atmosphere into two distinct strata, and secondly, in recognizing three distinct orders of beings intermediate between astral gods and men. (See Lydus below.) But he must have derived his notions about the atmosphere, not from the Epinomis directly, but from the more elaborate physical system of Posidonius.

**aeternis poenis.** Aeternus here means ‘lasting through endless time’, and not, as in chs. 26 b–32, ‘timeless’. Some souls are sentenced to everlasting punishment; and it is of these souls alone that the writer is here speaking. But it would be surprising if he said that all except ‘the pious’ will suffer everlasting punishment; and Lydus, in the passage quoted below, supplies positive evidence that he did not say so. Besides, we are told below that there are various degrees of punishment (‘pro delictorum qualitatis . . . reddentur poenae’); and it would seem to follow from this that there are some punishments which are not everlasting. The souls here described as ‘marked with stains of sin and defiled with vices’ must therefore be souls of extreme wickedness; they must correspond to the ἀναρτος, to whom everlasting punishment is assigned in each of the three eschatological myths of Plato (Gorgias 525 b ff.: Phaedo 113 e: Rep. 615 c ff.), and also in Plutarch's 'Vision of Thespiesus'. But if this was the writer's meaning, it is not likely that he omitted to express it here, and left the reader to infer it from what follows; it seems probable therefore that some word equivalent to ἀναρτος has fallen out of the text. We might read, for instance, ‘vitiisque oblitam (immedicabilibus)’.

*ut in hoc animae obit aeternitas . . . Ergo ne his inplacemur, verendum, timendum, cavendumque esse cognosco. Cf. Pl. Phaedo 107 c: εἰπέρ ἡ ψυχή ἄδανατος, . . . ὁ κύδνουσ ὁὐν ὑδή καὶ δόξειν ἐν δεισὶς εἶναι, εἰ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος δαμαίων ὀδοιαί. 1b. 9. 6: the disembodied human soul becomes a daemon, θρίμμα αἰθήρος, and resides in the αἰθήρ, i.e. in the upper stratum of the atmosphere. 1b. 10. 3: the state of the seer, whose soul is released from the encumbrance of the body, ἐνεκείν . . . ψυχή πτήσει μεταφη, σοὶ ὑπὲρ ἄκρον φημίνης τῶν ὁμών ἐν ἀκλωθεὶς καὶ παρακομένης τῷ ἄερ, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τούτον ψφῶν ἐν ταὐθήρι αἴθηρ, γαλαρίς καὶ ἡμίας αὐτῆς παραπημονόσης ἀλήσει ἐκὶ τὸ ἄληθε, ἐκι τὴν ὁμών. In his doctrine of the disembodied soul, Maximus Tyrius has been influenced by Posidonius; and his ἄηρ and αἰθήρ correspond to the two atmospheric strata of which Posidonius spoke.*
This sentence, where it occurs in the MSS., is irrelevant, and breaks the connexion between ‘poenis...tanto...severioribus’ and the following question of Asclepius, ‘Quare sunt digni maioribus poenis?’ On the other hand, in the place to which I have transposed it, it serves as an amplification of the preceding passione poenarum, and, by its mention of God, leads on to the following question about punishments inflicted by man. Praescia divinitate implies divina lege, to which sola humana lege stands in contrast.

Praesctia is probably a mistranslation. There is no occasion for speaking of foreknowledge; the meaning of the Greek must have been that God knows all things. Men’s sins may be undetected by their fellow-men, but cannot be hidden from God; and since God knows all, we may be sure that the agent of God’s will, the judge of the dead, will suit the penalty to the offence (‘pro delictorum qualitatis, perinde us sunt’), with absolute justice.

Primo...((sunt mortalia}) terrena quae sunt omnia [[ ]]...tunc ea etiam, quae &c. There are two parts of man which are mortal. The first of these two parts is the body; the second is that part of the soul which is inseparably connected with the bodily functions, and perishes when the body perishes. This sentence then is a repetition in other words of the preceding statement τοῦτο ἐστὶ θάνατος, διάλυσις σώματος καὶ ἀφανισμὸς αἰσθήσεως σωματικῆς. The part of the soul which perishes is that in which the ἐρωτευτικὸς resides; it corresponds to the θνητὸν ἔλδος ψυχῆς of Pl. Tim.

Ea omnia... poenis obnoxia (...) tanto post mortem severioribus subiciuntur. It is self-contradictory to say that the parts of man which perish at death are subjected to punishment after death; the subject of subiciuntur therefore cannot be ea omnia; and as no other subject is to be found in the text, there must be a lacuna. It is evident that the missing subject must be ‘the immortal part of man’. The offences which man commits during his earthly life are punished by human law (or rather, are sometimes thus punished, though not invariably, since the offences may escape detection); and since this kind of punishment takes the form of destruction of the body and the bodily senses, or hurts inflicted on them, it may be said that ‘the mortal parts’ are liable to such punishment (‘ea omnia... poenis obnoxia’). In contrast to these punishments, the writer
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...goes on to speak of another kind of punishment, to which 'the immortal part' is subjected 'after death'. But in order to bring out the contrast, he ought to say that the first kind of punishment is inflicted in this life. Now the words in vita, where they stand in the MSS., are pleonastic, the meaning being adequately expressed by dum vivereunt; but if we transfer them to the preceding sentence, they supply the contrast to post mortem which the sense requires.

As to the relation between the punishments inflicted in life and those inflicted after death, compare the 'Vision of Thespiesius', Plut. De sera numinis vindicta 22, p. 564 f: 'There are three different kinds of punishment. Some men are chastised in the body and by means of the body; these are dealt with by 'Swift Penalty' (Pouy ταχεία); and the chastisement which she inflicts is mild, and falls far short of that which awaits those who need purgatorial pains (καθαρριό). Those whose vice is more difficult to cure, their 'daemon', after death, hands over to Dike. Those who are utterly incurable (οἱ πάμπαν ἀνιατοι) are rejected by Dike; and the third and fiercest of the servants of Adrasteia, she who is named Erinys, pursues them as they flee hither and thither, and makes away with them and sinks them in unspeakable and unseen depths (ἁφάνετε καὶ κατέδεικεν εἰς τὸ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀόρατον) in pitable and grievous sort. ... The chastisements inflicted in this life, which affect the man through his possessions and his body, touch the bodily senses alone, and their grip is not so hard; moreover, they do not lay hold of vice itself, but for the most part deal only with the outward appearance of vice. But if a man departs from earthly life unchastened and unpurged, Dike receives his soul stripped of the body, naked and exposed to view, ... and he suffers a long course of punishment, during which every one of his evil passions is extracted from him by grievous pains. These pains exceed in intensity those suffered through the flesh, as much as the consciousness of waking life exceeds that of dreams in vividness.'

Ib. p. 567 a: 'Thespiesius saw that the shades of those whose

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1 The δαίμων here spoken of is the 'Guardian Genius' of the individual man, as in Pl. Rep. 10.
2 Read, perhaps, αἱ δὲ χρηστάνωται καὶ δὲ σοφόταν κολάσεις, ⟨⟨πρὸς αἰσθήμαν αὐτῷ⟩⟩ (οὕτω), ἢφαν οὐ ἢξουσι δρομιάν οὐδ' αὗτή εἰπαμβάνοιται τῆς κακίας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς δόξαν αἱ πολλαὶ καὶ (. . .) ⟨⟨πρὸς αἰσθήμαν αὐτῷ⟩⟩ εἶλαν.
3 θεάτῳ τῶν μὲν γυνώμας πυρηνῶν γενομένων καὶ καλαθίτων αὐτοῖς τὴν κακὴν οὐκ οἷς εἶναι καλέσων (περιπολομήν ἑν) οὐδέ όμοιας (ἕνεκα) γεμομένην, ἀτελή (ἵππις τὴν πυρηναν ἑν), περὶ τοῦ ἀλογον καὶ παθητικών ⟨⟨πονον⟩⟩ (ἐγε μόνον ἑν) οὐσαν δὲ τ.τ.λ.
wickedness had been discovered on earth, and who had suffered chastisement there, were not afterwards severely dealt with, and were not so heavily afflicted; for their wickedness was incomplete, since it affected only the irrational part of the soul, in which the passions reside (τὸ ἀλογὸν καὶ παθητικὸν); but those who had made a false pretence of virtue, and had lived their lives in secret vice, were beset by certain other daemons, who forced them to turn their souls inside out with pain and anguish; . . . . and some of them the torturers flayed and cut open, showing them to be inwardly unsound and discoloured; for their wickedness was in the rational and ruling part of the soul.' I.e. he who openly and recklessly gives way to evil impulses, and in whom reason is altogether dormant, is less guilty than the cunning rogue, who misuses his faculty of reason in devising schemes for the concealment of his wickedness. The former is usually detected and punished in life. The latter may escape punishment on earth, where penalties attach only to the δοθα κακίας; but '(...poenis) tanto post mortem severioribus subicitur'. The ἀλογον καὶ παθητικὸν in Plutarch corresponds to 'ea quae sunt corporali ratione viventia' in Ascl. III.

Ib. p. 567 f, the punishment of Nero after death is lightened, δὲ μὲν γὰρ ἡδίκησον δεδωκέναι δίκαις (by his downfall and untimely death on earth).

29 a. Qu(a) damnati humanis legibus vitam violenter amittunt. The judge of the dead takes into account, in mitigation of his sentence, the punishment previously inflicted by an earthly judge. The writer here confines his attention to the case of capital punishment. Death in the course of nature is no hurt (cf. ch. 27 e: 'de qua sollicitudo supervacia est'); it is merely paying a debt which all men owe. But the violent death inflicted on the criminal is a true penalty; and if he has already paid this penalty, there remains so much the less for him to pay in the other world.

Contra iusto homini (...). In the traditional text, the words 'Contra iusto homini' (29 a) 'in dei religione et in summa pietate praesidium est' (29 b) are read as a continuous sentence. But iusto does not suit what follows; we expect to be told that piety protects all who possess it, and not that it protects the just. Moreover, Lactantius, in quoting what is probably the Greek original of 29 b init., begins the sentence with μία φυλακὴ εστίβωσα; and Cyril agrees with him in this. I have therefore concluded that the break in the text falls between iusto homini and in dei religione. The words Contra iusto homini, if they belong to the
preceeding passage, 29 a, may be the beginning of a sentence in which the case of a righteous man unjustly condemned by human judges (e.g. Socrates) was dealt with, as in Pl. Gorg. fin.

33 b. (Dio o nunc daemonas . . . oommotio)). In the Latin text, the everlasting punishment of the (incorably) wicked is spoken of (ch. 28, aeternis poenis), but there is no corresponding mention of temporary and remedial chastisements. But Lydus tells us that the Λόγος τέλειος contained an account of 'purgatorial' suffering inflicted by daemons; and purgatorial chastisement is necessarily limited in time. A passage on the latter topic must therefore have been lost. It is clear that the right place for it would be after ch. 29 a; and there can be little doubt that the passage to which Lydus refers, and which is missing in our text of the Latin Asclepius, stood in this position.

In De mens. 4. 32, Lydus does not quote verbally from the Λόγος τέλειος, but merely reports in his own words the contents of a passage in it. But in another place, ib. 4. 148, he quotes the actual words of the document; and the sentence there quoted evidently formed part of the passage summarized in 4. 32. In his summary, he speaks of the station of each class of daemons in close connexion with the function discharged by that class. But in the text of the Λόγος τέλειος, the station and the function must have been described in separate sentences; and it is the sentence describing the function of the καθαρτικοι δαимальes that is preserved in De mens. 4. 148. As this sentence refers to the 'daemons of purgation' alone, and not to daemons in general, it is necessary to insert τούτως before τοῖς δαιμοσι.

We are told by Lydus that the writer of the Λόγος τέλειος distinguished three orders of daemons, stationed respectively on earth, in the lower and troubled stratum of the atmosphere, and 'near the lunar region' (i.e. in the higher and untroubled stratum of the atmosphere); and that each of these three orders of daemons discharges a distinct function with respect to human souls. The very same doctrine is ascribed to Iamblichus in Lydus De mens. 4. 25: ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν σελήνην δαμόνων φύλον τραχὴ διῇρηται κατὰ τὸν Ἰάμβλιχον καὶ τὸ μὲν πρώσχειν αὐτοῦ τιμωρών, τὸ δὲ ἄρειον καθαρτικόν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν σεληνιακὴν ζώνην σωτηρίων ἑστιν, δὴ δὴ καὶ ἑρωικῶν ἑσμεν. ἤγείονται δὲ λέγεται παντὸς τούτων μέγιστος τις δαίμων 2 οὗτος δ' ἀν ἐι τὰ μᾶλλον ὁ Πλοῦτων, δὲ φησιν ο ἀυτὸς

1 Cf. heroes in Ascl. Lat. 33 b.
2 Cf. summi daemonis in Ascl. Lat. 28.
The verbal resemblance between that passage and Lydus' summary of the teaching of the Λόγος ἁλμος in *De mens.* 4. 32 is too close to be merely accidental; but it may be sufficiently accounted for by assuming that Iamblichus and the author of the Greek *Ascl. III*, in dealing with this subject, drew from a common source.

Now the Latin fragment 33 b, which is clearly out of place where it stands in the traditional text, speaks of classes or orders of daemons in conjunction with atmospheric strata; it is therefore to be presumed that this fragment originally belonged to the passage summarized by Lydus, and I have accordingly inserted it here.

The text of 33 b is manifestly corrupt. The words 'quos inter aeris purissimam partem . . . et in terram' are meaningless. Thomas accepts Koziol's conjecture *et aethera* in place of *et in terram*; but that reading would not yield a satisfactory sense. It would imply that the beings in question inhabit a vacuum between the upper surface of the air and the lower surface of the aether; and the notion of such a vacuum is unexampled. Moreover, the following words 'ubi nec nubilis locus est' &c. clearly describe the upper stratum of the atmosphere, in contrast to the lower and stormy stratum mentioned in ch. 28 ('procellis turbini-busque aeris igni et aquae saepe discordanti[bus]'). We are told that the place spoken of is above the region of clouds, and below the region in which the heavenly bodies move; it must therefore be below the lunar sphere, which is the upper limit of the atmosphere; and the only region which satisfies these conditions is that of the higher air. We must conclude then that the Hermetist wrote something which would be correctly rendered by *in aeris purissima parte*, and that the words *et in terram* have been wrongly inserted here. On the other hand, the abode of the preceding order of daemons would be more clearly described if *in terra* were placed beside *nobiscum*; and the phrase *(in terra)* commorari *nobiscum* would then correspond to *ἐν αὑτῷ τῇ ἐλγῇ παρόντας* (in conjunction with *τὸ ἀνθρώπινον*) in the paraphrase of Lydus.

The words *supra nos* also are out of place; for the writer could have no possible motive for informing his readers that a place so lofty that clouds cannot rise to it is 'above us'. But it would be strange if, while speaking of the habitations of the first and third
orders of daemons, he omitted to mention the abode of the daemons of the second order, namely, the lower air. It seems probable that he did mention it, and that *supra nos* is a remnant of the lost clause in which he spoke of it. In that context, *supra nos* might appropriately stand in contrast to *nobiscum* in the preceding clause.

The awkward *quos . . . et . . . quos* may be accounted for as a mistranslation. The translator, we may suppose, read *οὔς μὲν . . . οὔς δὲ* (‘some . . . others’), but failed to understand the words, he wrongly rendered *οὔς* by *quos*, and inserted *credo* to make sense.

*et heroaς quos* &c. To which of the classes of beings spoken of is the term *heroes* applied? If we adopt the reading, *(et quos . . .) (supra nos)*, *et heroaς quos* &c., the *heroes* are inhabitants of the upper and purer air; and that is supported by the parallel statement of Iamblichus, as given by Lydus *De mens. 4. 25*: τὸ δὲ πρὸς τῇ σεληνιακῇ ζῴᾳ σωτήρων ἐστιν, δὴ δὴ καὶ ἡρωικὸν ἴσομεν. But we should rather have expected, from the use of the term *heroes* by Posidonius &c., that, if employed at all in this passage, it would be used to denote the inhabitants of the lower and turbid air; and that sense might be got by reading ‘*Dico nunc daemonas quos credo (in terra) commorari nobiscum, et heroaς quos (in aeris inferiore parte (?) (supra nos), (et quos) in aeris purissima parte*’ &c. There is, however, no good reason why a special name should here be given to one of the three classes; and it may be suspected that the Hermetist spoke merely of three orders of ‘daemons’, and that the word *heroaς* has been added by a transcriber. It is possible that in Lydus’ report of Iamblichus the words δὴ δὴ καὶ ἡρωικὸν ἴσομεν are out of place, and that we ought to read there τὸ δὲ ἀέραν (sc. δαμιόνων φύλων), *(δὴ δὴ καὶ ἡρωικὸν ἴσομεν,)* καθαρτικὸν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τῇ σεληνιακῇ ζῴᾳ σωτήρων ἐστιν *(δὴ . . . ἴσομεν).*

*ex signorum aliquorum agitatione commotio.* Cf. Plut. *De sera numinis vindicta* 566 τ., where Thespiesius, floating at or near the upper surface of the air, hears the Sibyl chanting her prophecies in the moon; ‘and he would fain have listened and heard more, but he was driven off by the eddies made by the moon as it swept along τῆς σελήνης εἰς τοιχα ναυτάν ὀπέρ ἐν ταῖς δίναις ἔξεσθήτη), and so could hear but little.’ It must be the air close to the lunar sphere that is thus disturbed; the region of
perfect calm lies somewhat lower than this, but above the region of clouds and storms.

**Lydus De mens. 4. 32.** In his classification of daemons, the Hermetist seems to have been more nearly in agreement with the *Epinomis*, which distinguishes three orders of beings intermediate between astral gods and men, than with Posidonius, who, as far as we know, distinguished only two such orders, named respectively 'daemons' and 'heroes'. The σωτηρικοὶ δαίμονες of *Ascl. III*, who are stationed 'near the lunar sphere', or in the upper air, correspond to the 'aetherial' beings of the *Epinomis*; the καβαρτικοὶ δαίμονες of *Ascl. III*, stationed in the lower air, correspond to the 'aerial' beings of the *Epinomis*; and the τιμωροὶ δαίμονες of *Ascl. III*, who 'dwell with us on earth', correspond, though somewhat less closely, to the 'watery' beings of the *Epinomis*, whose habitation is on or close to the surface of the earth.

The τιμωροὶ δαίμονες punish men in this life. Similarly, Chalcidius *In Timaeum* 134 describes the 'watery' kind of daemons as maleficent beings, and as often employed, under God's providence, in the punishment of the wicked. These daemons, he says, are 'neque ita probabiles neque ita commodi' (sc. as the aetherei and aerei daemones), 'nec invisibles semper, sed interdum contemplabiles, cum in diversas convertuntur figuras, exsanguium quoque simulacrorum umbrae formas induuntur, obesi corporis illuviem trahentes. Saepe etiam scelerum et impietatis ulteres iuxta iustitiaae divinæ sanctionem, ultro etiam plerumque laedunt: tanguntur enim ex vicinia terrae terrena libidine, habentque nimiam cum silva communionem, quam malignam animam veteres vocabant.'

According to the summary given by Lydus, the τιμωροὶ δαίμονες are present ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἡλι. But all daemons alike reside in some sort of matter. The Hermetist probably meant, and perhaps said, that these 'daemons of punishment' have their abode ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ σώματος ἡλι. They are the beings whose operation is seen in physical and moral disease. They are com-

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1 They thus supplement the inadequate work of human judges.
2 Read exsanguiumque.
3 Did Chalcidius read something corresponding to 'saepe etiam scelerum et impietatis ulteres' &c. in his text of the *Epinomis*? In the extant text of that dialogue, there is a description of the mental and moral qualities of the aetherial and aerial beings, and of their attitude towards mankind, but there is no analogous account of the watery beings, though something of the sort seems to be needed to complete the scheme.
parable to the ἀκάθαρτα πνεύματα of the synoptic Gospels; and if a man were wholly mastered by them, it would be a case of 'demonic possession.' See Corp. XVI. 13–16, and Corp. IX. 3.

Corp. XIII. 7 b: τιμωροῖς γὰρ ἐν ἐμαντῷ ἀκο, ὁ πάτερ;—οὐκ ἀλήγους ὁ τέκνον, κτλ. (The word δαίμονες is not there employed; but the hypothesized πάθη which the writer of Corp. XIII describes as τιμωροῖ correspond to the τιμωροῖ δαίμονες of Ascl. III.)

τοῦ δὲ καθαρτικοῦ, ἐν τῷ ἄρη πεπηγότας. The word πεπηγότας cannot mean merely 'placed' or 'stationed'; the meaning must be that these daemons have bodies composed of the air in which they dwell, and formed from it by a sort of coagulation. In this respect they resemble the 'aerial' beings of the Epinomis. Cf. Apuleius De deo Socr. ii: 'daemonum corpora . . . ex illo purissimo aeris liquido et sereno elemento coalita.' But this meaning is not clearly expressed; and it is probable that some words have been lost. The original text may have been to this effect; ἐν τῷ (περγείῳ;) ἄρῃ (πεταγμένους, καὶ ἐν αἰτῶ) πεπηγότας. The air of which the bodies of these daemons are composed must be the impure and misty air of the lower stratum, not the serenum elementum of which Apuleius speaks. They are the forces of wind and storm, imagined as personal beings.

μετὰ θάνατον is Lydus' substitute for ἐκαταλείφωσι τοῦ σώματος in the original.

ἀνατρέχειν περιωμένας. The 'daemons of purgation' detain impure souls in the lower air, which serves the purpose of a purgatory for the curable, as it also serves the purpose of a hell for the incurably wicked (ch. 28). There is no subterranean Hades; all disembodied souls, good and bad alike, ascend from the earth into the atmosphere above, and are there disposed of according to their merits.

In the Homeric poems, and in early Greek literature in general, the prevailing view is that the abode of the dead is below the surface of the earth. There are traces of a different view, according to which the land of the departed is in some distant region on the surface of the earth, and is separated from the land of the living by a river, which the dead must cross; but this notion was reconciled with the other by transferring the river of death from the surface

1 Porphyry, Ad Marcellam ii. speaks in similar terms of daemons residing in the soul (not the body): οἵτινες ἐν τῇ ἀναμνήσει τοῦ θανάτου ἡ (ὁ) πνεύματος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τῆς ψυχῆς κατασκευασμένην.
of the earth to the subterranean ‘kingdom of Hades’. Side by side with these conceptions, there persisted a popular belief that the ghosts of dead men hover in the air about their graves. This belief found expression in the cults of ‘heroes’; but it met with little recognition in literature; and according to the literary tradition which maintained its supremacy down to Plato’s time, the soul, when it quits the body, goes down to ‘the House of Hades’. Plato, in his eschatological myths, still adheres in part to this tradition, though he combines with it other conceptions derived from recent cosmology. In the Gorgias, the righteous soul goes to ‘the Isles of the Blessed’ (presumably on the surface of the earth); but the unrighteous soul goes to ‘the prison-house of just retribution, which men call Tartarus’; and Tartarus, since nothing is there said to the contrary, must be situated where Homer placed it, in the depths of the earth. The place of punishment is also described as Ἱππατος; and this term likewise must be taken in its Homeric sense, as signifying a place beneath the earth. In Rep. 10, we are told that the judges, seated between earth and sky, ‘bade the righteous take the road which leads to the right hand and up through the sky; but the unrighteous they sent by the road which leads to the left hand and down’ (into the interior of the earth).

In the myth of the Phaedo, the eschatological geography is more elaborate and more original. The abodes of the blest are situated on ‘the true surface of the earth’, i.e. on the summits of lofty table-lands which rise above the air into the aether; but the wicked are plunged into Tartarus, which is a great hole or cavern, pierced right through the spherical earth; and the Acherusian lake, ‘whither come the souls of the most part of the dead’, is connected with Tartarus, and is situated in a cavity of the earth. The Homeric conception has here been modified to suit the new theory of the

1 This notion may have been suggested in part by the Homeric Olympus. But it is worth noting that the country where such a description of the earth as Plato gives in the Phaedo would most naturally present itself is Egypt. Residents in the Nile-valley cannot fail to be aware, by the direct evidence of their senses, that they are living in a watery hollow scooped out of a table-land of indefinite extent, which rises into the pure dry desert-air above. This table-land is uninhabited by living men; in ancient Egypt, it might well be imagined to be peopled by the dead, who were buried along its edge; and among the various incompatible notions of the Egyptians about the place of the departed, there was one according to which the kingdom of Osiris, the abode of the ‘justified’, lay to the west of the Nile-valley, i.e. somewhere on that ‘true surface of the earth’, the Libyan desert-plateau. The myth of the Phaedo then may be reckoned among the evidences that Plato’s imagination at least, if not his philosophic doctrine, was affected by influences from Egypt.
earth's rotundity, and other advances of science; but the place of punishment is still subterranean.

After Plato's time, however, the new physics tended to prevail over the old literary tradition. The Stoics abandoned the notion of a subterranean Hades, and said that the soul, being a 'pneumatic' body (i.e. composed of fire and air), must rise when detached from the flesh.\(^1\) This is a necessary inference from Stoic principles, and was probably asserted by Chrysippus. (See Arnim, *Stoa. vet. fr. II, p. 224, § 815.) The earlier Stoics, however, concentrated their attention on the present life of man; and though they said that some souls at least continue to exist as separate individuals until the ecpyrosis,\(^2\) they took little interest in the state of the disembodied soul.\(^3\) But Posidonius followed the example of the Platonists in giving much attention to the life after death;\(^4\) and many of the statements of later writers on this topic are derived from him, or influenced by him. The writer of *Ascl. Lat. III* follows the lead of Posidonius in saying that all souls rise into the air on their departure from the body; that the air consists of two distinct strata; that impure souls are 'purged' by wind, heat, and cold, in the lower stratum of the air; and that purified souls pass upward thence into the higher and untroubled stratum of the air. But he has supplemented the doctrine of Posidonius by

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2 *Diog. Laert.* 7, 157: Κλεάνθης μὲν οὖν κάσας (τὰς ψυχὰς) ἐνδιαμένειν μέχρι τῆς ἐκπρόσωπης, Χρύσεππος δὲ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν μόνον.

3 Epicetus and Marcus Aurelius adhered to the attitude of the earlier Stoics in this respect. *Epicet.* 3, 13, 14 f. denies the existence of a subterranean abode of the dead (ὀθείς ἄφθεν ἀκέραιος Καλύτερος οὐδέ Περιφραγμένως), but does not substitute for it an aerial abode; he speaks of death as the dissolution of man into the elements of which he is composed, and does not contemplate the survival of the individual personality. Marcus Aurelius (4, 31) takes it for granted that disembodied souls, if and as long as they continue to exist, are situated in the air: εἰ δειμήνονε τὴν ψυχαὶ, καὶ νῦν έξ ἄλλου χαραῖ δέλτρον; He answers, 4 In the same way that earth finds room for dead bodies; room is made for the later by the dissolution of the earlier. οὐκέτως αἱ τὸν ἄλφα μεθιστάμεναι ψυχαὶ, ἐπὶ πασον συμμεῖναι, μεταβάλλονε τὰ ψυχαὶ καὶ ξύνονται καὶ ξύνονται (i.e. change into flame, and so cease to exist as separate individuals), εἰς τῶν δὲ συνεργίας λόγου ἀναλαμβάνομεν, καὶ τὸν τὸν πτώσιν χάραν τὰς προσωπικομένας παρέχουσαι. τοῦτο δ' ἀν τὶς ἀνακρίνειν φον ὑποθεῖς τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς διαμένειν. There is no trace of Posidonius here; the doctrine seems to have been derived rather from Chrysippus.

4 According to Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 610 f., Posidonius' views on this subject were derived in part from Heraclides Ponticus (350-300 B.C.), whose 'Vision of Empedotimos', an eschatological myth after the manner of those of Plato, was influential in shaping the notions about the state of the dead which were current in later times.

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combining with it a theory of daemons (beings of a different order from the disembodied or not yet embodied human souls called 'daemons' by Posidonius). Like Plutarch in the 'Vision of Thespaeus', the Hermetist ascribes to the action of these personal beings the processes of retribution and purgation which Posidonius must have held to be carried on by the working of natural law. The Hermetist's daemonology must have been derived from some Platonic source; it has some resemblance to that of the Epinomis; but it is impossible to trace the intermediate stages by which it reached him. Thus it appears that his teaching about the life after death is derived wholly from Greek sources; and there is no trace of evidence that in this portion of his treatise he was in any way influenced by the national religion of Egypt. This is the more noteworthy, because when he is dealing with the subject of the temple-cults, his position is that of an Egyptian rather than a Greek.

As part of the passage in Ascl. III is lost, we do not know whether the writer adopted the doctrine of repeated incarnation. But as this doctrine was taught by the Platonists, and probably by Posidonius, and as it appears in other Hermetica, the writer of Ascl. III also may perhaps have said that some souls are incarnated more than once.

It is unlikely that the Hermetist was so regardless of the mise en scène of his dialogue as to make his prehistoric Egyptian prophet speak of the Greek poets; it may therefore be presumed that both this clause in the paraphrase, and the corresponding clause in the verbal quotation from the Δόγος τέλειος (De mens. 4. 148), are notes added by Lydus. In De mens. 4. 32, Lydus has added to his note in 4. 148 the words καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Πλάτων ἐν Φαίδων. We may be sure that the Hermetist did not commit the anachronism of making Trismegistus mention Plato by name.

Does this refer to the souls which are rising from the lower air into the upper air, or to those which are rising from the upper air into the celestial fire? Presumably the former, as the word ἀποσωζέων implies a rescue from a painful situation. The souls spoken of must be either innocent souls, which rise rapidly through the lower air, and, with the aid of beneficent daemons, ascend at once into the upper air, or else, more guilty souls, at the stage when their purgation in the lower air is com-

1 Reincarnation in animal bodies, Ascl. I. 12 a; Corp. X. 8 a; Kore Kosmu, Stob. Exc. XXIII. 39. Reincarnation in human bodies only, Corp. X. 19 b-22 a.
pleted. In Lydus' paraphrase, the rescuers are said to be stationed 'near the lunar region'; this must be Lydus' way of describing the upper air, and the \textit{σωματικοί δαίμονες} must be the beings spoken of in 33b as residing 'in aeris purissima parte'. They take up into their own abode the souls which they rescue from the torments of the lower air.

Compare Plut. \textit{Gen. Socr.} 593 f: 'When men are swimming in the sea, the people who stand upon the beach merely watch them in silence as long as they are still in deep water and floating far from land; but when some of them have nearly reached the shore, the watchers run forward, and wade in to meet them, and help them with hand and voice, and bring them safe to land.\textsuperscript{1} And even so it is with the help which daemons\textsuperscript{2} give to men. As long as we are sunk in earthly things, and enter body after body; shifting, so to speak, from one vehicle to another, they leave us to struggle and endure unaided, and to endeavour by our own virtue to escape and to reach port. But when a soul has striven well and earnestly in long contests through the course of numberless births,—when the cycle draws towards its close, and the soul, beset with danger, and eager to make its way out, is struggling upward with hard effort,—then God does not forbid the familiar daemon\textsuperscript{3} of that soul to aid it, but permits him to give help, as he is eager to do; for each daemon is eager to urge on some particular soul, and to rescue it;\textsuperscript{4} and the soul, being already near at hand, hears the cheering voice, and is saved. But if the soul does not obey the voice it hears, the daemon abandons it, and that soul comes to a woeful end.' Plutarch is here speaking of help given by daemons to souls which are still in the body, and are seeking to escape from the 'circle of births'; but his language may have been suggested by some authority in which souls were described as escaping, with the help of daemons, from the purgatory of the lower air to the beatitude of those who dwell in the untroubled air above.

Lydus' summary of the passage ceases here; but in the original \textit{Αὔγος τίλειος}, the account of the lot of impure souls after death was

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{άνασώκουσιν}.

\textsuperscript{2} The 'daemons' of whom Plutarch is here speaking are \textit{αἱ αἰθιαλαμβάνεις γενεσίως ψυχαὶ καὶ σκολάζουσαι τὸ λοιπὸν ἀνώ σώματος},—\textit{οἱ πεπαλμένοι τῶν περὶ τῶν βλών ἀγάνων}, \textit{διὰ ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς γενόμενοι δαίμονες},—I. e. the disembodied souls of good men.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{τῶν οἰκεῖων δαίμονα}. Plutarch here assumes that the special daemon who watches over the individual man,—the 'guardian Genius',—is one of the class of \textit{δαίμονες} in the sense assigned to the term by Posidonius, i. e. disembodied and beatified human souls.

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{άνασώκειν}. 
probably followed by a corresponding account of the lot of pious souls after death, which is wholly lost. It may be presumed that, according to the writer's view, pious souls, on quitting the body, rise swiftly and painlessly through the lower air into the 'Elysium' of the higher air, and that they subsequently attain to the celestial fire; their lot would so far correspond to that of 'the few' in the system of Posidonius. If we might argue from other parts of the treatise, it would seem that the celestial fire itself must be only a stage on the way to that which is beyond it, and that the final destination of the pious must be 'the incorporeal and eternal'. But we cannot be sure that the writer applied his principles consistently.

29 b. In dei religiones . . . ceteris astris antistat. This paragraph deals with the advantages enjoyed by the pious during their life in the body. It has nothing to do with the lot of disembodied souls, which is the subject of chs. 27 e-29 a and the lost passage summarized by Lydus; and there is no reason to think that it originally formed the conclusion of the discourse of Hermes. Its contents are similar to those of chs. 22 a-23 a, where the distinction between the pious and other men is spoken of; but it does not seem possible to insert it there, as the text of that part of the treatise appears to be continuous. It may perhaps have followed the passage on the θείως νοῦς, ch. 32 b, or that on Heimarmene, chs. 39-40 c; but there is no sufficient reason for inserting it in either of those places. It is necessary to remove it, together with chs. 27 e-29 a, from the passage on time and eternity, which it clearly interrupts; and I have left it here, merely because I did not know where else to put it.

In dei religione et in [summa] pietate praesidium est (unum). The passage quoted from 'Hermes' by Lactantius 2. 15. 6 may possibly have been taken from some other Hermetic document in which identical phrases occurred; but it seems more likely that it is an extract from the Λόγος τέλειος as the text stood in his copy. If so, the sentences εὐσεβούς γὰρ . . . κρατεῖ and τὸ γὰρ ἐν . . . εὐσεβείᾳ must either have been added to the original in the text quoted by Lactantius, or accidentally omitted in the Latin Asclepius. The latter seems probable, because the sense of the passage is more satisfactory when we read it in the form in which Lactantius gives it. An explanation of the evils to be guarded against, such as he supplies, is desirable; and the statement that 'piety is the one and only good among men' is appropriate, if not indispensable, as an introduction to the praise of piety which follows.
Cyril quotes from ‘Hermes to Asclepius’; and either Ascl. III, or the Δόγος τέλως as a whole, might be thus described. Cyril’s quotation appears to be a later expansion of the text given by Lactantius; the words which he adds are superfluous, and weaken the force of the passage.

*Summa*, as an epithet of *pietatis*, yields no satisfactory sense; and on the other hand, the Greek parallels make it probable that *praesidium* was accompanied by an epithet. *Summa* may have arisen out of *unum* misplaced.

For the thought, compare Origen *Cels. 8. 27*: οδὸς γὰρ, κἂν μὴ ὅσιν αὐτῶς ἑμεῖς οἱ δαίμονες, πάσχειν ἀν τι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν δύναμις ἐφορούμενοι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑμείν ταῦτα διὰ τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἔτι πᾶσι θεοῖ. ... ὃς ἔχων τὸν τινὶ πάσι βεόν διὰ τὴν εἰς αὐτὸν εὐσέβειαν εὐμενῆ ... λέγοι ἄνθρωποι, δὲς οδὸν πεισόμενοι ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ τῶν δαίμονων στρατοπεδοῦ, “Εὕρης φωτισμός μου καὶ σωτήρ μου τίνα φοβηθήσομαι;” (*Psalm 26 (27). 1.*)

eὐσεβοῖς γὰρ ἀνθρώπου οὔτε δαίμων κακὸς οὔτε εἰμαρμένη κρατεῖ. Heimarmene and the maleficent daemons have power only over the corporeal things of the sublunar world, and can dominate a man only so far as he is subject to the influence of these corporeal things. The many, whose souls are wholly immersed in the body, are necessarily slaves of ‘Heimarmene and the bad daemons’; physical forces, operating through their bodily organs, trouble their souls with evil passions, and they consequently live a life of misery. But the ‘pious’ man,—that is, as we are told below, he who is ‘illuminated’ by the divine *nous*, and who ‘commingles himself’ with it (‘toto se sensu intellegentiae divinae commiscet’),—has escaped from the bonds of the body (‘a parte naturae quae mortalis est liberatus’). Even while still physically present in the corporeal world, he is no longer of it; he lives in another and a higher world,¹ and is in no way concerned with what Heimarmene may do to his body. Cf. Zosimus 1. 7 (*Testim.):* Hermes says that διὰ ... ἔκειν τὴν εἰμαρμένην δ θέλε[ν] ποιεῖν τῇ ἀντίθετῃ σημείῳ, τούτεστι τῷ σώματι.

Heimarmene is here, as often, regarded as a maleficent power, escape from which is to be desired. This notion is hardly consistent with *Ascl. III. 39*, where we are told that Heimarmene is either God himself, or the highest of God’s ἐνέργειαι. The aspiration to escape from Heimarmene is Platonic; the willing acceptance of Heimarmene

¹ Cf. Paul, *Phil. 3. 18 ff.:* πολλὸς γὰρ περισσαποικια έκ της θεοτης η νοηλα, ... ει τα ενέργεια φρονούντες. Ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολέμημα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει.
as God's ordering of the world ('Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem
trahunt') is Stoic.

As to the coupling of κακὸς δαίμων with εἴμαρμένη, cf. Corp. XVI.
13–16, where it is said that all corporeal things on earth are
administered by troops of daemons who work under the orders of the
planet-gods, and that this administration is called εἴμαρμένη. (The
star-gods were commonly regarded as instruments or agents of
Heimarmene.) Corp. XVI. 16 as emended: ὅτι οὖν ἐν τῷ λογικῷ
ἀρτι ἐπιλάμπει ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, τοῦτῳ καταργοῦνται οἱ δαίμονες, κ.τ.λ.

non ubi sit loco, nec qualis sit qualitate. Cf. ch. 31: 'Ubi enim
et quo et unde, et quomodo aut quale sit (sc. God, or Eternity), incertum est'. 'Quality' (the Stoic ποιόν or ποιότης) means sensible quality;
the writer would not deny that it can be known that God possesses
certain attributes, e.g. that of goodness. Porphyry, Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ
νοητὰ 5: δὲ νῦν ἀμέριστος οὐσία μόνον, τὰ δὲ σώματα μεριστὰ μόνον,
αἱ δὲ ποιότηται καὶ τὰ ἄνω ἐδοθὲν περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστὰ.

inmortalitatis futurae conceptum fiduciam. The 'immortality'
to which the pious man looks forward means a life unrestricted
by the limitations of human life on earth. He has already disengaged
his affections from all that is corporeal; the body is, to him, merely
an extraneous appendage; and he is assured that, when released
by death from the bonds by which he is bound to it, he will live wholly
in that incorporeal and eternal world on which his heart is set. Compare ch. 22 b: '[ad] inmortalitatis spem intentionemque protendens.'

'quasi oculi (ōculis ed. Rom.) vera ratione perspecta et
fiducia credulitatis sua'. These corrupt words suggest a meaning
something like that of Ἑρ. Ἱεβ. i. 1: ἐστὶ δὲ πάσιν ἀνθρώπων ὑπόπτωσις, πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος οὐ βλέπομένων. It would be possible
to make sense by writing 'fiducia credulitatis sua', quasi oculis, vera
ratione perspecta'. This might be taken as meaning 'fiducia
(abl.) . . . veram rationem perspicit'; but if we take it so, we
must assume that vera ratio stand for ἡ ἀλήθεια, 'reality', in the
sense in which that term is used in Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. II A.

[Ipse enim sol... ceteras stellas inluminat.] This sentence
appears to be one of the 'solar interpolations'. (See Ascl. III. 19 b,
'Solis οὐσιάρχης lumen est'.) It weakens an impressive conclusion by
introducing an irrelevant topic; and it does not agree with the preceding
words. There is no sense in saying that 'the pious excel other men
as much as the sun excels the stars in brilliance; for the sun does not
illuminate the stars with his brilliance so much as with something else'.

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The statement ‘sol ceteras stellas inluminat’, though inappropriate to the context, is not in itself impossible; for there were some who held that the sun gives light to the stars as well as to the moon. Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 346: Ἡμιπρόδωρος (of Chios) ἀπαντᾷ τοῦ ἀπλανικῆς ἀστέρας ὑπὸ τοῦ ἠλίου προσλάμπεισθαι, ἡμέρας καὶ αὐτὸ τὰ ἀστρα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἠλίου φωτίζεσθαι. Διώτιμος Τύρως . . . τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦτον εἰσηγήγκατο γνώμην. The writer of Corp. XVI held a similar view; see XVI. 8. It may be suspected however that inluminat has been substituted by error for some such word as exsuperat, which would agree better with magnitudine luminis. But if exsuperat were written, the sentence would be no less irrelevant.

Epilogus.

40 d. Dictum est vobis . . . pabulis saturavimus. Did this conclusion of the discourse of Hermes form part of the original Ascl. III, or was it added by the compiler of the Ὁγος τέλεως? The words ‘restat . . . ut benedicentes deum orantesque’ &c. lead on to the following prayer, 41 b, and are needed to introduce it. The narrative passage 41 a, in which Tat is spoken of as well as Asclepius, was probably written by the same compiler by whom the Prologue was added. The plural vobis in 40 d init. implies that more than one hearer is present; but ὑμῖν may have been substituted for τοι or ὑμῖν; and apart from that, there is nothing to prevent us from supposing that both 40 d and 41 b were included in the original Ascl. III, in which Hermes spoke to Asclepius alone.

The narrative 41 a was present in the Ὁγος τέλεως as known to Lactantius, i.e. not long after A. D. 300.


41 a. De adyto vero egressi. The situation is the same as that described in the Prologue. We are told in the Prologue that Asclepius, Tat, and Ammon were present; here, Asclepius and Tat are mentioned, and it may be presumed that Ammon is present also.

In austrum respiolentes. Cf. Corp. XIII. 16: νότῳ ἀνέμῳ ἀποβλέπων κ.τ.λ. Why those who pray at sunset should face southward, and not westward, I do not know; but the precept is probably based on some tradition of Egyptian ritual. Possibly the westward position was avoided because the region of the sunset was associated with darkness, death, and ghosts. Cf. Porphyry. De antro nymph. 29: κατὰ ταῦτα τοῖς τῷ μὲν θυγατρὶ καὶ γενέσει ὑποτότῳ φύλῳ τὰ βόρεα οἰκεία, τῷ δὲ θειότερῳ τὰ νότια, ὅτε θεοῖς μὲν τὰ ἀνατολικά, δαίμονι δὲ τὰ δυτικά.

In eum (sc. ventum) qui subsolans dicitur. On the eastward position in prayer, cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. 7. 7. 43: ἐνεί δὲ γενεθλίου ἡμέρας εἰκὼν ἡ ἀνατολὴ, κακεύθεν τὸ φῶς αὐξάται “ἐκ σκότους λάμψαν” τὸ πρῶτον, ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἀγγείᾳ κυλινδομένοις ἀνέτειλεν γνώσεων ἀθηνείας ἡμέρα κατὰ λόγον τοῦ ἠλίου, πρὸς τὴν ἑωθεὶν ἀνατολὴν αἱ ἐφόδιαι. The Hermetist would perhaps have given similar reasons for his practice, though no doubt it was really derived from primitive sun-worship. Clement adds: ὅθεν καὶ τὰ πολαίτατα τῶν ἱερῶν πρὸς δύσιν ἐβλέπεν, ἵνα οἱ ἀπαντιπρόσωποι τῶν ἀγαλμάτων ἵσταμεν πρὸς ἀνατολὴν τρέπεσθαι διδάκτωται. Clement here says that ‘the most ancient temples’ (Egyptian, or Greek?) faced westward. But this was not the usual arrangement in the times known to us. Cf. Hyginus De agr. tim. p. 153 Goes: ‘antiqui architecti in occidentem templum spectare recte scripsunt: postea placuit omnem religionem eo convertere, ex qua parte caeli terra illuminatur’ (i.e. in later times temples were usually built facing eastward). Porphyry (De antro nymph. 3) says that almost all temples face eastward: ὅσον δὲ σχεδὸν πάντων τῶν ἱερῶν τὰ μὲν ἀγαλματα καὶ τᾶς εἰσόδους ἑχόντων πρὸς ἀνατολὴν τετραμένας, τῶν δὲ εὐσύγειαν πρὸς δύσιν ἀφαρώνων, ἄταν ἀντιπρόσωποι τῶν ἀγαλμάτων ἐστῶτες τοῖς θεοῖς τὰς λιτάς καὶ θεραπείας προσάγοντο. The front of Greek temples is commonly towards the East. The Jewish temple fronted eastward. The Egyptian temples varied in their orientation; the great temple of Amon at Karnak, for instance, opened towards the North-west, and the temple at Luxor, towards the North-east.
iam ergo dicentibus precati0nem. There is an awkwardness in the narrative here, which confirms the suspicion that ch. 41a was inserted by a later hand. Hermes and his three pupils begin to pray simultaneously; after they have begun, Asclepius interrupts the prayers of his companions by his proposal; and Hermes, having rebuked him, proceeds to pray aloud, speaking for all of them together. If Hermes wished to lead his disciples in prayer, why did he not do so from the first? This difficulty disappears if we omit ch. 41a, and make the audible prayer of Hermes follow on his discourse without a break.

suggeramus patri tuo, e ritu ut (patri iusserit ut MSS.) ture addito et pigmentis preoem dicamus. The word tuo is needed; without it, patri would mean 'to my father'.


On the Egyptian usage of burning fragrant substances in the worship of the sun-god (Horus?), see Plut. Is. et Os. 52 and 80. The substance burnt at sunset was called κόμψα, and was composed of sixteen ingredients.

The Hermetist admits such offerings (sacrificiis frequentibus, ch. 38 a) in the worship of the 'terrestrial gods'; but he excludes them from the worship of the supreme God.

Melius, melius ominare . . . a mortalibus. Lactantius' translation of this passage is more trustworthy than that of Ascl. Lat.

tale quid de uno illo ac singulari bono in animum inducere (Lact.).—cum deum roges, tus oeteraque incendere (Ascl. Lat.). Perhaps some words have been lost in Ascl. Lat.; we might read ‘cum [d]eum roges (qui solus est bonus)’. The word in-cendere in Ascl. Lat. might be accounted for by some confusion between ἐνθυμιασθαι (in animum inducere) and ἐνθυμήσαι or ἐνθυμαν (tus oeteraque incendere); perhaps the translator read ἐνθυμιασθαι.

Haec et his similia huic non conveniunt (Lact.): omitted in Ascl. Lat.
omnium enim quae cunque sunt plenus est (Lact.).—qui
ipse est omnia, aut in eo sunt omnia (transposed in Ascl.
Lat.). The original Greek may have been πάντων γὰρ πλήρης
ἐστί. We might account for the reading of Ascl. Lat. by assuming
that the translator had before him two alternative readings, viz.
πάντα γὰρ αὐτός ἐστι, and πάντα γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστι, and rendered
both. Cf. Ascl. III. 26 b: '(deus) est omnium plenissimus; . . .
Et habet omnia quae vult.'

et omnium minime indigens (Lact.).—Nihil enim deest
ei (Ascl. Lat.). Cf. Porph. De abst. 3. 26: τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ παντὶ
κρείττον (i.e. τὸ θεῖον) . . . ἀπροσδεῖς πάντων.

huius enim sacrificium sola benedictio est (Lact.).—hae[o]
sunt enim summī incensiones dei, gratiae cum aguntur a
mortālibus (Ascl. Lat.). Summae, the reading of the MSS., is
clearly wrong; for it would imply that other kinds of incensiones
also are admissible, which is the very thing that the writer is
denying. The only doubt is whether summae should be corrected
into summī or sola. As the offering of incense to subordinate
gods is permitted, summī is appropriate.

On the notion that words of praise and thanksgiving ought to
take the place of material offerings in the worship of the supreme
God, cf. Corp. I. 31, διέα γονικὰς θυσίας (i.e. sacrifices which
consist of speech alone). Cic. Nat. deor. 2. 71: 'Cultus autem
deorum est optimus idemque castissimus atque sanctissimus
plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura, integra, incorrupta et
mente et voce veneremur.' Some went a step further, and
regarded even verbal worship as superfluous. Sen. Ep. 95. 47 ff.: 'Deum colit qui novit . . . Primus est deorum cultus deos credere;
dinde reddere illis maiestatem suam, reddere bonitatem. . . .
Vis deos propitiare? Bonus esto. Satis illos coluit quisquis
imitatus est.' Apollonius of Tyana in τῷ Περὶ θυσιῶν, in Euseb.
Pr. et. 4. 13: οὕτως τοῖνυν μάλιστα ἀν τις, οἷς, τὴν προσήκουσαν
ἐπιμέλειαν ποιοῦτο τοῦ θείου, τυγχάνοι τε αὐτόθεν Ἰλεώ τε καὶ εὐμάνους
ἀντῶν . . . ei (τῷ) θεῷ (ικεῖν;?) μὲν, δὴ δὴ πρώτων ἐφαμεν, ἐνὶ τε
ἀντί (καὶ) κεκοιρισμένω πάντων, μὲθ' ἐν γνωρίζεσθαι τοὺς λοιποὺς
ἀναγκαῖον, μὴ θῶοι τῇ τὴν ἀρχὴν, μῆτε ἀνάπτοι πῦρ, μῆτε καθόλου τι
τῶν αἴσθητων ἐπονομάζοι,—διατί γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ παρὰ τῶν κρει-
tῶν ᾧ πέρ ἡμῖν, οὖσ' ἢστιν δ τῇ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀνίησε γῇ φύτων ἢ τρέφει
ζώων, ἢ ἄρ, ὥ μὴ πρόσειτι γέ τι μᾶσμα,—μόνῳ δὲ χρήστο πρὸς
αὐτὸν ἀεὶ τῷ κρείττονι λόγῳ, λέγω δὲ τῷ μή διὰ στάματος ἐννυ, καὶ
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parā tού καλλίστου τῶν ὄντων διά τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν αἰτοῦ τάγαθα' νοῦς δὲ ἦτοι οὕτως, ὅργανον μη δεόμενος. οὐκοῦν κατὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲμένος τῷ μεγάλῳ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων θεῷ θυτέον. Porphry De abst. 2. 34: θύσωμεν τούτοις καὶ ἡμῖν· ἀλλὰ θύσωμεν, ὡς προσήκει, διαφόρους τάς θυσίας, ὡς ἂν διαφοροις δύναμθη προσαγόντες θεῷ τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, ὡς τις ἀνήρ σοφός (meaning Apollonius of Tyana ?) ἐφη, μηδὲν τῶν αἰσθήτων μήτε θυμώντες μήτ' ἐπονομάζοντες· οὖδὲν γὰρ ἦτοι ἔνυλον, ὡς τῷ ἠλίῳ εὐθὺς ἦτοι ἐκάθαρτον. διὸ οὖδ' λόγος τούτῳ ὅ κατά φωνῆν οἰκείος, οὐδ' ὁ ἐνδον, ὅταν πάθει ψυχῆς ἢ μεμαλαμμένος, διὰ δὲ στοῖς καθαρὰς καὶ τῶν περί αὐτοῦ καθαρῶν ἐννοιῶν θρησκευόμεν αὐτὸν. δὲ ἃρα, συναφθέντας καὶ ὁμοωθέντας αὕτη, τὴν αὐτῶν ἀναγωγὴν θυσίαν ἱερὰν προσάγειν τῷ θεῷ, τὴν αὐτὴν [ὅ] καὶ ὄμοιον οὐκάναι καὶ ἡμῶν σωτηρίαν. ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ ἃρα τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ θεωρηθῆ τὴν θυσίαν αὐτὴν τελεῖται. τοῖς δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐκγάνοις, νορτοῖς δὲ θεοῖς, ἥδη καὶ τὴν έκ τοῦ λόγου ὑμνηθαίαν προσθετεῖτο. ἀπαρχή γὰρ ἐκάθητον δὲ διέδοκεν ἡ θυσία, καὶ δὲ ἂν ἡμῶν τρέφει καὶ εἰς τὸ εἶναι συνέχει τὴν οὐσίαν. ὡς οὖν γεωργὸς δραγμάτων ἀπάρχεται καὶ τῶν ἀκροφώρων, οὕτως ἡμεῖς ἀπαρχόμεθα αὐτοῖς ἐννοίων τῶν περὶ αὐτῶν καλῶν, εὐχαριστοῦντες δὲ ἂν ἡμῶν δεδώκασιν τὴν θεωρίαν, καὶ ὧτι ἡμᾶς διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν θεᾶς ἀληθινῶς τρέφοντος, συνόντες καὶ φαινόμενοι καὶ τῇ μετέρῳ σωτηρίᾳ ἐπιλάμποντες.

Jewish thinkers untouched by Greek influence had independently ¹ arrived at the conclusion expressed by the Hermetist in the words 'huius sacrificium sola benedictio est'. Psal. 49 (50). 12 ff.: λάν πεινάω, οὐ μή σοι εἰπω· ἐμή γὰρ ἦτοι η ὁικουμένη καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αὕτης. μή φάγομαι κρέα ταύρων, ἡ αἷμα τράγων πίομαι; θύσων τῷ θεῷ θυσίαν αἰνέσεως, καὶ ἀπόδος τῷ ὑψίστῳ τὰς εὐχὰς σου. Psal. 50 (51). 15 f.: τὸ οὐκόμα μου ἀναγγελή τὴν αἰνέσειν σου. ὅτι ἐκ ἥθελσας θυσίαν, ἔδωκα ἐν ὑλοκαυτώματα οὐκ εὐδοκηθείς. θυσία τῷ θεῷ πνεύμα συντετριμμένον. Psal. 140 (141). 2: κατευθυνθή ἡ προσευχή μου ὃς θυμάμαι ἐννοιόν σου, ἐπαρασί τῶν χειρῶν μου θυσία ἑσπερῆν.

Paul, in whom Greek and Jewish influences met, speaks in similar language; Rom. 12. 1: παρακαλῶ οὐν υμᾶς . . . παραστήσει τὰ σώματα υμῶν θυσίαν ζωσάν ἂ γιάν τῷ θεῷ εὐάρεστον, τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν υμῶν. Cf. Heb. 13. 15: δὲ αὐτοῦ οὖν ἀναφέρωμεν θυσίαν αἰνέσεως διὰ παντός τῷ

¹ The thought cannot have been transmitted from Greeks to Jewish psalmists; but it may possibly have been transmitted to Greeks from Jews of the diaspora, who were debarred from offering sacrifices, and found in prayer and praise the only possible substitute.

² Cf. Auct. (Lact.): 'omnia . . . plenus est, et omnium minime indigens.'
Gratias tibi &c. The Greek text of this thanksgiving (or rather, an inaccurate transcript of it) has been preserved in a damaged state, in the magic Papyrus Mimaut, Louvre, col. X (Pap. mag. Par. ii, ll. 284–302). This Papyrus was probably written about the end of the third century A.D. The sorcerers were accustomed to make up their incantations partly out of passages extracted from books of religious ritual, or other religious writings, with little regard for the meaning of these passages in their original setting; and the man who composed one of the charms in the Papyrus Mimaut made use of the concluding hymn of the Hermetic Λόγος τέλειος for his purpose. In the papyrus, it forms the last part of an invocation addressed to the Sun-god, to whom the operator says ποιήσω τάντα τα τῆς εὐχῆς μου.—ποιήσω τὸ δείνα πράγμα—ἐλθε μοι, ἀλλοίως ἄλλοι τῷ δείνᾳ ὑγείᾳ, σωτηρίαν, πλοῦτον, εὐτεκνίαν, γνῶσιν, εὐχάριαν, εὐμενίαν, εὐβουλίαν, εὐδοκίαν, μνήμην, χάριν, μορφήν, κάλλος πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους τοὺς ὑπότας με.

1 Ps. 4. 5: θάνατος θυσίαν δικαιοίσθη.
2 ἄν (i.e. 'Him whom') Hort: ἄ MS.
3 The object at which the sorcerers aimed in composing their invocations was not to transmit a correct text of any such hymn or prayer, but merely to produce something that would sound impressive to their customers, who must have been mostly ignorant and stupid people. As long as that purpose was served, it mattered little to them whether the words which they wrote down meant this or that, or had no meaning at all. They were perfectly free to alter, to omit, to add things out of their own heads, and to patch together scraps taken from different sources; and they did so without scruple. This ought to be borne in mind in dealing with such documents as the Mithraic Apathanasiarmos (Dieterich's Mithrasriturgie), for instance.
4 εὐφραίων Pap. (Eitrem).
The Papyrus was transcribed by Wessely, and also by Reitzenstein; and it has recently been again examined and transcribed by Prof. S. Eitrem of Kristiania (Oslo). I owe it to Prof. Eitrem's kindness that I have not only been able to make use of his printed transcript of the papyrus-text (published in 1923), but have also been much helped by letters which he has written to me about this difficult passage.

(χ)έμων σοι οἴδαμεν, (ὑψιστε).

Gratias tibi (agimus), summe, exsuperantissime.

Some word denoting God, in the vocative, is wanted here; and υψιστε (Reitz.) serves the purpose well. Exsuperantissime might be a translation of ὑπεροχώστατε; cf. ὁ πάσης ὑπεροχής μεῖζων in Corp. I. 31. But one such word seems better here than two; and it is possible that summe and exsuperantissime are alternative translations of a single Greek word.

ψυχὴ πάση καὶ καρδία πρὸς σὲ ἀνατεταμένη. — (ψυχὴ παση καὶ καρδιαν προς . . ανατεταμενη PAP.) Omitted in Ascl. Lat. It would be possible also to write ψυχὴ πάση καὶ καρδία πρὸς σὲ ἀνατεταμένου, οἵ ψυχὴν πᾶσαν καὶ καρδίαν πρὸς σὲ ἀνατεταμένου. Cf. Corp. I. 31: δέξαι λογικὰς θυσίας [ἀγνὰς?] ἀπὸ ψυχῆς καὶ καρδίας πρὸς σὲ ἀνατεταμένης. Plotinus 5. 1. 6: θεον αυτον ἐπικαλεσαμένου, οὐ λόγῳ γεγυνῷ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ψυχῇ ἔκτεινας ἑαυτοῦ εἰς ἐξήν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον. The word ἀνατείνειν was used in its literal sense to describe the uplifting of the hands in prayer; e.g. Ps.-Arist. De mundo 6, 400 a 16: πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀνατείνομεν τὰς χειρὰς εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν εὐχὰς ποιοῦμεν. Thence it was transferred to the uplifting of the heart or soul ('sursum corda'), of which the bodily gesture was regarded as a symbol. Clem. Alex. Strom. 7. 7. 40: ταύτη καὶ προσανατείνομεν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὰς χειρὰς εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀνρομαν τοὺς τε πόδας ἐπιγείρομεν κατὰ τὴν τελευταίαν τῆς εὐχῆς συνεκφώνησιν, ἐπακολουθοῦντες τῇ προθυμίᾳ τοῦ πνεύματος εἰς τὴν νοητὴν οὐσίαν καὶ συναφοτάνειν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ σώμα τῆς γῆς πειρώμανοι, μετάρτοις ποιησάμενοι "τὴν ψυχήν ἐπτερωμένην" τῷ πόθῳ τῶν κρειττῶν, ἐπὶ τὰ ἄγα χωρεῖν βιαζόμεθα, τοῦ δεσμοῦ κατα-

1 There is a gap, caused by the loss of a strip of papyrus, in the lower part of the column. Prof. Eitrem's measurement of the width of this gap, and consequently, his estimate of the number of letters missing in each line, is more exact than Reitzenstein's as given in Poimandres, p. 151 f., and his transcript is, in that respect at least, more trustworthy.

2 'Stand on tiptoe,' Hort and Mayor.

3 A Hermetist would have said τοῦ νοῦ or τῆς διανόας.

4 'The uttered words,' H. and M.
The term ἄφραστον ὄνομα, 'ineffable name', might, in some contexts, be used to denote God himself, the Being to whom the name belongs. But in this passage, there are two reasons against taking that to be the meaning. Firstly, the grammatical construction is not clear. Is ἄφραστον ὄνομα vocative? If so, we must put a comma before it, and connect it closely with what precedes. But the first clause (χάριν σοι οἴδαμεν κ.τ.λ.) is already provided with a vocative ('summe', ὑψωτη); and a second vocative, appended after the intervening clause ('tua enim gratia . . . consecuti'), seems superfluous and wrongly placed. Or are we to take ἄφραστον ὄνομα as accusative, in apposition to the σε of the first clause (πρὸς σε ἀνατεταμένη)? That also is made difficult by the intervening clause, in which the pronoun (expressed or implied) must have been σου, in the genitive. And secondly, the following words, τετυμημένον τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορία κ.τ.λ., which are appropriate if applied to God himself, are inappropriate if applied to the word ὄνομα; for it could hardly be said that a name is honoured with an appellation. It therefore seems probable that some words, by which ἄφραστον ὄνομα was connected with the context, have been lost. This passage in the hymn was presumably suggested by what is said about the name of God in Ascl. III. 20 a, 'nullo ex his nominibus eum definite nuncupabimus' &c.; and the meaning must have been that God's true name cannot be told (or in other words, that God is ἀνώτατος), but men call him θεὸς and πατὴρ.

tετυμημένον (δί) (τῇ) τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορία.

et honorandum nomine divino (nomen unum MSS.).

The translator probably wrote 'honorandum nomine divino', rendering τοῦ θεοῦ by divino, as he rendered τοῦ πατρὸς by paterna in the corresponding phrase which follows. Cf. Corp. II. 16: τετυμημένοι τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορία.

quod solus dominus es.—(quo solus deus est MSS.).

Omitted in Pap. A clause beginning with οὗ is needed after τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορία, to correspond to οὗ πρὸς πάντας κ.τ.λ. after
to τοῦ πατρός; and the words quō solus deus est in the MSS. of
Ascl. show that the translator had some such clause before him
in the Greek. I have therefore added the words ὅτι σὺ μόνος
et κύριος. Cf. Corp. XIII. 21 as emended: θεός, σὺ ὁ πατὴρ, κύριε,
σὺ ὁ νοῦς.

Dominus (probably κύριος, though the word might stand for
διονυσίς also) and pater are repeatedly coupled together in
Ascl. III as names of God. Ch. 20 a: ‘deus etenim vel pater
vel dominus omnium.’ Ib.: ‘omniaque rerum patrem vel
dominum.’ Ch. 22 b: ‘deus pater et dominus.’ Ch. 23 b: ‘do-
minus et pater, vel, quod est summum, deus.’ Ib.: ‘pater ac
dominus.’ Ch. 26 a: ‘ille dominus et pater, deus primipotens’:
in the Greek, as given by Lactantius, δ κύριος καὶ πατήρ καὶ θεὸς
κ.π.λ. Ch. 29 b: ‘pater enim omnium vel dominum.’ In Ascl. I,
the words dominus and pater do not occur together; but in ch. 8,
God is called δ κύριος καὶ τῶν πάντων τοιητής, διὸ θεὸν καὶ
καὶ πατὴρ.

Philo spoke of the δύναμις βασιλική or διονυσική of God (cf.
dominus) on the one hand, and his δύναμις τοιητική or εὐγενετική
(cf. pater) on the other hand, as two distinct δυνάμεις. E.g.
Philo De Cher. 9. 27, Cohn I, p. 176: καὶ τὸν ἐνα διότι ὁ διὸ
θεὸν διὸ τὰς ἀνωτάτους ἐδόθη καὶ πρῶτας δυνάμεις ἀγαθώτατα καὶ
ἐξουσίαν καὶ ἐγαθῶτητα μὲν τὸ πάν γεγεννηκέναι, ἐξουσία δὲ τὸν
γεννηθέντος ἄρχειν. τρίτον δὲ, συναγωγὸν ἄμφοτερον, μέσον ἐναὶ
λόγου λόγον γὰρ καὶ ἀρχοντα καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐναὶ τὸν θεόν. De special. legg.
1. 8. 299, Cohn V, p. 72: What God demands of men is simple
and easy, viz. ἀγανάκτος ἀνθρώπων ὡς εὐγενετική, εἰ δὲ μῆς, φοβεῖται γοῦν
ὅς ἀρχοντα καὶ κύριον, κ.π.λ. Philo Quaest. in Genesin 1. § 57
Aucher: 'duas priores quae apud divinitatem sunt virtutes (i.e.
dynāmēs), creativam scilicet et regiam; quam una nomen gerit
dei (θεὸς), et altera, sive regia, domini (κύριος). Forma creativae
pacata lenisque et benefica est virtus; regiae autem, legislatrix et
castigatrix.' Ib. 2. § 16 (on the words Κύριος ὁ θεὸς in Gen. 7. 5):
'Utraque nomina (viz. κύριος and θεὸς) usurpavit nunc, declarata
superiorum virtutum (i.e. δυνάμεισ) dependendi ac benefici-
endi, praemittens dominum, et postponens beneficium, deum. . . .
Quum enim appellatio dei (θεὸς) benefica sit, istam frequen-
tius usurpavit in constructione universorum (i.e. in speaking of
the Creation) . . . hoc enim (κύριος) regium est nomen et exterminativum; quoniam ubi actio generationis est, deus (θεός) praemittitur in ordine, ubi vero supplicium, dominus (κύριος) praeponitur quam deus." These two δινάμεις of God are similarly spoken of by Philo in Quaest. in Gen. 2. § 51, 3. § 59, and 4. §§ 2 and 53. Thus the two names θεός and πατήρ, as used in Ascl. 41 b, correspond to the two names κύριος and θεός as explained by Philo. Similarly, in Christian writings, God's justice and God's mercy were contrasted; and Marcion carried the distinction so far as to make the 'just' God a different person from the 'good' God. Cf. Lactantius, Div. inst. 4. 3. 14: 'Unus igitur colendus est, qui potest vere pater nominari: idem etiam dominus sit necesse est, quia sicut potest indulgere, ita etiam cohercere. Pater ideo appellandus est, quia nobis multa et magna largitur; dominus ideo, quia castigandi ac puniendi habet maximam potestatem.' Ib. 6. 25. 16: 'deo, patri ac domino.'

καὶ εὐλογοῦμενον τῇ τοῦ (πατρὸς) ὀς (sc. προσηγορεῖ, δὲ(ι) κ.τ.λ. 
(e)τ benedicendum (-due MSS.) religione paterna, quoniam &c.

It is possible that benedicendus is right, and that we ought to read honorandus instead of honorandum in the preceding line, and τετμημένος and εὐλογοῦμενος in the Greek. It is God that is 'honoured' and 'blessed'; and assuming that there is a lacuna after αἴφραστον δνομα, we do not know in what construction the participles originally stood. They may have been altered to make them agree with δνομα, after some intervening words had fallen out.

The translator apparently failed to see that προσηγορεῖ was to be understood after τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς, and consequently inserted the inappropriate word religione.

The word πατρὸς (= paterna) suits well with πατρικὴν in the following phrase; and it may be taken as certain that the Hermetic wrote τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς, ὅτι. But the sorcerer who borrowed the Hermetic hymn appears to have written something else in place of πατρὸς, ὅτι. The Papyrus, as read by Prof. Eitrem, gives τῇ τοῦ . . . οὖ οὖ . . . ππ . . .;¹ and Reitzenstein's reading of Παφ. does not differ from this in anything that matters. It may be conjectured

¹ In vol. i, p. 375, the second of the two dots after ππ in Prof. Eitrem's reading of Παφ. has been omitted by mistake.
then that the sorcerer, misled by τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ in the line above, wrote θεοῦ again here instead of writing πατρός, and perhaps that he also substituted ὅσιος for ὑπάτω. Assuming that he did so, the passage, as altered by him, ran thus: καὶ εὐλογούμενον τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅσιος πρὸς πάντας — — εὖνοιαν — — ἐνεδείξω.

πρὸς πάντας καὶ περὶ πάντα.—(πρὸς πάντας καὶ πρὸς πάντας Pap.).

omnibus Ascl. Lat.

It may be that the Hermetist wrote simply πρὸς πάντας (= omnibus), and that καὶ πρὸς πάντας in Pap. is a doublet, possibly written as an alternative for ὅσιος (?) πρὸς πάντας. But if not, πρὸς πάντας καὶ περὶ πάντα seems a more probable correction than Reitzenstein’s conjecture, πρὸς πάντας καὶ πρὸς πᾶσας. Women are seldom spoken of in the Hermetic writings; and in none of them is it said or implied that any women (except the goddess-woman Isis) have attained to gnosis. Besides, if the Hermetist had thought fit to mention women here, he would have written πρὸς πάντας καὶ πᾶσας rather than πρὸς πάντας καὶ πρὸς πᾶσας.

πατρικὴν (εὐ)μοιαν καὶ στοργὴν καὶ φιλίαν, καὶ εἰ τις γυλκυτέρα (ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς), ἐνεργείᾳ ἐνεδείξω (καὶ εὐγλυκυτα(την) εὐεργ... εὐδίω Pap.).

paternam pietatem et dilectionem (religionem MSS.) et amorem, et quaecumque est dulciore efficacia, praebere dignaris Ascl. Lat.

Dilectionem (= στοργῆς), proposed by Eitrem, is almost certainly right. This word has been altered into religionem, which may have been suggested to a transcriber by religione in the preceding line.

The sorcerer probably wrote in the Papyrus καὶ εὐγλυκυτατην (or εἰ τις γυλκυτατην?) εὐεργειαν (or εὐεργεία) εὐδίω. The Latin translation can be accounted for by assuming that the Greek which the translator had before him was καὶ εἰ τις γυλκυτέρα εὐεργεία εὐεδείξω. (Instances of the substitution of a superlative for a comparative, or vice versa, occur repeatedly in the Hermetic texts.) The translator apparently took εὐεργεία (= efficacia) to be a nominative, and consequently wrote et quaecumque est dulciore efficacia, ‘and whatever εὐεργεία is sweeter’; but the Hermetist most likely wrote εὐεργεία, and connected this word with the verb ἐνεδείξω. If so, his meaning must have been that God not only feels kindly towards men, but shows his kindness in beneficent action, by bestowing
on them the gifts of νοῦς, λόγος, and γνώσις. For γνωσις in this connexion, cf. Corp. XIV. 4: οὐκ οὖν μακαρίσαι (δε) τὸν πατέρα γνωρίσαντα τί γὰρ γνυκύτερον πατρὸς γνησίου?

In place of ἐνεδέδω, the translation gives praebere dignaris, which would be more exactly equivalent to ἐνεδέδωσαι δείκτος. As the hymn is a thanksgiving for past favours (cf. χαῖρομεν ὅτι σεαυτον ἦμιν ἐδείξας below), the aorist seems more suitable than the present; it is therefore probable that the Hermetist wrote either ἐνεδέδω ο ἐνεδέδωσα διώκας. It is likewise doubtful whether he wrote ἐπεδέως or ἀποθέως διώκας (= furiis consecrare dignatus) a few lines below. He may very likely have written διώκας in one of these two places, but probably not in both.

χαρισμανος ἢμιν (θημιν Ραπ.) νοῦν, (λόγον, γνώσιν.
condonans nos sensu, ratione, intellegentia.

The translator rendered νοῦς by sensus. For γνώσις, he wrote intellegentia here, but cognitio further on in the same sentence.

λόγος must here mean 'speech', since it is given to men 'in order that they may call upon' God; but the translator wrongly supposed it to mean 'reason', and wrote ratione. For λόγος in the sense of 'speech', cf. λογικὰς θυρίας in Corp. I. 31, and λογικὰς θυρίας in Corp. XIII. 18. Also Corp. IX. 1 c: ἢ δὲ νόσος . . . ἀδελφὴν οὖν τοῦ λόγου. Corp. XII. i. 12: δύο υπάτα τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ ὁ θεὸς . . . ἐχαρίσασθαι, τὸν τε νοῦν καὶ τὸν λόγον. (The following sentences in Corp. XII. i make it clear that λόγος there means 'speech'.) γνώσις, which is God's last and greatest gift to men, follows on or results from the right use of νοῦς and λόγος, 'mind' and 'speech'.

λόγον (δε), (νο) σε ἐπικαλέσωμεν.
ratione, ut te suspicionibus indagemus.

The translator seems to have read something like ἵνα σε ἀναβλέψης (θ) ἐξηγεῖτομεν. epikaleçomen might easily be corrupted into εἰκεῖτομεν. It is difficult to account for suspicionibus; but it may possibly be a corruption of (caelum) spectantes or something of the sort, or a translation of something equivalent in the Greek, which we may suppose to have been added as an amplification of te indagemus (θ ἐξηγεῖτομεν). Such an addition would be appropriate only if λόγος were taken to mean 'reason' (ratio), and not 'speech'.

γνώσιν (δε), ἵνα (σε) ἐπηγνώκητε καὶ τῷ φωτὶ σου σωθέντες χαὶ ρω-
ASCLEPIUS III: 41 b

μεν. χαίρομεν δι' ευικλ.—(γνωσιν ινα επιγνωσώμεν 1 χα... ν
οτι Παφ.)

ογνοσίες, ut te cognoscentes [!] ac lumine (numine 
MSS.) salvati tuo (gaudeamus). Gaudemus quod &c. The 
longer clause given by Ascl. Lat. is preferable to the curt 
and comparatively feeble οτι 'επιγνώσωμεν' of Pap., and leads on, 
by a suitable transition, to the χαίρομεν of the following sentence. The 
corruption in Pap. may have been begun by the omission of χαίρομεν 
before χαίρομεν; or the sorcerer may have accidentally omitted a line 
of the Greek which he had before him. επιγνώσωμεν is hardly a 
possible form; the 1 aor. έγνωσα, in the few instances in which it 
occurs, is causal, 'to make some one know'. Eitrem proposes 
επιγνωσάμεν; but I have found no instance of επιγνωσάμεν in the 
sense here required.

επιγνώσωμεν differs from νοήσαι, as γνώσις from νοέσ. (The translator 
has obliterated the distinction, rendering both verbs by cognoscere.) 
νοήσαι θεόν here means to apprehend God intellectually; επιγνώναι 
θεόν, like the corresponding substantive γνώσις (θεού), means to come 
to know God as one knows a friend, and implies love as well as 
knowledge; at its highest degree, it is to be absorbed in God. The 
Hermetist then distinguishes three stages: (1) to form a conception 
of God (νοήσαι); (2) to adore God (επικαλέσαι); (3) to be united 
with God (επιγνώσαι).

γνώσις involves σωτηρία; those who 'know God' are 'saved' (from 
the evils which beset those who are subject to Heimarmene). Cf. 
Ascl. III. 29 b: μία φιλική ευσέβεια κ.τ.λ. And γνώσις brings with 
it χαρά. Cf. Corp. XIII. 8 c.

χαίρομεν δι' εις ονεών ημών εις (ε)ξαι (ολοι).

Gaudemus quod to nobis ostenderis totum.

It seems best to retain totum in the Latin, and add ολοι in the 
Greek. It is true that in ch. 32 b Hermes admitted a limitation of 
human vision which he here denies ('contingit hominibus ut quasi 
per caliginem quae in caelo sunt videamus' &c.); but in the 
enthusiasm of his adoration, all limitations are swept away. (Cf. 
ευσέβεσαι ἢζδωσας in the following line.) Perhaps men in the body 
may attain to the full vision of God in rare moments of exaltation, 
though it cannot be continuously present to them.

1 Reitzenstein (Poim. p. 151) gives γνωσιν ινα επιγνωσόμεν as the reading of 
Παφ.; but Prof. Eitrem, in a letter to me, says 'My copy (of the papyrus) 'has 
clearly έτσα επιγνώσωμεν (not οτι)'.

U 2
For ὅλον thus used, cf. Abammonis Resp. 10. 6 (Testim.): καὶ τότε ὅλον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ Θεῷ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνισθῆσαι (sc. ἡ θεωρία).

χαίρομεν ἣδι τῇ πάσῃ συμμεταίρῳ ἡμᾶς δυνατὰς ἀποθεώ(σαι ἡείως)σας τῇ σεαιτο(ῷ . . . .).

gaudemus quod nos in orporibus sitos aeternitate (aeternitati MSS.) (tua) fueris consecrare dignatus.

σεαιτοῦ ought to be followed by a feminine substantive of five or six letters, in the dative, meaning something like aeternitate or aeterna vita. I can think of no word that would exactly satisfy these conditions; but the sense required might be expressed by writing either τῷ σεαιτοῦ αἰῶνι οὐ τῇ σεαιτοῦ αἰῶνι (ξηθή).

Consecrare means 'to deify'. Cf. Cic. Nat. deor. 2. 62: '(Liberum) quem nostri maiores . . . cum Cerere et Libera consecraverunt.'

In ch. 29 b it was said that the pious man 'inmortalitatis futurae concipit fiduciam', i.e. is assured that he will be a god in the life to come; but here, the Hermetist goes further, and says that those who are united with God by gnosis are made gods even while they are still in the body; for the life in them is God's eternal life. Cf. Corp. XIII. 10 as emended: θεοθηκήν (by the παλιγγενσία). In some other Hermetica, the transformation from man to god is spoken of (as in Ascl. 29 b) as a process that is completed only when the soul has been released from the body by death. See Corp. XII. i. 12; Corp. X. 5 f.; Corp. I. 26 a.

Clement of Alexandria, whose conception of gnosis closely resembles that of the Hermetists, repeatedly says that the ὄντως becomes a god, not only after death, but even in the present life. Clem. Protr. ii. 114: οὐρανίως διδασκαλία θεοποίων τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Paed. 3. 1. 1: ὅ δε ἀνθρωπος ἑκὼν, ὁ σύνοκος ὁ λόγος, . . . ἔξομοιούσι τῷ θεῷ . . . θεὸς δὲ ἑκὼν ὁ ἀνθρωπος γίνεται, ὅτι βουλεῖται ὁ θεός . . . μετά τῆς γὰρ τοῦ λόγου, κοινὸς ἄμφος. Strom. 4. 23. 149: τοῦτον διανοίαν τῷ ἐρασίῳ τοῦ γνωστικοῦ ὣς γενόσθαι θεόν. Strom. 7. 10. 56: τὴν ἐσομενήν ήμῶν κατὰ τὸν θεὸν μετὰ θεῶν διὰντον. . . . καὶ θεοὶ τὴν προσοφροσίαν κέκλησαν οἱ σύνθροι τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν τῶν ὑπὸ τῷ σωστῷ πρώτῳ τεταγμένων γεννόμενοι.

Strom. 7. 16. 95: ὅ δὲ . . . τὸν ἀνατοῦ βίον ἐπιτρέψας τῇ ἅλθησίας οὐν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων θεός ἀποτελέσθη. Strom. 7. 16. 101: ὅ τῷ κυρίῳ πειθόμενος καὶ τῇ δοξαίᾳ δι' αὐτοῦ κατακολουθήσας προφητείᾳ τελέως ἐκτελεῖται καὶ ἐκόνα τοῦ διδασκάλου, ἐν σαρκὶ περιπολάθων θεός.

For similar phrases used by other Christian writers, see Hort and Mayor's note on ἐσομενής θεός, Clem. Strom. 7. 1. 3; e.g. Hippolytus Ref. haer. 10. 33: εἴ δὲ θέλεις καὶ θεὸς γενόσθαι, ὅποκεν τῷ
In the pair of clauses beginning with χαίρομεν, we have an amplified repetition of the two thoughts expressed by the pair of participles dependent on χαίρομεν in the preceding sentence. σεαντόν ἡμῖν ἔδειξες corresponds to σε ἐπιγνώστες; and ἡμᾶς ἀποδείξας ἥξισας corresponds to σωθήσετε.

χάρις ἄνθρώπου πρὸς σε μία τὰ τὸν μέγεθος γνωρίσαι.

Haec est enim humana sola gratulatio, cognition maiestatis tuae.

A word corresponding to sola is needed after πρὸς σε. Prof. Eitrem tells me that he saw in the papyrus, after μ, traces of letters which might be α, and that he now recommends me to print μα τῷ as his reading of Pap. It is therefore certain that the sorcerer wrote μα (not μόνη, which would have done equally well, as far as the meaning is concerned). For μα in the sense of sola, cf. μα φυλακὴ εὐσέβεια in ch. 29 b, and θρησκεία δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ μα ἑστί, μη ἐναι κακῶν in Corp. XII. ii. 23 b.

As there is no doubt about the τ after μα, we must conclude that the Hermetist wrote τῷ followed by something equivalent to maiestatem tuam (presumably either σὺν μέγεθος or μέγεθος σου),¹ and that the sorcerer omitted these two words by mistake.

For γνωρίσαι, cf. Corp. X. 15 a: γνωρίζει (se. τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ θεός), καὶ δέλαι γνωρίζεσθαι.

ἐγνωρίσαμεν (σε), ἵ - - - αλόνιος διαμονή. We have here a group of four classes, each of which begins with ἐγνωρίσαμεν. The repeated ἐγνωρίσαμεν follows on γνωρίσα, just as, in the preceding passage, the repeated χαίρομεν follows on χαίρομεν. The four clauses fall into two pairs; in the first pair of clauses the relation between God and man is spoken of, and in the second pair, the relation between God and the Kosmos.

In Pap., the σε which is needed as object of ἐγνωρίσαμεν, and is represented by τε in Ascl. Lat., is omitted in the first, third, and outh clauses, and was almost certainly omitted in the second clause also. If it was present in the Greek text which the sorcerer had before him, it is not likely that he would have left it out four times over through mere carelessness. It is almost indispensable in the

1 It would also be possible to write τῷ (σε) γνωρίσαμεν; but an accidental omission of σὺν μέγεθος by the sorcerer seems more likely than an arbitrary expansion of σε into maiestatis tuae by the translator.
first of the four clauses; but the Hermetist may possibly have written ἕγνωρίσματι σε there, and left the σε to be understood when ἕγνωρίσματι was repeated. Perhaps it is best to assume that he wrote ἕγνωρίσματι σε in the first of each pair of clauses, and ἕγνωρίσματι without σε in the second of each pair, and that the sorcerer was led by the absence of σε in the second and fourth clauses to omit it in the first and third clauses also.

Cognovimus te, [et] (o) lumen maximum solo intellectu sensibili(um);

cognovimus (intellegimus MSS.) te, o vitæ (humanae) vera vita.

One of these two clauses has to do with "ουθή, and the other with φως. (Cf. ζωή καὶ φως in Corp. I. 9 &c.) In Pap., the clause which deals with ζωή is placed before that which deals with φως; in Ascl. Lat., the clause which deals with ζωή is placed after the other. Which of the two the Hermetist placed first, we have no means of finding out.

One might write either δ (ζωή ἄληθής) τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς (υτις vita vera humanae vitae); or δ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς (ζωή ἄληθής) (υτις vita humanae vita vera). The former order is perhaps to be preferred, because it makes this clause match more exactly with the other. In the parallel clause, the sorcerer almost certainly wrote δ φως ᾱπάσας γνώσεως. (/AFPάσας γνώσεως stands legibly written in Pap.; and δ φως (lumen) would just fill the preceding gap, if we assume that σε was omitted here, as in the three corresponding clauses.) But this can hardly be what the Hermetist wrote; for there is no satisfactory meaning in ᾱπάσας; and φως ought to have an epithet.

If ᾱπάσας is wrong, how is that reading to be accounted for? It has occurred to me that ᾱπάσας γνώσεως might possibly be a corruption of λαμπάς (lumen) τῆς γνώσεως. Cf. Corp. X. 4 b as emended: (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θεοῦ) ἐκλάμπει ἐν τοσοίτων, ἐφ’ ὅσον δύναται ἐν θεομον ἀβασάθαι τὴν ἤπειρον τῆς νοητῆς λαμπάδος. Anything which sheds light might be called λαμπάς. Poets applied the word λαμπάς to the sun; and the notion that the Good, or God, is the sun of the νοητῆς θεομον is a commonplace in philosophic writings, from Pl. Rep. onward. The term λαμπάς (μεγίστης) (lumen maximum) might then be meant to signify the sun, in contrast to the lesser lights of heaven. Cf. Ascl. III. 18 b: "ut enim sole mundus, ita mens humana isto clarescit lumine" (viz. the light of νοῦς, which is God's gift to such men as are worthy to receive it). But perhaps it is more likely that the missing word is φως, which was frequently associated with ζωή.

The false reading ᾱπάσας might be accounted for in another way, by assuming that the Hermetist wrote δ φως ᾱπάσας (= lumen maximum) τῆς γνώσεως, and that ἅπας (τοῦ τῆς γνώσεως).
equivalent to maximum (cf. vera vita, i.e. ζωή ἀληθεύς, in the parallel clause).

The reading which the translator had before him was probably θέωσ μέγιστον (or ἄλεστον?) τῶν νοητῶν. (The phrase solo intellectu sensibilium would be a good translation of τῶν νοητῶν.) This seems preferable to the reading of Pap.; but the Hermetist may have written τῶν νοητῶν or τῆς γνώσεως.

In the MSS. of Ascl. Lat., the second γνωρίσαμεν is represented by intellegimus, instead of cognovimus. But it is difficult to believe that the translator can have intentionally made this purposeless variation. It seems more likely that he wrote cognovimus, and that intellegimus was substituted for it by a transcriber who was misled by intellet(cus) in the preceding clause.

εἰς τὶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὁ μήτρα (πάντοπορφόρε, δὲ τὰς θρόσφιτας φυτ(ές)κα (κυνοῦσα).

This clause was evidently suggested by the passage on the bisexuality of God, Ascl. III. 20 b sq. God is both Father and Mother of the universe.

It seems almost certain that the Hermetist wrote δὲ μήτρα παντο-φόρε. The translator may possibly have rendered παντοφόρε by naturarum omnium fecunda, ‘productive of all kinds of things’; but it is more likely that he wrote o matrix rerum omnium fecunda. The words matrix rerum may have been corrupted into naturarum; or matrix may have been accidentally omitted in transcription, and rerum altered into naturarum (which may have been caused by naturae in the line below).

There is more uncertainty about the words which followed in the Greek. Reitzenstein’s reading of Pap. is εμ πατρός φυτεύαι (with a doubt about the π); Eitrem’s reading of Pap. is εμητρός φυτεύαι (with a doubt about the η). We should expect the mention of the mother (μήτρα) to be followed by a mention of the father; it therefore seems most likely that the words written in Pap. were εμ πατρός φυτεύαι (i.e. εν πατρός φυτεύαι). But if this is what the Hermetist wrote, some participle is needed to provide a construction for εν πατρός φυτεύαι, which could hardly be made to depend on the adjective παντοφόρε; I have therefore added κυνοῦσα.

Of the corresponding phrase in the Latin translation, nothing is left except the one word praegnatio, which probably stands for
It may be conjectured that the translator wrote something like *per patris impragnationem gravida facta.*

The Greek text cannot be restored with any confidence; but the following hypothesis may be proposed as at least a possible way of accounting for the facts before us. Let us suppose that the Hermetist wrote *δ ὁ τὸ πᾶν ἔν στάσει κυκλοφοροῦντος αἰώνιος διάμορφη.* (στάσει is very doubtful; there is no evidence for this word in Pap. except the three letters στα read by Eitrem, and he is uncertain about the σ; but the repeated occurrence of *stabilitas* and *stabilis* in chs. 29 c–32 a gives some support to this conjecture.) In the translator’s copy of the Greek, this had been corrupted into *δ τοῦ παντὸς ἐν πάσι (ʔ) κυκλοφοροῦντος αἰώνιος διάμορφη.* and he translated this by ‘tutius naturae (= τοῦ παντὸς) conceptu plenissimae (= ἐν πᾶσι κυκλοφοροῦντος) aeterna perseveratio’. In our Latin text, *tuo* has been added by error; this mistake might easily arise out of ‘tutius naturae conceptu’. The sorcerer by whom *Pap.* was written copied from a text in which στάσει was retained; but he omitted τοῦ τὸ πᾶν ἐν (οτοῦ παντὸς ἐν), and wrote *ω στάσει κυκλοφοροῦντος αἰωνίος διάμορφη.*

1 *κυκλοφοροῦντος* (in place of *κυκλοφοροῦντος*) may have been suggested to a transcriber by μέτα παντοφόρος in the preceding clause.
In omni enim ista oratione adorantes (te solum) bonum, bonitatis tuae hoc tantum deprecamur.

I assume that the Hermetist wrote τοῦτο σὲ τῷ λόγῳ (= in ista oratione - - -). The words omni and enim seem to have been added by the translator. Assuming that Eitrem has read Pap. rightly,1 we must suppose that the sorcerer wrote οὐτὸς οὖν λόγῳ (for οὐτος οὖν λόγῳ); and the reading of the text from which he copied may perhaps have been οὐτως οὖν σὲ (τῷ) λόγῳ.

There is a sufficient reason for using the word λόγος here; Hermes has just been insisting that λόγος, 'speech', is the only kind of offering that can rightly be presented to the supreme God.

It seems best to retain the word bonum, which leads on to bonitatis tuae; but if we retain it, we must insert te solum before it, and assume that the Hermetist wrote τὸν μόνον ἀγαθὸν ἄντα or something equivalent. The statement that 'God alone is good' occurs repeatedly in the Hermetica. Cf. 'de uno illo ac singulari bono' (= peri ἐκείνων τὸν ἄντα καὶ μόνον ἀγαθὸν ἄντα) in ch. 41 a, as translated by Lactantius.

The genitive bonitatis tuae may be accounted for by supposing that the Hermetist wrote παρὰ τῇ σῇ ἀγαθότητος, and that παρὰ was omitted in the translator's copy of the Greek.

Pap. gives μὴδεμιὰν ἵπτόμεν (χάραν οὐ δόσων); but the Hermetist cannot have written that. We should have expected οἴδεμιαν αἴτουμεν; but how could οἶδ- be corrupted into μη-? I conjecture μηδεμίαν αἴτησομεν, 'let us ask for nothing except this'.

The translator may perhaps have written '(nihil praeter (or nisi)) hoc tantum έτε precamur'.

(δια τούτο νικηθήκαι εν τῇ σῇ γνήσισε έκ καὶ φιλότητι την).

ut nos velis servari (servare MSS.) perseverantes in amore cognitionis tuae.

The word beginning with γν, which followed εν τῇ σῇ in Pap., must have been γνώσει. But what followed that? The translator probably read εν τῇ σῇ γνώσεις φιλότητι (amore). I conjecture that the Hermetist wrote εν τῇ σῇ γνώσει καὶ φιλότητι, and that this was correctly copied in Pap. Of the word which I take to have been φιλότητι, Reitzenstein read in Pap. only the two letters τη; Eitrem read τη followed by a doubtful i (which might be the lower letter).

1 Reitzenstein gives οὕτως εγὼ (i.e. he was not sure about the second υ). Is it possible that the two letters which have been read as οὖ are really ε τ, and that what the sorcerer wrote was οὕτο (for οὕτω) σὲ τῷ λόγῳ?
part of a τ), and marked a space of eight letters between γνώσει and τη. I have inserted in this space the seven letters καὶ φιλο.

philosophy might very well be coupled with γνώσει. Those who 'know God' are both φιλόθεοι and θεοφιλεῖς; they love God and are loved by God. Cf. πατρικὴ εὐνοίαν καὶ στοργὴν καὶ φιλίαν above. Pl. Tim. 53 D: θεὸς οἶδε, καὶ ἄνδρῶν δὲ ἢ ἑκείνῃ φιλὸς ὦ. Pl. Phileb. 39E: δίκαιος ἄνὴρ καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἅγαθος πάντως ἢ οὐ θεοφιλὴς ἦν; Philo Fragm., 662 M. δὲ γὰρ εἶναι (τὸν ἄνθρωπον), ἐὰν γε ἄνω τοι τοι λογικός, κοινωνικός (towards men), φιλόκοσμος, φιλόθεος, ἵνα γίνηται καὶ θεοφιλής. Clem. Alex. Strom. 7. 1. 2: μένον τὸν γνωστικὸν δόον τε καὶ εὐσεβή (εἶναι), θεορετῶς τὸν τῷ ἄνθρωπον θεραπευτή τῷ θεοφιλῶ τῇ θεοφιλῇ ἔπεκται καὶ φιλόθεον ('the worship which beseems God includes both loving God and being loved by Him', Hort and Mayor). Ἰδ. 7. 3. sq.: θεοφιλὴς ὁ θεορετής ('the godly') μόνος. . . ταῦτα ἄρα φιλῶς τὸ πρώτον (ὁ θεορετής) δὲ γὰρ δὲ τιμῶν τὸν πατέρα φιλοπάτωρ, οὕτως δὲ τιμῶν τὸν θεὸν φιλῶς. Ἰδ. 7. 3. 19: ὁ δὲ ἱδή μὴ δὶ τὰς ἐνοτάτας, δὴ αὖτη δὲ τὴν γνῶσιν καθαρός τῇ καρδίᾳ, φιλὸς οὗ τοῦ θεοῦ. Ἰδ. 7. 7. 42: ἡ τοῦ γνωστικοῦ δόος (ὁσιόν) ἀντίστροφοι εὖνοι τοῦ φίλου τοῦ θεοῦ ('a responsive feeling of loyalty on the part of the friend of God' H. and M.). Ἐπ. τακ. 2. 23: Abraham φιλὸς θεοῦ ἀλήθην.

<kai> [τῷ] μή(ποτε) σφαλήναι τοῦ τοιοῦτον (θίου).

et numquam ab hoc vitae gener separari.

How was this phrase joined on? In Pap., if we assume that the preceding word was φιλότητι, there remains a space of three letters before το μή; and it is most likely that the missing word is καὶ (= et in Ascl. Lat.). But if so, μήποτε σφαλήναι is coupled to διατηρήθηναι, and dependent on διάλογον; the το of Pap. must therefore have been inserted by error. μήποτε (= numquam) is preferable to μή; Hermes prays that he and his pupils may not, at any future time, fall away from the happy state of life in which they now are. We may conclude then that the Hermetist wrote καὶ μήποτε (or μηδέποτε) σφαλήναι κ.τ.λ. For this petition, cf. Corp. I. 32: αἰτουμένοι το μὴ σφαλήναι τῆς γνώσεως. Clem. Alex. Strom. 7. 7. 44: ὁ γνωστικός δὲ ἢ δὲ μὲν κάτηται παραμονήν . . . αἰτήσεται τά δὲ δόντων ἁγαθά τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν εὖχηται εἶναι ταῦτά καὶ παραμένειν. ταῦτα οὖν ἐρέγεται τινος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀρκοῦμενος τοῖς παροῦσιν οὕτω ἀληθινῶς τῶν ὀλίκων ἁγαθῶν, ικανός ἣν Ἰδὴ λατέ τῇ τῆς θείας χάριτος καὶ γνώσεως. Ἰδ. 7. 7. 46: κορυφαίος
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δὴ ἡδή (γενόμενος) ('when he has reached the summit' Hort and Mayor) ὁ γνωστός θεωρίαν εἰκέται ἀδέξιον τε καὶ ταραμένῃ, καθάπερ ὁ κοντός ἀνθρώπως τὸ συνέχεις ὑμαίνειν. ταὐτὴ μὴν μηδὲ ἀποστείξῃ ποτε τῇ ἀφέτες αἰτήσεται, συνεργῶν μάλιστα πρὸς τὸ ἀπτώτως διαγενέσθαι. See note on Corp. XIII. 14.

Separari is not a good translation of σφαλήναι. (Decidere would be more nearly equivalent.) Has separari been substituted for some other verb in the Latin text? Or did the translator read some other verb (e.g. χωρισθέναι, or ἀποστῆναι; compare Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. II B. 3) in his copy of the Greek?

The last words of the thanksgiving must have been τοῦ τοιοῦτου βίου οὐ βιωτοῦ (= ab hoc vitae genere). In Pap., τοῦ τοιοῦτου stands at the beginning of a line, and is followed (in the same line) by . . . . . . . . τοῦ . . . λιων μεγα υπαγω | (Eitrem) and five or six more lines of detached scraps of words or phrases, out of which no meaning can be got; and at the end of this obliterated passage, we find ourselves among directions for working another charm, which appears to have nothing to do with that in which the Hermetic thanksgiving was employed. Assuming that βίου was written, there remains after it (according to Eitrem's reading) a gap of three letters, followed by τοῦ . . . λιων &c. (possibly πρὸς τοῦ ἢλιων or λέγε πρὸς ἢλιων ?); and we must suppose that the sentence which began with these words was either a note appended by the sorcerer at the end of the preceding incantation (perhaps giving some direction as to the place or time at which it was to be recited), or else, the beginning of the separate and unconnected charm which follows.

Haeo optantes (ταῦτα εἰδόμενοι?) convertamus (convertimus MSS.) nos ad — — oenam. The prayer or hymn serves as a 'grace before meat'. It is possible that, in the community of which the writer was a member, discourse and prayer were habitually followed by a meal which had something of the character of a sacred rite. As the prayer or hymn was a substitute for sacrifice (ἁ λογικὴ θυσία), so the meal which followed may have been a survival, in an altered form, of the sacrificial banquet. The initiation of the

1 αδέξιον is certainly wrong; there can be no αδέξιον for one who is already κορμαῖος. Has ἀδέξιον τε arisen out of ἑβέσται, written as an alternative for ἑβέσται? The future εὑρίσκει would perhaps be preferable to the present; cf. αἰτήσεται in the following sentence. Something like τῇ θεωρίᾳ ἑβέσται (οὔ ἑβέσται) παραμένειν would give the sense required.

2 τὸ συνεχές = συνεχῶς, 'continually'.

3 Keiltenstein (Poin.) gives the line thus:

| τοῦ τοιοῦτου . . . . . . . . λιων μεταγαγω |

puram et sine animalibus oenam. It is implied that those who have attained to gnosis must abstain from eating the flesh of animals. This rule was observed by Orphici (Eur. Hippol. 952 sq.), and, with more or less strictness, by Pythagoreans of all periods. As to the reasons commonly given for it, see Porph. De abst.

1 Porphyry (De abst. 4. 13), quoting this passage, adds ἀγρήσιον oboης καὶ καθαρᾶς. Cf. 'puram et sine animalibus oenam' in Ascl.
Lactantius says that this passage was *(Hermæ) ad filium scribentis exordium*. It must therefore have stood at the beginning of a *libellus*; and perhaps his words may be taken to imply that this *libellus* was the first in the collection of ‘the Discourses of Hermes to Tat’. The passage seems to have been widely known; it is quoted by three early Christian writers,¹ and probably referred to by a fourth (*Fragm. a*, Cyprian(?)); and Julian² also appears to have been acquainted with it. This would be accounted for, if we suppose that it stood at the beginning of the first *libellus* of a collection of *Hermetica*, and that the words θεόν νόησαι μὲν χαλεπῶν κ.τ.λ. were consequently the first that met the eyes of readers of the Hermetic writings.

It seems to be assumed by Lactantius, as it frequently was by others, that Hermes himself wrote the dialogues in which he appears as a speaker; unless indeed Lactantius means that the *libellus* which began with this passage was not a dialogue, but an *epistle* of Hermes to Tat (cf. *Corp. XIV* and *Corp. XVI*).

*Exc. I* is the second of the three Stobaeus-excerpts which Turnebus appended to *Corp. I–XIV*, and Flussas included in his *Caput XV*.

Wachsmuth (Stob. Anthol. vol. ii, p. 9) says that this excerpt ‘deest apud Patricium’. But that is a mistake. The passage θεόν νόησαι ... τούτο ἐστιν ὁ θεός, taken from Stobaeus, occurs in Patrizzi (1593), *Hermetis Trismegisti libel XX*, f. 51a. But Patrizzi joined on to the end of it without a break, as if they formed

¹ Pseudo-Justin, Lactantius, and Cyril. Lactantius again refers to *Exc. I* in *De ira dei ii. 13* (*Testim.*); he there connects it with *Pl. Tim. 28 c*. Cf. Lactant. *De epif. dei i. 11*: ‘a summo illo rerum conditore atque artifice deo, culius divinam providentiam perfectissimamque virtutem nec sensu comprehendere nec verbo enarrare possibile est’. In this latter passage, Lactantius may have been thinking either of *Pl. Tim. 28 c*, or of *Herm. Exc. I*, or possibly of both.

² Julian Or. 4. 131 D: ἦσαν μὲν οὖν, εἰδοθε, χαλέπων καὶ τὸ εὐνείμα περὶ αὐτοῦ μόνον, ὅπως τι ἐστίν ὁ ἄφωρος (εἰς ἡλίον) ἐκ τοῦ ἄφωρος λογισμόν, ἄρα δὲ ἑαυτῷ ἀδιάνοον, εἰ καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀγαθοῖς ἑληξομεί τις. The verbal agreement of ἀδιάνοον ἀδιάνοον with *Herm. Exc. I* makes it probable that Julian had in mind that passage rather than *Pl. Tim. 28 c* (ἀδιάνοον λέγειν).
part of the same passage, two Hermetic fragments (12 and 11, vol. I, p. 536: ἦσσιν γὰρ τις . . . ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον ἦσσιν, and ἄτιν ὡς τοῦτοι . . . στῶματι λαληθήσια), which he got from Lactant. Div. inst. 4. 7. 3. He placed these two fragments in inverse order, disregarding the statement of Lactantius that ἦσσιν γὰρ τις κ.τ.λ. occurred 'a little after' the other in the Hermeticum in which he found them.

§ 1. Θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν χαλεπόν, φράσας δὲ ἀδύνατον. This is a reminiscence of Pl. Tim. 28 c: τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦ παντός εὐρέων τε ἔργων καὶ εὐρύντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν. And the whole passage is based on the Platonic contrast between τὸ νοητὸν and τὸ αἰσθητὸν, which is dealt with in the preceding sentences of the Timaeus (27 d–28 b).

Φ καὶ νοῆσαι δυνατόν. This phrase is missing in our MSS. of Stobaeus; but as it occurs with slight variants in Pseudo-Justin, Lactantius, and Cyril, it is to be presumed that it was present in the original text, and was omitted in Stob. by an error of transcription.

τὸ γὰρ [ἀσώματον σώματι σημὴν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὸ] τέλειον κ.τ.λ. On the analogy of the two following clauses, τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον . . . ἀδύνατον ought to mean 'God is ἀσώματος, man is (or, man's vocal organs are ?) σῶμα; therefore, man cannot describe or explain God'. But such a statement would be out of place at this stage; for in what follows, Hermes is still speaking of the difficulty of conceiving or apprehending the incorporeal (νοῆσαι χαλεπόν); and it is not until later that he passes on from this to the other point, that it is impossible to express the thought of it in words (φράσαι ἀδύνατον, repeated in ἐξεπείν ἀδύνατον at the end of the passage). This objection might perhaps be got over by adopting the reading of Stob. A, συμβηκεῖ (''to meet with' or 'come to terms with',—cf. συγγενέσθαι below—), in place of σημὴν. But it seems best to bracket the words. They are omitted by Lactantius.

τὸ γὰρ [ ] τέλειον τῷ ἀτελεί καταλαβέσθαι ὡσ ὁ δυνατόν. God is τέλειος, man is ἀτελής; therefore, man cannot (?) apprehend God. For the use of the middle form καταλαβέσθαι in the sense 'to apprehend' (more commonly καταλαβεῖν), cf. Dion. Hal. 2. 66: ἐγὼ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐναι των . . . φυλαστάμενα . . . έκ πολλῶν πάνω καταλαβένομαι.

Even if we cut out ἀσώματον σώματι σημὴν ἀδύνατον, we still have, in close succession, ἀδύνατον—δυνατόν—ὁ δυνατόν. We may be sure that the author was not responsible for this clumsy iteration. Besides, ὡσ δυνατόν does not express his view; for he
EXCERPT I: 1

holds that it is possible, though difficult, for man to apprehend God. Most likely then ό ν δυνάμεως has been substituted by error for something equivalent to χαλεπών above and δύσκολον below.

τὸ ἀδίδων τῷ διλογοριφῷ συγγενεῖθαι δύσκολον. God is everlasting, man (as an earthly organism) is short-lived; therefore, it is hard for man to enter into converse or connexion with God. This must be the meaning; but what is the grammatical construction? συγγενεῖθαι requires a dative; and if the text is sound, we must understand τὸ ἀδίδων (nom.) δύσκολον (ἐστι) τῷ διλογοριφῷ συγγενεῖθαι (αὑτῷ), ‘the everlasting is difficult for the short-lived in respect of associating with it’. Cf. Pl. Rep. 1.330 c: χαλεποὶ ὅπως καὶ ξυγγενεῖθαι εἰς ὑπερμετροπικές. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. II B. 5: ομοιώς αὕτη διὸς . . . , χαλεπὴ δὲ ψυχὴ ὀδεύσαη.

Lactantius, Div. inst. 2. 8. 68 (Testim.), quotes from ‘Hermes’ a similar passage: ‘ut Hermes ait, “mortale inmortali, temporale perpetuo, corruptibile incorrupto propinquare non potest”, id est propius accedere et intellegentia subsequi.’ This, in Greek, would be τὸ θνητὸν τῷ ἀναντίῳ καὶ τῷ διλογορίφῳ τῷ ἀδίδῳ καὶ τῷ φθαρτῷ τῷ ἀφθαρτῷ ἐγγίζον οὐ δύναται. Is Lactantius there quoting Exc. I from memory, and very inaccurately? Or is he quoting from some Hermeticum now lost, in which a similar thought was expressed in different words?

τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ φαντασίας σκιαλεταὶ. σκιαλεταὶ means ‘to be overshadowed’ or ‘darkened’; but that meaning is not appropriate here. Oecolampadius (whose Latin translation of Cyril represents a better Greek text than that of Aubert) gives a satisfactory sense, by writing adumbratur, which might be a rendering of σκιαγραφηταί. The writer must have meant that the world of sense is a mere illusion or unreal appearance, as opposed to τὸ νοητόν, which alone is ἀληθές. Cf. Exc. II A (περὶ ἀληθείας). φαντασία, as used by the Aristotelians and Stoics, means the process by which the mind presents to itself an image of something in the external world; and in Platonic writings, the word sometimes carries with it an implication that this image is illusory. See Corp. V. i b.

[ὅπως οὖν τὸ δοθενεστερὸν τοῦ ἱεραρχώτερον καὶ τὸ Ἐλαττόν τοῦ κράττονος διεστήκε,] τοσοῦτον (διεστήκε) τὸ θνητὸν τοῦ θείου. This is Cyril’s reading. Stobaeus gives the passage thus: τὸ δὲ δοθενεστερὸν τοῦ ἱεραρχώτερον καὶ τὸ Ἐλαττόν τοῦ κράττονος διεστήκε τοσοῦτον δοσὸν τὸ θνητὸν τοῦ θείου. In either form, the statement is absurd. The difference between ‘that which is stronger’ and ‘that which
is weaker’ may be great or small; it varies through all degrees; and a thing so indefinite cannot be used to measure or indicate the extent of the difference between the mortal and the divine. Possibly a marginal note containing the words τὸ ἀσθενέστερον κ.τ.λ. has been worked into the text in two different ways.

There appears to be a reminiscence of this passage in Didymus De trin. 3. 1. 776 A (Testim.): (τὸ σῶμα) κατακρατεῖ (τῆς ψυχῆς) τῆς φύσει κρείττονος, καὶ τοσοῦτο κρείττονος ὅσον τὸ ἀθάνατον τοῦ θεοῦ.

For τὸ ἑλλήνου καὶ τὸ κρείττον, cf. Corp. X. 22 b: πάντων γὰρ οὗτος (τ. ὁ θεὸς) κρείττον [καὶ πάντα αὐτοῦ ἑλλήνοια].

§ 2. ἢ δὲ μάση τούτων διάστασιν κ.τ.λ. After τοῦ θείου (καὶ ἀθανάτου add. Cyril), our two authorities diverge. Stobaeus gives ἢ δὲ μάση . . . τούτο ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς; Cyril gives, in place of this, an entirely different passage, εἶ τῷ οἷν ἀσώματος . . . ταυτῷ ἀνάμονον (Fragm. 25). But the continuity of the text as given by Stobaeus is guaranteed by the word διάστασις, which refers back to διάστηκε in the preceding sentence. We must therefore conclude that Cyril has here quoted two distinct and unconnected passages, and that the two have been joined together by error. Very likely a separating phrase (e.g. καὶ πάλιν or καὶ ἐτέρωθι) originally stood after θείου καὶ ἀθανάτου in the text of Cyril, and has fallen out by accident.

τῆν τοῦ καλοῦθεν. Compare what is said in Corp. X. 4 b, 5 about ἢ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ θέα and (τῷ) θεώσωσθαι τὸ κάλλος τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ.

ὁφαλμοὶ μὲν γὰρ τὰ σώματα θεατᾶ [γλώττῃ δὲ τὰ ὀρατὰ λεκτά]; τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον . . . ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων αἰσθήσεων καταληφθῆναι οὐ δύναται. ‘With our eyes we can see bodies (only); the incorporeal cannot be apprehended by our senses.’ The δὲ to which μὲν points forward must be that in τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον; and the words γλώττῃ δὲ τὰ ὀρατὰ λεκτά break the connexion of thought. The contrast on which the writer is insisting is that between the things which we can see with our eyes, and a thing which ‘cannot be apprehended by our senses’; and the interposition of a statement about speech obscures this contrast. The tongue, as used in speech, is not an organ of sense-perception; the mention of the tongue is therefore irrelevant.

The emphatic ἡμετέρων seems to imply that there is another sort of ἀλθής (viz. that of ‘the eye of the mind’) by which it is possible to ‘behold the Beautiful’.
EXCERPT I: 2

With this passage may be compared Corp. V. 2: νόησις γὰρ μονή ὁρὶ τὸ ἀφανὲς κ.τ.λ.

εἰνοῦμαι, δὸ Τάτ, εἰνοῦμαι καὶ ἤπειτα ἀδύνατον. τοῦτο ἄστιν ὁ θεὸς. ¹ This cannot be right. The words convey no clear meaning; and the repetition of εἰνοῦμαι is pointless. The writer must have ended by applying to God what he had been saying about τὸ ἀδύνατον in general; but the words in which he made this application cannot be restored with certainty.

EXCERPTS IIA AND IIB

Exc. IIA is the first of the three Stobaeus-excerpts which Turnebus appended to Corp. I–XIV, and which Flussas took over from him and printed under the heading Trismegisti Pimandrace Caput XV. Turnebus appears to have got his text of these three excerpts from Trincavelli’s edition of the Florilegium of Stobaeus, which was published at Venice in 1535–6.

The text of Exc. IIA is arranged in three different ways in the MSS. In S and A, the sections are placed in the order 1–18; in M, they are placed in the order 4–15, 1–3, 16–18; in L and Br, they are placed in the order 1–12, 16–18, 13–15. Of these three arrangements, two at least must be wrong. For reasons given below, it appears to me certain that all three are wrong; and I have placed the sections in the order 1–5, 7, 6, 8–10, 16, 18, 11–12, 17, 13–15. That is to say, I have followed S.A.L.Br in placing §§ 1–5 at the beginning, and L.Br in placing §§ 13–15 at the end; but I have shifted §§ 7, 16, and 18 without manuscript authority. There may be a good deal of doubt about § 7; but it can hardly be doubted that §§ 16 and 18 ought to stand where I have put them.

When thus rearranged, IIA is intelligible throughout; and if we had nothing else before us, we might accept it as a finished whole, complete in itself. But IIB, which has been preserved in a different part of the Anthologium of Stobaeus, fits on perfectly to the end of IIA, and must have been written as a continuation of it. In IIA, the writer has been occupied in establishing the doctrine that nothing here below is real (τὸ μὴ ἐξ ὅλου· μὴ δὲν ἀληθὸς ἐνθάδε, § 8). The opening sentence of IIB, in the words τὸ μὴ δὲν ἕστιν ἀληθὸς ἐνθάδε, refers back to the conclusion arrived at in IIA,
and makes it the starting-point of a discourse in which a fresh topic is dealt with. In II A, ἀληθεία is discussed theoretically; in II B, the result of that discussion is brought to bear on the practical question 'How am I to live my life?' It may be considered certain then that II B was written to follow II A.

But was it written by the same person? It is conceivable that II A originally stood alone, and that it afterwards occurred to some one into whose hands the document came to write a sequel to it. But this is unlikely. The teacher's standpoint is the same in the one and the other; and there are peculiarities of diction in II A which recur in II B. ἀληθεία, which is the subject of discussion in II A, is repeatedly spoken of in II B, and has the same significance there; in both, there is the same avoidance of the word θεός; and in both alike, προσάρωπ is used to denote the supreme God. It is probable then, if not certain, that II A and II B are the work of the same man, and were intended to be read as two parts of one whole; and we may regard them as together making up a single libellus, which has been preserved in its entirety. The opening words of II A suggest the title Περὶ ἀληθείας; and not II A only, but the libellus as a whole, might very well bear that title. In the first part (II A), we are told 'where Reality is, and what it is'; in the second part (II B), we are told what we must do in order to attain to it. The one might be described as an exposition of the writer's metaphysic, and the other, as an exposition of his ethic; but in this document, as in the Hermetica in general, ethic is wholly subordinated to religion.

In Stobaeus, there is joined on to the end of II B, as if it were a continuation of the same Hermeticum, a document which I have separated from it, and which I call Excerpt XI. That document consists of a collection of aphorisms, with some appended remarks on the obligation of secrecy. It has nothing to do with II B; and it must have had a separate heading of its own, which has been lost by accident.

The doctrine of Exc. II A and II B is Platonic; and not only in the leading thought ('that there is nothing real here below'), but in the details of the argument by which this thesis is supported, there

1 Besides οἱ μὴν ὅτιν ἀληθῆ ἐστάθη in II B. 2, note II B. 3, (μαθησταὶ καὶ νῦν ὅτιν ἀληθεία καὶ τίς τοιν ζεύη; τὸν κατάληθον τοῦ ὅτινς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀληθείας; 5, πρὸς ἀληθείας ὅδη). The word νῦν occurs in neither; its correlate, ἀληθεία, is spoken of instead.
2 Προσάρωπ is not thus used elsewhere in the Hermetica, except once in the Kore Kosmē.
is fairly close resemblance between Exc. II A and a passage in Plutarch’s dialogue De Ei apud Delphos (16. 17 f., 392 b), in which a Platonist speaks as follows: "ο μὲν γὰρ θεὸς ἐκατόν ἦμῶν ἐνταῦθα προσέτετα . . . προσαγορεύει τὸ "Ἰννῆθι σαντὼν . . . ἡμεῖς δὲ τὰλαν ἀμείβομεν τὸν θεόν, "Εἰ" φαμέν, ὃς ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀφευθή καὶ μόνην μόνη προσηκόντας τὴν τοῦ εἶναι προσαγορεύοντας ἀποδιδόντες. ἦμων μὲν γὰρ ἄνω-"τως τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστιν οὔδεν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα θυτῆρι φύσις, ἐν μέσῳ γενέσεως καὶ φθοράς γενομένης, φάσμα παρέχει καὶ δοκεῖν ἄμυδραν καὶ ἀβέβαιον αὐτῆς ἀν θείαν διὰ λαβέσας λαβέσας χοῦλομενον, ὡσπερ ἡ σφοδρὰ παραβάσις ἕδατος τῷ πίεζει εἰς τοῦτο καὶ συναγείς διαρρέου ἀπόλλυσι τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον, οὔτω τῶν παθητῶν καὶ μεταβλητῶν ἐκάστοτε τὴν ἄναγραγίαν ὁ λόγος διώκων ἀποσφάλλεται τῷ μὲν εἰς τὸ γιγνόμενον αὐτοῦ, τῇ δ’ εἰς τὸ φθειρόμενον, οὔδενος λαβέσατε μένοντος οὐδὲ ὄντος ὄντως δυνάμενος. ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκτίν ἐμβήγαν διε τῷ αὐτῷ, καθ’ Ἑράκλειον, οὐδὲ θυτῆς οὐσίας διε ἄφασθαι κατὰ ἐξίν. ἀλλ’ ἀξύνησι καὶ τάχει μετα-βολῆς . . . (ἀμα) πρόσετι καὶ ἀπέκε. ὅθεν οὐδ’ εἰς τὸ εἶναι περαιρέ το γιγνόμενον αὐτῆς (οὐ. τ.’ς θυτῆς οὐσίας), τῷ μεδότοτε λήγειν μηδ’ ἵστασθαι τὴν γένεσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ σπέρματος δεὶ μεταβάλλονν μέμεν ἐμβηνον πολυμεν, ἔτα βρέφοις, ἐτὰ παιδά, (ἐντ) μεράκιοι, ἐφεξῆς νεανίσκων, [[ἐντ]] ἀνδρα, προ-βάτην, ἱεροντα, τάς πρώτας φθειρούσαν γενεσίας καὶ ἡλικίας τας επιγιγνόμενας . . . φθειρεται μὲν ἀκράζων γιγνομένον γέροντος, ἐφθάρη δ’ ὁ νέος εἰς τὸν ἀκμάζοντα, καὶ τὸ παιδα τὸ νήπιον’ δ’ ὁ δεῖδε εἰς τὸν σήμερον τέθηκεν, δ’ ὁ δείρασεν εἰς τὸν αὐρομ ἀποθηκεύει’ μενε δε οὐδετερ, οὐδ’ ἐστιμ εἰς, ἀλλὰ γιγνόμενα πολλαί, ἐπεὶ ἐν φαντασμοῖ καὶ κοινών ἐκμαγεῖαν ὅθης περιέλαμβανεν καὶ φωτισθαινόμενης.13 . . . οὕτω γὰρ ἀνευ μεταβολῆς ἔτερα πάσχειν εἰκός, οὔτε μεταβάλλων εἰς αὐτὸς ἐστίν. εἰ δ’ ὁ αὐτός οὐκ ἐστιν, οὐδ’ ἐστιν’ [ἀλλ’ ἐκ τούτου αὐτοῦ12 μεταβάλλει γιγνόμενος ἐτέρους ἐτέρους]17 ψευδεται δ’ ἡ ἀξιόθρησης, ἁγιοφι κὶ τοῦ ὄντος, εἰναι τὸ φαύλονον.8 τι οὖν ὄντως ἐν ὅστι; τὸ αἰῶν19 καὶ

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1 ἦμων . . . τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστιν οὔδεν: cf. Exc. II A. 11, καθότι ἄθροισας, οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀλήθη.
2 φάσμα παρέχει: cf. II A. 3, (κα) φαντασίας συνιστώτα. 1b. 17: φαντασίας οὖν καλείν δεῖ (τούς ἀνθρώπος γ.)
3 παιδα . . . νεανίσκων, ἀνδρα . . . γέροντα: cf. II A. 17, ὦτε . . . το παιδίν παιδίν (μένει), οὔτε δ’ νεανίσκως νεανίσκως, οὔτε δ’ ἁρπὴ ἁρπή, οὔτε δ’ γέρον γέρον.
5 Perhaps: περὶ ἐν [φαντασμοῖ καὶ κοινῶν ἐκμαγεῖον ὅθης περιέλαμβανεν καὶ φωτισθαινόμενης. The word ἐκμαγείας, is a plastic mass, is taken from Pl. Tim. 50 D.
6 Cf. II A. 16, τὸ δ’ ἡμ’ ὅταν τοὺς ἐν ἀληθείᾳ εἶνα ἔγερσιν.
7 The words ἀλλ’ . . . ἐτέρου interrupts the argument. They may have come from an explanatory note.
8 Perhaps ἄγνοια τοῦ ὄντος (ολομένη) εἶναι τὸ φαύλονον: cf. II A. 4, τῶν μὲν δωκοῦσαν ἀλήθη ὃμα, τῶν δ’ ἄν ἀληθεῖς ὄντων ἄφθου.
9 τί οὖν ὄντως ἐν ὅστι; τὸ αἰῶν κ.τ.λ.: cf. II A. 15 as emended, τί οὖν ἐν ἑσοι

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The writer of Corp. XIII appears to have borrowed from Exc. II A; and Lactantius, Div. inst. 2. 12. 4, quotes from it. Apart from that, I can find no definite indication of date. But the teacher's tone and attitude are not unlike those of Porphyry in his Ad Marcellam, and in some passages of his De abstinentia; and this libellus may very well have been written at some date in or not long before the lifetime of Porphyry, i.e. in the third century A.D.

Contents.

Exc. II A. Reality exists only in things everlasting. The four cosmic elements, when unmixed, are real; but we men consist of those elements intermixed. Thus we are unreal, and are consequently incapable of seeing or describing the real. §§ 1, 2.

On earth, there is nothing real. Of earthly things, some few are copies of reality; the rest are wholly unreal appearances. §§ 3, 4.

It is possible for us to see and declare the truth that there is nothing real on earth; but the fact that we can see and declare a truth must not be supposed to prove that we have reality in us. §§ 5, (7), 6, 8.

The real is the good; it is uncontaminated by matter, and is free from change. All earthly things are subject to change, and to destruction, which is the necessary counterpart of production; and all earthly things are therefore unreal. But the unreal things of this world are wrought by the Reality which is above. §§ 9, 10, (16), (18).

Man, as an earthly organism, is composite, and subject to change, and therefore is unreal. §§ 11, 12, (17).

The cosmic elements are partly real, but partly unreal. Inasmuch as they are everlasting, they are real; but inasmuch as they are subject to change, they are unreal. § 13.

tis ἀληθείας . . .; . . .—τὸν ἀλήθη. Ib. 1: ἀλήθειαν εἶναι ἐν μόνοις τοῖς ἄθεοις. Ib. 12 as emended, ἀληθεία εἶναι μόνον τὸ ἀλήθ. ὑπ'.
EXCERPTS II A, II B

[ ]

He alone is absolutely real, who is incorporeal and changeless.—He that ever is. § 15.

Exc. II B. That being so, what must a man do to live his life aright? He must be religious. And that he may be religious, he must pursue philosophy. He who does so will learn that there is One by whom all things are ordered to good ends; he will be thankful to Him; and being thankful to Him, he will be religious. § 2.

And if he pursues philosophy further, he will learn where Reality is, and what it is. Having learnt this, he will be yet more religious; and being filled with passionate love of the Good and Real, thenceforward he can never fall away. If you attain to that, all will be well with you, both in this life and after death. §§ 3, 4.

(But you must begin by freeing yourself from the body.) It is hard to do this; for before it can be done, there is a fight to be fought out within you. There is one part in you that strives to mount upward; but there are two parts in you that try to drag it down; and if the one is defeated by the two, your life on earth will be a state of penal torment. You must first win victory in this contest, and then mount upward. §§ 5–8.

Exc. II A, § 1. When a proposition is called ἀληθῆς, the word means ‘true’; when a thing is called aληθικόν, the word means ‘real’. In this document, ἀληθῆ signifies ‘real’, and ἀληθεία ‘reality’;—except in some phrases in §§ 5–6, where ἀληθῆ νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν means ‘to think true thoughts and make true statements’.


Περὶ ἀληθείας, ὧν Τάτ, οὗκ ἐστὶ δυνατὸν (καὶ δέξιαν εἰπεῖν). As Hermes goes on to say that it is possible to speak about ἀληθεία, (οὐκ ἐστὶ δυνατὸν, τούτο φημὶ,) he cannot have begun by saying that it

1 Interpolation: [The Sun alone is real, for he alone is changeless. The Sun resides over the Kosmos, and is subordinate only to the one supreme God.]
is not possible to do so; εἰπεῖν must therefore have been qualified by something like καὶ ἄξιαν. Cf. Pl. Phaedr. 247 c: τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον τόπον οὔτε τις ὑμνήσῃ τι ... οὔτε ποῦ ὑμνήσει καὶ ἄξιαν. ἢ μεῖ δὲ τολμήσει γὰρ οὖν τὸ γε ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν (to say what is true), ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀληθείας (reality) λέγοντα. Corp. XVIII. 12: κἂν εἰ μὴ [τὸ] πρὸς ἄξιαν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν.

ζῷον ἄτελης, εἰ ἄτελών συγκείμενον μερῶν (μελῶν MSS.). This is a reminiscence of Pl. Tim. 32 d, where the Kosmos is described as ζῷον τέλεον ἐκ τελεῶν τῶν μερῶν. In that passage, the τέλεα μέρη of the Kosmos are 'all the fire there is, and all the water, and all the air, and all the earth.' The ἄτελη μέρη of which a man is composed are, as the Hermetist proceeds to explain, portions of fire, air, water, and earth, corrupted by intermixture. In Herm. Exc. III. 12, the ἄδικα σώματα are called τέλεα σώματα.

[τολμήσαντα εἰπεῖν]. τολμήσαντα is meaningless in connexion with a verb dependent on δυνατὸν; and εἰπεῖν, if meant to depend on the preceding οὐκ ἐστι δυνατόν, is too far separated from it. It may be suspected that the words δίκαιον τολμήσαντα εἰπεῖν originally went together. 'It is possible to say something about ἀλήθεια; and it is right to make the venture.' Cf. τολμήσειν in Pl. Phaedr. 247 c, quoted above. Corp. X. 24 b: εἰ χρῆ τολμήσαντας εἰπεῖν. Ib. 25: τολμήσεως εἰπεῖν.

ἀλήθειαν εἶναι ἐν μόνοις τοῖς ἄδικοις [σώμασιν]. The ἄδικα σώματα may be 'real'—at least in some degree; but they are certainly not the only things that are real; for that which is real in the highest degree is incorporeal. (See §§ 13 and 15.) It is therefore necessary to bracket σώμασιν.

§ 2. τὰ (ἄδικα) σώματα αὕτα (μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ) ἀληθῆ ἐστὶ. The term ἄδικα σώματα is applicable both to the cosmic elements and to the heavenly bodies. But the writer here speaks of the cosmic elements alone; and if the heavenly bodies are thought of at all, they must be thought of as included under the element fire, of which they are composed.

The elements are 'real' only so far as they are pure. As they exist in our bodies, and in all things upon earth, they are adulterated by intermixture with one another, and therefore none of them is 'real'. πῦρ αὐτόπυρ means fire by itself, free from intermixture with anything else. The wording of this sentence may have been suggested in part by Pl. Tim. 51 b: ἄρ' ἔστι τι πῦρ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, καὶ πάντα περὶ ὑπὸ ἅληγομεν οὖν αὗτὰ αὕτα καθ' αὐτὰ ὑπὸ ἑαυτὰ ἐκαστά; ἢ
taïta ἄτερ καὶ βλέπομεν, δοσα τε ἄλλα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αληθειώμεθα, μόνα ἵστι τοιαίτερ ξοντα ἢληθειαν, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἠστι παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδαμὴ οὐδαμός, ἄλλα μᾶτην ἐκάστοτε εἶναι τί φαμεν ἐλθος ἐκαστον νοητῶν; But though the Hermetist may have had the words of that passage in his mind, his meaning is different. The πῦρ ἄτομο ἐφ' ἐαυτοῦ of the Timaeus is the νοητῶν ἐλδος (Platonic ‘idea’) of fire. But the πῦρ αὐτόπυρ of Exc. II A cannot be the νοητῶν ἐλδος of fire; for we are told that it is a body. The νοητῶν ἐλδος is not a body.

The source of the writer's thought is to be found rather in Pl. Phileb. 29 A: τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἀπάντων τῶν ζων πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πνεύμα (air) καθορίμεν ποι καὶ γῆν... ἐντάτα ἐν τῇ συντάσει... φέρε δὴ, περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν παρὶ ἡμῖν λαβέ τὸ τοιάνθε, ἄτομα ἐμφανίζεται καὶ ἡν ἐν τῇ δύναμιν οὐκ αἰείν τῆς φύσεως ἕχον... οἶνον πῦρ ἄστι μὲν ποι παρὶ ἡμῖν, ἄτομα δὲ ἐν τῷ παντὶ... οὐκοδομεῖ τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ ὁφη... ταυτά γάρ ἐρεῖσ, οἶμαι, περὶ τέ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζωίς γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ, κ.τ.λ.

But where and how do the elements exist in their ‘purity’ and ‘reality’? The πῦρ αὐτόπυρ may be considered to exist in the heavens, which, according to the Stoic physics, consist of unmixed fire. But where are γῆ αὐτόγη, ὕδωρ αὐτοῦδωρ, and ἀέρ αὐτοαέρ to be found? Perhaps the writer might have said that they occur nowhere in the universe as we know it, but that they did occur at a certain stage in the making of the universe. The Demiurgus first made the four elements (πῦρ αὐτόπυρ &c.) out of formless ἀληθῆ, and then made all sublunar things by mixing or combining the four elements together. See the passages on the separation of the elements in the Cosmogonies of Corp. I and Corp. III.

[μένον καὶ ὀδῦν ἄλλο]. Most likely (πῦρ) μένον καὶ ὀδῦν ἄλλο was inserted after πῦρ αὐτόπυρ, as an explanation of that unfamiliar term. If so, the explanation is correct; but it can hardly have been written by the author.

καὶ οὗτε πῦρ ἐστιν (ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀληθῆς) οὗτε γῆ οὗτε ὕδωρ οὗτε ἀέρ, οὗτε ὀδῦν ἀληθῆς. Lactantius, Div. inst. 2. 12. 4, referring to this passage, writes ‘(Trismegistus) nostra corpora... dixit... et neque ignem esse neque aerem esse neque aquam neque terram’. It appears therefore that he read καὶ οὗτε πῦρ ἐστιν οὗτε γῆ οὗτε ὕδωρ οὗτε ἀέρ, as in our MSS., and took the sentence to end at οὗτε ἀέρ. Perhaps we should insert ἐν αὐτοῖς or something of the sort, and also add ἀληθῆς.
Man is here considered merely as an earthly organism; and the divine νοῦς which is present in some men at least, and in virtue of which they are capable of seeing the Real, is left out of account.

If then nothing in us is real, we can apprehend nothing that is real.

Earthly things are divided into two classes, viz.

1. things which, though not real, are copies of the real, and
2. things which are not even copies of the real. The former, which are the less numerous, are presumably to be identified with the things which 'partake of the good', and the latter, with the things which are wholly bad.

It is necessary to insert τὰ δὲ before ἄλλα. The reading of the MSS. may be accounted for by assuming that τὰ δὲ was read as τὰ δὲ, and that this was altered into τὰ τῶν.

§ 4. ἑταὶ φάντασίαι [καθάπερ εἰκόνες] συμβατὰ. καθάπερ εἰκόνες is a misplaced doublet of καθάπερ καὶ ἡ εἰκόν in § 4.

φάντασία means 'unreal appearance', as opposed to reality. Cf. Pl. Soph. 260 c: καὶ μὴν ἀπάντης οὐκ ἂν εἰδώλων τε καὶ εἰκόνων ἢ δή καὶ φάντασία πάντα ἀνάγκη μεστὰ εἴναι. The word φάντασμα is similarly used by Plato; e.g. Soph. 236 b; Rep. 584 a, 598 b, 599 a.

§ 4. ἕτεροι δὲ ἄνωθεν τὴν ἐπίρροιαν ἐξῆ λέγεται φαντασία, τῆς ἀλήθειας γίγνεται µέµησις. This refers to the ὀλγα which were said above to be ἀλήθειας µυµήµατα. Does τὴν ἐπίρροιαν ἐξῆ mean ἐπιρρέῃ; Or are we to understand some genitive (e.g. τοῦ θείου) after ἐπιρροοιαν;

καὶ όσα ὅρασεν ἄφοβα (τὸν εἰκὼν τῇ γραφῇ), βλέπει δὲ οὐδὲν (καὶ δῦτα) ἄκουει δὲ οὐδέν ἄλλως. This looks like a
EXCERPT II A: 3–6

reminiscence of Ps. 113. 13 (115. 5): ὀφθαλμοῖς ἤζουσιν καὶ οὐκ ὄφωνται ὡτα ἤζουσιν καὶ οὐκ ἀκούσονται. (Repeated in Ps. 134 (135). 16, with ἐνώτιοτάς ἀκούσονται in place of ἀκούσονται.) But the resemblance is in the words alone, and not in the thought. The Psalmist is speaking of the idols worshipped by the heathen; the Hermetist is speaking of a painted portrait of a man.

τῶν μὲν δοκούντων ἀληθὶς ὄραν, τῶν δὲ ἔστιν ἀληθῆς οὕτων ψευδών. τῶν μὲν is masculine, and means those who look at the picture; τῶν δὲ is neuter, and means the things seen in the picture. For the play on the word ἀληθῆς, cf. Pl. Rep. 2. 382 a: τῷ γε ὦς ἀληθῶς ψεύδος, εἰ οἶνον τῷ τούτῳ εἰπεῖν. Theaet. 189 c: τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδονς.

The writer assumes that the man who looks at the picture is deceived by it, and mistakes the painted figure for a living being. Plato (Rep. 598 c, Soph. 234 b, and Phileb. 38 d) speaks of a similar mistake in the case of an image or painting seen at a distance.

§§ 5, (7)), 6, 8. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν . . . μηδεν ἀληθῆς εὑράδε. Hermes says that it is possible for men to think true thoughts and speak true words (ἀληθῆς) about reality (ἀλήθεια). Thereupon Tat, confusing the two meanings of the word ἀληθῆς, argues that if there are men on earth who think and speak ἀληθῆ, there is some ἀλήθεια (reality) on earth; but Hermes rejects this argument.

It is clear that this was the general meaning of the passage; but the text is in confusion. I have tried to make sense of it by transposing § 7 (οὗτως ἀληθῆς . . . Τί δοι;.)

§ 6. [οἷς ἄν ὁ θεὸς τὴν θεοτικὴν διωρίσηται δύναμιν.] θεοτικὴν is inappropriate here. If the power of thinking truly about ἀλήθεια is to be called ἡ θεοτικὴ δύναμις, it must be assumed that ἀλήθεια is identical with God; but the writer does not bring ἀλήθεια into connexion with God until § 15, and therefore could hardly presuppose its identity with God in § 6. It is probable then that οἷς ἄν . . . δύναμιν is an interpolation.

For the word θεοτικός, cf. Exe. VII. 3: μάλιστα ἐκεῖνος συμβαίνει τὸ ἀληθεύεται, οἷς θεοτική δύναμις οὐ πρόσεστι. In Adamonis Resp. 8. 6 a (Testim.), the higher of the ‘two souls’ of man is called ἡ θεοτικὴ ψυχὴ. An instance of θέσπτης occurs in the traditional text of Philo De mutatione nominum 2. 7, vol. iii, p. 157 Wendland: Μωνοχὶς οὖν οὐ τῆς ἀδελφός φύσεως θεατὴς καὶ θέσπτης. But Wendland brackets καὶ θέσπτης; and apart from this, the earliest instance of θέσπτης given in Sophocles Lex. is about A. D. 6oo. θεσπτία, as far as I know, occurs first in Eusebius.
§ 8. [τὰ δέντα [θ' θοί] νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν]. δεῖ may have been repeated from ἀληθεία καὶ καλεῖν; and τὰ δέντα νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν is probably a doublet of ἀληθῆ νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν above.

[ἐντὸς δὲ οὔδεν ἀληθῆ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.] These words might be combined with [φαντασίαι εἰσὶ καὶ δόξαι πάντα] in § 7. It would be possible to write ἐστὶν οὔδεν ἀληθῆ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, φαντασίαι δὲ καὶ δόξαι πάντα. We may suppose this to have been a marginal note in which the teaching of the passage was summed up.

[(καὶ οὐκ ἀσκότως)] (εἶπον ὦτι) τοῦτο ἀληθῆ ἔστι, τὸ μὴ εἶναι (εἰδέναι MSS.) μὴ δὲν ἀληθῆ εὐθάδε. The words καὶ οὐκ ἀσκότως are meaningless where they stand in the MSS.; and they make sense at the place to which I have transposed them. The statement τοῦτο ἀληθῆ ἔστιν, τὸ μὴ εἶναι μὴ δὲν ἀληθῆ εὐθάδε, is a repetition, in a slightly altered form, of the statement of Hermes as emended, ἀληθῆς οὔδεν εἶναι ἐν τῇ γῇ νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ἀληθῆ νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν. If Hermes admitted Tat's argument to be valid, he would have to admit that he had spoken ἀσκότως (i.e. without due consideration) when he made that statement. But he denies that he spoke ἀσκότως; that is he maintains that his statement was correct, in spite of Tat's objection.

§ 9. ἡ γὰρ ἀληθεία [ ] ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀκρότον ἀγαθὸν . . . τὰ δὲ εὐθάδε . . . ἠθέτα [ ] τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. The writer identifies τὸ ἀληθῆ with τὸ ἀγαθὸν. And so, when he says that there is nothing ἀληθῆ on earth, his position closely resembles that of the writer of Corp. VI, who says that there is nothing ἀγαθὸν on earth. That which is 'real' is that which is really good; things which are 'unreal' are things which men mistakenly think to be good.

τὸ μὴ ὑπὸ ἀλῆς θολοῦμενον μὴτε ὑπὸ σώματος περιβαλλόμενον, γυμνὸν φανόν, ἄτρεπτον [σεμόν] ἀναλλοίωσιν. Cf. § 15: τὸν μὴ ἐξ ὑλῆς, τὸν μὴ ἐν σώματι ... τὸν ἄτρεπτον, τὸν μὴ ἀλλοίωσιν, Corp. XIII. 6 as emended: Τὸ ὑπὸ ἁλῆς θολοῦμενον ... Τὸ μὴ χωλοῦμενον, ... τὸ μὴ περιορίζομενον, ... τὸ γυμνὸν, τὸ φανόν, ... ἄτρεπτον, τὸ ἀναλλοίωσιν, τὸ ἁγαθὸν. The words τὸ μὴ ὑπὸ ἁλῆς θολοῦμενον μὴτε ὑπὸ σώματος περιβαλλόμενον are a description of what might be more shortly called τὸ ἀσώματον.—ἄτρεπτον and ἀναλλοίωσιν ought to go together; σεμόν, by which they are separated in the MSS., is doubtless a corrupted duplication of γυμνόν.

§ 10. ἄνων μὴδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὰ ἀληθῆ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ εὑρεῖν; A thing would be πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἀληθῆ ('real in relation to itself'), if it continued through all time to be what it is at any given moment. But earthly things do not thus continue.
§ 16. πάντα δὲ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς φθορὰ καταλαβεῖ . . . πῶς ἂν ἀληθὲς εἶν;

The contents of this section are closely connected with those of § 10; and it seems clear that it ought to follow § 10, and precede § 11. In § 10, the writer has said that all things which are subject to change are unreal; in § 16, he goes on to say that all things which are subject to destruction are unreal. Having thus laid down certain tests of reality and unreality, he proceeds to apply these tests (1) to man (§§ 11, 12, (17)), and (2) to 'the everlasting bodies' (§ 13); and having shown that man is unreal, and that 'the everlasting bodies' are only partly real, he ends by asking and answering the question 'what then in absolutely real?' (§ 15).

These words are obviously out of place here. It would be possible to put them in after τὸ ψεύδος φημι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐνέργημα εἶναι at the end of § 18, supplying τὸ ψεύδος as the object of ἐμπερεῖξε; but they are not needed there, and it seems better to reject them altogether.

οὖθε γένεσις δύναται τούτην. This phrase would be admissible only if γένεσις were taken in the sense of τὰ γεγονόμενα, 'the things that come into being'. But in the rest of the paragraph, γένεσις is used only to signify 'the process of coming into being' (as in ἢν μὴ στῇ Ἰ γένεσις); and that process could hardly be said to 'be put together' (συντηναί), though the things themselves might. It is probable therefore that there is some corruption here.

[καὶ ἐμπερεῖξε καὶ ἐμπερεῖξε· ή τοῦ ἀληθοῦς πρόνοια]. These words are obviously out of place here. It would be possible to put them in after τὸ ψεύδος φημι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐνέργημα εἶναι at the end of § 18, supplying τὸ ψεύδος as the object of ἐμπερεῖξε; but they are not needed there, and it seems better to reject them altogether.

§ 18. μεταβαλλόμενα δὲ . . . ἐνέργημα εἶναι. The first sentence of this section (μεταβαλλόμενα δὲ ψεύδηται [ ] τὰ ὄντα) continues the argument of § 16, and has been wrongly separated from it in the MSS. by the interposition of § 17, which evidently belongs to the discussion of the question whether man is real (§§ 11, 12).

τὸ ψεύδος φημι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐνέργημα εἶναι. This implies that God
is the author of the \textit{phantasias} or illusions of which the sensible world consists. Cf. \textit{Corp. V. i}: οὐκ άυτός γεννώμενος ἐν φαντασίᾳ, πάντα δὲ φαντασίων, κ.τ.λ. The thought is similar to that of Omar Khayyam: 'We are no other than a moving row | Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go | Round with the Sun-illumined Lantern held | In Midnight by the Master of the Show.' But the writer is not yet ready to speak openly of God, and still adheres to the abstract term ἡ ἀλήθεια.

§ II. Οὔδε ἄνθρωπος ἄληθής ἐστιν; Compare the discussion of the question whether man is ἀγαθός, in \textit{Corp. II}, \textit{Corp. VI}, and \textit{Corp. X}. Ἐν σοφοὶ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἐστιν ἄληθής. In so far as he is merely a man (i.e. an earthly organism), he is not real. The words καθότι ἄνθρωποι serve to suggest the thought that a man may become something more than a mere man. He who has received into himself the divine νοῦς, or has got γnosis, is godlike, or a god (\textit{Corp. XIII} &c).

⟨τὸ⟩ [καὶ] ἐξ αὐτοῦ μένον τὴν σύνταξιν ἔχων. This stands in contrast to ἐκ πολλῶν συνέστηκε, and must therefore be taken as equivalent to τὸ ἀσύνηστον. (Cf. αἰτογέννητος = ἀγέννητος.) Man is (1) συνταξάτος, and (2) τρεπτός καὶ μεταβλητός; and for both these reasons, he cannot be ἀλήθης.

τρέπεται δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλεται (εἰς) ἥλικίαν ἀν ἥλικίας. Cf. \textit{Corp. XIII}. 5: τὸ γὰρ θνητὸν ἔδος καθ' ἡμέραν ἀλλάζεται χρόνω γὰρ τρέπεται εἰς αἰζήριν καὶ μείωσιν, ὡς ψεύδος (δὲν).

καὶ ταῦτα ἐπὶ δὲν ἐν τῷ σκήνῃ]. This would imply that man is even more subject to μεταβολαί when he has quitted the body. It might no doubt be said that a soul, when disembodied, is still subject to μεταβολαί—being liable, for instance, to a series of incarnations in different bodies (cf. \textit{Corp. X.} 7, τοῦτων τῶν ψυχῶν πολλαὶ αἱ μεταβολαί); but the 'man' spoken of in this paragraph is man embodied upon earth, and a reference to disembodied souls would be irrelevant. It is therefore best to bracket καὶ ταῦτα . . . σκήνῃ.

§ 17. φαντασιάς οὖν καλεῖν δεῖ [ ] ⟨⟨τοῦς ἄνθρωπος⟩⟩ . . . οὕτε ὁ γέρων γέρων. This passage fits on perfectly to the end of § 12 (ϕαντασία δὲ τις); and it can hardly be doubted that it originally stood here.

[⟨τὸν ἄνθρωπον⟩] [ἄνθρωποτοτοῦ φαντασίαν] τὸ δὲ (μὲν) παιδίον παιδίου φαντασίαν, τὸν δὲ νεανίσκον κ.τ.λ. ἄνθρωπος is the general term under which παιδίον, νεανίσκος, ἄνήρ, and γέρων are included; it ought not therefore to stand side by side with one of them.
the same series. Moreover, the addition of ἀνθρώπων to the list impairs the force of the argument; for the ἀνθρώπως remains an ἀνθρώπος all the time that he is passing through the changes from παιδίον to γέρων. It is most likely then that τὸν ἀνθρώπον was inserted before τὸ μὲν παιδίον by an accidental error, and that a transcriber tried to make sense of it by filling out the phrase on the analogy of those which follow. But he blundered in doing so; for he ought to have written ἀνθρώποι φαντασίαν, and not ἀνθρώπωτητος φαντασίαν.

ἀδεὶ φαντασία ψεύδος ἐν εἴη [ἀρξόταιον]. These words fitly end the paragraph by giving a direct answer to the question with which it began. 'Is man real?' 'No; for he is a φαντασία, and that which is a φαντασία is unreal.' But ἀρξόταιον can hardly be right; for it would imply that there are other things which are unreal in some degree, but less unreal than φαντασίας; and there would be no point in hinting at the existence of such things here.

§ 13. Ὁδὲ ταῦτα οὖν . . . τὰ ἄδιδα σώματα [[ ]] ἀληθῆ ἐστὶν; The ἄδιδα σώματα spoken of in § 2 were the four cosmic elements; and it is to be presumed that here also the four elements are meant.

⟨ἐπεὶ μεταβάλλεται⟩. The writer accepts the doctrine that all the four elements are transmutable, and are constantly changing into one another. But he holds that they are none the less ἄδιδα; for though portions of fire, for instance, are continually changing into air, water, and earth, the mass of fire in the Kosmos is maintained undiminished, by the simultaneous transmutation of portions of the other elements into fire. Cf. Corp. XII. ii. 14 c as emended: τὰ ἀσύνθετα σώματα (i.e. the cosmic elements), καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν εἰς ἀληθὲς ποιούμενα, ἀεὶ τῆς ταυτότητος τὴν ἀκτηριαν σῶζει. In Corp. VIII. 4, the cosmic elements are spoken of as τὰ ἄδικα αὐτὰ σώματα, τούτουτα τὰ ἄθανατα. See also what is said of τὰ ἄδικα σώματα in Exc. V. i. Cf. Macrobius Somn. 2. 12. 14: 'Plotinus . . . cum de corporum absolutione dissereret, et hoc dissolvi posse pronuntiaret, quiequid effluat, obiecens sibi: cur ergo elementa, quorum fluxus in aperto est, non similiter aliquando solvuntur? Et breviter tantae obiectioni valideque respondit: ideo elementa, licet fluant, numquam tamen solvi, quia non foras effluant. A ceteris enim corporibus quod effluat recedit; elementorum fluxus numquam ab ipsis recedit elementis. Ergo
in hoc mundo pars nulla mortalis secundum verae rationis adser.ta'.

In regarding air, water, and earth as 'everlasting' bodies, the Hermetist differs from the Stoics, who said that at each ecpyrosis these three elements are wholly transmuted into fire.

Πάν μὲν οὖν τὸ [γεννητὸν καὶ] μεταβλητὸν οὐκ ἀληθῆς. It is true that the elements are γεννηταί, both in the sense that they were originally made by the Demiurgus, and in the sense that they are continually being produced out of one another; but there is no occasion to mention that fact here.

This was probably suggested by Pl. Tim. 41 b, where the Demiurgus says to the gods whom he has made (i.e. to the parts of the Kosmos) ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε, ἀδάνατοι μὲν οὖν ἔότε οὐδὲ ἐλυτοί τὸ πάμπαν, οὐ τι μὲν δὴ λυθῆσεθε γε, οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μούρας. The elements are not in themselves indestructible; but it is the will of God, who made them, that they shall never be destroyed. Consequently, they hold an intermediate position between 'the unreal' and 'the real'. They are unreal qua μεταβλητά, but real qua αἰθία.

It is unintelligible; it is difficult to see what could be meant by saying that the elements 'have received matter' from God, and that the matter which they have received from him is real. It seems therefore that ἡλήν must have been substituted for some other word, possibly ὁδικαί or ὑπαρξιν.

προσάτωρ is here used as an appellation of the supreme God. Cf. τὸν προσάτορα (τῆς ψυχῆς) in Exc. II. 3. The only other Hermetic passage in which προσάτωρ is thus employed is Kore Kosmu, Exc. XXIII. 10: ταύτην Φύσεως (ὁ)νόματε ἐπίμην ὁ θεός ὁ προσάτωρ. See Abaβmonis Resp. 8. 4d (Testim.), where the supreme God is called προσάτωρ.

The earliest known instances of this use of the word occur in accounts of the Valentinian doctrine (second century A. D.). Irenaeus i. 1. 1: the Valentinians say τινὰ εἶναι ἐν ἀδοράτους καὶ ἀκατονομάτως ὑψόματα τέλειων αἰῶνα προσάτωρ τούτων δὲ καὶ (Προσάρχην καὶ) Προσάτορα καὶ Βούδον καλοῦν. Iren. i. 14. 2 &c. In the Valentinian system, Νοῦς, the first emanation from the Βούδος, is πατήρ, and the Βούδος itself is consequently προσάτωρ.

Whence did Macrobius get this? It partly agrees in meaning with Plotinus Enn. 2. 1. 3; but it is not a translation of that passage.
The writers of the *Pistis Sophia* and the other 'Coptic-Gnostic' documents frequently use προπάτωρ as the name or title of a divine Person. (See C. Schmidt, *Koptisch-Gnostische Schriften I*, Index, s. v. προπάτωρ.) They employed it as a word of vaguely holy import; but they had ceased to attach any definite meaning to it, as is shown by the fact that they sometimes speak of προπάτωρες in the plural.

It is most likely that the Valentinians adopted the use of προπάτωρ as a name of the supreme God from some Pagan Platonist, and that the writer of *Exc. II*, and the 'Egyptians' of *Abammonis Resp.*, got it from the same Pagan source. There is no need to suppose that the Hermetist borrowed it from the Valentinians, though the earliest extant instance of this use of the word happens to come from Valentinian writings. Perhaps he regarded the Kosmos as πατήρ of man, and God as προπάτωρ. Cf. *Corp.* X. 14 b, where it is said that man is son of the Kosmos, and 'τετραγωνος' of God. The word was used by later Platonists; e. g. Synesius, *Hymn.* 3. 47: προπάτωρ, ἀπάτωρ.

§ 14. [((Τι οὖν ἐν εἰποὶ τις)) ἀληθεῖς . . . ;—Μόνον τὸν θλιον κ.τ.λ.] This section must be one of the numerous 'solar interpolations' which we find inserted in the *Hermetica* by devotees of the Sun-god. It is inconsistent with what precedes and follows. The statement that 'the Sun alone is real' is contradicted by § 15; and the statement that the Sun οὐ μεταβᾶλλεται cannot be reconciled with § 13, where we are told that the ἀθικα σώματα (under which term the Sun, as a body composed of fire, must be included) are μεταβλητά. The interpolator borrowed the words which he found at the beginning of § 15 (Τι οὖν ἐν εἰποὶ τις κ.τ.λ.), and employed them here to introduce a passage in praise of the god of his special cult. The function which he assigns to the Sun, viz. that of a Demiurgus supreme within the Kosmos, and subject only to the supracosmic God, is similar to the function assigned to the Sun in *Corp.* XVI. See also *Exc.* V. 2.

§ 15. Τι οὖν ἐν εἰποὶ (τις ἀληθεῖς) τὴν πρώτην ἀλήθειαν;—(Τι οὖν ἐν εἰποὶ τὴν πρώτην ἀλήθειαν; MSS.). The phrase ἀληθεῖς τὴν πρώτην ἀλήθειαν, 'real with the supreme reality', i. e. 'real in the highest degree', is intended to contrast the absolute reality of God with the partial or imperfect reality of the 'everlasting bodies', which was spoken of in § 13.

Here at last the Hermetist passes from the neuter (τὸ ἀληθεῖς)
and the abstract feminine (ἡ ἀλήθεια) to the masculine (τὸν ... ἄει ὄντα), and by doing so, declares openly what he has hitherto kept back, namely, that 'the real' of which he has been speaking is nothing else than God. Yet even here, the word θεὸς is still avoided.

τὸν ἀρχώματον, τὸν ἀσχημάτιστον. Cf. Exc. VIII. 2: of the three kinds of ἀσώματα in man, the first (ἰ. δ. νοῦς) is ἀρχώματον, ἀσχημάτιστον. Pl. Phaedr. 247 c: ἢ γὰρ ἀρχώματός τε καὶ ἀσχη-

μάτιστος καὶ ἀναφής οὐσία ὄντως οὕτω, ψυχή, κ.τ.λ. Porphyry Ad Marcellam 8: εὖο οὐχ ὁ ἀπτός οὗτος καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ὑποτετών, ὁ δὲ ἐκ πλείστον ἀφετηκὼς τοῦ σώματος, ὁ ἀρχώματος καὶ ἀσχη-

μάτιστος, ... διανοίᾳ δὲ μόνη κρατήρος;

Exc. II B, § 1. εὖο [ὁ τίκνον] ... 'πρῶτον τῶν συγγραφῶν'. As given in the traditional text, this section is utterly incomprehensible. If we retain τίκνον, it would seem that the author must have intended the words to be taken as written by Hermes, and addressed to Tat. But this libellus is not an epistle or written treatise sent by Hermes to his son; it is ostensibly a written report of a spoken dialogue, in which Tat takes part (§ 2 init.) as well as Hermes; and how could the author possibly make Hermes say, in a conversation with his son, 'I am composing this dialogue in writing',—i.e. 'I am at this moment writing the libellus in which this my conversation with you is recorded'? It is impossible to believe that even the most muddle-headed Hermetist could have been capable of such confusion of thought as that would involve.¹

But if the speaker cannot be Hermes, who is it that is speaking? As long as we suppose that the Hermetist wrote this section, there seems only one course open to us, namely, to take § 1 as a pre-

liminary note written by the author in his own person, and to interpret him as saying: 'I am writing this libellus first, (but I intend to write some others afterwards)'.² But this hypothesis does not work out satisfactorily. What is the meaning of καὶ τῆς φιλανθρωπίας

¹ There is a somewhat similar confusion of thought in Ascl. Lat. 1 b ('Tracta-
tum hunc autem tuo (in)scribam nomine,' addressed by Hermes to Asclepius); but in that instance, the use of the future tense, if it does not wholly get rid of the absurdity, at any rate diminishes it. Besides, the introductory passage in which those words occur appears to have been added by a blundering redactor.

² On this assumption, it might perhaps be possible to retain τίκνον, taking the τίκνον to be, not Tat, but a pupil of the author (not necessarily a son in the literal sense), to whom the author sends or dedicates the dialogue which he writes. But it is simpler to strike out τίκνον.
Does the author mean 'I am composing this dialogue in order to show my benevolence and piety'? That will hardly do. And what is the point of the following remark, \textit{τὸς ἀνὴρ ... ἐσχατοῖα κ.τ.λ.}? Moreover, it seems clear that \textit{II B} was written as a continuation of \textit{II A}. Its author was probably the same man who had previously written \textit{II A}; and if so, \textit{II B} was not the first thing that he wrote. And even if he was not the same man, he would not be likely to write \textit{πρῶτον τὸδε συγγράφω} at the head of his sequel to an already existing document.

Thus the word \textit{συγγράφω} gives rise to insuperable difficulties on the assumption that the Hermetist was the writer. If, in place of \textit{πρῶτον τὸδε συγγράφω}, we write \textit{πρὸ πάντων προτιμῶ τὸδε τὸ σύγγραμμα} (or \textit{τὴν τὴν συγγραφὴν}), or something to that effect, the section becomes intelligible as a note written by a reader to express his admiration for \textit{Exc. II B}, and inserted into the text by error. (Compare the words \textit{Asclepius iste pro sole mihi est}, written by an admiring reader at the head of the Latin \textit{Asclepius}, and printed in the earlier editions as the opening words of the text.) \textit{ἐκ τῶν} may have been inserted by a transcriber who, finding that in the following section Hermes was addressing his son, thought that the same form of address was needed in the opening sentence.

[If \textit{συγγράφω} be taken in the sense of 'set down', another hypothesis may be considered. The section is placed at the head of an excerpt, and the 'reader' who wrote it might be an anthologist, who placed this extract, \textit{ἐνεκα τῆς εὐσεβείας}, at the head of a series dealing with the same subject. It may be observed that this at all events is what Stobaeus did in chapter 41 of the first book.]

Patrizzi singles out \textit{Exc. II B} for special praise, and says there is more philosophy in it than in all the works of Aristotle;\textsuperscript{1} and the unknown writer of this note must have been similarly impressed by it. He says that he esteems it more highly than all other writings (or at any rate, more highly than all other \textit{Hermetica} that he has read), on account of the \textit{φιλανθρωπία} and \textit{εὐσεβεία} expressed or manifested in it; by way of justifying his opinion, he refers to certain phrases in § 2 \textit{(νοήσαι τὰ ὅντα} was suggested to him by \textit{δὲ μαθὼν οἷα ἔστι} \textit{(τὰ ὅτα})}, and \textit{χάριν τῷ ποιήσαντι ὑπὲρ τούτων ὁμολογήσαι} is his summary of \textit{χάριν εἰςεται ὑπὲρ πάντων τῷ ὁμολογηθεῖ} ... \textit{δὲ χάριν}

\textsuperscript{1} It is of the undivided piece in Stobaeus (\textit{i.e. Exc. II B + Exc. XI}) that Patrizzi says this; but it must have been the first part of it \textit{(Exc. II B)}, and not the collection of aphorisms \textit{(Exc. XI)}, that he so highly valued.
δομολογών εὐσεβήσει:); and he ends by declaring his resolve to put in practice in his own life that piety which the discourse of Hermes describes and recommends.

§ 2. ὁ δὲ εὐσεβείς ἄντων φιλοσοφήσει.—(ὁ δὲ εὐσεβῶν ἄκρως φιλοσοφήσει MSS.) The reading of the MSS. would imply that when a man has become completely εὐσεβής, he will pursue philosophy; i.e. that εὐσεβεία is the means whereby we may attain to φιλοσοφία. But the following words (χωρὶς φιλοσοφίας εὐσεβήσας ἀδύνατον κ.τ.λ.) show that the writer’s meaning was the reverse of this. His view is that εὐσεβεία is the end to be aimed at, and φιλοσοφία is the means whereby we may attain to it.

φιλοσοφία—or rather, the earlier stage of φιλοσοφία—is here explained to mean τὸ μαθεῖν οἷα ἐστὶ (τὰ ὄντα), καὶ τῶς διαταττόμενος, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος, καὶ ἕνεκεν τίνος (i.e. to learn that all things are ordered ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, and ἕνεκεν τοῦ ἅγαθοῦ). Compare the definition of philosophy at the end of Ascl. Lat. I.

§ 3. ὁ δὲ ἄκρως φιλοσοφῶν μαθήσεται (ὁ δὲ εὐσεβῶν εἰσέρθει MSS.) καὶ πού ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ τίς ἐστιν ἐκεῖνη καὶ (ταῦτα;) μαθών, ἔτι μᾶλλον εὐσεβεστέρος ἔσται. The learner’s progress in philosophy is divided into two distinct stages. In the first stage, he learns about the corporeal world (τὰ ὄντα). He comes to know that all things in it have been made and ordered by God; he is grateful to God for his goodness; and inasmuch as he is grateful to God, he is εὐσεβής. At this stage, he knows that God is the author of all corporeal things, but he still supposes these things to be real. But if he pursues philosophy further, he will learn ‘where reality is, and what it is’; that is, he will come to know that (as has been explained in Exc. II A) all corporeal things are unreal, and God alone is real; and this higher and fuller knowledge of God will make him still more εὐσεβής. The higher stage is described below as ἡ καταλήψις τοῦ ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀληθοῦς.—ἀλήθεια is correlative to νοῦς; and ἡ κατάληψις τοῦ ἀληθοῦς corresponds to what Platonists commonly called apprehension of τὰ νοητά. Compare Porphyry. De abstr. i. 31: ὡστε καὶ μελετητέον, εἰπερ ἀναστρέφειν πρὸς τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπουδάκαμεν, καθ’ ὅσον δύναμις, αἰσθήσεως μὲν ἀφιστατθεὶς καὶ φαντασίας, τῆς τε ταύταις ἐπομένης ἀλογίας, καὶ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὴν παθῶν . . . διαρθρωτέον δὲ τὰ κατὰ τῶν νον., . . . ἵνα μὴ μόνον ἀκούωμεν περί νοῦ καὶ τῶν νοητῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ, ὅση δύναμις, ὃμεν ἀπολαύοντες τε αὐτοῦ τῆς θεωρίας, καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀσωματίαν
EXCERPT II B: 2-4

καθιστάμενοι, καὶ ζώντες μετ' ἀληθείας δι' ἐκείνου, ἄλλ' οὐ ψευδώς μετὰ τῶν τοῖς σώματι συμφύλων.

The two stages of ἄληθεία (and of the ἐστίν which results from it) distinguished by the Hermetist are analogous to the two stages of the Christian's progress distinguished by Clement of Alexandria, who calls the lower stage πίστις, and the higher stage γνώσις.

In place of ἐστίν, we need some phrase signifying a further advance in knowledge. In the MSS., ἀκρός occurs in connexion with the earlier or preliminary stage. It is inappropriate there, but is just what is wanted here; and it is most likely that the author wrote ὁ δὲ ἄκρως φιλοσοφῶν.

(καὶ οὐκέτι ἄκρως διενεργεῖται ὑποσταί (ὡναται MSS.) τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.)

As placed in the MSS., this statement is a feeble and pointless repetition of what has been more fully expressed in the words οὔδεπεσε γὰρ . . . μνημὴ . . . ἀληθήναι ὑποσταί κ.τ.λ. On the other hand, something to this effect is needed before οὔδεπεσε γὰρ κ.τ.λ., to account for the γάρ.

On the question whether it is possible for one who has got gnosis to fall away, see Corp. XIII. 14. The writer of Exc. II B appears to hold that a man who has attained only to the lower stage of 'philosophy' and 'piety' may lose what he has gained, but that he who has once attained to the higher stage is secure against backsliding. Cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. 4. 22. 139: εἰ δὲ ἀγαθῶν μεμάθηκε τῶν θεῶν (ὁ γνωστικός), οὐχ ἔξει τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀπόβλητον οὕτος οἰκεῖως, κ.τ.λ. Ἱβ. 6. 78: ἐν ἔξει τελευτεῖσα τῇ μυστικῇ ἀμετάπτωτος δὲ ἀγάπην μένει (ἡ γνώσις).

[ἐν σῶματι οἴσα καὶ]. Probably a misplaced doublet of ἐν σῶματι σῶρῃ. § 5 fin.

§ 4. τούτῳ ἐστίν ἐστι (ὡνατω MSS.) τὸ ὅπου· ἐφ' ἐκ ἀληθινοῦ (ἀληθινοῦ MSS.) καὶ καλὸς βιώσῃ κ.τ.λ. With these words Hermes concludes his answer to Tat's question, Τί οὖν ἄν τις πράττων . . . καλὸς διαγάγω τὸν βίον; The way to live your life aright is to be ἐστίν; and he who learns to 'know God' attains to the height of ἐστίν. But Hermes adds to this a mention of the life after death, of which Tat had said nothing. If a man knows God, all will be well with him not only in this life, but also in the life to come; for his soul, when it quits the body, will know 'whither to direct its upward flight'; that is, it will fly up to God, whom it has learnt to know on earth. Cf. Exc.
To what does αὐτή refer? And what is meant by γάρ? The 'way which leads to Reality' (i.e. to God) must be the mode of life of the man who is seeking to attain to εἰσεβεία; but in the preceding section, Hermes was speaking, not of this 'way', but of the goal to which it leads (εἰσεβείας τέλος). We must therefore suppose that between § 4 and § 5 a passage has been lost, in which Hermes spoke of the course which must be pursued by the man who seeks to become εἰσεβής, or of some preliminary condition which he must fulfil before he can be εἰσεβής. What would that condition be? Judging from parallel passages in other Hermetica, it seems most likely that the writer said that the aspirant must begin by 'freeing himself from the body', i.e. ridding himself of the πάθη which are produced by the debasing influence of the body on the soul. Cf. Corp. IV. 6 b: ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα μακρέσθη κ.τ.λ. Corp. XI. ii. 21 a: ὁδὸν γὰρ δύνασαι τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν (νοησαί), φιλοσώματος ἄν καὶ κακῶς. Corp. VII. 2 b: πρῶτον δὲ δὲ σε περιρρήσασθαι δὲ φορεῖς χειρῶν (i.e. the body). Exe. VI. 19: ὅσοι δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου περισσόμενοι εἰσιν, οὔτων οὐκ ἄν ποτε θεάσασθαι τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ὀψιν. Now in § 8, the MSS. give δὲ γὰρ σε, ὁ τέκνον, πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα . . . ἐγκαταλέιψαι. The words πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα . . . ἐγκαταλέιψαι interrupt the sequence of thought there, and must be excised; but I am inclined to think that something like them originally stood at the beginning of § 5. E.g. the author may have written πλὴν δὲ σε πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα ἐγκαταλέιψαι: αὐτή γὰρ μόνη κ.τ.λ. 'But you must begin by abandoning your body,'—not in the sense of quitting it at death, but in the sense of alienating yourself from it during your life on earth;—for that is the only road that leads to Reality'.

ἳν καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι δηεένυαν, καὶ δεδώσαντες ἑτυχον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. 'Our ancestors' were once men on earth like you and me, but now are gods in the world above. In Corp. X. 5, Hermes is made to say much the same about two of his ancestors, who are there named Uranos and Kronos.

σεμνη αὐτή ὅδε καὶ 'λεία'. σεμνη and λεία are not suitable words to couple together; and λεία can hardly be reconciled with χαλεπή. It would be possible to write σεμνη . . . καὶ θεία.

χαλεπή δὲ ψυχή ἰδεύεται ἐν σώματι οὐση. Cf. Corp. IV. 9, as
emended: λαβώμεθα οὖν τῆς ἀρχῆς, καὶ ὀδεύσωμεν τάχει ἄπαντι. πόνι γὰρ ἐστι δύσκολον κ.τ.λ. Porphyry. Ad Marciam 6: οὐκ ἔν ... πρὸς τῶν μελλόντων νόστου δὴ μμυηκέσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἐνταύθων ἐξής καταγωγῆς τὸ δὲ ἡδονῆς ... καὶ βραχώνος ποιεῖ μὲν τὴν ἐπάνοδον. ... διὰ γὰρ μερίμνης ἡ ὀδός.

§ 6. πρῶτον [μὲν] γὰρ αὕτη ταὐτή πολεμήσασθαι δεῖ. πρῶτον means 'to begin with', i.e. before you can set out upon the way which leads to God.

ἐνδῶς γὰρ (ἑκ. μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς) γίνεται πρὸς δύο ή [σύ]στάσις. The Platonic psychology is taken for granted. The 'one' is νοῦς, or τὸ λογιστικὸν; the 'two' are τὸ θυμοειδὲς and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν, the two subdivisions of the irrational part of the soul. Cf. Corp. XVI. 15: τὰ δύο (ἅλογα) μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς ... τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς. The word στάσις shows that the writer has in mind the analogy between the human soul and a city, which is worked out in Pl. Rep.

[τοῦ μὲν φυγέων βουλομένου, τῶν δὲ κατασχεῖν σπευδότων.] This is a doublet of τοῦ μὲν ἑυγόντος, τῶν δὲ καθελκόντων κάτω.

§ 7. τιμωρούμενον τῇ ἐνθίδε διαίτη. 'Impiety' or s. is its own punishment. Cf. Corp. X. 20, 21. Corp. XIII. 7 b: Τιμωροῦσα γὰρ ἐν ἑμαυτῷ ἔχω ...; Οὐκ ἅλγους.

§ 8. οὔτως ἐστιν [ ] ἡ (περί) τῆς ἀκείσε ὅδοι ἄγων (ἄγων MSS.). It is a contest 'concerning the journey thither'; that is, a contest to decide whether the man shall enter on the upward way or not. If 'the one' is defeated by 'the two', you cannot even start upon the road which leads to God. The word ἄγων is used differently in Corp. X. 19 a: τὸν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἄγων ἀγωνισμένην ἄγων δὲ εὐσεβείας τὸ γνῶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ μηδένα ἀνθρώπων ἁδικήσαι.

EXCERPT III

Stob. 1. 41. 6 is given in the MSS., and printed in the editions of Stobæus, as a single and undivided piece, headed by the lemma Ἐρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρῶς Τὰρ. But it is evidently made up of two distinct and unconnected excerpts. The first page ('Ορθῶς ταῦτα . . . τοῦτο πράττοντιν, pp. 284. 4–285. 5 Wachsmuth) is a discussion of the instincts of animals. The rest ('Ενέργειαι γὰρ . . . τὰ δὲ ἀνάμιμα, pp. 285. 6–289. 18 Wachsm.) is a dialogue περὶ ἐνέργειῶν, i.e. concerning the forces, put forth by the heavenly bodies, which work on
sublunar things; and with that topic the first page has nothing to do. It is most likely that Stobaeus gave the two pieces as distinct extracts, and wrote a second lemma (Τοῦ οὖν, meaning 'Ερμοῦ,) at the head of the second piece, but that this lemma has been omitted by an error of transcription.

I call the piece about ἐνίργειας Excerptum III. The piece about the instincts of animals appears to be a continuation of a passage given elsewhere by Stobaeus (Exc. IV A); and I call it Excerptum IV B.

All parts of Exc. III alike deal with ἐνίργειας, and therefore presumably belong to one and the same libellus. But the first part of the text (Exc. III. 1–6) consists of a series of detached scraps, some of which are more or less intelligible in themselves, but have no connexion with their context, while others are wholly meaningless. It is only when we arrive at § 7 that we are able to get at what the author meant. From that point onward to the end of the excerpt, we can trace his line of thought, though the continuity of the text is broken by some lacunae and by some interpolations.

Moreover, § 7 appears to be the beginning of a discussion of ἐνίργειας. The writer there starts by pointing out that there are forces at work in soulless bodies; he calls these forces ἐνίργειαι, and gives a definition of the term (§ 9 fin.); and he then goes on to discuss them. There is therefore strong reason to think that the dialogue originally began at our § 7, and that it is by error that §§ 1–6 have been placed before § 7.

Now § 7 begins with the words ἱερὸς λόγος, ὡ τέκνων, ἵστών οὖν, which, in the traditional text, follow the statement ἐνὶργειὰς ἔστι τῶν σωμάτων οὐ δύνανται ἐναι (§ 6 fin.). It is evident that there is something amiss here. There could be no reason for thus singing out, as 'holy', the proposition that forces cannot exist apart from bodies. Why should it be regarded as more 'holy' than the numerous other statements about ἐνίργειας which are made in the course of the dialogue? On the other hand, the discourse of Hermes as a whole, or the document in which it was recorded, might very well be described as 'holy', inasmuch as Hermes was a teacher inspired by God. Compare the title of Corp. III : Ἔρμοῦ τοῦ τρισμεγίστου λόγος ἱερὸς. Heading of the Kore Kosmu (Exc. XXIII) in Stobaeus : Ἔρμοῦ τρισμεγίστου ἐν τῇ ἱερᾶς βιβλίων (τῆς) ἐπικαλομένης Κ. Κ. Title of Ascl. Lat. : Ἔρμοῦ τρισμεγίστου βιβλίου ἱερὰ πρὸς Ἀσκληπιόν προσφωνηθεῖσα. We may conclude then that
EXCERPT III

\(\text{ἐρώς λόγος}\) was originally written, as a part of the title, at the head of the Hermetic \textit{libellus} which began with our § 7. When §§ 1–6 had been prefixed, the words \(\text{ἐρώς λόγος}\) stood no longer at the beginning, but in the midst of the text. In that position, they were meaningless; and a transcriber tried to make sense of them by adding \(\tau\varepsilon\kappa\nuν, \deltaστίν οὖτος\).

Most of the disconnected scraps which are heaped together in §§ 1–6 appear to be passages which have been accidentally shifted from their proper places in the body of the dialogue; one or two of them may be marginal notes misplaced.

\textit{Contents of Exc. III.}

\textbf{A. §§ 7–13. The forces-at-work.}

There are forces at work in bodies from which the soul has departed (\textit{e.g.} in a human corpse); and there are also forces at work in bodies that have never had soul in them (\textit{e.g.} in a stone). A ‘force-at-work’ may be defined as ‘that by which any sort of process is effected’. §§ 7, 9.

And all sorts of processes are always going on; for the Kosmos never ceases to generate things by the revolving movement of the heavens. § 10.

(Consequently, the forces-at-work are everlasting.)

The forces are incorporeal, but cannot work except in bodies; and as earthly bodies are perishable, there must be an unceasing production of fresh bodies for them to work in. §§ 11, 1((1)), 1((4)).

They come from the heavenly bodies, and enter into earthly bodies. Some of them act on the body; others act on the soul, but only while the soul is embodied. § 1((6)).

Of those which act on the soul, some begin to work in the man from the moment of his birth, but others not until his adolescence. The former act on the irrational parts of the soul; the latter cooperate with the rational part. § 1((5)).

The forces are more numerous than the bodies in the Kosmos; for there are often several different forces at work in a single body. § 13.

\textbf{B. §§ 14–21. The senses, considered in relation to the forces-at-work.}

Sensations are results produced by the working of the forces; and it is through the sensations produced by them that the working of
the forces is revealed. The forces come from heaven, (and are incorporeal and everlasting;) the senses are corporeal, and perish with the body. §§ 14, 15.

The heavenly bodies have not sensation; for sensation is the apprehension of an increase or decrease of the body, and the heavenly bodies are exempt from increase and decrease. The changes (i.e. increases and decreases) that befall a body, and the sensations (by which these changes are apprehended), are inseparably connected; and both together are produced by the forces at work in the body. §§ 16, (18).

Sensation takes place in all bodies (that are subject to increase and decrease), even in those that are soulless. § 17.

In men and beasts, these changes, and the sensations that go with them, are attended by pain and joy. Pain and joy are more completely dominant in beasts than in men. In man, it is the irrational part of the soul that is affected by pain and joy; and they work mischief in his life. §§ 19, 20.

Sensation does not belong to the soul. The soul, and the forces-at-work, are incorporeal things that are in a body; but sensation is a body. § 21.

Sources. In holding that all physical processes on earth are effected by the operation of forces put in action by the heavenly bodies, the writer is merely adopting an opinion which was generally prevalent in the period of the Roman empire. This opinion was already coming into vogue in Plato's time; and its influence is manifest in the Epinomis, written shortly after Plato's death. It was almost universally accepted in the philosophic schools which derived their doctrines from that interfusion of Platonism with Stoicism which took place in the first century B.C.¹

But the writer of Exc. III formulates this widely current doctrine in a way peculiar to himself. He uses the word ἐνόπηγες as a technical

¹ When the doctrine of which I am speaking presents itself apart from religion, it may be called 'astral physics'. But the heavenly bodies to whose influence all earthly processes were attributed were commonly regarded and worshipped as gods; and when the doctrine takes this form, it may be called 'astral religion'. See Cumont, Astrology and religion among the Greeks and Romans, 1912.

Astral religion is presupposed by astrology, but is not itself astrology. The astrologer was a man who not only held that all events on earth result from the operation of the heavenly bodies, but furthermore believed (or pretended to believe) that he knew the laws of their operation, and that he could consequently infer the course of future events on earth from the observed positions of the heavenly bodies. The distinction between astral religion and astrology is hardly maintained with sufficient clearness in Cumont's otherwise most instructive book.
term to denote the action of the heavenly bodies on earthly things; and though he does not personify the ἀνέργεια,¹ he so far hypostatizes them as to put them on a par with ἔναντι. See § 21, where he says that ἀνέργεια and ἔναντι alike are incorporeal things which 'are in bodies'.

In his recognition of incorporeal entities, the writer sides with the Platonists against the Stoics; and he shows himself a Platonist in his distinction between the 'rational part' of the soul and the (two) 'irrational parts', and in his condemnation of the emotions which belong to the 'irrational parts' (§§ 5 and 20), as well as in his mention of disembodied souls (§ 6). His statement that αἰσθήσεις is σῶμα (§ 21) seems to be a mark of Stoic influence. He holds the heavenly bodies to be immutable (§ 16), and apparently considers them to consist of 'the fifth substance' (§§ 16 and 8); in this respect, he agrees with the Aristotelians, and differs from the Stoics.

In this excerpt, the writer says not a word about God, and abstains from speaking of anything supracosmic.² But we have before us only that part of his system which deals with the Kosmos and the things within it. It is probable that, either in a continuation of the same libellus, or in other libelli which were meant to be read after it, he went on to speak of a supracosmic God, to whom the heavenly bodies are subordinate, and of that part of the human soul which is capable of escaping from the domination of the heavenly bodies and the physical forces which they put forth (i.e. from subjection to Heimarmene), and entering into immediate relation with the supracosmic God. If that part of the writer's teaching had been preserved, we should very likely find the distinctive doctrines of Platonism no less predominant in it than they are in most of the other Hermetica.

§ 7. Συνεστάναι μὲν, (Δ ὧ τέκνον,) σῶμα χωρίς ψυχῆς οὐ δύναται, τὸ δὲ ἀνέργεια ὃν δύναται (τὸ δὲ εἶναι δύναται MS.). συνεστάναι means 'to exist as an organized whole'. A living body συνίσταται; for the ψυχή in it holds it together, and makes it a thing in which every part is correlated to every other part. But when the ψυχή has quitted it,

¹ He does not call them 'daemons', as some of the Hermetists did.
² The only exceptions are the use of the word ἦπερον in § 2; the mention of 'divine ἀνέργεια which act on the heavenly bodies' in § 12; and possibly, the mention of 'purer ἀνέργεια' which 'co-operate with the rational part of the soul' in § 5. But § 2 is an isolated fragment of unknown origin; § 12 is probably an interpolation; and even if the writer held that the 'purer ἀνέργεια' spoken of in § 5 come from a supracosmic source (which is uncertain), at any rate he refrains from saying so.
the body no longer συνεστήκεν; it is thenceforward an unorganized heap of matter.

According to the MSS., the Hermetist says that the body may continue to exist after the soul has departed. That is true, and the fact is incidentally mentioned below, in the words ἐπιμένει αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα; but it is not the thing to be insisted on. The point to which the writer seeks to call attention is rather that forces are still at work in the corpse, as is shown by the fact that processes of decomposition go on in it. He probably asserted this shortly in the first sentence, by writing ἐνεργείσθαι here, and then went on to explain his statement. If we read ἐνεργείσθαι, the topic of ἐνέργεια, with which the whole dialogue deals, is introduced in the opening words.

§ 8. αὐτή οὖν ἡ διαφορὰ ἄθανάτου σώματος καὶ θητοῦ . . . δολῶν (δὲ) φέρεται. This section has nothing to do with the subject spoken of in §§ 7 and 9. When it has been excised, the train of thought runs on without a break through those two sections. In § 7, the writer points out that there are forces at work in bodies which have once had soul in them, but from which the soul has departed; in § 9, he adds that there are also forces at work in bodies which have never had soul in them, e.g. in a stone.

Has § 8 been shifted from some other part of the dialogue? I have failed to find any place where it would fit into the text; but it may possibly be an isolated fragment of the lost passage which followed § 10. θεία (= ἄθανατα) σώματα are spoken of in § 〈〈6〉〉 as things already known to the reader; it seems not unlikely therefore that an explanation of their nature and function, such as is given in § 8, occurred somewhere before § 〈〈6〉〉. But it is also possible that § 8 was written as a marginal note on the words τὰ δὲ ἄθανατα σώματα . . . ὡς ξέ σούσια (οὗ) τοιαύτης συνεστῶσα in § 16.

τὸ μὲν ἄθανατον (σῶμα) ἐκ μιᾶς ὦλης συνεστήκηκε, τὸ δὲ (θητὸν σῶμα) ὄ. ὦλη here means, not ἄτοιος or ἁμορφὸς ὦλη, but a material substance. Earthly bodies are composed of all four elements in combination (see Exe. II. A. 1 f.); and they are consequently subject to dissolution, because the process by which the different elements have been combined in them is liable to be reversed. The heavenly bodies consist of one element only, and are consequently indissoluble. But what is this one element? The Stoics said that the element of which the heavenly bodies consist is fire; the Aristotelians said that it is the ‘fifth’ and ‘circularly-moving’ substance. (See note on quinta
The writer of Exc. III probably adopted the view of the Aristotelians on this point; see note on § 16.

These words imply that the ἐνέργειαi which operate in earthly bodies are emitted or put in action by the heavenly bodies. This is expressly asserted in § 6: οἱ ἐνέργειαι . . . ἀπὸ τῶν θείων σωμάτων ἐρχονται εἰς τὰ θνητὰ. That is to say, all physical processes which take place on earth result from the operation of the heavenly bodies. That is the view of the Hermetists in general. Some of them give to this operation of the heavenly bodies the name ὑμαρμένη; and some of them (e.g. the author of Corp. XVI) hold that the influence of the heavenly bodies is brought to bear on earthly bodies by personal agents called 'daemons'. The writer of Exc. VI identifies the 'daemons' with the ἐνέργειαι.

§ 9. (α) ἐνέργειαι οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐμφύχα ἐνέργειαν σώματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ᾱφυχα. The phrase οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐμφύχα is not quite accurate; the writer ought rather to have said 'not only bodies that have had souls in them'. The thing of which he has been speaking is a corpse; and a corpse is not an ἐμφύχα. But his meaning is clear enough. A corpse is a body which, though it has no soul in it now, has had a soul in it; and as such, it is contrasted with a stone, which has never had a soul in it.

(ἐνεργοῦσι) τὰ ᾱφυχα, (τὰ) ἐίλα καὶ τοὺς λίθους καὶ τὰ [[ ]] δέμοια, αὐξοῦσαι τε [καὶ καρποφοροῦσαι] καὶ πεπαίνονται, καὶ φθείρουσαι κ.τ.λ. καρποφοροῦσαι is obviously wrong; the ἐνέργειαι do not 'bear fruit'. It might be said that there are ἐνέργειαι which make trees or plants bear fruit; but the writer is not here speaking of living trees or plants, but of 'ᾱφυχα, such as logs and stones'. On the question whether plants have 'souls' or not, opinions differed (see note on Ascl. Lat. I. 4); but even if they have not 'souls', they have some sort of life; and a mention of anything that has life in it would be out of place in this sentence. καὶ καρποφοροῦσαι was probably inserted by some one who wrongly assumed that πεπαίνονται must mean 'ripening fruit', and thought that fruit must be produced before it is ripened. The interpolator presumably took ἐίλα (dead logs) to mean living trees.

It is evident that there are forces at work which make logs rot, and stones crumble (φθείρουσαι καὶ ... ὀρύττονται). It is not quite so
evident what is meant by \( \alpha \iota \varepsilon \nu \theta \gamma \rho \varepsilon \gamma \varepsilon \) in the case of lifeless things; but we may take these words to mean ‘increasing their bulk, and bringing them to maturity’. It was a common opinion that rocks ‘grow’; (some stones do in fact ‘grow’ by crystallization;) and perhaps the author, when he wrote \( \alpha \iota \varepsilon \nu \theta \gamma \rho \varepsilon \gamma \varepsilon \), was thinking solely of rocks or stones, and overlooked the fact that \( \xi \upsilon \alpha \) increase in bulk only while they are still living trees. \( \pi \varepsilon \tau \alpha \iota \nu \nu \sigma \sigma \alpha \), in the case of stones, might mean ‘softening’, and in the case of timber, ‘seasoning’.

\( \epsilon \nu \pi \gamma \rho \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \gamma \varepsilon \alpha \gamma \) \( \gamma \dot{a} \rho \kappa \varepsilon \kappa \lambda \lambda \gamma \varepsilon \iota \), \( \delta \tau \kappa \nu \nu \tau \), \( \tau \dot{a} \) \( \delta \dot{i} \) \( \delta \dot{i} \gamma \gamma \gamma \eta \gamma \vee \tau \). Having shown by instances what he means by \( \epsilon \nu \pi \gamma \rho \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \gamma \varepsilon \alpha \gamma \), the writer now gives a definition of the term. \( \tau \dot{a} \gamma \gamma \nu \mu \mu \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \) may mean either ‘the thing that comes into being’, or ‘the process that goes on’. Which of the two is meant, must be determined by the context. Here, it necessarily means the latter. But if the Hermetist said that an \( \epsilon \nu \pi \gamma \rho \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \gamma \varepsilon \alpha \gamma \) is ‘any sort of process that goes on’, he worded his definition very inexacty. He must have meant to say that an \( \epsilon \nu \pi \gamma \rho \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \gamma \varepsilon \alpha \gamma \) is the force by which any sort of process is carried on. It is most likely that he did write something to that effect; and I have accordingly inserted the words \( \tau \dot{a} \) \( \delta \dot{i} \) \( \delta \dot{i} \gamma \gamma \eta \gamma \vee \tau \).

§ 10. \( \delta \varepsilon \delta \varphi \varepsilon \mu \varepsilon \nu \nu \nu \alpha \nu \) \( \delta \kappa \varsigma \mu \varsigma \) \( \delta \varepsilon \nu \) \( \epsilon \nu \) \( \epsilon \nu \pi \gamma \rho \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \gamma \varepsilon \alpha \gamma \). \( \varphi \varepsilon \mu \varepsilon \nu \nu \nu \alpha \nu \) refers to the circular movement of the heavens and the heavenly bodies. It is this movement that gives forth the \( \epsilon \nu \pi \gamma \rho \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \gamma \varepsilon \alpha \gamma \) by which all individual organisms (\( \tau \dot{a} \) \( \delta \varepsilon \alpha \tau \) upon earth are brought into being. The circular movement of the heavens never ceases; and therefore the production of \( \tau \dot{a} \) \( \delta \varepsilon \alpha \tau \) upon earth can never cease. In this section, the writer seems to take \( \tau \dot{a} \gamma \gamma \nu \mu \mu \varepsilon \) in the sense of ‘the thing that comes into being’, rather than in the sense of ‘the process that goes on’.

[\( \text{o} \delta \delta \text{ap\varepsilon} \lambda \iota \varepsilon \theta \varepsilon \pi \sigma \sigma \mu \varepsilon \nu \alpha \nu \text{t} \) \( \text{f}[\theta] \text{or} \varepsilon \nu \) \( \text{s} \).] \( \varphi \varepsilon \alpha \nu \) may be considered a certain emendation; the word refers back to \( \varphi \varepsilon \mu \varepsilon \nu \nu \nu \alpha \nu \). But the phrase in which it stands is awkwardly appended, and seems merely to repeat what has already been said. \( \text{o} \delta \delta \text{ap\varepsilon} \lambda \iota \varepsilon \theta \varepsilon \pi \sigma \sigma \mu \varepsilon \nu \alpha \nu \text{t} \) \( \text{f} \) \( \text{or} \varepsilon \nu \) would be a paraphrase of \( \delta \varepsilon \delta \varphi \varepsilon \mu \varepsilon \nu \nu \nu \alpha \nu \); and it is possible that something of the sort occurred in a marginal note, and was inserted in the text by error.

At the end of § 10 there is evidently a lacuna. In § 11, we find the writer asserting, as an inference (\( \alpha \nu \) \( \text{f} \)) from something that has gone before, that ‘every \( \epsilon \nu \pi \gamma \rho \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \gamma \varepsilon \alpha \gamma \) is \( \delta \theta \alpha \nu \alpha \tau \upsilon \nu \upsilon \) (or \( \delta \upsilon \omega \mu \mu \alpha \nu \)?)’. But this cannot be immediately inferred from the statement, with which
§ 10 ends, that 'the Kosmos is ever producing things'; and a passage now lost must have intervened. From what follows, it appears that in the missing passage the writer proved (1) that the ἐνέργειαι are everlasting, and (2) that they are incorporeal.

The forces at work are everlasting; that is, being kept in action by the ceaseless movement of the heavenly bodies, they go on working for ever without change, though the earthly bodies upon which they work perish, and are replaced by other bodies. The misplaced fragment § 3 (ἀδύνατον ἄργα ποτέ μεῦναι κ.τ.λ.) may perhaps have belonged to the passage in which the everlastingness of the ἐνέργειαι was demonstrated.

§ II. πᾶσα ὁν ἐνέργεια ὤπεισῶν ὡς ἀσώματος ὄθα (ὡς ἄδικον ἀδάνατος ὄθα MSS.). A thing cannot be immortal (in the sense of everlasting) at one time and mortal at another time; the combination ἄδικον ἀδάνατος, 'immortal at all times', is therefore meaningless; and if we retain one of these two words, we must strike out the other. But it seems more likely that the author wrote ἀσώματος, which corresponds better with the following words ἐν οὐφθησει σώματι. If so, we have in this section the conclusion of the missing proof that the ἐνέργειαι are ἀσώματος, which was probably preceded by the missing proof that they are ἄδικον (everlasting).

((§ I. ἐνέργειαι γὰρ . . . ἔναι ἄδικον ἀδάνατος,)) The thing asserted in § I is that ἐνέργειαι 'are always in bodies'; and if we place § I here, the words ἐν οὐφθησει σώματι in § II lead on to that assertion. In § I, it is assumed, as a thing already known, that the ἐνέργειαι are ἀσώματοι; that point must therefore have been previously established, and I suppose it to have been established in the lost passage which preceded § II.

καθότι (μὲν) ἀσώματοι εἰσὶ, καὶ ἄδικον ἀδάνατος φησὶ (φης MSS.) εἶναι. The fact that the ἐνέργειαι are incorporeal confirms the conclusion that they are ἄδικον. Corporeal things alone are perishable.

((§ 4. τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ ἔπεται . . . ἄδικον ἀδάνατος is that which was stated in § I, namely, that ἐνέργειαι are everlasting, and 'are always in (earthly) bodies'. From this it follows that there must always be (earthly) bodies in existence, to serve as 'places and instruments' for the working of the ἐνέργειαι; and since earthly bodies are perishable, there must be a continual production of fresh bodies to replace them as they perish. It seems clear that this must have been the meaning of § 4, though the restoration of the text is
doubtful. The words τόπους καὶ ὄργανα τῶν ἐνεργείων correspond to ἐν σώμασιν ἔστι καὶ διὰ τῶν σωμάτων ἐνεργοῦσι in § 1. [ἐ λ γ] may perhaps have come from εἰ γὰρ at the beginning of the sentence.

§ 6. αὕτα δὲ (δὲ MSS.) (ἀσώματοι οὖσαι) (αἱ σωματοποιοῦσαι MSS.) αἱ ἐνέργειαι τῶν σωμάτων ἔστιν ἤρημαν. In the MSS., αὕτα (or αὕτα) is obscure; it becomes intelligible if we insert ἀσώματοι οὖσαι after it. Compare ἀσώματοι οὖσαι ἐν σώμασιν ἔστι in § 1; the thought expressed in § 1 is resumed in § 6, after the digression in § 4. Below in § 6 occurs the meaningless phrase αὕτα οἱ σωματοποιοῦσαι; and it seems probable that this is a corruption of αὕτα δὲ ἀσώματοι οὖσαι, repeated by error.

καὶ αὕτη (γὰρ) [(μέντοι)] τῇ ψυχῇ συγγίγνονται, (οὗ) (μέντοι) χωρὶς σώματος. According to the MSS., we are here told that the ἐνέργειαι enter into connexion with the soul 'apart from the body'. But that is contradicted by the following words, αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι χωρὶς τῶν σωμάτων οὐ δύναται εἶναι, as well as by what has been said in § 1 and in § 6 init. In order to get rid of the contradiction, it is necessary to insert οὗ before χωρὶς σώματος.

With the corrections which I have made, the meaning of the passage becomes clear. ἐνέργειαι must always be 'in bodies'; i.e. they can only operate in bodies. They act on the soul as well as on the body; but they act on the soul only when it is embodied. In other words, it is only while embodied that the soul is liable to be governed by the influences of the heavenly bodies, or to be subject to εἰμαρμένη.

§ 5. αἱ δὲ καθαρώτεραι ἐνέργειαι (παραγίγνονται) κατὰ μεταβολὴν τῆς ἡλικίας (ὁμοίας MSS.), τῇ λογικῷ μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς συνεργοῦσαι. The μεταβολὴ τῆς ἡλικίας is the change from childhood to manhood. It is at adolescence that the λογικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς first begins to act. Cf. Pl. Rep. 3. 402 a: ἐτε νέος ὄν, πρὸς λόγον δυνάτος εἶναι λαμβών ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου, κ.τ.λ.

What is the origin of the 'purer forces' that enter into the man at adolescence, and are connected with his soul from that age onward? Some of the Hermetists say or imply that the λογικὸν μέρος is exempt from the domination of the heavenly bodies, or of εἰμαρμένη; (see, for instance, Corp. XII. i. 2–9;) and if the writer of Exc. III was of the same opinion, he might hold that the καθαρώτεραι ἐνέργειαι are worked by the supracosmic God directly, and not through the intermediate agency of the heavenly bodies. (Cf. Corp. XVI. 16, where the ἀκτίς (τοῦ θεοῦ), which ἐν τῷ λογικῷ ἑπιλάμπει, is
contrasted with the action of the ‘daemons’, the emissaries of the planets, on τὰ δύο (ἄλογα) μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς.) In Ἑξ. III, all mention of God is deliberately avoided; and if its author had occasion to speak of a kind of ἐνέργεια which come direct from God, he might very likely refrain from expressing his meaning fully, and merely hint at the higher origin of this kind of ἐνέργεια by calling them καθαρώτεραι.

But on the other hand, in the rest of the dialogue, the term ἐνέργεια is applied only to forces put in action by the heavenly bodies (ἀπὸ τῶν θείων σωμάτων ἐρχονται εἰς τὰ θητὰ, § 6); and it is here implied that the καθαρώτεραι ἐνέργεια, as well as the others, act on the soul only while it is embodied. It seems most probable then that we are meant to understand that these ‘purer forces’, like the rest, come from the heavenly bodies, and not (or at any rate, not immediately) from a supracosmic source. The writer does not say that the ‘purer forces’ act on the λογικὸν μέρος, but that they work together with it (συνεργοῦν),—whatever that may mean. Perhaps his notion is that there are astral influences which, without exerting compulsive force on the θεῖων δύναμις, assist that part of the human soul in its endeavour to discharge its function rightly, and to keep the body and the ψυχή in due subjection.

§ 13. [ὡς ἐν ἐνεργείαις οὖσα κατά τὰ ὀργατότα.] This section is a classification of the different kinds of ἐνέργειαι. It has no clear connexion either with what precedes or with what follows; and I think there are sufficient reasons for concluding that it is a note inserted in the text by error.

ai μὲν εἰσι τῶν θείων σωμάτων (ἐνεργητικαῖς). That ἐνεργητικαῖς, or some word of similar meaning, must either be inserted in the text, or supplied in thought, is proved by the equivalent phrase below, αἰ εἰσὶ τὰ ἄλογα σώματα ἐνεργοῦσιν. These ἐνεργείαι are forces which act on the heavenly bodies, and must therefore be put in action by the supracosmic God. But the only ἐνεργείαι spoken of elsewhere in the dialogue are forces which work in earthly bodies, and, with the possible exception of the ‘purer forces’ mentioned in § 5, are put in action by the heavenly bodies. Moreover, the καθαρώτεραι ἐνεργείαι of § 5, even if we take them to be of supracosmic origin, cannot be identified with the θεῖαι and τέλειαι ἐνεργείαι of § 12; for the former are forces which act on the embodied soul of man, and not on the heavenly bodies. Thus the use of the term ἐνεργείαι in § 12 differs from its use in the rest of Ἑξ. III.

1 The apparent exception in § 12 is probably due to interpolation.
kaí (tòv eis tà φαρτὰ ἐνεργοσύνων) οἱ μὲν καθολικαί, (οἱ δὲ γενικαί,) οἱ δὲ (εἰδικαί). The addition of οἱ δὲ γενικαί is made necessary by the words οἱ δὲ ἐνός ἐκάστου γένους τῶν ζευγ. This triple division cannot be applied to 'the forces which act on the heavenly bodies'; we must therefore suppose that something like τῶν εἰς tà φαρτὰ ἐνεργοσύνων has been lost.

For εἰδικά in the sense 'limited to this or that individual', see note on Ascl. Lat. I. 2 fin.

[kai ai mev tvn genwn, ai de [tvn meron] enos ekastou.] This appears to be a corruption of kai ai mev (tovn ovtwn symaptwn, ai de) twn genwn, ai de enos ekastou, which must have been written as an alternative for the preceding words kai ai mev katholikai, (ai de genikai), ai de eideikai.—tov meron is probably an alternative for twn genwn; cf. merikai substituted for genikai below.

§ 13. οὖτος ὁ λόγος, ὃ τέκνον, συνάγει πάντα μαστά εἶναι ἐνεργειάς. The λόγος from which it is inferred that 'all things are full of forces-at-work', is the proposition that 'there are often several forces at work in a single body'. That proposition has not been expressly stated in the preceding text; but it is implied in what has been said in §§ (6) and (5) about the various ἐνεργειαῖ which act on a man's body and soul. Thus, if we cut out § 12, and place § 13 next after § (5), we get a satisfactory sequence of thought.

ei γάρ [ἀνάγκη τὰς ἐνεργείας ἐν σώμασιν εἶναι] πολλὰ [δὲ] σώματα ἐν κόσμῳ, πλείουσι φημὶ εἶναι τὰς ἐνεργείας τῶν σώματων. The statement that ἐνεργείαι 'are always in bodies' has been made in §§ (6) and (5). But the conclusion that 'the forces-at-work are more numerous than the bodies' cannot be inferred from that statement; it therefore seems necessary to strike out the words ἀνάγκη τὰς ἐνεργείας ἐν σώμασιν εἶναι.

ἐν ἐνὶ γάρ πολλάκις σώματι ὡστε μία καὶ δευτέρα καὶ τρίτη (. . .), χωρὶς τῶν (τῆς γενεσι) ἐπομένων καθολικῶν. The 'first, second, and third' ἐνεργειαῖ here spoken of must have been qualified by some adjectival phrase which served to contrast them with the καθολικαὶ ἐνεργειαῖ. They were doubtless called εἰδικαί, and probably εἰδικαί of some particular kind; for the writer speaks of ἑτέραι εἰδικαὶ ἐνεργειαὶ below.

καθολικάς γάρ ἐνεργείας φημὶ τὰς τῶν ὄντων σωματικὰς (τὰς ὄντως σωματικὰς MSS.). We have been told that all ἐνεργείαι are ἀσώματοι; it is therefore impossible to say that some of them are σωματικαὶ. The meaning must be that the 'universal' ἐνεργειαὶ
are those forces by which bodies are brought into existence
(χωρὶς γὰρ τούτων τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὸ σῶμα συντίθεναι οὐ δυνατόν). These forces operate wherever bodies come into being, and therefore are everywhere at work throughout the sublunar world.

It is evident from the wording of this sentence that the term καθολικαὶ ἑνεργειαὶ is here used and defined for the first time in the dialogue; whence it follows that § 12 cannot have preceded. Perhaps § 12 is a marginal note suggested by these words in § 13.

"ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διὰ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἐπιτη-
δεμάτων καὶ ἐνεργημάτων" (§ 13). As the end of the sentence is lost, the meaning of these words cannot be discovered. Possibly the author may have written something like ἕτεραι δὲ εἰςν εἰδικαὶ ἑνεργειαὶ, (ἀτίνες) ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διὰ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστη-
μῶν [καὶ ἐπιτηδεμάτων καὶ] ἐνεργησίας συνεργοῦσιν). As far as a man works with conscious and deliberate aim, what he does may be ascribed to the action of his ψυχή, operating διὰ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν. (Cf. Exc. IV B. i : ἔφης γὰρ ποι ἡν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὴν τέχνην ἑνεργειας εἶναι τοῦ λογικοῦ, 'forces put in action by the rational part of the soul'.) But he is often aided by promptings which arise he knows not how or whence,—impulses from 'the unconscious'. It might be said that such impulses are ἑνεργειαὶ in the sense in which the term is used in this libellus, i.e. forces of the same nature as those by which all physical processes are carried on, and that, like all ἑνεργειαὶ, they are put in action by the heavenly bodies.

§ 14. (§§ διὰ τῶν αἰσθησεων [καὶ τῶν κινήσεων] (φανεράς για-
μέναις).) ἑνεργειαὶ are not 'brought into being by means of the senses'. We are told below that they are made manifest by means of the senses; I have therefore inserted φανεράς. But even with this correction, the words are out of place where they stand in the MSS.; and it is most likely that they have been shifted from the passage on αἰσθησις which begins in § 14.

παρέπονται γὰρ ταῖς ἑνεργειαῖς [καὶ] αἰσθησεῖς. From this point to the end of the excerpt, the writer is discussing the relation between ἑνεργειαὶ and αἰσθησεῖς. What does he mean by αἰσθησεῖς? The word αἰσθησις may signify (1) an act of sensation or perception (= τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι); (2) a faculty or permanent possibility of sensation or perception (= δύναμις τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι); (3) an organ of sense (= αἰσθητήριον). The writer of Exc. III appears to
use it sometimes in one of these senses, and sometimes in another. In § 14, his meaning seems to be that, when a physical change is produced in a man’s body by the action of an ἐνέργεια, the man feels a corresponding sensation, and the working of the ἐνέργεια is manifested to him by the sensation which he feels. E.g. my body is warmed by the heat of the sun; I feel a sensation of warmth, and thereby I am informed by what the sun is doing to my body. This is αἰσθήσις in sense (1).

§ 15. (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐνέργεια) ἀνωθεν πέμπεται. ἀνωθεν means ‘from the heavenly bodies’.

καθάπερ αὐτὴν σωματοποιῆσα, αἰσθήσις is inseparably connected with the body, and is dependent on the body for its existence; (in § 21, we are even told that αἰσθήσις ‘is a body’;) and so, when the working of the ἐνέργεια manifests itself in αἰσθήσις, the incorporeal force may be said to be ‘corporealized’.

(ἐπὶ) τοσοῦτον συνεστῶσας δόντω καὶ τὸ σῶμα· καὶ γὰρ συγγενεῖται τῷ σῶματι αἰ αἰσθήσις καὶ συναποθηκευόμεθα. It is obviously untrue, that particular acts or processes of sensation last as long as the body does, and that they are born with the body and die with it. Thus αἰσθήσις in sense (1) would here make nonsense; and the word must be taken either in sense (2) or in sense (3).

§ 16. ὅ τε δὲ ἀθάνατα σώματα ἀ[ ] αἰσθήσιν ὅν ἔχει, ὃς ἐς ὀνήσια ὁ(οὺ) τοιούτῳ συνεστῶτα. The heavenly bodies consist of a substance which is not such (as to admit of αἰσθήσις). This substance must be the πέμπτη ὀνήσια of the Aristotelians. Cf. § 8.

When the Hermetist says that the heavenly bodies αἰσθήσιν ὅν ἔχει, he does not mean that they are devoid of conscious life, but that they possess a higher sort of consciousness. Man has both αἰσθήσις and νόησις; the heavenly bodies have νόησις alone, and not αἰσθήσις.

ἡ γὰρ αἰσθήσις ὡδὲ ἄλλη ἐλλο ἐστὶ [σωματικῇ] ἀ[καλλικτικῇ] ἡ τοῦ προσογινομένου (-γενομένου MSS.) τῷ σώματι τ[κακοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἡ τοῦ πάλιν απὸ ἀπογινομένου (-γενομένου MSS.). The writer assumes that the changes in the body which are produced by the working of ἐνέργειας, and are apprehended by αἰσθήσις, always consist in either the addition of something to the body, or the subtraction of something from the body. It is not clear how this could be maintained in the case of all kinds of sense-perception; but perhaps it might be said that, when I see an object, an image of the object ‘is added to’ my eye.
The words κακοῦ ἢ [τοῦ] ἄγαθοῦ are irrelevant. The point of the passage is that, in the case of the heavenly bodies, there are no 'additions' or 'subtractions'; and there can therefore be no αἰσθήσεως; and the writer could have no reason for saying here that, in the case of earthly bodies, the things added or subtracted may be bad or good.

In other words, the heavenly bodies are not subject to μεταβολή. From this it appears that the writer's cosmology is Aristotelian rather than Stoic. According to the Stoics, the heavenly bodies are constantly receiving τροφή, in the form of ἀναθυμάματα from the lower elements, which are transmuted into fire as they rise; and they are constantly giving off fire, which descends from them into the lower world, and is there transmuted into the other elements. Aristotle on the other hand held that the 'fifth substance' of which the heavenly bodies consist is confined to the heavens,1 and is not subject to transmutation.

§ 17. 'Εν παρτί οὖν (παθητῇ) σώματι αἰσθήσεως [αἰσθάνεται] (γίνεται);

1 Some of the later Aristotelians, however, said that the human soul or mind consists of this same substance; see note on quinta pars in Ascl. Lat. I. 6 b.
—'En παντί. We have just been told that there is no αἰσθήσεις in
heavenly bodies; σώματι must therefore be qualified by some ad-
jective which limits this statement to earthly bodies. θυγγάρ or
φθαρτό would serve the purpose; but παθήματα suits the context best.
καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (καὶ ἀφόφως MSS.). It was sometimes said
that plants are ἄψυχα, and yet have αἰσθήσεις; see Ascl. Lat. I. 4 :
'sine anima quidem, et tamen non carens sensibus.' But the
writer of Ext. III asserts that not only plants, but all ἄψυχα
have αἰσθήσεις, though not the same kind of αἰσθήσεις as men or
animals. It seems strange to say that a stone αἰσθάνεται; but
similar statements were made by some of the early Greek thinkers.

Theophrastus, De sensibus 4, Diels Doxogr. p. 500, reports
Parmenides as saying τὸν νεκρὸν φωτός μὲν καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ φωνῆς
όχι αἰσθάνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἐκλεψιν τοῦ πυρός, ψυχροῦ δὲ καὶ σωπῆς
... αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ ἄλως δὲ τὰν τὸ ἐν ἄξιοι τινὰ γνώσων. Cf.
Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 390: ὁ δὲ Δημώκρατος πάντα μετέχειν φορὶ
ψυχῆς ποιάς, καὶ τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων, διότι δὲ taire (ἀφανῶς?)
tuνος θερμοῦ καὶ αἰσθητικοῦ μετέχει, τοῦ πλείονος διαπνεομένου,
αἱ δὲ τῶν ἄλγων 'σωματικαί' εἰσὶ μόνον. σωματικαί can hardly
be right; for all αἰσθήσεις alike are σωματικαί.
§ 19. τῶν δὲ ἐμφύξων [ζώων] εἰσὶ δύο ἄλλαι 'ἐνέργειαι', αἱ παρέπο-
νται ταῖς αἰσθήσεισι καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι, λύπη καὶ χαρά. There are no
ζώα that are not ἐμφύξα; either ζώων or ἐμφύξων must therefore
be struck out.

Pain and joy may be said to result from the working of ἐνέργειαι
(as we have just been told that πάθη and αἰσθήσεις do), but
cannot themselves be called ἐνέργειαι, in the sense in which that
term is used throughout Ext. III; ἐνέργειαι must therefore have
been substituted by error for some other word. The missing word
may possibly be ἰδέαι, 'two other kinds of things'; cf. [τῶν πάθων
ἰδέας] below.

In a stone, the ἐνέργειαι (i.e. the physical forces which are
at work in it) produce πάθη (increases and diminutions) and αἰσθή-
σεις (perceptions of these increases and diminutions). In a man
or animal, the ἐνέργειαι produce πάθη and αἰσθήσεις in like manner;
but in the man or animal, the πάθη and αἰσθήσεις are accompanied
by λύπη and χαρά; i.e. the sense of diminution gives rise to a
feeling of pain, and the sense of increase gives rise to a feeling of
enjoyment.

The word πάθος is often used by other writers to signify 'an
emotion'; and in that sense, λύπη and χαρά might be called πάθη. But the writer of Exc. III uses πάθος only in the sense of 'something that befalls one', and applies it only to bodily increases and decreases. He therefore does not call pain and enjoyment πάθη, but says that they accompany πάθη.

χωρίς τούτων λόγων [ἐμψυχων] καὶ μάλιστα ἄλογον (λογικῶν MSS.) αἰσθήσεις ἔντυνατον. According to the MSS., we are told that it is impossible both for beasts and for men, but 'in the highest degree' impossible for men, to perceive anything without feeling λύπη or χαρά. But that is nonsense. In the first place, one thing cannot be more impossible than another; μάλιστα must therefore be rejected. In the second place, the following section clearly shows that in the writer's opinion it is not impossible for men to rid themselves of λύπη and χαρά. These perturbations are pernicious (κακωτεκαί); they are connected with the irrational part of the soul, i.e. with that part of the man in respect of which he is no better than a beast; and it is to be inferred that in the man who attains to 'piety' or 'gnosis' they will be suppressed.

In order to get the sense required by the context, we must write ἄλογον in place of λογικῶν. With the corrections which I have proposed, the passage becomes consistent and intelligible. 'In beasts, αἰσθήσεις is necessarily accompanied by λύπη and χαρά. These emotions may therefore be called proper to beasts rather than to men; for beasts are more completely mastered by them. In man, it is the beast-like part of the soul that is affected by them; and (if he allows himself to be mastered by them) they work mischief in his life.'

[αἱ μὲν ἐνεργείαι (ἀφαίρεσις ἐνεργοῦσι, αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀναφαίρουσιν.] This has nothing to do with λύπη and χαρά, the things dealt with in § 19. It is evidently connected with the contents of §§ 14 and 15; and it would be possible to insert it in the text before παρέστωνται γὰρ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ αἰσθήσεις in § 14. But it is not needed there, as the writer's meaning is
sufficiently expressed without it; we may therefore conclude that it is a marginal note on that passage.

§ 30. αὕτη δέ, ὑποστάσασθαι, ἀνακρινοῦνται ὡς τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἀντίγραφα δέ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλόγων μερῶν. The 'irrational parts of the soul' are τοῦθεν και ἐπιθυμητικῶν (Pl. Rep.), or, as Platonists often called them, ἑθικὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία (Exx. IV A. 7). The author cannot have said that λύπη and χαρά 'are stirred up by' these parts of the soul. He may have said that they are stirred up by the αἰσθήσεις, or by the πάθη and αἰσθήσεις, or by the ἐνέργειαι (which produce the πάθη and αἰσθήσεις), and that they take hold of, or arise in, the irrational parts of the soul.

διὸ καὶ ἀμφότερα φημὶ κακοτικῆς εἰναι (τοῦ ἀνθρώπου?). Cf. Corp. XII. i. 2: ψυχή γὰρ πάσα, ἐν σώματι γενομένη, ἐθικῶς ὑπὸ τῆς λύπης καὶ τῆς ἱδρούς κακίζεται. The writer's ideal is what some called ἀπαθεία, i.e. freedom from the perturbing emotions which result from the debasing influence of the body on the soul; and he applies the words λύπη and χαρά to these perturbing emotions. There is another sort of χαρά, which is a function of νοῦς or τοῦ λογικῶν μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς; (see Corp. XIII. 8 c.;) but of that higher and better χαρά the writer of Excc. III says nothing.

§ 31. Ἡ αὕτη δὲ εἰς ἀισθήσεις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, δὲ πάτερ; From Hermes' answer, it appears that Tat spoke of αἰσθήσεις ψυχῆς, i.e. implied that ἡ ψυχή αἰσθάνεται. But did he mean that all αἰσθήσεις is ψυχῆς and not σώματος? Or that there are two kinds of αἰσθήσεις,—an αἰσθήσεις ψυχῆς and an αἰσθήσεις σώματος? Or that all αἰσθήσεις is both ψυχῆς and σώματος? Most likely, I think, the last. Cf. Corp. IX. 2 as emended: δημοσίως γὰρ ἡ ἀισθήσεις εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ εἰς τὴν ψυχήν καὶ ὅταν ἀμφότερα τὰ μέρη τῆς αἰσθήσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνίαν, κ.τ.λ. Arist. De somno 454 a 7 : ἐπεὶ δὲ οὗτος τῆς ψυχῆς ἱδιὰν τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐκ ὅτι τοῦ σώματος,—οὐ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις, τοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἢ δὲ λεγομένη αἰσθήσεις, ὡς ἐνέργεια, κίνησις τις διὰ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς ἑστι,—φανερῶν ὡς οὐτε τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πάθος ὑδαν, οὐτοὶ ἄψυχοι σῶμα δύνατον αἰσθάνεσθαι. Arist. De sensu 436 a 6: φαίνεται δὲ τὰ μέγιστα . . . κοινὰ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτω καὶ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον αἰσθήσεις κ.τ.λ. Ιβ. 1 b 6: ἡ δ' αἰσθήσεις ὅτι διὰ σώματος γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς δήλων.

οὖχ ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ αἰσθάνεται, ἢ δὲ αἰσθήσεις σῶμα; Wachsmuth assigns these words to Tat; but they must surely be spoken by Hermes. They give a reason for rejecting the phrase ψυχῆς αἰσθήσεις.
EXCERPT III: 20, 21

We are told in this section that αἴσθησις is σῶμα. What can the writer have meant by this? He said in § 15 that ἡ αἴσθησις ἐν τῷ σῶματι ἐστιν, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τὴν οὕσιαν ἔχει; but that is not quite the same as saying that αἴσθησις 'is a body'. The most probable explanation seems to be that the Hermetist here takes the ambiguous word αἴσθησις to signify the material pneuma by means of which the Stoics held that the processes of sensation and perception are carried on, and to which they attributed a function corresponding to that which, in modern physiology, is assigned to the sensory nerves. Cf. Diog. Laert. 7. 52: αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στοικοὺς τὸ τ’ ἀφ’ ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα ἐτί τὰς αἰσθήσεις (τὰ αἰσθητήρια;) διὰκον, καὶ ἡ δὲ αὐτῶν κατάληψις, καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια ἑπακεννηρ. Nemesius De nat. hom. 77, Diels Doxogr. pp. 393 and 55: καλεῖται δὲ πολλάκις αἴσθησις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια. οὕτω δὲ αἴσθησις ἀντίληψις τῶν αἰσθητῶν. δοκεῖ δὲ υἱὸς οὗ ὁ ὀρος ὁ αὐτῆς εἶναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς διὸ καὶ οὕσως ὑπέρων τῆς αἴσθησιν πνεῦμα νοεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐτί τὰ ἐργανα τεταμένον. The διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατάληψις could not be called a body; but the αἰσθητήρια themselves (e.g. the eyes and ears) are bodies; and the pneuma which extends to them from the ἡγεμονικὸν is also 'a body', i.e. a material thing. See note on αἱ αἰσθήσεις τῶν σῶματος in Corp. I. 24.

(. . .) ἄν εἶ, ἄ πάτερ, ἡ αἴσθησις ἢ ἐν σῶματι οὕσα τυχάνει; This is meaningless. It may be guessed from the context that Tat said something like 'Why should not αἴσθησις itself be incorporeal, though it is in a body?' Cf. ἀσώματος αὐταί οὕσαι, ἐν σῶματι εἰσι, said of the ἑνέργειαι in § 1.

Ἤν αὐτῶν (Ἤν ἐν σῶματι MSS.) αὐτήν θῶμεν κ.τ.λ. According to the MSS., Hermes denies that αἴσθησις is ἐν σώματι. But he himself has said in § 15 that ἡ αἴσθησις ἐν τῷ σῶματι; and even if he had not said it, it would be impossible to deny it. The question here discussed must be, not whether αἴσθησις is ἐν σώματι or not, but whether it is ἀσώματον ἐν σώματι (as the ψυχή and the ἑνέργειαι are), or σῶμα ἐν σώματι, a body contained in or forming part of another body. Tat is inclined to say that it is the former; Hermes maintains that it is the latter. It is therefore necessary to alter ἐν σώματι into ἀσώματον.

ἀμοίλαν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῆς ἀποφανόμεν ἤ ταῖς ἑνέργειαις. The writer seems to regard the ἑνέργειαι, not as mere συμβεβηκότα of
the heavenly bodies which ἐνεργοῦσιν, or of the earthly bodies which ἐνεργοῦσιν, but as incorporeal substances, in the same sense that the soul is an incorporeal substance.

οὖτε ἄσωματον τι ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ προειρήματα. In these words, the very thing which Hermes is engaged in proving,—viz. that ἄσωμα is not a third kind of ἄσωματον,—is asserted without proof.

τῶν γὰρ ὅτις δει (ἀδ ΜΣ.) τὰ μὲν σώματα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἄσωματα. This seems to be a clumsy attempt to say 'a thing must be either σώμα or ἄσωμα'. But it would be superfluous to say that. I take the words to be an appended note.

EXCERPTS IV A AND IV B

Stobaeus gives Exc. IV A and Exc. IV B, as separate extracts, in different chapters of his Anthologium. But it may be considered certain that IV B came from the same libellus as IV A, and followed it immediately or very closely in that libellus. A few lines before the end of IV A, Hermes says διότερ καὶ ἄλογα ἐκλήθη τὰ ἄλογα ταῦτα, στερήσει τοῦ [ἀ]λογικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς. In the first section of IV B, Tat says to Hermes τῶν δὲ φύσις ('you have just said') τὰ ἄλογα ψυχα στερήσει τοῦ λογικοῦ ἄλογα εἶναι καὶ κεκλησθαίναι, and it can hardly be doubted that this refers to what Hermes has said in IV A. The repetition of the phrase στερήσει τοῦ λογικοῦ is conclusive.

I was at first inclined to think that IV A (and consequently IV B also) might be a later part of the same libellus from which Stobaeus took Exc. III; but I now see that it cannot be so. The usage of the word ἐνεργεῖα differs in the two documents; and the action of the heavenly bodies on earthly things, which is the main subject of III, is ignored in IV A, except in § 9, and in that section is regarded from a different point of view, and spoken of in different terms.

As to the relation between Exc. IV B and Exc. III, see introductory note on Exc. III.

Excerpt IV A

§ 1. (δε) ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἄθανατος καὶ ἀεικήνητος.] This must have been written as a summary of the contents of Exc. IV A. (Cf.
EXCERPT IV A: 1

Corp. III init.) The man who wrote it apparently took the phrase from § 4 (ὅςτι ψυχή ἁπάντα δήβινασ, καθότι δεικήτης) after καθότι had been altered into καί.

ἐφαμεν γάρ ἐν τοῖς γενικοῖς. As Hermes refers to the γενικοὶ λόγοι, Exc. IV A must be an extract from one of the διεζóδωκοι λόγοι of Hermes to Tat. The name of Tat does not occur in IV A: but Tat takes part in the dialogue in IV B, which is a continuation of IV A.

The γάρ in the opening sentence shows that Exc. IV A was not the beginning of a libellus, but was preceded by something which has not been preserved.

(τὰς τῶν) ἐνεργείους τὰς μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν (ψυκήων;) ἐνεργείους, τὰς δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν (ὡς κινήσεων) (ψυχῶν γίνεσθαι).

The two classes of κινήσεις spoken of in § 1 are doubtless the same as the δικαίων κινήσεως spoken of in § 3; and the two passages must be considered together.

A Hermetist is not likely to have said that things (whether bodies or incorporeal things) are moved by bodies. Body is passive and inert; it cannot move anything; and if it is moved, it must be moved by something other than itself. (See Corp. II. 8 b, 9.) τῶν σωμάτων is therefore wrongly placed after ὑπό; and it probably stood before κινήσεως. The genitive which the author wrote after τὰς δὲ ὑπὸ has been lost; but there can be little doubt that it was τῶν ψυχῶν. Α σῶμα ἐμψυχον is moved by the ψυχή which is in it.

But we are here told that bodies are moved ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνεργείων also. Now in Exc. III, ἐνεργείαι and ψυχαῖ are spoken of together, as the two kinds of incorporeal things which act on bodies. It seems possible then that Exc. III is that very γενικὸς λόγος to which the writer of Exc. IV A refers; and at any rate, in the libellus to which he refers, ἐνεργείαι and ψυχαῖ must have been spoken of side by side, as they are in Exc. III.

In Exc. III however, the ἐνεργείαι are the forces put in action by the heavenly bodies. The author of Exc. IV A does not employ the term ἐνεργείαι in that special and restricted sense; he calls the parts of the soul ἐνεργείαι (§ 7), and might equally well have called the ψυχή as a whole an ἐνεργεία; indeed, he probably did so (see § 9). Hence, if he used the word ἐνεργείων in contrast to ψυχῶν, as he appears to have done in § 1, we should expect him to restrict its meaning by some qualifying adjective; for if
ψυχή is an ἐνέργεια, the things contrasted with ψυχή must be, not ἐνέργεια in general, but some particular kind of ἐνέργεια. Now in IV 346 B, he uses the word φύσις to denote the thing which performs a function that would have been ascribed to the ἐνέργεια by the writer of Exc. III, and accordingly contrasts the working of φύσις with the working of 'the rational part of the soul'. It therefore seems probable that in IV 346 A. 1 he wrote ψυχή τῆς μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν (ψυχικῶν) ἐνέργειῶν, τὰς δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν (ψυχῶν γίνεσθαι). At any rate, his meaning must have been that which these words would express.

§ 2. [φαμὲν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν . . . ἐκ τινος γεγενηθαι.] This is irrelevant, and interrupts the discussion of the two kinds of movement of bodies, which has been begun in § 1, and is continued in § 3. It is possible that § 2 is a fragment of a lost passage which followed § 4 and preceded § 5. We may suppose that, after bringing his discussion of the movements of bodies to a conclusion in the missing passage which followed § 3, the writer went on to speak of the soul, and showed, firstly, that it is δυνάμεις, and consequently ἄθανάτος (§ 4), and secondly, that it is ἀσώματος (lost passage), and, being ἀσώματος, must be made τοῦ ἀσωμάτου οὐσίας (§ 2).

τὰς γὰρ τὸ γενόμενον ἀμάκη ἐκ τινος γεγενηθαι. This seems better suited to precede φαμὲν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν . . . ἀσωμάτου οὐσίας than to follow it. 'Everything that has been made is made of some substance; (the soul has been made; therefore the soul is made of some substance.) And as the soul is incorporeal (this point must have been previously established), the substance of which it is made must also be incorporeal.' The making of souls is described in mythical language in the Timaeus, and in the Kore Kosmu.

What is the 'incorporeal substance' of which the soul is made? The writer might perhaps have said, as the writer of Corp. XII. i init. says with respect to νοῦς, that it is the same substance as that of which God consists, but that what that substance is, 'God only knows'.

§ 3. δόθω μὲν οὖν (σωμάτων) τῇ γενέσει φθορά ἐπακολουθεί, τούτως κ.τ.λ. This means τοῖς φθαρτοῖς σώμασιν; and the shorter phrase τῶν φθαρτῶν σωμάτων is used as an equivalent at the end of the section. The Kosmos and the heavenly bodies also γεγένηται; (in this respect, the writer accepts the teaching of the Timaeus in its
EXCERPT IV A:

literalsense;) but in the case of the Kosmos and the heavenly bodies, γίνεσις is not followed by φθορά; having once been made, they will last for ever.

δύο κινήσεις . . . , τήν τε (γινομένην ὑπὸ τῆς) ψυχῆς, ὃς ἢ κινεῖται (τὸ σῶμα κατὰ τόπον), καὶ τήν [τοῦ σώματος] (ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως), ὃς ἢ αὔξεται καὶ φθίνει (σχ. τὸ σῶμα). According to the MSS., the two κινήσεις spoken of are ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησις and ἡ τοῦ σώματος κίνησις. But that is clearly wrong. The subject of the section, as we are told in its closing words, is ἡ κίνησις τῶν φθαρτῶν σωμάτων; the two κινήσεις therefore must both alike be κινήσεις σωμάτων; and τοῦ σώματος, which in the MSS. is applied to the second κίνησις in contrast to the first, must have been inserted by some one who misunderstood the passage.

The distinction between the two κινήσεις τῶν φθαρτῶν σωμάτων is that they are worked or effected by two different agents. The first of the two agents is ψυχή; this appears from the words ψυχῆς, ὃς ἢ κινεῖται. The antecedent of ἢς must be ψυχῆς, not κίνησις; for it would be impossible to say σῶμα ὑπὸ κινήσεως κινεῖται. The word denoting the second agent has been lost, and τοῦ σώματος has been substituted for it; but the second ὃς, which refers to it, shows that it must have been a feminine singular substantive. What feminine singular substantive then would best serve to denote the agent ὃς ἢς αὔξεται καὶ φθίνει τὸ σῶμα? The two words which suggest themselves are ἐνέργεια (§ 1) and φύσις (Exe. IV B). But ἐνέργεια in the singular would not very well do; the growth, decay, and dissolution of a body might be said to be worked by ἐνέργειαι, but hardly by ἐνέργεια. Thus we are led to the conclusion that the missing word is φύσις. If we read, in § 3, δύο κινήσεις . . . , τήν τε (γινομένην ὑπὸ τῆς) ψυχῆς, ὃς ἢ κινεῖται (τὸ σῶμα . . . ), καὶ τήν (ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως), ὃς ἢς αὔξεται καὶ φθίνει κ.τ.λ., and in § 1, κινήσεις τὰς μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν (ψυχῶν) ἐνέργειῶν, τὰς δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν (ψυχῶν γίνεσθαι), the two passages agree with one another.

ὁς ἢς κινεῖται (τὸ σῶμα κατὰ τόπον). The subject of κινεῖται is certainly τὸ σῶμα or τὰ σώματα. It would be possible to supply it in thought, but the meaning is more clearly expressed if we insert τὸ σῶμα.

Some qualification of κινεῖται is indispensable, as these words apply to the first kind of κίνησις only, in distinction from the other; and as the other kind is described as that which takes the forms of growth, decay, and dissolution, the first kind was presumably
described as ἡ κατὰ τόπουν κίνησις, ‘movement in space’, or ‘movement from place to place’. It is the ψυχή in me that moves my limbs; it is the other agent (φύσις) that makes my body grow and decay. Aristotle attributed processes of the latter kind to another sort of ψυχή, ‘the vegetative soul’; but the writer of Exc. IV A does not include them under the functions of ψυχή; he ascribes them to a different agent.

The μὲν at the beginning of § 3 shows that the writer intends, after speaking of the movement of perishable bodies, to speak of the movement of imperishable bodies (ἀφθαρτα, ἀδία, or ἀδάνατα σώματα), i.e. of the heavenly bodies. These bodies are exempt from increase, decay, and dissolution, the processes worked by the second agent (φύσις); he must therefore have said, in a lost passage which followed § 3, that the heavenly bodies have one sort of movement only, viz. that which is worked by ψυχή. It must be either by the one soul of the Kosmos, or by the souls by which they are severally animated, that the heavenly bodies ‘are moved’, i.e. are made to revolve in their orbits.

§ 4. Ὡς ἦν τοῦτον ὡς τὸν λόγον ὕστερ ψυχή πάσα ἀθάνατος, καθότι (καὶ MSS.) ἀείκινητος. Having spoken of the movement of bodies, the writer goes on to speak of the movement of soul. The word ἀείκινητος is used by Plato in one passage only, Phaedrus 245 c: ψυχή πάσα ἀθάνατος: τὸ γὰρ ἀείκινητον ἀθάνατον, κ.τ.λ.1 It is evident that the writer of Exc. IV A had that passage (or some paraphrase of it) in mind; and it can hardly be doubted that he, like Plato, said that soul must be ἀθάνατος because it is ἀείκινητος. But if so, he must have written καθότι, or some such word, before ἀείκινητος. For καθότι, cf. Exc. III. 1: καθότι (μὲν) αὐσωματιν εἰσι (κ. αἰ ἐνέργειαι), καὶ ἀθανάτως αὐτὰς φύσις ἔλαια.

§ 5. Ὡς ἦν τοῦτον ὡς τὸν λόγον σώματος (κινητικῆ). What does this writer mean by τὸ θεῖον σῶμα? Exc. III. 6, τὰ θεία σώματα

EXCERPT IV A: 4, 5

means the heavenly bodies,—sun, moon, and stars. But in Exc. IV A, the term is used only in the singular. In §§ 7 and (6), τὸ θεῖον σῶμα is the body which the human soul quits when it enters an earthly body, and which it enters when it quits its earthly body. The ‘divine body’ of which that is said might be a star. But the term could hardly be thus interpreted in § 9, where we are told that the agent by which soulless bodies upon earth are moved is ἢ ἐν τῷ θείῳ σώματι κινομένη (ψυχή). This agent cannot be an individual soul residing in this or that particular star; it must be the world-soul; and the ‘divine body’ spoken of must be the body in which the world-soul resides. Now the world-soul might be said to reside either ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, in the universe as a whole, or ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, in the sphere of heaven, which, according to the Stoics, is the seat of the cosmic ἡγεμόνικον. But in §§ 7 and (6), τὸ θεῖον σῶμα cannot mean the whole universe; for it would be impossible to say that a human soul quits the universe when it enters an earthly body, and enters the universe when it quits its earthly body. It seems then that the only way to make sense of both passages together is to assume that in this document τὸ θεῖον σῶμα means ὁ οὐρανός. The agent by which soulless bodies are moved (§ 9) is ἢ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ κινομένη ψυχή, i.e. the world-soul, which resides and ‘moves itself’ in the sphere of heaven; and an individual human soul, before and after its occupation of an earthly body, is ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, in the sphere of heaven. This does not necessarily exclude the view that each human soul, when not embodied on earth, resides in some particular star, and the writer may very likely have held that view; but he does not expressly say so.

Accordingly, in § 5, the words ἢ θεία ψυχή τοῦ θείου σώματος (κωνσταντι) may be taken to mean that ‘the divine soul’ (i.e. the world-soul) makes the sphere of heaven revolve.

(.,.) αὐτής ἐνέργεια· ἐν μὲν γὰρ αὐτῇ κυνεῖται, καὶ [ε] αὐτῷ (δί) κυνεί. Perhaps: (διπλὴ δὴ) αὐτῆς (ἡ) ἐνεργεια· ἐν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ‘Its motive force (i.e. the motive force which the divine soul puts in action) is twofold; for on the one hand it (moves itself?), and on the other hand it moves the divine body also.’ (ἐνέργεια used as in § 4, and not as in Exc. III.) But what is the meaning of ἐν αὐτῷ κυνεῖται? Wachsmuth conjectures ἐν μὲν γὰρ αὐτῇ κυνείται. That is possible, and might perhaps be accepted as a rather obscure equivalent for ‘it moves itself’, which the context seems to require. But αὐτῷ is supported by two similar phrases below, ἐν αὐτῷ (ἰαντῷ P) κυνεῖται, § (6),
and ή εν τῷ θείῳ σώματι κινουμένη (ψυχή), § 9; and it is difficult to believe that the same form of words can have been introduced by corruption in all three passages. If we retain αὕτη, the words may be taken to mean ‘the divine soul resides in the divine body, and residing therein, moves itself’ (κινεῖται = ἑαυτὴν κινεῖ).

§ 7. ήξει μὲν (τι) καὶ [τό] τοῦ θείου. The human soul has in it ‘something that is divine’, viz. τὸ λογικὸν μέρος, which is called νόης by some of the Hermetists.

καὶ (γὰρ) αὕτα [μὲν ἀθανάτοι καθοικί τα καὶ αὕτα αἱ ἐνέργειαι τυγχάνουσιν (οὗσιν), ἐνέργειαι δὲ θυτῶν σωμάτων. The reading of the MSS. cannot be right. On the question whether ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, the irrational parts of the soul, are immortal or not, opinions might differ; and though in § (§ (6)) the writer expressly denies that a man’s ἐπιθυμία and θυμός live on as parts of him after he has quitted his earthly body, he may possibly have held that they live on as separate entities. (See note on καταλιπτῶν τῆς ψυχῆς κρίσει in Corp. X. 16.) But even if he did hold that opinion, he could have no reason for inserting here an obiter dictum to that effect. Moreover, if αὕτα, meaning ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, has an adjective (ἄθανατος) for predicate, its gender is wrong; it ought to be ταῦτα. (Cf. κάθεινα below.) But if we write αὕτα [ ] ἐνέργειαι τυγχάνουσιν οὕσιν, the pronoun rightly takes its gender from the predicate substantive. Of the words which I have cut out, ἄθανατοι καθοικί may have found its way to this section from ἄθανατος καθοικί ἄεικιντος in § 4; and καὶ αὕτα may have come by duplication from the preceding καὶ (γὰρ) αὕτα.

The ἀλογικὸ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς are here called ἐνέργειαι; and it is implied that the λογικὸν μέρος also is an ἐνέργεια. This is a different use of the word from that in §§ 4 and 5, but not so widely different that we need hesitate to ascribe both to the same writer. In §§ 4 and 5, ἐνέργεια means a motive force exerted by a thing upon a thing; in § 7, it means a thing which exerts a motive force. In none of these instances is it used as in Exc. III; and the writer of Exc. III would certainly not have said that the parts of the soul are ἐνέργειαι.

ἐνέργειαι δὲ θυτῶν σωμάτων. It is to be inferred from the context that these words mean ‘they are things which exert a motive force on mortal bodies’. They move mortal bodies only, and therefore begin to act only when the soul enters a mortal body, and cease to act when it quits that body. The meaning might be more clearly expressed by writing θυτῶν σωμάτων (κινεῖται); but the addition of κινεῖται is hardly necessary.
This closely resembles the teaching of the *Timaeus* on this matter. Compare, for instance, *Tim.* 69 c, where it is said that the created gods, παραλαβόντες ἄρχην ψυχήν ἀθάνατον (= τὸ λογικὸν μέρος'), τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο θυγτὸν σῶμα αὐτῇ περιετέρωνεν, ... ἀλλὸ τε εἴδος ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῆς προσφιλοδόμοιν τὸ θυγτὸν (= τὰ ἄλογα μέρη), δεινὰ καὶ ἄναγκαια ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον κ.τ.λ. This Platonic notion was elaborated by Basilides and his son Isidorus in their doctrine of τὰ προσφιλήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐ τῇ προσφυγαί προσφιλήματα τὰ πάθη καλεῖν εἰώθαι, πνεύματα (τέ) τινα (λέγοντες) ταῦτα κατ' οὖσαν ὑπάρχουν προσφυγαίματα τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ κ.τ.λ. ... οὗ τῷ Βασιλείδου οὐδὲ ἵστορος ἐν τῷ Περὶ προσφυγαί προσφιλήματα ψυχῆς ... γράφει ... "ἔναν γὰρ τῶν πείαμα δός ὅτι μὴ ἔστων ἡ ψυχή μονομερείς, τῇ δὲ τῶν προσφυγαίματῶν μία τὰ τῶν χειρόνων γίνεται πάθη, κ.τ.λ. δεῖ δὲ, τῷ λογικῷ κράττονας γενομένους, τῆς ἑλάττους ἐν ἡμῖν κτίσεως (= τῶν ἄλογων μερῶν) φανεῖν καταφύγεσθαι." δύο γὰρ ἡ ψυχῆς ὑποικίας καὶ ὀστος ἐν ἡμῖν.

ἐπιφοιτᾶ ('visit from time to time') is not a suitable verb to use in speaking of the ἄλογα μέρη, which attach themselves to the soul at the moment when it enters an earthly body, and cling to it without intermission until it quits that body. ἐπιφοιτᾶ ('grow on to', or 'come into being as accretions on') gives precisely the sense required; cf. the προσφυγαί ψυχῆς of Isidorus, and προσφυγαικόθεν used in a similar connexion by Clement l.c. in his report of the teaching of Basilides.

τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτῶν γίνεται [dei] (κακῇ ἡ) ψυχῇ (ἀνθρωπινῇ). Cf. Corp. X. 15 b as emended: the soul, when it has been drawn down into the body, κακῇ γίνεται.

(§ 6. ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἐκεῖνο τῷ παντὶ.) It is evident that the soul here spoken of is ἡ ἀνθρωπινὴ ψυχή, and not ἡ θεία ψυχή, and consequently, that this section is wrongly placed in the MSS. If we put it after § 7, it fits in perfectly.

cειλελθοῦσα (εἰελθοῦσα MSS.) (δὲ) εἰς τὸ θεῖον σῶμα, ... ἐν αὐτῇ κινεῖται, συμπεριφερομένη τῷ παντὶ. Cf. Corp. X. 16: ὁ δὲ νοῦς (= τὸ λογικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς), when it quits its earthly body, σῶματος πυρώνου (ἐνι)λαβόμενος περιστολεῖ πάντα τότεν. But the meaning in Corp. X appears to be that the liberated νοῦς becomes a daemon, and as such, clothes itself in a body of fire, and "ranges through all space". In *Exc.* IV A, the meaning is rather that the soul, having cast off its
irrational parts’, becomes an astral god, and resides in the revolving sphere of heaven. eis ὁθεῖον σῶμα probably means eis τῶν οὐρανῶν; if the writer had meant to say ‘it becomes embodied in a star’, he would have omitted τό, and written εἰσελθοῦσα eis θεῖον σῶμα, as he writes εἰσέλθη eis θυτῶν σῶμα above. He does not clearly explain the situation and condition of the soul which has ‘entered into the divine body’; he may perhaps have held (though he does not say so) that each individual soul is embodied in some particular star, but that all souls thus embodied are in some sense parts of the one world-soul which resides in the sphere of heaven.

According to this writer, the soul is never completely disembodied. It is always in some sort of body; when it is not ἐν θυτῶν σώματι, it is ἐν τῷ θείῳ σώματι. As to this variation of Platonic doctrine, see note on Corp. X. 16.

§ 9. τετάρτην δὲ νῦν τὴν τῶν ἀφύλων (ἐνέργειαν). ήτις ἐξωθεὶν οἶοσα τῶν σωμάτων ἐνέργει κινοῦσα. The meaning required is ‘you must understand that the thing which moves soulless bodies is the fourth kind of thing that exerts motive force’—the other three being the three kinds of soul, divine, human, and irrational. But the feminine substantive to which τετάρτην is predicate, and which must have meant ‘thing that exerts motive, force’, has disappeared. I have assumed that it was ἐνέργεια. If so, it is implied that the three kinds of ψυχή are also ἐνέργειαι; and the word is here used in the same sense as in § 7, where the parts of the soul are called ἐνέργειαι. The meaning might be more clearly expressed by inserting κινητικήν after τῶν ἀφύλων; compare ἐνέργειαν δὲ θυτῶν σωμάτων in § 7.

We have been told that the ‘divine body’ (i.e. the sphere of heaven), the body of a man, and the body of a beast, are moved by the souls which reside in them. But by what agent are soulless bodies moved? What is it, for instance, that makes a stone fall? That is the question that is answered in § 9. In this case, the agent does not reside in the body that is moved, but is external to it. The substantive by which this agent was denoted has fallen out of the text; but there can be little doubt that the author wrote ἂ in τῷ θείῳ σώματι κινούμενη (ψυχή). Cf. §§ 5 and (6), where it is said that ἂ θείᾳ ψυχῇ ἐν αὑτῷ (κτ. τῷ θείῳ σώματι) κυνηγάται. If so, we must understand that the force which makes a stone fall is exerted by the world-soul, the seat of which is the sphere of heaven.

In locating the world-soul in the sphere of heaven, the writer is in agreement with the Stoics. He most likely differed from them, and
agreed with the Platonists, in holding that the world-soul (i.e. the soul which moves and governs the material Kosmos) is subordinate to a supracosmic God; but in this excerpt, he has no occasion to speak of the supreme God.

If I am right in adding ψυχή, the fourth agent turns out to be identical with ἡ θεία ψυχή, which is one of the three previously mentioned; so that there are really only three kinds of agents, and not four. But ἡ θεία ψυχή, when it makes a stone fall, does a different kind of work from that which it does in making the heavens revolve, and does it in a different way (ἐξωθεν σώσα, and κατὰ πάροδον); it is therefore possible to say that it is 'a fourth ἐνέργεια' when it is acting in this capacity.

ὁσπερ κατὰ πάροδον ταῦτα κινοῦσα. κατὰ πάροδον (‘in passing’ or ‘by the way’) is equivalent to ἐν παρέγυψ. The main work of the θεία ψυχή is to make the heavens revolve; but incidentally, it also moves soulless things on earth. According to the writer of Exc. III, soulless bodies on earth are moved by forces put in action by the heavenly bodies; according to the writer of Exc. IV A, both the movement of the heavens and the movements of soulless bodies on earth are worked by the θεία ψυχή residing in the heavens.

Excerpt IV B

§ 1. ἔφης γὰρ που τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὴν τέχνην ἐνεργεῖας (γειαν MSS.) εἶναι τοῦ λογικοῦ. The writer refers back to a passage (either in this libellus or in an earlier Hermēticum) in which it was said that 'knowledge and skill are motive forces put forth by the rational part of the soul'; i.e. that when a man does something in which knowledge and skill are manifested, it is the rational part of the soul that is in action. Tat says that such things are done by beasts as well as men, and argues that beasts as well as men must therefore have a 'rational part of the soul'.

In Exc. III. 13, something was said about τέχναι and ἐπιστήμαι in connexion with ἐνέργειαι and 'the souls of men'; but as that passage is mutilated, we do not know whether it contained anything resembling the statement quoted in IV B. 1.

An opinion similar to that which is here ascribed to Tat is expressed by Porphyry, De abst. 3. 1-10.

§ 2. τὰς τροφὰς ἀποθησαυρίζομένους τοῦ χειμῶνος. The text of the MSS. can only mean 'laying up their stores of food in winter'. But ants were believed to store up food in summer for use in winter.
Wachsmuth proposes (τὰς) τῶν χειμῶνος, 'the food on which they are to live in the winter'; but it seems better to cut out τῶν χειμῶνος, which may be a remnant of a marginal note.

§ 3. Ταῦτα, οὐκ ἐκείνη, ὡς ἐκείνη, ἀλλὰ φύσει. This amounts to saying that the force at work in the bird which builds a nest is not put in action by a 'rational part' of its own soul, but is the same force which is at work in all physical processes throughout the sublunar world. The bird is not acting deliberately; it is not aiming at an end or good which it has conceived in thought, and seeks to realize by its action, as a man does when he builds a house; it is impelled by a force of the same character as that which makes a tree grow, or a stone fall. We are told in IV A. 9 that the agent to which all such processes are to be attributed is ἡ θεία φύση, i.e. the world-soul (presumably working in subordination to the supreme God); some of the other Hermetists (e.g. the writer of Corp. III) would have said that the agent is God. But φύσις, the force exerted on sublunar things by the world-soul or by God, is often spoken of as if it were itself an agent.

The thing discussed in Exc. IV B is one particular department of the working of this cosmic force, namely, the actions of beasts; and in that connexion, φύσις may be translated 'instinct'. For φύσις in the sense of instinct as opposed to reason, cf. Corp. IX. 1 b, and Corp. XII. i. 1 fin. Arist. De part. an. 657 a 36: ἕκαστο τοῦ πάντα (τὰ ξύλα), καὶ μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος, πάντα μὲν ὅπως τὰ προσιτύπωτα τοῖς βλεφάροις κοιλύωσι, καὶ τούτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ἡ φύσις ἐστίν. I.e. the act of blinking is instinctive.

The writer distinguishes instinctive actions from rational actions by two criteria. Firstly, instinctive actions 'are not taught' (that is, the animal does the thing without having been taught to do it); and secondly, the thing is done by all animals of some one race or kind. With respect to the first of these criteria, we may compare the frequent use of φύσις in contrast to διδαχή or μελέτη in speaking of men. Epicharmus, fr. 33 Diels: ἀ δὲ μελέτα φύσις ἀγαθὸς πλέονα δωρεῖτα. Democritus, fr. 242 Diels: πλέονες εἶ ἄskήσιος ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἤ ἐπὶ φύσις. Critias, fr. 9 Diels: ἐκ μελέτης πλεῖον ἡ φύσις ἀγαθὸς. Διωνοσόφος, Diels Vorsokr. p. 646: ἐστι δὲ τι καὶ φύσις, ἢ δὴ τις μὴ μαθῶν παρὰ σοφωτῶν ίκανος ἐγένετο. Cf. Pl. Apol. 22 B: ἐγγὺς οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν... τούτῳ, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιούμεν ἄποιον, ἀλλὰ φύσις τυλί (by 'instinct') καὶ ἐνθυσιάζοντες (being possessed by a god). See Epicharmus, fr. 4 Diels, on the 'wisdom' or 'cleverness' (τὸ σοφὸν) which
a hen shows in hatching her eggs: τὸ δὲ σοφὸν ἄ φύσις τὸ ὅ ὁδε ν ὡς ἵχει μονὰ. for the hen is ‘self-taught’ (i.e. her cleverness is not a τέχνη διδακτη) .


Compare also Orig. c. Cels. 4. 81-83. Celsus spoke of the well-ordered πολυτεινοι of ants and bees, as showing that ὁδε ν µυρμήκων ἄ µελισσών διαφέρει δ ἀνθρωπος παρά τῷ θεῷ. To this Origen replies:

A a 2
Celsus spoke also (id. ch. 83) of the foresight shown by ants in laying up stores for the winter, and added that they take precautions to prevent the grains which they lay up from sprouting; to which Origen replies, 
on koi karptov tllyaiwpov toip aitovel opon aitoyp, alla tyn parameitn fous, tyn kai tla aloga koumbrisasw.

The term evropol katholik may have been suggested to the writer by Exc. III. 13, if he had read that document; but he applies it differently. The evropol which are called katholikai in III. 13 are the forces by which bodies of all kinds are brought into being; but those called katholikai in IV B. 3 are forces which act alike on all individuals of some one kind of animals. They are those which, in III. 12, are called genikai, and from which the katholikai are there distinguished.

In place of oip, we need a word meaning 'to some', in contrast to pai. Wachsmuth conjectures eido< (cf. eido< in Exc. III. 13 and 12); but paragonetai requires a dative. It would be possible to write ta de ... te<< evropol eido< (paragonetai, oip pai).

The words evropol, which are out of place at the end of § 3, are wanted here, to stand in contrast to evropol kai te<< evropol below.

§ 5. (tou' oun tay) [to'ou prattou] kai te<< swagwina tis trophas. Toou prattou has come from toou prattou above.

1 I. e. the logos by which the actions of the ants and bees are directed is not in the animals themselves, but acts on them from without. That which is in them is not logos, but an allocos fous (i. e. instinct) implanted in them by the logos by which the universe is governed.
§ I. ὁ μὲν [κύριος καὶ πάντων] δημιουργὸς τῶν ἀνίμων σωμάτων. The supreme God is the Maker of 'the everlasting bodies', and as such, is distinguished from the Maker of men (ὁ ἡμέτερος δημιουργὸς, § 2), who is a subordinate god. πάντων cannot be right; there is no reason to insist that all the everlasting bodies, and not some of them only, have been made by the supreme God. It would be possible to write ὁ μὲν κύριος πάντων, καὶ δημιουργὸς τῶν ἀνίμων σωμάτων. But ὁ μὲν δημιουργὸς τῶν ἁ. ὡ., without additional words, is better suited to stand in contrast to ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος δημιουργὸς. Perhaps the reading of the MSS. has resulted from a mixture of ὁ κύριος καὶ πάντων δημιουργὸς (a title of the supreme God) with ὁ δημιουργὸς τῶν ἀνίμων σωμάτων.

What is here meant by τὰ ἀδίδα σώματα? In its widest application, the term might include (1) the four cosmic elements, (2) the body of the Kosmos, and (3) the heavenly bodies,—sun moon and stars. (We are told in the Timaeus that God made these things himself, and then committed to the gods whom he had made, i.e. chiefly the gods incorporated in the heavenly bodies, the task of making the bodies of men and other θνητὰ ζωὰ.) In Exc. II A (§§ 1 f. and 13), τὰ ἀδίδα σώματα are the four cosmic elements. But in Exc. III, τὰ ἀδίδα σώματα (§§ 16 and 12), also called τὰ ἀθάνατα σώματα (§§ 16 and 8) and τὰ θεῖα σώματα (§§ 6 and 12), are the heavenly bodies. In Exc. V, τὰ ἀδίδα σώματα perhaps means both the cosmic elements and the heavenly bodies. If so, it is equivalent to τὰ στοιχεῖα in the wider sense of that term; for the heavenly bodies were sometimes called στοιχεῖα.

τὰ ὅτα γαρ ἐναυτοῦ παραδόσει καὶ ἐνώσας ἀλλήλοις ἀφῆκε φέρεσθαι. ἀφῆκε φέρεσθαι, 'he let them go on their course', seems to apply best to the heavenly bodies (cf. εἰςεσε στρέφεσθαι in Corp. 1. 11 a). But on the other hand, it is difficult to see what could be meant by saying that God 'united' the heavenly bodies 'to one another'; whereas this statement is intelligible when applied to the cosmic elements, which, according to the prevalent opinion, were continually being transmuted into one another. (See note on Exc. II A. 13.) And it would be possible to say that the cosmic elements 'go on their course', in the sense that they pass through the unending series of processes appointed for them.
The point on which the writer is insisting is that the ‘everlasting bodies’ do not need nutriment from without, as our bodies do (§ 4). He admits that they need and get nutriment, but only from one another. They are ‘united to one another’; and if all of them are regarded together, as making up a single whole, it may be said that they are oœdeüœs evêdaïta.

This applies to the cosmic elements rather than to the heavenly bodies. Each of the four elements is perpetually maintained in existence by the transmutation of portions of the other elements into that element. The heavenly bodies, according to the Stoic physics, consist of the element fire, and receive tpoçf; from the other elements, in the form of exhalations which are transmuted into fire; but it could not be said that the heavenly bodies receive nutriment from one another.

( . . . ) [œs] åðâðnâta. Ýdei γαρ τα δπ' εκείνου σώματα γενόμενα τοιαύτην έξειν [και] την φύσιν. A satisfactory sense might be got by writing ὦς(τε ταίτα μεν) åðâðnâta. The bodies hitherto spoken of are åðâñata, and as such, are contrasted with the bodies of men, which are θνητά (§ 2). τοιαύτην έξειν την φύσιν means åðâñata èína. Things made by the supreme God are necessarily immortal. Cf. Pl. Tim. 41 c, where God says to the gods whom he has made δι' εμοί δι' ταίτα γενόμενα . . . θεοῖς ἵσαζον' ἂν' ἵνα καὶ θνητά . . . ἃ γάρ πράξεθε κατά φύσιν ἵμαΐς ἐπὶ την τῶν ξύσων δημιουργίαν.

§ 2. δι' ἡμέτερος δημιουργός, ἐν σώματι ἄν. In the Timaeus, the bodies of men, and the ‘mortal part’ of their souls, are made, not by the supreme God himself, but by the gods whom he has made. The writer of Exc. V substitutes for these ‘gods’ a single god, who is embodied (ἐν σώματι), and, like the gods of the Timaeus, has been made by the supreme God (τὸν έαυτοῦ δημιουργόν). This subordinate and embodied Demiurgus must be either the Kosmos, or the Sun. For the Sun as subordinate Demiurgus, cf. Corp. XVI, Exc. XXI, and the interpolated passage Exc. II A. 14.

As the subordinate Demiurgus has been made by the supreme God, his body (whether the whole Kosmos or the Sun) must be regarded as one of the δίδα σώματα.

The notion that τὰ åðâñata have been made by one Maker, and τὰ θνητά by another, is discussed and rejected in Corp. XI. ii. 9 f.
This is opposed to Troi<rasovKeri iirolrjcrei. In Corp. XI. ii.12 b-14 a, it is asserted that God ‘is always making things’. The writer of Exc. V denies this with respect to the supreme God, but asserts it with respect to the ‘Maker of mortal bodies’. The everlasting bodies have been made once for all; but the mortal organisms of the sublunar world are continually being made.

According to the MSS., the Hermetist here says that men are bodies. If he did say this, he expressed his meaning inexactly; for man, even if regarded merely as an earthly organism, is not σώμα, but a thing made up of σώμα and ψυχή. The writer seems to speak of men as if they were merely bodies in the words ἐκ τῆς . . . σωματώσεως ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς (not τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα) at the end of the section; but on the other hand he also employs the phrase τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα, which implies that ‘we’ are not ‘bodies’.

οὐ γὰρ θέμις ἢν αἰτήσεώς μεμείσθαι τὸν ἐαυτοῦ ὑμιουργὸν, ἄλλως τε καὶ (. . .) ἀδύνατον ὅ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Wachsmuth adopts Meineke’s emendation, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀδύνατον (ὅν). This would mean ‘It was not permitted to him, . . . especially as it was impossible’. But that cannot be right. οὐ θέμις and ἀδύνατον cannot be used together with reference to the same action; if a thing is impossible, the question whether it is permitted or forbidden does not arise. There must therefore be a lacuna before ἀδύνατον. Perhaps the author wrote something like this: ‘(And indeed) it was impossible (that our bodies should be of the same nature as the bodies made by the supreme Maker); for the supreme Maker made of incorporeal substance (the bodies which he made), but our Maker’ &c.

ὅ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἐποίησεν, οὐσίας ἀοιμάτων. In Exc. IV A. 2, it is said that ἡ ψυχὴ has been made ἕξ ἀοιμάτων οὐσίας. But the writer of Exc. V is speaking, not of the making of soul, but of the making of the everlasting bodies. What is the ‘first’ and ‘incorporeal’ substance of which the everlasting bodies are made? In Exc. III. 8, we are told that the ἀδύνατα σώματα are made ἐκ μιᾶς ζήσεως, and ἰδ. 16, that they consist of an οὐσία different from that of which our bodies are made; but the ἡλί or οὐσία there spoken of is not said to be ἀοιμάτως; it is probably the ‘fifth (corporeal) substance’ of the Aristotelians. The view of the writer of Corp. V appears to be that originally nothing existed except
‘incorporeal substance’, i.e., the substance of which God, νοῦς, and τὰ νοητά consist; (cf. Corp. I. 4, where that substance is symbolically denoted by the word φῶς;) and that God transformed portions of that incorporeal substance into the corporeal elements, and made the Kosmos out of the elements thus brought into being. If so, he rejects the Platonic doctrine of ὦλη; he holds that the ὦλη out of which all material things have been made is τὸ νοητὸν.

ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς γενομένης (γενομένης MSS.) σωμάτωσις ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς. γενομένης gives the sense required. ἐγενόμην is said by Liddell and Scott to be sometimes used in the sense of ἐγενόμην ‘in late poets’; but I know of no instance of this use in prose.

ἡ γενομένη σωμάτωσις means ‘the corporeal things that had been made’, i.e. the four cosmic elements, which were made by the supreme God.

§ 3. οἰκότως οὐ [κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον] ἐκεῖνα μὲν . . . αἰθανατά ἔστι. κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον must have been written as an alternative or substitute for οἰκότως.

ὡς τῆς ὠλης ἡμῶν ἐκ σωμάτων συνεστῶσης. It is not ἡ ὦλη ἡμῶν, i.e. the material of which we are made, but our bodies, that are ‘made up of bodies put together’, i.e. of portions of the four elements. In place of ὦλης then, a feminine substantive equivalent to σώματος is wanted.

§ 4. διὸ καὶ ἀθενὴ ἔστι (διὰ τὸ ἀθενὴ εἶναι MSS.). It could not be said either that the human body is made of material elements ‘because it is weak and needs help’, or that it is dissoluble and mortal for that reason. The meaning must have been that our bodies need help from without because they are dissoluble and mortal.

πολλῆς ἐπικουρίας δεόμενα. The two kinds of ἐπικουρία of which the Hermetist proceeds to speak are food (§ 4) and sleep (§§ 5–7). The everlasting bodies need neither.

§ 5. (. . .) ὡστε καὶ πρὸς τὰς κυνήσεις ἄσμεν ἀσθενότεροι. There must be a lacuna here. ὡστε refers to some statement which has disappeared; and the κυνήσεις could hardly be thus spoken of without some preceding explanation.

The body is moved (i.e. its muscular movements are worked) by the ψυχή which resides in it; but it would soon be worn out by these movements, if it were not refreshed and renovated by sleep.
It is necessary to write either τάς κινήσεις or ἀδώτας; and the repetition of τάς κινήσεις would be clumsy.

ἀγάθος ἢ ὁ δημιουργός . . . ἐποίησε τὸν ὕπνον. Is this the 'Maker of the everlasting bodies', or the 'Maker of mortal bodies'? Probably the former. The body of this or that individual man has been made by the subordinate Demiurgus; but sleep is a force that works in all human and animal bodies alike; and in the language of Exc. III it might be said that, though ἐν σώματι, it is itself ἀσώματος and ἄθανατος. The 'making' of sleep really means the making of a law that all human and animal bodies shall be recuperated by a certain process; and the making of such general laws may very well be ascribed to the supreme God. Sleep is often personified; and ὕπνος, regarded as a person, might be classed among the gods whom the supreme God has made. The writer of Exc. V does not personify it; but he speaks of it as if it were a substantive thing, and puts it on a level with ψυχή.

ἀγάθος ἢ ὁ δημιουργός is a reminiscence of Pl. Ῥήμ. 29 κ, ἀγάθος ἢ ν κ.τ.λ.

ἐν ἑσόπτες ἔταξεν ἑκάστῃ χρόνῳ (ἐκάστῃ χρόνῳ MSS.). The writer does not mean to say that men sleep exactly half their time, but merely that, night being the time appointed for sleep, and day for movement, the nights are on the average equal to the days in length.

[μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἀνάπαυλῃ πλείονα (χρόνον ἔταξε)]. This is obviously untrue:—[unless ἀνάπαυλη be understood as 'rest from labour'.]

§ 6. Καθάπερ γάρ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως ἐστὶν ἐνεργητική (ἐνεργεία MSS.), τὸν ἀδῶτα τρόπον (ὁ ὕπνος . . .). In contrast to ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως, the author must have written ὁ ὕπνος followed by some genitive (ἀνάπαυλης;).

ἀνεσίς γάρ [καὶ ἁφεσίς; ἐστὶ τῶν συνδέτων τῶν μελῶν]. τῶν συνδέτων μελῶν (P) is meaningless; and τῶν συνδέσμων would not give a satisfactory sense. The bonds by which the body is held together are not relaxed in sleep. It might perhaps be said that the bonds by which the soul and the body are bound to one another are relaxed in sleep (cf. Corp. I. 1), and that it is in consequence of this relaxation that the soul no longer works bodily κινήσεις.
when the man is asleep; but if that was the meaning, the words by
which it was expressed are lost.

ἀνέσεισ occurs in connexion with sleep in Aetius, Diels Doxogr.
p. 436: οἱ Στοβαῖοι, τὸν μὲν ἐννοοῦν γίνεσθαι ἀνέσει τοῦ αἴσθητικοῦ
πνεύματος. (Cf. Arist. De somno 454 b 10: ὃ ὕπνος τοῦ αἴσθητικοῦ
μορίον ἔστιν ὁλον δεισμός καὶ ἀκεφαλία τος.) But the writer of Exc. V
does not speak of αἰσθήσεις; he describes sleep as a suspension of
movement, not of sensation or consciousness.

§ 7. καὶ ἀνεβεβαι ἐνεργεῖ, σωματοποιῶν τὴν ἐκείσελθοῦσαν ὀλην.
This is a second function of sleep, distinct from that of relieving
the strain of κίνησις. The two might be connected, by saying
that κίνησις expends the material substance of the body, and that
sleep is therefore needed to replace the matter expended; but the
writer has not thus connected them.

For the notion that nutriment is distributed within the body
and worked into its structure by (or during) sleep, cf. Arist. De
somno 454 b 32: τὸ ἔργον τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοιεί τὸ θρεπτικόν μόριον ἐν τῷ
καθείδειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορόναι τρέφεται γάρ καὶ αὔξεται (τὸ σῶμα)
tότε μᾶλλον. Aristotle also says (id. 456 b 24) that μάλιστα γίνονται
ὑπὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς.

(τοῖς) δοτέοις καὶ μυελοῖς. There is no apparent reason why the
marrow, rather than any other parts of the body, should be said
to be made of earth or fed with earth; and on the other hand, some
mention of the flesh seems almost necessary. If the author wrote
μύσι (muscles), this might easily be altered into μυελοίς, which would
be suggested by δοτέοις.

τὸν δὲ ἄπερ τοῖς νεῦροις [καὶ φλεψ]. According to a theory
originated by Erasistratus (see Corp. X. 11), the νεῦρα are pipes
through which flow streams of πνεῦμα; and as πνεῦμα consists
of warm air, it might be thought that the air which enters the
body passes into the νεῦρα, and serves as nutriment to the vital
πνεῦμα contained in them. In place of φλεψ, we might have
expected ἀρτηρίαι; for the arteries also were commonly supposed
to contain air or πνεῦμα. Aetius (Diels Doxogr. p. 436) reports
Diogenes (which Diogenes?) as saying that the φλέβες contain
air as well as blood; but that is hardly enough to account for
the mention of them in Exc. V. 7; and it seems best to bracket
καὶ φλεψ.

τὸ δὲ τῷ τῇ ὀράσει. It is assumed that the eyes contain fire,
or consist partly of fire. Cf. the description of the process of
vision in Pl. Tim. 45 b ff., where it is said that the eyes contain fire, which emits streams of light. Arist. De sensu 437 b 11: εἲ γε πῦρ ἦν (ἡ ὅφις), καθαύτερ ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ Τιμαῖῳ γέγραπται, καὶ συνέβαινε τὸ ῥαν ἐξόντος ὄστρη ἐκ λαμπτῆρός τοῦ φωτός, κ.τ.λ. Empedocles, fr. 84 Diels, compares the eye to a lighted lantern, and speaks of the μύριγεῖν ἐργυμένων ὁγάγων πῦρ which it contains.

EXCERPT VI

This Libellus gives a description of the position and functions of the star-gods called Decani; to which are added some statements about other stars, and about meteors and comets. It is a sequel to an earlier dialogue, in which an account of the Zodiac and the planets had been given; and a knowledge of the contents of that earlier document is presupposed.

In Exc. VI we have the outlines of a system according to which the thirty-six Decani are (under God supreme and incorporeal) the chief powers by which the universe is governed. They discharge collectively that function of 'second God' and ruler of the Kosmos, which in some Hermetica (e.g. in Corp. XVI) is assigned to the Sun. The system set forth in this document includes some elements of recent origin; the Graeco-Egyptian theory of the Zodiac and the planet-spheres appears in it; and though the writer himself is not an astrologer, he has been influenced by astrological conceptions;¹ but there can be little doubt that his doctrine is, in its groundwork, a survival of one of the many religions of Pharaonic Egypt.

The conception of the Δεκανοὶ² was of Egyptian origin. The Egyptian priests, under the native dynasties, and before the importation into Egypt of the astronomy and astral religion of Babylonia (which seems to have taken place for the most part during the Persian dominion, from 525 B.C. onward), had already been accustomed to observe the heavens, and had constructed a list of conspicuous stars or star-groups, each of which they regarded as the embodiment or domicile of a special deity. The name by which these deities were collectively denoted in the Egyptian language has not been ascertained; but we may call them 'the

¹ E.g. the phrase καθολικά Δωσελίσματα (§ 16) is a technical term of astrology.
stellar gods'.

Egyptian observers had in early ages noted the regularity of the variations in the relative position of the sun and the fixed stars; they knew (as the Greeks, in and before the time of Hesiod, also knew) that if you observe the eastern or western horizon shortly after sunset or before sunrise, you will, as the year advances, see different star-groups there, in a fixed order of succession; and they had long recorded the results of such observations; but they had not yet marked out the zodiacal circle, by which the sun's annual course among the stars was represented in later times. They thought of the sun's path rather as a broad equatorial zone, (the intertropical zone, as we might call it,) within which he moves.

1 When Aeschylus (Agam. 5) made his Watchman speak of τοῖς φώστας χείμα καὶ θέρος θρόσος λαμαρδοι δυνάταις, έμπρόσωτος αλθείς, his notions about the stars were not very different from those which had long been current in Egypt, though his knowledge of their movements was, no doubt, less detailed. The 'stellar gods' of the Egyptians are λαμαρδοι δυνάταις.

2 The 'zodiacal circle', or ecliptic, is a circle described on the surface of the revolving star-sphere, cutting the equator obliquely at two opposite points, and touching both tropics. Its demarcation presupposes the resolution of the sun's apparent movement into two distinct movements, viz. (1) the daily movement of sun and stars alike round the earth, and (2) the sun's annual movement relatively to the fixed stars. The zodiacal circle represents the latter movement in separation from the former. This mode of representing the sun's movement is said to have been known to Greek thinkers in the sixth century B.C.; Pliny Nat. hist. 2. 31: 'Obliquitatem (signiferi, i.e. of the Zodiac) intellexisse. . . Anaximander Milesius traditur primus, Olympiade quinquagesimo octava (548-545 B.C.), signa deinde in eo Cleostratus (circ. 520 B.C.), et prima Arietis et Sagittarii.' See J. H. S. 1919.

The Greeks must have got the conception of the zodiacal circle from Babylonian astronomers, either directly or through Egyptian intermediaries. Jastrow, Religious beliefs in Babylonia and Assyria, pp. 326-330: 'The ecliptic, known as the 'path-way of the sun', was divided (by the Babylonians and Assyrians) into three sections. . . . The stars near the ecliptic were combined into groups, and designations more or less fanciful were given to them. In this way, twelve such groups were gradually distinguished, corresponding to our constellations of the Zodiac: though . . . there are no indications that the Babylonians or the Assyrians divided the ecliptic into twelve equal divisions of 30° each. . . . It appears that up to c. 1000 B.C., only four or five constellations in the Zodiac were distinguished, and we must descend to the Persian period before we find the full number twelve marked out along the ecliptic.' Cumont, Astronomy and religion among the Greeks and Romans, p. 11, mentions a Babylonian tablet, dated 523 B.C., which shows, 'the astonishing advance (in astronomy) made (by the Babylonians) since the fall of Assyria (625 B.C.). Here for the first time we find the relative positions of the sun and moon calculated in advance; we find, noted with their precise dates, the conjunctions of the moon with the planets and of the planets with each other, and their situation in the signs of the Zodiac, which here appears definitely established.'

The pictures of men, beasts, and inanimate things, which Babylonians and Egyptians drew on their celestial globes to represent the signs of the Zodiac and other constellations, were taken over, with some changes, by the Greeks. Jastrow, op. cit., p. 230, says ‘we have ram, twins, lion, crab, scorpion, archer, and fishes, in Babylonian-Assyrian astrology. In place of the virgin, we have a constellation designated as 'plant-growth'; instead of the bull, a spear; the remainder (of the twelve Zodia) are still in doubt.'
in his daily journey from East to West, travelling at a pace not quite so fast as that of the fixed stars, and shifting his course northward or southward according to the season of the year. And any conspicuous star-group, the nightly circuit of which lies within this same zone, and which consequently must, on account of the difference of pace, be in proximity to the sun at some stage in the yearly movement, was qualified for enrolment in the list of stellar gods.

Nine lists of these gods are extant in Egyptian documents, ranging in date from the fourteenth to the fourth century B.C. They include twenty distinct constellations; and as some of these constellations are subdivided into two or more parts, and each part is treated as a distinct stellar god, the number of stellar gods whose names are recorded amounts to forty.

The Egyptian doctrine of stellar gods no doubt included some theory as to their influence on terrestrial things. It may have been held that the particular stellar god who rose at sunset,—or rather, who was nearest to the eastern horizon when the stars first became visible after sunset,—was dominant for the time being; and it seems that in some such way as this the year was parted out among the stellar gods, each of them in turn being *chronocrator* for a space of nearly ten days on the average. Or again, it may have been thought

1 This agrees in substance with Bouche-Leclercq’s explanation, if I understand him rightly. But he is surely mistaken (p. 320) in connecting the theory of stellar gods with the fact that ‘les Égyptiens, dès le temps des Pharaons, avaient semé le long de la route diurne et nocturne du Soleil toute espèce de génies, qui lui disputaient pour ainsi dire la maîtrise du temps, de qui il obtenait le passage au moyen de charmes magiques, et qui, lui couché, régnaient enfin à sa place sur le monde’. During a given day and night, the sun traverses a complete circle of the celestial sphere; and during the whole of that day and night,—and indeed, during ten successive days and nights, or something like that number,—he is in company with one and the same stellar god, who travels with him. It would be easier to imagine the stellar gods as successive escorts of the travelling Sun,—each of them taking his turn of duty for ten days and nights together, and then going on ahead and giving place to another who comes up from behind,—than as stationary residents on the Sun’s route, who dispute his ‘daily and nightly’ passage. Daemons who stand fast while the Sun moves in his daily circuit must be daemons of earth, and not of sky.

2 There are also some lists of later date. The several lists differ in some details.

3 E.g. in the constellation called *Kenmut*, there is one stellar god named *Point of Kenmut*, and another named *Navel of Kenmut*, as well as one named *Kenmut*. (Is each of these a single star, or a small group of stars?)

4 The notion of *xeposdērōs*—i.e. the notion that each division of time is presided over by its own special deity,—was indigenous in Egypt (Bouche-Leclercq, p. 320). One of its many applications has survived in our names of the days of the week, which came from Egypt (Dio Cass. 37. 18). The assignment of the days to the seven planets in a fixed order is due to an artificial combination; but the practice of assigning divisions of time to *chronocratores*, of which this is one of the later instances, must have arisen out of actual observation of the positions of certain heavenly bodies, such as the ‘stellar gods’, at certain times.
that the issue of events was dependent on the action of the stellar god who rose at or near the critical moment.\(^1\) Such notions, if they already existed in Pharaonic times, would afford a basis on which a system of astrology (i.e. a method of predicting future events from an observed position of the stars) could easily be built up; but there seems to be no evidence that astrology of any sort was practised in Egypt\(^2\) before the time of the Persian dominion,\(^3\) when it was imported from Babylonia.

The development of a more precise astronomy by Greeks and Egyptians together, which began in the fourth century B.C., led to some changes in the doctrine of the stellar gods. The list of these deities was revised; their number was fixed at thirty-six, and a space of exactly ten days was assigned to each.\(^4\) Moreover, the zodiacal circle having now been accurately determined, and divided into twelve ‘Signs’ or parts of equal length, corresponding to the twelve months of the year, the further step was taken of assigning to each of the thirty-six stellar gods as his domicile one-third of a sign, i.e. ten of the 360 degrees of the whole circle.

To these thirty-six stellar gods the Greeks gave the name demavôs.\(^5\) The origin of this word is uncertain. It was used also in the sense

\(^1\) When the number of the stellar gods came to be fixed at thirty-six, each of them would in this sense preside over a space of forty minutes in every twenty-four hours.


\(^3\) In the time of Herodotus, astrology was already in existence in Egypt. Hdt. 2. 82: ‘The Egyptians have likewise discovered to which of the gods each month and day belongs,’ (this is the system of chronocraters.) ‘and what a man born on a given day will meet with in the course of his life, what will be his manner of death, and what sort of man he will be.’ I.e. in the fifth century B.C. there were people in Egypt who held not only that the chronocrator in power on the day of a man’s birth determines the whole course of his life, but also that this deity works according to fixed laws, and that the laws of his working are known to men, who can thereby predict the future. This is astrology; though it is still a simple and rudimentary kind of astrology that Herodotus describes.

\(^4\) Thirty-six periods of ten days each make 360 days. The five (or more exactly, 5\(\frac{1}{4}\)) epagomenal days which completed the year were disposed of by some makeshift.

\(^5\) The word demavôs was used in the astrological writings ascribed to Nechepso and Petosiris, and in those of the astrologer Teucer of Babylon. The date of ‘Nechepso and Petosiris’, the primary authority for all subsequent Graeco-Egyptian astrology,—or at least, the date of one of the books which passed under that name,—has been fixed at about 150 B.C. (Cumont, in *Cilt* Bd. IX; Heft 3, 1909; Boll, in *Catal. Cod. Astrolog. Græc. VII*); but the original work may very likely have been subsequently expanded by additions, of various and undeterminable dates, which were ascribed to the same authors. Teucer of Babylon (who, despite his name, must have lived and worked in Egypt,) wrote ‘certainly not later than the first century B.C.’ (Boll, *Sphaera*, p. 8.) I know of no earlier instance of demavôs in the astral sense.
of 'a commander of ten men'; and no doubt, when applied to the stellar gods, it was understood to mean 'a chief of ten', i.e. one who presides over ten days of the year, or ten degrees of the zodiacal circle. But its formation is without parallel in Greek; and it seems probable that it was borrowed from some Oriental language, but somewhat altered to assimilate it to the Greek δεκα.

The old Egyptian system of stellar gods did not, however, adjust itself easily to the new zodiacal theory; for some of the stars or star-groups included in the list were situated at a considerable distance north or south of the zodiacal circle, so that it was necessary to assume that the stellar god was operative in one place (viz. in a certain subdivision of the Zodiac) while he was visibly present in another. Astronomers in general, and many astrologers, ignored the Decani; Ptolemy, for instance, in his work on astrology (about A.D. 140), pays no attention to them; and those astrologers who made use of them dealt with them in various ways. One school of

1 δεκαωνός, signifying a man of a certain military grade, occurs in a Ptolemaic document of 259 B.C. (Grenfell and Hunt, Hibeh Papry P. i, 1906, n. 96, pp. 266-269). Bouché-Leclercq, Hist. des Lagides, IV, p. 48, mentions δεκαωνός or δεκαωνός as a grade in the Egyptian cavalry, referring to Tety. Pap. n. 251, and Hibeh Pap. nn. 30, 81, 90-91, 96, 103. In an Alexandrian inscription of the Roman period, the word δεκαων is applied to naval officers (Otto, Priester und Tempel im hellen. Aeg., p. 46); and in the accounts of a temple in the Fayum (ib.) there is mention of τοῦ δεκαωνοῦ τῶν πλοῶν, which appears to be an impost paid to δεκαων who were officers of the river-police.

2 Iamblichus, as reported by Proclus in Tim. 5. 299 k, spoke of certain ὄχαραι θεών whom he called ὑπὲρ τῆς κατάσκοπας δεκαώρατα; i.e. he used the word δεκαώρατα as a substitute for δεκαων.

3 It might be taken to mean 'an officer in command of ten Liturgi', if the Liturgi were reckoned to be 360 in number. The Pistis Sophia comes very near to that reckoning; for it says that there are 365 Liturgi. See note on Exc. VI. 12.

4 As a mere guess, the probability of which it is for experts in Aryan philology to estimate, I would suggest that δεκαωνός may perhaps be a Greek adaptation of a Persian word meaning 'a chief of ten', and used in the special sense of a sergeant of cavalry or mounted police. 'Ten' is dah in modern Persian, dasa in Avestic; and there is an adjectival termination -dasra in Avestic (Brugmann, Comp. Grammar, Eng. tr. 1891, II, p. 152); so that an early Persian form of the word might be something like dasana. A Persian military term may very well have been introduced into Egypt during the Persian occupation of the country, and may have been retained in use there after the Macedonian conquest; and Alexandrian translators of Egyptian astral writings may have considered it a suitable word to describe these patrolling officers of the heavenly host, who ὕπερ φύλαξει ἄκριτης καὶ ἱκανοῦ ποτὶ παντὸς περιέχοντο τῷ νυχτήματι τῷ πῶν, and have under them ὑπηρετάς καὶ στρατιάτας to execute their orders (Exc. VI. 6 and 12).

The Latin decanus is late; it occurs, in the astral sense, in Firmicus Maternus, c. A.D. 340; in the military sense, in Vegetius, A.D. 386; and in the derived sense 'a chief of ten monks' (whence our 'dean'), in Jerome, c. A.D. 400. Manilius (c. A.D. 12) does not use the word; he perhaps once used decania (neut. plur.), in the sense of 'thirds of a zodiacal sign' (4. 298); but the verse is hopelessly corrupt. Decanus is not a legitimate formation in Latin; (the words most nearly analogous are decumanus, septimianus, tertianus, &c., which are derived from the ordinals;) it must have been taken over by the Romans from the Greeks.
astrology, which professed to be specially 'Egyptian', retained the Decani as personal deities, each of whom is operative in a particular portion of the Zodiac, three being domiciled in each of the twelve 'Signs'. Other astrologers allowed the personality of the Decani to drop out of sight, and used the term merely to signify subdivisions of the zodiacal circle. Some assigned the thirty-six subdivisions to other astral powers, in substitution for the stellar gods who had been their previous occupants. Manilius has a system peculiar to himself, by which the thirty-six portions of the Zodiac are assigned to the twelve *Zodia* in succession, as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Aries, 30°</th>
<th>2. Taurus, 30°</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aries, 10°</td>
<td>Taurus, 10°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gemini, 10°</td>
<td>Cancer, 10°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leo, 10°</td>
<td>Virgo, 10°</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and so on.

Others assigned the thirty-six subdivisions of the Zodiac to the seven planets in succession,—or rather, as they expressed it, to the πρόσωπα of the planets (i.e. Decani 'personating' planet-gods, disguised as planets and operating as such, or planet-gods 'personating' Decani), thus:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Aries, 30°</th>
<th>2. Taurus, 30°</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mars, 10°</td>
<td>Sun, 10°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venus, 10°</td>
<td>Mercury, 10°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moon, 10°</td>
<td>Saturn, 10°</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and so on.

This last system, in which the decan-subdivisions of the signs were occupied by planetary πρόσωπα, had a long and prosperous career, and passed over into Arabic, Persian, and Indian astrology.

But these vagaries of a pseudo-science do not directly concern us here; for they were confined to professed astrologers, and the writers of the religious and philosophic *Hermetica* held astrology in slight esteem. In the belief of the Egyptians in general, the old national

1 See Bouché-Leclercq, pp. 229–235 on certain astrological systems described by Firmicus (A.D. 340) and Hephaestion (A.D. 379–395).

2 This system also is described by Firmicus. The πρόσωπα seem to have been already known to Teucer, first century B.C. (Bouché-Leclercq, p. 224, n. 3).


4 There were of course many astrological writings which bore the name of Hermes Trismegistus; but they had little in common with the writings with which we are dealing.
doctrine of stellar gods lived on into the Hellenistic age, little affected by the more elaborate systems of astrological experts; and it is on that indigenous doctrine that the conception of the Decans as expounded in Exc. VI is based.

The notions of Egyptian priests of the Hellenistic period concerning the stellar gods whom the Greeks called ἥκανοι are illustrated by an inscription of Ombos, dated 145–117 B.C. (Bouché-Leclercq, p. 222: Brugsch Thes. Inscr. Aeg. I, p. 135): 'The stellar gods shine after the sun. They move in a circle, succeeding one another; they appear after sunset, at their appointed times, according to the seasons. O ye souls of the stars of the gods, who rise to promise blessings, cause Ptolemy, son of the Sun, to rise, even as you rise yourselves.' A similar inscription at Tentyra (Brugsch ib. p. 138) speaks of 'the sublime and great and very great gods, the protecting stars who follow Sothis in the sky, the rising stars who rise in the eastern sky, who grant their protection to the deities of Tentyra, the messengers of her Majesty (Isis-Hathor), who exterminate all that act against their will, and bestow their protection on the city of Tentyra.' From the stress laid on the 'rising' of these deities 'after sunset', it may perhaps be inferred that the stellar god who rose first after sunset was chronocrator for the time being, and that in this way each of them in turn was dominant for ten days. It is clear that the beings invoked in these inscriptions are not merely items in an astronomical system, but are personal and potent gods, who act on earthly things according to their will.

The Egyptian, Coptic, and Greek names of the Decani are given by Brugsch, op. cit., p. 166. Transliterations of these native names occur in Greek and Latin astrological writings. The first Decanus of the sign Cancer is Sopdet (the 'star of Isis') = Σῶθυς, the dog-star. Figures of these gods in bodily form, as imagined by Egyptian priests in the first century A.D., are depicted in the carvings of the temple at Tentyra.1 Portraits of them in Graeco-Roman style may be seen in the 'Bianchini Planisphere' (Boll, Sphaera, ch. 12 and Taf. V), a marble tablet found at Rome, and assigned to the second century A.D. The outer ring of the circular diagram engraved on that tablet contained, when complete, figures of the thirty-six Decani in human form; and above the head of each

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1 Brugsch, Thes. I; Boll, Sphaera, ch. 10 and Taf. II–IV. The date of these carvings seems to be settled beyond doubt; the circular 'Zodiacus' is of the time of Augustus, and the rectangular 'Zodiacus', of the time of Nero.

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Decanus is placed the corresponding planetary πρόσωπων, in the form of the bust of a planet-god.

In the popular beliefs of Egypt in the Graeco-Roman period, various departments of the physical world were thought to be specially subject to the influences of the Decani; and the established method of distributing divisions of time among the members of a class of astral deities,—Decans, Zodiac, or Planets, as the case might be,—was imitated in other matters also. Thus, a document entitled Τὸ Ἐρμοῦ πρὸς Ἄσκληπιόν ἡ λεγομένη Ἰερὰ βιβλιον (Pitra, Anal. sacra 5. 2, pp. 284–290) assigns to each of the Decans (here represented by the planetary πρόσωπα under which the original stellar gods are disguised) a particular kind of precious stone, and a particular kind of plant; the magic properties of the stone or plant being supposed to be due to the operation of the astral deity to whom it is assigned. And again, the human body was parted out among the Decans, each of whom was supposed to preside over one particular organ or member, and to be prepared to heal disease in it when appealed to in due form. A system of this kind was known to Celsus, c. a. d. 180 (Origen c. Cels. 8. 58): ὅτι μὴν ἐν τούτῳ μέχρι τῶν ἑλαχίστων ἥττων ὧν δεδομένα ἡμοία, μάθοι τις ἄν ἐξ ἐν Ἀλγῖνποι λέγωσιν, ὅτι ἄρα τοῦ ἄνθρωπον τὸ σῶμα ἐξ καὶ τρίκοντα διειληφθές δαίμονες, ἢ θεοὶ τινες αἰδέρειος, εἰς τοσαύτα μέρη νεομημένοιν, (οὶ δὲ καὶ πολὸ πλείονες λέγουσιν), ἂλλος ἄλλο τι αὐτοῦ νέμεν ἐπιτέτακται. καὶ τῶν δαίμονων ἦσαν τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπιχωρίω ψωφῇ, ὀρίστερ Χνομόμην, καὶ Χναχομόμη, καὶ Κνάτ, καὶ Σκάτ, καὶ Βιοῦ, καὶ Ἑρό, καὶ Ἑρεβιοῦ, καὶ Ῥαμανοῦ, καὶ Ῥεισανοῦ, ὅσα τε ἄλλα τῇ ἑαυτῶν γλώσσῃ ὀνομάζοντες καὶ δὴ ἐπικαλοῦντες αὐτοῦς ἵσταται τῶν μερῶν τὰ παθήματα. The ‘daemons or aetherial gods’ of whom Celsus speaks are the Egyptian Decans; though he does not seem to have been aware that they were stars or star-groups.

He must have met with some book in which the human body was divided into thirty-six parts, and each part was assigned to its special Decan, who, when invoked by name, would heal disease in it. The outlandish forms of the Egyptian god-names were

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1 The ‘much more numerous’ deities among whom some people distributed the parts of the body were probably the Liturgi. Cf. Pistis Sophia, cap. 132, C. Schmidt, p. 214, where it is said of the 365 Liturgi by whom the human body is fashioned in the womb that ‘each of them fashions one member (μύλος)’.

2 The corresponding Egyptian names in Bouc'h-Leclercq’s list of Decani (p. 232 f.) are Κνων, χαρ-κνων, Σνατ, Σι-κατ, Βια, Αρατ, Χρι-ων (according to Boll, Sphaera, p. 177, Χρι-ιβ-ωνια or Χρι-ιβ-ωνια), Κεμεν-καρ.
doubtlessthought, by the Greeks who used them, to add a magic
efficacy to the prayer.

Diodorus, 2. 30. 6, in his description of the astral doctrine
of ‘the Chaldaeans in Babylon’, speaks of certain stellar gods called
\( \text{βουλαίων θεοί} \), in whom we may recognize the Egyptian Decani under
another name. The Chaldaeans, he says, ascribe supreme importance
to the five planet-stars, which they call \( \text{ηρμηνεύς} \) (i.e. interpreters
of the purposes of the gods). \( \text{ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν τούτων φορὰν λέγοντι}
τετάξθαι τριάκοντα (ξ ἀξ. Letronne) ἀστέρας, οὗ προσαγορεύοντοι
βουλαίων θεοί' τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἡμίσεις τοὺς ὑπὲρ γῆν τότες ἐφοράν,
toüs δ' ἡμίσεις τοὺς ὑπὸ [τὴν] γῆν, τὰ κατ' ἄνθρωπος ἐπισκοποῦντας\(^1\)
ἀμα καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν συμβαίνοντα διὰ δ' ἡμερῶν δέκα πει-
πεθαι τῶν μὲν ἄνω πρὸς τοὺς κάτω καθάπερ ἄγγελον ἕνα τῶν
ἀστέρων, τῶν δ' ὑπὸ γῆν πρὸς τοὺς ἄνω πάλιν ὄμοιος ἦν. Over
these (thirty-six) gods preside (κυρίους εἶναι φασι) twelve other gods,
viz. the twelve Signs of the Zodiac.

The statement that the \( \text{βουλαίων θεοί} \) ‘are posted below the course
of the planets’ must be an error, either of Diodorus himself or of the
抄ists. The true account may have been that these stellar gods
are posted in the outermost sphere, or (as in Exc. VI) immediately
below it, but are subject or subordinate to the planets. If so, the
authority followed by Diodorus differed in this respect from the
writer of Exc. VI (who makes the planets subordinate to the Decani),
and agreed more nearly with the doctrine of planetary πρόσωπα
operative in the Decan-divisions of the Zodiac.

According to the MSS., the number of the ‘Counsellors’ is
thirty. But we are afterwards told that ‘every ten days one of
those above is sent as a messenger to those below’ (i.e. disappears),
‘and one of those below the earth is sent as a messenger to those
above’ (i.e. reappears); and it clearly follows from this that their
number must be equal to the number of ten day periods in the year,
i.e. that it must be thirty-six\(^2\), and consequently, that \( \xi \) must be
inserted after τριάκοντα.\(^3\) The ‘messenger sent to those below
the earth’ must be the stellar god who approaches the sun so

\(^{1}\) In Exc. VI 6, the Decani are called \( \text{ἐνσώπως τοῦ παντός} \).

\(^{2}\) The year may be reckoned for this purpose at 360 days, the five additional
days being disregarded.

\(^{3}\) Boll, Σφαίρα, p. 337, doubts this, and considers it at least equally probable
that thirty (the \( \text{λαμπροὶ ἀστέρες} \)) is the right number, and that \( \xi \) is a mistake for
\( \text{δέκασα} \). \((30 \times 12 = 360.\) But the number thirty-six is confirmed by the fact that
the \( \text{βουλαίων θεοί} \) are said to be subject to the twelve Zodiac. Thirty servants could
not be assigned to twelve masters by any symmetrical arrangement.

B b 2
closely as to become invisible; and if there were thirty-six of them, following one another along the sun's path, and occupying equal spaces, one would thus disappear every ten days. The 'messenger sent from below' is the stellar god who becomes visible again after having been for a time obscured by the sun's light.

'Half of them watch over the regions above the earth, and the other half, the regions below the earth'; i.e. *at any given moment of the night*, half of the stellar gods are above the horizon, and the other half below it. But every forty minutes, one of them sets in the west, and another rises in the east; so that in the course of the night, all of them are at some time visible, except the few (some six at most) who are nearest to the sun during the current decad. This must have been the view of Diodorus' informant; though it may be doubted whether Diodorus himself clearly understood it.

The gods of the twelve zodiacal Signs are κόροι of the thirty-six 'Counsellors'. This agrees with the Graeco-Egyptian method of distributing the Decans among the Signs, three to each; though it differs from the doctrine of *Exc.* VI, according to which the Decani are masters of all other astral powers.

On the whole, the 'Chaldaean' doctrine of βουλαίων θεώ described by Diodorus so closely resembles the Graeco-Egyptian doctrine of Decani, that the two must certainly be connected. There were in the time of Diodorus two schools of astrology, one called 'Egyptian', and the other 'Chaldaean'. Both systems were ultimately based on beliefs and practices which had originated in Babylonia, but had been imported from Babylonia into Egypt; both alike had been developed and elaborated in Ptolemaic Egypt, and were in reality Graeco-Egyptian. They agreed in their main principles, and differed only in details,—chiefly, it seems, in the fact that astrologers of the 'Chaldaean' school attached more importance to the planets, whereas those of the 'Egyptian' school attached more importance to the Zodiac and its subdivisions. Now Diodorus was in Egypt in 20 B.C.; and he probably got his account of the Chaldaean astral system from an astrologer of the 'Chaldaean' school in Egypt. But even if he got it directly or indirectly from Babylonia, it might none the less include Egyptian elements; for by his time the Graeco-Egyptian astrology had spread to other countries, and the writings of 'Nechepso and Petosiris' were doubtless studied in Babylonia as well as in Egypt.
There is no reason then to be surprised at finding the Egyptian Decani included, under the name of βουλαίων θεῶν, in a professedly 'Chaldaean' system of this period; and the mention of these deities by Diodorus is no proof that the conception of the Decani was indigenous in Babylonia. On the other hand, there is evidence that this conception, or at least something out of which it could be evolved without any large alteration, had existed from ancient times in Egypt.

§ 1. έν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν γενικοῖς λόγοις. Either ἐμπροσθεν or γενικοῖς seems superfluous. If γενικοῖς is sound, it is to be presumed that Exc. VI is one of the διεξοδικοὶ λόγοι.

οἱ κυριώτατοι πάντων λόγοι καὶ κορυφαίοτάτος οὕτως (αὑτός MS.) εὖ εἰμι. Cf. Corp. XVI. 1 a: μέγαν σου (τοῦτον) τὸν λόγον . . . διεπεμψάμην, πάντως τῶν ἄλλων ὀστρεί κορυφῆ καὶ ὑπόμνημα. Compare also the first sentence of Ascl. Lat., and the title Τέλειος λόγος borne by the Greek original of Ascl. Lat.

οὖ ὁ (αὗ MS.) δὲ νοεῖ [οὕτως]. Cf. Corp. I. 20: οὖκ ἐφην σοι νοεῖν;—οὕτως may have come either from the preceding οὕτως, or from the following οὕτως βούλομαι σε νοεῖν.

§ 3. ('Ε)φαμεν . . . περιεκτικοί τῶν ἄπαντων εἶναι σώμα. This σώμα is the outermost sphere.

ὁτὸ δὲ τὸν κύκλον τοῦ σώματος τούτους τετάχθαι τοῦς τριάκοντα ἐξ δεκαζών, μέσους τοῦ (τοῦ) παντὸς κύκλου (καὶ) τοῦ ἅγιον. The circle of the περιεκτικόν σώμα could not be called ὁ πᾶς κύκλος, 'the whole circle'; but it might be called ὁ τοῦ παντὸς κύκλος, 'the circle of the universe'. I have therefore written τοῦ (τοῦ) παντὸς κύκλου.

According to the cosmology popularized by the Stoics, and commonly accepted in the time of the Roman empire, all the fixed stars are at the same distance from the earth, and the sphere in which they are situated is the outermost sphere of the universe. If that view were adopted, it would follow that the Zodiac (a band or zone consisting of twelve groups of fixed stars) and the Decans (fixed stars or star-groups in or near the Zodiac) are situated in that same sphere. But the writer of Exc. VI conceives the structure of the universe differently. According to him, there is an outermost sphere (τὸ περιεκτικὸν τῶν ἄπαντων σώμα); there is a 'zodiacal circle', which is not situated in the outermost sphere, but is at some distance below it (i.e. nearer to the earth); and the Decans float in aether below the outermost sphere and above the Zodiac. His description appears to be based on a diagram drawn on the flat; this may
account for the fact that, in speaking of the outermost sphere, he uses the word κύκλος, and not σφαιρα. The diagram which he had before him must have represented a section of the universe in the plane of the zodiacal circle, and must have been something like that which is here appended. He does not mention the obliquity of the zodiac, and there is nothing to show that he distinguished the 'zodiacal circle' from the equator.

In this paragraph the writer indicates the positions of two classes of fixed stars, viz. (1) the thirty-six Decans, and (2) the stars of which the Zodiac is composed, but says nothing about the position of the rest of the fixed stars. Where did he suppose the rest of them to be situated? They might conceivably be located (1) in the outermost sphere, or (2) in the inner sphere in which the Zodiac lies, or (3) together with the Decans, in the space between those two spheres. In § 12, we are told that those fixed stars which are called Liturgi φιρονται εν τω αιθω αλωρομενοι, i.e. doubtless in the same inter-
mediate space in which the Decans are situated; and it is probable that the writer would have said the same of the 'nameless stars' spoken of in § 14. His view then appears to be that the stars of the Zodiac (and possibly some other star-groups) are fixed in a certain inner sphere, and that the Decani and Liturgi, and other fixed stars also, float in aether in the space between that sphere and the outermost sphere; but that no stars are situated in the outermost sphere.

As to the position of the Great Bear (§ 13), we are told only that it is situated κατὰ μέσον τοῦ ζωδιακοῦ, i.e. near the axis of heaven; and as nothing is said about its distance from the earth, we do not know whether the writer located it in the same inner sphere as the Zodiac, or in the space between the two spheres.

In § 17, it seems to be implied that the fixed stars in general are divided into two classes, called respectively ἀστῆρες and ἄστρα, and that the ἀστῆρες float free (ἐν τῷ ὀβεράνῳ ἀλωροῦμενοι), presumably in that intermediate space in which the Decans float, whereas the ἄστρα are fixed in a celestial sphere (ἐγκείμενα ἐν τῷ σώματι τοῦ ὀβερανοῦ), i.e. presumably in that inner sphere in which the Zodiac lies. But there is reason to think that § 17 was not written by the author of the libellus.

§ 4. (. . .) ἁυδιπόστοι καὶ ιοσδυναμεῖν τῇ τοῦ παντὸς φορὰ κατὰ τὸ ἐναλλαξ τοῖς ἑπτα. In the preceding clauses, the writer has been speaking of the positions of the heavenly bodies; he here goes on to speak of their movements. This distinct topic ought to be introduced by a fresh sentence; and it is most likely that something has been lost before συμπερισμένους.

The words συμπερισμένους . . . τοῖς ἑπτά are unintelligible. According to the MS., the writer says that the Decans move together with the planets (συμπερισμένους τοῖς πλάνησι). But he cannot have said that. The πλάνησι (‘wanderers’) are so called just because their movements differ from the movement of the fixed stars, among which the Decans are included. Perhaps τοῖς πλάνησι may be a misplaced doublet of τοῖς ἑπτά below. If we assume that καὶ ιοσδυναμεῖν, as well as τοῖς πλάνησι, has been inserted here by error, we get the reading συμπερισμένους τῇ τοῦ παντὸς φορὰ. This reading is at any rate less obviously impossible than that of the MS. But what is meant by ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φορὰ? These words would most

1 Bouché-Leclercq, Astrol. gr., p. 233, n. 3, alters τοῖς πλάνησι into τοῖς ἀπλάνησι. But as the Decans are themselves ἀπλάνησι ἀστῆρες, we should rather have expected τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπλάνησι.
naturally mean the movement of the outermost sphere (cf. τοῦ (τῶν) παντὸς κύκλου in §§ 3 and 4); but perhaps they might also be taken to mean the movement of the fixed stars. It might be said with truth that the Decans (being themselves fixed stars) move with the same velocity as the other fixed stars. Whether the writer held that the outermost sphere (which is invisible) moves with the same angular velocity as the fixed stars (which are situated below it), we do not know; on that subject he tells us only that the outermost sphere moves more swiftly than the planets, and that it would move still more swiftly than it does, if it were not held back by the Decans.

καὶ ἵσοδυναμεῖν [τῇ τοῦ παντὸς φορᾷ] κατὰ τὸ ἑναλλάξ τοῖς ἑπτὰ. Taken in connexion with the context, these words are inexplicable; but apart from the context, it is possible to make sense of them, if we cut out τῇ τοῦ παντὸς φορᾷ, and write καὶ ἵσοδυναμεῖν κατὰ τὸ ἑναλλάξ τοῖς ἑπτὰ (or καὶ τοῖς πλάνησιν ἵσοδυναμεῖν κατὰ τὸ ἑναλλάξ). The Decans 'have equal power with the planets by way of interchange'; that is, they take on themselves the functions which primarily belong to the planets; they act on sublunar things as if they were planets. This may be taken as referring to the astrological doctrine of planetary πρόσωπα.

The statement that the Decans 'have equal power with the planets' cannot however have been written by the author of Εκκ. VI; for it is contradicted in § 9, where we are told that the planets are subject to the Decans. Moreover, it would be out of place in a passage in which the writer is speaking only of the movements of the heavenly bodies, and not of their influence on terrestrial things, with which he first begins to deal in § 7. It seems then that καὶ ἵσοδυναμεῖν κατὰ τὸ ἑναλλάξ τοῖς ἑπτὰ must be a marginal note written by some one who was thinking of the πρόσωπα.

κατὰ τὸ ἑναλλάξ is equivalent to κατ' ἑναλλαγήν, and means either 'alternately' or 'interchangeably'.

καὶ τὸ μὲν περιεκτικὸν ἐπέχειν ὅμα, ... ἐπισπευδεῖν δὲ τοὺς ἑπτὰ ἀλλοὺς κύκλους. The 'seven other circles' are the orbits of the seven planets; but the orbit of each planet is regarded as a sort of revolving wheel-rim in which the planet is fixed, and by which the planet is carried round. The writer does not tell us where

1 Liddell and Scott give 'crosswise' as one of the meanings of ἑναλλάξ, referring to Ar. Nub. 983, ἐπ' ἐχθέν τῷ πόλ' ἑναλλάξ. But the word cannot mean 'at an inclination to another thing', and cannot be intended to refer to the oblique angle at which the 'zodiacal circle' or ecliptic cuts the equator.
the planets are located; (that must have been explained in the earlier dialogue to which he refers in § 2 ;) but it is to be presumed that they move in seven concentric circles situated between the 'zodiacal circle' and the earth.

He knows that the planets travel round the earth more slowly than the fixed stars do; and he assumes (on what grounds, I do not know,) that the outermost sphere moves more swiftly than the planets,—perhaps with the same angular velocity as the fixed stars below it. The Decans, who are (subject to the supreme God) the rulers of the whole universe, exert a controlling influence both on the movement of the outermost sphere above them and on the movements of the planets below them, restraining the former, and urging on the latter.

The Decans control the movements of the heavenly bodies, which is the topic discussed in § 4. The Decans control those movements; and in discharging this function, they employ the Bear as their instrument.

The Bear is situated near the North Pole, round which it revolves at a short distance; and the North Pole is situated 'over against the middle of the zodiacal circle'. That is to say, the North Pole is at the apex of a cone, the base of which is the zodiacal circle. (The obliquity of the ecliptic is ignored; or in other words, the zodiacal circle is identified with
the equator.) The Decans are ranged in an outer circle concentric with the zodiacal circle, and in the same plane with it; the Bear is therefore centrally situated with respect to the Decans, though not in the same plane with them; it is approximately equidistant from all of them. ὑπὸ τοῦτος means 'subject to the Decans', not 'situated below them in space'.

Ἦχουσα ἀντίξυγον ἑτέρων ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς. The ἑτέρα (ἀρκτός) is the Little Bear. In the Planisphaerium reproduced 'aus Vaticanus gr. 1087' in Boll, Sphaera, Tafel I, the two Bears are depicted moving round the Pole on opposite sides of it, and are so placed that, if we assume the Great Bear to be walking on level ground, the Little Bear appears to be vertically above the Great Bear (ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς), with back downward and feet upward.

d'αυτής [μὲν] ἡ ἐνεργεία ἐστὶ καθάπερ ἄξονος, κ.τ.λ. Cf. Corp. II. 7, τὰς γὰρ ἀρκτοὺς ταύτας κ.τ.λ., and the passages in the Mithraic Apathanatismos ('Mithrasliturgie') which are quoted in vol. ii, p. 97.

In a magic incantation (Pap. mag. Par. i. 1279), the heading of which is ἀρκτική (κ. πράξις) πάντα ποιοῦσα, the Great Bear is invoked thus: ἐπικαλοῦμαι σε τὴν μεγίστην δύναμιν τὴν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ (ἄλλαι τὴν ἐν τῇ ἀρκτῇ) ὑπὸ κυρίου θεοῦ τεταγμένην ἐπὶ τῷ στρέφειν κραταιῷ χειρὶ τὸν ιερὸν πόλον.1 Ιβ. 1301: ἀρκτε, θεὰ μεγίστη, ἀρχονα οὐρανοῦ, βασιλεύοντα πόλον, ἠτέρων ἕπετατή, καλλιφεγή (-γε;) θεά, στοιχεῖον ἀθαρσίου, σύντημα τοῦ παντός, πανθεγνὴς ἄρμονία (τοῦ) τῶν ἄλων ἑσιομον πλευρίου, ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ πόλου ἐφεστώσα, ἢν ὁ κύριος θεὸς ἔταξε κραταιῷ χειρὶ στρέφειν τὸν ιερὸν πόλον.

ἐνεργοδοσίας δὲ τὴν (τοῦ) ἱερ(α)φόρου κύκλου (περιφοράν). Is the Bear situated in the outermost sphere, or in the inner sphere in which the zodiacal circle lies, or (like the Decans) in the space between those two spheres? In any case, the meaning is that the Bear, working in subordination to the Decans, moves the framework in which the fixed stars are contained, and makes it rotate. The writer appears to hold that the constellations of the Zodiac, though not all the fixed stars, are fastened to this framework, and that even those stars which are not fastened to it move together with it.

1 This appears to be based on a passage in iambic metre: σε τὴν μεγίστην τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ — ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τεταγμένην τῷ στρεφὲν κραταιῷ χειρὶ τῶν ιερῶν πόλων.

2 This probably means 'bright-shining coadjustment of the ordered group of the seven planets'. The seven vowels were often used to represent the seven planets; and the seven stars of the Bear are, I think, here identified with the seven planets, or assumed to be under the charge of the same star-gods; they are, so to speak, πρόσωπα of the planets.
EXCERPT VI: 6, 8

(6...) παραδιδοῦσα τὸ πᾶν τοῦτο ἀπὸ μὲν [ἢς] νυκτὸς ἡμέρη, ἀπὸ (9') ἡμέρας νυκτί. What was the substantive to which παραδιδοῦσα belonged? Wachsmuth writes παραδιδοῦσα(τι), making the participle agree with τὴν τοῦ ἐωσφόρου κύκλου (περιφοράν). But that is not quite satisfactory. The immediate cause of the change from night to day and from day to night is, not the movement of the Zodiac, but the diurnal movement of the sun. It might be said that the diurnal movement of the sun is caused by the movement of the Zodiac, which carries the sun along with it (the retardation of the sun, which is too slight to be perceptible from day to day, being neglected); but that could hardly be tacitly assumed. It is probable therefore that a passage dealing with the movement of the sun (and the other planets) has been lost before παραδιδοῦσα.

§ 6. οὗτε γὰρ ἐπεχῶμενοι τῶν δρόμων στηρίζουσιν οὗτε κυλώμενοι ἀνατολίζουσιν. Planets sometimes 'stand still' and 'go backward'; (see note on Ascl. Lat. I. 13, 'stationes praeﬁnitas cursu(um)que commutationes') but none of the fixed stars are subject to these πάθη. In this respect then the Decans differ from the planets alone, and not from 'the other stars' in general; and for that reason, something like (ἀπερ πάσχουσιν οἱ πλάνητες) ought to follow after ἀνατολίζουσιν.

ἀλλ' οὖσα μὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ ἡλίου σκέπωνται, ἀπερ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἄλλοι ἀστέρες. 'The Decans 'are not hidden (?) by the light of the sun, as the other stars are'. There must be some blunder here. No one could be so blind to obvious facts as to suppose that there are thirty-six stars or star-groups which remain visible in full daylight. The writer ought to have mentioned some πάθος from which the Decans are exempt, but to which other fixed stars are subject; but what could that πάθος be? Possibly his view may have been that the stars in general act on things below only while they are visible, and that their operation is suspended during the daylight, but that the Decans, unlike the other stars, act at all times, whether they are visible or not. That might be expressed by writing something like οὖσα μὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ ἡλίου σκέπωνοι (ἀποστεροῦνται τῆς δυνάμεως), ἀπερ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἄλλοι ἀστέρες.

περιέχονται τῷ νυκτήματο ύπὸ πᾶν. Each of the Decans, in the course of twenty-four hours, traverses a complete circle parallel to and not far distant from the equator.

§ 8. τῶν (μὲν γὰρ) καθολικῶς πάνων συμβαίνοντων ἡ ἐνέργεια (τῇ
Events which affect men in the mass are produced by the immediate action of the Decans. It is to be inferred from § 9 that the writer added that events which befall an individual man are produced by the action of the planets; but the passage containing the latter statement, which must have followed § 8 and preceded § 9, has disappeared.

§ 9. [ἔτι τε πρὸς τούτοις νόησων]. This appears to be a wrongly placed doublet of ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις (ἔλλο) νόησων in § 11 ἐπι·

οὐ νοεῖ καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τὴν (τινα MSS.) ἐκεῖνων φθάνειν ἐνέργειαν, ἢτοι ὑπ᾿ (ὑπὸς F) ἄντων ἢ δι᾿ ἐκεῖνων (ἐνέργουμεν); Since the planets are subject to the Decans, even those events of which the planets are the immediate authors (viz. those which befall this or that man as an individual) result from the working of the Decans. In such events then, the Decans work on us through the planets, which they employ as their instruments.

§ 10. Τις (ἢ ᾧ) αὐτοῖς εἰς, ὁ πάτερ, ὁ τοῦ σώματος τύπος; In the traditional text, αὐτοῖς refers to the beings spoken of in § 9, viz. the Decans. But Tat could have no reason for asking 'what is the bodily shape of the Decans?' The Decans are stars or star-groups; their bodies are visible to us, and it was commonly taken as a known fact that the bodies of all stars are spherical. On the other hand, the question 'what is the bodily shape of the daemons?' is one that might well be asked; and we find Hermes speaking of the bodies of daemons in his reply. It may be considered certain then that αὐτοῖς
means τοῖς δαίμονων, and consequently, that § 10 was preceded by some mention of daemons. And as we have concluded that daemons were spoken of in § 11, the best way to make sense of the passage is to put § 11 before § 10.

[toôtous odn] [καλοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ δαίμονας.] I assume that the words καλοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ δαίμονας were wrongly transposed to this place from the end of § 11, and that, after the transposition had taken place, τοῦτος odn was inserted by way of an endeavour to make sense.

[[οὐδὲ γὰρ διὸν τι ἄστι γένος τὸ τῶν δαίμονων.]] The reply of Hermes to Tat's question cannot have begun with these words. But if we put them after ὄστερ ἡμῶς, and write ἔχουσι and κινοῦμαι in place of ἔχοντες and κινοῦμενοι, we get a perfectly satisfactory sense. 'What is the bodily shape of the so-called daemons?' 'They have no bodies, nor have they souls; (for they are not a distinct race of living beings,) they are merely forces put in action by the Decans.' (As to ἐνέργαις εἰς, cf. Corp. XVI. 13: δαίμονος γὰρ οὐδὰς ἐνέργεια.)

The writer rejects the doctrine, taught by the author of Corp. XVI and some of the other Hermetists, that physical processes in the sublunar world are worked by personal agents called daemons. The only personal agents (other than men and the supreme God) that he recognizes are the star-gods; and he refuses to regard as persons the ἐνέργειαι put forth by the star-gods. His attitude in this respect resembles that of the writer of Exc. III.

It is not clear how those ἐνέργειαι 'which men call daemons' are to be distinguished from the other ἐνέργειαι which have been spoken of in §§ 8 and 9. We have been told that there are καθολικαὶ ἐνέργειαι, in which the Decans work on the sublunar world directly and immediately, and (εἰδικαὶ) ἐνέργειαι, in which they work by means of the planets. It would seem that the ἐνέργειαι which men call daemons must be another sort of εἰδικαὶ ἐνέργειαι; but what sort? The effects of the ἐνέργειαι previously spoken of seem to be events in the external world, by which men are affected only from without; perhaps then the daemon-ἐνέργειαι may be forces which act directly and immediately on the man's own body, and through his body, on his soul also, thus influencing his will and actions. On the operation of daemons within the human soul, see Corp. IX. 3.

§ 12. ἦτα καὶ (ἀλλοι) ἐν οὐρανῷ φερόμενοι ἀστέρες [γεννώσιν] αὐτοῖς, (οἱ καλοῦμενοι) [ὑποβλειτουργεῖς], ὡς καὶ ὑπηρέτας καὶ στρατιῶτας ἔχουσιν. γεννώσιν is meaningless, and must have been wrongly
substituted for some other verb, such as ἀκολουθοῦν or πιθαρχοῦν. [See Addenda in vol. iv.]

The word ἐπολευτώργοι does not occur elsewhere; and the true reading is doubtless λειτουργοὶ. (ὅποι may have resulted from the blunder of a copyist who began to write ἔπηρετα here.) λειτουργοὶ was a term used to denote certain stars or star-gods subordinate to the Decans. On the Liturgi, see Bouché-Leclercq Astr. gr. p. 217. As to their number, authorities differ. According to Martianus Capella 2. 200, there are seven Liturgi to each Sign of the Zodiac, i.e. eighty-four in all. According to a system mentioned by Firmicus Maternus, there are three Liturgi to each Decan, i.e. nine to each Sign, and 108 in all. In the Pistis Sophia (see C. Schmidt, Kopt.-gnost. Schriften I, index, s.v. λειτουργοί), we are told that there are 365 Liturgi (i.e. one for each day of the year), and that they are the agents by whom the human body is fashioned in the womb, and by whom the process of incarnating human souls is carried out.

Are the Liturgi of a given Decan identical with the παρανατέλλοντες of that Decan? (Cf. the title Περὶ τῶν λεῖ δεκανῶν καὶ τῶν παρανατελλόντων αὐτῶν, Cat. Cod. Astrol gr., Flor. p. 16.) The παρανατέλλοντες are conspicuous stars, situated in any part of the celestial sphere north or south of the Zodiac, which rises simultaneously with a given star in the Zodiac, or with a given subdivision of the Zodiac. It would be natural to regard the stars which rise simultaneously with a Decan as subordinates employed in executing his commands.

εἷς δὲν αἱ (καὶ MSS.) κατὰ τᾶς χώρας φθοραὶ γίνονται τῶν ἄλλων ἐμψύχων. The writer's view appears to be that the Liturgi execute the will of the Decans by acting on beasts, and thereby indirectly affecting the interests of men. A cattle-plague and a swarm of locusts would be instances of the action of the Liturgi. These are ἄποσελήσματα καθολικά, and in that respect correspond to the λιμοί, λυμοί, &c., which are attributed to the Decans in § 8. It seems strange that the working of the Liturgi should be so narrowly limited; but if the writer ascribed any other function to them, the passage in which he did so has been lost.

It is to be noted that both the Decans and the Liturgi are thought

1 Those who reckoned them thus can hardly have connected them closely with the Decans; for the seven Liturgi could not be symmetrically distributed among the three Decans of the Sign. The number seven suggests rather that these people considered them to be subordinates of the Planets.

2 Firm. Mat. Math. 2. 4. 4 : 'Quidam . . . terna numina decanis singulis applicartunt, quos munifices appellandos esse voluerunt, id est liturgos, ita ut per signa singula novem possint munifices inveniri, ut ternis munificibus decani singuli praeferantur.'
of chiefly, if not solely, as maleficent. It is true that in § 11 the daemon-ενέργεια of the Decans are said to be in part σωτηρίου, as well as in part ἐλευθεροτάτου; but the instances given of the καθολικά ἐνεργήματα of Decans and Liturgi are calamities. The stars were held to be instruments of εἰμαρμένη; and it was commonly thought that εἰμαρμένη is a maleficent power, and that the salvation of man consists in escape from εἰμαρμένη, i.e. from the dominance of astral influences.

§ 14. μετὰ δὲ τούτων (ταύτην MSS.) ἐστὶν ἄλλος χορὸς ἀστέρων. The writer knows that in his own time the whole extent of the sky has been mapped out by astronomers, and that every visible star, if not distinguished by an individual name, has at least been included in this or that constellation. But he knows that this systematic mapping of the stars is recent; and he assumes that, in the time of the prehistoric Hermes, most of the constellations were still nameless.


According to the MSS., these nameless stars are placed μετὰ ταύτην, i.e. after the Great Bear. But it seems clear that § 13, in which the Bear is spoken of, has been wrongly inserted here, and that the mention of the 'other stars' (§ 14) ought to follow that of the Liturgi (§ 12). If so, the original reading must have been μετὰ τούτων, and τούτων must have been altered into ταύτην after the insertion of § 13.

§ 15. κατάθεν δὲ τῆς σελήνης εἰσὶν ἐτέροις ἀστέρεσι φθάρτοι κ.τ.λ. These perishable stars are the shooting stars or meteors. Cf. Arist. Meteor. 1. 4, 341 b, where they are called οἱ διαθέμενες ἀστέρες and οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀστέρες ἀφίμενον, and are said to result from ἀναιθήμασις of dry vapour from the earth. Aristotle says that κάτω ταύτα σελήνης γίνεται (342 a 30). See also Sen. Nat. quaest. 1. 1 and 7. 23.

παρακολούθημα δύτα τῆς φώτεως. The writer has adopted this notion from the Stoics, who made use of the word παρακολούθημα in their endeavours to show that the existence of noxious things was not inconsistent with their belief in the beneficent providence of God. Gellius 7. 1. 7: 'Chrysippus (in libro περὶ προονίας quarto) tractat consideratque . . . εἰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λόγου κατὰ φύσιν γίνονται, id est, (si) natura ipsa rerum, vel providentia quae compagem hanc
mundi et genus hominum fecit, morbos quoque et debilitates et aegritudines corporum, quas patiuntur homines, fecerit. Existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale naturae consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios, nunquam enim hoc convenisse naturae auctori parentique omnium rerum bonarum. "Sed cum multa" inquit "atque magna gigneret pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia quoque simul adgnata sunt incommoda, his ipsis, quae faciebat, cohaerentia;" eaque (non) per naturam, sed per sequellas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod ipse appellat κατὰ παρακολούθησιν.' Cf. M. Aurel. 6. 44: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔβουλεύσαντο (οἱ θεοὶ) καὶ ἔβουλεύσαντο, περὶ γε τῶν κούκλων πάντως ἔβουλεύσαντο, οἰς καὶ ἐπακολούθησαν καὶ τάσσα συμβαίνοντα σωτάξασθαι καὶ στέργειν ὅψεῖν. The phrase καὶ ἐπακολούθησαν occurs again in a similar connexion in M. Aurel. 9. 28.

§ 16. τῶν καλουμένων κομήτων. Comets are discussed by Aristotle, Meteor. 1. 6, 342 b, and by Seneca, Nat. quaest. lib. 7. Seneca refers to Posidonius on this subject; and it is probable that what Posidonius wrote about comets had been transmitted to the writer of Exe. VI also. τῶν τόπων ἕχουσιν ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλων τῶν τοῦ ἡλίου. This is a vague statement; but the writer's view appears to be that the comets are permanently existing bodies, more or less similar to planets, and that in ordinary times they are situated a little below (i. e. nearer to the earth than) the orbit of the sun (which, according to the commonly received opinion, was the fourth of the seven 'circles of the planets'), and so close to the sun itself that the sun's light makes them invisible to us. But occasionally one of them sallies forth from that position, moves in some direction to a part of the sky more remote from the sun, and so becomes visible. After a time, it returns to its former position near the sun, and is thenceforth again invisible as before (πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλων ἐλθόντες τοῦ ἡλίου ἀφαιρέσ μένουσιν). It seems that 'the circle of the sun' must here mean the sun itself, and not the sun's orbit; for if the comet were close to some part of the sun's orbit, but distant from the sun, it would not be hidden.

1 Seneca holds this opinion, and maintains it against others who thought otherwise.
2 Cf. Sen. Nat. quaest. 7. 20. 4: 'Multos cometas non videmus, quod obscursantur radia solis, quo deficiens quondam cometen adparsisse, quem sol vicinus tesserat, Posidonius tradit. Saepe autem cum occidit sol, sparsus ignes non procul ab eo videntur: videlicet ipsa stella (i.e. the head or nucleus of the comet) sole perfunditur et ideo adspici non potest, com[et]ae autem (i.e. the tail) radios solis effugunt.
EXCERPT VI: 16-18

The Hermetist's words imply that, besides the stars of which the ἀστρά (i.e. the known constellations) are composed, there are other stars which do not form part of any ἀστρόν, and that he limits the term ἀστήρ to stars of the latter class. His meaning appears to be that the stars of which the ἀστρά consist are firmly fixed in a revolving sphere, but the rest of the stars (i.e. those which he calls ἀστήρ) float free in aether.

This limitation of the meaning of ἀστήρ is peculiar to § 17, and disagrees with the wider extension of the term in the rest of the document. It is therefore probable that § 17 was not written by the author of the dialogue.

§ 18. ὁ ταῦτα μὴ ἀγνοήσας ἀκριβῶς δύναται νοῆσαι τὸν θεόν, κ.τ.λ. What is meant by ταῦτα? If we retain § 17, we are told that he who understands the difference between ἀστήρ and ἀστρά is thereby enabled to 'see God' and attain to bliss; which is absurd. If we cut out § 17, we get the hardly less absurd statement that he who knows certain facts about shooting stars and comets is thereby enabled to attain to the same blessed condition. And even if we take ταῦτα to include the whole contents of the dialogue down to this point, the difficulty is not much diminished. It could hardly be said that a knowledge of the position of the Decans in the structure of the universe, and of their functions in its administration, is enough
to enable a man to 'see God'. It seems certain therefore that something has been lost before § 18. It is possible that this concluding paragraph (§§ 18, 19) was originally unconnected with §§ 1–17; it may be a fragment of another document, and may have been appended to Exc. VI by mere accident.


Ἰνα ἐκεί γεγομένῃ, ὅπου αὐτὸν (ἀυτὴν MSS.) ἱζετὶ θεᾶσασθαί, ἄδῳ μὴ σφαλῇ. If a man has rightly trained his soul in this life, it will, when released from the body by death, know how to find its way to God. (ἐκεί γεγομένῃ means 'when it has entered the other world', i.e. after death.) Cf. Exc. II B. 4: εὐδαίμονως τεθηκής, τῆς ψυχῆς σου μὴ ἀγνοούσης τούτου αὐτῆς ἀναπτήναι.


οἷον γάρ ἐστι κάλλος, δὲ τέκνον, τὸ (τοῦ) μὴτε ςχῆμα μὴτε χρώμα [μὴτε σῶμα] ἔχον(τος). The meaning must have been that 'that which has neither shape nor colour' (i.e. the incorporeal, which coincides with, or at any rate includes, τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἅγαθὸν, the object of the beatific vision,) is beautiful in a higher degree than all corporeal things. For τὸ μὴτε ςχῆμα μὴτε χρώμα ἔχον, cf. Exc. II A. 15: τὸν ἀχρώματον, τὸν ἀσχήματον, and Exc. VIII. 2. μὴτε σῶμα must have been written as an alternative for μὴτε χρώμα.

Εἰς δὲ ἂν τι, δὲ πάτερ, χωρὶς τούτων καλὸν; χωρὶς τούτων means χωρὶς ςχήματος καὶ χρώματος. Tat has not yet grasped the conception of the incorporeal.

Μόνος δὲ θεός. It is implied that τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἅγαθὸν is identical with God.

μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ μείζον τι δὲν τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ δόμα. The writer must have meant to say that the thing in question (viz. τὸ χωρὶς σχήματος καὶ χρώματος καλὸν) 'is too great to be called God'. He is obliged to use the term δὲ θεός, for want of a better; but he feels that this name, like all others, is inadequate to describe the object of his aspiration. Cf. Corp. V. 1 a: τοῦ κρείττονος θεοῦ δύνατος.

A suitable sense might be got, for instance, by writing (ἀνόμω)γερ (i.e. ἀνόμωσον τῷ τῶν σωμάτων κάλλε) ἵστι (τὸ) κάλλος τοῦ(ο) μὴτε ςχῆμα μὴτε χρώμα ἔχον(τοι).
EXCERPT VII

§ 1. Δαίμων γὰρ τις μεγίστη: viz. Ἰθέα. The justice of God is already personified as a goddess in Hesiod Op. 256 ff.: ἥ δὲ τι
παρθένον ἢστὶ Δίκη, Δῶς ἵγγεγανία .... καὶ β’ ὁπότ’ ἂν τέν μὲν βλάστη
σκολιῶν ὄνταξιν, ἀντίκε πάρ Μιθρὶς καθεξομένη Κρονίων | γηρότε
ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκων νόον, ὁφ’ ἀποτίσῃ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pl. Legg. 715 E : ὁ μὲν
dὴ θεός, ... ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ἄνω τῶν ἄνωτον ἵχων,
εὐθείᾳ δικαιοῦ, κατὰ φύσιν ὄρεισσόμενον τῷ δὲ αἰεὶ εἰσνέπεται δίκη, τῶν
ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός. Cf. the Orphic line: τῷ δὲ
Δίκη πολύστονος ἐφίσπευτο πᾶσιν ἀρωγός (Procl. In rerm. 2. 145. 3 Kroll).

For Δαίμων cf. Parmenides, fr. 12 (Diels, Vorsokr. p. 123), ἐν δὲ μέσῳ

tέτακται ... ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ παντός [ἐλλομένη]. Cf. Parmenides, fr.
12 above, and Simplicius, Phys. 34. 14: τὴν ἐν μέσῳ πάντων ἱδρυμένην ...
δαίμων τίθενα (Παρμενίδης). Aet. 2. 7. 1 (Doxogr. p. 335): τὴν
μεσαίτατην ... ἡττινα καὶ δαίμων κυβερνήτην καὶ καλοῦχον ἐπονομαζεί
Δίκην τε καὶ Ἀνάγκην. Ancient commentators on Parmenides disputed
whether Δίκη went in the midst with the sun (Procl. In Tim. i. 34. 20
Diehl) or was stationed at the centre with the Pythagorean Ἴστία
(see Simplicius above). If the latter, Δίκη can hardly be said ‘to go
to and fro in the centre of the universe’. It seems best therefore to
brace ἐλλομένη.

ἐν τῆς θείας τάξεως (ἡ) πρόνοια καὶ ἀνάγκη τέτακται. The phrase
tῆς θείας τάξεως is explained by what follows in § 2 (as emended):
kατεὶ τὴν τάξιν τῶν ἄνω, ὡς θείων ἄνων. This shows that θεία τάξις
(which is equivalent to τῶν θείων τάξις) means the heavenly bodies
regarded collectively.

As the Power which watches over the actions of erring men is
denoted by a single name (Δίκη), it may be considered certain that
the Power contrasted with it (viz. that which presides over the un-
erring movements of the heavenly bodies) was also denoted by
a single name, and consequently, that either πρόνοια or ἀνάγκη ought
to be struck out. The only question is, which of these two words
we are to retain. In support of ἀνάγκη may be quoted the analogous
passage in Ascl. Lat. III. 22 b: diis (as opposed to erring men)
... ordinem (= τάξιν) necessitatis (= ἀνάγκης) lege consecrptum aeterna
constituit (deus).

[ταῦτα ἐκεῖνος ἐνεργοῦσα.] In place of ἐκεῖνος, we ought to have
either ἐκείνως (sc. προνοία καὶ ἀνάγκη) or ἐκείνη (sc. ἀνάγκη or προνοία). But the author cannot have said that the work of δίκη is the same as that of ἀνάγκη (or πρόνοια); for he goes on to explain the difference between the function of the one and that of the other. These words must therefore be bracketed.

§ 2. [ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὸ ἀναμάρτητον (ἀναμαρτέων MSS.) συμβαίνει.] This is a pointless repetition of what has been said in the preceding words.

§ 3. [καὶ μᾶλλον ἐκείνως... ἐπιρρητεὶ δίκη.] This passage interrupts the sequence of thought; I therefore take it to be a note appended by a reader. (If it is not to be rejected altogether, it would be best to place it after τὰς ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀμαρτίας, at the end of the extract.) The words imply that even those who possess 'the power of seeing God' are liable to fall, though less than other men.


τῇ (μᾶς) εἰμαρμένῃ ὑπόκειται (sc. ἄνθρωπων γένος) διὰ τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ἐνεργείας. The ἐνεργείαι τῆς γενέσεως are the forces which operate in the process by which a man is born, and which therefore determine the course of his life,—except so far as he is able to 'escape from εἰμαρμένη' in virtue of the divine νοῦς implanted in him. According to the view which prevailed among the Hermetists, these forces are put in action by the stars.

EXCERPT VIII

This extract, as transmitted in the MSS., is utterly meaningless. I have tried to make sense of it by freely altering the text. My emendations in detail are open to much doubt; but I think the general meaning of what the author wrote must have been that which is given by this attempt at restoration.

§ 1. τίνα ἐστὶ (τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀσωμάτων) τὰ κατὰ πρόνοιαν. The things spoken of throughout Exc. VIII are neither things in general, nor incorporeal things in general, but incorporeal things 'in us', i.e. in man. (See ἐν ἡμῖν in § 2 init. and § 3 init.) The words τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀσωμάτων are therefore required after τίνα,—unless indeed this limitation was so clearly implied by the preceding context that it was needless to express it here.

For the same reason, I have inserted ἐν ἡμῖν in § 4 init.

§ 2. τὸ μὲν τί ἐστὶ νοητὸν (...). The first of the three kinds of 'incorporeal things in us' is the higher and diviner of the two parts of
EXCERPTS VII: 2, 3; VIII: 1-3

which the human soul consists. It is that which, in Pl. Rep., is called τὸ λογισμικὸν. Platonists more commonly called it the νοῦς. But the writer of Exc. VIII uses neither of these terms; his name for it is ἡ νοητὴ οὖσια (§ 3 and § 5).

We are here told that it is νοητὸν. But for the purpose of distinguishing it from the two other kinds of 'incorporeals in us', it is not enough to say that it is νοητὸν. This word differs little in meaning from ἄσωματον; and all the three things alike are ἄσωματα. The second of the three is the other part of the human soul (τὸ παθητικὸν); and it could hardly be denied that this also is νοητὸν; for it is certainly not αἰσθητὸν. It seems probable therefore that νοητὸν was accompanied by some word or phrase, in conjunction with which it would be applicable to the νοῦς alone, and not to the παθητικὸν also. Better sense might be got by writing νοητὸν (ἀπλῶς), i.e. 'νοητὸν absolutely, or without qualification'. The παθητικὸν, though it is νοητὸν, might be said to be less absolutely νοητὸν than the νοῦς, inasmuch as it is more closely connected with the material body. νοητὸν (κυρίως) is also possible.

ἐκρώματον, ἀσχημάτιστον, [ἀσώματον]. Cf. Exc. II A. 15: τὸν ἐκρώματον, τὸν ἀσχημάτιστον, and VI. 19. The author cannot have said that one of three kinds of incorporeals 'is incorporeal'; I have therefore bracketed αἰσθητὸν. But even when this word is struck out, the two other adjectives still present the same sort of difficulty as νοητὸν above. We want marks by which the first kind of ἄσωματον is to be distinguished from the other two; but all ἄσωματα alike are devoid of colour and shape. If the text is sound, the writer must be charged with some confusion of thought in this respect.

ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πρώτης [καὶ] νοητῆς οὖσιας (προβεβηλήμενον;). The πρώτη νοητὴ οὖσια is God, or the divine νοῦς. The νοητὴ οὖσια in man (i.e. the human νοῦς) is an emanation from the divine νοῦς, or a detached portion (ἀπόρροια or ἀπὸστασμα) of it. Cf. Abammonis Responsum 8. 6 (Testim.), where it is said that the higher of man's 'two souls' is ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου νοητοῦ.

§ 8. ἐστὶ δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ (εἰς δὲ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν MSS.) (ἐκεῖνον εἶδος) ἀσωμάτων, ...). The words in which the 'second kind of incorporeal in us' was described have been lost; but we can infer from the context that it is τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, i.e. that part of the soul in which the passions reside,—the θυμητὸν εἶδος ψυχῆς of Pl. Tim. (In Pl. Rep., this part of the soul is subdivided into two parts, called respectively τὸ θυμοειδὲς and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν.) The
probable sense of the missing words might be given by writing ἀλογον μὲν (ἀντὶ καθ' αὐτῷ), κινήσεως δὲ λογικῆς ὑποδεκτικῶν. This part of the soul is in itself irrational, but is capable of being impelled or directed by the reason which resides in the νοῦς. Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. i. 1098 a 4 and 1103 a 1, where τὸ λόγον ἔχον ὡς ἐπισειβὴς λόγῳ (= the second ἀσώματον of Exc. VIII) is distinguished from τὸ λόγον ἔχον κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ (= the first ἀσώματον of Exc. VIII).

It would be possible to get the same meaning in another way, and at the same time to utilize the unintelligible words τοῦτο ἐναντίας σχηματώτητες, by rewriting the passage thus: ἦστε δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἑπερον εἰδος ἀσωμάτων. (ἀλογον μὲν) τοῦτο, ἐναντίας δὲ σχηματώτητος [τοῦτο] ὑποδεκτικῶν. 'It is irrational, but is capable of receiving a contrary (i.e. a rational) configuration'. But it seems more likely that τοῦτο ἐναντίας (αἰ σωματικα;) σχηματώτητες is a fragment of a marginal note suggested by ἀσχημάτιστον.

τὸ γοῦν (ἀλογον), κινούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς νοητῆς ὀδεσίας, πρὸς τινα λόγον (κινεῖται). Cf. τὸ δὲ ἀλογον . . . κινεῖται πρὸς τινα λόγον in § 6. The παθητικῶν, though irrational in itself, is rationally moved when it is moved by the νοῦς. But why πρὸς τινα λόγον, and not simply πρὸς λόγον? The addition of τινα is perhaps meant to signify that the movement of τὸ παθητικὸν under the direction of the νοῦς is rational in some degree, or in a certain sense, but not absolutely; whereas the action of the νοῦς itself (provided that it has 'drawn near to God') is absolutely rational.

εἰσεῖνες μεταβάλλεται εἰς [[ ] [ ] [ ] εἰδώλων [ ] τοῦ νοήματος τοῦ δημιουργοῦ. The λόγος of the human νοὶς coincides with God's νόημα (i.e. with what is purposed or willed by God); consequently, the παθητικῶν, when it is obedient to the νοῦς, becomes 'an image of God's νόημα', i.e. a thing fashioned in the likeness of God's purpose, or a reflection of God's purpose as in a mirror.

§ 4. τρίτων δὲ ἐστὶν (ἐν ἡμῖν) εἰδος ἀσωμάτων, & περὶ τὰ σώματα ἐστὶ συμβεβηκός. (Perhaps & περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐστὶ συμβεβεβηκότα;) The third kind of ἀσώματον is of a different character from the others. The first and second, being parts of the human soul, are substances; but ἀσώματα of the third kind are merely attributes of the human body, and have no substantive existence. Cf. Porphyry, Ἀφορμαί πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ, 19: ἡ τῶν ἀσωμάτων προστογραφία οὐ κατὰ κοινότητα ἕνος καὶ ταῦτα γένους προσηγορεῖται, καθ' ἐπερ
EXCERPT VIII: 4

EXCERPT VIII: 4

тa σώματα, κατά δὲ ψηλὴν τὴν πρῶς τὰ σώματα στέρησων ὑθεν τὰ 
μὲν αὐτῶν ὄντα (substances), τὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα (not substances) εἶναι 
οὔ κεκάλυται. . . . καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' έαυτὰ ὄφεστηκότα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλων 
eis τὸ εἶναι δύόμενα. Incorporeal substances,—the class to which 
nois and ψυχή belong,—are called by Porphyry тα καθ' αὑτά δύόμε 
itate φύσις (ib. 1 ff.), or αἱ δύόματα υποστάσεως (ib. 11).

The writer of Exc. VIII might have expressed his meaning more 
simply by saying that the human body is governed by εἶμαρμένη. 
But instead of this, he prefers to say that the attributes or qualities 
of the human body are καθ' εἶμαρμένη (§ 7), and to class these 
attributes or qualities, together with the two parts of the human 
soul, under the general term δύόματα.

[τότος, χρόνος, κίνησις, σχήμα, ἐπιφάνεια, μέγεθος, ἔθος]. A few 
lines below, we have a nearly identical list: τὸ σχήμα, ἡ χρόνα, 
tὸ ἔθος, ὁ τότος, ὁ χρόνος, ἡ κίνησις. In the second list, ἐπιφάνεια 
and μέγεθος are omitted; but as the MSS. give καὶ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια 
καὶ τὸ μέγεθος a little further on, it seems probable that these 
words originally followed ἡ κίνησις in the second list, and have 
been separated from it by error. If so, the only difference between 
the two lists is that χρόνα is added in the second.

This string of substantives is evidently meant for a list of 
συμβεβηκότα of the human body. It is possible that the author 
gave one list only, and that the other is a misplaced doublet. 
But as he proceeds to divide the συμβεβηκότα into two distinct 
classes, it would seem most natural to give instances of each class 
separately. It may therefore be suspected that there were originally 
two distinct lists; that one of them stood where the second list 
now stands, and consisted of instances of ἕδως ποιά; that the 
other consisted of instances of the other kind of συμβεβηκότα, but 
has been shifted from its proper place; and that the similarity 
of the two lists has been brought about by transcribers who added 
to each of them items which belonged to the other.

τότος and χρόνος, as attributes of a human body, must mean the 
position of the body in space and time. Heimarmene has deter 
mined that my body should come into being at a certain place 
and at a certain time, and should continue to exist for a certain 
time.

The inclusion of κίνησις in the list implies that the movements 
of the human body are determined by Heimarmene. It might be 
objected that some of the movements of the body are voluntary
actions, and that, according to the doctrine of this Excerpt, the voluntary actions of a man whose νοῦς is joined to God, and whose παθητικὸν is obedient to his νοῦς, ought to be said to be καθ' ἐμφαμένην. But at any rate the involuntary movements of the body (e.g. the beating of the heart) are καθ’ ἐμφαμένην.

What is the difference between σώμα and ἔδος? σώμα means ‘bodily shape’; ἔδος, in this connexion, perhaps means ‘visible appearance’.

1 ἀ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν περὶ τὸ σώμα συμβεβηκότων) ἔδος ποιά.

1 ἔδος ποιῶν is a term employed by the Stoics. (See Zeller, Stoiics, Engl. tr. pp. 102-105; Arnim Sto. vet. fragm. vol. ii, §§ 395-398; Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, vol. i, pp. 428-432.) It is sometimes opposed to τὸ κοινὸς ποιῶν. As used by Stoics, τὸ ἔδος ποιῶν appears to mean the individual thing, as characterized by the permanent and inseparable qualities by which it is distinguished from other individuals of the same species. For instance, Socrates, regarded as a person, is an ἔδος ποιῶν, and is, as such, contrasted with the οὐσία (the material substance) of which he consists. Socrates ἑν οὐσία (a σύνθεσις composed of material elements which are in ceaseless flux) is perpetually changing; but Socrates ἑν ἔδος ποιῶν continues to be one and the same from his birth to his death.

Sometimes ὁ ἔδος ποιῶν, masculine, is used instead of τὸ ἔδος ποιῶν. Prantl and Zeller say that in these cases the masculine

1 Dexippus in Cat. 23, 25. Busse (Zeller, Sto. p. 103) : ἐστὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐπὶ τούτων . . . ἐν μὲν τὸ λεγόμενον πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, ὁ μὲν ἔδος ἔλθε, . . . τεύχων ἐν ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποιῶν (i.e. the thing as characterized by qualities), . . . καὶ ὁ ἔδος ἔφεσται ὑποκείμενον γὰρ καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς (τοῦ κοινοῦ ποιῶν) καὶ ὁ Ζωκράτης (ὅπως ποιῶν).

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substantive understood is λόγος; but in some at least of the instances given, a satisfactory sense can be got by understanding ἀνθρώπος (or, where the thing spoken of is the universe as a whole, θεός or κόσμος).

In most of the instances collected by Zeller l.c., τὸ ἰδίως ποιῶν appears to mean, not the quality (or complex of qualities) by which the individual thing is characterized,¹ but the thing itself as characterized by that quality. In Exc. VIII, on the other hand, we are told that τὰ ἰδίως ποιά are συμβεβηκότα belonging to bodies, i.e. qualities or attributes of bodies. There are two kinds of συμβεβηκότα; and τὰ ἰδίως ποιά are one of the two kinds. It may be inferred from the Stoic use of the term that the ἰδίως ποιά of a given man are the qualities by which he is distinguished from all other men,—the peculiarities by which his acquaintances recognize him when they meet him.

& δὲ τοῦ σώματος (...). The writer must have here described the second of the two classes into which he divides the attributes of the human body; but owing to the corruption of the text, we are left in doubt what this second class was. It might consist of τὰ κοινῶς ποιά, i.e. qualities possessed by all human bodies in common, e.g. the attribute of being situated somewhere or other in space, and that of having a shape of a certain type (two legs, &c.). Or on the other hand, it might consist of temporary and separable accidents, e.g. that of being situated in a certain place at a given moment, or posed in a certain attitude; for such accidents might equally well be contrasted with the ἰδίως ποιά, which persist unchanged throughout the man's life.

τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος 'τὰ δὲ τοῦ κ.τ.λ.¹ ἰδια in the sense of 'properties' can hardly be right; for 'properties of the body' could not stand in contrast to τὰ ἰδίως ποιά, which are themselves properties of this or that human body.

τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος corresponds to & δὲ τοῦ σώματος above. In both places, it is strange that τοῦ σώματος should occur in connexion with the second kind of attributes only, seeing that both kinds alike are attributes of the human body.

τὸ ἐσχήματισμένον σχῆμα καὶ τὸ κεκρωσμένον χρῶμα [ἐστι δὲ] καὶ ἡ μεμορφωμένη μορφή.¹ These phrases are meaningless. Perhaps it might be possible to make sense of them by writing τὸ (κατὰ τόπον

¹ In Posidonius ap. Stob. l.c., the quality in this sense is called ἡ καθά τοῦ ποίητα. The words are παραμένειν τὴν ἱεράτου ποίησιν [τὰ] ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς ἀναρίσκειας.
καὶ χρόνον' ἐσχηματισμόνον σχῆμα κ.τ.λ., and taking this to mean 'the particular shape and colour imposed on the body at a given place and time'. If we assume that the second class consists of separable accidents, these might serve as instances of such accidents.

ἡ μεμορφωμένη μορφή may be an alternative for τὸ ἐσχηματισμόνον σχῆμα.

Ταύτα ἐστὶ τούτων ἀμέτοχα. This may perhaps be a remnant of something like ἀμέτοχοι ἕκατον (ἡ περὶ τὸ σῶμα συμβεβηκότα: τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς μόρα) τούτων ἀμέτοχα. I.e. the νοῦς and the πνευματικόν have no part in the attributes which belong to the body; they are ἀξράματα, ἀσχημάτιστα.

§ 5. η μέν οὖν νοητὴ οὐσία, πρὸς (μὲν) τῷ θεῷ γενομένη, κ.τ.λ. The first μὲν points forward to τὸ δὲ ἀλογον in § 6; the second μὲν is needed to point forward to ὑπολειφθείσα ἐστὶ [ὑπὸ] τοῦ θεοῦ.

ἐνυπος ἐξουσιά ἐξεί. The human νοῦς, if it 'draws near to God' (who is the source from which it has sprung), is αὐτεξουσιως, 'self-determining'; i.e. in this case it acts with free will, and is not subject to compulsion from without.

καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐτερον (ἐκτὸς τῶν πνευματικῶν) αὐτήν σώζουσα. It saves itself (from subjection to ανάγκη); and in doing so, it also saves from that subjection the πνευματικόν (which, in this case, is controlled and directed by the νοῦς). Thus the soul of the man whose νοῦς has drawn near to God is wholly free.

ἐπειδὴ. Some connecting word or phrase is needed; but neither ἔσται nor ἐπεί gives a satisfactory connexion.

άστη [ἡ] (καθ' αστήν) οὖσα ὑπὸ ἀνάγκην οὖκ ἐστι[ν]. In itself, or when it is by itself, (i.e. when it is not hampered by the body and the things of the body,—cf. αἰρεῖται τὴν σωματικὴν φύσιν below,—) the νοῦς is not subject to ανάγκη.

(καὶ ἡ αἴρεσις αὐτῆς κατὰ πρόνοιαν) (γινεται). It exerts its own will freely; but in doing so, it acts in accordance with the will of God.

ὑπολειφθεΐσα δὲ [ὑπὸ] τοῦ θεοῦ. If we strike out ὑπὸ, this means literally 'having lagged behind God'. God goes on his way; the human νοῦς, which ought to keep up with him, lags behind, and so is separated from him. ὑπολειφθεΐσα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ would mean 'having been left behind by God', and would rather imply that it is God, and not man, that is responsible for the separation.

αἰρε(τα) τὴν σωματικὴν φύσιν. The νοῦς chooses the wrong alternative; it sets its affections on τὰ σωματικά, instead of on τὰ θεῖα. Cf.
EXCERPT VIII: 5-7

Corp. IV. 6 b: δύο γὰρ ὄντων τῶν ὄντων, σώματος καὶ ἀσωμάτου, ἐν οἷς τὸ θυρτὸν καὶ τὸ θύμιον, ἡ αἰρέσις θατέρου καταλείπεται τῇ ἀλλοθείᾳ βουλομένης. Compare also Corp. I. 14, where the fall of man is figuratively described by saying that Anthropos (i.e. the human νοῦς) took φύσις to wife.

οὗτος (νοῦτο MSS.) δὲ (τῇ) τοῦ κόσμου (ἀνάγκη ὑποπίπτει). The paragraph must have ended with something to this effect. If a man's νοῦς 'chooses the corporeal world' and rejects the incorporeal, it becomes subject to the ἀνάγκη by which the Kosmos (i.e. the corporeal world) is governed.

§ 6. τὸ δὲ ἀλογον 'πάν', (ἡ μὲν νοητὴ οὐσία πειθόμενον (?),) κινεῖται πρὸς τίνα λόγον, (. . . μὴ πειθόμενον δὲ (?), . . .). The author must have here dealt with τὸ παθητικὸν as he had previously dealt with the νοῦς; but of the section in which he did so, only a few words remain. He told us above that ἡ νοητὴ οὐσία σώζει τὸ ἔτερον αὐτὴν σῴζοντα, and we may infer thence that he here said that, if the παθητικὸν is obedient to the νοῦς, its action is κατὰ πρόνοιαν, but that if it is disobedient to the νοῦς, its action is κατ’ ἀνάγκην.

This section must have been followed by another, now lost, in which the attributes of the body (τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα συμβεβηκότα) were similarly discussed, and shown to be subject to εἰμαρμένη.

§ 7. καὶ ὁ μὲν λόγος κατὰ πρόνοιαν, τὸ δὲ ἀλογον κατ’ ἀνάγκην, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸ σῶμα συμβεβηκότα καθ’ εἰμαρμένην. In these words the writer sums up the contents of the three preceding paragraphs (§ 5, § 6, and the lost section which followed § 6), and in so doing, gives his answer to Tat's question, τίνα ἐστὶ (τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀσωμάτων) τὰ κατὰ πρόνοιαν κ.τ.λ. (§ 1).

ὁ λόγος κατὰ πρόνοιαν is equivalent to τὸ πρὸς λόγον γινόμενον κατὰ πρόνοιαν γίνεται. The νοῦς acts πρὸς λόγον when it 'has drawn near to God'; and the παθητικόν acts πρὸς λόγον when it is directed by a νοῦς which acts πρὸς λόγον.

The νοῦς, when it 'has fallen away from God', and therefore acts ἀλογος,—and the παθητικόν, when it is not directed by a νοῦς which acts πρὸς λόγον,—are κατ’ ἀνάγκην. That is, the man whose soul is in this condition is no longer free; having 'chosen the material world', he is driven by the forces which work in the material world.

To the power which drives him other Hermetists give the name εἰμαρμένη. But the writer of Exc. VIII prefers to call it ἀνάγκη, and restricts the term εἰμαρμάνη to the force to which 'the attributes
of the human body' are subject, i.e. that by which the human body is governed. As the human body is a part of the material world,—and indeed, is that very part of it through which compulsion is brought to bear upon the human soul,—it would seem that έιμαρμένη, in the limited sense in which the word is here used, ought to be regarded as one particular branch or aspect of ἀνάγκη; and we might have expected to be told that ἀνάγκη, when acting on the human body, is called έιμαρμένη. Yet the writer speaks of ἀνάγκη and έιμαρμένη as if they were mutually exclusive.

A different account of the relation between ἀνάγκη and έιμαρμένη is given in Ascl. Lat. III. 39: 'ειμαρμένη rerum omnium initia parit, necessitas (ἀνάγκη) vero cogit ad effectum quae ex illius primordiis pendent.'

EXCERPT IX

This passage is an answer to the question (presumably asked by Tat in a preceding sentence) 'has ὦ λη begun to be (γέγονεν), or is it without beginning (ἀγέννητος)?' The answer is based on the description of the ὑποδοχή in Pl. Tim. 48 ff. The form in which the question is stated may perhaps have been suggested by the question asked (not about ὦ λη, but about the Kosmos) in Pl. Tim. 28 B: σκεπτέον ἃ ἠ ἀ (ὃ κόσμος), γενέσεως ἄρχην ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἡ γέγονεν, ἀπ᾿ ἄρχης των ἀρχάμενων. The answer given by the writer of Exc. IX is to the effect that ὦ λη, ὀμοιόμορφος, ἠ ἀ, or is ἀγέννητος, but ὀμοιομορφώμενη γέγονεν.

§ 1. καὶ γέγονεν . . . καὶ (ἀ) ἡν. If we accept the reading of the MSS., we must take ἡν to mean ἢ δὲ or προθ. Cf. Ascl. Lat. II. 14 b: Fuit (= ἢ) deus et ὦ λη. But it seems better to add ἀ, as in Pl. Tim. 28 B.

ἄλη γὰρ ἄγγειον γενέσεως ἵστι. ἄγγειον, if sound, is the writer's substitute for Plato's term ὑποδοχή (Tim. 49 a: τὰς ἐίναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχῆν αὑτῆν). The meaning of that term is explained by the phrases ὦ τὸ ἐν ὃ ἐγγιγνόμενα ἀδὲ ἔκαστα φαντάζεται (Tim. 49 b), ὀ τὰ πάντα δεχομένη σώματα φύσις (50 b), ὀ τὸ ἐγγίνεται ὄ γιγνόμεσσαν (50 c), ὀ τὰ πάντα ἐκδιδόμενον ἐν ἄντῳ γένη (50 e).

[The editor considers that the metaphor of 'vessel' is hardly appropriate, and tentatively suggests ἐκμαγεῖον (Pl. Tim. 50 c). But τὸ στέρωμα τῆς γενέσεως below suggests the parallels of Plutarch, De Ei, 392 f: ἄστερ ἄγγελον φθορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως ὁ χρόνος; De Defect. orac.
423 e: τὴν φύσιν δρόμεν (τὰ) καθ' ἐκαστὰ γένεσιν καὶ ἐδέσων ὀλον ἀγγείους ἢ περικαρπίας σπέρματος περιέχονσαν, where the word means the seed-capsule of a plant. Compare ἐναγγειοσπέρματος, and see Kroll, Lehren des Herm. Triism. p. 127, for other examples. See also note on ἀντιον in Vol. II. p. 197.]

tοῦ ἀγειν'νητοι καὶ προφτος [τοῦ] θεοῦ. In most instances, we have no means of knowing whether a Hermetist wrote ἀγεινητος or ἀγεινητος. But in this passage, the word is associated with γένεσις and γέγονεν, not with γεννᾶν; and for that reason it seems better to write ἀγεινητος here, and ἀγεινησία in § 2.

The writer appears to have held that the world has had a beginning; (that is implied by the past tenses γέγονεν and ἐγένετο;) and for one who took that view, the statement that God is προὼν would mean that God was in existence before the world began. But those who held, as the Aristotelians and some of the Platonists did, that the world is without beginning, or in other words, that the world-process has been going on from all eternity, might still say that God is προὼν, meaning that he is prior to τὰ δῶτα, or ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, as being the cause or author of all that is.

tὸ σπέρμα οὖν τῆς γενέσεως (ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ) λαβοῦσα (λαμβάνουσα MSS.) γέγονε. ἕλη is, as it were, a matrix, in which God, at some definite moment in the past, implanted a quickening germ, and thereby caused the world to come into being. Cf. Pl. Tim. 50 D: προσευκάσαι πρέπει τὸ μὲν δεχόμενον (= τὴν ἕλην) μητρί, τὸ δ' ὅθεν πατρί.

τὸ σπέρμα τῆς γενέσεως means τὸ σπέρμα τῶν γεννησμένων, the germ from which all things were to spring. The writer's meaning would have been more clearly expressed if, instead of saying ἕλη γέγονεν, he had said ὁ κόσμος (ορ τὰ δῶτα) γέγονεν, τῆς ἕλης τὸ σπέρμα ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ λαβοῦσας.

καὶ τρεῖς ἐγένετο, καὶ ἰδέας ἔχει (ἔχε MSS.) (πολλάς, ποικίλως) μορφοποιομένη. When ἕλη first 'came into being', (i.e. when the world was brought into being by the implanting of the 'germ' of it in ἕλη, or in other words, by the first imposition of forms on formless matter,) it came into being as a thing subject to change; and so it has ever since been passing through an uninterrupted succession of changes, forms ever fresh and different being ceaselessly imposed on it.

The imperfect ἔχε is impossible. Meineke and Wachsmuth alter
εἰχε into ἔσχε. But the tense wanted is the present; for the process of change is continually going on. And ἔσχε is confirmed by the following ἐφεστηκε, which ought to have been ἐφεστήκει if ἔσχε had preceded.

ἐφεστηκε γὰρ αὐτῷ τρειμομένη ἤ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια. Some feminine substantive is needed; and ἐνέργεια is suggested by ἐνεργείας above and τῷ ἐνεργείῳθαι below.

In order to make sense, I have found it necessary to assume three lacunae, viz. (ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ), (ἡ πολλᾶς, ποικίλως), and (τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας). Between the first and the second, there are (in my emended text) 40 letters; between the second and the third, there are 39 letters. If the archetype was written in lines of about 54 letters, all three lacunae together may have been caused by a single blot or rent, by which three lines were damaged.

τὰς τῆς τροπῆς ἰδέας. This must be taken to mean ‘the (various) forms which ἔλη (successively) receives in the course of its continual mutation’. But possibly some words which would have made the meaning clearer have been lost.

ἀγενήσια οὖν ἡ ἧς (or possibly ἀ. οὖν τῇ ἤς ἢ;) ἀμορφία ἃν, γένεσις δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειῳθαί (ἡ δὲ γένεσις τῷ ἐνεργείῳθαῖ MSS.). The author might have expressed his meaning more simply by writing ἀγένητος ἃν ἢ ἦλη ἀμορφος οὖσα, ἀγένητο δὲ (or γένηται δὲ) ἐνεργευμένη (sc. ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ). The past tense ἃν is used, because there is now no matter without form; it was only before the beginning of the world that ἀμορφος ἦλη existed. As the substantive γένεσις gives no indication of time present or past, we are left in doubt whether the writer meant to say that matter ‘came into being’ by ‘being worked on’ (i.e. by having forms imposed on it) at the beginning of the world, or that it continually ‘comes into being’ afresh, by having ever fresh forms imposed on it.
Wachsmuth thinks that the superscription Ἕρμος ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Τάταρου, which stands at the head of Exc. X in the MSS., belonged, not to this piece, but to a lost ecloga which preceded it in the Anthologium of Stobaeus. The reason which he gives,—namely, that this extract 'is so different from the Hermetic writings',—is not quite conclusive; for we have Hermetica in many different styles. But as the text contains no ὅ Τάταρος ἢ τίτικον, and no indication that the writing from which the passage is taken was a dialogue, it is not unlikely that Wachsmuth is right, and that Exc. X is not a Hermeticum,—that is, that its author did not put his teaching into the mouth of Hermes, but spoke in his own person.

The passage is an extract from a discussion of time. It deals with two distinct questions, viz. (1) Are past time, present time, and future time united with one another or separate from one another? Do past, present, and future time exist? The first question is discussed in §§ 1, 2, 4, 5, and the second in § 3. It is evident therefore that § 3 is out of place; and it most likely stood where I have put it, after § 5. But perhaps something which followed § 5 and preceded § 3 has been lost.

See Arist. Phys. 4. 10-14, 217 b-224 a, where time is discussed at considerable length. Stobaeus (1. 8. 40 e-42) gives, together with Herm. Exc. X, short extracts from Zeno, Apollodorus, Posidonius, and Chrysippus on the subject of time. (According to Diels, Doxogr. p. 461, Stobaeus took over this group of extracts, with the exception of Herm. Exc. X, from the Epitome of Arius Didymus.) The influence of Chrysippus is apparent in the passages from Apollodorus and Posidonius; and Exc. X, whether written by a ‘Hermetist’ or not, is based on the same Stoic tradition.

§ 1. οὐτε γὰρ καθ’ έαυτόν εἰσιν οὐτε συνήνωμαι καὶ πάλιν, (καὶ) συνήνωμαι καθ’ έαυτόν εἰσιν. καθ’ έαυτούς is equivalent to χωρίς ἀλλίθων. The meaning must have been that the three times ‘are united’ in one sense or aspect, and ‘are separate’ in another sense or aspect; but it is doubtful in what words this was said. A satisfactory sense might be got by writing οὔτε γὰρ κ. Ι. εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ συνήνωμαι, καὶ πάλιν, (οὗ) συνήνωμαι, ἀλλὰ κ. Ι. εἰσιν.

Compare Ar. Phys. 220 a 4: καὶ συνέχει τε δὴ τοῦ χρόνου [τῷ νῦν ὃ], καὶ διήρηται κατὰ τὸ νῦν. Ἰθ. 222 a 10: τὸ δὲ νῦν ἐστὶ συνέχεια χρόνου . . . συνέχει γὰρ τῶν χρόνων τὸν παρελθόντα καὶ ἐσόμενον. καὶ ἔλως
§ 2. The writer deals with the hypothesis that the three times 'are separate', and gives reasons for saying that they are not separate, but united. We must suppose that in § 5 he similarly dealt with the hypothesis that the three times 'are united', and gave reasons for saying that they are not united, but separate; but of that part of his argument, only the last clause (οὔτω... διεστὸς γίνεται... δ' χρόνον) has been preserved.

§ 4. These words, where they stand in the MSS., break the connexion between εἰς γίνεται and τῇ συνεχείᾳ. If we put them here, and alter οὗ γὰρ into οὐκ ἄρα, they supply just what is wanted to conclude the argument which began with εἰς χωρὶς εἶναι... υπολάβης in § 2 init.

§ 5. οὖτω [καὶ συνεχής καὶ] διεστῶς γίνεται, εἰς οὖν καὶ δ' αὐτός, δ' χρόνον. Time, though it is 'one and the same' throughout (as has been shown in §§ 2 and 4), is nevertheless διεστῶς; that is to say, time past, time present, and time future χωρὶς εἰσὶν (as has been shown in the lost part of § 5).

εἰς οὖν καὶ δ' αὐτός is equivalent to συνεχής ὄν; and either καὶ συνεχής καὶ or εἰς οὖν καὶ δ' αὐτός must be struck out. For the latter phrase, cf. Ar. Phys. 222 a 31: δὴ ἥν δ' ὅτι ὃν ἐν ἡ κόντης, οὖν καὶ δ' χρόνος' εἰ μὲν γὰρ ή αὕτη καὶ μὴ γίνεται μόνον, ἢσται καὶ χρόνον εἰς καὶ δ' αὐτός, εἰ δὲ μὴν, οὐκ ἢσται.

§§ 3. el &c. 8ei... to-Tivaiom*rf|X£fo$; Past time and future time are not in existence; and even present time cannot properly be said to be in existence, because the present is a mere point of time, and is no sooner come than gone. Cf. Ar. Phys. 217 b 32: ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ δόλως οὐκ ἐστιν (δ' χρόνος) ἡ μόλις καὶ διμηρδός, ἀκ τῶν δέ τις ἀν ὑποτεύχησιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ γέγονε καὶ οὐκ ἢστι, τὸ δὲ μέλλει καὶ οὖσα ἢστιν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων καὶ ὁ ἀπειρός καὶ ὃ ἀπειρός χρόνος συνεχεῖται: τὸ δ' ἐκ μὴ οὕτως συνεχείμενον ἀδύνατον δὲν εἶναι δόξεις μετέχειν οὖσιν.

1 Sc. of past time and future time. But there seems to be something wrong here. The meaning might be made clearer by striking out πέρας διϊφών, or by shifting it. One might write, for instance, τὸ νῦν, (πέρας διϊφών ὅτ' ) τὸ μὲν τοῦ χρόνου διϊφώσας κ. δ., τὸ δ' ἦντης.
Chrysippus (Stob. i. 8. 42): μηφανεστατα δε τουτο λεγει (ό Χρ.) οτι οθεις άλωσ ενισταται χρονος' επει γαρ εις άπειρον ή τομη των συν-
εχωντων ισοι, κατα την διαφευνη ταυτην και πας χρονος εις άπειρον έχει την ημερη, οτατε μηθενα κα' απαρτισμον ένεσταις χρονον, αλλα κατα-
πλατος λεγεσθαι,—μονον δ' ιπαρχει φοσι (Ο Χρ.) τον ένεσταιν. 1 τον 
δε παραρχεων και των μελλοντα έφεσταις μεν, ιπαρχει δ' οδομων 
[ει μη] δαι και κατατυπωσαι ιπαρχει λεγεται μόνα τα (εσ τω παρονυ) 
συμβεβηκατα, οτα το περιπατειν ιπαρχει μοι οτα περιπατατω, οτα 
δε κατα-
kελμαι ιη κατημαι αυτη ιπαρχει. 2 Posidonius (Stob. i. 8. 42): τον 
χρονον των μεν ειναι παραληθυβα, τον δε μελλοντα, τον δε παρονυ, δε 
ει των μερους του παραληθυβατος και των μελλοντος περι των διορισμω
αυτων συνηστηκε' τον δε διορισμων συμμευδη ειναι. το δε νυν και τα 
εραι εν πλατει [χρονου] και ουχι κατ' απαρτισμον νοεσθαι. λεγεσθαι 
δε το νυν και [κατα] των έλαχιστων προσ αναθησιν χρονων (των) περι των 
διορισμων του μελλοντα και παραληθυβος συνεσταμενον. Apollodorus 3 
(Stob. i. 8. 42): το μν γαρ έστων αυτου (ες του χρονου) παραληθυβος, 
το δε ένεστηκος, το δε μελλον: ένεσται δε τον παντα χρονον ως των

1 This second statement of Chrysippus is inconsistent with the first, and must 
have occurred in a different connexion.
2 The teaching of Chrysippus on this subject is criticized by Plutarch, Comm. 
nol. 41, 1051 c: παρα την έννοιαν ιστι, χρονον ειναι μελλοντα και παραρχειων, 
ένεσται δε μη ειναι χρονον, αλλα τω μεν άρτι και το προην δεκασταιν, το δε νυν 
δηλω μηδεν ειναι. και μην τοτε συμβαιτει τοις Σταυκοις ιλάχιστοις χρονοι μη 
αλησεις, μηδε το νυν άμερω ειναι Βουλομενοις, αλλ' ει δεν εις έννοιαν εχει 
λαβειν διαλουσαι, τουτον το μεν μελλον, το δε παραρχεων ειναι φασκονιν, δετε 
μηδην κατα τον νυν υπομενει, μηδε λεικουσαι μορφων χρονων μαρων, δεν 
δε λεικησαι παραυα, τουτον τω μεν εις τα μελλοντα, τα δ' εις τα παραρχεχα 
διαφημηται. ουν των συμβαινει δαερων ή το "νυν χρονον" και το "ουστα χρονον" 
 τιθεντα άνωραα το "ιστα χρονον" και (ηλεγκτον η) έστι χρονον ενσεσθαι οτα 
τω μεν ένεσται, και τω νυν εσται. τα δε (κατα των παραρχων τω 
νυν εσται, και του τω μεν προπερον το δε δαερων, δετε νυν ειναι το μεθεν νου, 
και το μεκετε νυν ουδε εισι τα χρονον το μελλον, και νουν το 
αρχηγημεν μι. . . . . χρονεσται δε, Βουλομενοις φιλωτεκνει περι την 
διαφευνη, εν των τω Περι του κενου και άλλως τια το 'μεν παραρχεων 
του χρονου και το μελλον ουδε εφαρτειν αλλ' έφαρτειν" φοσι, "μονον διεπαρχειν το ενσεσθαι" 3 ει δε 
την τριτη και τεταρτη και πεμπτη το των μερων τιθησι "το ενσεσθαις το 
χρονον το μελλον ειναι, το δε παραληθυβον." δετε συμβαιτει το 
υπαρχοντος αυτου του χρονου διαιρει εις τα μη επαρχοντα [του 
υπαρχοντος], μελλον δε δια του χρονου μεθεν 
αλησεις μελλον, ει το ενσεσθαις ουδεν έχει μεθος δ μη 
μελλον εισι, το δε παραληθυβον. το 
την ημερη ιστην, και το "παρεστι" [(δ) και το τω φεραγμωθα] τουτο αυ παλιν [αναλογι
μενον] ο λογος αναλογιν, εικοσμαι χαρ (τω νυν) εις το μελλον και το παραρ
χεων, δεστε [αρκη] Βουλομενοις ιδουν, ως αναγης διαταμενον.

3 Doubtless the Stoic Apollodorus who is frequently mentioned by Diog. Laert.

2804-8
Pseudo-Archytas (ap. Simplic. in Arist. Phys. 186 a (Mullach, Fr. Ph. Gr. II. 118 a)): to the point, and he says that the 'chronos' of wisdom is the one who knows us [to the meaning, and] to the unspeakable. He says, surely he is one [and] the 'chronos' of man, of the great, of the great, of the wise. He signifies that man, and he signifies that knowledge, but it signifies that we are the reason. He signifies that we are the reason, and it signifies that we are the reason. It would be possible to say o'xeto-0ai el to the 'chronos' of the 'chronos' of the 'chronos' of the 'chronos' of the 'chronos', and perhaps ofy. tis to the past. It would be quite satisfactory. It is superfluous to tell us that o'xeto-0ai el the 'chronos' of the 'chronos' of the 'chronos' of the 'chronos' of the 'chronos', and the statement that the past is not existence, being the main point, ought to stand in the principal clause, and not merely to be brought in subordinate. It is most likely that the writer had in mind the passage of Chrysippus which is given by Stobaeus in the words μόνον ὑπάρχειν τὸν ἐνεστῶτα, τὸν ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸν πέπληκτον ὑφεστάναι μὲν, ὑπάρχειν δὲ οὐδαμῶς, and by Plutarch in the words τὸ μὲν παραχημένον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὗ ὑπάρχειν ἀλλ' ὑφεστήκειν, μόνον δὲ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἐνεστήκος. If so,

1 Perhaps: ἐνεστήκειν δὲ τὸν πάντα χρόνον (ὁ λέγομεν), δὲ (καὶ) τὸν ἱκανὸν ἐνεστήκειν [[ ]], κατὰ μείζονα περιγραφήν (λέγομεν).
2 μόνον is out of place: we must either strike it out, or write τούτου (κατ' ἀρχὴν) μὲν οὐδεμιῶς οὐδεμιῶς [[ ]], κατὰ μένας γε τὸ οὖδος (εἰς τούτο οὐδεμιῶς).
3 Cf. Exc. X. 5.
4 Cf. Exc. X. 4. ὁ παραληθὼς συνάπτων τῷ ἐνεστῶτι κ.τ.λ.
5 Cf. Exc. X. 4.
6 Is φίλες right? And if so, what does it mean?
7 This passage occurs again, but written in Attic instead of Doric, in Simplicius Comm. ad Categ. 130 B.
EXCERPTS X: 3; XI

he may have written something like τὸν μὲν παρελθεῖσαν χρόνον μὴ ὑπάρχειν δὴλον ἐν τῷ οἷς οὖσαν καὶ μηκέτι παρεῖναι, τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα (ἰ. μὴ ὑπάρχειν δὴλον) ἐν τῷ μηδέπον παρεῖναι. It seems necessary to insert δὴλον, or something of the sort, before the first ἐν τῷ (cf. Xen. Cyr. i. 6. 2: διὶ οἱ θεοὶ . . . πέμπουσι σε, . . . δὴλον . . . ἐν οὐδενίσιος σημείοις). Otherwise, we should have to translate τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ μηδέπον παρεῖναι 'and that the future is not in existence in respect of (or on account of) its not yet being present'; but such a use of ἐν would be difficult to justify.

ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα 'συμπαρείναι, ἐν τῷ (μὴ) μέλεν. συμπαρείν— is probably a corruption of ὑπάρχειν; and I am inclined to think that -αι is a remnant of ἀπαρτιζόντως, 'exactly' or 'precisely'. Cf. Chrysippus ap. Stob.: ὥστε μηθένα κατ' ἀπαρτισμὸν ἐνεστοναι χρόνον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πλάτος λέγονται. Posidonius ap. Stob.: τὸ δὲ νῦν καὶ τὰ δόμα ἐν πλάτει [χρόνον] καὶ οὐχί κατ' ἀπαρτισμὸν νοεῖσθαι. Apollodorus ap. Stob.: ὑπάρχειν ὃ τὰς χρόνος λέγειαι, οδηγῶς αὐτοῦ τῶν μερῶν ὑπάρχοντος ἀπαρτιζόντως.

ὁ μηδὲ (ὁποῖον) ἐστάναι δυνάμενος. This is superfluous, being merely a repetition, in other words, of ὃς οὐκ ἔστηκεν, ἔχων οὖσα κέντρον μονῆν; but it may nevertheless have been written by the author. The argument sounds more effective in Greek than in English, owing to the connexion between ἐνεστῶτα and ἐστάναι.

EXCERPT XI

In the MSS. of Stobaeus, the document which I have named Exc. XI follows that which I have named Exc. II B without a break, as if it were a part of the same extract from the 'Discourses of Hermes to Tat'. But the contents of Exc. XI have nothing to do with those of Exc. II B; and from internal evidence it may be inferred with certainty that the two pieces were originally unconnected, and that Exc. XI was once headed by a superscription of its own. It is possible that the two documents had already been joined into one in the book of 'Ερμοῦ πρὸς Τάτ λόγοι, before that book came into the hands of Stobaeus. But it seems more likely that Stobaeus read them in it as two distinct 'discourses', and copied these pieces into his Anthologium as two distinct excerpts; that he wrote a lemma (τοῦ αὐτοῦ, meaning 'Ερμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Τάτ') at the head of the second; and that this lemma was subsequently lost by an error of transcription.

Exc. XI appears to be a complete libellus. Its writer makes
Hermes say that he has previously given instruction to his son in a number of discourses (διὰ πλούσιων λόγων, § 3), and that he now sums up the teaching of those discourses in the string of brief sententiae or aphorisms (κεφαλαία, §§ 1 and 3; περιοχαί, § 3) which we read in § 2, (1)–(48). This implies that the author of Exc. XI had in his possession a collection of written 'Discourses of Hermes to Tat', and that he wrote this libellus with the intention of placing it at the end of that collection, so that readers might find in the series of aphorisms contained in it a short and handy summary of the doctrines taught in the preceding λόγοι. The sententiae were no doubt meant to be learnt by heart (τούτων τῶν κεφαλαίων μεμνημένος κ.τ.λ., § 3), and to serve as a sort of catechism of the Hermetic philosophy. Compare the Epicurean Κύριας δόξας, in which the essentials of the teaching of Epicurus are briefly formulated.¹

In §§ 4 and 5, the writer appends a warning with regard to the teaching contained in the collection of discourses (οἱ νεμικοί λόγοι, § 4) and summarized in the sententiae. That passage is to be taken as meaning that those who are permitted to read this body of Hermetica must be on their guard against making known the truths taught in it to any except the few who are worthy to receive them.

Exc. XI must certainly have been the last of a series of 'Discourses of Hermes to Tat'; but we do not know what that series was. It may have consisted of the whole number of those which were afterwards called οἱ γενικοὶ λόγοι, or of the earlier of them alone; or again, it may have included, together with the γενικοί, some or all of the διεξοδικοί λόγοι. (The word διεξάγων in § 3 is suggestive of διεξεδικοί; but this may be merely accidental. Cf. διεξελεύσοναι in § 1.) If we could identify the sources from which the several sententiae were taken, we should have a list of the Ἐρμοῦ πρὸς Τατ λόγοι which were known to the writer. But the brevity of the aphorisms, and the textual corruption of some of them, make it difficult to do this; and while some of the λόγοι in question are probably to be found among the extant Hermetica, it is to be presumed that others have perished.

¹ Lucian Alex. 47 : τὰς Ἐπικουροῦν Κυρίας δόξας, τὰ ... κεφαλαίων περίγραφον (cf. κεφαλαία and περιοχαί in Exc. XI) τὰς ταχεῖας σφοδρὰς τὰ δέγματα. But the Epicurean Κ. δόξας, which was not nearly so concise as the sententiae of Exc. XI; and in respect of form, a closer analogy is to be found in a condensed summary of the first four Κ. δόξας, which was known to Epicureans as ἡ τετραφάρμακος ('the fourfold remedy' for human ills); viz. ἄφοβος ὁ θεός ἀναλυόμενος ὁ θάνατος τάγμαθι εὑρήκειν τὰ δεινὰ εὐκαρπίμητα. (Voll. Herc. Coll. alt. I, f. 148; Usener, Epicurea, p. 69.)
By what principles was the writer guided in the arrangement of his aphorisms? He certainly had a preference for grouping together *sententiae* which deal with the same topic, and especially those which have one or more prominent words in common (e.g. (2)–(5), διαλυτά and ὑδία σώματα; (8) and (11)–(13), ψυχή and its functions; (18)–(21), ἀγαθόν and κακόν; (25)–(29), ὄφρανός and γῆ). But there are also a good many *sententiae* which have no apparent connexion with those adjacent to them; and topics already dealt with present themselves again later on. (E.g. διαλυτά and ὑδία σώματα are spoken of again in (32)–(34), and ὄφρανός and γῆ again (41)–(45).) It is very likely that there are some displacements and some interpolations; and if we had the document before us in its original form, we might find the arrangement of the *sententiae* somewhat more systematic; but it does not seem probable that there was any continuous sequence of thought running through the whole series. Perhaps the author after reading the first of the ‘Discourses’ in his collection, wrote down in a more or less orderly group the *sententiae* which it suggested to him, and then went on to deal in the same way with each of the other ‘Discourses’ in succession.

It is to be noted that most of the *sententiae* have to do with the Kosmos alone, and not with the supracosmic God. They speak, for the most part, of things visible, not of things invisible; and the contrast on which the writer most strongly insists is not the Platonic contrast between the corporeal (= τὰ αἰσθήτα) and the incorporeal (= τὰ νοητά), but that between the two parts of the corporeal world (ὀφράνος and γῆ, ὑδία σώματα and διαλυτά σώματα). The writer does not indeed wholly ignore the incorporeal; he shows recognition of it in (1) (τὸ ἄσωματον ?), (6) and (7) (ὁ θεός contrasted with ὁ κόσμος), (16) (μόνον τὸ ἄσωματον ἀγιότεθε), and (46) (πρόνοια distinguished from ἀνάγκη); and in the doctrine that the Kosmos, the elements, and the celestial gods ‘have come into being’ or ‘have been made’, which is implied in (5), (17), and (31), the existence of a supracosmic Maker is virtually asserted. This is enough to show that the author of the *sententiae*, like the Hermetists in general, believed in an incorporeal and supracosmic God, and was in that fundamental point a true Platonist; but about that part of his belief, he says little. This may be accounted for by assuming that he wrote the *sententiae* chiefly for the use of novices. The pupil must first be taught to understand the Kosmos and the things in it; he must learn to despise all that is earthly and perishable, and to revere the immortal gods who circle...
in the material heavens. When that part of his education has been completed, he will then be ready to rise above the material Kosmos, and draw near to the supracosmic God. See Exc. II B. 2. 4, where a lower and a higher stage of philosophy are distinguished.

§ I. (8v) kefalaious pantà (tà ònta MSS.) diexeleusomai. If we retain tà ònta, we must translate: 'I will expound in summary sentences the things that are'. But diexélonai does not suit well with èv kefalaious; for it implies ample and detailed rather than concise and summary treatment. This difficulty can be got rid of by altering tà ònta into pantà, and taking the meaning to be 'I will go through all (the things that I have taught you), summing them up in brief sentences'. Hermes intends to give only the main principles of his teaching, and to state them concisely (èv kefalaious); but he will give all the main principles, and in that way he will cover the whole ground (pantà diexeleusomai).

§ 2 (1). pánta tà sómata (tà ònta MSS.) kinéitai: mónon to ásómaton (tà ònta ònta ònta MSS.) káthēnon. The statement pánta tà ònta kinéitai agrees with (10) as emended (pán to ònta kaihnai); but it is contradicted by (11) as emended (òv pánta kinéitai); and it is hardly consistent with (37) as emended (tòn ònton tà ònta sómata èostai, tà ònta kaihnai k. t. l.). It can be accepted only if we take tà ònta to mean corporeal things, and neither to mean nor to include the òntas òntas of the Platonists. tà ònta is sometimes used by Hermetists to denote corporeal things; but what could be meant by saying that 'the non-existent is immovable'? tà ònta ònta could not mean 'things which exist but are incorporeal'; and unless we give it that sense, the second clause is difficult to explain. It seems most likely therefore that ònta and ònta ònta are false readings for sómata and ásómaton. (Cf. Corp. XII. i. (to Tat) 11: pán gáro to kaihnai ásómaton, pán de to kaihnai sóma. Corp. XI. ii. 18, as emended: pán sóma kaihnai; to de ásómaton káthēnon.) And this is confirmed by the fact that sómata are spoken of in the next sententia. If we thus emend the text, sent. (1), in which sómata are distinguished from ásómaton, is naturally followed by (2)-(5), in which the two kinds of sómata are distinguished from one another.

All bodies are in motion; even in bodies which are apparently motionless for a time, invisible movement is continually going on. See Exc. III. (to Tat) 7-10; and cf. Corp. XII. ii. (to Tat) 18: pán
EXCERPT XI: 1, 2

. . . ἵσθι. . . τὸ ἐν ἐν κόσμῳ (= πᾶν σῶμα) κυνούμενον [ἡ κατὰ μείωσιν ἡ αἰφέσιν].

The ἀσώματα here spoken of are chiefly, if not solely, ὁθεός, νοῦς, and ψυχή. Of these, God at least is ἀκίνητος (cf. Corp. V. (to Tat) 5, θέασασθαι τὸν ἄκινητον (τὸν θεόν) διὰ (τῶν κυνηγῶν) κυνούμενον); it would commonly be said that νοῦς is ἄκινητος; and in Corp. II. (to Ascl.) 6 b, we are told that ψυχὴ also is ἄκινητος, though the Platonists usually preferred to say that it is ἄκινητος and αὐτοκύνητος. Compare Pseudo-Archytas Περὶ ἀρχῆν, Stob. i. 41. 5, vol. i, p. 282 W.: νασά μὲν τὰ ἄκινητα, αἰσθατὰ δὲ τὰ κυνούματα.

(1) πᾶν σῶμα μεταβλητῶν· οὐ πᾶν σῶμα διαλυτῶν. This sententia may have been suggested by Exc. II (to Tat); see especially II A. 13. The bodies which are μεταβλητά but not διαλυτά are τὰ ἀδίδα σῶματα; i.e. the Kosmos as a whole, the four cosmic elements, and the heavenly bodies. Cf. Corp. XVI. (Ascl. to Ammon) 9: παντὸς γὰρ σώματος διαμονῆ μεταβολῆ, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἄθανατου ἀδιάλυτου, τοῦ δὲ θνητοῦ μετὰ διαλύσεως.

(2) οὗ πᾶν ἥ送来 θυγτόν οὐ πᾶν ἥ送来 ἄθανατον. The author cannot have written such a pointless truism as οὐ πᾶν ἥ送来 ἄθανατον. The first οὐ should be struck out; the form employed was probably πᾶν . . ., oὶ πᾶν . . ., as in (1). θυγτόν in the first clause may be a corruption of γεννητόν; and we might make sense by writing πᾶν ἥ送来 γεννητόν' οὐ πᾶν ἥ送来 θυγτόν. (Cf. Corp. IV. (to Tat) 2: τὸν ἀνθρωπόν, (ἀνόν) ἥ送来 ἄθανάτου ἥ送来 θυγτόν.) The ἀδίδα σῶματα are ἥ送来 γεννητά; for they have been made and endowed with life by God. But they are not ἥ送来 θητά; they will never perish, and their life will never cease.

As sent. (3) stands between and separates two sententiae in which the word διαλυτῶν is prominent, it may be suspected that it is out of place. If γεννητόν is the right word in (3), this sententia might very well be followed by (5), which deals with τὸ γενομένον; we should therefore get a better order by interchanging (3) and (4).

(4) μόνον τὸ ἀδιάλυτον (τὸ μόνον ἀμετάβλητον MSS.) ἀδίον. For μόνον τὸ, cf. (1). The writer appears to be talking about bodies, and we have just been told that there are no bodies which are ἀμετάβλητα; I have therefore altered ἀμετάβλητον into ἀδιάλυτον.

(5) τὸ ἄει γενομένον ἄει καὶ φθείρεται. All διαλυτὰ σῶματα, i.e. all earthly organisms (e.g. the human body), ἄει γίνεται. This
might be taken to mean either that the individual body is continually renewed by the absorption of fresh nutriment, or that the race is continually renewed by the birth of fresh individuals. But where γένεσις is going on, φθορά also must be going on; the individual body is continually perishing, and the race is continually dying in the successive deaths of individuals.

The interdependence of γένεσις and φθορά is spoken of in Exc. II A. (to Tat) 16. Cf. Exc. IV A. (to Tat) 3: δόσων μὲν οὖν (σωμάτων) τῇ γενέσει φθορά ἔπακολοθεῖ κ.τ.λ.

τὸ δὲ ἄπαξ γενόμενον (γενόμενον MSS.) οδήγητο ποιήσαται. This is the teaching of Plato's Timaeus,—at least if the statements of the speaker in that dialogue are taken literally, as they were by most readers, though some Platonists refused to accept them in that sense. The Kosmos γέγονε (Tim. 28c), or ἄπαξ ἐγένετο; it was made by God once for all; but its Maker has decreed that, having once come into being, it shall never cease to be. Cf. Corp. VIII. (to Tat) 2, as emended: (ὁ κόσμος) αἰείως ὄν, ὡς ἀναντιξόμενος ἕντω ἄδιδον ἄγος τοῦ πατρός. And the same might be said of the cosmic elements and the heavenly bodies. Exc. V. (to Tat) 1, 2: ὁ μὲν ... δημιουργὸς τῶν ἄδιδων σωμάτων ... ἄπαξ ποιήσας κ.τ.λ.

(6) πρῶτον ὁ θεός, δεύτερον ὁ κόσμος, τρίτον ὁ ἄνθρωπος. This may have been taken from Corp. VIII. (to Tat) 2 and 5: πρῶτος γὰρ πάντων ... (ὁ ... θεός ... δεύτερος δὲ ὁ κόσμος). ... τὸ δὲ τρίτον: [ ] ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Cf. Corp. X. (to Tat) 14 b and 22 b.

(7) ὁ κόσμος διὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος διὰ τὸν θεόν. Does this mean ‘the Kosmos (was made) for the sake of Man, and Man (was made) for the sake of God’? That will not do; for it implies the order ‘God first, Man second, Kosmos third’, and is therefore inconsistent with (6). The author probably wrote something like ὁ κόσμος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ (sc. γέγονε or διωκεῖται), ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος διὰ τοῦ κόσμου. God works on the Kosmos directly and immediately, but he works on man through the intermediate agency of the Kosmos. That would agree with the teaching of the Timaeus, according to which the Kosmos was made by God, but man (or at least the mortal part of him) was made by ‘the gods whom God had made’, i.e. by the cosmic forces. Cf. Corp. X. (to Tat) 25: διὰ τῶν τῶν πάντων διωκεῖται τῶν δύο, κόσμου καὶ ἄνθρωπου, ὑπὸ δὲ ἔνος τοῦ θεοῦ (ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἔνος MSS.) τὰ πάντα.
(g) [πᾶσα οὐσία ἀδιάνυσις] πᾶσα οὐσία μεταβλητή (οὐ πᾶσα οὐσία φθαρτή). The only things that are both ἀθάνατα and μεταβλητά are the ἀδιά οὐσία. The reading of the MSS. could therefore be made intelligible only by taking οὐσία to mean ἀδιά οὐσία; but there is no authority for such a use of the word.

If πᾶσα οὐσία (= πᾶν τὸ ὁν) here means πᾶν οὐσία, this sententia, in the form in which I have rewritten it, is a duplicate of (2). Compare also (17).

(10) πᾶν τὸ ὁν κυνητῶν (ὁπτόν MSS.) οὗδέν τῶν ὄντων ἔστηκεν. This is, in part, a repetition of sent. (1) as given in the MSS. (πάντα τὰ ὄντα κυνητὰ μένον τὸ μή ὁν κυνητῶν); and it is necessary either to alter τὸ ὁν . . . τῶν ὄντων into ὄσμα . . . τῶν σωμάτων, as I have there altered τὰ ὄντα into σωμάτα, or to assume that τὸ ὁν here means σωμα. As the difficulty caused by τὸ μή ὁν in (1) does not arise in (10), the traditional text is less open to objection in the latter.

(11) οὗ τὰ πάντα κυνητὰ, πᾶν δὲ τὸ κυνομένον ψυχὴ κυνητὰ. (οὗ πάντα ψυχὴ κυνητὰ, πᾶν δὲ δὲν ψυχὴ κυνητὰ MSS.). In the text of the MSS., there is an impossible antithesis between πάντα and πᾶν τὸ ὁν. ‘Not all things are moved.’ The Hermetist would presumably have said that πάντα τὰ σωμάτα κυνητὰ, but τὰ ἀσωματὰ, or at any rate some of them (e.g. ὁ θεός and ὁ νοῦς), are ἀκῖνητα. (See (1).) But of πάντα κυνητὰ is difficult to reconcile with the preceding sententia (πᾶν τὸ ὁν κυνητῶν κ.π.λ.), which is, verbally at least, contradicted by it; and I am inclined to think that the first clause of (11) has been added with a view to assimilating the form of this sententia to that of most of the others, and that the author wrote simply πᾶν τὸ κυνομένον ψυχὴ κυνητὰ. For this statement, which is ultimately derived from Pl. Phaedrus 245 C, D (τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα κυνητὰ τούτο (ἰς ἡ ψυχὴ) πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κυνητεύεις), cf. Corp. II. (io Ascl.) 1, πᾶν τὸ κυνομένον . . . κυνητὰ . . . ὕπο τινος, and ib. 8 b, 9.

<<(8) ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν αἰσθήτικὼν θετόν, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἀθάνατον.>> This is the doctrine of the Timaeus. It is only the νοῦς or λογιστικῶν (the part of man that has come direct from God) that is immortal; the αἰσθητικῶν has come into being together with the body, and perishes with the body.

If we place (8) between (11) and (12), sententia (10)-(13) form a connected group, in which each sententia leads on to the next by a natural sequence of thought.

(12) [πᾶν τὸ πάσχειν αἰσθηταί] πᾶν τὸ αἰσθήταιομένον πάσχει: (μόνος) (ὁ νοῦς ἀπαθης.) The statement that ‘everything which is passively
affected is sensitive' could hardly be maintained. A stone πάνει when I break it; but most people would not say that a stone αἰσθανόμενον; though it is true that something of the sort seems to be asserted in Exe. III. 17.

In (15), the MSS. give ὁ νοῦς ἀπαθής, which is there irrelevant; and as ἀπαθής may very well stand in contrast to πάνει, and νοῦς to αἰσθανόμενον, it seems most likely that (μόνος) ὁ νοῦς ἀπαθής was the latter part of (12). In Corp. XII. i. (to Tat) 11, the question whether νοῦς is ἀπαθής or παθητός is discussed; the conclusion there arrived at appears to be that embodied νοῦς (i.e. the νοῦς of a man living upon earth) is παθητός, but unembodied νοῦς is ἀπαθής.

ἀισθανόμενον sometimes occurs, in MSS. at least, as a later form of αἰσθάνομαι. We have no means of knowing whether the Hermetist used that form or not; but as there would be an advantage in distinguishing the present participle (which is required here) from the aorist αἰσθάνομαι, it is probable that he wrote αὐτόν-αῖντον.

(13) πάν τὸ λυποῦμενον καὶ ἤθεται [ ]; οὐ πάν τὸ ἡδύμενον λυπεῖται [ ]. If we retain ὁ, the second clause means that some beings (e.g. God, or νοῦς, or the celestial gods) feel pleasure unaccompanied by pain. But ἡδύμενον is usually limited to the lower forms of pleasure; and inasmuch as it is a πάθος, to say that νοῦς ἤθεται would be inconsistent with saying that νοῦς is ἀπαθής. It seems probable then that the Hermetist, if he spoke of ἡδύμενον and λυπητό, together, would put them on a par; and he may perhaps have said that pain is always accompanied or followed by pleasure, and pleasure by pain. This meaning might be got by striking out ὁ, and writing πάν τὸ ἡδύμενον (καὶ) λυπεῖται. That, however, is not quite satisfactory; for why should this connexion between pleasure and pain be insisted on as a leading principle of the Hermetic doctrine?

[Χαρόν θυτών] . . . [Χαρόν αἰδιον]. The person who inserted these words apparently took the sententia to mean that the θυτά ζῷα feel both pain and pleasure, but the αἴδια ζῷα feel pleasure and do not feel pain.

(14) οὐ πᾶν σῶμα νοσεῖ· πᾶν σῶμα νοσοῦν διαλυτών. 'Not all bodies are diseased' implies that τὰ αἴδια σώματα are not diseased. That is doubtless true; but was it worth while to say it? As (13) also, in its present form, is somewhat dubious, I am inclined to suspect that (13) and (14) have been produced by the expansion of a single

1 As to the inseparable connexion between pleasure (of the lower sort) and pain, see Pl. Phaedo 60 c, where Socrates, speaking of τὸ ἤδι καὶ τὸ λυπητό, says ὅτι ἀν τὸ ἤδιν παραγέεται, ἀνακολουθεῖ ὅστερον καὶ τὸ ἔτερον.
sententiae, which ran thus: πάν τὸ λυπούμενον [ ] νοσεί· πάν σώμα
νοσοῦν (οἵ πάν τὸ νοσοῦν) διαλυτόν. Having in us an αἰσθητικόν, we
feel pain; and every pang of pain is an intimation that (qua αἰσθητι-
κόν) we are mortal.

(15) οὐκ γίνεται ἐν τῇ θεῇ· [ὁ λογισμός ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ] ὁ λόγος ἐν τῷ νοτ.
ὁ λογισμός would mean the function τὸ λογιστικόν (= ὁ ἀνθρώπινος
νοῦς), the rational or intelligent part of the human soul. But ὁ
λογισμός ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ is most likely a corrupted doublet of ὁ λόγος
ἐν τῷ νοτ (νοὶ having been altered into ἄνθρωπος.)

With this sententiae should be compared Corp. XII. i. (το Τάτ) 13 a:
ὁ σῶμα (speech) ἐστὶν εἰκὼν (τοῦ νοτ), καὶ ὁ νοῦς τοῦ θεοῦ. Ἡ
13 b, the MSS. give λόγον δὲ ἐν τῷ νῷ, which agrees with sent. (15);
but the original reading there was probably θεῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ νῷ,1 in
which the relation between νοῦς and θεὸς as stated in sent. (15) is
reversed. It is possible, however, that λόγον had already been substituted
for θεῶν in Corp. XII. i. 13 b before these sententiae were written.

'A is in B' probably here means 'A is to B as a part to the whole'.
The human νοῦς is a part of God (cf. Corp. XII. i. init., ὁ νοῦς ἐς
ἀντὶς τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ οὐσίας ἐστίν); and the human faculty of speech (or
reasoning) is a part of the human νοῦς.

(16) οὐδὲν σωματικὸν ἄληθὲς (οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι ἄληθὲς MSS.)· μόνον τὸ
ἀσωμάτων ἀφευδές (ἐν ἀσωμάτῳ τὸ πᾶν ἀφευδές MSS.). It is not ἐν
σώματι, ' that which is embodied' (e.g. the incarnated soul), that is
unreal, but body itself, or the corporeal. And ἐν ἀσωμάτῳ presents
a similar difficulty. It therefore seems necessary to write σώμα or
σωματικὸν in place of ἐν σώματι, and ἀσωμάτων in place of ἐν ἀσωμάτῳ.
Compare the misreadings in (37).

This sententiae sums up the teaching of Exc. II A (το Τάτ).

(17) τὰν τὸ γενόμενον μεταβλητῶν· οὐ πάν τὸ γενόμενον φθαρτόν. Cf.
(2)–(5), τὰ γενόμενα are τὰ σώματα. The διαλυτά σώματα are both
μεταβλητά and φθαρτά; the άδια σώματα are μεταβλητά but not
φθαρτά.

Sent. (17) may have been suggested by Exc. II A. 13; and
perhaps this may account for its being placed next to (16), which is a
summary of Exc. II A.

(18) οὐδὲν ἄγαθον ἐν τῇ γῇς· οὐδὲν κακὸν ἐν τῷ ὀδηγῷ. Sententiae
(18)–(21) deal with the contrast between ἄγαθον and κακόν. In Exc.
II A, we are told that there is nothing ἄληθές on earth, and (ib. 9)
that ἡ ἄληθες is αὐτῷ τὸ ἀκρατον ἄγαθον; so that this topic also may

1 Cf. Corp. XI. i. 4 b: ὁ μὴν θεός ἐν τῷ νῷ.
possibly have been suggested by that same *libellus*. In *Corp. X* (to *Tat*) also, the words ἄγαθος and κακὸς are prominent.

‘There is nothing good on earth.’ This is strongly asserted in *Corp. VI* (to *Ascl.*). But in that document, as well as in *Corp. II* (to *Ascl.*) sub fin., it is not the corporeal heaven, but the incorporeal God, that is spoken of in contrast to the lower world in which we live, and the leading thought is ‘God is good, man (as an earthly organism) is bad’, or ‘the incorporeal is good, the corporeal is bad’.

The words οὐδὲν κακὸν ἐν οὐρανῷ may be compared with *Corp. X*. 10 b (as emended): οὐ κακὸς ὁ κόσμος. But the writer of *Corp. X* adds οὐκετί δὲ ἄγαθός, ἐλίκος γάρ; whereas in the *sententiae* it is implied that ὁ οὐρανὸς ἐστὶ ἄγαθός.

(19) ὁ θεὸς ἄγαθος· ὁ ἀνθρώπος κακός. This agrees verbally with *Corp. VI*, II, and X; but there is nothing to tell us whether the writer meant by ὁ θεὸς the incorporeal God, or the corporeal gods who circle in the heavens, and who are spoken of as οἱ θεοὶ in (21). ὁ ἀνθρώπος means οἱ ἀνθρώποι; and ὁ θεὸς, being coupled to it, might here mean οἱ θεοὶ.

(20) τὸ ἄγαθὸν ἐκώστιον, τὸ κακὸν ἀκούστιον. This is based on the saying of Socrates, that vice is ignorance (of the good), and is therefore involuntary. Compare the verse quoted in Ar. *Eth. Nic.* 3. 5, 1113 b 15: οἶδεις ἐκὼν ποιητής, οὐδεὶς ἀκών μάκαρ. (Aristotle disputes the first clause, and maintains that ἡ μυθηρία ἐκώστιον ἐστιν.) Some of the Hermetists expressed a similar thought by saying that he who has attained to γνώσις is free from εἰμαρμένη, but all other men are in subjection to εἰμαρμένη. Cf. (26), οὐδέν ἐπὶ γῆς ἑλεύθερον.

(21) οἱ θεοὶ τὰ ἄγαθα αἱροῦνται· ὁι ἀνθρώποι τὰ κακὰ αἱροῦνται) ὡς ἄγαθα. The astral gods act by free choice (οὐδέν ἐν οὐρανῷ δοῦλον, (26) but choose the good, and so, act always in accordance with God’s will. For the second clause, cf. *Corp. VI*. (to *Ascl.*) 3 b: ἐκαστὸν τούτων ... πεπίστευται ἐνθάδε μέγιστον ἐναι ἄγαθον, τὸ μᾶλλον ἀνυπέρβλητον κακῶν. Ἰδ. 6: τὸ κακὸν πιστεύσαντα ἄγαθον ἐναι.

*Sententiae* (18), (19), (21), and (29) should be compared with *Exc.* VII. (to *Tat*) 2.

(22)–(24) ἡ εὐνομία ... ἀνθρώπου φθορά́. This is one mass of corruption. As a guess, I propose (22) ἡ εὐνομία μετὰ θεοῦ δύναμις· ἡ ἀνομία (πρὸς θεὸν ἐργᾷ). (23) νόμος θείος ἄρετή (οἱ εὐνομίαι)· νόμος ἀνθρώπων κακία (οἱ ἀνομίαι). (24) ὁ χρόνος κόσμου στροφή· ὁ χρόνος...
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\[\text{ἀνθρώπου φθορά. Sententiae (22) and (23), when thus rewritten, have to do with the good and bad in human action, and so continue the topic of (18)-(21). For νόμος θεώς, cf. Porphyr. Ad Marcellam 25 f.: τρεῖς δὲ νόμοι διακεκρίθησαν αἰτίας εἰς μὲν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἄτερος δὲ ὁ τῆς θυγτῆς φύσεως, τρίτος δὲ ὁ θετῶς κατ᾽ ἑθνή καὶ πόλεις. ... ὁ δὲ γε θεῖος ἀγνοεῖται μὲν ψυχῇ δὲ ἀφροσύνην καὶ ἀκολασίαν ἀκαθάρτως ἐκλάμπει δὲ ἀπαθείας καὶ φρονήσεως.}

In (24), τροφή may be a corruption of στροφή or περιστροφή. Time is measured by the revolving movement of the heavenly bodies, and was often said by the Greeks to be constituted by that movement.

The movement of the Kosmos, being cyclic, is unending; but to men the lapse of time brings destruction (ὁ χρόνος ἀνθρώπου φθορά).

(25) πᾶν (τῶ) ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀμετάθετον πᾶν τὸ ἐπὶ γῆς μεταθετόν. Human decrees and resolves may be altered or annulled; but the star-gods, in their movements and workings, maintain a law which is unalterable.

This unalterable working of the star-gods, through which the will of the supreme God finds fulfilment in all physical processes in the sublunar world, is frequently denoted by the term εἰμαρμανή. See Ascl. Lat. III. 40 a.

(26) οὔδὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ δοῦλον· οὔδὲν ἐπὶ γῆς ἔλευθερον. Cf. Exc. III. (το Τὰ) ὅ : αὕτη οὖν Ἐ διαφορά διανάσαν σώματος καὶ ἥθη, ὅπι ... τὸ μὲν, ..., ἔλευθερον (δὲν), ἄγει, τὸ δὲ, ..., δοῦλον (δὲν), φέρεται. Corp. I. 15 : (ὁ ἀνθρώπως) (εἰμαρμανής) γέγονε δοῦλος. All corporeal things on earth are subject to εἰμαρμανή, i.e. to the working of the star-gods; man therefore, as long as the corporeal predominates in him, is a slave of εἰμαρμανή. But the star-gods are not slaves; (they act in accordance with God's will, but willing accordance with God's will is not δουλεία;) and man also, in virtue of the divine element in him, may, after death at least, if not in this life, 'join the company of the celestial gods' (Corp. X. 7), and be free, as they are free.

How is οὔδὲν ἐπὶ γῆς ἔλευθερον in (26) to be reconciled with πᾶν τὸ ἐπὶ γῆς μεταθετόν in (25)? It might be objected that if the movements of the heavenly bodies (τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ) are ἀμετάθετα, and all corporeal things on earth are governed by the movements of the heavenly bodies, then τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς also must be ἀμετάθετα. How can that which is determined by εἰμαρμανή be μεταθετόν?

To this objection a Hermetist might perhaps reply that a man's will may be variable without being free, and indeed only ceases to be variable when it becomes free. As long as he is in subjection to
his earthly body and the things of the body, he is driven to and fro by the πάθη (desires and aversions) generated in his soul by bodily processes; he shifts and changes, wills one thing to-day and another to-morrow; and so his aims and actions are μεταβετέα. But when he escapes from this servitude, his will no longer varies; for like that of the celestial gods, it is harmonized with the will of God, and unalterably fixed upon the Good.

There remains however a further difficulty. If τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς are worked by τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ, and τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ are good, how is it that τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς are bad? (οὕτων ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ γῆς, (18).) If all things on earth (including the πάθη of the man who is in subjection to οἴμαρμάνη) are wrought by the ἄι κατέστις, who are good, it ought to follow that all things on earth are good. A Hermetist, if he was conscious of this difficulty, could evade it only by having recourse to the Platonic conception of ἀτάκτου ἐλήνη. God and his ministers the star-gods do the best that can be done; but they cannot eliminate evil in the sublunar world, because the matter on which they have to work is, in part at least, irremediably evil. See Ascl. Lat. Π. 16 a.

(27) οὕτων ἀγαθών ἐν οὐρανῷ· οὕτων γινόμενον ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς. We might have expected rather to be told that God, or the Good, cannot be (fully) known on earth, but only in heaven; that is, that perfect gnōsis (of God or the Good) is possible for men only when they have quitted the earthly body and ascended to heaven. (That is what is taught in Corp. X, for instance.) But the object of the knowledge here spoken of is not God or the Good, but ‘anything’. For man, as long as he remains on earth, true knowledge (not merely knowledge of God, or of all things, but even knowledge of any one thing) is impossible; what he thinks to be knowledge is only a dim and doubtful opinion. As γνώσις is correlative to ἀλήθεια, this statement is connected with the thesis maintained in Exc. Π Α, ἀλήθεια οὕτως ἐν τῇ γῇ. (Cf. sent. (16).) Perhaps the writer may have been thinking of the saying of Socrates, ‘I know that I know nothing’.

(28) οὐ κοινωνεί (τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς· κοινωνεί) τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς τοῖς ἐν οὐρανῷ. The Stoics were accustomed to say that there is κοινωνία between God and man, or between the gods (= τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ) and men. (See Corp. Χ. 22 b, and Ascl. Lat. Ι. 5.) But the point on which the writer of the sententiae insists is that in this κοινωνία the two parties are not on equal terms; men are dependent on the gods, but the gods (being ἄναθεῖς) are not dependent upon men. Sententiae (38), (40), and (41) are to the same effect.
(29) The primary meaning of μῶμος seems to have been 'a bodily blemish'. μωμοσκότος (Philo) means 'one who looks for blemishes' in sacrificial victims. Cf. Orac. Sib. i. 351: νοσεροὶ ἢστεαί ἰδ" ἐπιμάμονοι. (ἐπιμαμοῦν, literally 'having blemishes upon them', is there coupled with νοσεροῖς, and stands on a par with τυφλοῖς, χωλοῖς, and κωφοῖς in the following lines. Leprosy, for instance, would be a μῶμος.) If so, μωμᾶσθαι must have meant 'to find or point out blemishes' in a person; and thence must have come the secondary sense of μῶμος, 'blame'.

(30) τὸ αὐξάνατον ὑπὸ θητῶν. Possibly: τὸ αὐξάνατον ὑπὸ (παθήτων μόνον τὸ) θητῶν (πάσχει). Cf. (12) as emended: πάν τὸ αἰολαθήματον πάσχειι μόνος ὑπὸ νοσῆς. In the human soul, τὸ θητόν is τὸ αἰολαθήματον, and τὸ αὐξάνατον is ὑπὸ νοσῆς. (See (8).) From the loss (through homoioteleuton) of the words παθήτων μόνον τὸ, the silly statement τὸ αὐξάνατον ὑπὸ θητῶν would result; and we may suppose that some one tried to complete the damaged sententia by adding the equally silly statement τὸ θητόν ὑπὸ αὐξάνατον.

(31) τὸ σπαρέν ὑπὸ πάτως θητῶν (γενητόν MSS.) τὸ ἐξ θητῶν (γενητόν MSS.) πάντως καὶ σπαρέν. The reading of the MSS. is impossible; for anything that is σπαρέν ('begotten') necessarily γενέτο. If we write θητῶν in place of γενητόν, this sententia repeats what was said in (5). The 'everlasting bodies' ἑκάτερο (= ἀπαζέγενετο), but are not θητά (= οὐδέποτε φθείρεται).

(32) διαλυτὸν σώματος δύο χρόνων, ὅ τ' ἂν τῆς σπορᾶς μέχρι τῆς γενέσεως καὶ ὁ ἂν τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τοῦ θανάτου. [τοῦ] ἀδίδον σώματος χρόνον 'ἐκ τῆς γενεσεως' μόνος. σπορά, if distinguished from γένεσις, must mean 'begetting' as opposed to 'birth'; so that the text of the MSS. must be taken to mean 'a dissoluble body (e.g. the body of a man or animal) has two times, that of its existence as an embryo, and that of its life from birth to death; an everlasting body (e.g. the Kosmos, the element fire, or the sun) has one time only, which began when it was made by the Demiurgus'. That amounts to saying that an earthly organism has, and an 'everlasting body' has not, an embryonic stage of existence. But why should any one want to call attention to this insignificant point of difference between the two kinds of bodies? (See Addenda in vol. iv.)

I am inclined to think that the author must have written something like διαλυτὸν σώματος δύο χρόνων, ὅ τ' ἂν αξίζεως καὶ ὅ τ' ἂν μείωςες; ἀδίδον σώματος χρόνον ὅ τ' ἂν ταττότητος μόνος. (Note that αξίζεως and
μείωσις are spoken of in the following sententia (33). But (32), emended as I propose, would be an amplification of the thought expressed in (33), and ought therefore to follow (33) rather than to precede it.) A 'dissoluble body' passes through two successive stages, a stage of growth (which lasts from birth to maturity), and a stage of diminution or decay (which lasts from maturity to death). An 'everlasting body', when it has once come into being, persists, not indeed without change of any kind, (for it is μεταβαλλόν, sent. (2),) but without that kind of change which is called αὐξήσεως καὶ μείωσις.

Assuming that this was the original wording of the sententia, we might account for the text of the MSS. by supposing that some one added ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς στοράς μέχρι τῆς τελείωτητος as a note in explanation of ὁ τῆς αὐξήσεως, and ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς τελείωτητος μέχρι τοῦ θανάτου as a note in explanation of ὁ τῆς μείωσις; and that γανίσεως, having been written as an alternative for στοράς, was afterwards wrongly substituted for τατιόν/τοῖς and τατορρον-οι. Cf. Corp. VIII. (to Tat) 4, as emended: αὕτη δὲ ἡ ἀποξία (sc. ἡ τῆς αὐξήσεως καὶ μείωσις) περὶ τὰ ἐπίγεια ζώα (the bodies of which are διαλυτὰ) γίνεται. τῶν γὰρ οὐρανῶν τὰ σώματα (which are ᾠδία) μελᾶν τάξιν ἔχει, ἢν ἐληκέν ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρός τὴν ἀρχὴν. For τῆς ταυτότητος, cf. Corp. XII. ii (to Tat) 14 c, as emended: ἔχεται γὰρ τῆς ταυτότητος τὰ δυνάμεια σώματα (i. e. the cosmic elements), καὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς εἰς ἀλληλα ποιούμενα, δέ τῆς ταυτότητος τὴν αὐθαρσίαν σῶζει.

(34) ἡ διαλυτὴ ἕλη εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἐναλλοιώται {[ ... ]} εἰς τὰ δωματία. I can find no sense in ἡ διαλυτὴ ἕλη and ἡ ᾠδίας ἕλη. It may be suspected that ἕλη has come by duplication from the last three letters of διαλυτὴ and has driven out some other substantive. Possibly, ἡ διαλυτὴ οἰκία (meaning 'thing') εἰς τὰ ἐναντία (sc. διαλυτὰ) ἐναλλοιώται, ἡ δὲ ᾠδίας εἰς τὰ δωματία (sc. ᾠδία). An earthly organism, when it is broken up, 'is changed into' the elements (of which it was composed); and the elements are διαλυμα and ᾠδία. An ᾠδίας σῶμα (e. g. the element water) is (part by part, though not as a whole) ᾠδίον.

(35) γένεσις [ἀνθρώπου] φθορὰ(ς), φθορὰ [ἀνθρώπου] γενέσεως ἀρχῇ. There is no reason to restrict the application of this sententia to men; it is equally true of all διαλυτὰ σώματα. Cf. sent. (5), and Exc. II A. 16.

(36) τὸ ἀπογνωμένον κ.τ.λ. Cf. sent. (5).
(37) τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν σώματα ἐστὶ (τὰ μὲν ἐν σώμασιν εἰσὶν MSS.), τὰ δὲ ἰδεῖα (τὰ δὲ ἐν ἰδεῖαις MSS.), τὰ δὲ ἐνεργείαι (ἐνεργείαις MSS.).

In this classification of τὰ ὄντα, as in most of the sententiae, cosmic things alone are spoken of, and supracosmic entities are disregarded.

The ἰδεῖα are the formae visibles of bodies, and not Plato’s νοῦς ἐνθα (ἐνθά; for the latter could not be said to be ‘in bodies’. νοῦς might possibly be called an ἐνεργεία of the supracosmic God; but it is not an ἐνεργεία of the kind the writer is here speaking of; for νοῦς is not (always or necessarily) ‘in a body’. And the supracosmic God himself is neither a σῶμα, an ἰδεία nor an ἐνεργεία. God is not one of τὰ ὄντα; he is ἑπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας.

ἰδεία (ἰδία MSS.) δὲ καὶ ἐνεργεία, (ἀσώματα δύντα,) ἐν σώματι ἐστι. The meaning would be better expressed by writing ἰδεία δὲ καὶ ἐνεργεία, (ἀσώματοι οὖν,) ἐν σώμασιν εἰσι. As regards ἐνεργείαι, this statement agrees with Exc. III. (to Tat) 1: ἐνεργείαι . . ., ἀσώματοι οὖν οὖν, ἐν σώμασιν εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τῶν σομάτων ἐνεργοῦσι. ἦ. 21: τὰς ἐνεργείας: ταύτα γὰρ ἀσώματα ἄντα φαμέν ἐν σώμασιν (ἐναι).

It seems that the phrase ἐν σώματι (or ἐν σώμασιν), which is rightly used here, caused a transcriber to write ἐν σώμασιν in place of σώματα in the preceding clause; and that gave rise to the false readings ἐν ἰδείαις and ἐνεργείαις. A similar error occurs in (16).

(38) τὸ ἀθάνατον οὖς μετέχει τοῦ θνητοῦ κ.τ.λ. Cf. (28) and (41).

(39) τὸ μὲν θνητὸν εἰς ἀθάνατον σῶμα ὕστερον ἔρχεται. The ‘imortal bodies’ (setting aside the Kosmos as a whole and the cosmic elements, which cannot here be meant,) are the corporeal heavens, and the several bodies contained in them, viz. the fixed stars and the planets. τὸ θνητὸν here means especially the mortal part of man, i.e. the body and τὸ αἰσθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς (see (8)). This part of man cannot ascend to heaven. At his death, his body remains on earth; and his αἰσθητικὸν perishes or is dispersed, and can never be re-embodied in a star, though his νοῦς, the immortal part of him, possibly may. Cf. Corp. I. 24, where we are told that the ascending soul casts off its αἰσθησεῖς.

τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον εἰς θνητὸν (σῶμα) παραγίνεται. The immortal part of man, i.e. the νοῦς, descends from above, and is, for a time, incorporated in a mortal body upon earth.

Sententia (39) would serve to remind the pupil of what is said at greater length in Exc. IV A. (to Tat) 7, (§§6).
(40) οἱ ἐνέργειαι ὀφεὶ εἰσὶν ἀνωφερεῖς, ἀλλὰ κατωφερεῖς. The ἐνέργειαι are the forces which are at work in all life and movement upon earth. (See Exc. III, to Tat.) They ‘work downward from above, not upward from below’. That is, all life and movement upon earth result from the action of the heavenly bodies on the things below; but the life and movement of the heavenly bodies do not result from any action of the things below, but are infused into them by the supracosmic God. Cf. Exc. III. 6: (αἱ ἐνέργειαι) ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν σωμάτων ἔρχονται εἰς τὰ θνητά. Ἰθ. 15: (ἡ ἐνέργεια) ἀνωθέν πέμπεται.

(41) οὐδὲν ὀφελεῖται τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς (οὐδὲν ὀφελεῖ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ MSS.) πάντα ὀφελεῖται τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ (πάντα ὀφελεῖ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ MSS.). The celestial gods do all for us; we can do nothing for them. They are ἀνενδεικτὶ; they have no unsatisfied wants, and therefore no offerings or services of men can benefit them.

It would be grammatically possible to take the text of the MSS. in the same sense; but the phrases would be absurdly ambiguous.

(42) οἱ οὐρανοὶ σωμάτων ἑβίων δεκτικός· ἡ γῆ σωμάτων φθαρτῶν δεκτική. It is somewhat surprising to find this elementary statement so near the end of the string of sententiae. It would seem more appropriate if it were either placed in connexion with (2)–(5), in which the distinction between the two kinds of bodies is first spoken of, or put at the beginning of the group (25)–(29), in which οὐρανός and γῆ are contrasted. For similar reasons, it may be suspected that (45) also is out of place.

(43) ἡ γῆ ἄλογος· οἱ οὐρανοὶ λογικὸς (λοφὸς MSS.). Cf. Corp. I. 10 and 11 b, where we are told that ὁ λόγος (personified), after doing his part in the demiurgia, flew up to heaven, and that his departure left the sublunar world ἄλογον, and consequently capable of producing only ἄλογα ζῷα (and the ἄλογον μέρος οἱ άνθρώποι).

(44) τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ὑπόκειται· τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς τῇ γῇ ἑπάκειται. I propose τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ (προνοίᾳ) ὑπόκειται· τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς [ἀνάγκῃ] ὑπόκειται. That would agree with what is said in (46), and in other Hermetica, as to the relation between πρόνοια and ἀνάγκη. But if πρόνοια and ἀνάγκη were spoken of both in (44) and in (46), that would be an additional reason for thinking that (45), which deals with a different subject, is out of place.

(45) οἱ οὐρανοὶ πρῶτον τῶν στοιχείων· ἡ γῆ ὄστεαν τῶν στοιχείων (στοιχείαν διὰ MSS.). The heavenly bodies were sometimes called...
orotxtwi; but as the word στοιχεῖα is here applied to γῆ also, it presumably means 'an element'. If so, στοιχεῖον must here be taken to mean πᾶρ, the element of which the heavens consist. Cf. Corp. XII. ii. (to Tat) 21: τοῦ κόσμου μέρη εἰσὶν στοιχεῖα καὶ γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρ.

(46) πρόνοια θεία τάξις: ἀνάγκη προνοίας ὑπηρέτης. Cf. Exc. XII. i (to Ammon): ἡ δὲ εἰμαρμένη ὑπηρέτη προνοία. See also Exc. XIII and Exc. XIV (to Ammon), and Exc. VIII. (to Tat) 5. God works on the heavenly bodies immediately; and his will, regarded as acting on them, is called πρόνοια. But he works on sublunar things through the intermediate agency of the heavenly bodies; and the force which the heavenly bodies exert on sublunar things is called ἀνάγκη (or εἰμαρμένη). Thus ἀνάγκη is subservient to πρόνοια.

(47) τύχη φορὰ (ἄτακτος), [ἄτακτον ἐνεργείας (προσηγορία)]. Cf. the anonymous definition in Stob. i. 7. 9 b, vol. i, p. 92 W. (Diels Doxogr. p. 326): τύχη ἄτακτον ἐνεργείας ἀυτή προσηγορία. It may be conjectured that the Hermetist wrote τύχη φορὰ ἄτακτος; that some reader, having met with the similar definition which has been preserved for us in Stob. i. 7. 9 b, added the words ἄτακτον ἐνεργείας προσηγορία; and that ἄτακτος was omitted before ἄτακτον by an error of transcription.

For τύχη φορὰ ἄτακτος, cf. Eurythys Pythagoreus Περὶ τύχας, Stob. i. 6. 19, vol. i, p. 90 W.: δύο φύσεις ἐν τῷ ἄλοι πέδε ... ἐνεπάρχοντι ἐναντία ἄλλαλως καὶ ταταία καὶ μᾶν ἐντὶ ρητα καὶ τεταγμενα καὶ λόγον ἔχουσα τοι πάντα, ὧν ἄρρητος καὶ ἄτακτος καὶ ἄλογος καὶ ἀδεμέναν σύνταξιν ἔχουσα. ... τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχας καὶ τῷ αὐτοματῷ γνώμονας γίνεται ἐμπεσονόσας τὰς ἀλόγας καὶ ἄτακτα φύσεις ἐς τὰ πράγματα.

If this sententia was similar in form to most of the others, there must have been a second clause; and as τύχη and τέχνη are often contrasted, and Eurythys ib. speaks of τέχνη καὶ φύσιν τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας καὶ θεία, it is possible that something like τύχη ἐνεργεία ἄτακτος followed. The meaningless words εἰδωλον δόξα ψευδής, which re appended in the MSS., may be a remnant of a lost sententia.

(48) τί θεός; ἄτρεπτον, ἀγαθόν. This might be said either of the star-gods, or of the supreme and supracosmic God. For θεὸς ἄτρεπτον, ἀνθρωπος τρεπτον, cf. Exc. II A. 15 (of the supracosmic God): τὸν ἄτρεπτον, τὸν μὴ ἀλλοιμιμὸν. 1b. 11: τρέπεται δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλεται (ὁ ἀνθρωπος). For θεὸς ἀγαθόν, ἀνθρωπος κακόν, cf. sent. (19).

If a man refuses to tell to others truths which he knows, he may seem to lay himself open to a charge of φόνος, i.e. malicious unwillingness to impart to one's neighbour something that would be good for him. (Cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 12 b: 'nec sinit partem divinitatis agnoscere invidens in mortalitate malignitas.')

But he who does what is here enjoined is not really open to that charge; for he will speak without reserve to the few who are worthy to receive the true doctrine; and (as we are told in § 5) if the unworthy hear it, they will be the worse for it, and not the better.

μᾶλλον δὲ δι’ τοῦ πολλοῦ δόξης καταγέλαστος εἶναι. Wachsmuth says 'post μᾶλλον δὲ haud scio an haustum sit διαγορεῶν vel simile quid'. But it is hardly necessary to insert a verb. The writer means to say 'I warn you against talking to the many' for this reason, that' &c.; but the text of the MSS. can be understood to mean that, though it is defective in grammatical construction.

The first of the two reasons given for concealment is that the unworthy will laugh at the man who speaks of these things to them. What harm would that do? It is unpleasant to be laughed at; but a good man does not refrain from doing what he thinks right because it might result in some unpleasantness to him. To speak to those who only laugh at what you say is, no doubt, a waste of time and energy; but that is hardly an adequate reason for enjoining silence. And though the laughers will certainly get no good from what they hear, it is not self-evident, and has not yet been shown, that they will be positively harmed by it. The harm implied is probably that

1 Cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. 55: ταύτα δὲ ἐμποδῶν τοῦ γράφειν ἥμων, καὶ τῶν ἐκ σκλαβών ἑκὼν, ἢ φονεῖν, ἢ ἐμπροσθεῖν τῶν χυλῶν τοὺς μαρμάρης λάλειν, μὴ ποὺς κατακαπνίσας τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ στραφέας ἁβέων ἤμας' (Matt. 7. 6). Χαλεπῶς γὰρ τούτο περὶ τοῦ ἄλλου φοντὶ καθαροῦ ἄτοτε καὶ διανοιξώ ἐπικείμενοι λόγους ἀκροατῶν τοῦ βλάστης τοῦ καταγελαστοῦτε καὶ διαπεριευθοῦς' σχεδίων γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πρὸς τούτο πολλοῦ καταγελαστοῦτα ἀκούσματα.
which the speaker himself is liable to suffer, not from the mere unpleasantness of incurring ridicule, but from the weakening of his own convictions. As religious fervour is fostered and intensified by the companionship of others who are fervent in the faith, so it is liable to be lowered and deadened by the sarcastic comments of unsympathetic hearers.

οὖν δὲ οἱ λόγοι ἀλάγους παντελῶς τοὺς ἄκροατας ἦσσωσιν (Ἑκουσιν MSS.) ἢ τάχα οὖν τοὺς ἀλάγους [Ἑκουσιν]. ἦσσωσιν, which is needed to make sense, may easily have been omitted through its resemblance to ἦσσωσιν.

οὖν οἱ λόγοι, in the mouth of Hermes, means the discourses by which he has previously given oral instruction to Tat, and the substance of which it is assumed that Tat will hereafter repeat to a few other persons. For the reader, it means a collection of written ‘Discourses of Hermes to Tat’, at the end of which Exc. XI was placed as an appendix.

Even the few who may rightly be permitted to read these sacred writings, or to hear them read, are not wholly ‘worthy’ to do so; and all other men are utterly unworthy.

§ 5. ξούσι δὲ τι καὶ ξειόν ἐν εὐαυτοῖς· τοὺς κακοὺς μᾶλλον παροξυνομεῖ πρὸς τὴν κακίαν. A second reason for silence and concealment is here given, namely, the harm that indiscriminate talk about holy things (or the indiscriminate circulation of the Hermetic writings) may do to the hearers (or readers).

[ὅτι θρη τὸὺς πολλοὺς φυλάττεσθαι, ἢς μὴ νοοῦται τῶν λεγομένων τὴν ἀρετήν.] This sentence is evidently out of place; for it breaks the connexion between what precedes (Ἑκουσι δὲ . . . τὴν κακίαν) and what follows (Πῶς εἶπες κ.τ.λ.). The only question is whether it is better to reject it altogether, or to transpose it. The most suitable place for it would be after οὖν τοὺς ἀλάγους, at the end of § 4. But it is not needed there; for it merely repeats what has been said before in that section, and repeats it in a less expressive form, μὴ νοοῦται τῶν λεγομένων τὴν ἀρετήν being a comparatively feeble substitute for δόξεις καταγέλαστος εἶναι. It seems most likely then that θρη τὸὺς πολλοὺς . . . τὴν ἀρετήν is a marginal summary of § 4, which has been inserted into the text, with δο prefixed to make connexion.

[πάν] τὸ ἡσύ (τὸ) τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπερρέπετοτερὸν ἐστιν ἐς τὴν κακίαν. Wachsmuth adopts Usener's correction, τὸ ἡσύ τὸ ἀνθρώπων. That gives the meaning required; but perhaps the author may have written τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων in the sense of τὸ ἀνθρώπων. Cf. Ps.-Pl.
Εραντικαὶ ἐπιμέλεια... μὴ παραγενομένη... ἀνοητότατον ἀν... παράσχοντι ζῷον τῷ τῶν ἄνθρωπῶν;

We must not translate 'the animal part of men'; that would be τὸ ἄλογον τῶν ἄνθρωπῶν. A star-god, as well as a beast, is a ζῷον.

δι' οὐ ἂν τὸ κόσμος. This is implied in sent. (5), (17), and (31); and it is expressly said in extant 'Discourses of Hermes to Tat' (e.g. Corp. IV init.).

καὶ (δι') πάντα κατὰ [πρόνοιαν καὶ] ἀνάγκης γίνεται, εἰμαρμένης πάντων ἀρχώσης. See sent. (46) and (44). πάντα must be taken to mean πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς. According to the doctrine of the Hermetists in general, it is only earthly things that are governed by εἰμαρμένη, and therefore determined κατ' ἀνάγκην.¹ The man who 'has got gnosis', being no longer a mere thing of earth, is freed from subjection to εἰμαρμένη; his actions are κατὰ πρόνοιαν (i.e. in accordance with God's will), but not κατ' ἀνάγκην. (See Exc. VIII.) But 'the many' will not understand that. The only things they recognize or take into account are earthly things; and when they are told that these things are governed by εἰμαρμένη, they will infer that all things without exception, and therefore the actions of all men alike, are determined κατ' ἀνάγκην.

πρόνοιαν is irrelevant here, and impairs the force of the argument. It was doubtless inserted by some one who rightly thought that its addition would be needed for a complete statement of the Hermetic doctrine on the subject, but failed to see that an incomplete statement of it suits the context better. To be consistent, the interpolator ought also to have added πρόνοιας καὶ before εἰμαρμένη.

τολῆς δυνατῶν κείρων ἔσται, καταφρονήσαν μὲν τοῦ παντὸς ὡς γενητοῦ. It is bad to 'despise the universe'. See Ascl. Lat. III. 25, where the contemptus mundi of the Christians is denounced. Even the most pessimistic of the Hermetists, the writer of Corp. VI, admits that the Kosmos is good in one respect (τοῦτον τὸν τρότον ἀγαθὸν ὁ κόσμος, καθὰ... πάντα ποιεῖ, § 2 b), though in all other respects, he says, it is not good. The writer of Exc. XI holds that the higher part of the Kosmos is good, and the lower part of it alone is bad (sent. (18)).

But why should a man 'despise the universe' because he is told that it has come into being? The writer has not given his answer to that question; but it might perhaps be answered in some such way as this. The many have no conception of an incorporeal and

¹ The writer of Exc. VII probably said that the movements or operations of the heavenly bodies are determined by ἀνάγκῃ (πρόνοια καὶ ἀνάγκῃ MSS.); but that statement is exceptional.
supracosmic God, and would fail to understand any such notion if it were put before them. The highest religion of which they are capable is a worship of cosmic and corporeal gods (i.e. of the material universe in its several parts), a cult of Sun, Moon, and Stars in heaven, Mother Earth, and the gods or daemons identified with material things on earth. Such a religion is better than nothing, and may be enough to keep them from gross wickedness. They probably assume that the cosmic gods, or powers of nature, that they worship,—the highest beings that they know or can conceive,—are everlasting, and without beginning. If you tell one of ‘the many’ that these gods have had a beginning, he will infer that they are less worthy of worship than he had supposed; and as he cannot transfer his reverence to the supreme God who made them,—for of that God he knows nothing,—he will be in danger of losing such religion as he has, and sinking into sheer atheism.

The doctrine of Heimarmene, when not safeguarded by the Hermetic theory of man’s power to escape from subjection to Heimarmene (which is explained in Corp. IV, for instance, but which the many would fail to comprehend,) appears to annul the responsibility of the human agent.

Does this mean ‘in order that they may (continue to) be in ignorance, and so, may be less wicked (than they would be if they learnt the truth)?’ Or does it mean ‘in order that, since they are (and will in any case continue to be) without true knowledge, they may be less wicked (than they would be if they were told truths which they cannot understand)?’ Probably the latter. The many are in agnoia, i.e. without gnosis (cf. of of γνώσιν ὅτες), and will always be so, whether you talk to them or not. If you tell them truths, they will misunderstand them, and the truths will turn into pernicious falsehoods in their minds.

What is ‘the uncertain thing’ that the man is afraid of? How does his fear of it restrain him from wicked actions? And how will he be relieved of his fear if you talk to him? There is nothing in what has preceded to suggest an explanation. These words must have been added by a reader. The man who added them was probably thinking of some doctrine of penal suffering; but it is not clear what he meant.
EXCERPT XII

In the passages extracted by Stobaeus from 'The teachings of Hermes to Ammon' (viz. Excerpts XII–XVII, and probably XVIII and XIX also), there is no trace of dialogue; & "Aττίταν" occurs once, in Exc. XVII, but Ammon never speaks. It is possible therefore that the libelli from which these excerpts were taken were not dialogues, but epistles or treatises addressed by Hermes to Ammon. Cf. Corp. XIV, which is an epistle of Hermes to Asclepius, and Corp. XVI, which is a treatise written by Asclepius and addressed to Ammon.

§ I. πάντα δὲ γίνεται «ψύχη καὶ εἰμαρμένη». εἰμαρμένη cannot have been mentioned here; the Hermetist must have first spoken of Τρποβοια, the supreme or sovereign power of God, and then gone on to speak of the two other powers, ἄνάγκη and εἰμαρμένη, which he regards as subordinate to πρόνοια.

The words πάντα γίνεται φύσι would imply that there is a fourth power, called φύσις, which operates in the same sort of way as πρόνοια, ἄνάγκη, and εἰμαρμένη. But in what follows, these three powers alone are recognized; nothing more is said about φύσις, except in § 2 fin. (τῇ φύσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις), and there the word means, not a power which operates, but the world which is operated on. A satisfactory sense might be got by writing πάντα δὲ (κατὰ πρόνοιαν) γίνεται (τὰ) φύσι (γνώμενα). Inasmuch as ἄνάγκη and εἰμαρμένη are subject to πρόνοια, it might be said that 'all things', including those which result from ἄνάγκη and εἰμαρμένη, 'come to pass κατὰ πρόνοιαν'.

πρόνοια δὲ ἐστὶν αὐτοτελῆς λόγος τοῦ ἐπουρανίου θεοῦ. πρόνοια is called αὐτοτελῆς ('sovereign') in contrast to ἄνάγκη and εἰμαρμένη, which are not αὐτοτελεῖς.

λόγος probably means 'design', 'plan', or 'purpose'. God's λόγος is not actually personified here; but πρόνοια, to which λόγος stands as predicate, is in this excerpt, as often elsewhere, on the verge of personification, as are ἄνάγκη and εἰμαρμένη also.

ἐπουράνιος is usually nothing more than a synonym for οὐράνιος. But the writer probably meant here, not 'the God of heaven' (who would be a cosmic god), but 'the God who is above the corporeal heaven', i.e. the supracosmic God of the Platonists and Hermetists. If so, we must suppose either that he used ἐπουράνιον in that exceptional sense, or that he wrote ἐπουρανίου. (Cf. Exc. XXI. 2.)
The word οὐφράνως would be more fitly applied to the subordinate power Heirmarmene, who 'uses the stars as her instruments'.

ό�ο δὲ τούτου 'αὐτοφυεῖς δυνάμεις, ἀνάγκη καὶ εἰμαρμένη. Does τούτοι mean τοῦ θεοῦ, or τοῦ λόγου (= προνοιας)?

'αὐτοφυεῖς is a synonym of 'αὐτογέννητος, which means 'having no begetter other than itself', and is commonly used as equivalent to ἀγέννητος, 'without beginning'. To say that Necessity and Destiny are 'αὐτοφυεῖς would be inconsistent with saying that they are subordinate to Providence. 'αὐτοφυεῖς must therefore be rejected. It has probably been substituted by error for some other adjective, such as ὑπερτερικά. 'αὐτο- may have come from 'αὐτοτελής above.

καὶ ἣ μὲν ἀνάγκη ...') ἢ δὲ εἰμαρμένη κ.τ.λ. The Hermetist must have spoken of the two 'powers' in the order in which he had just named them; what he says about εἰμαρμένη must therefore have been preceded by a corresponding statement about ἀνάγκη. Stobaeus, who in this chapter of his Anthologium was collecting passages περὶ εἰμαρμένης καὶ ἀνάγκης, and not περὶ ἀνάγκης, may perhaps have intentionally omitted what the Hermetist here wrote about ἀνάγκη.

Now in the preceding chapter, (Anthol. 1. 4, περὶ ἀνάγκης), Stobaeus gives, as an extract from Hermes to Ammon, the detached sentence which I call Excerpt XIII. It seems probable that this is the very sentence which has been omitted in Excerpt XII. If we write here (καὶ ἡ μὲν) (Exc. XIII, ἀνάγκη ἕστι κρίσις βεβαια καὶ ἀμετάτρεπτος [δύναμις] προνοιας') ἢ δὲ εἰμαρμένη κ.τ.λ., we get just such a supplement as the context requires. The insertion of δύναμις in Exc. XIII, where it is clearly out of place, may, on this hypothesis, be accounted for by taking it to be a misplaced duplication of δυνάμεις, which occurs in the preceding sentence of Exc. XII.

ἳ δὲ εἰμαρμένη ὑπηρετεῖ προνοιὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη. This statement, as given in the MSS., seems to place Necessity on a level with Providence; but the author's view was rather that both Necessity and Destiny are subservient to Providence. We might either strike out καὶ ἀνάγκη, or alter it into καὶ ἀνάγκην.

§ 2. [οὕτω γὰρ εἰμαρμένην φυγεῖν τις δύναται, οὕτω φυλάζει ταῦταν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦτων δεινότητος.] This sentence interrupts the sequence of thought. If we cut it out, ὅπλον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. follows rightly on εἰμαρμένη ὑπηρετοῦσιν τι ἀστέρες. Its writer must have intended it to be read after τοῖς ἀνθρώποισι manner below; but it is probably a marginal note, and not a part of the original text. Its doctrine is Stoic, and differs from that which is usually taught by Hermetists when they
speak on this subject. We are told in other *Hermetica* that the man who attains to *gnosis* can and does ‘escape from Heimarmene’.

**EXCEPRT XIII**

See note on *Exc. XII. 1.*

**EXCEPRT XIV**

This passage appears to be a statement of the relations between *πρότωνα*, *ἀνάγκη*, and *εἰμαρμένη*; but the text is so corrupt that no continuous sense can be made out. We are told in *Exc. XII* that *ἀνάγκη* and *εἰμαρμένη* are subordinate to *πρότωνα*, which is the supreme power of God; and it is to be presumed that in this respect the writer of *Exc. XIV* agreed with the writer of *Exc. XII*.

An exposition of the relation between *πρότωνα* and *εἰμαρμένη*, as understood by a Platonist, is given by Boethius, *Philos. consol.* 4. 6: 'Omnium generatio rerum cunctusque mutabilium naturarum progressus et quidquid aliquo movetur modo, causas ordinem formas ex divinae mentis stabilitate sortitur. Haec in suae simplicitatis arce composita multiplicem regendis modum statuit: qui modus cum in ipsa divinae intellegentiae puritate conspicitur, providentia (i.e. *πρότωνα*) nominatur: cum vero ad ea quae movet atque disposuit reperitur, fatum (i.e. *εἰμαρμένη*) a veteribus appellatum est: quae diversa esse facile liquebit, si quis utrisque vim mente conspexerit. Nam providentia est ipsa illa divina ratio in summo omnium principi constituta quae cuncta disposuit: fatum vero inhaerens rebus mobilibus dispositio per quam providentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus. Providentia namque cuncta pariter quamvis diversa quamvis infinita complectitur, fatum vero singula digerit in motum locis formis ac temporibus distributa: ut haec temporalis ordinis explicatio, in divinae mentis adunata prospectu[m], providentia sit, eadem vero adunatio, digesta atque explicata temporibus, fatum vocetur. Quae licet diversa sint, alterum tamen pendet ex altero: ordo namque fatalis ex providentiae simplicitate procedit. Sicut enim artifex facienda rei formam mente praecipiens movet operis effectum, et quod simpliciter praesentariaque prospekerat, per temporales ordines ducit: ita deus providentia quidem singulariter stabiliterque facienda disposit, fatu vero haec ipsa quae disposuit multipliciter ac temporaliter administrat. Sive
igitur famulantibus quibusdam providentiae divinis spiritibus fatum exercetur, seu anima, seu tota inserviente natura, seu caelestibus siderum motibus, seu angelica virtute, seu daemonum varia sollertia, seu aliquis horum seu omnibus fatalis series textur: illud certe manifestum est, immobilem simplicemque gerendarum formam rerum esse providentiam, fatum vero eorum quae divina simplicitas gerenda dispositum mobilem nexum atque ordinem temporalem. Quo fit, ut omnia quae fato subsunt providentiae quoque subiecta sint, cui ipsum etiam subiectet fatum, quaedam vero quae sub providentia locata sunt fati seriem superent: ea vero sunt quae primae propinqua divinitati stabiliter fixa fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. . . . Quod longius a prima mente discedit, maioribus fati nexibus implicatur; ac tanto aliquid fato liberum est, quanto illum rerum cardinem vicinius petit. Quod si supernae mentis haeserit firmitati, motu carens, fati quoque supergregreditur necessitatem. Igitur uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus, ad punctum medium circulus: ita est fati series mobilis ad providentiae stabilem simplicitatem.

It appears from what remains of Exc. XIV that its writer, like Boethius, connected εἰμαρμένη (as opposed to πρόνοια) with κύνης; and he probably said that εἰμαρμένη is the cause of two different kinds of movement, viz. (1) the invariable movement of the stars in heaven, and (2) the alternating process of birth and destruction upon earth.

§ I. η μὲν διακρατοῦσα τὸν διὸν κόσμον πρόνοιαν ἠτιν. η δὲ 'συνέχουσα καὶ περιέχουσα' ἀνάγκη ἠτιν. The second clause must have contained something which stood in contrast to τὸν διὸν κόσμον ('the Kosmos as a whole') in the first clause. Perhaps, η δὲ (τὰ καθ ἐκαστὸν) συνέχουσα [ ] ἀνάγκη ἠτιν.

εἰμαρμένη δὲ δέχει καὶ περιάγει πάντα, κατ' ἀνάγκην (ἐνεργώσα (καταναγκάζουσα MSS.). δέχει is equivalent to κινεῖ; and περιάγει implies that the movement caused by Heimarmene is cyclic. In heaven, it takes the form of circular movement in space; on earth, it takes the form of a cyclic succession of births and deaths.

φῶς γὰρ ἦσθιν αἰτής (σα. τῆς εἰμαρμένης) τὸ ἀναγκάζει. Cf. 'fati necessitatem' in Boethius l. c.

[ἀνία γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ἡσιοῦ.] The process of γένεσις and φθορᾶ is the kind of movement which Destiny causes upon earth. But these words are out of place here; and it may be suspected that they originally stood after what is said about οἰδανός in § 2.
The γένεσις and φθορά which take place on earth result from the movement of the stars in heaven, and ought to be spoken of after that movement, not before it.

βλού is impossible. There is no need to qualify γενέσις καὶ φθοράς by adding a genitive. ζωῆς would be superfluous; and βίος is not used as a synonym of ζωῆ, except sometimes in early poetry.

§ 2. ο μὲν οὖν κόσμος τρότος ἔχει τὴν πρόνοιαν. τρότος, applied to the Kosmos, is unintelligible; and it seems probable that it has come from the following τρότος γὰρ. I propose ο μὲν οὖν κόσμος δὸς ἔχεται τῆς προνοίας (a repetition of what was said in § 1 init.). With this reading, 'the Kosmos as a whole' would stand in contrast to οὐρανός, which is a part of the Kosmos.

η δὲ πρόνοια (perhaps ἠ δὲ τῆς προνοίας ἐνέργεια) ἔχεται ἐν τῶ οὐρανῷ. ἔξαπλοθεία means explicari. Cf. Boethius l.c.: 'ut haec temporalis ordinis explicatio, in divinae mentis adunata prospectu[m], providentia sit, eadem vero adunatio, digesta atque explicata temporibus, fatum vocetur.' It is in the movement of the heavenly bodies that the unity of the eternal present is 'spread out' into temporal succession.

What the author probably meant might be more fully expressed by writing the passage thus: ο μὲν οὖν κόσμος δὸς ἔχεται τῆς προνοίας (perhaps ἠ δὲ τῆς προνοίας ἐνέργεια) ἔχεται ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ (πρὸ τῶν γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐνεργείας) (ὁ οὐρανὸς). The working of Providence issues from God (who is thought of as located in the boundless space above the Kosmos), and descends into the Kosmos. In the course of this descent, the first thing that meets it is the sphere of heaven (which is the highest or outermost part of the Kosmos); and it takes effect there in causing the unvarying movement of the stars. But secondarily, and by means of the stars (which are ὁπλον εἰμαρμένης, Exc. XII. 2), God's Providence operates on terrestrial things also.

οἷς θεὸς περὶ αὐτῶν (εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν) ὁρίζονται [καὶ κινοῦνται] ἀκάματον καὶ ἀπαντήτον κύριον ἔχοντες. The circling movement of the star-gods is ἀκάματος καὶ ἀπαντήτους; and as such, it is contrasted with the process of γένεσις and φθορά which takes place upon earth.

η μὲν πρόνοια (. . .) προνοεῖ. No sane writer can have thought his readers needed to be told that ἡ πρόνοια προνοεῖ. If προνοεῖ is sound, it must have been accompanied by some qualifying word or phrase; perhaps συμπάντων ὅμοιος προνοεῖ (cf. τὸν ὀλὸν κόσμον in § 1 init.).
EXCERPTS XIV: 2; XV: 1

It may be suspected that διαθέσεως is corrupt; either κινήσεως or διοικήσεως would seem more suitable. It might be said that Heimarmene is (in subordination to Providence) αἰτία τῆς τῶν ἄστρων κινήσεως; but she is αἰτία of another kind of κίνησις also, viz. the γένεσις and φθορὰ of earthly things, and that part of her action could hardly be ignored here. It is therefore probable that some words have been lost, and that the sentence ended with a statement that Heimarmene (τοῖς ἐπιγείοις) αἰτία ἐστὶ (γενέσις καὶ φθοράς διὰ) τῆς τῶν ἄστρων διαθέσεως (οὐ διοικήσεως).

But such a definition of πρόνοια is not in its right place here. It may have originally stood at the beginning of the Excerpt; or possibly it may have been taken from some other document, and appended by a transcriber.

EXCERPT XV

The doctrine of this Excerpt is Platonic in its essentials; the writer recognizes the supracosmic, and speaks of pre-existent souls. His embryology resembles that of Aristotle; but it is probable that the Aristotelian ingredient was transmitted to him by Stoic intermediaries. Compare Exc. XXII (from the Aphrodite of Hermes), in which a problem of embryology is discussed.

§ 1. κινεῖται δὲ τὸ κινούμενον κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς κινήσεως (φύσεως), τῆς κινούσης τοῦ πάν. The δὲ points back to something which has preceded. There may have been an opening passage in which τὸ κινούμενον was distinguished from τὸ ἀκόμητον, as in Exc. XI. 2 (i) as emended: πᾶντα τὰ σώματα κινεῖται μόνον τὸ ἀσώματον ἀκόμητον.

κινήσεως is evidently wrong; and as the name given to τὸ κινοῦν in the following sentence and in § 2 init. is ἡ φύσις, the word wanted here is φύσεως. For the same reason, I have inserted ἡ φύσις in § 4 fin. and in § 5.
As given in the MSS., this passage is meaningless. But a clue to the writer’s meaning is to be found in the following words: καὶ ἡ μὲν δεῖκει διὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου καὶ ἐντὸς συμφέρει, ἡ δὲ ‘παρέχει’ (ὑπερέχει;) καὶ ἐκτὸς περιέχει. Two entities are here distinguished and contrasted. One of them is cosmic, and the other supracosmic; the one permeates the universe, and the other transcends it. That is a distinction familiar to all Platonists; but there was much variation in the terms used to express it. In the Timaeus, the two are called ὁ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ and ὁ δημιουργός; they are named by Philo ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος and ὁ θεός, and by others, ψυχὴ (ὁ τοῦ παντός) and νοῦς.

The name employed by the writer of Exc. XV to denote the lower of the two,—the thing which pervades the Kosmos and moves all things in it,—is ἡ φύσις, a term commonly used in this sense by Aristotelians and Stoics. But what did he call the higher of the two, the supracosmic entity? He must have named it here; as he refers to it by a feminine pronoun (ἡ δὲ . . . ἐκτὸς περιέχει), the name he used must have been feminine; and as the phrase νοερὰ ὁσία occurs in § 9, it seems most likely that his name for it was ἡ νοερὰ ὁσία. The clause in which he spoke of it is lost; but it may be conjectured that he wrote something like ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις τῷ πάντει παρέχει κινήσεις, (ἡ δὲ νοερὰ ὁσία τῇ φύσις χορηγεῖ τῷ ἐνέργειαν.)

I can make no sense of these words. The person who wrote them appears to have been thinking of the Aristotelian antithesis between δυνάμεις, ‘potentially’, and ἐνέργεια, ‘actually’. But that antithesis is inapplicable here. The substantive which must be understood with μᾶν and ἐπάνω is κίνησις; and what could be meant by saying ‘Nature gives to the universe two movements, one of which is potential, and the other actual’? Even supposing that it were possible to make that distinction between two kinds of

1 The Stoics recognized only the first of the two, and ignored the second.
2 Some of the later Platonists (e.g. the writer of Corp. II) superimposed on these two a third entity, τὸ ἐνέργεια νοῦ; and to this third and highest entity Plotinus gave the names τὸ ἔν and τὸ ἐγκαθίστα. Whether the author of Exc. XV also recognized a third beyond and above the second, we do not know; but there is nothing to suggest it in the fragment of his writing which we have before us.
3 In Exc. VIII, ἡ νοητὴ ὁσία is used as an equivalent for δ νοῦ; and in Exc. XVII, XVIII, and XIX, ἡ νοητὴ ὁσία is used in the same sense.
EXCERPT XV: 2

cosmic movement, what could any such distinction have to do with the distinction between something cosmic and something supra-cosmic, which is spoken of in the following sentence? Moreover, the word ἐνέργεια has just been used to signify 'a working force', the sense which it usually bears in the Hermetica; and it is not likely that the same writer would use it in a different sense a few lines after.

Perhaps the text of the MSS. might be accounted for as follows. The clause ἦ δὲ νοερὰ οὕσια κ.τ.λ. was accidentally omitted; and the following words (καὶ ἦ μὲν δεῖξει . . . , ἦ δὲ . . . οὕτως περεῖξει) thereby became unintelligible. A reader, finding nothing else to which ἦ μὲν and ἦ δὲ could refer, assumed that they must refer to two different kinds of κινήσεις; and trying to think of some way of dividing κινήσεις into two classes, he chanced to hit on the Aristotelian distinction between τὰ δύναμει δὴντα and τὰ ἐνέργειά ὡστα, and accordingly inserted the words μὰν μὲν τὴν κατὰ δύναμιν, ἑτέρων δὲ τὴν κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν.²

αὐτῆς must have got in through some subsequent error. If the writer had wished to say 'according to the δύναμις of φύσις' (whatever that may mean), he would have written, not κατὰ δύναμιν αὐτῆς, but κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς.

[καὶ διὰ πάντων πειροίκηκασι κοινῇ.] These words, as written in the MSS., can only mean that both the thing which pervades the universe (δείχει διὰ τὸν σύμπτωτος κόσμου), and the other thing which is contrasted with it, alike pervade the universe. But that is absurd. If we write πειροίκηκις instead of πειροίκηκασι, the phrase fits in well at the place to which I have transposed it. Possibly -και and κοινῇ are two different corruptions of -κις.

§ 2. σπέροσα μὲν (εἰς θνη) τὰ ταυτῆς σπέρματα (γένεσις). Cf. Exc. IX. I as emended: τὸ σπέρμα οὖν τῆς γενέσεως ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ λαβοῦσα γέγονε (ἐκ ἦ ὕλη). It is possible that the author of

1 It might perhaps be said that the movement of the element fire is κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, and that of the element water is κατὰ δύναμιν, inasmuch as fire is active, and water passive (τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ πάσχει, § 2). But if the words had been meant to refer to that distinction, it would have been necessary for the writer to explain his meaning more fully; he could not expect his readers to anticipate in § 1 what they are first told in § 2.

2 In the phrase which I have written to express the probable meaning of the lost clause, the last word happens to be ἐνέργειαν (used in the Hermetic sense, not the Aristotelian). Supposing that this word remained when the rest of the clause was lost, and that the interpolator consequently found in the text before him a lacuna followed by ἐνέργειαν, that may have suggested to him the supplement which he inserted.
Exc. XV used a similar phrase, and wrote τὰ ὁπέρματα τῆς γενέσεως. That would account for the meaningless word γένεσις, which we must otherwise suppose to be a remnant either of a lost clause (e.g. καὶ κινούσα αὐτὴν εἰς γένεσιν), or of a marginal summary of the paragraph.

κινούμενη δὲ θερμαίνεται (καὶ φύκεται ἢ) ἡ (ὅλη), καὶ γίγνεται [ἐπὶ] πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ. Ὁλη is in itself ἀμορφος or ἄπωσος; but φύσις imposes on it (i.e. on different portions of it) two opposite ‘forms’ or qualities, that of heat and that of coldness. Ἡλη, when the quality of heat is imposed on it, becomes fire;1 when the quality of coldness is imposed on it, it becomes water. The word κίνησις, as applied to the action of φύσις on Ὁλη by which fire and water are brought into being, means ‘change’ (ἀλλοίωσις) rather than ‘movement’ (κίνησις κατὰ τόκον).

πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, τὸ μὲν σθεναρὸν καὶ ἱσχυρὸν, (τὸ δὲ ἁρμαξός, καὶ τὸ μὲν ποιοῦ,) τὸ δὲ πάρχον. Fire is the active element, and water the passive element. See note on Corp. I. 17.

καὶ ἐγένετο ἡ γῆ [ὁ χοιμνήτης ἐπὶ τοῦ ὅθατος)]. It is contrary to common sense to say that earth ‘is carried on water’, i.e. rests or floats on water. If you place earth on water, it does not float, but sinks. The relative positions of these two elements might be described by saying either that water rests on earth (sea and sea-bottom), or that water and earth lie side by side (sea and land). A satisfactory sense can be got by shifting this phrase to the following sentence, and writing there ἐγένετο ἄηρ, ἡ (ὁ χοιμνήτης ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ ὅθατος;) Air comes into being as an exhalation given off by earth and water; and having come into being, it rests on the two elements out of which it has arisen; that is, the atmosphere lies above land and sea.

περιθηραιομένων (-μένω MSS.) δὲ (τοῦτων), ἀτμός ἐγένετο ὅκ [τῶν τριῶν] τοῦ τοῦ ὅθατος (καὶ) τῆς γῆς [καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς], καὶ ἐγένετο ἄηρ. Fire and water having been produced, the heat of the fire (which is presumably situated above the water) transforms some of the water into earth. At this stage, we have fire above, water and earth below. The heating action of the fire now takes effect both on the water and on the earth, and causes a vapour to rise from them; this vapour is the air.

The part assigned to the fire must have been that of heating the earth and the water, and thereby causing them to emit vapour, not that of emitting vapour from itself. I have therefore bracketed τῶν τριῶν and καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς. The Stoics spoke of ἀναθημάτων which rise from earth and water; but no one spoke of ἀναθημάτων which issue from fire.

In speaking of the formation of fire and water, the writer uses the present tense (γίγνεται), which might seem to imply that the process is continually going on. But in speaking of the formation of earth and air, he uses the past tense (γένετο). His view therefore appears to be that the Kosmos γέγονεν, and that the elements came into being once for all; and if so, γίγνεται must be taken as a historic present, i.e. as equivalent to γένετο. He probably held, like most men of his time, that, having once come into being, the elements are continually transmuted into one another; but in this passage he says nothing about their continual transmutation.

With this cosmogonia should be compared those of Corp. I and Corp. III, in which the formation of the elements is differently described. The author of Exc. XV has not been influenced by the first chapter of Genesis, as the writers of those libelli were.

§ 3. ταύτα (δὲ) συνήλθε κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρμονίας λόγον, θερμὸν ψυχρὸν, ἐπὶ δὲ ὄγρων. ἡ ἀρμονία apparently means ‘the structure of the Kosmos’. In § 5, the same term is used to signify the structure of the human or animal body (which is a microcosm). In Corp. I, ἡ ἀρμονία means ‘the structure of the heavens’.

ὁ λόγος τῆς ἀρμονίας must be taken to mean ‘the plan or design according to which the universe is constructed’. If the phrase were used by some one who was speaking of a personal Demiurgus, it would mean the plan which the Builder of the universe had in his mind when he began to construct it. The elements combine together in such a way as to carry out this plan or design.

θερμότης, ψυχρότης, ὑγρότης and ἔσχος are the four primary qualities of matter. The Stoics said that fire is τὸ θερμὸν, air τὸ ψυχρὸν, water τὸ ὕγρον, and earth τὸ ἔσχος (Diog. Laert. 7. 137). Aristotle connected the elements with the four primary qualities in

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a different and more complicated way; according to him, fire is θερμῶν καὶ ἔθρον, air is θερμῶν καὶ ὕπρον,1 water is ψυχρῶν καὶ ὕπρον, and earth is ψυχρῶν καὶ ἔθρον (Ar. Gen. et corr. 2. 3, 330 b 3). It is to be inferred from what is said in Exc. XV. 2 about the formation of fire, water, and earth, that the author of this Hermeticum agreed with the Stoics in assigning one of the primary qualities only to each of the four elements, and in holding fire to be τὸ θερμῶν, and earth to be τὸ ἔθρον; but if I am right in inserting καὶ ὕπρον, he must have made water, not air, τὸ ψυχρῶν, and consequently air, not water, τὸ ὕπρον. It would be possible to write θερμαίνεται (καὶ ὑγραίνεται) instead of θερμαίνεται (καὶ ψυχραίνεται); but it seems more likely that the two opposite qualities of heat and coldness were spoken of together.

καὶ ἐκ τῆς συμπνοίας τούτων ἐγένετο (τὰ σύνθετα σώματα (?). . . ). In a lost passage which followed these words, the writer must have spoken of the first formation of (plants?), beasts, and men. In § 4, we find him speaking of the process by which existing beasts and men generate others of their kind. His account of reproduction resembles in some respects that given by Aristotle in his De gen. an.

§ 4. (... ἐστι δ' ἐν τῷ τῶν ἔθρον σπέρματι (?)) πνεῦμα [καὶ σπέρμα] ἀνάλογον τῷ περιέχοντι πνεῦματι. πνεῦμα is air mixed with fire, or warmed air.3 τὸ περιέχον πνεῦμα is the atmosphere, regarded as air permeated by the heat infused into it from the region of fire which lies above it, or more simply, air warmed by the heat of the sun. The atmospheric pneuma was held to be the life-breath (i.e. the material vehicle of life) of that great ζῷον, the Kosmos, and the ὅργανον by means of which life is conveyed into individual ζῷα upon earth. (See Ascl. Lat. III. 17 a.) This conception of the cosmic pneuma was elaborated by the Stoics out of earlier physical theories.

There is in the individual ζῷον a pneuma analogous to the cosmic pneuma, of which it is a detached portion; and this individual pneuma is the material vehicle of the individual's life. The semen genitale, being a part of the father's living body, contains a portion of his pneuma; and that portion of pneuma, in virtue of the vital force residing in it, is the source or germ of the life of the new

1 ὕπρον, when applied to air, means 'fluid', or 'yielding to pressure', rather than 'moist'. Air is more ὕπρον, in that sense of the word, than water.

3 See Arnim, Sto.vet. fr. II, §§ 439–446. Ar. Di gen. an. 2. 2, 736 a 1: τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα (sc. the pneuma in the semen) ἐστι θερμὸς ἄηρ.
organism which is brought into being by procreation. The 'pneuma in the semen' is spoken of by Aristotle, De gen. an. 2. 3, 736 b 33: 

οδὲ ἡμεῖς ἐν τῷ σπέρματι ἐνυπάρχει, ἵπτεν τοις γόνιμοι ἐμίλαι τὰ σπέρματα, τὸ καλοῦμενον θερμὸν. τὸν δ' οὖθ' οὐ πῦρ οὐδὲ τοιαύτη δύναμις ἔστων, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενον ἐν τῷ σπέρματι... πνεῦμα, καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι φύσις, ἀνάλογον ὅσον τὸ τῶν ἀστρῶν στοιχεῖον. ¹

οδὲ ἡμεῖς ἐν τῷ σπέρματι. The words ἐν τῷ σπέρματι are out of place here, but probably occurred in the lost part of the first sentence of § 4.

If the text is sound, the writer says that the matter on which the pneuma works, and which it develops into a foetus, is the semen. But if so, there would be no point in ἐν τῷ μήτραν ἐμπεσον; for the pneuma, being in the semen from the first, might just as well begin its work on it without waiting till it had entered the μήτρα. It is therefore probable that in this respect the writer agreed with Aristotle, who says that the ἄλη worked on is supplied by the female.⁵ If so, τὸ σπέρμα must have been substituted by error for something equivalent to τὸ περίττωμα τὸ τοῦ θήλεος, the term used in Ar. De gen. an.⁶

ἐπὶ τῷ μεγάλῳ δὲ ἐπιστᾶται σχῆμα (εἰδωλον ἐπιστᾶται σχήματος MSS.). The insertion of εἰδωλον here, and the alteration of εἰδωλον into εἰδωλοποιεῖται, must have resulted from some misunderstanding on the part of a transcriber; but what he supposed the words to mean, I cannot guess.

ίστα (ἐξείται MSS.) δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ σχήματι (προσδέχεται) τῷ εἴδος. What is the difference between τὸ σχῆμα and τὸ εἴδος? Probably τὸ σχῆμα is the shape of the embryo at a time when it does not yet

1 These last words imply that 'the pneuma which is in the semen' contains something which is not composed of any of the four sublunar elements, but is analogous to the 'fifth substance' of which the heavens consist. But that is a distinctively Aristotelian notion, and no trace of it appears in Exe. XV. 4, the immediate sources of which must have been Stoic rather than Aristotelian.

Zeller, Arist. Eng. tr. II, p. 6, says that Aristotle 'is wholly unable to give any clear account of the qualities of the thing of which he speaks in that passage, or to harmonize this conception with the general teaching of the Physics'.

⁵ Ar. De gen. an. 2. 3, 737 a 20: the semen, ὅταν ἄληθεν ἐς τὴν ὑποκάτω, συνάστησι καὶ κατεὶ τὸ περίττωμα τὸ τοῦ θήλεος. ⁶ Ar. De gen. an. 2. 4, 738 b 20: παρέξω τῷ μὲν θηλεῖ τὴν ἄληθ, τῷ δ' ἀρνεῖ τὸ ἑμμοργῶν. Zeller, Arist. Eng. tr. II, p. 50: 'Aristotle denies any participation on the part of the male seed in the material composition of the embryo, declaring that it only communicates the necessary impulse to the substance derived from the female.'
resemble any living animal, and τὸ εἴδος is the form distinctive of this or that particular species of animals. The writer distinguishes three successive stages in the development of the foetus. In the first stage, it increases in bulk, but remains a semi-liquid or plastic mass, without any fixed or definite shape (σχῆμα). In the second stage, it assumes a certain shape, but not a specific shape; at this stage, a human embryo and that of a sheep would be indistinguishable. In the third stage, it acquires the distinctive shape of a certain species (εἴδος); one can see that it is a human being, or that it is a sheep. Cf. Ar. De gen. an. 2. 3, 736 b 2: οὐ γὰρ ἀμα γίνεται ζῷον καὶ ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε ζῷον καὶ ἄμωσ, ὥμοιος δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἕστερον γὰρ γίνεται τὸ τέλος, τὸ δὲ ίδιον ἢστι τὸ ἑκάστον τῆς γενέσεως τέλος. I.e. there is a stage at which it can be said that the foetus is a ζῷον, but not that it is a ζῷον of this or that species. That which Aristotle there calls τὸ ίδιον, the Hermetist calls τὸ εἴδος.

ὁχείται, the reading of the MSS., is hardly possible. It may be conjectured that the author wrote ἐίτα ... προσδέχεται, or something of the sort, and that ὁχείται has resulted from a mixture of εἴτα with the verb.

〈(τὸ δ' ἐν τῇ νηδώ ... εἰς τὸν ἔχων ἀδέα ἄγει.)〉 If this sentence occurred at all in the original text, it must have stood at the end of § 4. The development of the foetus is followed by the birth. The missing subject of the verbs must be ἡ φύσις, which τῷ παντὶ παρέχει κινήσεις (§ 1). It cannot be the pneuma which has been working in the foetus; for the pneuma works only within the organism to which it belongs, and has no power to change the relations between that organism and other bodies.

ἀρθμοῖς λοχεύει καὶ μασσάται. ἀρθμοῖς, ‘by numberings’, must mean ‘according to fixed measurements of time’. In the case of the human foetus, for instance, the ἀρθμός would be nine months. But possibly ἀρθμοῖς may be a corruption of some more easily intelligible phrase to the same effect.

§ 5. τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ εἴχεν ἐν τῇ νηδώ τὴν ζωτικήν κίνησιν, τὴν δὲ βλαστικήν (βλαστικήν MSS.) (μόην). βλαστικός is equivalent to θεριστικός, the word used by Aristotle in similar connexions. The only life which the foetus possesses is that of a vegetable, and its only movement is that of vegetable growth. ζωτική κίνησις is the movement of an animal (ζωών) as opposed to a vegetable; and animal life begins at birth.

καὶ [ταύτην] (ψυχήν προσήμοσθεν (ἡ φύσις τῇ) ἀρμονία, ὑποδοχήν οὖσαν
The meaning of this passage as originally written, if not the exact words, can be inferred with confidence from the context. The πνεύμα gives only vegetable life and movement to the organism to which it belongs; the ψυχή gives animal life and movement. Animal life begins at birth; and accordingly, it is at birth that a ψυχή is added to the organism. The words which I have transposed from § 7 (παρευσάρχει γὰρ τῷ πνεύματι (ἡ ψυχή) καὶ κυνεί ζωτικός) supply precisely the addition which is wanted here to make the meaning clear.

διανοητικής cannot be right; for a mention of διάνοια, which is the characteristic of adult men as opposed to young children and the lower animals, would be out of place at this stage. We may suppose that ἐνεργείας or some other substantive was omitted after ζωτικής; that ζωτικής was then altered into ζώης; and that a transcriber, seeing that some qualification of ζώης was needed, but misunderstanding the writer’s distinctions, wrongly inserted διανοητικής.

In his view of the successive grades of life, the Hermetist agrees in the main with Aristotle; but he differs from him in his application of the word ψυχή. He says that there is no ψυχή until birth, and that the growth of the foetus is a function of the ῥυγμα alone; whereas Aristotle says that the unborn foetus already has a ψυχή θρεπτική. Ar. De gen. an. 2. 3, 736 a 31: πότερον ἐνυπάρχει (ψυχή) τῷ σπέρματι καὶ τῷ κυμάτι ή ὧν...; οὔτε γάρ ὡς ἀγνωστῶν ἀν θείη τις τὸ κύμα κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐστερημένον ζώης, οἰδὲν γάρ ἢππον τὰ τε σπέρματα καὶ τὰ κυμάτα τῶν ζῴων ἐξ ὤν τῶν φυτῶν,1 καὶ γόνιμα μέχρι τυφλός ἑστών. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὴν θρεπτικὴν ἔχουσι ψυχήν, φαινόμενον... προώντα δὲ καὶ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν (ἔχουσι ψυχήν), καθ’ ἢν ζωήν.2... πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἀπαντᾷ δοκεῖ ζῆν τὰ τούτων φυτῶν βίον, ἐπομένως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς λεκτέον ψυχῆς καὶ περὶ τῆς νοητικῆς.

The writer of Exc. XV agrees with the Stoics against Aristotle in saying that the ψυχή first presents itself in the organism at birth; but he shows himself a Platonist, and not a Stoic, in saying that at the moment of birth a pre-existent (and presumably incorporeal) ψυχή enters into the organism from without,3 whereas the Stoics said that the ψυχή (which they held to be a corporeal thing) comes into

1 'Embryos are no less alive than plants.' The Hermetist would have expressed this by saying that they have ἀληθικὴν κίνησιν.
2 The αἰσθητική ψυχή of Aristotle corresponds to the ζωτική κίνησις of the Hermetist.
3 Aristotle, De gen. an. 2. 3, 736 b 27, says τὸν τούς μὸνον θύραβαν ἱππασίναι, καὶ θείον εἶναι μόνον' οἴδεν γὰρ αὐτῶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴν ἱππαρχία.
existence at birth, being a modified form of the corporeal pneuma which was already present in the foetus.

§ 6. καὶ ἡ ἐγγυτάτω παροῦσα ψυχή προσοικειοῦται—(καὶ ἐγγυτάτω ψυχή οἶδα οἰκειοῦται MSS.) If a pre-existent ψυχή enters the body at birth, how is it determined which of the innumerable unembodied ψυχαί is to do so? The writer's answer to this question appears to have been that the ψυχή which enters the body is that ψυχή which is nearest at hand (hovering in the adjacent air?) at the moment of birth; and that it is there at the right moment, not (as some people mistakenly suppose) because of any kinship or resemblance between it and the body it is about to enter, but because it has been assigned to this body by Heimarmene.

οὖν κατὰ τὴν συγγενικὴν οὐσίότητα (ἰδιότητα R) (παραγενεμένη), ἄλλα [τὴν] καθ' εἰμαρμένην. οὐσίότητα, the reading of F, may be a corruption of ὁμοιότητα, or of οἰκειότητα (cf. κατὰ συγγενικὴν οἰκειότητα in Exc. XVI. 4). It would be possible to write οὖν κατὰ [τὴν] συγγενικὴν οἰκειότητα, ‘not on the ground of a relationship which has to do with kinship’; but it is perhaps more likely that the original reading was οὖν κατὰ συγγένειαν, and that οἰκειότητα or ὁμοιότητα was written as an alternative for συγγένειαν. At any rate, οὖν κατὰ συγγένειαν would serve to express what the author probably meant.

οὖ γάρ ἔρως (ἐρώτων MSS.) ἐστὶν αὐτῆ (τοῦ) μετὰ σώματος εἶναι. Some Platonists said that the soul is drawn down into the body by its own morbid desire for bodily things. But the writer of Exc. XV rejects that view, and holds that the soul has no choice in the matter; its incarnation is determined for it by Heimarmene.

§ 7. (ἡ δὲ φύσις ζωτικὸς ἡδη κινομένη (?) παρέχει τῷ γενομένῳ (γενομένῳ MSS.) διανοητικὴν κύριαν. διάνοια is this writer's name for what is often called λόγος, viz. the mental function by the possession of which man is distinguished from τὰ ἄλογα ζώα. All that the Hermetist has hitherto said about the development of the living organism applies to men and beasts alike; but he now goes on to speak of the further development which is peculiar to men. The διανοητικὴ κύριαν begins, not at birth, (for a new-born baby has no διάνοια,) but after some years of life,—perhaps at adolescence. (Cf. Exc. III. 5 as emended: τινὰς μὲν (τῶν ἐνεργειῶν) ἀμα τῷ γενέσθαι τὸν ἀνθρώπον παραγίγνονται, . . . αἱ δὲ καθαρότεραι ἐνέργειαι κατὰ μεταβολὴν τῆς ἥλικιας, κ.τ.λ.) But it is present in all adult men. The agent to whose operation the writer attributed its presence was doubtless ἡ φύσις.
EXCERPTS XV: 6, 7; XVI: 1

The νοερά οὐσία is the νοῦς (in the higher and more restricted sense of that term), which is conferred on a few men only. It is an ἀπόσπασμα or ἀπόρροια of the divine νοῦς (Corp. XII. i init.), and is bestowed, not by cosmic Nature, but by the immediate action of the supracosmic God. The few who receive it are thereby raised above the Kosmos, and become θεῖοι, or even θεοί.

((τορις ου-ρτ)δ/τ)επισκοι ως ριχταυρις.)) In the MSS., this sentence is placed in § 5; and in that position, αὕτη would mean, according to the traditional text of § 5, ἡ διανοητικὴ ζωή, and according to my emendation of it, ἡ ζωικὴ ἐνέργεια ὑπ’ κίνησις. But neither of these things is ἀμεταβλητος. The only thing in man that is exempt from ἀληθινός is ὁ νοῦς; this sentence must therefore have followed the mention of νοερά οὐσία in § 7. It is just because ὁ νοῦς is ἀμεταβλητος, that in speaking of it the writer uses the word οὐσία, and not κίνησις. His series is βλαστική κίνησις, ζωική κίνησις, διανοητικὴ κίνησις, νοερά οὐσία.

EXCERPT XVI

In § 1, the writer is speaking of ψυχή; in §§ 2-5, he is speaking of σῶμα, and of certain things (τόπος, χρόνος, and φυσικὴ κίνησις) which are connected with σῶμα. In the last sentence of § 6, ψυχὴ is spoken of again.

§ 1. (ἡ) ψυχὴ τοῖνοι οὐσία ἦσαν ἀσώματος. The soul is an οὐσία (a ‘substance’, i.e. a thing which exists independently), and not a mere attribute of some οὐσία (e.g. of the body).

But there are οὐσίαι of different kinds. Bodies also are οὐσίαι; but the soul is οὐσία ἀσώματος, ‘an incorporeal substance’. The word ἀσώματος is here equivalent to νοητή. Cf. Exc. XXI. 1: ἡ οὐσιώτης, [ἡ] καθόλου λεγομένη, κοινή (ἐστὶ τῶν) νοητῶν (καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν?). . . . (ἡ δὲ) φύσις (i.e. the corporeal world) οὐσία αἰσθητή, ἔχουσα εἰν ἑαυτῇ (τὰ) αἰσθητὰ πάντα.

καὶ ἐν σώματι δὲ οὐσία οὐκ ἐκβαίνει τῆς ἴδιας οὐσιώτητος. There are unembodied souls; and even when a soul is embodied, it still continues to be an οὐσία ἀσώματος, as it was before.

τυγχάνει γὰρ οὕσι ἀἰσθητὸς κατὰ νόησιν αὐτοκίνητος. I propose to read τυγχάνει γὰρ οὕσι αὐτοκίνητος, κατ’ οὐσίαν νοητὴν κινουμένη. (If this conjecture is right, αὐτοκίνητος has been repeated
by error after νοσήμα (νόσου MSS.), and has been altered into ἀκύντησος (P) and ἀεικύντησος (F) after ὁδὸς. See § 6 fin., where I read ἢ κατ’ ὁδόις νοσήμα κίνησις. Cf. Exc. XIX. 3: δύο τοίνυν εἰσίν ξωάλ καὶ δύο κυνήσεις, μέν μὲν ἢ κατ’ ὁδόις, ἐτέρα δὲ ἢ κατὰ φύσιν. (The ὁσία of Exc. XIX is ἀσώματος or νοσήμα ὁσία.)

The writer of Exc. XVI holds that 'there are two different kinds of ὁσία, and in correspondence with them, two different kinds of κίνησις. The movement of bodies is called by him ἡ φυσική κίνησις (§ 5) and ἡ κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις (§ 3); and the sort of movement that is appropriate to an ἀσώματος ὁσία might very well be called by him ἢ κατ’ ὁδόις νοσήμα κίνησις.

Compare Aetius, Diels, Doxogr. p. 387: ὁδὸν πάντας . . . ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑποστίθεται, φύσιν (‘a thing’) λέγοντες αὐτοκύντησον καὶ ὁδόις νοσήμα. Perhaps we ought to read there φύσιν λέγοντες αὐτοκύντησον, κατ’ ὁδόις νοσήμα (κινουμένη;?): 'saying that the soul is a thing which is self-moved, being moved in the manner of an ὁσία νοσήμα.'

Both ἀεικύντησος (which is used in Pl. Phaedr. 245 c) and αὐτοκύντησος (which is not used by Plato, but was suggested by the same passage in the Phaedrus) were habitually applied to the soul by Platonists. Cf. Aetius, Diels, Doxogr. p. 386 (quoted in note on Exc. IV A. 4).

οὐκ ἐν τινὶ ἑνομηνὴ (ὁδοῖ;?), οὐ πρὸς τι, οὐχ(χ;) ἐνεκέν τινος. οὐκ ἐν τινὶ seems inconsistent with καὶ ἐν σώματι δὲ ὁδός above, which implies that a soul sometimes is 'in something'. But the words might perhaps be understood as an expansion of the statement that the soul is an ὁσία. 'It does not exist (merely) in something, &c.'

[Since the soul has been defined as αὐτοκύντησος, the writer might proceed to deny that it is moved in something, i.e. has its motion from without. This is one of the senses of ἐν discussed in Ar. Phys. 4. 3: καὶ ἄλος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κυνηγεῖ;]

§ 2. 'τὸ ἐν τινὶ τοίνυν ἐστὶν' δ τόπος καὶ (δ;) χρόνος 'καὶ φύσις'. This section appears to be meant for an explanation of the words ἐν τινὶ, πρὸς τι, καὶ ἑνεκέν τινος in § 1; but as given in the MSS., it is unintelligible.

It would be possible to make sense of the first clause of it by writing τὸ ἐν τινὶ, and taking this to mean 'the answer to the question "in what?"'. We might then translate 'That in which things are is place and time'; and καὶ φύσις might be a remnant of something like (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ) ἡ φυσική κίνησις, 'physical movement
EXCERPT XVI: 2

is in place and time’. But if ἐν τίνι were written here, πρὸς τι in the following clause could hardly be retained, and we should have to assume that τὸ δὲ πρὸς τι... σχῆμα is an interpolation,—which seems probable on other grounds also. [See Addenda in vol. iv.]

Perhaps a nearer approach to the original reading might be made by writing τὸ δὲ πρὸς τι, οἷον ἀρμονία κ.τ.λ.: ‘by “that which exists merely in relation to something” I mean, for instance, ἀρμονία’ &c.

The word ἀρμονία occurs again in § 3 and in § 6; but in both those places, there is reason to bracket the phrase in which it occurs. There is no other mention of εἴδος or σχῆμα in this Excerpt.

It may be suspected that the man who wrote these words was thinking of the doctrine that the soul is a ἀρμονία; and the argument implied may perhaps have been to this effect: ‘a ἀρμονία is πρὸς τι (a coadjustment of things), not οὐσία; but the soul is οὐσία, not πρὸς τι; therefore the soul cannot be a ἀρμονία.’

The doctrine that the soul is a ἀρμονία is discussed and rejected in Pl. Phaedo 86 a–d and 91 c–94 e; and it is there presented in two different forms, viz. (1) that the soul is to the body as the ἀρμονία of a lyre (i.e. the coadjustment or tuning of its strings) is to the lyre, and (2) that the soul is a ἀρμονία or κράσις (i.e. a coadjustment or ‘contemperation’) of the elements (τὸ θερμὸν, τὸ ψυχρόν, τὸ ξηρόν, τὸ ύγρόν) of which the body is composed. In either form alike, it implies that the soul is not an οὐσία, but is dependent on the body for its existence, and that it ceases to exist at death.

Aristotle, De an. 1. 4, 407 b 27 sqq., speaks of the doctrine that the soul is a ἀρμονία, and says it is a δόξα πιθανῆ πολλῶς. This doctrine was asserted by Aristoxenus, who took the word ἀρμονία in its musical sense (Cic. Tusc. 1. 10. 20); and by Dicaearchus, who took it in the other sense (Aetius, Diels, Doxogr. p. 387: Δικαίορχος (ἐφι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐναι) ἀρμονίαν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων). It is discussed and rejected by Lucretius, 3. 98 sqq. Macrobius, Somn. Scip. 1. 14. 19, says ‘Pythagoras et Philolaus (dixerunt animam esse) harmoniam’; but there appears to be no earlier evidence that the doctrine was of Pythagorean origin; and it is inconsistent with the Pythagorean belief in the existence of disembodied souls.

Aristotelians might say that the soul is the εἴδος of the living body. (Arist. Fragm. 42, 1482 b 37: εἴδος τι ἡ ψυχή. W. D. Ross,
Aristotle, 1923, p. 134: 'Animate bodies . . . are individual independent substances concrete of matter and form. In this concrete unity, . . . body plays the part of matter or possessor of attributes, and soul that of form or essential attribute.') That might possibly account for the mention of ἔδος in this clause, if we assume that the writer knew the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul and rejected it, as he rejected the ἄρμονία-doctrine. But I do not know that it was ever said that the soul is a σφήμα.


What are 'these things' (ταῦτα)? They appear to be the three things which, in the preceding clause, were said to be ἕνεκα σώματος; namely, χρόνος, τότος, and φυσικὴ κίνησις). But the following sentence, ἀμήχανον γὰρ κ.τ.λ., does not fit on well to this statement; and we get a better connexion if we cut out ταῦτα δὲ . . . κοινωνεῖ ἄλληλοις (as well as ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ σῶμα ἰδεῖτο τόπου) and make ἀμήχανον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. follow immediately on ἕνεκα γὰρ σώματος καὶ χρόνος καὶ τότος καὶ φυσικὴ κίνησις, which it seems intended to explain.

[ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ σῶμα ἰδεῖτο τόπου] . . . [καὶ μεταβάλλειται φυσικῇ (κινήσει)]. These misplaced phrases may perhaps be fragments of a sentence which followed at the end of § 3.


ἀδύνατον δὲ μεταβολὴν (σώματος) ἐλναι ἂνευ χρόνου. It is necessary to add σώματος. Soul, as well as body, is subject to μεταβολὴ; but the writer is here speaking of body only, and not of soul. Cf. ταῖς τοῦ σώματος μεταβολὰσ in § 4.

[οὔτε σῶματος οἷον τῇ σύστασιν ἐλναι ἂνευ ἄρμονίας.] This is doubtless a later addition. If it was to be said at all, it could have been said better in two words, by adding καὶ ἄρμονίας after ἀμήχανον γὰρ συντήναι σῶμα (= σώματος σύστασιν ἐλναι) ἂνευ τόπου.

§ 4. Ἐνεκα τοῦ τούτου τοῦ σώματος ἐστιν ο τότος. τότος, 'place', means the space which is occupied by body. But what is meant by saying that place exists 'for the sake of' body? The word ἐνεκα (in its primary sense at least) implies a purpose; and a purpose implies some one who purposes. This statement therefore, if we give the words their full significance, would seem to imply that the Creator first said to himself 'I will make body', and then added 'in order
that I may do so, I must first make a space for the body to occupy'.

But the writer was probably not here thinking of a personal Creator;
and perhaps he meant merely that body could not exist if there were
not a place for it. If so, the same thought is expressed in a different
way by the phrase ῥὸν σῶμα ἔδειστο τότου in § 3; 'body was in need of
place (in order that it might exist).'

Thus the writer apparently holds to be τότος, i.e. the space which the
body occupies. Thus he assigns to τότος the function which, in the
Timaeus, is assigned to the ὑποδοχή, and which, after Plato's time,
was commonly assigned to ὑλή. This notion may have been
suggested to the Hermetist by Pl. Tim. 52 a, where the ὑποδοχή is
identified with χώρα. Cf. Ar. Phys. 4. 2, 209 b 11: τὸ καὶ Πλάτων
τῆν ὑλήν καὶ τῆν χώραν ταύτῳ φθορᾶν εἶναι ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ.

It might be objected that one of the kinds of change to which
bodies are subject is motion from one place to another, and that
when a body is in motion, τότος does not, with respect to that
body, persist unchanged, and therefore cannot 'save the body from
destruction'. The writer ignores this difficulty; he seems to be
thinking only of a body which remains in the same place throughout
the series of changes to which it is subjected.

The ξῆς of a
body is the sum of the qualities which it manifests at a given
moment. When a body changes, it loses the ξῆς which it had
before, and receives another ξῆς instead; but it still remains
a body.

What has just been said is
here repeated in other words, άδοθεσίς being used as a synonym for
ξῆς. The repetition is superfluous; and there is no apparent reason
for writing κατὰ άδοθεσίς and ἤ δὲ ποιὰ άδοθεσίς instead of καθ' ξῆς and
ἤ δὲ ποιὰ ξῆς. It may therefore be suspected that τὸ σῶμα τοῖνυν . . .
οὐ μένει is a parallel passage appended in the margin.

§ 5. (ἔνεκα) σῶματος τοῖνυν δ' τότος καὶ δ' χρόνος καὶ ἡ φυσική κίνησις.
This has already been asserted in § 3 ἵνα. In § 4, it is shown that
the assertion is true in respect of τόπος. It seems probable that § 4 was followed by a passage, now lost, in which χρόνος and φυσική κίνησις were similarly dealt with, and it was shown of each of them in turn that it is ἑνεκα σῶματος. If so, the proposition which was asserted in § 3, and proved in § 4 and the lost passage together, is repeated in § 5, when the proof has been completed.

§ 6. Ἰδιότης δὲ [τοῦ] τόπου παραδοχή. Wachsmuth alters παραδοχή (παρασχεῖν P) into περιοχή; but παραδοχή is confirmed and explained by παραδεχόμενος γὰρ τὰ τοῦ σῶματος μεταβολὰς in § 4.

χρόνου δὲ (ἰδιότης) διάστημα καὶ ἀριθμός. Cf. Arios Didymus, Diels Doxogr. p. 461 (Stob. 1. 8. 40 e and 42, vol. i, pp. 104 ff. W.): Ζῆνος ἐςθε χρόνον εἶναι κυνήγεως διάστημα, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ μέτρον καὶ κριτήριον τάχους τε καὶ βραδύτητος. . . Ἀπολλόδωρος δ᾽ . . . ὀυτὸς ὀρίζεται τὸν χρόνον “χρόνος δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κυνήγεως διάστημα.” . . . τὸν δὲ χρόνον ὀυτὸς ὀρίζεται (Posidonius), διάστημα κυνήγεως, ἢ μέτρον τάχους τε καὶ βραδύτητος. . . δὲ Χρύσιττος, χρόνον εἶναι κυνήγεως διάστημα, “καθ᾽ ἐν (ὁ Heeren) ποτὲ λέγεται1 μέτρον τάχους καὶ βραδύτητος.” Plut. Quaes. Plat. 8. 4, 1007 A: ἤμησιν οὖν τούτων ὑπὸ τούτων παρατημάνους δὲ ἄγνων οἴεσθαι τὸν χρόνον “μέτρον” εἶναι “κυνήγεως”, καὶ “ἀριθμὸν κατὰ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερόν” ὡς Ἀριστοτέλεως εἶπεν, . . . ἢ “διάστημα κυνήγεως” ἄλλο δ᾽ οἴδας, ὡς ἐνοι τῶν Στυκών. Simplicius in Ar. Phys. p. 700 Diels: τῶν Ἀρχότων λέγοντος καθόλου τὸν χρόνον διάστημα τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως, ἢ ὡς (ὡς καὶ;) τινες τῶν Στυκών ἔλεγον. These passages show that διάστημα was the most prominent word in one of the Stoic definitions of time; and the Hermetist, when he said that the Ἰδιότης of time is διάστημα, must have been thinking of that definition.

Similarly, the word ἀριθμός must have been suggested by Aristotle's definition, Phys. 4. 11, 219 b 1: τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμός κυνήγεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερόν. But as the Ἰδιότης of each of the other things spoken of is indicated by a single word, it may be suspected that διάστημα alone was originally given as the Ἰδιότης χρόνου, and that καὶ ἀριθμός has been added later.

“φύσεως δὲ (ἰδιότης) κίνησις, ἀρμονίας δὲ φιλία, σῶματος δὲ μεταβολὴ.” This cannot be right. It might be expected that something would be here said about φυσική κίνησις, which is coupled with τόπος and χρόνος in § 5, and appears therefore to be one of the things referred to by the words ἐκαστον τούτων. But it could not be said

1 Cf. Stob. 1. 8. 40 b, vol. i, p. 103 W: (τῶν χρόνων) μέτρον βραδύτητος ἢ τάχους ἐλε Ἰρύσιττος.
that κύριος (without qualification) is idiótēs φύσεως; for ψυχή also κινεῖται, and the κύριος of ψυχή differs from φυσική κύριος, and is contrasted with it in this document. Nor could it be said that μεταβολή is idiótēs σώματος; for ψυχή also μεταβάλλεται. It would be possible to make sense by cutting out these words, and rewriting the following sentence thus: idiótēs δὲ (σώματος μὲν ἡ φυσική κύριος), ψυχής (δὲ) ἢ κατ’ οὖσιν νοητάκεν κύριος

EXCERPT XVII

This piece is an extract from a discourse or epistle addressed by Hermes to Ammon (§ "Αμμων, § i). In style and terminology, Exc. XVII closely resembles Exc. XVIII and Exc. XIX. It is therefore probable that these three pieces were written by the same author; and it is possible that all three were extracted by Stobaeus from the same libellus. If so, Exc. XVIII and Exc. XIX, as well as Exc. XVII, ought to be reckoned among ‘the teachings of Hermes to Ammon’. All three are badly damaged by corruption of the text, and much of their meaning is lost beyond hope of recovery.

§ I. ψυχή . . . ἵστιν . . . οὖσιν αὐτοτελής ἐν ἀρχῇ. αὐτοτελής, ‘independent of external authority’, or ‘self-determining’, is equivalent to αὐτοτελόνος. The soul, ‘in the beginning’, i.e. before it has been incarnated and affected by material things, is αὐτοτελής; for in that condition it is not subject to Heimarmene.

It may be suspected that there is a lacuna after οὖσια, and that αὐτοτελής ἐν ἀρχῇ belongs to another clause, the beginning of which has been lost.


καὶ ἐπεκτάσατο ᾧστῇ (ξ)λογὸν (τῇ) δμοιόν τῇ ἅμη λόγον δμοιόν τῇ ἅμη is inexplicable; and there can be little doubt that we ought to read ἀλογὸν in place of λόγον. (Cf. ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀλογὸν in § 6.) The soul, when embodied, adds to itself something which is of like nature with the matter of which the body consists. This thing which is added or appended to the soul in consequence of its incarnation is called τὸ ἀλογὸν (μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς). It might equally well be called τὸ πάθητος; and the πάθη by which it is affected fall under the two heads θυμός and ἐπιθυμία. The writer has been
influenced by Pl. Rep., in which τὸ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς is divided into τὸ θυμοειδὲς and τὸ ἐνθυμητικὸν.

δεινὴ after ἀπεσπάσατο is redundant, and may perhaps have been inserted by error. The verb ἐπισπάσαται probably occurs again in a similar connexion in § 7, and also in Exe. XIX. 1.

§ 2. ὁ μὲν θυμὸς [ ], ἢ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς νόμον, γίνεται ἀνδρεία. θυμὸς is an irrational πάθος; but when rightly directed and controlled by νοῦς or τὸ λογιστικὸν, it is changed into the moral virtue ἀνδρεία. And the relation between ἐπιθυμία and σωφροσύνη is analogous to that between θυμὸς and ἀνδρεία.

πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς νόμον appears to be identical in meaning with πρὸς τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμὸν below; and it seems probable that τὸ ... λογισμὸν was the original reading in both places (cf. ἔχεται ... τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμοῦ in § 3), and that τὸ ... νόμον has been substituted for it by a transcriber. It appears that in this excerpt ὁ λόγος means what Plato calls τὸ λογιστικὸν (μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς), and ὁ λογισμὸς signifies the function or operation of the λόγος.

In §§ 2 and 3 as given in the MSS., ἔξω ποιήσῃ occurs twice, and ἄνω ποιήσῃ once. The author must have used the same phrase in all three places; but neither ἔξω ποιήσῃ nor ἄνω ποιήσῃ is quite satisfactory.1 The meaning of ἔξω here seems to be that which is given to the word in Aristotle’s Ethics. Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 2: λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν, ἀργὴν, κ.τ.λ., ἔξω δὲ, καθ’ ἄνω πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν ἢ ἕ κακὸς. Α ἔξω in this sense is a διάθεσις (‘disposition’) which is firmly established and lasting (Ar. Cat. 8. 9 a 8). The phrase ἔξω ἔξω ποιήσῃ (οτ’ έσται) πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμὸν corresponds to ἔξω ... ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα ... ἀριστερὴ λόγῳ in Aristotle’s definition of θυκὴ ἀρετή, Eth. Nic. 2. 6. 15.2

(ὁ θυμὸς) οὐ παράγεται ὑπὸ δειλίας. The corresponding phrase with reference to σωφροσύνη is (ἡ ἐπιθυμία) οὐ κινεῖται ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς. But δειλία, being a vice (i. e. a κακὴ ἔξω), does not rightly correspond to ἡδονή, which is a πάθος and not a vice. Perhaps the author wrote ὑπὸ δειματος, or ὑπὸ τῶν δεινῶν.

[ὑπάρχει ἀλ. οὗτος] ... [παράγεται. ἀντὶ]. These are unintelligible remnants of two parallel phrases, which may or may not

1 One might perhaps compare Pl. Rep. 4. 443 E: ὅποιμεντοι διαλαγῶ ... πράξειν, ἢ ἐν ταύτῃ τῆς ἔξω αὐτῶ τοι καὶ συναρμολογηθῶν.

2 Prof. Stewart says that ἀριστερὴ λόγῳ there means ‘determined according to the proper ratio or proportion’, and not ‘determined by Reason’. But whatever Aristotle may have meant by the words, the Hermetist, if he had read them, might take them to mean ‘determined by the rational part of the soul’. 
have been present in the original text. ηαρέχεται might be a corruption of ὑπάρχει, or of παράγεται.

§ 3. [ἀναπληροὶ γὰρ ὁ λογισμὸς τὸ ἐνδείκνυτι ἐπιθυμίας.] This appears to be a doublet of ἐπανοίει δὲ τὸ ἐνδείκνυτι ἐπιθυμίας at the end of the section. There is no corresponding clause with reference to θυμὸς.

ὅταν δὲ ἀμφότερα (ἐκ. ὁ θυμὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία) διμονωθῆ ἤσσον ἤσσον ποιήσῃ, καὶ ξηκτηρὶ ἀμφότερα τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμοῦ, γίνεται δικαιοσύνη. In Pl. Ῥέπ., it is not δικαιοσύνη, but σωφροσύνη, that is described as consisting in a certain 'unanimity'. Ῥέπ. 4. 432 a: ὁρίζονταί δὲ φαίνει ποιήσῃ τὴν ὀμόνοιαν σωφροσύνην εἶναι, χείρονός τε καὶ διεισδύονος κατὰ φύσιν ἐμφανίαν, ὥστετερον δὲ αἰχμαλωθην ἢν πάλαι καὶ ἐν ὑπό ἐκάση 

§ 4. [ἀρχὴ δὲ τούτων ἡ διανοητικὴ οἰσία.] This appears to be a doublet of § 5 init. [καθ' αὐτὴν ἔστω τῇ αὐτῆς περινοητικῇ λόγῳ] [κράτος ἱχυσα
These meaningless words have a curious resemblance to the two phrases αὐτῇ ἑαυτῆς ὄσων ἐν τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ, and νόμῳ ἐξ οὗ ἴσωσά τιν ἑαυτῆς λόγον, which occur in Exc. XIX. 1. Assuming that Exc. XVII and Exc. XIX were parts of the same libellus, it is possible that doublets of phrases which belonged to one of them may have been inserted by error in the other.

§ 5. ἀρχεί μὲ τοῖς [τούτων] ἡ (νοητική) ὀνοσία, ἰδίως ἐν τού πανεμονεθεί; ἀλλὰ (αὐτῇ ὑπ’ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον, ἵνα λόγος ἵππου (συνακολουθεί) αὐτῇ (ἀυτής ΜΣ.) ἀπερίπτωμα σύμβουλος. The addition of τοῖς (to the θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας) and νοητική is suggested by the doublet in § 4 init. The term ἡ νοητική ὀνοσία occurs in Exc. XIX. 4 (cf. νοητικὴ ὀνοσία in Exc. XIX. i init.); and I have restored it by conjecture in Exc. XVII. 6 and Exc. XVII. 4. It is presumably equivalent to δοῦσ. (Compare the use of ἡ νοητὴ ὀνοσία—possibly νοητική ὀνοσία—in the sense of δοῦσ in Exc. VIII. 5, and that of νοητικὴ ὀνοσία, apparently in the same sense, in Exc. XV. 7.) In Plato, δοῦσ and τὸ λογιστικὸν are two names for the same thing; but the Hermetist divides the thing which Plato called by those names into two distinct but closely interconnected things, one of which is named by him ἡ νοητικὴ ὀνοσία, and the other, δοῦσ. We are told that the former is ‘ruler’ or ‘commander’, and the latter ‘counsellor’. This may perhaps be taken to mean that the function of the one is that which, in Aristotle’s Ethics, is called βουλησις, and that of the other corresponds to Aristotle’s βούλευσις and προαίρεσις; i.e. that the νοητικὴ ὀνοσία determines the good to be aimed at, and the δοῦσ deliberates and decides concerning the action to be taken with a view to realizing that good.

§ 6. δ Περινοητικός δοῦσ τοῖς τῆς (νοητικῆς) ὀνοσίας ἑστι. The MSS. give περινοητικὸς δοῦσ τοῖς τῆς (νοητικῆς) ὀνοσίας. The MSS. give περινοητικὸς λόγον here, νοηματικὸς (al. νοητικής) λόγον in Exc. XVIII. 2, περινοητικὸς (or περι νοηματικὸς) λόγον in Exc. XVIII. 4, διανοητικὸς λόγον in Exc. XVIII. 5. The λόγος of which the Hermetist is speaking might possibly be called νοητικός (as being closely connected with the νοητικὴ ὀνοσία), or διανοητικός (as to διάνοια, see note on Exc. XVIII. 1); but περινοητικὸς (‘shrewd’ or ‘subtle’) cannot be right; and neither νοηματικός nor περινοητικός, as far as I know, occurs elsewhere in Greek literature. It may be conjectured that περι has been inserted by error, and

1 Perhaps it is worth while to note also the resemblance between ἀρχεί in Exc. XVII. 4 init. = 5 init. (as emended) and ἀρχεί μὲ τοῖς in Exc. XIX. 1.

8 Cf. Exc. XI. 3. (15) as emended: δοῦσ ἐν τῷ πανεμονεθθεί δοῦσ τοῖς τῷ νοητικῆς.
that νοτηκός has come from νοτηκής misplaced. Emended as I propose, the words mean ‘The λόγος belongs to the νοτηκή ουσία’.

(As we have just been told, the relation between them is like that between an ἀρχων and his σύμβουλος.) Cf. δὲ λόγος τῆς ουσίας in *Exc.* XIX. 5 (MSS.), and δὲ λόγος τῆς ουσίας ἐστὶ τὸ φρονοῦν, id. 6 (MSS.). It would be possible to add (τὸ φρονοῦν), or something of the sort, after ουσίας ἐστὶ in *Exc.* XVII. 6; but that is hardly necessary.

(. . .) ἀπείκασμα (εἰκασμὸν MSS.) λογισμοῦ [τῇ ἀλήγῳ], ἀμβρον μὲν ὡς πρὸς λογισμόν, . . . (σαφές) ἐκ τοῦ ἀλογον. The missing subject of this sentence must have been the name of some mental faculty or function intermediate between λογισμός and τὸ ἀλογόν. It may have been δόξα; and this seems the more probable, because γνώσεις, with which δόξα is contrasted in *Exc.* XIX. 5, has been mentioned just before in *Exc.* XVII. In Pl. Rep. 5. 478c, δόξα is said to be γνώσεως μὲν σκοτωδέστερον, ἄγνωσε δὲ φανώτερον. In Rep. 6. 509 ὁ ff., Plato distinguishes four mental functions, which he arranges in series according to their respective degrees of ‘clearness’; he names them (1) νόσος, (2) διάνοια, (3) πίστις, (4) εἰκασία; the object of νόσος and διάνοια he calls νοτήτων, and the object of πίστις and εἰκασία, δρατών or δοξαστῶν. The Hermetist may have been thinking of one of those two passages, or both of them.

§ 7. [Ἡρμοσταὶ δὲ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πρὸς τινα λογισμόν.] This must be a misplaced fragment of the passage concerning θυμός and ἐπιθυμία, §§ 2 and 3. Do the words mean that θυμός and ἐπιθυμία are ‘put in tune with’ one another (i.e. rightly adjusted with reference to one another)? Or, that both of them are ‘put in tune with’ λογισμός? The metaphor of a musical ἀρμονία is used by Plato, Rep. 3. 411 E, in speaking of the relation between τὸ θυμοειδὲς and τὸ φιλόσοφον (= τὸ λογιστικόν); music and gymnastic, he says, have been given to men ἐπὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ τὸ φιλόσοφον . . . ὅτως ἄν ἀλληλοις ἔναρμοσθῆναι ἐπιτευνομένω καὶ ἀναμένω μέχρι τοῦ προσήκοντος. (Adam’s note ad loc.; ‘The soul has, so to speak, two strings, the φιλόσοφον and the θυμοειδὲς, which make a kind of ἀρμονία when they are tuned to the proper pitch.’) See also Rep. 4. 441 E. But in Rep. 4. 443 D, E, where Plato uses the same metaphor again, he speaks of three strings of the soul-lyre (ἔναρμοσάντα τρία δότα δοτέρ δόρους τρεῖς ἀρμονίαι κ.τ.λ.), the three being τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ θυμοειδὲς, and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, to which the Hermetist’s λογισμός, θυμός, and ἐπιθυμία correspond.

800-8
tina is obscure, and may possibly be a misreading for tov; but the similar phrase πρὸς τινά λόγον occurs in Exc. VIII. 3 and 6. καὶ εἴπωσται εἰν ταυτοῖς κυκλικῆν διάνοιαν. εἴπωσται is very likely a corruption of εἴπωσται. Usener's conjecture υλικῆς for κυκλικῆν may be right; but the combination υλικῆς διάνοιαν is hardly possible, for διάνοια must surely belong to that part of the soul which is not δύμων τῷ ὑλῇ (§ 1).

EXCERPT XVIII

§ 1. ἦστι τοῖς ... οὐ μένει. It appears that the writer was here explaining the relations between certain 'things in the soul', or parts of the soul; and perhaps a meaning more or less resembling that of the original text might be expressed by rewriting the passage as follows:—ἐστι τοῖς ... ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς νοητικῆς οὐσίας καὶ λόγους [ ]. ἄναφηρεται δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς (νοητικῆς) οὐσίας (τὸ νόημα, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον ἡ διάνοια). εἰπεῖται δὲ τῷ νοῆμα (καὶ τῇ διάνοιᾳ) ἐλθόντα δὲ δὲ ἀλλήλων μία ἦν ἐγένοντο. αὐτὴ [δὲ] ἦστιν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς (σύνθεσις). I assume that ἡ νοητικὴ οὐσία καὶ ὁ λόγος are used as in Exc. XVII; that νόημα (= νόσης) is the function of the νοητικῆς οὐσίας, and διάνοια (= λογισμὸς) is the function of the λόγος;1 and that δόξα and άισθησις are functions of τῷ λόγῳ. On these assumptions, the Hermetist's series νόημα, διάνοια, δόξα, άισθησις would be comparable to the series νόσης, διάνοια, πίστις, εἰκασία in Pl. Rep. 6. 511 D.

§ 2. ἦθεν καὶ ὑπερβάλλει καὶ ἔλλειπε (ἐκλείπει MSS.). The missing subject of the verbs in this section is probably τοῦ λόγου (μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς). The statement that τὸ λόγον ὑπερβάλλει καὶ ἔλλειπε may be taken to mean that when a man's passions or impulses are not controlled by reason he is apt to diverge from the mean on either side. Compare Exc. XVII. 3: τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ... τὸ ἐνδείον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας.

1 διάνοια is associated with λόγος in Pl. Soph. 263 E: διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος τοιτῶν; πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἐστιν διηνομένος τοῦτο; αὕτη ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία, διάνοια ... τὸ δὲ γὰρ ἡ ἑκατοντάκτη καὶ τὸν στόχον τῶν μετὰ φθόγγον εὔκλετων λόγων. In that passage, διάνοια means what the Stoics called the ἐπιθυμήσεως λόγος, in opposition to the ἐφορομένῳ λόγῳ. Cf. Pl. Theaet. 189 B: τὸ δὲ διακοίησθαι ἐρ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς;—Τί καλῶν;—Λόγον δὲ αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχῆ διεξήγηται πέρι ὅλῳ σκοπόν. In my translation, I have written 'thought' for νόημα, and 'discursive thought' for διάνοια.
Χείρον μὲν γίνεται (sc. τὸ ἄλογον) ἐταὐ ἀποσπασθὴ τῆς διανοίας: ἐταὐ δὲ ἀκολουθῇ καὶ πειθαίται, κοινώνει τῇ ἄλογῳ (ἄλογος) λόγῳ φίλῳ τῶν μαθημάτων. Cf. Exc. VIII. 3: τὸ γοῦν (ἄλογον), κυνούμενον ὑπὸ τὸν μέγας οὐσίας, πρὸς τινα λόγον (κυνεῖται). Compare also Ar. Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 3 and 1. 13 on τὸ λόγον ἄλογον ὡς ἐπιπεδεῖς λόγῳ. For the last clause, one might conjecture κοινώνει τῷ λόγῳ τῶν διανοημάτων, 'shares with the λόγος in its διανοήματα'.

This passage gives support to the assumption that διάνοια, as used by the writer of Exc. XVIII, means the function of the λόγος.

§ 3. τὸ γάρ αἱρεῖται τὸ κρείττον ἢ μὲν ἔστιν, ὅμως δὲ καὶ τὸ χείρον.
Cf. Corp. IV. 6 b–8 a.

( . . . ) ἄκοινως. Cf. Exc. XI. 2 (20): τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔκοινων τὸ κακὸν ἄκοινων. We are free to choose the higher life; whence it necessarily follows that we are also free to choose the lower life. But when we have once chosen the lower life, we are under compulsion, and thenceforth our evil actions are involuntary. The bad man is a slave of Heimarmene; but it is by his own choice that he has become a slave.

ἐκμένῃ γὰρ [αἱρεῖται] (ἡ ψυχή) τῶν κακῶν πλησίασει τῇ σωματικῇ φύσει. It is not the 'choice', but the soul which has chosen wrongly, that 'draws near to bodily nature', and is consequently governed by Heimarmene, as bodies are. The sense required might perhaps be better expressed by writing ἐκμένῃ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν σωματικῶν (ορ ἐκμένῃ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ σωματικὰ) πλησίασει τῇ φύσει.


§ 5. τοῦ πρώτου ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ διανοητικῶν λόγον προίησα καὶ ὅλον τῶν λόγων. Sense might be made of this by writing προϊησα δὲ τοῦ[πρώτου τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ [ ] προίησα [ ] καὶ τὸν (διανοητικὸν) λόγον. The νοητικὴ οὐσία (i.e. the νοῦς, which is the divine part of the human soul,) was emitted from God in the beginning (cf. Corp. XII. i init., ὁ νοῦς... ἐκ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ οὐσίας ἔστιν); and having thus come into being, it emits from itself the λόγος. If διανοητικὸν λόγον is right, we may suppose that the full names of the two things were ἡ νοητικὴ οὐσία and ὁ διανοητικὸς λόγος, but that the writer sometimes called them by the shorter names ἡ οὖσία and ὁ λόγος. But it is also possible that διανοητικῶν may have arisen out of διάνοιας written as an alternative for λόγον.

I cannot explain καὶ ὅλον τῶν λόγων. Possibly ὅλον may be a corrupted doublet of λόγον.

G g 2
§ 1. Ἐκβιαία τοῦν... ταυτής λόγον. The only intelligible part of this corrupt section is the sentence ἀπαλλαγεῖσα δὲ τοῦ φυσικοῦ σώματος, αὐτῇ καθ᾽ αὐτὴν μένει [ ] ἐν τῷ νοστῷ κόσμῳ. The subject of that sentence must be either ἡ ψυχή, or ἡ νοητική οὐσία, which presumably means ὁ νοῦς, as in Exc. XVII and Exc. XVIII. The δὲ implies a μέν; and the probable sense of the preceding words might be expressed by writing (καὶ σώματι μὲν συνοῦσα, ἄλογον τι ἀπό) τῆς (ψυκής) ἀρμονίας ἐπιστάθηκαί (cf. Exc. XVII. 1). ἀπαλλαγεῖσα δὲ κ.τ.λ. The word ἀρμονία, in this connexion, might mean either the structure of the material universe, or the structure of the human body (see Exc. XV. 3 and 5).

Soul is, no doubt, ἄδιδος; but as that fact has no connexion with anything that is said in the rest of this excerpt, it may be suspected that ἄδιδος is corrupt.

The four terms οὐσία, λόγος, νόμημα, διάνοια occur together here, as in Exc. XVIII init.; but what was said about them, it is difficult to guess. In the phrases νόμημα ἔχουσα τὸν έαυτῆς λόγον and ἀρχεῖ δὲ τοῦ έαυτῆς λόγον, the writer seems to be speaking of the relation between the νοητική οὐσία and the λόγος. With νόμημα ἔχουσα τὸν έαυτῆς λόγον should be compared κράτος ἔχουσα τὸν έαυτῆς λόγον in Exc. XVII. 4; but neither νόμημα nor κράτος makes sense. We are told in Exc. XVII. 5 that ἡ (νοητική) οὐσία ἀρχεῖ (τῶν παθῶν), and has the λόγος for its σύμβουλον; and it would be possible to get a similar meaning here by writing ἀρχεῖ δὲ τοῦ [ ] (ἄ)λογον (ἡ νοητική οὐσία, σύμβουλον) (ἔχουσα [ ] έαυτῆς (τῶν)) λόγον).

§ 2. (..) Ἐκβιαία δρομαίνει κόμαν ἐν τῷ έαυτῆς νοηματι δρόματι λογίν τῷ εἰς ἰών ἐρχομένην. τούτῳ γὰρ τινιν ψυχής, τὸ παρέχειν ἑτέρους δμοῖν
EXCERPT XIX: 1-4

It may be conjectured that this passage, in its original form, was to the following effect: ἡ ψυχή, εἰς σῶμα ἐρχομένη, φέρει (οὐ παρέχει) αὐτῷ ἡμέραν τούτο γὰρ ἵδιον ψυχής, τό παρέχειν ἑτέροις κίνησιν ὤνομαν τῇ ἀυτῇ. Cf. Exc. XX. 3, 4 as emended: μετεξελθός δὲ ψυχῆς ἦ (τὸ σῶμα) κ.τ.λ.—ἄνοματι is most likely a doublet of νομάτι; and both may perhaps be corruptions of σωματι.

§ 3. δύο τούτων εἰσί τοιαί καὶ δύο κινήσεις, μία μὲν ἡ κατ' οὐσίαν, ἄτερα δὲ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ὁμοία. As to these 'two kinds of κίνησις', compare Exc. XVI. 1 and 6. The ἡμέρας ἡ κατ' οὐσίαν is that of the νοστικὴ ὁδός ὧν νόσος; the ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν is that of τὸ ἀλογον, which is added to the soul at its incarnation. The man in whom the νοστικὴ ὁδός has the upper hand is ἀνεξούντος, i.e. his will is free; the man in whom τὸ ἀλογον has the upper hand is under compulsion, being a slave of Heimarmene.

§ 4. (..) ἀμέτοχος ὁδός (ὁδός MSS.) τοῦ φυσικοῦ σώματος. The subject of this sentence must have been either ἡ ψυχὴ or ἡ νοστικὴ ὁδός.

ei γὰρ ἐξείς σῶμα, οὔτε λόγον ἐξείς οὐτε νόσην. The subject is probably ἡ ψυχή. But if so, ἐξείς σῶμα is impossible. Sense might be made by writing ei γὰρ (κατ') ἔχει (αἱ) ἑκ τοῦ ἑρωτῆς τὸ σῶμα, οὗτος μὲν ἐν τῷ σκότει κ.τ.λ.) νόσης is the function of the νοστικὴ ὁδός; and in the man who is overpowered by desire for bodily things, the νοστικὴ ὁδός (and with it, the λόγος, which is its 'counsellor',) is absent or dormant, and τὸ ἀλογον alone is active.

In Exc. XX. 1, the MSS. give ἐστὶ τοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀδόματος οὐσία. ei γὰρ ἐξειδομα κ.τ.λ. In Exc. XIX. 4, the MSS. give εἰς γὰρ ἐν ψυχή ἀδοματός. . . . ei γὰρ ἐξείς σῶμα κ.τ.λ. Is the resemblance between these two passages merely accidental?

πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα ἀνάθετον μεταλαβόν δὲ οὐσίας, τὸ εἶναι ἤνοιχτον ἐμπνοῦν ὄνομα. Bodies are incapable of νόσης, but are capable of ἡμέρας. If a soul enters a body, the body thereby becomes a living body. This applies to the bodies of all animals alike, and not to human bodies only.

As to μεταλαβόν οὐσίας, cf. Exc. XX. 3 as emended: μετεξελθός δὲ ψυχῆς ἦ (τὸ σῶμα), καὶ κοινωνη τοῦ εἶναι τῇ ψυχῆς . . . τὸ δὲ εἶναι νόν λέγο τὸ μετέχειν ἡμέρας. Even the lower animals partake of οὐσία (i.e. 'true being'), inasmuch as they are alive; though they do not partake of νοστικὴ ὁδός.
§ 5. καὶ τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα τοῦ σώματος (ἔστι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν), ὃ δὲ λόγος τῆς ουσίας (ἔστι τὸ φρονοῦν κ.τ.λ.). The MSS. give, in § 5 init., καὶ τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα τοῦ σώματος, ὃ δὲ λόγος τῆς ουσίας, and in § 6 init., τοῦ γὰρ σώματος ἢστι καὶ δεκτικῶν πάντων, ὃ δὲ λόγος τῆς ουσίας ἢστι τὸ φρονοῦν. It seems probable that one of these two passages is a misplaced doublet of the other; and in my conjectural reconstruction of the text, I have assumed that the right place, not only for these opening words of § 6, but for what follows in that section, is at the beginning of § 5.

It would be possible to write τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα τοῦ σώματος ἢστι without any further predicate, taking the words to mean ‘the pneuma is a part of the body’, or ‘belongs to the body’; but if we read ὃ δὲ λόγος τῆς ουσίας ἢστι τὸ φρονοῦν in the following clause, a corresponding phrase is needed in connexion with τὸ πνεῦμα; and αἰσθητικῶν, which occurs below as an epithet of πνεῦμα, is the right word to stand in contrast to φρονοῦν. The words καὶ δεκτικῶν πάντων in § 6 init. can hardly be right; (the πνεῦμα is receptive of sense-impressions, but not of ‘all things’;) and it may be suspected that καὶ δεκτικῶν is a corruption of αἰσθητικῶν, and that πάντων was added by a transcriber who thought that a genitive was needed after δεκτικῶν.

We must either write τῆς (νοητικῆς) ουσίας, or take τῆς ουσίας to mean τῆς νοητικῆς ουσίας, i. e. τοῦ νοῆς. The use of the word φρονοῦν implies that in the writer’s terminology φρόνησις is a synonym for διάνοια or λογισμός, the function of the λόγος.

The πνεῦμα is the material vehicle or organ of animal life, and of the lower grade of human life. According to this Excerpt, its special function is αἰσθητικὸς; but δόξα also is associated with it (συνυπάρχει τῷ πνεύματι ἡ δόξα). The πάθη (θυμός and ἐπιθυμία, spoken of in Exc. XVII) would presumably be regarded by the writer as likewise connected with the πνεῦμα; but they are not mentioned in Exc. XIX.

(… συνυπάρχει δὲ τῷ (μὲν) λόγῳ ἢ τῶν ἡμῶν γνώσεως, τῷ δὲ πνεύματι ἡ δόξα;) ὃ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ καλοῦ’θεωρητικός ἢστι, τὸ δὲ [αἰσθητικὸν πνεῦμα] τῶν φαντασμῶν κριτικῶν ἢστι. αἰσθητικὸν πνεῦμα gives the right sense, but is superfluous. τῶν τιμῶν (meaning τοῦ καλοῦ?) is hardly satisfactory; and as there is no corresponding genitive after δόξα, it seems best to strike it out. As to γνώσις and
δόξα in contrast, see *Exc. XVII.* 6. If my reconstruction of the passage is right, it is implied that γνώσις is τοῦ καλοῦ θεωρία, and δόξα is τῶν φανομένων κρίσις. But there seems to be something amiss in τοῦ καλοῦ; the term opposed to τῶν φανομένων should rather be τοῦ ἄνω. As to κριτικὸν here, and κρίνει below, cf. Ar. Anal. post. 99 b 35: (τὰ ζῷα ἔχει) δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικὴν, ἢν καλοῦς αἰσθησιν. Diog. Laert. 7. 54: ὃ δὲ Χρύσωττος . . . κριτηρία φησιν εἶναι αἰσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν.


τούτῳ τὸ πνεῦμα ἄναγον (ἀλ. ἀνάλογον) γεγομονικὸν διανοίας κρίνει τὸ αἰσθητικὸν (καὶ . . .), εἰ δὲ μή, φαντάζεται μόνον. The sense required might be expressed by writing, in place of ἄναγον γεγομονικὸν διανοίας, something like ὅταν μὲν ἥξηται τῆς διανοίας (cf. ὅταν . . . ἥξηται . . . τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμοῦ, *Exc. XVII.* 3).

κρίνει must have been followed by some qualifying word or phrase, e.g. ὅρθως or κατ' ἀλήθειαν; for without some such addition, it could not stand in contrast to φαντάζεται μόνον.

In saying that the material πνεῦμα κρίνει and φαντάζεται, the writer is following the usage of the Stoics, who made no clear distinction between bodily and mental processes, and held the soul to be πνεῦμα πῶς ἔχων. As a Platonist, he ought rather to have said that τὸ αἰσθητικόν τῆς ψυχῆς κρίνει.

§ 7. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιήχοντος [κόσμου;] τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει,
The connexion of this with what precedes is lost; but it is probable that τὸ μὲν means τὸ πνεῦμα, and that ἥ δὲ means ἡ ψυχή. The πνεῦμα of the individual man or animal derives its force from the atmosphere, which is the πνεῦμα of the Kosmos, and of which the individual’s πνεῦμα is a detached portion. To say that ἡ ψυχή ἀφ’ ἑαυτῆς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει is equivalent to saying that the soul is αὐτοκίνητος.

EXCERPT XX

The teaching of this Excerpt appears to have been to the following effect:—

The bodies of men and animals are produced by Nature. In the composition of the bodies which she produces, Nature combines τὸ θερμὸν and τὸ ψυχρόν in varying proportions; and the proportionate quantities of τὸ θερμὸν and τὸ ψυχρόν which she puts into this or that body are determined by the influences of the stars.

But a body, as produced by Nature alone, cannot be said to be ‘real’. In order that it may be real, it must have life; and life is conferred on body by soul, which is not a product of Nature, but a thing independent of Nature, inasmuch as it is incorporeal.

The life conferred on bodies by the soul which enters into them is of two grades. Life of the lower grade (called simply ὁ νοῦς) is conferred on all animals; life of the higher grade (called ὁ νοερὰ) is conferred on man alone. But the ὁ νοερὰ of men varies in quality; and the difference between the ὁ νοερὰ of one man and that of another results from the different proportions of τὸ θερμὸν and τὸ ψυχρόν in the composition of their bodies.

§ I. ἦτε τοῖς ζ ψυχῆς ἀσώματος οὐσίαι. Cf. Exc. XVI init.: (çı) ψυχῆ τοῖς ζ ὁ νοερὰ ἐστίν ἀσώματος. Exc. XVII init.: (çı) τοῖς ζ ὁ νοερὰ ἐστίν . . . οὐσία αὐτοτελῆς κ.τ.λ. Exc. XVIII init.: (çı) τοῖς ζ ὁ νοερὰ οὐσία κ.τ.λ. Exc. XIX init.: (çı) ζ ψυχῆ τοῖς ζ ἐστίν ἀδίκος νοητὴ οὐσία. But there is no intelligible connexion between these words and what follows them in Exc. XX (εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.). It would seem that either ἦτε . . . οὐσία has been wrongly inserted; or a passage which connected it with what follows has been lost; or it is a corruption of something which led on to εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. (e.g. it would be possible to write ἦτε τοῖς ζ ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῆς ζ τοῦ σώματος οὐσία. εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.).

εἰ γὰρ (μή ψυχῆν) ἔχει (τὸ) σῶμα, οὐκέπῃ ἐσται [ἑαυτῆς σωστὶ ἥ]. εἰ γὰρ ἔχει (ἡ ψυχή) σῶμα is impossible. The passage seems to have
been altered with a view to connecting it with the preceding words as given in the MSS. (.transactions, η ψυχή) ἄσωματος οὐσία; but in order to do that satisfactorily, it would be necessary to write εἰ γὰρ (ἡ ψυχή) ἦν σώμα, οὐκ ἐὰν ἦν ἐνυξ σωστική, or something of the sort. If on the other hand it is to be connected with what follows, some such corrections as I have made are needed. [See Addenda, vol. iv.]

τὰν γὰρ σώμα πρὸς τὸ εἶναι δεῖται ζωῆς.—(πάν γὰρ σώμα δεῖται τὸν εἶναι δεῖται καὶ ζωῆς MSS.) τὸ εἶναι must here be taken as meaning 'to be an οὐσία,' i.e. to have real and substantive existence. The soul is an οὐσία; and a living body also is an οὐσία, though not an οὐσία of the same kind as the soul. But a lifeless body is not an οὐσία; it is mere ὕλη, and as such, is μὴ ὅν.

These words might be taken to imply that not only men, beasts, and plants, but all existing bodies without exception (including stones, for instance) are to some extent alive; and as this writer makes life dependent on the presence of ψυχή, it would seem to follow that even stones have in them some portion of ψυχή. That, however, is an unusual doctrine; and perhaps the writer meant rather that lifeless bodies, such as stones, are not ὄντως ὁστα, but are merely φαινόμενα.

§ 3. Παντὶ γὰρ τῷ γένεσιν ἱκονίτ... μειώσε (δὲ) φθορά. This section breaks the connexion between § 1 and § 3, and must have been inserted here by error. It may have come either from some other part of this libellus, or from another document.

In Exc. XI. 2 (2) and elsewhere we are told that there are bodies (viz. τὰ άδια σώματα) which are γενητά but not φθορτά. But the writer of this fragment must have thought otherwise, and held the Aristotelian view that the Kosmos and the heavenly bodies are ἀγένητα, i.e. had had no beginning, but have always been in existence.

§ 3. μεταληφός δὲ [εἴδους] [ζωῆς] [ψυχῆς], ἡ. It looks as if εἴδους and ζωῆς were due to two different attempts to fill the gap left by the accidental omission of ψυχῆς.

τὸ δὲ εἶναι νῦν λόγῳ τὸ [ἐν λόγῳ γενέσθαι καὶ] μετέχει ζωῆς [νοερᾶς]. ἐν λόγῳ is probably a corruption of ἦλλογον or λογικόν.

In order to make sense of this sentence, it is necessary either to strike out ἐν λόγῳ γενέσθαι καὶ and νοερᾶς, or to write τὸ δὲ (ἄνθρωπον) εἶναι κ.τ.λ. If the latter emendation were adopted, we should have to take the words in connexion with § 4, in which man is spoken of. But so taken, they would be out of place here. It seems probable that man was first spoken of in § 4 init., where the term ἄνθρωπος is defined; and if so, τὸ δὲ εἶναι κ.τ.λ. must have been connected...
with what precedes, and the insertion of the words which limit the application of the statement to man must have resulted from a misunderstanding.

§ 4. καλεῖται δὲ (ἡ ἀνθρωπός) κ.τ.λ. This implies the definition ἡ ἀνθρωπός ἐστι ζωὴν λογικὸν θητῶν. The addition of θητῶν is needed to differentiate man from the Kosmos and the stars, which are ζωὴ λογικὰ ἀθάνατα.

θητῶν δὲ διὰ τὸ σῶμα. Man is mortal, not ‘because he has a body’ (for the Kosmos and the stars also have bodies, and yet are immortal), but ‘because of ἥς body’, which is φθαρτόν.

ἡ ψυχή ἄρα (ἀσώματος), ἀμετάπτωτον ξύουσα τὴν δύναμιν (τοῦ ζωῆς παρέχειν, τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) θ' (ἐν ἡ ψυχῇ) ζωῆς νοσεῖν). This restoration of the text is very doubtful; but it gives the sense which the context seems to require. Soul has the power of conferring life on any sort of body into which it may enter (e.g. the body of a beast); and when it enters a human body, it retains that power unchanged. But the life which it confers on human bodies is life of a special kind; it is not merely ζωή, but ζωή νοσεῖ.

λέγειν ζωῶν (νοσεῖν) (τῶν ἀνθρώπων). The word νοσεῖν may perhaps be a corruption of (τῶν) ἄνων, i.e. τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

μὴ οὖσας [ἡς διανοητικὴς] οὐσίας τῆς καὶ παρεχοῦσας νοσεῖν ζωῆς. Man’s ‘reason’ (λόγος), i.e. the thing by the possession of which man is distinguished from the lower animals, is called in this document τὸ νοσεῖν, or ἡ νοσῆ ζωή. The equivalent term in Exc. XV. is ἡ διανοητικὴ κόμης. The words τῆς διανοητικῆς must have been inserted here by some one who used the language of Exc. XV, and not that of Exc. XX.


ἡ μὴ (ἡμὲ) (ἐγὼ) φύσις [ἐγὼ] ἀρμόζει τὴν τοῦ σώματος σύστασιν πρὸς τὴν ἀρμονίαν. ἡ φύσις is the force at work in the production of organic bodies. Cf. Exc. XV. 2, where we are told that ἡ φύσις πάντα φύει τὰ γεγομένα.

The verb ἀρμόζειν and the corresponding substantive ἀρμονία (which might be translated ‘temperament’) are used in this document to denote the ‘coadjustment’ or ‘contemperation’ of τὸ θερμὸν and τὸ ψυχρόν (i.e. the determination of the proportions of these elements relatively to one another) in the composition of the human body. That is what ἀρμονία means in τὴν ἀρμονίαν τοῦ σώματος, § 7, and τῆς (τοῦ σώματος) ἀρμονίας, § 6. This use of ἀρμονία occurs in
Pl. Phaedo 86 λ-δ and 91 甫-94 Ε, side by side with its use to denote the tuning of a lyre. (See note on Exc. XVI. 2.)

[The phrase ἡ τῶν ἄστέρων ἀρμονία is used below as the equivalent of ἡ τ. ἑ. σύγκρασις. The assumption of the astrological theory underlying this passage is that the ‘coadjustment’ of the stars with one another influences the destiny of men on earth, through συμπάθεια, and that the proportion of elements in living bodies depends upon a corresponding ‘coadjustment’ of stars. In practice the astrologer would select a group of stars in certain prominent positions at a given time (see note on § 7) and reason from their ἀρμονία or σύγκρασις. Cf. a chapter-heading in Laurentinus 27. 34: Ἀνάκρασις ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄστερων συγκράσεως περί οὗ τις ἐφωτιν βουλεύει (Boll, Sphaera, p. 10). The ἀρμονία-theory is criticized by such phrases as οὔτε ἄλληλος συνάδουσιν.]

§ 6. τὸ κατὰ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ κατὰ (τὸ) ψυχρὸν. Of the four primary qualities of matter (heat, cold, dryness, and fluidity,—see Exc. XV), heat and cold alone are spoken of in Exc. XX.

ἀρμἐζει δὲ (ἡ φύσις) κατὰ τὸν ἐπικρατῆσαντα ἄστέρα τῆς συγκράσεως (συγκρατήσεως MSS.). Supposing, for instance, that among the influences of the stars that of a ‘cold’ planet predominates at the time when a certain man’s body comes into being, there will be an excess of τὸ ψυχρὸν in the ‘commixture’ of that man’s body. But we are not told at what time the ‘mixing’ takes place; is it at the moment of conception, or at that of birth, or during the interval between the one and the other?

§ 7. ἡ φύσις τούν ὅρμοι τὴν ἀρμονίαν τοῦ σώματος τῆς τῶν ἄστερων συγκράσεως. [According to Sextus Empiricus (Math. 5. 42) the Chaldaeans practised both a simple and a refined method of astrology, according as a single star or a combination of stars was observed: ἀρμβέστερα δὲ τὰ κατὰ συνδρομὴν καὶ ὅσα αὐτοὶ λέγουσι τὰ κατὰ σύγκρασιν πλειόνων (SC. ἄστερων), οἷον “ἔναν ὤμοι μὲν ἄρτι ρογοκοπή ὤμοι δὲ μεσουραν ὤμοι δὲ ἀντιμεσουραν οἶ δὲ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχοι, συμβῆσται τάδε.” The text may therefore stand.]

καὶ ἐνοί τὰ πολυμιγῆ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄστερων ἀρμονίαν. [Cf. Ps.-Philolaos, fr. 10 Diels: ἀρμονία δὲ πάντως εἴ ἐναντίων γίνεται ἐς τῷ γὰρ ἀρμονία πολυμιγῶν ἔννοιας κ.τ.λ. The νοῦς of Anaxagoras is described by Sextus Empiricus (Math. 9. 6) as ordering τὴν τῶν ὁμοιομερεῖων πολυμιγῶν ὑλικῆν.]

ἐστε ἐχει πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπάθειαν. The word συμπάθεια was used by the Stoics to express the notion that the several parts of the
Kosmos are (like the several parts of a human or animal body) so interconnected, that one is affected by what takes place in another; and in particular, that things on earth are affected by the influence of the stars in heaven. Cf. Sext. Emp. Math. 9. 79: ὃς δείκνυμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ (τῶν κόσμων) συμμπάθειῶν κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῆς σελήνης αὐξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις πολλὰ τῶν τε ἐπιγείων ἡμῶν καὶ θαλασσιῶν φθίνει τε καὶ αὐξάνεται.

... εἰ δὲ συμφαίνειν ὅτι ἡνωμένον τι σῶμα καθεστηκεν ὁ κόσμος. 
... ηπὶ δὲ τῶν ἡνωμένων συμμπάθειά τις ἐστὶν, εἶναι δικτύλου τειμομένου τὸ δὸλον συνδιατίθεται σῶμα. ἡνωμένου τοινῦν ἐστὶν σῶμα καὶ ὁ κόσμος. Sext. Emp. Math. 5. 4: τῷ συμμπάθειν τὰ ἐπίγεια τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἑκαίνιας ἀπορροφώς ἐκάστοτε ταύτα νεοχρόνοτα.

It was commonly held that the συμμπάθεια between τὰ ἐπίγεια and τὰ οὐράνια is one-sided; that is to say, that what takes place on earth is influenced by what takes place in heaven, but not vice versa. (See Exc. XI. 2. (28), (38), (40), (41).) [But compare Philo's words, used of the Chaldaeans, De somn. I. 10. 53 (III. p. 216 Wendl.): τί δὲ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἀστερῶν φύσεως ἢ περιφορᾶς ἢ συμμπάθειας πρὸς τὲ ἄλλους καὶ τὰ πέταγεν; De Abr. 15. 69 (IV. p. 17 Cohn): κατὰ τὴν τῶν οὐρανῶν πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια συμμπάθειαν.]

τῆλος γὰρ τῆς τῶν ἀστερῶν ἀρμονίας τὸ γεννᾶν συμμπάθειαν καθ’ εἰμαρμένην αὐτῶν. τὸ γεννᾶν συμμπάθειαν is impossible; perhaps we ought to read τὸ γεννᾶν σώματα. But it could hardly be said that the τῆλος of the (system? or movement?) of the stars (i.e. the purpose for which it exists) is to generate bodies; that is rather the ἔργον of the stars. [See Addenda in vol. iv.]

If αὐτῶν is struck out, καθ’ εἰμαρμένην may be allowed to stand. The stars are (as we are told elsewhere) ‘the instrument by means of which Heimarmene works’; that which the stars do is therefore καθ’ εἰμαρμένην.

EXCEPRT XXI

§ 1. ἄρτι τοῖς τῷ προὸν ἐπίκεινα (ἐπὶ M. MSS.) πάσιν τῶν ὄντων, καὶ τῶν ὄντως ὄντως προὸν. τὰ ὄντας ὄντα ἄρ αἱ τὰ νοητά.

τὸ προὸν, ‘the Pre-existent’, is a term applicable to God, either as being prior to the ἀιώνθετος κόσμος (cf. τοῦ ἀγγελητοῦ καὶ προόντος θεοῦ in Exc. IX. 1), or as being prior to τὰ νοητά also. The writer of this passage uses it in the latter sense.

The word ἐπίκεινα, which I propose in place of ἄρτι, was in common use among the later Platonists; they got it from ἄρτι ἐπίκεινα τῆς οὐσίας
EXCERPT XXI: 

in Pl. Rep. 6. 509 b. It is frequently used by Plotinus (e.g. Enn. 3. 8. 9) in speaking of τὸ ἐν (= τὸ ἄγαθον), which is beyond, above, or 'prior to' νοῦς and τὰ νοητά (= τὰ ὄντως ὄντα). See Adammonis Resp. 8. 2 (Testim.).

'ἐν γὰρ ἔστι δὲ ἕδ' ... ἐξουσία ἐν ἑαυτῇ (τὰ) οἰσθήτα πάντα. Notwithstanding the corruption of the text, it seems clear that in this passage the writer was speaking of τὰ νοητά and τὰ οἰσθήτα as two different kinds of ὄντα, and contrasting the one kind of ὄντα with the other. It is possible therefore that the meaningless δὲ ὁδ' is a corruption of διττοῦ. A satisfactory sense could be got by writing ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ "ἔστιν" διττοῦ, or τὸ γὰρ "ἔστιν" διττῶς λέγεται ("the word ἔστι is used in two different senses").

ἡ οὐσίατης, [ἡ] καθάλου λεγομένη, κοινὴ (ἔστι τῶν) νοητῶν (καὶ τῶν οἰσθήτων). The word οὐσίατης means 'the attribute of being an οὐσία'; and ἡ οὐσίατης κοινὴ ἔστι τῶν νοητῶν καὶ τῶν οἰσθήτων must be taken to mean that both τὰ νοητά and τὰ οἰσθήτα are ὄσσεα (= ὄντα) Cf. Exc. XVI. 1: (ἡ ψυχή) οὐκ ἐκβαίνει τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίατης (i.e. does not cease to be an ἀξιόματος οὐσία) when it is ἐν σώματι.

(....) τῶν ὄντως ὄντων καὶ [τῶν ὄντων τῶν] καθ' ἑαυτὰ ροομένων. This must be the end of a sentence concerning τὰ νοητά. The νοητά are existent καθ' ἑαυτά, 'by themselves', or 'of themselves'.

τὰ δὲ (οἰσθήτα), ἐνάντια (ὄντα) τούτων, κατὰ τὸ ξερον πάλιν (ἔστων οὗ γὰρ) αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἔστι. As the writer has just said that the νοητά are existent καθ' ἑαυτά, he must have denied this of the οἰσθήτα, which are ἑνάντια τοῖς νοητοῖς. It is therefore necessary to insert οὗ before αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἔστι. The οἰσθήτα also are ὄντα, but they are not ὄντα of the same kind as the νοητά; the existence of the οἰσθήτα is derivative or secondary.

Compare Pl. Tim. 35 35 A, B. Plato there speaks of two kinds of οὐσία, viz. ἡ ἁμέραπτος καὶ δέι κατὰ ταυτά ἐξουσία οὐσία (ἡ ταυτοῦ φύσις), and ἡ περὶ τὰ σώματα γεγομένη μεριστὴ οὐσία (ἡ θατέρου φύσις), and also mentions a third kind of οὐσία (τρίτον οὐσίας ἔδος) which is intermediate (ἐν μέσῳ) between the two; and as the writer of Exc. XXI likewise speaks of two kinds of οὐσία and of something intermediate (μεταξύ), it seems probable that he was thinking of that passage in the Timaeus. Perhaps he did not fully understand it; 1 but he may have taken it to mean that the

1 The language of Tim. 35 A, B is clumsy and confused; commentators differ in their construing of the words; and there can be little doubt that the text is corrupt. (One of the difficulties in it could be got rid of by writing μετὰ τῆς (τρίτης) οὐσίας and ἐν τῷ ταυτῷ καὶ θατέρου καὶ τῇ (τρίτῇ) οὐσίας μεμιγμένην in 35 B.)
three things of which the soul is composed are νοῦς, δόξα, and αἰσθήσις, i.e. the three functions or faculties the objects of which are respectively τὰ νοητά, τὰ δοξαστήρια, and τὰ αἰσθητά.

What is the meaning of κατὰ τὸ ἔτερον? I was at first inclined to think that in this phrase the writer used τὸ ἔτερον, as Plato used θάτερον, to signify that which is many and mutable, in contrast to ταὐτὸν, which is one and changeless. (Cf. τῆς τε ταὐτοῦ φύσεως καὶ τῆς θατέρου in Pl. Tim. 35 a.) On that hypothesis, one might conjecture τῶν ὄντων ὄντων, τῶν κατὰ ταὐτῶν (καθ’ ἑαυτὰ MSS.) νοομένων. τὰ δὲ εἵνα τοὺσ, τὰ κατὰ τὸ ἔτερον πάλιν . . . .

But seeing that the soundness of the reading καθ’ ἑαυτὰ is confirmed by its recurrence in the phrase αὐτὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ ἑστὶ which follows, and that, if we do not alter the text, there is no mention of ταὐτὸν in this Excerpt, it seems better to take κατὰ τὸ ἔτερον as meaning simply ‘in the other way’, or ‘in the other sense (of the word ἑστὶ)’.

(τὰ δὲ) φύσεις ὀνέα αἰσθητή, ἔχουσαν ἐν ἑαυτῇ (τὰ) αἰσθητά πάντα. ἥ φύσις must here mean ὁ φυσικός κόσμος, ‘the world in which the force called φύσις operates’, that is, the material world.

The statement that ἥ φύσις is ὀνέα αἰσθητή κ.τ.λ., as given in the MSS., appears to have little connexion with the context; but that objection disappears if we assume that this was preceded by a corresponding statement about the νοητά. The author may have written something like this: (καὶ ὁ μὲν ὁ ὁμοιότατος ἐστὶν ὀνέα νοητή, ἔχουσαν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ νοητὰ πάντα; ἥ δὲ) φύσις κ.τ.λ. After speaking of the contrast between τὰ νοητὰ and τὰ αἰσθητά, he may very well have added that all the νοητὰ are massed together in a higher world, and all the αἰσθητά in a lower world.

(μεταθύμη βίδε τούτων [νοητοὶ (νοματικοὶ MSS.) καὶ αἰσθητοὶ θεοί] (τὰ δοξαστήρια). τούτων means τῶν νοητῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. The things which are intermediate between the νοητά and the αἰσθητά cannot be two kinds of gods, and certainly cannot be αἰσθητοὶ θεοί, that is, gods who are themselves αἰσθητά. The words νοητοί καὶ αἰσθητοὶ θεοῖ must therefore be struck out. They may perhaps be a superscription that was intended to stand at the head of the lost passage which preceded (τῶν αἰσθητῶν) θεῶν in § 2 init.

νοματικοὶ is doubtless a misreading for νοητοὶ. There is no good authority for the existence of the word νοματικός; but the terms νοητοὶ θεοὶ and αἰσθητοὶ θεοὶ were in frequent use among the later Platonists; and ἔλειος, as spoken of in § 2, is an instance of an αἰσθητὸς θεός who is an ἑκὼν of a νοητὸς θεός.
The missing subject must have been a neuter plural; (that is shown by the words τὰ μὲν μετέχοντα which follow;) and it was almost certainly τὰ δοξαστά. The word δοξαστά has dropped out here, but is given by the MSS. in the next line.

The use of the term τὰ δοξαστά to denote things intermediate between τὰ νοητά and τὰ αἰσθητά may perhaps have been suggested to the writer by Pl. Rep. 5. 476–480, where δόξα is said to be a state of mind intermediate between γνώσις and ἀγνώσια, and its object, τὸ δοξαστόν, is described as a thing intermediate between τὸ ὅν and τὸ μὴ ὅν (μεταξὺ τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὅντος καὶ τοῦ ἀδ μηδαμῶς ὅντος). The writer of Exc. XXI likewise makes his δοξαστά intermediate between two other things; those two things, however, are not, as in Pl. Rep. 5, τὸ ὅν and τὸ μὴ ὅν, but are called by him two different kinds of ὄντα.

(τὰ δοξαστά), τὰ μὲν μετέχοντα τῶν νοητῶν, τὰ δὲ (οὕ). δόξα, 'opinion', is sometimes true, and sometimes false. The writer (if I understand this sentence rightly), accordingly divides τὰ δοξαστά, the 'things opined' or 'objects of opinion' (which appears to mean the context of the opining mind) into two classes, the objects of right or true δόξα and the objects of wrong or false δόξα, and says that the former 'partake of' τὰ νοητά, and the latter do not. The statement that some of the δοξαστά 'partake of' the νοητά may perhaps be understood as meaning that some of the δοξαστά (but not all of them) are 'images' or copies of τὰ νοητά, which are necessarily and invariably true or real. Cf. Exc. II A. 3 as emended: πάντα . . . τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἀληθῆ μὲν οὐκ ἐστιν τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας μιμήματα οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ δὲ. τὰ δὲ ἀλλα πειθός καὶ πλάνος.

δοξαστά τὰ κοινωνοῦντα τῶν νοητῶν (νοηματικῶν MSS.). This may possibly be a remnant of a sentence in which something more was said about τὰ δοξαστά; but it seems more likely that it is merely a doublet of the preceding phrase τὰ δοξαστά τὰ μὲν μετέχοντα τῶν νοητῶν, the word κοινωνοῦντα being written as an alternative for μετέχοντα.

§ 2. (. . . τῶν αἰσθητῶν) θεῶν. οὕτως (οὕτω MSS.) γὰρ εἰκόνες εἰσὶ (τῶν) νοητῶν (νοημάτων MSS.) (θεῶν). The writer has here passed on from speaking of νοητά and αἰσθητά to speaking of νοητοὶ θεοὶ and αἰσθητοὶ θεοὶ. Perhaps his classification of τὰ ὄντα was merely preparatory to a classification of gods. Compare the classification of gods in Ascl. Lat. III. 19 a, where, as here, dīi intelligibles (νοητοὶ) are contrasted with dīi sensibles (αἰσθητοὶ).
Julian, Or. 4 (Eis τὸν βασιλεά ἡλιόν), distinguishes two different suns: above the αἰσθητὸς ἡλιός, who reigns over the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος, is the νοερὸς ἡλιός, who reigns over the νοερός θεός. And above the νοερὸς ἡλιός is ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς (also called τὸ ἐπίκενα τοῦ νοῦ, ἡδύ τῶν ὄντων, ἐν, and τάγαθον, Or. 4. 132 D, and ὁ πάντων ἐπίκενα, id. 136 D), who reigns over the νοεροὶ θεοί. Julian’s πάντων βασιλεύς corresponds to the πρῶτον of Exc. XXI; and his νοερὸς ἡλιός corresponds to the ἑπωράννοι δημιουργὸς of whom, in Exc. XXI, the visible sum is said to be an ‘image’.

anvas, if that is the right reading, must here mean ‘above the heavens’; i.e. supracosmic; for ὁ δῶν δημιουργός, the Maker of the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος, must be a νοερὸς θεός. But ἑπωράννοι would be a more suitable word to express that meaning. Cf. Exc. XII. 1.

καθάπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τὸ δῶν δημιουργηθεὶς(ν, ὀντω) καὶ ὁ ἡλιός δημιουργεῖ τὰ ἱώνα καὶ [γεννῆ] τὰ φυτὰ. For the distinction between a higher and a lower Demiurgus, cf. Exc. V. 1, 2: ὁ μὴν [ ] δημιουργὸς τῶν ἁλίων σωμάτων . . . ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος δημιουργὸς κ.τ.λ. (See also Exc. II A. 14.) The doctrine here taught, or one that resembles it, is mentioned and rejected in Corp. XI. ii. 9 f.

1 A reminiscence of Pl. Rep. 6, 507 A, where the sun is called τόκος τῇ καὶ ἐκείνος τοῦ ἄγαθον.
2 Bernardakis gives ἐγγονὸν ἐκείνον καὶ τόκον ὄντως ὁ ἡμέρος ἡμέροις ἐπάνω κ.τ.λ. That is manifestly wrong; and by writing ἐγγονὸν ἐκείνον . . . ὄντως ὁ ἡμέροις ἡμέροις ἐπάνω we get precisely the sense wanted. Plutarch’s Apollo is ὁ ἡμέρος ἡμέροις (ἐπάνω); the sun is ἡμέρος ἡμέροις (ἐπάνω). Dr. W. C. Wright, in her introduction to Julian’s Or. 4, speaks of a ‘hierarchy of three suns in the three worlds’. But as far as I can see, Julian does not anywhere in this oration call the supreme God by the name ἡλιός, or speak of a νοερὸς ἡλιός; and if he does not, there are in his system only two suns, not three. There are three worlds, and three kings who reign over them; but the name ἡλιός is given by him only to the second and third of the three kings, not to the first. The special object of Julian’s worship is the νοερὸς ἡλιός, king of the second and intermediate world.
3 The term νοερὸς θεός, meaning a class of gods intermediate between the νοερὸς θεός and the αἰσθητὸς θεός, seems to have been first introduced by Iamblichus, whose teaching Julian tells us he is reproducing in Or. 4.
Compare Julian Or. 4. 140 A: εἰς μὲν ὁ τῶν ὁλῶν δημιουργός, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ κατ᾽ οὐρανὸν περιπολοῦντες δημιουργικοὶ θεοί μέσην ἄρα καὶ τούτων τὴν ἀφ' ἡλίου καθήκουσαν εἰς τὸν κόσμον δημιουργόν θετέον.

The change of tense (ἐδημιουργηθεν . . . δημιουργεῖ) is explained by what is said in Exc. V. 1, 2. The universe was made once for all; but animals and plants are always being made.

[καὶ τῶν πνευμάτων πρωτανεύει]. Does πνευμάτων mean 'winds', or 'spirits'? (If 'spirits', this phrase has probably been added by a Christian transcriber.) In either case, these words (which are omitted in F) must be rejected; πρωτανεύειν is not δημιουργεῖν, and this sentence has to do with δημιουργία alone.

EXCERPT XXII

The libellus from which this extract was taken was entitled Ἀφροδίτη. Compare the titles Κόρη κόσμου (Exc. XXIII), Ποιμάνδρης (Corp. I), Κρατήρ (Corp. IV), and Κλεῖς (Corp. X). For the contents of the extract, cf. Exc. XV. 4.

Lydus De mens. 4. 64 (Testim.) says that Hermes ἐν τῇ κοσμοποιώκα spoke of a bisexual Aphrodite. It is possible that the libellus which Lydus there calls ἡ κοσμοποία is the same that is called Aphrodite in Exc. XXII.

παρὰ τί (δέ) τὰ βρέφη ὤμων τοὺς γονεῖσι γίνεται ἡ συγγενείας ἀποδίδεται ἐκθέσω λόγον. It may be doubted whether παρὰ τί . . . γίνεται is a superscription, or a part of the text. In the latter case, it may be an indirect question, dependent on ἐκθέσω (or ἀποδόω;) λόγον. It might possibly be a direct question asked by the pupil, and answered by the teacher in a sentence ending with ἐκθέσω λόγον; but if so, we should have expected the answer to be marked by δέ τέκνων or something of the sort.

It may be conjectured that ἀποδίδεται is a corruption of ἀποδόω (σοι ?), and that ἐκθέσω was added as a variant. συγγενείας may perhaps have something to do with the resemblance of children to kinsmen other than the parents; cf. ἐσθ' δέ καὶ εἰς μακρὰς γενεάς (. . .) below.

The resemblance of child to parent is discussed by Aristotle, Gen. an. 4. 3, 767 a 36 ff. Compare also Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 422: Πάθεν γίνονται τῶν γονέων αἱ ὀμοιώσεις καὶ τῶν προγόνων. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, . . . Παρμενίδης, . . . οἱ Στοικοὶ, ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος πατρὸς.
The teaching of Zeno the Stoic concerning the στέρμα is reported as follows by Arius Didymus, Diels Dox. p. 470 (Arnim Sto. vet. fr. I, § 128) : to τὸ στέρμα φησὶν ὃ Ζήνων εἶναι τὸ μεθ᾽ ἀνθρώπος, πνεῦμα μεθ᾽ ὄργιον, ψυχής μέρος καὶ ἀπόστασμα, καὶ τὸ στέρματος τῶν προγόνων κέρασμα, καὶ μήγα (ἐξ ἀπάντων) τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν.

1 Perhaps καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ought to be either bracketed, or altered into καὶ (ἀπάντων) τῆς ψυχῆς (μερῶν). Compare μήγα (ἐξ ἀπάντων) τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν συνελαχθένθες in the quotation from Zeno which is given below.

2 Perhaps εἰς ομοιότητα.

3 "γενέων vix sanum: tentabam γώνων... vel mērōν" Diels. I have thought of λόγων; cf. ἔχον τῶν λόγων τῷ ἐλιφ τῶν αὐθέντων in Zeno, quoted below. But something analogous to ἀπὸ τῶν ὅμων χρωμάτων is wanted; possibly ἐξ ὅμοιότητας?

4 Read γραφόσα.

5 τοποθητία... παρ᾽ non sunt Stoicorum," says Diels.

6 This is a restatement, in Stoic terms, of the theory of συνεστραμμα spoken of by Aristotle, Gen. an. 4. 3, 769 a 29. The στερματικός λόγος of the Stoics is the plan or design of the human or animal body which is to be formed; but it is at the same time a corporeal thing, a πνεῦμα, which is present in the στέρμα, and by the action of which the body is fashioned in the womb.

7 Perhaps: τῆς τῶν στερμάτων ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ ἀπόστασις. ('τοῦ στερμάτος' may have come from τῶν στερμάτων misplaced.)

8 Perhaps: καὶ [τοῦ στερμάτος τοῦ] τῶν προγόνων (λόγων) κέρασμα. Cf. ἔχει
Chrysippus used the resemblance of children to parents in qualities of soul as an argument against the Platonic doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul. His argument is criticized by Plutarch, *Sto. rep.* 41. 8, 1053 c, D: γάν διὰ τοῦ γαρ ψυχῆς, καὶ ψυχῆς συμφόρουσαν τὸν θελείον, καὶ αὐτὸν ψυχῆς καὶ τούτων, οὕτως ἐπικρίνει τοῦ πνεύματος μεταβαλλόντος. 

A passage closely resembling *Exc. XXII* occurs in *Lactantius De opif. dei*, 12. 4 ff.: Ipsum semen quidam putant ex medullis verum singulare quidem in Origen, quoted above, and "κατὰ μεγίσταν τῶν πνεύματος λόγον" in *Diog. Laert.* (see following note).

1 This passage (τὰ δὲ σέιρα... μερῶν συνελημυσθῶν) is repeated, with slight variations, in *Theodore Gr. aff.* siv. 5. 25: τῶν γάρ του ἀνθρώπου προσώπου, ἕτοι μόνον καὶ μετέχοντα πνεύματος, τῆς ψυχῆς ἐγγενέους (τώς Ἰερών καὶ ζωτικοῦ) ἐδέ μέρος [τε] καὶ ἀπόφοβομαι, καὶ τοῦ τῶν προγόνων σώματος κίρασαμ (τε), καὶ μέμεν ἐκ ἀκάντας τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων συναθροῦμαι. Compare also *Diog. Laert.* 7. 158 : ἀνθρώπου δὲ σέιρα (λόγους καὶ σειράς) ἐδέ μεθίσαν καὶ ἀνθρώπου (σέιρα) μὲθ' ὕμνοι, εὐγκαίριας τάς τῆς ψυχῆς μέγεθες κατὰ μέγιστον τοῦ τῶν προγόνων λόγου. (This might be corrected into (καὶ) [συγκρίσασθαι τοῖς] τῆς (τοῦ σώματος) ψυχῆς μέρος (καὶ ἀπόβασμα), καὶ μέμεν [τοῦ] τῶν προγόνων (λόγων). — Galen "Oroī latr. 94, XIX, p. 370 K: σέιρα ἐν διατριβῇ ἀνθρώπου καὶ μεθίσαν διψάσας (σέιρα) μὲθ' ὕμνοι, ψυχῆς μέρος ἀκάντας (read μέρος καὶ ἀπόβασμα), καὶ σύγκρισα τοῦ τῶν προγόνων γένους (perihēς τοῦ τῶν προγόνων γένους), οἷον τε αὐτό ἦν καὶ αὐτὸ συμμετέχει ἀνεκρῆς. (Is ἡν το οὖν αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ a corruption of something like (ἐξον γὰρ τῶν λόγων) τῷ δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο in *Arius Didymus*! — Plut. *Decoh.* 15. 453 f.: ὁ Ζήνων λόγος τοῦ σέιρα τάς σύμμετρα καὶ κύριαμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων ἐνάρθωμεν ἀπαθεσαμένοις.)

2 Perhaps : ἐξελθεῖ ἄν καὶ τῶν λόγων γὰρ τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο. τοῦτο (δὲ), ὅπως κ.τ.λ.

3 Perhaps : συλλεβόν (ὑπ' ἄλλου πνεύματος) καὶ (ἄλλῳ) μέρος ψυχῆς τοῦ θηλέος...

4 Possibly ὁπ' ἄλλου πνεύματος is a mis-placed gloss on ὑπ' ἄλλου below.

5 Perhaps : τὸ δὲ ἄλλου (τοῦ) φυτᾶται (οὐ φύτευε).

6 Els del. Dils.

Chrysippus said that the πνεύμα of the embryo is chilled and 'tempered' by the cold of the external air, to which the child is exposed at birth, and that the πνεύμα is thereby changed into a ψυχή. Plutarch's meaning might be made clearer by writing τοῦ πνεύματος (els ψυχῆς) μεταβαλλόντος.

7 For this last clause, cf. *Exc. XXVI.* 13 : προσεποίηται δὲ... καὶ ἀνεκρῆ τίνα ἡμῶν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ φυράματος συναθροίσεως.
tantum, quidam ex omni corpore ad venam genitalem confluere ibique concrescere. . . . Conceptum igitur Varro et Aristoteles sic fieri arbitrantur. Aiunt enim non tantum mariibus inesse semen, verum etiam feminis, et inde plerumque matribus similes procreari. Sed earum semen sanguinem esse purgatum: quod si recte cum virili mixtum sit, utraque concreta et simul coagulata informari. . . .

Similitudines autem in corporibus filiorum sic fieri putant: cum semina inter se permixta coalescant, si virile superaverit, patri similem provenire seu marem seu feminam; si muliebre praeveruerit, progeniem cuiusque sexus ad imaginem respondere maternam. Id autem praevalet e duobus, quod fuerit uberius; alterum enim quodammodo amplectitur et includit: hinc plerumque fieri ut unius tantum linimenta praetendat. Si vero aqua fuerit ex pari semente permixto, figuras quoque misceri, &c. According to Brandt (Wiener Studien 13, pp. 255 ff.), the source from which Lactantius got the contents of that passage was a book by Varro, entitled Tubero, de origine humana. The Greek authority followed by Varro must have referred to Aristotle (Gen. an. 4. 3). The writer of Exc. XXII probably made use of Varro's Greek source, or some document derived from it.

οὖν νοστίμων αἰματος ἔξαφρουμένον (ἔξαφδρουμένου MSS.) 'ἡ γένεσις' ἀποθησαυρίζῃ γόνον. ἔξαφδρουμένον was probably written by some one who was thinking of ἀφεδρός, menses muliebres. But that cannot be right, because this clause has to do with the father; the mother is not spoken of till later (τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γυναικὸς). For αἰματος ἔξαφρουμένον . . . ἀποθησαυρίζῃ γόνον, cf. Clem. Alex. Paed. 1. 6. 48: τύνες δὲ καὶ τὸ στήρια τοῦ ζύφον ἀφρὸν εἶναι τοῦ αἴματος καὶ οὕσιν ὑποίδεται, δὴ τῇ ἦμιφτος τοῦ ἄρρενος θήρῳ [παρὰ τὰς συμπλοκὰς ἵκταραχθέν] ἐκρηξιζόμενον ἐξαφρούται, καὶ τοῖς ἐκ περιμένα ταρατείται.18 παρὰ τὰς συμπλοκὰς ἵκταραχθέν appears to have been added by some one who misunderstood the writer's meaning. It is not at the συμπλοκὴ, but before it, that the στήρια is formed and stored up.

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2 Probably στερματικὰς ἀποτίθεται. Cf. ἀποθησαυρίζῃ in Exc. XXII.
The subject of ἀνθρωπομορφία cannot have been ἡ γένεσις. The agent is presumably nature, operating in the man's body; and this may have been expressed by ἡ φύσις, with or without some additional words such as εἰς γένεσιν.

The writer's meaning might be expressed by saying that the semen is πνεῦμα μετ' ἀφροῦ; cf. Zeno's πνεῦμα μεθ' ἀγροῦ. The πνεῦμα is the active component of the semen; it is that in which the life resides.

μελῶν is perhaps a remnant of (καὶ πάντων τῶν) μελῶν (οὐ μερῶν), which may have been written as an alternative for ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἄλου. But it is also possible that it may be a remnant of (καὶ πάντων τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς) μερῶν; cf. Zeno ap. Arius Didymus, quoted above.

For ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἄλου, cf. Aetius (Diels, p. 422, quoted above): οἱ Στουκαί, ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἄλου καὶ (πάντων τῶν; τῆς ψυχῆς (μερῶν; φέροντα) τὰ σπέρματα. Diog. Laert. 7. 159: καὶ ἀπ' ἄλους δὲ τῶν σωμάτων (τὸ σπέρμα) φασὶ καταφέροντα οἱ περὶ τὸν Σφαῖρον πάντων γοῦν γεννητικὸν εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν.

(καὶ τὴν σπέρματος, ὡς [τοῦ αὐτοῦ] ἀνθρώπου γενημένου. It is impossible to say that 'the same human being' is brought into existence by the process of reproduction; the son may be like the father, but cannot be identical with him. If we strike out τοῦ αὐτοῦ (which may have come by duplication from the following τὸ δ' αὐτὸ), we may suppose the writer's thought to have been that the production of a human being is a thing that requires a special putting forth of divine power. The formation of a beast, or of a human body, might be sufficiently accounted for by the working of merely physical forces; but there is something in man that comes direct from God, and must have been breathed into him by God at his birth. But it is difficult to see how anything of this kind can have been connected with the context; and it may be suspected that the words κατὰ . . . γενομένου have come from a marginal note.

τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γυναικός εἶκος (εἰς τὸ MSS.) γίνεσθαι. ὅταν (οὖν) καθωπερτερησά (ρώση MSS.) τὸ μωη ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπος . . . , τῷ πατρὶ δόµαιν (δηοςίμων MSS.) τὸ βρέφος ἀποδειχθήσεται, ὡς τὸ ἀνάπαλιν τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον τῇ μητρί. This agrees closely in meaning with the corresponding passage in Aetius l. c.: προσέβαλ δὲ καὶ τῆς γυναικα σπέρμα: κἂν μὲν ἐπικράτηση τὸ τῆς γυναικός, κ.τ.λ. Cf. Αἰ. Gen. an.
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4. 3. 767 b 21: kratoúsias mèn (тяс тóу ἀρρενος κυνήσεως ον γονής), ἀρρένε τε τοῦτον καὶ οὐ δῆλον, καὶ οὐκόσι τῷ γεννώντι ἄλλο ὑπὸ τῷ μητρί· μὴ κρατήσαν δὲ, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ἤτητον (ἄδους MSS.) ἔνενται. ἄδους is impossible; but ἤτητον (which, for a transcriber, would differ very little in pronunciation from ἄδους) gives a satisfactory sense: 'if the vigour of the semen is not softened or relaxed.'

ἐὰν (δὲ ἐπὶ) τινος μέρους (ἡ) καθυπερτέρησις (καθυπέρθεσις MSS.) γένηται, πρὸς ἑκείνῳ τὸ μέρος ἀφομοιοῦται (ἐκ. τὸ βρέφος τῷ πατρὶ ἢ τῇ μητρί). Cf. Αρ. Gen. ap. 768 b 1: ὁ ὁμός τρόπος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μορίων καὶ γὰρ τῶν μορίων τὰ μὲν τῷ πατρὶ οὐκε πολλάκις, τὰ δὲ τῇ μητρί, τὰ δὲ τῶν προγόνων τοιῷ. Ιβ. 769 a 6: εἰρήκασι δὲ τινὲς τῶν φυσιολόγων καὶ ἔτεροι περὶ τούτων, διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια γίνεται τοῖς γονεῖσιν... ἐνοι μὲν γὰρ φασιν, ἂφ' ὁπότερον ἢν ἐλθῇ στέρμα πλοῦν, τούτῳ γίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον παντὶ τῇ πάν καὶ μέρει μέρος, ὡς ἀπόντος ἂφ' ἐκάστοτε τῶν μορίων στέρματος.

καὶ ἐντὸ καὶ εἰς μακρᾶς γενεάς (. . .). This may have referred to the case of a child's resemblance to some πρόγονος other than the father and the mother (cf. τὰ δὲ τῶν προγόνων τιῶν in Aristotle, quoted above). μακρὰς γενεάς, if sound, must mean 'remote generations'.

(. . .) ἑκείνῳ (τοῦ) δεκανοῦ (τοῦ) λόγον ἐχοντος πρὸς τῆν ἄραν ἐν ἡ γυνὴ ἑπαθωποεῖ. As to the Decani, see Exc. VI. The reading of the MSS. would appear to mean 'since he (ἐκ. ἡ γυνήσεως) stands in the relation of a Decanus to the hour in which' &c. But it could hardly be said that there is the same relation between a man and a certain hour as between a Decanus and that hour; and the true reading is probably τοῦ δεκανοῦ τοῦ κ.τ.λ., 'of the Decanus who has to do with the hour' &c. (ἐκείνου may be a corrupted doublet of δεκανοῦ.) At a given hour, one of the thirty-six Decani—presumably the Decanus who is at that time rising above the eastern horizon—is dominant; and the writer must have said that the child is in some way affected by the influence of the Decanus who is dominant at the hour in which the child's existence begins. In the Pistis Sophia, it is the function of the 365 Liturgi (who are subordinates of the Decani) to fashion the body in the womb; and the writer of Exc. XXI may have assigned a similar function to the dominant Decanus.

Does ἡ ἄρα ἐν ἡ γυνὴ ἑπαθωποεῖ mean the hour of birth, or the hour of conception?
EXCEPRT XXIII
(Kore Kosmu.)

Exc. XXIII contains a narrative (§§ (50) ff.) preceded by two detached fragments of other documents (§§ (32), 1, 2, and §§ 3–8), and interrupted by the insertion of three other unconnected passages (§§ 27–29, § 42, and §§ 43–48), as well as by some smaller interpolations.

Setting aside these extraneous additions, and confining our attention to the main narrative, we have in Exc. XXIII the greater part of a libellus which must have been one of a collection of documents in which the teachings of the writers were presented in the form of instruction given by Isis to her son Horus. Excerpts XXIV–XXVII are extracts from other libelli of the same collection.

These Isis to Horus documents differ in character from those of the Hermes to Tat, Hermes to Asclepius, and Hermes to Ammon collections, and must have originated among somewhat different surroundings. They are 'Hermetic' only in the sense that the knowledge which Isis imparts to Horus is supposed to have been learnt by her, in part at least, from Hermes,—and possibly also in the sense that the spoken words of Isis and Horus were assumed to have been set down in writing by Hermes. (The headings of Exc. XXIII, XXV, and XXVII in Stobaeus imply that these pieces were extracted from books written by Hermes; but we do not know that the original libelli bore any superscriptions to that effect.) In respect of the doctrines taught, however, the Isis to Horus documents do not differ much more widely from the other Hermetica than the other Hermetica differ among themselves.

The doctrinal position of the writer of Exc. XXIII is somewhat obscured by the mythical form of his narrative. He employs for his purpose the chief figures in the mythology of the Egyptian Isis-cult (the deities Osiris, Isis, and Horus, and the god Thoth-Hermes); and he makes use of conscious and deliberate personifications (Φως, § 10; Πή, § (52)); the four Elements, §§ 55–64). The greater part of what he says, or makes Isis say, is evidently not intended to be taken as literally and historically true; he cannot have believed, or expected his readers to believe, that his descriptions of the making of plants (§§ 9–(52)), the making
of souls (§§ 14–16), and the making of beasts (§§ 18–23), were, in all their details, true accounts of things that had actually taken place, any more than he believed, or expected it to be believed, that the speeches which he ascribes to God, and the words which he puts into the mouths of the Elements, had really been spoken by them. But it is difficult to draw a precise line between what he meant to be accepted as true and what he meant to be understood as symbolic fiction. His narrative is presumably based, in its main outlines at least, on pre-existing traditions; much of the detail is doubtless of his own invention. But how much he invented for himself, and how much he took over from earlier writers, we have no means of finding out. (It would be interesting to know, for instance, what authority he had for saying that the bodies of the beasts were made by 'holy daemons', § 19.)

The writer of this document, though he can hardly be called a thorough-going Platonist, has been much influenced by Platonic teachings. He recognizes a supreme and incorporeal God, by whom the Kosmos has been made out of a Chaos of formless matter (§ 50). He assumes the pre-existence of human souls, and holds that, before their incarnation on earth, they resided in a higher world; he describes the body as a prison (§ 34 fin. &c.), and speaks of the lethe to which the soul is subjected during its earthly life (§§ 37 and 41); and he says that, when the soul departs from the body, it will, according to its merits or demerits, either return to its home above, or be reincarnated in the body of a beast (§ 39). All this must have been derived, directly or indirectly, from Plato; and in his description of the making of souls, as well as in his conception of God as Demiurgus, the influence of the Timaeus is manifest.

On the other hand, the distinction between the ἀταθήτων and the ὄντων,—the corporeal and the incorporeal,—which is one of the most fundamental principles of Platonism, appears to be of but slight importance to the writer of the narrative. It is here and there implied (e.g. in the conception of the pre-cosmic God and a pre-cosmic group of gods, § 50), and in the contrast between seeing with bodily eyes and seeing with the eyes of the mind, § 36; but little stress is laid on it, and for the most part the incorporeal is ignored. The distinction on which the writer insists is not that between things cosmic and things supracosmic, but rather that between different parts of the Kosmos, τὰ ἀνω and τὰ κάτω, things
celestial and things terrestrial; and the supreme reward promised to virtuous souls is not transference into a supracosmic world, but admission to heaven, or in other words, transformation into star-gods (§ 17). This might indeed be accounted for to some extent by the mythical form of the discourse of Isis; and it might perhaps be said that the corporeal things spoken of are meant to be understood as symbols of incorporeal realities. But there remains a fact which cannot be thus explained away. The religion which is said to have been introduced among mankind by Osiris and Isis, and which it seems to have been the writer's main object to uphold or recommend, is not a Platonic mysticism such as we find in some of the Hermetica,—a religion the aim of which is the soul's escape from the world of sense, and its union with a supracosmic God; it is little more than a belief in penalties imposed by superhuman beings,—the sort of religion which might be described as a substitute for a police-force.

Signs of Stoic influence are apparent in the terms used to describe the materials of which souls are made (νοερον νυμη, and a portion of God's πνευμα, § 14); in the writer's conception of the πνευματα of beasts (§§ 18-21); and in the statement that the soul is situated in the heart (§ 36). The notion that animal births are brought about by the working of the Zodiac (§ 20) implies acceptance of the doctrine of astral influence, to which greater prominence was given by the later Stoics than by Chrysippus. The view that unembodied souls reside in the atmosphere, the division of the atmosphere into distinct strata, and the notion that each soul is located in one particular stratum, but is capable of rising from a lower stratum to a higher (§ 19), must have been derived from the system of the Platonizing Stoic Posidonius.

The framework of the dialogue is Egyptian, and the writer shows familiarity with Egyptian traditions about Isis and Osiris (e.g. in the list of the benefits which they conferred on mankind, §§ 66-69). The statements that Osiris and Isis are an απορροια of the supreme God, and that these deities came down from heaven to dwell for a time on earth, and then returned to heaven, may perhaps be of Egyptian origin; but apart from the mythology, this document contains few traces of native Egyptian speculation independent of Greek thought.

There are certain expressions which appear to show that the writer had some knowledge of the first chapter of the Jewish Genesis (see notes on ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ προῆλθεν in § 10; εἶπε καὶ ... ἐγένετο in
§ (§ 50), and εἴπευ ὁ θεὸς, καὶ ἑη in § (§ 11); ἔχαρε δὲ ὁ θεὸς κ.τ.λ. in § (§ 5); δημοσιονίας in § 21); and the word θρόνος in § 17 may have come from a Jewish source. It is therefore not unlikely that throughout his narrative of the demιurγία the author was more or less influenced by Genesis ch. 1, as well as by the Timaeus.

I can find no evidence that anything in the teaching of Exc. XXIII was derived from Christian sources.

Date. The intermixture of Platonic and Stoic conceptions in the Kore Kosmu, and more especially the writer's dependence on Posidonius in his doctrine concerning the souls, makes any date earlier than 50 B.C. impossible. We may therefore begin by setting down as the extreme limits 50 B.C. on the one hand, and A.D. 500 (the approximate date of Stobaeus) on the other. But we should most likely be right in striking off two hundred years at either end of this long period, and fixing on A.D. 150 as the terminus a quo, and A.D. 300 as the terminus ante quem.

There is one thing which seems to tell somewhat in favour of a more definite date. In my note on § 61, I have pointed out the resemblance between the petition of the Elements in this document and the prophecy of Hermes in Ascl. Lat. III. 24 b-26 a. The writer of the Kore Kosmu, like the writer of Ascl. Lat. III, is endeavouring to uphold the established worship of the gods of Egypt, and does so by describing, in similar language, the disastrous results of ἀθεότητα, which, according to both alike, not only causes mutual slaughter among men, but also tends to produce disorder in the world of nature. (See Kore Kosmu 63, where it is implied that the Elements were on the point of abandoning their functions in disgust at the misdeeds of men, and compare this with Ascl. Lat. III. 25, tunc nec terra constabit &c.) Now a man would not be likely to write thus in defence of the established cults unless he knew or thought that some attack on them was to be feared. The danger which the writer of Ascl. Lat. III had in view was the spread of Christianity, which he expected to result in the abolition of all Pagan cults. Is it not probable then that the author of the Kore Kosmu also wrote at a time when this same danger was already becoming apparent? As I have pointed out in the introduction to Ascl. Lat., this would indicate a date hardly before A.D. 260 at the earliest.

There is good reason for thinking that the distress of the author of Ascl. Lat. was intensified by the Palmyrene invasion of Egypt in A.D. 268, and that he wrote in the midst of the troubles to which
that invasion gave rise. The calmer tone of the *Kore Kosmu* would agree very well with the assumption that it was written shortly before the Palmyrene invasion, at a time when the aggressive temper of the Christians was beginning to give pious Pagans cause for apprehension, but when Egypt was enjoying an interval of repose after preceding troubles. On that assumption, the calamities endured by the Alexandrians in A.D. 262–263, and described in the letters of bishop Dionysius (Euseb. *H. E.* 7. 21 ff.), would be still recent, and would be vividly pictured in the writer’s memory; and that might account for the resemblance between the complaints of the Elements in the *Kore Kosmu* and the bishop’s descriptions of the state of things in Egypt. For this reason, a date between A.D. 263 and 268 may perhaps be thought a little more probable than any other; but the argument is not one to which much weight ought to be attached.

Excerpts XXIV, XXV, and XXVI were presumably written by members of the same group of Egyptian worshippers of Isis, and cannot be far separated in date from *Exc. XXIII*.

**Title.** The superscription in Stobaeus tells us that *Exc. XXIII* is an extract from a book written by Hermes Trismegistus, and entitled *Kşeip Kσσμου*. What is the meaning of this title? It has sometimes been translated ‘The virgin of the world’. But that is certainly wrong. *Kσρη* means, not a virgin, but a girl or young woman; and if the word is to be understood in that sense, *Kσρη Kσσμου* could only mean ‘Daughter of the Kosmos’. But to whom could that term be applied? Certainly not to Isis, who, as described in this document, is not daughter of the Kosmos, and who, moreover, is here depicted neither as a virgin nor as a girl, but as a matron, wife of Osiris, and mother of a glorious son.

Since *Kσρη* in the sense of ‘girl’ is inappropriate, we must take the word in its other sense, and understand the title to mean ‘The pupil of the eye of the Kosmos’. But who or what was denoted by that term, it is difficult to guess.

1 Athena, for instance, is called Διόδ Κσρη (daughter of Zeus), Aesch. *Eum. 415*; and the Eumenides are called Γης τε καλ Σκότου κόραι (daughters), Soph. *O. C. 40*.

2 In § 65, she is spoken of as an ‘efflux’ of the supreme God.

3 It is possible, however, that those who used the term in this sense sometimes bore in mind the other meaning of *κόρη* also. Cf. Plut. *De facie in orbe lunae* 27. 3, 942 d: Κόρη δι καλ Φοινίκη εὐλητήν (ἡ ἐν σελήνη τεθει· τὸ μὲν [ἐκ Φοινίκης] ἐν φωσφόροι εὐσα, Κόρη δὲ, δεῖ (τὸ ἑλιοῦ φέγγος ἀντιλάμμαχον τῇ σελήνῃ) τὸ ἐμμένος καὶ τοῦ ἐμμάτως (τὸ) ἐκ ἑλιοῦ ἀντιλάμμαχο τοῦ βλέφαρος [δοντερ] τοῦ ἑλιοῦ φέγγος ἀνορᾶται τῇ σελήνῃ) κόρην προσαγορεύομεν. That passage shows that Plutarch could easily have found a reason for calling the Moon-goddess Κσρη Kσσμου; but there is no evidence that he or any other Greek ever did call her by that name.
The sun was often called 'the eye of heaven', both in Greek poetry and in Egyptian documents; and as Horus was one of the numerous deities whom the Egyptians identified with the sun, he might very well be called 'the eye (ὀφθαλμός) of the Kosmos', and perhaps even 'the eye-pupil (κόρη) of the Kosmos'. But the fact that Horus takes part in the dialogue as a disciple of his mother Isis is hardly a sufficient reason for using a name of Horus as the title of the book.

Brugsch, *Rel. und Myth. der alten Aeg.* p. 81, says that the name Osiris meant (or might be taken to mean) 'the power of the eye-pupil', or 'powerful is the eye-pupil', and that the Egyptians understood 'the eye-pupil', in his connexion, to mean the sun. If so, perhaps Osiris might be called κόρη κόσμου.

Hathor of Tentyra is called in inscriptions 'the pupil of the eye of the light-god Ra', 'the female sun, the head of the light-god Ra', and 'the right pupil of the two pupils of the holy eye'. It seems therefore that the name 'eye-pupil of the universe' might be applied to Hathor; and if to Hathor, perhaps to Isis also.

It is most likely then that κόρη κόσμου is an appellation of some particular god or goddess. But we do not know which out of many possible deities was called by this name; nor do we know why the book was thus entitled. It must be remembered, however, that we have only the Excerpt given by Stobaeus; if the whole book were before us, both the meaning of the title and its

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1 Cf. *περιλαμὴ τε, ὀφθαλμοὶ θεῶν, ἀστρά,* in *Kore Kosm 34.
2 *The eye of Horus* is a term which occurs very frequently in Egyptian documents, and was used in some cryptic sense in the ritual formulae of Egyptian worship. But to speak of the eye of Horus is not the same as to call Horus himself an eye; and to call him an eye is not quite the same as to call him the pupil of an eye.

3 *Us-iri*; in Coptic, *οτσίpe.* The second part of the word (-iri) was represented in hieroglyphic writing by the picture of an eye. Brugsch says that in late times the name was sometimes written *Us-rā* (i.e. with a picture of the sun in place of that of an eye).

4 Brugsch *ib.* pp. 118 and 132.
5 The possibility of a different interpretation of the term κόρη κόσμου is suggested by the words of Plutarch, *Is. et Os. 33: τὴν Ἀγαθον, ἐν τοῖς (ταῖς Reitzenstein) μαλαττίται μαλαττίων ὄφοις, ἄφθαρτα μόνας τῶν ὀφθαλμοῖς, Χαίμαν καλοῦσιν.* (Erman, *Aeg. Glossar,* says that in the Egyptian language *km,* Coptic *kākā,* meant 'black'; and *km-ri,* Coptic *kākā,* meant 'Egypt'.) Assuming that the same Egyptian word meant both 'the land of Egypt' and 'the black of the eye', it is conceivable that Egypt might be called 'the eye-pupil of the universe'. Ebers ("Die Körpermitte in Allägyptischen," *Abh. d. k. bayr. Akad.* 1897, p. 111) quotes from an ancient text found at Edfu 'Egypt (lit. the Black), which is so called after the eye of Osiris, for it is his pupil'. (Mead, *Thrice Greatest Hermes,* III, p. 158.)
connexion with the contents of the dialogue might be less obscure.¹

See note on § ⁵(50).

((§ 32. Πρόσεχε, τέκνον Ὠρε . . . σὺ παρ’ ἐμοῦ.)) In the MSS.,
the Excerpt begins with the words ταῦτα εἰσοίσθα Ἰσίς (§ 1). A
passage containing something said by Isis must therefore have
preceded; but as we are told in § 1 that Isis begins her discourse
(τοῦ λόγου ἔρχεται) in § 2, the missing passage cannot have amounted
to more than a few sentences.

Now § 32 is evidently out of place where it stands in the MSS.
It must have stood at or near the beginning of a dialogue in which
Isis gave instruction to Horus; and if we put it here, ταῦτα εἰσοίσθα
κ.τ.λ. follows quite satisfactorily.

κρυπτής γὰρ ἐπακούεις (ἐπακούεις;) θεωρίας, ἡς ὁ μὲν προτάτωρ
Καμήφις (ἦν ἀρχηγότης, Ἑρμῆς δὲ) ((παρὰ τοῦ πάντων προγενεστέρου
Καμήφεως)) ἔτυχεν ἐπακούεις, (ἦν δὲ) παρὰ Ἑρμοῦ.
Καμήφις is a
name of the Egyptian god Khnum, whom Greeks called the Agathos
Daimon. In the sentence as given in the MSS., the words παρὰ
τοῦ πάντων προγενεστέρου Καμήφεως are meaningless, and the words
Καμήφις ἔτυχεν ἐπακούεις παρὰ Ἑρμοῦ yield an impossible meaning.
If Kamephis was the 'forefather' of the other persons mentioned,
and 'older than all' of them (πάντων προγενεστέροις), how could he
have been a pupil of Hermes, his junior and descendant? There
can be little doubt that here, as elsewhere, the Agathos Daimon
was spoken of as the teacher from whom Hermes learnt the gnosis,
and that what Isis said was 'Kamephis taught the doctrine to
Hermes; Hermes taught it to me;'² and I will now teach it to you.'

¹ Dieterich, Abraxas, p. 110, n. 1, speaking of 'the coin (Münze) which is
published as no. 13 by Engel in Bull. de corr. hellénique VIII', says that it bears
the inscription ΚΟΡΦ ΚΟΚ; and he takes this to mean ΚΟΡΦ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ.
Dieterich's note gave me some hope of finding a portrait of the Kore Kosmu.
But that hope was vain; for I cannot accept his reading of the inscription. The things
dealt with in Engel's article are not coins, but leaden tesserae; and the tessera in
question is not no. 13, but no. 68, which Engel describes as follows: 'ΚΟΡΥ—ΚΟΣ.
Némésis debout tenant un frein; à ses pieds une roue.— Rev. AIA (pour AIA<ov)
ΠΥΡ—ΦΟ—ΠΟΥ. Autel, le tout dans une couronne.—Corcyra, ville de Cilicie!'
In Engel's reproduction of the obverse, one sees a standing human figure, with a
wheel beside its right foot, and something (which does not look like 'a bridle') in
its left hand; and the letters ΟΡΥ ΚΟΚ (not ΟΡΥ ΚΟΣ) are quite plain and un-
mistakeable. A letter which stood before ΟΡΥ is almost completely obliterated;
and the little that is left of it is (if Engel's copy may be trusted) more like the
bottom of a Ψ than the bottom of a Κ. The inscription on the obverse then is not
νομος νομοῦ. The only intelligible word on the tessera is νομοφόρον on the reverse.

² It was commonly said that Isis learnt from Hermes. Diodorus (1. 27) gives
an epitaph of Isis (regarded as a mortal woman) which was said to have been
found 'at Nysa in Arabia'; it begins thus: 'Εγὼ Ἰσίς εἷμι ἡ βασιλεία ἡ πόλις χωρίς,
ἡ θεοδεσία ἤδη Ἑρμοῦ.'
The text has been thrown into confusion by the shifting of παρὰ τοῦ
... Καμήφους.

'Ερμου τοῦ [πάνων ἑργῶν] ὑπομνηματογράφου. Καμήφους taught the
doctrine orally to Hermes; but Hermes was the first to set it down
in writing. (Cf. § 5, and Corp. XII, i. 8.) In § 43, Hermes is called
θεῖον ὑπομνηματογράφος.

καὶ τῷ τελείῳ μέλαν ἑτίμησεν. 'At the time when he
honoured me with the perfect ink.' That is nonsense. Wachsmuth
supposes that the 'ink' is that with which Hermes wrote his books.
But if the writer had meant to make Isis say 'at the time when
he permitted me to read the books which he had written', he
would surely have found some better way of expressing that
meaning.

Reitzenstein, Poimandres, p. 139, quotes from a magic papyrus
(Wessely, Denkschr. d. k. k. Akademie 1893, p. 37, l. 500) the
words ἐνυκαλοῦμαι σε, κυριά Ισή, ἤ συνεχόμενον ὑ' Αγαθος Δαίμων
βασιλεύων ἐν τῷ τελείῳ μέλαν. The occurrence of the words τῷ
teleioi melain in the papyrus is significant, as it seems to exclude
the hypothesis that their presence in the Kore Kosmu is due merely
to corruption of the text.1 But that passage gives little help towards
the explanation of the phrase.2

1 A satisfactory sense could be got by writing τοῖς τελεῖοι τῶν μεγάλων (or τῷ
teleioi τῷ μεγάλῳ) ἑτίμεσθαι. (τῷ τελειῷ τῷ μεγάλῳ would be nearer to the reading
of the MSS.; but it is usually τέλειοι, plural, and not τέλειος, singular, that is used
in the sense of 'initiation'.)

2 Reitzenstein ib. begins his attempt to explain the passage by saying (if I under
stand him rightly) that τῷ τελείοι μέλαν means the land of Egypt; and in support
of this, he refers to Plut. Is. et Os. 33: τὸν Ἀγαθόν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις μελαγγείοις
οὐκ ἦσσε ὅτι τὸ μέλαν τοῦ ὑδαθλοῦ Κηφινοῦ καλούσα. (But it may be objected that,
even if we assume that τὸ μέλαν could mean the black earth', and that 'the black
earth' could mean the land of Egypt', the epithet τελείου remains unexplained.)

But to this Reitzenstein appends a different and inconsistent interpretation of the
phrase, namely, that τῷ τελείοι μέλαν means, not the land of Egypt, but a particular
part of that land, viz. the district in which Syene was situated, and which was called
the Dodekaschoinos. He refers to an inscription in which it is said that king Doser
gave this district to the god Khnum; he mentions the known facts that in early
times the chief seat of the cult of Khnum was in that region, and that in the time
of the Ptolemies the cult of Khnum had been partly superseded there by that of
Isis; he assumes the existence of a 'priestly tradition of Syene' that Khnum had,
by a definite act, transferred his rights over the district to Isis (natürlich muss der
Gott es ihr freiwillig überlassen, sich mit ihr vereinigt haben'); and he takes
both the words ἤ συνεχόμενον ὑ' Αγαθος Δαίμων βασιλεύων ἐν τῷ τελείῳ μέλαν in
the magic papyrus, and the words ἤτοι ἐμὲ καὶ τῷ τελείῳ μέλαν ἑτίμησεν in the
Kore Kosmu, to refer to that transfer.

Against this it may be said that in the first place Reitzenstein brings forward no
date evidence to show that any such tradition existed; in the second place,
assuming the tradition of a transfer of the Dodekaschoinos from Khnum to Isis to
I am inclined to suspect that εἴμυρος is a corruption of εἴμυσος, and that the words refer to a τελετή, i.e. a sacramental initiation, by which the instructor of Isis prepared her for the reception of the secret doctrine which he was about to impart to her. If the words τῷ τελείῳ μέλαν are sound, we may suppose them to have signified something which had to do with the ritual of the sacrament spoken of; but their meaning is unknown to us.

§ I. ἔγγει πρῶτον ὦρα γλυκὸ τῇ ποτῶν (ἔγγει ποτῶν ὦρα γλυκὸν τῷ πρῶτῳ MSS.) ἀμβροσίας. ποτῶν ἀμβροσίας means a draught of a liquid which makes those who drink it immortal. Isis then makes Horus immortal by giving him this draught. Cf. Diodorus i. 25: (φασὶ δ' ἀληττοί τῷ Ἠρώτῳ εἰρέων... τῷ τῆς ἀβανασίας φάρμακον, δι' οὗ τον νιόν ὤραν, ὑπὸ τῶν Τιτάνων (i.e. the followers of Set) ἐπιβουλεύθηντα καὶ νεκρῶν ἐφέβηντα... μὴ μόνον ἀναστήσας, δοῦσα τῷ νησὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ἀβανασίᾳ ποιήσας μεταλαβεῖν. Ὀξυρυχνύς Παρ. (1915) no. 1380, l. 242 (addressed to Isis): οὗ τὸν μέγαν Ὀσἱμν ἀβάνατον ἐποίησας, δι' ἡμῶν δὲ καὶ ὤραν.

The notion that immortality is to be got by drinking something existed in many different cults. It was probably derived from sacramental rites, in which the worshippers drank blood, wine, or some other liquid, and thereby received into themselves the substance of their god. And the mention of such a draught here makes it probable that a sacrament of this nature was in use in the cult of Isis at the time when the passage was written. We are told that Isis administered a draught to Horus before she revealed the secret doctrine to him. Why is this said? Perhaps because it was usual for a teacher to give a sacramental draught to his pupil on a like occasion. It may have been the rule in the writer's community that those to whom the gnostis is to be revealed must first be made worthy of that high privilege by 'receiving the sacrament'.

If Horus needs a 'draught of ambrosia' to make him immortal, it seems to follow that he is a mortal. And if so, it is to be presumed that his mother Isis also either is or has been a mortal. (See Exc. XXV. 1 and 9, and Exc. XXVI. 12 and 13.) We may take it then that in this paragraph the scene is laid on earth, and that Horus is a have existed, there is no reason why Khnum should have chosen the occasion of that transfer to reveal the gnostis to her; and in the third place, it was probably not from Khnum, but from Hermes, that Isis was supposed by the writer of this section (as by other people) to have learnt the gnostis.

1 On this assumption, Mead's translation, 'when he did honour me with the Black [Rite] that gives perfection', might be accepted as giving something like the probable meaning.
young king of Egypt; and we may suppose either that Isis is a living woman, holding the position of queen-mother and regent, or that she has died and gone to heaven, and now, having become a goddess, revisits and instructs her mortal son. (Compare what is said about the gods Asclepius, Hermes, and Isis in Ascl. Lat. III. 37.)

§ (32) does not conflict with this view, but rather confirms it; for the passing down of the gnosia from Kamephis to Hermes, from Hermes to Isis, and from Isis to Horus is more easily understood if the persons spoken of are human beings than if they are gods. Assuming that they are human beings, the writer must have regarded Kamephis, whom he calls the πρωτάρων, as the founder of the dynasty.

On the other hand, in the narrative which begins at § (50), Isis neither is nor has been a mortal woman, but is a goddess, who, after having been sent down to earth, and having resided there for a time, has returned to her home in heaven. See note on § (50).

§ 2. The Kosmos is divided into two parts, viz. ‘the things above’ (i.e. heaven and its contents) and ‘the things below’ (i.e. the sublunar world); and it is asserted that ‘the things below’ are subject to ‘the things above’, and must
have been set in order by them; i.e. that, so far as chaos has been reduced to order in the sublunar world, that order must have resulted from the action of heaven, or the gods of heaven, on the things below.

The contrast between ‘the things above’ and ‘the things below’ is similar to that between τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ and τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς in the Periochæ of Exc. XI.

The many στέφη of heaven are the orbits of the heavenly bodies. 

καὶ κατ’ οἴδενα τότων στερομένου τινὸς ὕπνος ἐκ νῦν ὁ σύμπας ἔχει κόσμος1. I cannot understand this. Why σύμπας? And the contrast between ‘then’ and ‘now’, which is implied by the word νῦν, seems in-appropriate.

A better sense might be got by writing καὶ τὸν σύμπαντος κόσμον κατ’ οἴδενα τότων στερομένου τινὸς ὑπὲρ ἔχει. Every part of the Kosmos (i.e. not only heaven, but the sublunar world also) has been supplied with what it needs (or in other words, συγκεκριμένα as καὶ πεπλήρωται); and if the sublunar world has been ‘set in order, and filled (with living organisms)’, this must have been done by the agency of ‘the things above’.

οὗ γὰρ δύνατα (τὰ κάτω) κοσμῆσαι [[ ]] τὸν ὑπὲρθεν [δια]-κόσμον. τὸν ὑπὲρθεν κόσμον, ‘the world above’, is a synonym for τὰ ὑπερκείμενα. Cf. Exc. XI. 2 (41) as emended: οὐδὲν ὕφελείται τὰ ἐν οὐράνῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς πάντα ὕφελείται τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν οὐράνῳ.

ἀνάγκη τοιῶν τοῖς κρείσσοις μυστηρίοις εἰσεῖν τὰ ὕλασσονα. These words cannot have anything to do with the distinction between τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια and τὰ μεγάλα μυστήρια, the two stages of the Eleusinian initiation. The word μυστήρια (‘holy powers’) is repeatedly used in the Kore Kosmu to denote the stars or the star-gods (see § 3 and § 51); but what are the μυστήρια of the sublunar world? Perhaps μυστηρίοι ought to be bracketed.

κρείσσον δὲ (ἡ F) τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἢ τῶν μετεώρων ἢ τὰ κρείσσονες. Compare the term οἱ κρείσσονες, frequently used to signify ‘the gods’.

ἡ τῶν μετεώρων τάξις, ‘the order (i.e. rank or class) of things on high’, is equivalent to τὰ ὑπερκείμενα. The word διάταξις (‘arrangement’ or ‘disposition’) is less suitable.

καὶ τῷ παντὶ ἄσφαλθε [τῇ], καὶ θυητῶν ὅχι ὑποπίπτουσα διανοία. The connexion of thought between these words and what precedes is far from clear. It might perhaps be said that ‘the things above’

1 802-3
are incomprehensible to mortal men (though there is some inconsistency in saying so in a discourse the very purpose of which is to make men comprehend them); but even if we admit this to be true, there is no apparent reason for asserting it here.

Perhaps the author wrote something like τὰ παντὶ ἀσφαλῆς ὁδὸν, καὶ θανάτῳ οὐχ ὑποπίπτοντα. 'The things above' are κρείνονα, because they are not subject to change and death, as are the things below.

§§ 3–8. ἔθελεν ἐσπεραξαίων . . . (ἐν)τεμενίζεται ἠώμοι. This passage describes the origin of the Hermetic gnosis. It may be summarized as follows. 'At first, men did not know God. They looked up at the sky, and were struck with fear when they looked at it; they asked questions, but could not answer them. But after a time, God decided to make himself known to men; and so He put into certain men, who were of higher nature than the common sort, both the will to seek Him and the power to find Him. And of these men the first and greatest was Hermes. Hermes found out the truth, and wrote it down in books; but he hid the books which he had written. When he departed to heaven, he left his son Tat to succeed him as a teacher upon earth; and Tat was followed by Asclepius and others. But Tat had learnt from his father only a part of the true doctrine; the rest lay hidden in the books of Hermes, to be discovered anew in a later age.'

This passage has no connexion with § 2, and cannot have been written to follow it. It ought rather to precede any such exposition of doctrine as is begun in § 2. It deals with the same subject as § (32), which I have placed before § 1; but it deals with it in a different way, and is inconsistent with that section. According to § (32) (as emended), the first teacher of the gnosis was Kamephis; Hermes learnt it from Kamephis, and transmitted it to Isis; and Isis passed it on to Horus. In §§ 3–8, on the other hand, there is no mention of Kamephis; Hermes discovers the truth for himself, unaided, except by divine inspiration; part of the truth which he has discovered he conceals, and the rest he transmits to his fellow-men, not through Isis and Horus, but through Tat, Asclepius, 'and others'. It is evident then that § 32 and §§ 3–8 cannot have originally belonged to the same document.

It seems incongruous that Isis should give her son Horus information about Tat, Asclepius, and other successors of Hermes.
What have they to do with him, or he with them? Isis and Hermes are apparently regarded as contemporaries; if so, the successors of Hermes belong to later generations, and it is an anachronism to make her talk about them as if she were narrating past events. This suggests a suspicion that the passage (§§ 3–8), in its original form, was not put into the mouth of Isis. If we cut out the words άτείνατον ἄξιοθαυμαστον ὸμει in § 5, and άτείνατον in § 8,1 we have in §§ 3–8 such a narrative of the origin and early history of the gnosis as might have been given by a writer speaking in his own person, or attributed to an imaginary speaker of a later age than Hermes and his first successors; and it is possible that the words by which Isis is made the speaker were added by the man who inserted the passage into the Kore Kosmu.

§ 3. (. . .) ἐνθέν ἐστέναζον (ἐστεναζε MSS.) τά κάτω1 φόβον ἔχοντες (ἔχοντα MSS.). As the beginning of the paragraph is lost, we do not know to what ἐνθέν referred. A satisfactory sense might be got by inserting here (with a slight alteration) the detached fragment which in the MSS. stands at the beginning of § 53, and writing ((καὶ μὴν ἄγνωστα ἦν καὶ ἀρχάς πάντα πάσιν τοῖς ἐκεί γῆς (οὐ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις))1 ἐνθέν ἐστέναζον κ.τ.λ. (Cf. ἄγνωσια καταίχε τά σύμπαντα in § 4 init.). Men did not know that all things have been made by God, and are subject to His will; and consequently they dreaded the unknown powers the working of which they saw around them.

It is clear from what follows that those who 'moaned' and 'were afraid' were the men of early times; therefore, if τά κάτω is the subject of the verb, it must mean 'the men who lived on earth'. But the use of the neuter to express that meaning would be strange. See note on § 4.

(ἄμα 8 ἔθαυμαζον;) τὴν περικαλλὴ (τάξιν; οὐ ἄριστον;) καὶ εἰς ἐκ διαμονὴν τῶν ἐπικειμένων. Primitive man could see the beauty of the heavens; but he could not, by looking at the heavenly bodies, find out that they were destined to last for ever. It may therefore be suspected that καὶ εἰς ἐκ διαμονὴν is an interpolation.

'Ἡν γὰρ ἄξιον θεωρίας ὅμω καὶ ἄγνωσις1 ὁμοῦ κ.τ.λ. The state of mind which the writer is describing is a mixture of admiration and

1 Indeed, it is only the two words ἄξιοθαυμαστον ὸμει that make it absolutely necessary to take the passage to be spoken by Isis; for any teacher might say ἀτείνατον in speaking to his pupil.
terror. But these words are puzzling. The thing seen might be called ἀξιὸν θεωρίας, 'well worth looking at'; but could it be called ἀξιὸν ἀγωνίας, 'worth painful effort'? And the act of seeing (ὄραν) could not properly be called either the one or the other. The passage might be made more intelligible by cutting out ἣν γὰρ ..., ἀγωνίας (which may perhaps be a marginal note), and altering ὀρᾶν into ὀρῶντες.

ὄραν οὐρανοῦ κάλλος [[θερ]] (ἡλίων) καταφωτιζόμενον (καταφαταξόμενον MSS.) [[τῷ ἐν ἀγνώστῳ]], παραπλησίαν (πλουσίων MSS.) τε νυκτὸς ομοιότηται, ὀλάττων μὲν ἡλίου ὄξει δὲ πυρφορομένης (προσφορομένη MSS.) φωτὶ. The writer speaks of the sky first as seen by day, and then as seen by night. From the words ὀλάττων ..., ἡλίου ..., φωτὶ in the description of the night-sky, it may be inferred that the light of the sun was spoken of in the earlier part of the sentence; I have therefore written (ἡλίῳ) καταφωτιζόμενον in place of the meaningless καταφαταξόμενον. A mention of 'the yet unknown God' (θεῷ ..., τῷ ἐν ἀγνώστῳ) may very well have occurred somewhere in §§ 3–8, but is out of place in this sentence; and as the phrase is just what is wanted to supply the missing object of the verbs ζητῶν and ἔρημον in § 4, I have inserted θεῶν τῶν ἐν ἀγνώστον there.

In place of προσφορομένης, I propose πυρφορομένης, 'lit up by torches borne along'. The stars look like torches carried by a crowd of men at night. Seeing that ὁρυφορεῖν is commonly used as a transitive verb, there is no reason why πυρφορεῖον should not be used in the same way, though I have not found an instance.

διὰ (τῷ) τῶν κρυπτῶν ἀπορροιῶν τὰ κάτω συγκοσμοῦταν καὶ συναιξόμενως. Could it be assumed that men were aware of these κρυπταὶ ἀπόρροιαι at a time when ἀγωνία κατείχε τὰ σύμπαντα? Primitive man could see the stars, and might perhaps notice that their movements are periodic; (the regularity with which they sweep across the sky night after night is evident enough, though an exact knowledge of their periodic changes of position could be got only by long and careful observation;) but the theory of their 'secret effluences' belongs rather to that gnosis of which Hermes was the originator. There is therefore some reason to suspect that these words, as well as καὶ εἰς δεὶ διαμονῆς above, have been added by a transcriber.

καὶ οὕτως (ἀγνώστῳ) ψάλτῃ μὲν ἑπάλληλον (ψάλτῃ μὲν ἑπάλληλος MSS.), ζητήσεις δὲ (τῷ MSS.) ἄληκτοι (ἀλ. ἄδεκτοι). The first results of men's observation of the heavens were 'fears' and 'questionings'.

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Men feared the unknown, and sought to know it; but, till Hermes came, they sought in vain.

§ 4. ἔρωτα ἐνεφώσῃσε θείοις τιεὶν ἀνθρώποις.—(ἔρωτας ἐνθουσίασε θεῖος MSS.). Perhaps a genitive (e.g. γνώσεως or σοφίας) has been lost after ἔρωτα. At any rate, the ἔρως spoken of is a passionate desire for knowledge of God.

ἐνθουσίας is an intransitive verb, meaning 'to be ἐνθεός', i.e. 'to have a god inside one', and so 'to be inspired'. ἐνθουσίασε then is impossible here. The sense required could be got by writing either ἐνέπνεον or ἐνεφώσῃσε; but the latter involves a smaller change. A similar correction must be made in § 18, where the MSS. give καὶ ζωστοῖον ἐνθουσίας.

If we retain θεός, the reading of the MSS., it is implied that Hermes (who, as we are told in § 5 and § 8, was the first discoverer of the gnosis,) was a god at the time when he made the discovery. But that is certainly wrong. The writer of §§ 3–8 thought of Hermes as a man living like other men on earth, and assumed that he became a god only when he departed to heaven after hiding his books. In this very sentence, the words αὐτὴν ἠχθαν ἐν υἱοῖς στέρνοις πλείονα ταῖς τούτων ἕχαρισαν διανοίας are more suitable if said of men than if said of gods. And there is plenty of other evidence also. The ψυχὴ συμπάθειαν ἠχόνα τοῖς οὐρανοῖς μυστηρίους (§ 5) must be a human soul; gods are themselves celestial μυστήρια. Hermes wrote his books on earth, and hid them on earth; for in § 8 he says that they are to remain for a long time undiscovered by 'those who go to and fro on the plains of this land'. When his work was done, he 'ascended to the stars' (§ 6), 'departed to heaven' (§ 7), and 'entered the sanctuary of the everlasting zones' (§ 8); he must therefore, until then, have been living upon earth. And when he died and went to heaven, he left his son Tat,—evidently a man and not a god,—to succeed him here below.

On the other hand, there are, besides θεός in § 4, two phrases which, as given in the MSS., appear to imply that Hermes was a god at the time spoken of. These are τοῦτο δ... οὐκ ἂν ἐπὶ θυγνῆς στοράς ἔγενεν, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν οὐδὲπω, in § 5, and ἀφθάρτων... μοῦ ἑσπόνας (χείρων ᾧ Μείνεκε) in § 8. But in § 5 the traditional text is unintelligible; and in § 8 it seems to me certain that the right reading is φθάρτων, and not ἀφθάρτων. We must conclude then that the writer of §§ 3–8 regarded Hermes as a man, and that the three phrases which seem to tell against that view are due either to
accidental corruption of the text or to intentional alteration. It is possible that a transcriber assumed that the Hermes of §§ 3-8 must be the god Hermes who is spoken of later on in the *Kore Kosmu* (§ 26 ff.), and altered the words at these three points to make them agree with that mistaken assumption.¹

I have therefore expressed what I take to have been the author's meaning by writing θεῖος τινῶν ἀνθρώπων in place of θεῖος. Hermes and his successors were θεῖοι ἀνθρώπων; i. e. they were not gods, but men who 'were in sympathy with the mysteries of heaven' (§ 5), and were therefore better qualified than other men to 'search out the secrets of the heavenly *theoria* ' (§ 6).

αὐτὴν ὡς εἶχον (αὐτὴν ὡς εἶχεν MSS.) ἐν στέρνοις πλείονα ταῖς τοῦτων ἐχαρίσατο διανοίας. These men had some 'light' in their breasts already; but God gave them more. αὐτὴν ταῖς τοῦτων ἐχαρίσατο διανοίας is equivalent to ἐφώτισεν αὐτοῖς. Cf. Plut. *De Pyth. orac.* 7, 397 c, concerning the inspiration of the Pythia: (ὁ θεὸς) φῶς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιεί πρὸς τὸ μέλλον; ὁ γὰρ ἐνθυωμασμὸς τοιούτων ἐστι.

Τά (ὁθεῖος) (τῶν ἐπὶ ἄρωσιν) πρῶτον μὲν ζητεῖν θελήσωσιν, εἶτα (ὅκαί) ἐπιθυμήσωσιν εὑρεῖν (εἶτα καὶ κατορθώσαι) διενήθωσι. ἐπιθυμήσωσιν εὑρεῖν is a pointless repetition of ζητεῖν θελήσωσιν; and κατορθώσαι διενήθωσι, 'be able to succeed', is intolerably feeble. Altered as I propose, the words give precisely the sense required. God gave them both the will to seek Him, and power to find Him. (τὴν θυσίαν and τὸν κόσμον correspond respectively to ξυστα (γνώσεως) and αὐτῇ.

§ 5. τοῦτο ὣς... οὖσαν (ἡμῖν) ἔγγυνει [ ] ψυχή [ ] συμμεθέλησαν ἡγομένα τοῖς οὐδέποτε μυστηρίοις—(τοῦτο ὣς... οὖσαν ἐπὶ θυσίαν στοράς ἔγγυνει, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν οὐδέποτε, ψυχής ὥς τὴν συμμεθέλησαν ἡγομένα τοῖς οὐδέποτε μυστηρίοις MSS.). With my corrections, this means 'It would not have been possible for mortal men to discover the truth, if there had not arisen among them a soul capable of being affected by heavenly influences; and such a one was Hermes.'

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν οὐδέποτε appears to mean 'for as yet there was no θυσία στορά in existence', i. e. 'men had not yet been made'. We may

¹ Perhaps the puzzling phrase τὰ κάτω in § 3 ini. may be accounted for in the same way. We may suppose that the author of §§ 3-5 wrote in § 3 some term denoting men, and that the same person who made the other alterations changed that term into the vague neuter τὰ κάτω, because he thought that 'no men yet existed' at the time spoken of. Who were the beings, other than men, that he imagined to have been frightened at the sight of the sky, it is difficult to guess; possibly the elements, which are personified later on in the *Kore Kosmu* (§ 56 ff.).
suppose these words to have been inserted by some one who mistakently thought §§ 3–8 to be the beginning of a continuous narrative which ran on through the whole of the Kore Kosmu, and in which the incidents followed one another throughout in chronological order. This person saw that the making of men comes later in the book (§§ 14–42), and thence inferred that, at the time when Hermes (whom he took to be a god) discovered the gnosis, there were no men in existence.

κατανοήσας ἵκνυε δηλώσας [τε καὶ δεῖξαι]. (…) καὶ γὰρ ἐνόησεν ἐξάραξε, καὶ χαράξας ἐκρυψεν ᾿(δάσφαλός), τὰ πλείστα σιγήσας. 'He had power to make the gnosis known; for he wrote it down, and hid what he had written, leaving most of the truth untold.' There is a want of sequence here. What is the point of γὰρ? If the sentence had ended at ἐξάραξε, we might have supposed that it was his knowledge of writing (of which he was said to have been the inventor) that gave Hermes power to make the gnosis known; i.e. that he made it known by means of his books. But as we are told that he hid the books, that explanation is excluded, and γὰρ is unintelligible. In order to make sense, we must assume that something like οὐ μὴν οὖν ἀπερισκέπτως ἐδείξε has been lost before καὶ γὰρ. He had power to make it known; but he thought fit to make known only the smaller part of it (which he taught orally to Tat and others).

tὰ πλείστα σιγήσας [[δάσφαλός]] [ἡ λαλήσας]. This seems to be a mixture of two alternative readings, viz. τὰ πλείστα σιγήσας, and πλείονα σιγήσας ἡ λαλήσας.

§ 6. τοὺς συγγενεῖς θεῶς ἄνθρωποι ἄναβαινεν ἐὶς ἄστρα. Hermes was summoned to quit the earth, and become one of the escort or attendants of the gods who dwell in heaven. In plainer language, he was warned of his approaching death; but the writer, holding death to be merely a change of abode and condition, prefers not to say straight out that Hermes died.1

Hermes is a θεῖος ἄνθρωπος, and as such, he is 'akin' to the gods; but as long as he remains on earth, he is not one of them. If the writer had meant to class him as a god, he would have written τοὺς ἄλλους θεῶς rather than τοὺς συγγενεῖς θεῶς.

The imperfect ἄνεβαινεν is used here, and not the aorist ἄνεβη; the tense implies that his death was imminent, but had not yet taken place.

1 Cf. Corp. VIII. 1 b, where we are told that there is no such thing as death, and that θάνατος is a word without meaning.
This passage shows that the writer of §§ 3–8 knew some at least of the libelli entitled 'Ερμοῦ πρὸς Τάτ and 'Ερμοῦ πρὸς 'Ασκληπιόν. Among the 'other men' is probably included Ammon; and the writer may perhaps have had in mind more recent teachers also, such as Pythagoras and Plato.

Asklepiade (καὶ) Ῥμοῦθης, ὁ Π(τ)αύδης (τοῦ) καὶ Ἦφαιστου [βουλαίς]. Ο Πτανός is a certain correction of οἰκος, the reading of the MSS. Ῥμοῦθης is Imhotep, the native name of the Egyptian god whom the Greeks called 'Ασκληπιός; and Πτάς is Ptah, the native name of the Egyptian god whom the Greeks called Ῥμοῦθης. Imhotep was said to be son of Ptah. or καὶ is often used to couple together two different names of the same person. In illustration of its use in the case of Egyptian gods, Reitzenstein (Poim. p. 122) quotes C. I. Gr. 4893: Χνοῦβει τῷ καὶ Ἀμμων, Σάτα τῇ καὶ Ἡρα. Ἀνούκει τῇ καὶ Ἐστία, Πεπερασμένει τῷ καὶ Διονύσῳ, Πεπερασμένει τῷ καὶ Κρόνῳ, Πεπερασμένει τῷ καὶ Ἐρμεῖ.

The word βουλαίς must have slipped in through some mistake; possibly it may have come by duplication from βουλούμενης below.

§ 7. Ἐρμῆς μὲν οὖν ἄπελογείτο τῷ περιέχοντι ὥς ὁδῆ τῷ παιδί παρθένεκεν ὄλοτήλῃ (τῆς) θεωρίαν. ἄπελογείτο τῷ περιέχοντι is impossible. Hermes was under no accusation; he had no occasion to 'make his defence to the atmosphere', or to any one else; and what follows is not an ἄπελογία. Most likely these words are a corruption of something equivalent to ἀνέβαινεν εἰς ἀστρα. One might propose, for instance, Ἐρμῆς μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἀπελύσε τοῦ σκῆνος, ὁδῆ τῷ παιδί κ.τ.λ. (ἐπε δὲ οὕτως). Usener was the first to point out that the words Ἐγὼ κ.τ.λ. are spoken by Hermes. But he made the speech of Hermes end at στοιχεῖοις σύμβολα; I have included in it the following words (ἐπικατεύθυμοιν . . . ἀπέλθε(ί)ν) also.

Ἐγὼ δὴ [τῆς ἀνατολῆς γενόμενος] τοῖς πάντα βλέπουσιν ὀφθαλμῶς (τοῦ νοῦ) τὰ τῆς ἀνατολῆς ἡθελήσα θεωρήσα (τοιούτου τί θεωρήσαι τι θεωρήσα τι MSS.). I can find no meaning in τῆς ἀνατολῆς. It may be conjectured that τῆς ἀνατολῆς γενόμενος is a corruption of τῆς ἀντολῆς γενόμενος, which would be out of place here, but may perhaps have occurred in the missing passage which preceded πλησίον τῶν κ.τ.λ. below.

It seems necessary to add τοῦ νοῦ after ὀφθαλμῶς. It is only with

1 This name was sometimes written Θόας. Suidas: Θόας' ὁ Ἦφαιστος παρὰ Μεμβάται.

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‘the eyes of the mind’ that it is possible to see τὰ ἀεὶ, i.e. things which are invisible to the bodily eyes.

It is probable that ἀνατολής before θεώρησα has come by repetition from the preceding ἀνατολής, and has driven out some other word or phrase which originally stood here (e.g. τῶν ἀλλων οὐσιάς).

I have altered θεώρησαί τι into θεώρησα, and put a colon after ἀεὶ. The sense wanted might be got in another way, by accepting Heeren’s correction ἔμοι . . . θεώρησατι for ἔγω . . . θεώρησαί τι, and writing ἔμοι δὴ . . . τὰ τῆς ἀνατολῆς1 θεώρησατι ἀεὶδή [καὶ ἐπισκοποῦντι] . . . ἦλθεν ἡ ἀκριβῆς γνώσις. But this involves a larger alteration of the text. The present participle ἐπισκοποῦντι ought not to be coupled to the aorist θεώρησατι; it is therefore necessary, if we construct the sentence in this way, to assume that καὶ ἐπισκοποῦντι (ἐπισκοποῦντι MSS.) has been added by a blundering transcriber. If we take θεώρησα to be the true reading, it is possible that this was altered into θεώρησατι through the influence of the following ἐπισκοποῦντι, and that by a second error θεώρησατι was altered into θεώρησαί τι.

ἤλθεν ἡ ἀκριβῆς γνώσις (διάγνωσις MSS.). διάγνωσις is certainly wrong; γνώσις is the word required. It may be suspected that δια- is a corruption of ἰδία, which may very likely have occurred somewhere in the sentence, though the place where δια stands in the MSS. hardly seems the right position for ἰδία.

(. . . χρὴ μὲ) πλησίον τῶν Ὀσίριδος κρυφιῶν ἀποθέσατι τὰ ἱερὰ τῶν κοσμικῶν στοιχείων σύμβολα. The probable meaning of the missing words might be given by writing ‘and that knowledge I have written down in books; (ὦν δὲ, ἀνωθέν μοι (ἳς ἐν ἀνατολῆς γενομένης), χρὴ μὲ) πλησίον κ.τ.λ.’ Hermes has been warned that the hour appointed for his (death and) ‘departure to heaven’ is at hand, and has received command from God to hide his books before he departs.

The writings of Hermes are here called τῶν κοσμικῶν στοιχείων σύμβολα. The word στοιχεῖα meant ‘cosmic elements’; but it also meant ‘letters of the alphabet’. Democritus compared atoms to letters, and found in the composition of bodies out of atoms variously grouped and arranged an analogy to the formation of words by putting letters together.1 This comparison was borrowed from Democritus

by the Epicureans, and occurs repeatedly in Lucretius. Posidonius, arguing against the Epicureans, referred to it; his argument is reproduced in Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 93: ‘Hic ego non mirer esse quemquam qui sibi persuadeat corpora quaedam solida atque individualia vi et gravitate ferri, mundumque effici ornatisseum et pulcherrimum ex eorum corporum concursione fortuita? Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intellego cur non idem putet, si innumerables unius et viginti formae litterarum vel aerae vel quales libet aliquo coniciantur, posses ex iis in terram excussis Annales Ennii, ut deinceps legi possint, effici.’ Stoics and Platonists rejected the atomic theory of Epicurus; but there was no reason why they should not compare their own four elements to letters of an alphabet, and say that the universe is, as it were, a book written in that script,—not indeed a book produced by throwing letters together at random, as the Epicurean doctrine implied, but a book deliberately written by God. This thought would the more naturally present itself by reason of the double meaning of the word στοχεία; and it was probably some such thought that was in the mind of the author of this passage when he called the writings of Hermes ‘symbols of the cosmic elements’.

It is possible, however, that he was thinking more especially of the hieroglyphic script, which it was assumed that Hermes had used in his writings, and which he was reputed to have invented. The hieroglyphic signs, which might be called στοχεία (letters), are pictures of things; and it might be supposed, especially by those who could not read the writing, that each of these little pictures had some cryptic significance, and was a symbol of some religious or cosmological conception. Cf. Philo, *Vita Mos.* 1. 5. 23, Cohn IV, p. 125 (quoted by Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1. 23. 153): ἁρμαίους μὲν οὖν... καὶ μονωτήν τὴν σύμπασαν... Αἰγυπτῶν οἱ λόγοι παρεδόοσαν (τὸ Moses), καὶ προσέτη τὴν διὰ συμβόλων φιλοσοφιὰν, ἂν εν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἑρωΐς γράμμασιν (ἐν τοῖς ἑρωγλυφικοῖς γράμμασιν Clem.) ἐπιδείκνυνται. Clement *Strom.* 5. 7. 41 sg. gives instances of symbolic meanings of hieroglyphs (which he calls τὰ τῶν Ἀιγυπτίων αἰνίγματα); e.g. ἐν Διοσπόλει τῆς Αἰγύπτου ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑρωί καλομένου πυλῶν διατείκτωται παίδιον μὲν γενήσως σύμβολον, φθορᾶς δὲ ὁ γέρων, θεοῦ τε αὐτὸ ἦρα, ὥσ

1 See Diels *Elementum* 1–14, where the history of this comparison of atoms to letters is more fully set forth.
3 Diels 26, gives sufficient reasons for holding Posidonius to have been the source whence Cic. *N. D.* 2. 93 and similar passages in other authors were derived. The same argument occurs, for instance, in Plut. *De Pythiae oraculis* 11, 399 ε.
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Greek sacred writings connected with the cult of Osiris, or holy things of some other kind, e.g. parts of the body of Osiris. Whatever these ‘secret things’ may have been, they were probably kept, or believed to be kept, in some Egyptian temple. If any definite place is meant, it is most likely the temple and reputed burial-place of Osiris at Abydos.

For the notion that the books of Hermes had long remained hidden or buried, and had but recently been discovered and made known, cf. Syncellus I, p. 72 Dindorf: ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σαμαία μυστικῶν σημαίνομεν τὰ τῶν Οσίρης συμβολῶν δηλωτικόν εἶναι τοῦτον ἡ γνώμην καὶ ἀπογνώμην, θεοῦ μεγάλα ἀναλείπειν'. See also Clem. Strom.

It would be absurd to say that the writings were translated into Greek ‘after the Flood’; how could any one imagine that they were translated into Greek before the Flood, or even shortly after it? The traditional text may be accounted for by assuming that the words ἐρμηνευθεὶν τὰ τῆς ιερᾶς διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνιδα φωνῆν were accidentally omitted by a copyist, but were added in the margin, and that a later copyist put them back into the text, but placed them wrongly.

Varro (Augustine De civ. dei 18. 8 and 39 f.) spoke of a ‘second Mercurius, called Trismegistus’, and said that he was grandson of ‘the first Mercurius’. But Varro’s ‘first Mercurius’ is the Greek god Hermes, son of Zeus and Maia; and he appears to have known of only one Egyptian Hermes.

The connexion of this passage with its context is obscure. The text of Syncellus, as given by Dindorf, runs as follows: προετίθεται δι’ λοιπῆς καὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλληνῶν ὑστορεῖας μετὰ διαλεύκην ἐκ τῶν Μανεθοῦ τοῦ Ξενοποιοῦ, δι’ ἑις Πτολεμαίου τοῦ ψυλλόβου ὀρκερίου τῶν ἐν Ἑλληνωτὶ ἡλικίᾳ χρηματίας ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σαμαίᾳ μετὰ κειμένων σημαίνων . . . ἐν τούτῳ ἀδύνατον τῶν ῾Ιερῶν Ἑλλήστου προετίθησαι τῷ

1 Read ἰερογλύφοις.
2 It would be absurd to say that the writings were translated into Greek ‘after the Flood’; how could any one imagine that they were translated into Greek before the Flood, or even shortly after it? The traditional text may be accounted for by assuming that the words ἐρμηνευθεὶν τὰ τῆς ιερᾶς διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνιδα φωνῆν were accidentally omitted by a copyist, but were added in the margin, and that a later copyist put them back into the text, but placed them wrongly.

3 A misplaced double of ἰερογλύφοις 'γράμματα above.
The *gnosis* was inscribed on tables of stone by the first Hermes, and in that form escaped destruction in the Flood; after the Flood, the second Hermes transcribed it from the stone tables into books (i.e. rolls of papyrus), which were deposited in certain Egyptian temples; and at some later time, the contents of these books were translated from the Egyptian language into Greek.

Another version of the same legend occurs in Joseph. *Ant.* 1. 71. Josephus there says that the primaeval wisdom was engraved on two *στῆλαι*, one of clay, and the other of stone, these materials being chosen in order that the table of clay might escape destruction in the coming devastation of the world by fire, and the table of stone, in the coming deluge of water; and that the *στῆλη* of stone remains to this day κατά γῆν τήν Σιρίαν. But Josephus attributes the

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1. By a slight inaccuracy, the writer says that the stelae themselves were 'transcribed', 'laid up', and afterwards 'translated'; but what he means is that the writings inscribed on the stelae were transcribed &c.
2. Cf. *Ammian. Marcell.* 22. 15. 30: 'Sunt (in Egypt) et syringes subterranei, quidam et flexuosi secessus, quos, ut furtur, peritii rituum vetustorum, adventare diluvium praeeci, metuentesque ne caerimoniorum oblitteraretur memoria, penitus operosis digestos fodinis per loca diversa struxerunt, et excisis paletibus volvulam, ferarumque genera multa sculpserunt, . . . quas hierographicas litteras appellearunt.' These *σύργια* (or *σύργεια*) are evidently ancient tombs, such as the tombs of the kings near Thebes; and the tales about writings 'hidden' or 'buried' doubtless resulted from the discovery of tombs containing hieroglyphic inscriptions.
3. *Σιρία* Naber : *Σιρία* Reitzenstein. The *γῆ* *Σιρίας* of Josephus is evidently the same as the *Σιρίανή* γῆ of Syncellus. What land is this? In view of *αἰσχρόν*
inscription, not to Hermes, but to the family of Seth the son of Adam.

Compare also Philo of Byblos (Euseb. Pr. ev. 1. 9. 26): ὅ δὲ (Σαῦρονίαν), συμβαλὼν τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄδων ἐφεδρόειν ἀποκρύφοις Ἀμμονίων γράμματι συγκειμένοι, ὅ δὲ οὐκ ἦν πάντες γνώριμα, τὴν μάθησιν ἀπόγυνται ἀπότις ἱστορεῖ. From what Philo Bybl. had said before (ib. 1. 9. 24) it is evident that the writings here spoken of are writings of Thoth-Hermes.

§ 8. Ὅ εἰσιν βιβλία, τῶν ἄρθρων ἀυτῶν ἢ τετεύχθαι μου χειρῶν, διὰ (μου χειρών MSS.) τῆς ἀδφαρσίας φαρμάκες ἁρείας ἐπικράτει. χειρῶν—must certainly be corrected into χειρῶν (Meineke); and it seems no less certain that the adjective applied to χειρῶν was not ἀδφαρσίαν, but φθαρτῶν. The books were written by ‘the perishable hands’ of the man Hermes, but were made imperishable. τετεύχθαι no doubt stands for some form of the verb τεύχειν, ‘to make’. (The fact that τεύχος means ‘a book’ makes this verb the more appropriate.) For χειρίας we must read χείρας (Meineke) or some other form of χείρας, which is a suitable verb to go with φαρμάκης. The phrase ‘anointed them with the drug of imperishability’ must have been suggested by some magical or ritual practice, but is here used metaphorically, and means merely ‘made them imperishable’. Since that could be done only by superhuman power, the person who did it cannot have been the man Hermes; and if not Hermes, it was presumably God.

tὼν Ὀσίρδος κρώνων in Κόντ Κοσμη, it seems possible that in both passages the land was originally called γῆ Οσίρεως or Οσίρεως (cf. 'Ισιδως and 'Ισιακος), and that the place meant is the district of Abydos in Egypt.

1 Seth and Enoch were sometimes identified or confused with Agathodaemon and Hermes; see Tertull. (Arabic).

2 Probably τῶν (Ἔμμονος(ἄνα)) ἄδων. It is doubtful how the corrupt text ought to be corrected; but the meaning must have been that Sanchuniathon found and read certain writings of Hermes which had been hidden in the temple of Ammon.

3 Similar notions appear in a passage quoted by Reitzenstein (Poim. p. 121) from an unpublished MS. in the Laurentian library (Cod. Antinori 101, fol. 301 v.): a medical prescription is there described as ἀντίστοιο ἐκ τῶν θεαίων ἄδων του ἐν Μεμφίτηδι μεταληψία, κράπα καὶ φλανθρωπία, φασί, του Τρισμεγίστου Ἑρμοῦ. ὁτοῦ γὰρ ἑκείνην ἱκοδομεῖ παύειν (παύειν MS.), τῆς ἀθροφορίας φροντίδος σωτηρίας. ἐφέσθη δὲ αὕτη ἐν χρασῆ στήλη γράμματι Αλγυτοῦ ἀναγγεγραμμένη, ὧν συνεγεγράμμη φροντίδος ἀκριβῶς, μηδεὶς βεβίλε ὅ τοι λειψάνους τοιῷομαι πάσην μεταδοῦναι ἔξοδόθη δὲ ἀπὸ Αλγυτοῦ ἑπτάδα ἐν τοίς Βασιλείων ἀρρητά καὶ πολλὰς παραφάρος δικαλομένον. There is something wrong in the text; the meaning must have been that the prescription was written by Hermes on a gold tablet, which was left in charge of the priests of Puth at Memphis, with a strict injunction to keep it secret; and that this injunction was disobeyed only when the remedy was needed to cure a king (or Roman emperor) suffering from gout. A satisfactory sense might be got by inserting a participle (e.g. συγγραφείας) after Ἑρμός; shifting ὁτοῦ γὰρ... σωτηρίας, and
The sense wanted can be got by writing "Ω ἵερα βιβλίαν, ἃς διὰ τῶν φθαρτῶν τετευμένας μου χειρῶν τῷ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας φαρμάκῳ ἔχομεν ὁ ἑπτά πάσιν κρατῶν.

ἀσάπεις πάντας αἵνες (πᾶντες αἵνες MSS.) [καὶ ἀφθαρτοὶ] διαμείνατε [χρόνων]. ἀφθαρτοὶ is a feeble repetition of ἀσάπεις, and is the more objectionable because φθαρτῶν and ἀφθαρσίας have occurred just before. χρόνοις is an alternative for αἵνες.

παντὶ τῷ τῇ γῆς (τῇ MSS.) ταῦτας παροδεύειν μελετοῦντες πεδία. [παροδεύειν may be retained in the sense 'feregere', 'traverse'. Cf. Plut. Symp. prol. 670c, ἡλίου τὸν λέοντα παροδεύοντος, and 700 λ; De Sol. anim. 973 D, κυμάων ἀκρόαμα τοῖς συνήθεσι παροδεύοντι τὸν τόπον.]

ἐχρίς ὡς γέρων (γενέμηνοι;) ὀθανώς σωστήματα ὑμᾶς ἡμῖν τερ-

ωσμάται. All earthly σωστήματα ('organisms') are 'children of heaven'; that is, they are brought into being by the action of 'the things above' (cf. § 2). But the σωστήματα here spoken of are men; and the meaning is 'until, in a late age of the world's history, men shall be born who shall be worthy to read the books of Hermes'. There is a momentary personification of ὀθανῶς; Heaven, born when the world was made, will have grown old before that time comes.

[δὲ ψυχὰς ὃ δημιουργὸς προσηγόρευε.] Perhaps προσαγορεύειν ought to be written in place of προσηγόρευε; but with or without that correction, the words are out of place here. The men who are to find and read the books of Hermes are not ψυχαί, but σωστή-

ματα; they, like all men on earth, consist of soul and body joined together. The person who inserted ὃς ψυχὰς ὃ δ. π. was doubtless thinking of the making of souls which is described in § 14 ff.

[ς τοῖς δ.]δίόις (διάς MSS.) ἃ τεμενίζεται ζώναις. The δίοις ζώαις are the spheres of heaven. Cf. Corp. I. 25, where each of the seven planetary spheres is called a ζώη.

τεμενίζεται would mean 'is dedicated as a τέμενος to a god'. That could not be said of Hermes. The word required is ἄντεμε-

νίζεται, 'is placed in the τέμνονς'. Heaven is a τέμνον, i.e. a region assigned to the gods; and Hermes takes up his abode in it.

(§ 50. [πάλιν] ὃ μέναρχος . . . διαστάσει ἐγένετο καί). In the MSS., the passage which describes the origin of the gnosis (§§ 3-8) is followed by a fragment of a cosmogonia (§§ 9-12); and this is placing these words after δοκυλομένου (the man who 'ordered it to be published' would then be the gouty king, and not Hermes, who had forbidden publication); and adding a participle (e.g. μεταληθείς) after ἐνταῦθα.
followed by a narrative which begins with the making of souls (§ 14 ff.), and runs on to the end of the Excerpt. But the continuity of that narrative is broken by §§ 50, 51, and 52, which, like §§ 9–12, are disconnected scraps of a cosmogony.

These facts may be accounted for as follows. The description of the making of souls was preceded by a description of the making and equipping of heaven and earth. Parts of this have been lost; but a piece of it (§§ 9–12) remains in its right position; and another piece of it (§§ 50–52) has been preserved, but misplaced. Both these pieces, as given in the MSS., are incoherent; but if we rearrange the fragments of which they consist, it is possible to fit them into their places as parts of a continuous narrative which leads on to § 14 ff. The order which I propose is ((50)), ((11)), 9, 10, 12, ((52)), ((51)). When the sections are read in this order, the story runs thus: 'There was a chaotic mass. God resolved to organize this mass. He divided it into two parts; the upper part he fashioned into heaven, and the lower part, into earth' (§ 50). He peopled heaven with star-gods (§ 11); then, he set about producing living things on earth. To this end, he created Nature, and bade her make seeds (§§ 9, 10, 12); these seeds he flung forth on earth, and bade Earth develop them into plants (§ 52). Thus both heaven and earth were organized and filled with living things (§ 51). But the space between heaven and earth still remained unoccupied; and in order that this region also might have inhabitants, God proceeded to make souls, and assigned to them the atmosphere as their abode (§ 14 ff.).'

In the narrative which begins at § 50, and runs on to the end of the Excerpt, Isis is a goddess, who has for a time resided upon earth, but has returned to her home in heaven (§ 70) before the dialogue takes place. Some part at least of the story which she tells to her son Horus had been told to her by Hermes (§§ 25, 26, 30); and Hermes, her informant, is a god, who was in existence before men were made, and had taken part in the events which he narrated to her. But what sort of being is Horus? And where is the scene of the dialogue laid,—in heaven, or on earth? These questions are not explicitly answered in the text; and it is not quite clear how the writer would have answered them. Horus, being son of a god and a goddess, must be in some sense a god; but the author most likely assumed that he had been born to Osiris and Isis during their residence on earth; and if so, he must
have been for a time a god incarnate, as his parents were when he was born. We may suppose then that, at the time when the dialogue took place, Horus was a god incarnate upon earth,—in outward semblance a human being, and presumably a young king of Egypt;¹ and that his mother, the goddess Isis, who had already returned to heaven, came down thence to visit and instruct him. (Cf. Corp. I, in which a prophet is visited and instructed by Poimandres, and Corp. XI, in which the man Hermes is visited and instructed by Nous.)

Neither of the two introductory passages (§§ (32), 1, 2, and §§ 3-8) which precede this narrative in the MSS. is in any way connected with it; and each of them contains things inconsistent with it. In §§ 3-8, Hermes is a man, and does not become a god until after his death; in §§ (50) ff., Hermes is a god, and has been a god from the first. It may therefore be considered certain that §§ 3-8 did not originally form part of the libellus which contained §§ (50) ff. The other introductory passage (§§ (32), 1, 2) evidently stood at the beginning of one of the libelli of the Isis to Horus collection; but the libellus to which it belonged can hardly have been that which contained §§ (50) ff. In § (32), Isis speaks of Kamephès as the source of the κρυπτῆθε ϑεωρία which she is about to impart to her son, and (if I have rightly reconstructed the text) says that she had learnt it from Hermes, and Hermes from Kamephès. But in the narrative of §§ (50) ff., there is no teaching that can have been derived from Kamephès; the goddess Isis has got her information partly from the god Hermes,—who had not received it from any one else, but had been an eyewitness of the events of which he spoke, and had himself participated in them,—and partly (e.g. in § 70) from her own memory of what had taken place. In § 2, we have an exposition of doctrine, which appears to be the beginning of the ϑεωρία promised in § (32); and the word ϑεωρία applies better to an exposition of that kind than to a narrative of events, such as is contained in §§ (50) ff.

We must conclude then that the first introductory passage (§§ (32), 1, 2) is the beginning of a libellus of which the rest is lost, and that it had originally no connexion with the narrative

¹ The epithets which Isis applies to Horus (μεγαλύτερος, §§ 33 and 59: μεγαλύνης, § 58: μεγαλοσθενης, § 64) are such as might be used in addressing an earthly king; they may be taken as equivalent to 'your Majesty'. Cf. ἡ μεγῖστη βασιλεία in Ἐκκ. XXVII, where it is to be presumed that Isis is the speaker, and that she is speaking to Horus.
of which the bulk of Exc. XXIII consists, but has been prefixed to that narrative by error. The mistake might be accounted for by assuming that, in a book which contained a collection of Isis to Horus documents, some pages, containing the end of one libellus and the beginning of another, were accidentally lost. (Compare the gap between Corp. I and Corp. II, and that between Corp. XVI and Corp. XVII.)

This being so, it is possible that the title Kore Kosmu belonged to the libellus of which §§ (32), 1, 2 are the only extant fragment, and that the narrative which follows in §§ (50) ff. did not originally bear that title. But as a matter of convenience, it seems best, in any case, to continue to use the title Kore Kosmu as it is used in the MSS. of Stobaeus, i.e. to apply it to Exc. XXIII as a whole.

The beginning of the narrative is lost; but § 50 must have stood near the beginning. At the stage with which it deals, nothing exists except (1) God, (2) a group of gods subordinate to God, and (3) an inert and undifferentiated mass of matter (ἀγγελία σύστασις, χάος, ἐνωσις).

Who are the ὄντες whom God summons and addresses? Since there is as yet no Kosmos and no heaven, they cannot be star-gods; they must be incorporeal and supracosmic beings,—ὅντες νοητοί. The Hermes spoken of in § 26 and § 30 appears to be a god of this kind; perhaps then the writer assumed the 'senate of the gods' (σύγκλητων τῶν θεῶν συνέδρων) of which he speaks to consist of the chief gods worshipped in Egypt, one of whom was Thoth-Hermes.

The notion of such a συνέδρων may have been suggested by the councils of the gods described in the Iliad; but the writer may perhaps have had in mind also Jewish descriptions of God enthroned in heaven as a king surrounded by his ministers and attendants. He may possibly have been influenced by Jewish comments on the plural verb in ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον, Gen. 1. 26; see, for instance, Philo De opif. mundi 24. 72-76, Cohn I, p. 25: φησίν δὲτι εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς "ποιήσωμεν", ἀπερ ἐμφαίνει συμπαράλληλαν ἐκείνων ως ἐν συνεργῶν, κ.τ.λ.

We do not know how the narrative began, or what was told in the lost passage which preceded § 50; but it would seem that there are only two things which could possibly have been placed earlier in time than the situation presented in this section; namely, the origin
of the gods, and the origin of the chaotic mass. It seems probable
that the origin of the gods at least was spoken of, and that the story
began in some such way as this: 'In the beginning was God; and
God generated, or put forth from himself, the (supracosmic) gods.'
Cf. § 64, where it is implied that Osiris and Isis are an ἀπάρρομα of
the supreme God.1

It is more doubtful whether anything was said about the origin of
the chaotic mass. The Platonists in general assumed the pre-exis-
tence of unformed matter, and made no attempt to account for its
presence; but in Corp. I. 4 its beginning is described, and some-
thing of the same kind may possibly have been said about it
here.

The MSS. give πάλιν . . . ἔποιησε συνέδριον . . . καὶ πάλιν . . . ἔφω-
νησε. If we retain πάλιν, it is implied that a similar meeting of the
gods had taken place before. But for what purpose could a previous
meeting have been summoned and addressed? The only thing
which could possibly be supposed to have been done by God after
the emission of the gods, and before the time spoken of in § 50, is
the creation of the chaotic mass of matter; and even if we assume
that the writer said that this mass was created by God, he is not likely
to have said that God called on the gods to help him in creating it.
I have therefore bracketed πάλιν. When § 50 had been shifted to the
place where it stands in the MSS., it came later in the narrative than
the meeting of gods which is described in § 27; and we may suppose
that a transcriber, reading it in that position, said to himself 'this is
the second meeting', and accordingly inserted πάλιν twice in § 50.

ὁ δὲ τῆς κορυφαίας, ὁ δὲ καὶ ἀφθαρτοῦ φύσεως τετεύχατε. Perhaps
the author's meaning might be expressed by writing ὁ δὲ τῆς κορυφῆς ἐπιβεβήχατε, καὶ ἀφθαρτοῦ φύσεως τετεύχατε. (Or possibly
τῆς κορυφαίας (Ἀρχής) or the like, 'the topmost summit of dominion',
with some suitable verb?) [Cf. Pl. Phaedr. 247 ff.]

οἱ τῶν μέγαν αἰῶνα διδέπνι ἐς ἄει κεκληρωθεὶ. The functions of the
gods have already been determined, though they have not yet begun
to discharge their functions.

tῶν μέγαν αἰῶνα appears to mean either 'the course of things in
time', or 'the universe'.

ὁ λαοῦς ἀντιπαραβιδόντες οὐδέποτε κοπίσαιτε τὰ σύμπαντα—(οἷς
αὕτη λαοῦς ἀντιπαραβιδόντε οὐδέποτε κοπίσαιτε τὰ σύμπαντα MSS.).

1 According to the old Egyptian theogony of Heliopolis, the chief gods issued
from the primal god Tum by successive processes of generation.
The gods are ἀκοπίαστοι (cf. φῶς ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἀκοπίαστον, § 34); but it could not be said that the things subject to their rule are ἀκοπίαστα.

The word ἀνυπαραδίδωτες implies the conception of chronocratores; each god in turn takes charge for a certain time, and then hands over his charge to another (e.g., according to one system out of many, Helios is on duty on Sunday, and Selene on Monday). This notion, which seems to have been of Egyptian origin, was originally applicable only to astral gods, but is here assumed to apply also to gods who existed before the formation of the Kosmos.

μέχρι πότε ἀνεπίγνωστοι ταύτης διεστόσομεν τῆς ἡγεμονίας;—(μέχρι πότε τῆς ἀνεπιγνώστου ταύτης διεστόσομεν ἡγεμονίας MSS.). God and the gods rule over the mass of matter; but the mass, being as yet unorganized, contains no living beings to recognize their rule.

μέχρι πότε [Ἀθεώρη τα γενήσεται ταύτα ἥλιῳ καὶ σελήνῃ] [[ἐκαστὸς ἡμῶν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ γεννᾶτο] ἀργὴν καταλείψομεν τὴν σύστασιν ταύτην;—(ἀπαλείψομεν τῷ δύνασθαι τὴν ἐπὶ ἀργὴν σύστασιν ταύτην; MSS.). The mass is inert and lifeless; it must no longer be left so.

The mention of sun and moon is out of place at a stage at which neither sun nor moon has yet come into existence; and the words {ἐκαστὸς ἡμῶν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ γεννᾶτο ought to form part of the exhortation which follows. The future -λείψομεν has been altered into -λείψωμεν through the influence of γεννᾶτω. I cannot account for τῷ δύνασθαι.

ἁπατος τοῖς μεταγενεστέροις µῦθος δή (δὲ MSS.) δεξιῶτω (τὸ) χάος εἶναι. Chaos now exists; let us so completely do away with it, that the beings who are to be produced hereafter (i.e. men, and perhaps star-gods also,) will find it difficult to believe that it has ever existed.

εἰπε, καὶ εὐθὺς [κοσμικὸς] τῆς ἐτὶ [μελαίνῃ] ἐνώσεως διάστασις ἐγένετο. The ἐνωσις is the undifferentiated mass of formless matter, which was called σύστασις above. It might perhaps be called σκοτεινή (cf. the σκότος spoken of in Corp. I. 4); but μελαίνῃ is a less suitable word. Besides, the writer of the Kore Kosmu thinks of the διακόσμησις, for the most part, not as an outpouring of light into darkness, but as a process by which a mass of matter hitherto inert and lifeless is filled with living beings. It seems probable therefore that μελαίνης has been substituted for some other adjective. If we assume this adjective to have been ἀκοσμήτου, the meaningless adverb κοσμικὸς may have come from it by corruption.
The διάστασις is a separation of the mass into two parts, out of which God made heaven and earth. It corresponds to the separation of 'the waters above the firmament' from 'the waters below the firmament' in Gen. 1. 7, and to the first stage of the separation of the elements in Stoic cosmogonies. (See Corp. I. 5 b and Corp. III.)

There can be little doubt that both εἶπεν καὶ ... ἔγένετο here, and εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ θύμον in § 11, were suggested by the similar phrases in the first chapter of Genesis: v. 3, εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς Γανηθήσω φῶς καὶ ἔγένετο φῶς. Ib. vv. 6, 9, 14, 20, 24, 29; καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς ... καὶ ἔγένετο οὐτῶς. Cf. Ps. 32 (33). 9: αὐτὸς εἶπεν, καὶ ἐγενήθησαν.

§ II. Ἐστιν πεπληρωμένοι ὁ οὐρανὸς ἀστρασιν (ἀπασών MSS.) (...)[ἀπη τε καὶ αἰθήρ]. πεπληρωμένοι here means 'supplied with inhabitants'. The inhabitants of heaven are the astral gods; and the simplest way to obtain the sense required is to alter ἀπασών into ἀστρασιν. It may be doubted whether the writer said that God at this stage created a second order of gods (viz. the astral gods), or that He made the material sun, moon, and stars, and incorporated in them the gods of § 50, who had till then been unembodied. In either case, § 11 corresponds to Gen. 1. 14, Γανηθήσωσαν φωτισμοὺς κ.τ.λ.

The peopling of the atmosphere is a thing distinct from the peopling of heaven, and the two cannot have been mixed together in the same clause. The inhabitants of the atmosphere are the souls, the making of which is described in §§ 14 ff. The words ἄηρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ must therefore have been inserted here by error.

The peopling of heaven (§ 11) ought to precede the filling of the earth with living things (§§ 9, 10);¹ and as the star-gods are spoken of as already existing in § 9 (οἱ ἡδη περιπολεῖν τὸν οὐρανὸν κελευσθέντες), it is certain that § 11 originally stood before §§ 9 and 10.

§ 9. Ἰκανὸν δὲ τὸν μέσον ἦργει χρόνον (ικανὸν δὲ ὁ μέσος ἦργει χρόνος MSS.) [ἐκέκρυπτο] [(καὶ)] ἀ (τῶν ὑποκειμένων) φῶς, ὁ τέκνον, (καὶ) ἐτόσχανα στείρα. In the text of the MSS., we have here (omitting the unintelligible word ἐκέκρυπτο) two distinct statements, viz. 'the intermediate time was inert', and 'nature was barren'. But χρόνος is not a suitable subject for ἠγεῖα; and since the writer goes on to tell us how the earth was made active and fruitful, it must have been the earth that was till then inert and barren. The sense required can

¹ It is true that in Gen. 1 the making of plants precedes the making of sun, moon, and stars; but that is a strange inversion of the natural order.
be got by changing ὁ μέσος χρόνος into τὸν μέσον χρόνον, and making φύσις the subject of ἡρεμία as well as of ἑπήγαγον στέρα. It would perhaps be possible to make ἡ φύσις mean the region in which 'nature' operates, i.e. the earth or the sublunar world; but that would be awkward here, as the creation of Φύσις is described a few lines below, and this would give rise to the objection that, at the time spoken of, there was no φύσις in existence. It is therefore most likely that the author wrote something like ἡ τῶν ὑποκειμένων φύσις (cf. φύσις ἡ τῶν ὑποκειμένων in § 27). This would be merely a periphrasis for τὰ ὑποκείμενα, 'the things below', i.e. the earth; and the word φύσις, thus used, would pass unnoticed, or would be forgotten by the time the reader comes to the creation of Φύσις.

τὴν τῶν (κάτω) ὄντων ἱστοχαί ἀπήγγειλαν, καὶ διὶ θεοῦ ἐστὶ συγκοσμημένη <καὶ ταῦτα> [σύμπαντα]. Heaven has already been organized and peopled, as is shown by the words οἱ θεοὶ περιπολούν τῶν οὐρανῶν κελευσθέντες; it is only the sublunar world that remains to be dealt with. I have therefore written τῶν κάτω ὄντων and καὶ ταῦτα in place of τῶν ὄντων and τὰ σύμπαντα.

Δεόμεθα σου, ἄλεγον, τὰ νῦν ὄντα καὶ [ὡς] ὄστερον <ἐσομένα τίνος> ἔχει χρείαν διασκέψασθαι. The star-gods see that it is desirable that living things should be produced on earth, but are unable to devise means of bringing this to pass; they therefore appeal to God to solve the problem; and he solves it by creating Φύσις, the force which makes living things spring up. This force is needed both by τὰ νῦν ὄντα (earth in its present state of inertness and lifelessness), and by τὰ ὄστερον ἐσομένα; i.e. it is needed both to produce the first generation of living things, and to maintain an unending succession of them.

τίνος having been lost, ὡς was inserted to give the sentence a grammatical construction.

§ 10. ἐμαθίασεν ὁ θεός, καὶ εἶπε Φύσιν εἶναι. As to ἐμαθίασεν, compare a Κοσμοποιία (extracted by Dieterich, Abraxas, p. 182 ff., from a magic papyrus, Leiden W) in which God creates by laughing; e.g. ἐγέλασεν ὁ θεός ἐπτάκις: "χα χα χα χα χα." ἐγελάσατος δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγεννηθέραν θεοὶ ἐπτά, οὕτως τῶν κόσμον περιέχουσιν. . . . ἐκάκχασε τὸ τέταρτον ὁ θεός, καὶ ἐφανε τῆς θέου, παίνων κρατοῦσα σποράν, δι' ἑς τὰ πάντα ἐσπάρῃ.¹

καὶ θῆλυ πάγκαλον χρήμα ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ προῆλθεν. The notion

¹ The function of this Γέννα (or Γενεά) is the same as that of Φύσις in the Λύκειον Κοσμίῳ.
that God creates by his voice is Jewish; 'By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth' (Ps. 33. 6). See Corp. I. 5 a.

ὅ θεός ὁ προσπάτωρ. On προσπάτωρ as an appellation of the supreme God, see Exc. II (A. 13 and B. 3), the only other Hermeticum in which the word is thus used. In § 13, Kamephis is called ὁ προσπάτωρ; but Kamephis, in that passage, does not seem to be regarded as the supreme God, and is possibly not even a god, but a man.

καὶ ταῦτην (ταύτης MSS.) προσέταξεν εἶναι (παρουσίων (?) σπερμάτων) γεννητικήν. There must have been a genitive dependent on γεννητικήν; and what follows in § 13 makes it almost certain that the missing word is σπερμάτων. God bade Nature 'generate' or bring into existence certain things; and when she had done so, God filled his hands with these things (which, in § 52), are called ἐκ τῆς Φύσεως ὑπάρχοντως(. . .), and flung them forth upon the earth, saying that Earth was to be γεννητευμα τῶν. The things thus spoken of must surely be seeds. Cf. Τένα, πάντων κρατοῦσα σποράν, διὰ τὰ πάντα ἑστάρη, in the Kosmopoiía quoted above. Corp. XIV. 10: ἰδε γεωργὸν σπέρμα καταβάλλοντα εἰς γῆν. . . οὕτω καὶ ὁ θεὸς κ.τ.λ. Exc. IX. 1 as emended: τὸ σπέρμα οὖν τῆς γενέσεως ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ λαβοῦσα γέγονε (ἐκ. ἡ ἤλη). Exc. XV. 2 as emended: ἡ φύσις. . . σπεροῦσα μὲν (εἰς ἤλην) τὰ ἑαυτῆς σπέρματα κ.τ.λ.

§ 13. [καλὴν Πόνος συνελθουσα[ν] θυγατέρα ἐποίησεν, ἥν Εὔρεσιν ἐκάλεσε]. § 13 appears to consist of four unconnected fragments, of which this is the first.

Some person became the wife of Πόνος ('Hard Work'), and gave birth to a daughter named Εὔρεσις ('Discovery' or 'Invention'). According to the traditional text, this wife and mother is the Φύσις spoken of in §§ 10 and 12. But that is impossible. There is no place for πόνος and Εὔρεσις in a cosmogonia; they belong to human life. It is men, not gods or cosmogonic forces, that have to 'work hard' and 'discover things'. This sentence must therefore be a
fragment of a passage in which the life of men on earth was spoken of. (Cf. τῇ εὐρίσκειν συνών in § 29.) One might compare the saying 'Necessity is the mother of invention'.

If Εὐρίσκειν were said to be the daughter of Φύσις and Πάνος, it would be necessary to take the word φύσις in a sense different from that which it bears in §§ 10 and 12, and understand it to mean ingenium, 'innate ability' (cf. εὐφυῆς). But as the sentence is out of place here, and has no connexion with what precedes it in the MSS., we have no reason to suppose that the mother was named Φύσις. Her name may very likely have been Σύνεσις. At any rate, the meaning of the allegory must have been this: 'In order that a man may make discoveries, two things are needed; he must be intelligent, and he must take pains.'

[τῇ δὲ θεός ἔχαριστα τὰ εἶναι, καὶ χαρισμένος]. This looks like an alternative for καὶ τῇ . . . ἔχαριστα ἡγεμονικόν, which I have transposed to § 10.

[διέκρινε τὰ ἡθη γεγονότα, καὶ ἐπλήρωσεν ἀυτὰ μυστηρίων.] What are τὰ ἡθη γεγονότα? Heaven and earth? If συνεκόσμησε were written in place of διέκρινε, this might be a summary of the contents of §§ (§ 11), 9, 10, 12, (§ 52).

§ 52. καὶ μηδενός (μηδενὶ MSS.) ἐστείλαν λεῖπονθαν ὅκει. Earth has hitherto remained barren and desolate, and has in that respect 'lagged behind' heaven, which has already been supplied with inhabitants; but that reproach is now to be done away with. It is true that earth must always be inferior to heaven; but she will have no cause for shame when she also is πᾶσι τοῖς περὶ αὐτὴν συγκεκοσμημένης καλοῖς (§ 51).

The meaning might be more fully expressed by writing μηδενός τῶν (τῶν) ἐν τῇ τῶν ὄντων συνστάσει, 'no part of the universe'.

What were the living things that were produced on earth at the time here spoken of? The inhabitants of earth as we know it are men, beasts, and plants. But the making of beasts comes later on in the story (§§ 18-23); and the making of men comes later still (§ 24 ff.). The process described in §§ 10, 12, (§ 52), must therefore be the making of plants alone; and the things which God flings forth must be seeds of plants. These sections then correspond to Gen. 1. 11, ἔπειν ὁ θεὸς Βλαστησάτω ἡ γῆ βοσάνην χόρτου κ.τ.λ.

It follows from this that Φύσις, as here regarded, is a personification of the force which manifests itself in plant-life, rather than
of ‘nature’ in general. The action of Φύσις might the more easily be thus restricted, because the Stoics used the word φύσις to signify the principle of life in plants (φυτά), as distinguished from that in beasts and men, which they called ψυχή.¹

It is true that in the words τῇ Φύσει τὸ τῶν κάτω πάντων ἔχαριστο ἡγεμονικόν (if that is the right reading) the writer recognizes that Φύσις has other functions also; but it is only in the making of plants that she is brought into action in his myth; he gives her no part in the making of beasts and men.

τὰς χείρας [οίας δὴ (δει MSS.) θεῶν (εἰκὼς) έχειν]. The words οίας . . . έχειν are a reminder that χείρας is not to be taken literally. (God has no hands; He is incorporeal.) But such a reminder is hardly in keeping with the tone of the mythical narrative; and it seems most likely that these words were not written by the author, but were added by a transcriber. Cf. [οἵον]ς ἐπιτεχνίς έχουσα . . . ὀφθαλμοὺς in § 34 as emended.

§ 51. (οὔτω δ’| δ’ (ε’ δ’| τοῦ) οὐκατερρίπτο . . . τὰ ζῷα κυνοιμενα.) This section must have stood after § 52; for it is a summing up and conclusion of the narrative of which the making of plants in § 52 is the last part. God has made heaven and earth, and filled both heaven and earth with living beings; he looks upon his work, and sees that it is good.

[κραδαιμομένη ἐτι γὰρ ἡλίου λάμψαντος ἐπάγη.] These words have to do with the formation of the earth; and if they occurred anywhere in the Kore Kosmu, they must be a fragment of the lost passage which preceded § 9. We may suppose the writer to have there said that, after the heavenly bodies had been made (§ (ΙΙ)), the lower world was still an undifferentiated watery mass; and that God divided this mass, and separated out the earth from the water. (Cf. Gen. 1. 9: συνήθη τὸ ὕδωρ . . . καὶ ἀφθη ἡ ξηρά). The land thus formed was at first only half solid, and ‘quivered’ like jelly; but the heat of the sun soon dried it up, and made it hard and firm. Cf. Herm. fragm. 31 (a cosmogonia): ἐφάνη [δή] ἡ γῆ, ἔμπνευς καὶ τρέμονα: ἥλιον δὲ . . . ἀναλάμψαντος, καὶ . . . ἔνθρεινος, ἡ γῆ ἑστηκέρατο.

cαλὰ γὰρ τῷ θεῷ καὶ τὰ θεντοῖς εἶναι νομιζόμενα φαύλα, ὅτι δὴ τοὺς τοῦ θεοῦ νόμους δουλεῖσθαι ἐποιήθη. Cf. the Hymn of Cleanthes, Stob. 1. 1. 12, vol. i, p. 26. 1. 7 W.: ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περιστὰ (τε) ἐπίστασαι ἄριστα θέλαι | καὶ κοσμεῖν τάκοσμα, καὶ οὐφίλα σοι φίλα ἐστίν.²

1 See, for instance, Sext. Emp. Math. 9. 81, quoted in note on Ascl. Lat. I. 4.
2 Possibly the original reading there may have been οὐ καλὰ σοι καλὰ ἑστίν.
The preceding mention of earthly καλά might give rise to the objection that there is nothing καλόν or ἄγαθόν on earth (see Corp. VI), or that at any rate there are many things on earth that are not καλά; and the statement that all things are καλά in God's sight is intended to answer that objection. But this sentence is not needed, and rather interrupts the sequence of thought; it may therefore be suspected that καλά γάρ... δουλεύειν ἐπούσθη is a note added by a reader.

ξαίρε δὲ ὁ θεὸς ὄρων ἡδή ἑαυτοῦ τὰ ἔργα κινούμενα. This corresponds to Gen. i. 31: καὶ ἤδη ὁ θεὸς τὰ πλήρα δοσα ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἤδη καλὰ λίαν. It also corresponds to Pl. Tim. 37 c: ώς δὲ κυηθέν αὐτῷ καὶ ζών ἐνόθη... ὁ γεννήταις πατήρ, ἡγάσθη τε καὶ εὐφρανθείς κ.τ.λ. The writer may very likely have been thinking of both those passages.

§ 14. οὐκέτι βουλόμενος ἄργων τὸν ὑπουράνιον (ὑπεράνων MSS.) κόσμον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸν πνευμάτων πληρώσαι δοκιμάσας (καὶ) τοῦτον, ὡς μὴ τὰ κατὰ μέσον (μέρος MSS.) ἀκίνητα [καὶ ἄργα] μένη, οὕτως εἰς ταύτα ἔργα τεχνέτειας (-τείας MSS.). God sets about making souls, in order that a certain region may not remain uninhabited. What is that region? Since heaven (§§11)) and earth (§§9, 10, 12, (52)) have already been provided with inhabitants, the only region that is still ἄργων and ἀκινήτων, and has not yet been 'filled' (with living beings), is the space between earth and heaven; this therefore must be the place assigned to the souls as their abode. (Cf. Exc. XXV. 9: τὸ δὲ ἄπο σελήνης, δέ τέκνων, ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ψυχῶν ἐτυμ οἰκητήριον. Exc. XXIV. 1: ἐν δὲ τῷ ἄρη (κατοικοῦσι) ψυχαί. The text then must be corrected accordingly. The sense required may be got by writing τὸν ὑπουράνιον κόσμον ('the region next below heaven') instead of τὸν ὑπεράνων κόσμον, and τὰ κατὰ μέσον ('the intermediate space') instead of τὰ κατὰ μέρος.

The souls are beings of the same nature as the δαίμονες of the Platonists, and the δαίμονες and ἡρωες of Posidonius; and like them, they dwell in the atmosphere. Their incarnation on earth does not take place till later on, § 24 ff.

The word πνεύματα was used by Jews and Christians as an equivalent for the Pagan δαίμονες; and it is probable that πνευμάτων, in that sense, was written here by a Christian transcriber, in substitution for some word meaning 'inhabitants'.

The description of the process of soul-making was evidently suggested by Pl. Tim. 34 b–36 d (the making of the world-soul) and 41 d (the making of individual souls).
The souls are made of a mixture of πνεῦμα (‘breath’ or air) and fire, combined with certain ‘unknown materials’. The notion that the soul is a material thing, and consists of the two material elements air and fire, is Stoic; and the writer, for the purpose of his myth at least, has adopted that notion, with such modification as his Platonic principles seemed to him to demand.

The Epicureans described the composition of the soul in similar terms. Aetius, Diels DoxoGr. p. 388: Epicurus says that the soul is κράμα ἐκ τετάρτων, ἐκ ποιοῦ πυρόδον, ἐκ ποιοῦ ἀέρόδον, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ, ἐκ τετάρτου τυός ἀκατονομαστοῦ . . . δι' τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα κτίστη, τὸν δὲ ἀέρα ἑρείμακ, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τὴν φαινομένην θερμότητα τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δ' ἀκατονομαστὸν τὴν ἐν ἕμι ἐμποτίζειν αἰσθήσιν ἐν οὐδένι γὰρ τῶν ἀνομαζομένων στοιχείων εἶναι αἰσθήσιν. See also Plut. Adv. Coloten 20. 4, ΙΙΙΒ D, and Lucr. 3. 231-245.

Even Epicurus appears to have felt the difficulty of attributing feeling and thought to such things as fire and air, and to have been thereby led to add his ‘unnamed fourth substance’ to the three other components of the soul. The writer of the Kore Kosmu, being, to some extent at least, a Platonist, would feel that difficulty more strongly; and it is presumably for that reason that he adds to the πνεῦμα and πῦρ certain ‘unknown’ ingredients (ἀγνώστοι τῶν ἔτερων ἓλατι ἐκείραν). We are doubtless meant to understand that it is in virtue of these ‘unknown’ or incomprehensible (i.e. incorporeal) constituents that the soul possesses conscious life and thought, and is akin to God.

But at the same time, the writer so qualifies the πῦρ and πνεῦμα as to make it appear that he regards these material things themselves as conscious and intelligent; and in this respect, he is closely following his Stoic authorities. The fire is described as πῦρ νοερὸν,—

1 Cf. Exc. XXV. 11, γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ παντὸς τοῦ μέσου [ἰεροῦ] πνεύματος, where τὸ ἱερὸν πνεῦμα means the atmosphere. In Exc. XXVI. 13-30, πνεῦμα means the element air.

2 The position which he here adopts approximates to that of Posidonius, who appears to have said that the soul, as long as it remains in its proper abode (viz. the upper atmosphere), consists of air and fire alone, but that when it descends to lower levels, it is corrupted by an intermixture of water. Epicurus seems to have meant by πνεῦμα ‘wind’, i.e. air in motion, and by ἄφρ, air at rest; though it is strange to speak of air in motion and air at rest as if they were two different substances.

3 A man who had read the Timaeus, and was puzzled by its obscurities, might well describe as ἄγνωστα the materials which the Demiurgus is there said to have used in the making of soul: τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἀκούσεις ὤνωσις καὶ τῆς αἰ περὶ τὰ σώματα γινομένη μεροτῇ τρόπῳ ἐν ἄμφοι ἐν μέσῳ ἐνεκεράσατο ὤνωσις εἶδος, τῆς τε ταῦτα φύσεως καὶ τῆς θατέρου, κ.τ.λ. (35 λ.).
a phrase which the Stoics employed to denote that substance which is at once material fire and God; and the πνεῦμα is ‘a portion of God’s own πνεῦμα’ (ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου)—that is to say, the atmosphere, from which it is taken, is God’s life-breath. This conception of πνεῦμα is Stoic, and implies the Stoic view that God is immanent in the Kosmos. But it is possible that the writer also had in mind Gen. 2:7: ἐνεφύσησεν (ὁ θεὸς) εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον (τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο δ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζώσαν.

μετὰ τινων ἐπιφωνήσεων κρυπτῶν. Cf. μετὰ λόγου τοῦ καθῆκοντος, § 15 fin., and κρυπτῶι ἐπιφωνῶι λόγοισ in § 18. God pronounces a spell, just as a human magician would do on a like occasion; without this, his manipulation of the materials would not produce the desired effect.

ἐπεγελάσα τις ὡλὴ τῷ μίγματι λεπτότερα τε καὶ καθαρότερα μᾶλλον [καὶ διαφανεστέρα] ἢ ἐξ ἐν εὐγένετο: διειδὴς δὲ ἦν αὐθι, ἢν δὲ καὶ μόνος ὁ τεχνίτης ἐώρα. Διαφανείς is a synonym of διειδῆς, and seems unnecessary.

The substance of which the souls are made is not the mixture as a whole, but the ‘purer’ stuff which rises to the surface of the mixture. This stuff is perfectly transparent,—like clear water or pure air,—and therefore invisible; ‘God alone could see it’. That is a hint that the stuff of which souls consist is in reality δασώματον or νορτῶν, though in the mythical style of the Kore Kosmu it is spoken of as if it were a chemical product.

§ 15. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκκλψε πλησιμεία διετήκετο, ὦτε ὡς ἐκ πυρὸς καλομένη διετήκετο, ὦτε μὴ [ὡς ἐκ πνεύματος][[ ]] ὑφεκε (ὑφεκεν MSS.) ἐπῆγκτο, ἀλλὰ τινα ἐπλυγενῇ [καὶ οἰκεῖαν] εἰς [ην τοῦ κράματος] σύστασιν διετήκετο means ‘(a solid) was melted’; and in the contrasted phrase, we need a verb meaning ‘(a liquid) was solidified’. I have therefore added ἐπῆγκτο. We might have supposed the stuff spoken of to be gaseous, since it is the lightest and rarest part of a mixture the only known ingredients of which are air and fire; but it is here pictured as something between a solid and a liquid. The heat tends to make it liquid, the cold tends to make it solid; and when the hot component and the cold component have been thoroughly blended together, there results a substance neither liquid nor solid, but of an intermediate and jelly-like consistency. The writer calls this surface-layer of the mixture the ἐπίταγος; and ἐπίταγος means a half-solid scum which forms on the surface of a liquid,—e.g. a layer of cream on the surface of a pan of milk. On the other hand, in § 16 init. he
calls it to ἐκ τῆς καθ ὑπόσως ἐξατμισμένον ἄνθος; and the word ἐξατμισμένον seems to imply that he there thinks of it as gaseous.

The words ὡς ἐκ πυρός and ὡς ἐκ πνεύματος were intended to indicate that the hot ingredient in the mixture is the πῦρ, and the cold ingredient is the πνεῦμα. (In the Stoic system, air is τὸ ψυχρόν.) That is probably a correct explanation of the author's meaning; but the explanation is awkwardly expressed, and it seems most likely that it was added by a reader.

(God gave a name to the ψυχοίς. The word ψυχοίς properly means 'the act of making soul', or 'the act of giving soul (to a body)'; but it is here made to mean 'the stuff of which souls are made'. As ψυχοί, 'cold', has been spoken of just before, it is possible that the writer meant to suggest that ψυχοίς and ψυχῆ are derived from ψυχοῖς; and something of the sort seems to be implied in the words ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐφημοστέρου ὄνοματος. But those words are unintelligible. Is ψυχοίς the εὐφημότερον ὄνομα? And if so, what is the δυσφημότερον ὄνομα with which it is contrasted? Possibly θερμόν? But why should 'cold' be thought more εὐφημον than 'heat'?

The phrase τῆς καθ ὑποτήτη αἰνεργείας is equally inexplicable.

The number of souls is large, but finite. They were all made at the same time; and when once made, they are everlasting (πάσας ἀδίνους, § 16).

§ 16. ἄλκηληρότερον (πληρότερον MSS.) ἦν τοῦ δευτέρου τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τῷ παντὶ καθαρώτερον, ..., καὶ οὕτως ἀληθῶς βαθμῶν ἐξήκοντα ὁ πᾶς ἀπήρτιστο ἄριθμος. The ἄνθος or ἐπίταγος of which the souls are made is not homogeneous. The Craftsman again and again skims off the scum which is continually forming, until the number of skimmings amounts to sixty; and the stuff yielded by each successive skimming is inferior in 'integrity' and 'purity' to that yielded by the one before. Consequently, the souls made of this soul-stuff are of sixty different grades.

This graduation of souls is further elaborated in Exc. XXV. 11–13, where we are told that the atmosphere is divided into sixty distinct strata (χώραι), and that each soul has its abode assigned to it in that particular stratum which is suited to its nature.

ταῦτας (ταῦς MSS.) δὲ καὶ τιμήματα καὶ ταμεία (τοιαίς MSS.) ἐν

1 Cf. Plut. Sto. rep. 41, 1052 Ρ: Chrysippus says οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ καθ' ὑπόσως ἐντόμασθαι παρά τὴν ψυχήν.
The abodes of the souls are in metarosio, 'up above the earth', but not in heaven. o"proavou must have been added by some one who mistakenly supposed that the souls resided in heaven before their incarnation; and τής ἀνώ φύσεως is an alternative for o"proavou. Cf. τής μακαρίας [μετὰ θεῶν] πολιτείας in § 34, (πλησίων) τοῦ o"proavou in § 38, and (o"proavou) δι᾽ in § 39.

Some commentators understood this φῶς to be the axis of the Universe, and called it the cylinder. Cf. Photius p. 501 (Porson):

τεταμένων φῶς εἰσὶν οὗν κῶνα· τὸ οὐδαμὸν λέγει. τὸ γὰρ συνεχεῖ τῇ ὑπόφορᾳ (συνεχοῖ τῷ περιφορᾷ) τὸ ὑπόκωσμα τοῦ κόσμου, κατὰ ἀκρα δ᾽ αὖ διήκον (διήκον) εἰπονοῦται ὁ ἄξον. εἰσὶ δὲ αὐτῆ τοῦ ὄρβου. τινὲς τὸν ἄξονα τοῦ κόσμου, οἱ δὲ κυλινδρὸν τινα πυρὸς αἰθέριον περὶ τὸν ἄξονα διὰτα. Possibly the reference to the πᾶλος in the soul's protest (§ 34) should be interpreted in this connexion.

The natural sense of περιστροφῆς is 'revolve round'. The verb στροφῆς is usually transitive. But it is not likely that the souls were set to turn the axis of the universe, and there seems to be no reason why the writer of this document should not use the word in a sense

1 ταμείων, in the sense of a chamber or cell in which souls are imprisoned, occurs repeatedly in the Pistis Sophia; e.g. (C. Schmidt) p. 214, l. 37: 'the ταμεια of the δρακών of the outer darkness.' ib. p. 215, l. 20: 'the door of the ταμείων in which are the φυτά of those men is opened.' Perhaps the person who wrote ταμεία in the Κοινή Κοινων was thinking of some similar application of the word.

A ψυχοστασίας is spoken of in Exe. XXVI. 3.
similar to περιχωρείτες. Cf. Aristophanes, Vesp. 1529: στροβεῖ, παράβαινε κύκλῳ καὶ γάστρισον σεαυτόν, where στροβεῖ is apparently intransitive.

The words τάξει τοι καὶ οἰκονομία καθηκούση may be interpreted of the regular orbit in which the souls circle about the cylinder. It would appear as if this passage should be counted among those which regard the souls as being ἐν μεταροτίῳ τῆς ἄνω φύσεως. The Father's pleasure is presumably caused by their seemly order. When the souls left their stations (§ 24), they aroused the Father's anger and were embodied by his command.]

§ 17. ἐν τῇ περικάλλει τοῦ αἰθήρος στάς (στάς MSS.) (ἀπάθετον αἰθήρ.), καὶ τὰς τῶν ἡδίν οὐσίας (δύναν MSS.) (ψυχῶν) μεταπεμφάμενος φυλάς (φύσεις MSS.). The word αἰθήρ, as used in the Kore Kosmu, probably means the upper part of the atmosphere. The atmosphere, which fills the space between the earth and the lunar sphere, is divided (as in Pseudo-Pl. Epinomis) into a lower, darker, and more turbid part called ἄηρ, and a higher, brighter, and purer part called αἰθήρ. Cf. αἰθήρ τε καὶ ἄηρ in § 34, and [ἄηρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ] in § 〈11〉; 'air and aether' means the atmosphere as a whole. (See note on Exc. XXIV. 1.) The distinction between a higher and a lower stratum of the atmosphere was adopted and elaborated by Posidonius, by whom the writer of the Kore Kosmu was doubtless influenced.

The souls are located in the atmosphere; and when God wishes to address them, he descends from his abode in or above the highest heaven, and takes his stand in or on 'the (vault?) of aether', that is, at the upper boundary of the region within which the souls are confined.

φύσεις cannot be right; and φυλάς, which I have written in place of it, is the more appropriate, because we have just been told that the souls are divided into sixty graduated classes or 'tribes'.

[πνεύματος ἐμοῦ καὶ] μερίμνης ἐμῆς ἦν [ψυχᾶς] καλὰ τέκνα. πνεύματος ἐμοῦ must be understood as a reference to πνεῦμα ἄνω ἀρκετῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱδίου λαβῶν in § 14. But if God mentions the πνεῦμα, why does he not also mention the πῦρ, which was the other of the two known materials? Besides, the souls are not children of the πνεῦμα and the πῦρ (the materials of which they were made) in the same sense that they are children of God's μερίμνη. It is therefore probable that πνεύματος ἐμοῦ καὶ was added by a transcriber.

& ... ἐν τῷ μέσῳ (μῷ MSS.) καθιερῷ (καθιερῷ MSS.) κόσμῳ. Cf. § 14 as emended: ὡς μὴ τὰ κατὰ μέσον ἀκίνητα μέγη.—κόσμος here means, not 'the universe', but 'a region of the universe'. Cf. τὸν
Kathorou (διαλθα, τειά, or the like) means to dedicate or consecrate something or some one to a god. The word is hardly appropriate here; καθιδρίω better gives the sense required.

[λόγων ἐμῶν ὅσ] νόμων τούτων ἐπακούσατε. Λόγων ἐμῶν is probably an alternative for νόμων τούτων.

tótpou μηδενός ἄλλων θέγγετε πλην τοῦ διαταγεντος ὅμι. The souls are here warned against the transgression which they are afterwards described as committing (§ 24). If τόπου is sound, the thing which they are forbidden to do is to trespass beyond the bounds of the region assigned to them. This would agree with τῶν ἑαυτῶν τιμημάτων προήχοντο in § 24. But τόπου διγγάνειν, `to lay hands on a place', is a strange expression; and perhaps we ought to bracket τόπου. If τόπου were struck out, the prohibition would be expressed in less definite terms, and would in that respect correspond more closely to ἐν τι νεώτερον παρά τάμα πράξετε σουλείματα. Below.

ἔστασησαις μὲν οὖν ὅμι νόρων [τε καὶ μένει πάλιν] ὁ μοθὸς (δόμως MSS.), καὶ [ὁ διαταγεῖς] (κατ)αστερισμός, θρόνοι τε ἀρετῆς πεπληρωμένοι. I suppose the writer's meaning to have been this. The souls, when first made, are placed in the atmosphere, to dwell there during a period of probation. If they are obedient to God's commands, they will, at the expiration of that period, be permitted to rise to a higher level, and enter heaven; which implies that they will be transformed from 'souls' into gods.1 On the other hand, if they are disobedient, they will be punished by incarnation in human bodies upon earth.

ὁ μοθὸς (if that is the right reading) may have been altered into δόμως by accident; but πάλιν must have been inserted intentionally, by some one who wrongly assumed that heaven was the original abode of the souls, and therefore that, if they went to heaven, they would be going 'back' to the place they came from. μένει was presumably added because, after ὁ μοθὸς had disappeared, a verb was felt to be needed. But μένει ought to have an accusative object (ὑμᾶς), and does not rightly go with the dative ὑμῖν.

1 Posidonius seems to have said that the upper atmosphere is the proper home of souls in general, and the place to which most of them will sooner or later return after their incarnation upon earth; but that a few exceptionally noble souls will ultimately rise still higher, and become gods in heaven. In the system of Posidonius then, heaven is the highest reward for embodied souls; and the writer of the Kore Koinon, when he made God promise heaven, as a reward for obedience, to unembodied souls, was probably influenced by what Posidonius had said.
[δ διαταγής] has come from τοῦ διαταγήτος above.

ἀστερισμός, the reading of the MSS., is not satisfactory. This word occurs in the two senses ‘a making with stars’ and ‘a constellation’; and in Plut. Plac. Phil. 2. 13 (Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 341), the verb ἀστεριζεῖν means ‘to make (a stone) into a star’. But the recognized term for ‘the making of a man into a star-god’, which is what we want here, is κατασταρισμός.

The word θρόνοι (‘judgment-seats’) expresses a conception which is probably of Jewish origin. Cf. Daniel 7. 9: θρόνοι ἐδέησαν, καὶ παλαιῶς ἡμερῶν ἐκάθητο. Ev. Matth. 19. 28: οὐκ αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ θρόνον δάζησαι αὐτοῖς, καθίσασθε καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ δώδεκα θρόνους κρίνοντες τὰς δώδεκα φυλὰς τοῦ Ἰσραήλ. Ἀρω. 20. 4: εἶδον θρόνοι, καὶ ἐκάθησαν επ’ αὐτοῖς, καὶ κρίμα ἔδοθη αὐτοῖς. Col. 1. 16: εἰτέ θρόνοι εἰτέ κυρίοτητες εἰτέ ἄρχαι εἰτέ ἐξουσία. In coupling together (κατ’) ἀστερισμός and θρόνοι, the writer combines a Pagan and a Jewish mode of picturing the powers and dignities conferred on those who are admitted to heaven.

ἄρτη here means, not moral virtue, but supernatural force or potency. A plant or stone efficacious in magic would be said to possess ἄρτη.

ἰέρον [ὅμιν] ὄμων [πνεῦμα καὶ] κράμα τούτ’ ἀφ’ ὀσπερ ὄρας ἐγέννησα, ψυχοποιοῦσι τε ταύτας μου τὰς χεῖρας. Here, as before, πνεῦμα has been added by a transcriber,—perhaps a Christian. The ‘mixture’ and the hands by which it was manipulated go well together; but it would be superfluous to mention the ingredients of the mixture also, and it is still more inappropriate to mention one of them only, the πνεῦμα, and omit the πῦρ.

§ 18. τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν στοιχείων [συγγενῆ] μίξας, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν. Here begins the making of beasts. They are made of a ‘mixture’ which is analogous to that out of which the (human) souls were made, but is composed of coarser materials; in place of πῦρ and πνεῦμα (fire and air), God this time uses the two grosser elements, water and earth.

(καὶ ᾿ωσπόδον ἐμφυσόσας) (ἐνθυσιάσας MSS.) (τινά ὁσιάν). This phrase corresponds to ἀγνώστοις ταῖς ἐπέρασι ἔλαις ἐκέρασε in § 14, and ought to stand in the corresponding position; I have therefore transposed it.

1 Ἀναβαύρας, τῶν περικύμανων αὖθισ ... ἀναρράσατα λίτρους ἀνὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ καταφλάσατα τούτους ἡστερήκεναι. But the reading is doubtful; in the same passage as given by Stobaeus, the verb is ἡστερεῖναι.
EXCERPT XXIII: 18

(τὸν) τῷ κράματι ἐπιπλέοντα [ὁμοιός] ἐπίπαγον, [ἐνθαφθὲ τε καὶ] ἐναγῆ (ἐπίπαγη MSS.) γενόμενον. ὁμοίος, both here and before κρυπτοῖς ἐπείτων λόγως above, seems intended to mean 'as in the case of the first mixture (§14)'. But both clauses read better when ὁμοίος is struck out; and in both places it is probably a misplaced duplication of (οὐ τοῖς πρῶτοις δ') ὁμοίους.

ἐνθαφθὲ (well steeped or dyed) is meaningless in this connexion; and ἐναγῆ (compact or solid) is not a suitable adjective to apply to a thing which must be imagined as semi-liquid. It is most likely that the original reading was ἐναγῆ, and that both ἐναγῆ and ἐνθαφθὲ were written as substitutes or variants. ἐνάγη, bright or clear, gives the sense wanted; cf. καθαρωτέρα and διειδής, applied to the corresponding substance in § 14. The adjective ἐνάγης (not to be confused with ἐναγής, from ἄγος,) occurs twice in Plato (Tim. 58 D, ἀέρος, τομέν ἐναγήσατον ἐπίκλην αἴθηρ καλούμενος, ὀ δὲ θαλαφτάτος κ.τ.λ.; Legg. 952 A, ἐναγήστερον opposed to σκοτιδέστερα); but it is not a common word, and transcribers may have been puzzled by it.

ἐκ τούτου (sc. τοῦ ἐπίπαγου) τὰ [ἀνθρωποειδῆ] (πνεύματα) τῶν ἔλθων διέπλαιτο τὸ δὲ τοῦ μέγατος λείψανον κ.τ.λ. There is evidently something wrong here. The word ἀνθρωποειδῆ seems to be in some way connected with ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τῶν ζῳδίων τὰ ἔξης ἀπαρίτητας in § 20. Perhaps the man who altered the text wrote τοῖς ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τῶν ζῳδίων in § 20, and τὰ ἀνθρωποειδῆ τῶν ζῳδίων in § 18, and meant the words to signify 'those Signs of the Zodiac which are of human form' (Gemini, Virgo, Sagittarius, Aquarius). But it is clear that the author, in § 18 at any rate, was speaking, not of the making of Signs of the Zodiac, but of the making of beasts. What then is the missing word for which ἀνθρωποειδῆ has been substituted?

We are told that God first makes certain things out of the 'scum' (ἐπίπαγος) of the mixture, and then (§19) directs the souls to make certain things (which, from §23, we know to be birds, fishes, quadrupeds, and reptiles) out of the 'residuum' (λείψανον) of the mixture; and God promises (§ 21 init.) τοῖς ὄρατοις 1

1 Usener conjectures ἐφαφθῆ, 'soft' or 'delicate', for ἐνθαφθὲ. In support of this, Prof. Stuart Jones has pointed out to me that in an anonymous medical text, Rheinisches Museum vol. 58, ἐφαφθὲ occurs for ἐφαφῆ, p. 72, and ἐφαφία for ἐφαφῆ, p. 87; and that in Paul of Aegina 4. 21, ἐφαφῆς στεργόνων, 'well-steeped' sponges, may perhaps be an error for ἐφαφῖν στεργών, 'soft'.) It would be possible to write ἐφαφθὲ τε καὶ ἐναγῆ; but it seems more likely that the author wrote one adjective only.
If we write τὰ ὀρατὰ πνεῦμα in place of τὸ ὀρατὸν πνεῦμα in § 21, all becomes clear. The things which the souls make are ὀρατά; i.e. they are the visible and tangible bodies of the animals; and when the bodies have been made, God completes the animals by adding a πνεῦμα to each body. That is to say, every beast, when completed, consists of two parts, a body and a πνεῦμα. (Most Greeks of the period would rather have said either that a beast is composed of σῶμα and ψυχή, or that it is composed of σῶμα, πνεῦμα, and ψυχή; but the writer of the Kore Kosmu restricts the word ψυχή to human souls, and calls the ‘invisible’ part of a beast,—the part in which its life resides,—πνεῦμα, not ψυχή.) The bodies of the beasts are made out of the λεύσανον of the mixture; the things which are made by God out of the ἐπίσαγος must therefore be the πνεῦματα of the beasts. And so, in place of ἀνθρωποειδῆ, we must write the πνεῦματα.

When the passage is thus understood, we see that the use made of the ἐπίσαγος of the second mixture is analogous to the use made of the ἐπίσαγος of the first mixture. Out of the ἐπίσαγος of the first mixture are made the ψυχαὶ of men; out of the ἐπίσαγος of the second mixture are made the πνεῦματα of beasts. (As to the question what is done with the λεύσανον of the first mixture, see note on § 30.)

§ 19. τοῖς ἡδη προκοψάσις ψυχαῖς ἤθωκε, [ψυχαῖς δὲ ταύταις] τοῖς εἰς [χωρίᾳ θεῶν καὶ] τοὺς ἅγγις ἄστρων τόπους (ἀναβάσαις), καὶ ἱεροῖς δαίμονας μετακεκλημέναις (ἱεροὶς δαίμονας μετακεκλημένας MSS.) These words imply that, though each soul was originally placed in and confined to one particular τῦμα of the atmosphere, it was permitted after a time to rise to higher τῦματα, if it showed sufficient merit. (Posidonius said something not unlike this. Compare the promise in § 17, that obedient souls shall ultimately be permitted to rise above the highest limit of the atmosphere, and enter heaven.) Some time has now elapsed; and some souls which were originally placed in lower τῦματα have risen to the highest stratum of the atmosphere, that stratum which is ‘near to the stars’, i.e. immediately below the sphere of heaven. When they have attained to that position, they are called ‘holy daemons’,—i.e. not gods, but beings of the next grade below that of a god. It is to these

1 I.e. souls either destined to be incarnated in human bodies, or actually incarnated in human bodies.
advanced' souls, and not to the souls in general, that the task of making the bodies of beasts is assigned.

In the extant text, nothing has hitherto been said about the advancement of souls to higher τούτα of the atmosphere. But the words of § 19 seem to imply that this matter has been previously spoken of. If so, the passage in which it was spoken of has been lost.

[χωρία θεῶν καὶ] must have been added by some one who misunderstood the author's meaning, and thought that the advanced souls were already in heaven. (Cf. [οὗραν] in § 16, which may have been added by the same person.) εἰς χωρία θεῶν is equivalent to εἰς οὐρανόν, and is inconsistent with τοῖς ἐγγὺς ἀστρων τόπους, which means places not in heaven, but near it.

After a participle (probably ἀναβαθμός) had been lost, the phrase ἵπτος δαίμονι μετακεκλημένως was altered into the accusative by some one who supposed it to be coupled to τόπους.

ἐκάστη τῇ ιαυτῇς φύσει (πεποιθεία) πλασσέτω τι [παραπλήσιον].

There would be no sense in saying that the bodies of the various beasts are 'somewhat like' or 'nearly equal to' the 'natures' of the souls by whom they are made. If we write τῇ ιαυτῇς φύσει πεποιθεία, the meaning is that each of the souls is to do the best it can, 'relying on its own ability', i.e. without any assistance from God (beyond that of supplying a model). Cf. ἀπέστη (ὁ θεὸς below. παραπλήσιον is probably a corrupted doublet of παραβήσιον.

The words ἐκάστη τι πλασσέτω seem to imply that each of the souls spoken of made a different kind of beast, or in other words, that each species of beasts known to us was made by a different soul.

παραβήσιον δ' ἐγὼ (ἐν τι MSS.) [καὶ] ταῦθ' οὕτων παραδείγματα. ταῦτα must mean the things which God has just made, viz. the πνεύματα of the beasts. The writer imagines the πνεύμα of a horse, for instance, as a sort of gaseous body, of the same shape and size as the gross body of the horse, but invisible to mortal eyes, and

1 Perhaps a similar notion underlies the obscure term τὸ ἄνωτρον πνεύμα in Pistis Sophia, C. Schmidt Kopt.-Gnost. Schriften I, p. 182 ff. According to that passage, a man, when living on earth, consists of four parts: viz. the 'Power' (i.e. ηθία δύναμις, the divine principle in the man, which corresponds to the Platonic νοῦς; the ψυχή; the ἄνωτρον πνεύμα; and the σῶμα. (The μύξα, the man's 'destiny', though it is sometimes coupled with the ἄνωτρον πνεύμα, and is reckoned as a fifth thing beside the other four, ib. p. 194, l. 31, can hardly be regarded as a part of the man in the same sense.) The ἄνωτρον πνεύμα is the thing in which
visible only to God and to unembodied souls (cf. ἥν δὴ καὶ μόνος ὁ τεχνήτης ἄωρα, said of the soul-stuff in § 14). God, having made the πνεῦμα of a horse, sets it before the soul whose business it is to make the gross body of the horse, and says ‘take this πνεῦμα for your model, and make a copy of it in gross matter’; and when the gross body has been made, God puts the πνεῦμα into it. The πνεῦμα, being of the same shape and size as the gross body, permeates and gives life to every part of it; and thus there results a living horse.

The word παράδειγμα may perhaps have been suggested by passages in Plato where the νοστόν εἴδος is spoken of as the παράδειγμα of which material things are copies (e.g. Pl. Tim. 28 a); but the πνεῦμα of a horse, as conceived by the author of the Κόραι Κοσμ, has little in common with the αὐτότιτος, or νοστόν εἴδος of the horse, as conceived by the Platonists.

§ 21. τὸ ὁρατὸν πνεῦμα (τὸ ὁρατὸν πνεῦμα MSS.). The epithet ὁρατὸν is not applicable to πνεῦμα in any of the various senses of that word. It would perhaps be possible to say τὸ ὁρατὸν πνεῦμα, ‘the invisible πνεῦμα (of each of the animals which were about to be made)’; but as τοῖς ὁρατοῖς ἔργοις (the gross bodies of the animals) is in the plural, the sense required is better expressed by writing either τὰ ὁρατὰ πνεῦματα, or τὰ πνεῦματα without any adjective.

(ἄξοναι τὰ ὅμοιονα τὰ ἴχνη, ὅπως [ἀντὶ [αὐτός] ἐστερίκων ἰχνῶν, κ.τ.λ. MSS.) αὕτα (ἀδήθα MSS.) [τε] μηκᾶς ἀνάγκης ἵχνουν (οὐκ ἐνί ἀνάγκης ἵχνουν MSS.) ἄλλοι τι ποιεῖν (πάρ’ αὐτῶν ἐφθασαν ἐργάσασθαι. The production of a first specimen of every species of animals has the passions reside. It is bound to the ψυχή, but is hostile to it, and causes it to sin. When the soul quits the body at death, the ἀντίμομον πνεῦμα still clings to the ψυχή, and testifies against it before the judgement-seat. But if the ψυχή has obtained forgiveness of its sins by means of sacraments, the bonds by which the ἀντίμομον πνεῦμα is bound to it are loosed, and the ψυχή, released from this appendage, attains to ‘the place of its inheritance’.

Ib. p. 39, l. 39 : Sophia says ‘I am become as an ἀντίμομον πνεῦμα which finds itself in a ὅμοιον σῶμα, and in which is no Light-power (i.e. no θείον φῶς or νόον).’

The ἀντίμομον πνεῦμα then is something intermediate between the ψυχή and the σῶμα. It corresponds partly to τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς in the Platonic system, and partly to the πνεῦμα which is spoken of in Corp. X and other Herméticas,—the ‘vehicle’ or ‘garment’ of the embodied soul. But why is it called ἀντίμομον? Probably because it is thought of as a copy or ‘double’ of the σῶμα,—a gaseous body of the same shape as the visible and tangible body.

Compare Tertullian De an. 9 : ‘Recognita enim, cum Deus “flasset in faciem hominis flatum vitae, et factus esset homo in animam vivam”, totum utique per faciem statim flatum illum in interiora transmissum, et per universa corporis spatia diffusum, simulque divina aspiratione densaturn, omni intus linea expressum esse, quam densatus impleverat, et velut in forma gelasse. . . . Hic erit homo interior, alias exterior, dupliciter unus, habens et ille oculos et nures suas, . . . habens et cacteros artus.’
now been provided for; but how is a *succession* of animals to be produced? That is the question which is answered by the words ἐξοντὶν ὀμοιογονίας δοῦναι ἐκάστῳ. God promised to give to each of the animals made by the souls and vivified by Him ‘power to breed others like to itself’.

This corresponds to Gen. 1. 12, οὐκέπερον στήριμα κατὰ γένος καὶ καθ’ ὀμοιότητα, ... οὐ τὸ στήριμα αὐτῶν ἐν αὐτῷ κατὰ γένος,—except that the writer of Genesis is there speaking of plants, and not of animals. The corresponding phrase with regard to animals is Λασάνεσθε καὶ πληθύνεσθε, Gen. 1. 22.

The words ὅπως αὐτῷ ἔτερα γεννᾷ ὀμοια correctly explain the meaning of ὀμοιογονία; but the explanation is superfluous, and was doubtless added by a reader. In the words ὅπως αὐταί (αἱ ψυχαί) μηκέτι ἀνάγκην ἔχωσιν κ.τ.λ. we are told that God undertook to do this in order to save the souls the trouble of making each successive generation of animals by a separate act, as they would otherwise have had to do. I have not ventured to bracket this clause; but it may be suspected that the sentence originally ended at ἐκάστῳ, and that all that follows is a later addition.

§ 22. Τὸ κεκερασμένον ... τῆς ὕλης λαβοῦσαι (λαβόμεναι MSS.) κατενών πρῶτον [καὶ τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς προσεκίνων κράμα], καὶ ὅποθεν ἦ(ν) συμπεπληγμένον ἐπεζήτουν. τῆς ὕλης λαβόμεναι, ‘having taken hold of the material’ will not do. λαβοῦσαι, ‘having received the mixture (from God, who handed it over to them)’, gives the sense required.

καὶ τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς προσεκίνων κράμα is manifestly inappropriate. The souls, when they first receive the mixture, are not disposed to ‘worship’ it, nor even to worship God who has committed it to them; on the contrary, they are tempted to irreverent curiosity. After a time, they fear they may have angered God by their irreverence; and so they set to work. They obey God’s command; but we are meant to understand that they ought to have obeyed it more promptly, and that their conduct on this occasion is a first indication of that presumptuous spirit which afterwards caused their fall.

Probably τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς κράμα was written in the margin as an alternative for τὸ κεκερασμένον, and when the words had got into the text, προσεκίνων was added to give them a grammatical construction.

§ 23. ἔκ μὲν τῆς ἀνωτέρω ὕλης, τῆς ὑπερβολὴ κούφων ἐκουσίης (τῆ ... ἐκουσίη MSS.) τὸν ἐπίσπαγον; τὸ τῶν ὄρμων γένους ἐμόρφουν (ἐμόρφουν MSS.). The ἐπίσπαγος of the mixture has already been skimmed off, and used up in making the πνεύματα of the animals; and ἓ ἀνωτέρω
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\(\text{\textit{ελή}}\) means the upper layer of the \textit{λείψανον} of the mixture. The words \textit{κούφον} \textit{ἐχούσης} \textit{τὸν} \textit{ἐπίσταγον} would imply that a fresh \textit{ἐπίσταγος} has formed on the surface of the upper layer of the \textit{λείψανον}. But the stuff of which the birds are made is the upper layer (\(\text{ἡ} \ \textit{ἀνωτέρα} \ \textit{ελή}\)) as a whole, not an \textit{ἐπίσταγος} of the upper layer; and there would be no use for any such \textit{ἐπίσταγος}. The word \textit{ἐπίσταγον} must therefore have been substituted by error for some other substantive. A satisfactory sense could be got by writing \textit{κούφην} \textit{ἐχούσης} \textit{τὴν} \textit{σύστασιν}, ‘its consistency’.

Four portions of the \textit{λείψανον} are dealt with in succession. We are told that the second portion is denser than the first, because it is situated lower down; that the third is denser than the second, because it is dealt with later; and that the fourth is denser than the third, because it is dealt with later still. It is assumed then that the \textit{λείψανον} increases in density from the surface downward, and also that any given part of it becomes more dense by lapse of time.

\(\text{[ἐν} \ \text{τοῦτῳ} \ \text{δὴ} \ \textit{μικράγως} \ \textit{ἡδη... τὸ} \ \text{τῶν} \ \textit{τετραπόδων} \ \textit{γένος} \ \textit{ἐπιπλασασων]}\). This has evidently been shifted. The order must have been birds, fishes, quadrupeds, reptiles. Birds fly in air; fishes swim in water; quadrupeds walk on earth; reptiles creep on the ground, or live in holes beneath the surface of the earth. Accordingly, the birds are said to have been made of the lightest of the four portions of the \textit{λείψανον}; the fishes, of the next lightest; the quadrupeds, of the third portion, which is heavier, and half-solid; and the reptiles, of the fourth portion, which is heavier still, and quite solidified.

The phrases \textit{κατωφέρον} \textit{υπάρχοντος} and \textit{στερεῶν} \textit{τὴν} \textit{(τὴν} \textit{στερεῶν MSS.)} \textit{πῆξαν} \textit{λαβόντος} are wrongly placed in the traditional text; to make the scheme work out rightly, we must interchange them.

\(\text{καὶ} \ \textit{ἐπερας} \ \textit{ὑγρᾶς} \ \textit{οὐσίας} (\textit{ὑγρασίας} \ \textit{οὐσίας} \ \textit{F'}) \ \textit{δεδομένων} \ \textit{εἰς} \ \textit{διάνηξιν}.\) As there is no corresponding phrase concerning the birds, the quadrupeds, or the reptiles, it is to be presumed that these words have been added by a reader. \textit{ἐπερας} is probably a variant for \textit{ὑγρᾶς}; and we may suppose that the interpolator wrote \(\text{τὸ} \ \textit{ὑγρᾶς} \ \textit{οὐσίας} \ \textit{δεδομένων} \ \textit{εἰς} \ \textit{διάνηξιν},\) as an amplification of \(\text{τὸ} \ \textit{τῶν} \ \textit{ἰχθύων} (\textit{sc.} \ \textit{γένος}).\)

§ 20. (δ θεὸς ...) \(\text{[τὸν} \ \textit{ζωικάκι} ... \ \textit{διέσταξε} [ ], καὶ} \ (\text{τοῦτο}) [\textit{τάς} \ \textit{παρτ} \ \textit{χαρισάμενος} (\textit{χαρισάμην MSS.}) \ \textit{δυνάμεις} [ ], \ \textit{γενητικὴ} \ \textit{ἐκλευσθεὶς} \ \textit{εἶναι} \ \textit{τῶν} \ \textit{εἰς} \ \textit{δεῖ} \ \textit{μελλόντων} \ \textit{ἐσταθαί} [ \ \textit{καθολικὸς} \ \textit{πάντων}]} \ (\textit{ζωῶν}).\) This passage is obviously out of place where it stands in the MSS. If we put it here, it describes the fulfillment of the second of God’s two promises in § 21 (ἐξουσίαν \ \textit{δυναμονάς} \ \textit{δοῦναι} \ \textit{ἐκαστῷ}).
God has to contrive some means by which a continual succession of animal births may be effected; and he does so by making or arranging the Zodiac, and assigning to it the function of causing animals to be born. The writer did not think it enough to make God merely say that the animals were to breed; it was generally believed that births were brought about by the operation of astral influences, and it is here assumed that the source of birth-producing influences is the Zodiac. The phrase παντουργοίς δυνάμεις, 'powers of bringing into existence all manner of creatures', corresponds to the term παντομορφος (omniformis) which is applied to the Zodiac in Ascl. Lat. III. 35 and elsewhere. (The MSS. give πανούργος; but πανούργοσ usually means 'crafty' or 'knavish'.)

καθαλικως is superfluous, as the meaning which it seems intended to express is adequately given by εἰς δεῖ and πάντων. Some word or phrase meaning 'in succession' would be more appropriate.

It is most likely that this section was preceded by a passage, now lost, in which was described the fulfilment of the first of God's two promises in § 21 (τοῖς δρατοῖς ἐργοῖς αὐτῶν τὰ δόρατα πνεύματα ἐπιζεύξαι). We may suppose the writer to have said in the lost passage that God put the πνεύματα into the bodies of the animals, and thereby gave them life.

τῶν ζωδιακῶν συμφώνως ταῖς φυσικαῖς (ψυχικαίς MSS.) κυήσει (τῶν Ἴων;) διέταξε [κόσμον]. ψυχικαίς is certainly wrong; according to the Kore Kosmu, beasts have no ψυχαί. Probably the author wrote φυσικαίς. ( Cf. § 29: ὅταν ἦ ἐπικειμένη αὐτοῖς τῶν ἄστερων κύνοις σύμφωνον ἔχῃ τὴν ἐνὸς ἐκῶστον φυσικὴν ἐνέργειαν.) The notion implied in these words seems to be that the κρυσταλ δίπροις of the stars co-operate with φύσις in producing births; i.e. that the astral influences work in accord with the workings of nature in the animals themselves.

Possibly the writer's view may have been that the bodies of the offspring are generated by the parent-beasts (that is, by φύσις operating in the bodies of the parent-beasts), but that the πνεύματα which enter and animate the bodies of the offspring are generated by the Zodiac, or more exactly, that the πνεῦμα of each animal that is born is generated by that particular Sign of the Zodiac which is rising above the eastern horizon at the moment of the birth.

[πρὸς τοῖς ἀθροισμενοῖς τῶν ζωδίων (ζωδιακῶν MSS.) τὰ ἔξης ἀπαρτί- σεις]. The person who inserted these words apparently divided the twelve Zodia into two classes, the man-shaped Zodia (Gemini, Virgo, &c.), and the beast-shaped Zodia (Aries, Taurus, &c.). But what
can have been his reason for speaking in this way about the Zodia? Perhaps he misunderstood what was said about παραδείγματα in § 19 fin., and assumed that the things which God set before the souls as models to copy from when they were making beasts were the beast-shaped Zodia.

[καὶ πάντεχνον πνεῦμα]. καὶ πνεῦμα may have been added by the same man who inserted [πνεῦματος ἵμον καὶ] and [πνεῦμα καὶ] in § 17; and πάντεχνον may perhaps have come from παντέχνον written as an alternative for παντουργοῦς.

§ 24. δὲ (μέγα) περίβασαν, ήδη. It was only the 'advanced' souls that had actually taken part in the making of the beasts; but all the souls alike were puffed up with sinful pride when they thought of the great thing that had been done by some of them, and consequently all alike incurred the penalty of incarnation.

περίγειγον ὀψιλιστότα τόλμαν. Cf. περίγειγον ὀπλισθήσοντι (ἡθετεὶ MSS.) τόλμαν in § 45.

(⌜τοῖς (γὰρ) ἐν οὐρανῷ θεοῖς ἐφιλονείκουν κ.τ.λ.⌟) In the MSS., this sentence occurs in § 53. But if we read them in the context in which they stand there, we are told that the souls claimed equality with the star-gods at a time 'when they had just been imprisoned (in mortal bodies), and found their degradation unendurable'; which is absurd. If the sentence was written by the author of the narrative, he must have written it in connexion with what is said in § 24 about the presumptuous behaviour by which the souls incurred the penalty of embodiment.

The souls claimed equality with the celestial gods; this implies that they sought to rise above the atmosphere, and enter heaven, in which the star-gods dwell. Admission to heaven had been promised to them as the ultimate reward for obedience (§ 17); but they demanded it before they had deserved it.

As to περικρατοῦσας, see note on Exc. XXIV. 6.

καὶ ἡδη τῶν ἰδίων τιμημάτων [ ] προήρχοντα. This is an overt act of disobedience to God's express command (§ 17). Each of the souls attempted to quit the particular stratum of the atmosphere in which God had placed it, and rise into higher strata; and this they did at their own pleasure, without waiting for God's permission. That would be the first step towards the accomplishment of the design which seems to be ascribed to them in the preceding sentence, viz. that of quitting the atmosphere altogether, and rising to heaven.
del δὲ ἐκουόντο. This phrase may perhaps have been suggested by the Platonic dictum that ψυχή is ἀεικίνητος and αὐτοκίνητος (see Exc. XVI. 1). But if so, the writer here gives an unusual meaning to that familiar saying.

§ 25. τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώμα [τι] τεχνήσασθαι. Man is a σώμα, i.e. a being composed of body and soul. The ψυχή, as long as they remain unembodied, are not called ἀνθρώποι. At this point then begins the making of ‘man’ in the proper sense of that term.

§ 26. Τότε δὲ μεταπεμψάμενος ἐμέ, φησίν Ἐρμῆς, εἶπεν κ.τ.λ. Hermes, in §§ 26 and 31, is a god, and not a man; he is in existence before the making of men, and is entrusted with the task of making the bodies in which the (human) souls are to be incarnated. Moreover, God calls him ‘soul of my soul and mind of my holy mind’, which seems to imply that he is placed above all the other gods, and stands next in rank to the supreme God himself. The Hermes thus spoken of is a being of totally different nature from the man Hermes of §§ 3–8; nor can he be identified with the Hermes of § (32), who learnt the gnosis from Kamephus.

§§ 27–29. Ἀρχῇ ποῦ ... φίλον τὸ ἀνθρώπων. This passage is unconnected with what precedes and follows, and describes things from a different point of view. In § 25, and in §§ 31 ff., the making of men is spoken of as the incarnation of souls hitherto unembodied, and this incarnation is regarded as a punishment. But in §§ 27–29 (with the exception of some words in the speech of Aphrodite, which are out of keeping with the rest of the paragraph, and have presumably been interpolated), nothing is said about punishment; there is not the slightest hint that the souls have offended, or are in disgrace; indeed, there is no mention at all of hitherto unembodied souls; and of the seven gods who speak in the council, two only (Kronos and Ares) announce intentions adverse to mankind, while the other five, so far from desiring to punish men, undertake to confer boons upon them, and we are expressly told that the supreme God is pleased by the benevolent promises of Aphrodite and Hermes. God’s reason for making men is here a different one; he is not seeking to punish offenders; he merely observes that the earth is uninhabited, and decides to remedy that defect. Moreover, the gods whom God consults, and on whom it is assumed that the welfare of men depends, are the
seven planet-gods; whereas in the rest of the Kore Kosmu no prominence is given to planet-gods or planets.

We must conclude then that §§ 27–29 are an extract from another document, in which the making of men was differently dealt with. This extract may perhaps have been appended by a reader, as a parallel to the passage on the same subject in the Kore Kosmu.

According to the traditional text, God says to Hermes, ‘Thou soul of my soul, and mind of my holy mind, . . . summon the gods’. But why should Hermes be thus solemnly addressed, if he is merely to be told to deliver notices of a meeting? The ‘soul of God’s soul’ must be something more than a mere messenger; and we expect some more important task to be assigned to him. That expectation is fulfilled, and a satisfactory sequence is obtained, if we cut out §§ 27–29, and assume that the story told by Hermes to Isis ran thus: (§ 26) ‘God sent for me, and said, “Thou soul of my soul, and mind of my holy mind, (make bodies in which the offending souls may be incarnated.”’ And (§ 30) I looked for material out of which I might make them’ &c.

§ 27. "Αχρι ποι ου στοινη φωνες η των υποκειμενων δραται; Αχρι ποτε τα ηδη γεγονοτα [αργα] μενει [και] ανεγκυμιαστα; φωνες η των υποκειμενων, ‘the world of things below’, means the earth. The earth is στοινη (gloomy or dismal), because it is uninhabited; it will cease to be στοινη when God has peopled it with men.

Compare § 9 as emended, where we are told that the earth was at first inert and barren. The two passages are inconsistent. According to § 9 ff., God supplied what was lacking by making plants, and the earth was thenceforth πασι τοις περι αυτην συγκεκοσμεμενη καλοις (§ 51); but according to § 27, the earth remained ουργη until the making of men.

τα ηδη γεγονοτα ought to mean, not the earth alone, but all parts of the Kosmos, including heaven. But heaven was not ουργα at the time spoken of; its inhabitants, the star-gods, were already in existence. It is therefore necessary to bracket ουργα. The addition of this adjective may have been suggested by § 14 init.

ανεγκυμιαστα, on the other hand, goes rightly with τα ηδη γεγονοτα. Until men are made, there is no one to sing the praises of the universe and its Maker. Cf. § 50 as emended: μεχρι ποτε ανετήρωστοι ταυτης δεσποσμεν της ηγεμονιας;

toους εν οδρακω θεους (καλεσον) παντας ηδη. To whom is this
addressed? To Hermes, as messenger of the supreme God? If so, Hermes in this paragraph combines the function of messenger with that of planet-god. But it is possible that the command was addressed to no one person in particular. Would it be better to write (καλέσω τευ) instead of (κάλεσον)?

All the star-gods are summoned to the council; but it is only the seven planet-gods that speak. The writer of this paragraph must have ranked the planets above all the other gods of heaven.

[εἶπεν δ' θεός, δ' τέκνον, δ' φησιν 'Ερμῆς]. These words imply that the speaker is Isis, and that she is repeating to her son Horus a story which she has heard from Hermes. But they are awkwardly placed; and δ' φησιν 'Ερμῆς can hardly be reconciled with § 29, in which Hermes (the planet-god) is spoken of in the third person. It is therefore most likely that the words εἶπεν . . . Ερμῆς were added by the man who inserted the passage into the text of the Κορε Κόσμου. If we omit them, there is nothing to show that Isis is speaking; and we are free to suppose that, in the document to which this paragraph originally belonged, the story of the council of the star-gods was neither put into the mouth of Isis nor said to have been told to her by Hermes, but was narrated by the writer in his own person.

"'Ἄπεδεπ᾽ εἶπεν "εἰς τὴν γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ χαμαί' (..)."
Some description of what was to be seen on earth is wanted. The words which stand at the beginning of the section (ἄριστε ποῦ στιγμὴ φώς η τῶν ὑποκειμένων δράτα; ἄριστε πότε τὰ ἔδη γεγονότα μένει ἀνεγκακώμαστα;) would serve the purpose well enough; and it is possible that these words have been shifted, and originally followed τὰ χαμαί.

§ 28. Εἶρεν Ἡλιος "'Επὶ πλέον' λάμψω." It is not clear why the Sun should undertake to shine 'to a larger extent'; and his speech was probably not quite so curt. As the Moon promises other benefits besides that of giving light, we should have expected the Sun to do likewise.

Εἶρεν δὲ (Σελήνη) καὶ προπεπαιδοποιηκέναι [φόβον καὶ] σιγῆν καὶ ὄπων [καὶ τὴν μᾶλλοναν αὐτοῖς ἐστοθαί (π')ανωφελή μνήμην]. The Moon, inasmuch as she presides over the night, may very well be called the mother of Silence and Sleep; but why should she be called the mother of Memory? 1

1 The Egyptian god Thoth, the scribe and recorder (θεομηματογράφος) of the gods, is said to have been originally a moon-god; but I know of no evidence that
φόβον was probably added by some one who thought of nightly terrors. But terror is not a thing that can be fitly coupled with the boons of silence and sleep.

Κρόνος ἀπ' ἀγγειεῖν ὡς παντὴρ γεγονότα, δίκης καί ἀνάγκης. The influences of the planet Saturn are maleficent. ἀνάγκη is a force to which men submit with reluctance; and δίκη means ‘penal justice’, as in Ἔξ. VII.

Ζεὺς Ἀθεν. "Ὡς μὴ παντάπασι πολέμους ἀπόληται (πολεμήσαι MSS.) τὸ φύλον τὸ ἐσόμενον (ἐσομένων MSS.), ἢδε αὐτῶς καὶ τύχη καὶ ἐπίδα καὶ εἰρήμην γεγονήτα." [Fortune and Hope were thought to play a decisive part in war. Cf. Dion Chrysost. De Fort. I. 21: αὐτὴ πολέμοιν μὲν ἐστὶ νίκη... ὡς δὲ ναῦς εἰκῇ φέρεται καὶ ταχὺ βεβίζεται, κυβερνήτῃ στρατιάς... σωτὶ πόλις εἰς φθορὰν ἐλη χωρεῖ σπάνει τύχης; Π. 8, ὄνωμασται δὲ ἡ τύχη καὶ πολλοὶ ταῖς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀνώμασι, τὸ μὲν ἴων αὐτῆς νέμεσις, τὸ δὲ ἀδηλὸν ἐλπὶς κ.τ.λ. Plut. De fort. Rom. 5: καὶ τόχα οὖν τῇ τύχῃ τὴν ἀνδρείαν παρανόμασιν, γὰρ πλείοντον εἰς τὸ νικῶν τύχης μέτετει, and passim.]

[ὡς μὴ χαλεπωστάθηναι αἰ συγγενεῖς ψυχαὶ τὴν καταδίκην ὑπομένων (ὑπομένουσαι MSS.)] ἐπὶ πλεον κολάζωνται. ἐπὶ πλέον κολάζωνται is an alternative for χαλεπωστάθηναι... τὴν καταδίκην ὑπομένων.
The planet Venus is here made to speak of God’s decision to punish the souls by incarnation (§ 25). But as there is no mention of punishment in the speeches of the six other planets, there can be little doubt that these words were added after §§ 27–29 had been inserted in the Kore Kosmu.

§ 29. Ἔγὼ δὲ, εἶπεν Ἐρμής, [καὶ] (ὑπευθήν): ποιῆσαι τὴν (τῶν) ἀνθρώπων φύσιν [ἐκέ], καὶ σοφίαν αὐτῶς [καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πειθώ] καὶ ἀληθείαν παραθῆσαι (ἀναθῆσις MSS.). The Hermes here spoken of is neither the man Hermes of §§ 3–8, nor the great god Hermes of §§ 26 and 30; he is the planet Mercury. The thing which this planet-god is to do for men must have been indicated by some lost adjective such as ὑπευθήν. He will make them intelligent, and will thereby enable them to attain to ‘wisdom and (knowledge of the) truth’.

I know of no authority for attributing σωφροσύνη to the influence of this planet; and as the moral virtues are not elsewhere spoken of in §§ 27–29, it is not likely that one of them would be mentioned here. πειθῶ (persuasive eloquence) might be reckoned among the gifts of the Greek god Hermes and the planet assigned to him; but it is inappropriate in this passage.

in the third century A.D. memory was thought to be in any way connected with the moon.
The words ουτος ξυδιων των εμων γινομενων ανθρωπων would imply that there are certain Signs of the Zodiac which are placed under the control of the planet-god Hermes, and that he limits his benefits to the men who are born under those Signs. In the following clause, the Signs placed under his control appear to be called ξυδια τα εμφρονα και νοερα. But a distinction between certain Signs of the Zodiac which are ξυνατωκανοτα and certain others which are not εμφρονα και νοερα, would be unexampled; and there can be little doubt that there is some corruption. The text of the MSS. may be conjecturally accounted for as follows. Some one wrote ξυτα γαρ εμοι ανθηκεν ο πατηρ και δημιουργος τα εμφρονα και νοερα, using the phrase ξυρα τα εμφρονα και νοερα to signify men as opposed to beasts, and meaning that men, quia intelligent, are under the special charge of Hermes, the god who confers intelligence; and a later transcriber, whose thoughts were running on the Zodiac, (perhaps the same man who inserted the words προς τοις ανθρωποειδεσι των ξυνατωκανοταν τα ξης απαρτισαις in § 20,) altered ξαν into ξυδια, and added the words των υπο ξυδιων των εμων γινομενων ανθρωπων above. But the clause ξυτα γαρ . . . και νοερα cannot have been written by the original author of the paragraph. Hermes ought not to be made to speak thus of the Demiurgus in answer to a question put to him by the Demiurgus himself; if he said anything of the sort, he ought to say εμοι συ ανθηκας rather than εμοι ανθηκεν ο πατηρ και δημιουργος.

και τοτε πλεον (sc. οφελησων), δειν [και] (ἡ) έπικεμενη αυτοις των αντερων κινησις συμφωνων ξης την ενδι εκαστοις φυσικης ανεργιαν. The influence of the stars on a man is here distinguished from the operation of φωτις in him (cf. § 20 init.). φωτις so works in some men (i.e. their bodies are so composed and constructed) as to qualify them for attaining to a high degree of intelligence; and in such men, the work of φωτις co-operates with the stellar influence which is brought to bear on them by the planet Hermes.

I had thought of transposing τη ευφεσει συνων, and placing it before σοφιαν αυτοις . . . παραθεσαι. If it is to be retained, that is perhaps the best place for it; but it is not needed there.
§ 30. ὅ δὲ ταῖς ψυχαῖς προσέταξε τοῦ κράματος τὸ λείψανον δοῦναι. It seems hardly fitting that God should order the souls to take action conducive to their own punishment; 1 perhaps therefore it would be better to bracket ταῖς ψυχαῖς, and translate 'God commanded that the residuum of the mixture should be given to me'. But whether we retain ταῖς ψυχαῖς or cut it out, the λείψανον here spoken of must be the residuum of the second mixture (i.e. the stuff out of which the bodies of the beasts had been made by the advanced souls), and not the residuum of the first mixture. The bodies of men consist of the same materials as the bodies of beasts; both alike are composed chiefly, if not solely, of the grosser elements; and it was the second mixture, and not the first, that contained the grosser elements.

At this point, the writer's scheme does not work out quite satisfactorily. The πνεύματα of beasts are made out of the ἐπίσαγος of the second mixture, and the bodies of beasts out of the λείψανον of the second mixture; the ψυχαί of men are made out of the ἐπίσαγος of the first mixture, and symmetry would seem to require that the bodies of men should be made out of the λείψανον of the first mixture. But the writer knew that the chief components of human bodies, as well as of the bodies of beasts, were earth and water; he was therefore obliged to say that the bodies of men and beasts alike were made out of the λείψανον of the second mixture, and to leave the λείψανον of the first mixture unutilized.

καὶ λαβὼν εὑρὼν αὐτὸ παντελῶς ἔηρον. ἔθεν πολλῷ [πλείον τοῦ δέοντος] ἐκχρησάμην (εἰς) κατάμεθι ὦδαι, οὕτῳ (ὡς MSS.) (δὲ) τὴν τῆς ὕλης σώσασθαι νεαροποιήσας (ποιήσασθαι MSS.) [ἐπλασα]. We were told in § 23 that the portion of the λείψανον which remained when the souls were finishing their work was already completely solidified, and was consequently not fit for making anything above the grade of reptiles. If human bodies are to be made of it, it must first be restored to a liquid condition; and this is what Hermes does by adding water to it.

The words πλεῖον τοῦ δέοντος imply that he did his work badly, and are inconsistent with καλῶν ὑπηρχέ μοι τὸ ἔργον, καὶ ἑτερομνὴν βλέπων.

[ὡς ἐκλυτὸν παντάπασι καὶ ἄσθενὲς καὶ ἀδύνατον τὸ πλασσόμενον εἶναι]. This must have been inserted by some one who misunderstood the writer's reason for saying that Hermes added water to the mixture.

1 It is not till later (§ 31) that the souls become aware that they are sentenced to incarnation.
The words imply that the addition of water caused the bodies made of the mixture to be feebler than they would otherwise have been; but it follows from § 23 that this is a reversal of the author's meaning. Water stands higher than earth in the scale of elements; and an addition of water to the solidified mass is needed if human bodies are to be made from it, because human bodies, though imprisonment in them is a degradation to unembodied souls, stand higher in the scale of existence than the bodies of reptiles.

[ὅς μὴ πρὸς τῷ συνετὸν εἶναι ἔτι καὶ δυνάμεως ηὲ πεπληρωμένων.] These words were probably added by another person in consequence of the same misunderstanding.

καὶ καλὸν ὑπήρχε ἰγνὸν. Incarnation is a punishment; but the human body is a well made thing (cf. Corp. V. 6–8 a), and Hermes had good reason to be proud of his workmanship.

§ 31. θαύμασα οὖν: θαύμασα is perhaps a corrupted doublet of ἔστυγνασαν.

§ 32. πρόσεχε . . . παρ’ ἐμοῦ]. This section is manifestly out of place. There is no reason why Isis should describe her report of the lamentations of the souls about to be embodied, in distinction from the rest of her discourse, as a κρυπτὴθεωρία; nor is there any reason why she should interrupt her narrative at this particular point to tell her son whence she got her information. And supposing that she did so, she would have no occasion to mention Kamephis, seeing that in the preceding sections her sole informant is the god Hermes, who was an eyewitness and participant in the events narrated.

The proper place for such a statement as this is at the beginning of a discourse of Isis to Horus; and I have accordingly transposed § 32 to the beginning of the Excerpt.

§ 33. αἰ μὲν [γὰρ] αὑτῶν αὐτὸ μόνον ὡδὸροντο καὶ ἐστεναξον, ᾧδὲ ἐκ (καὶ ἀντεςπάλαιον). The clause beginning with αἰ μὲν must have been followed by a clause beginning with αἰ δὲ, in which it was said that others did something more than merely (αὐτὸ μόνον) lament; and the simile which follows (ἂντερ τρόπον τῶν θηρίων κ.τ.λ.) shows that what these others did was to struggle against the compulsion to which they were subjected. It may therefore be conjectured that the author wrote αἰ δὲ καὶ ἀντεσπάλαιον, and that the meaningless words αἰ δὲ παλαιῶν (αἰ. αἰ δὲ πλεόν), which occur at the end of the section, are a misplaced corruption of that phrase.

ἢντερ τρόπον τῶν [γεγονότων] θηρίων τὰ ἐλευθέροις δὲ[ψ]λοις πονηρῶν [μελήσει] (οὐ δούλων πονηρῶν μελέταις;) τῆς συνήθους [καὶ φίλης]
The souls are compared to wild beasts (e.g. lions, or possibly elephants,) entrapped and vainly struggling against their captors. As to τῶν θηρίων τὰ ἑλευθέρα, cf. Arist. *Hist. an.* 1. 1, 488 b 16: τὰ δὲ (τῶν ζῴων ἑστῶν) ἑλευθέρα καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ εὔγενη, οἷον λεον. The word γεγονότων may have been added by some one who was thinking of the making of beasts in §§ 18–23. *στασιάζειν* and ὁχόμοιοί are feeble alternatives for μάχεσθαι.

[ἀλλὰ καὶ, ἐάν τούχη περιγενόμενα, θανάτω παραδίδοσι (παραδώσουσι MSS.) τοὺς (τοὺς MSS.) αὐτοὺς ἐπιμέλειας]. This is an inappropriate amplification of the simile. Lions sometimes kill their assailants; but the souls cannot have killed or tried to kill God's agents (presumably gods of the same type as Hermes) by whom they were being imprisoned in bodies.

*τριζέων* δίκην ἀδιπίδων. [In *Od.* 24. ll. 5, 7, 9 τρίζειν is used of the suitors' souls conducted by Hermes to the abode of the dead. The passage was so often quoted that this seems the natural word for the impotent cry ('vox exigua') of a soul under compulsion, and not inconceivably the expansion of the previous simile may imitate Homer too. 'Like asps' is a local touch. It is true that τρίζειν means primarily the shrill noise of a bat or mouse or locust, and that συρίζειν is the κύριον ὀνόμα for a snake's hiss. But there seems no reason why, by the Hermetist's time, τρίζειν should not have had the same extension of meaning as *stridere*. In Ar. *H. A.*, 535 b, where ψόφος is distinguished from φωνή, τρεγμός and συργμός are both used to describe the inarticulate ψόφοι of fish.]

§ 34. πολλάκις ἂνω τε καὶ κάτω [[τοῦς]] [οίους (ὁς MSS.) ἐτύχειν ἧχουσα] μεταφέρουσα (†τοῦς) ἄφθαλμοι. The distressed soul, still situated in the atmosphere, directs its eyes alternately upward to heaven, from which it is henceforward to be separated by a greater distance, and downward to earth, to which it is to be banished.

For [οίους ἐτύχειν ἧχουσα], cf. χείρας [οῖας ὅθε θεῶν εἰκός ἤχειν] in § (52) as emended. Unembodied souls have no bodily eyes; and some one (probably not the author) thought it worth while to remind the reader of that fact.

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The writer of the *Kore Kosmu* regards the stars as gods, and therefore would hardly call them 'eyes of gods', though a person who was not thinking of them as gods might very well describe them by that phrase.

αἰθήρ τε καὶ ἀήρ, καὶ τοῦ μονόφρωνου [θεοῦ] [χεῖρες τε καὶ] ἱερὸν πνεῦμα, τὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχής σύντροφα. αἰθήρ τε καὶ ἀήρ means the atmosphere. Cf. [ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ] in § 11; and see note on αἰθέρος in § 17.

The ιερὸν πνεῦμα of God is also the atmosphere, regarded as God's life-breath; cf. πνεῦμα ἀπὸ τοῦ διόν λαβών in § 14. The soul, after appealing to heaven and its inhabitants, goes on to appeal to the atmosphere. The addition of χεῖρες may have been suggested by ιερὸν δυνιόν [πνεῦμα καὶ] κράμα τούτο... ψυχοποιῶς το ταύτας μου τὰς χεῖρας in § 17; but the mention of God's hands is irrelevant in § 34.

The phrase τὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχής σύντροφα refers to αἰθήρ, ἀήρ, and πνεῦμα, from which it has been separated in the MSS. by the interposition of the misplaced words ἐπιλαμμοῦ... ἀκοπίσσων. The souls have hitherto dwelt in the atmosphere; the components of the atmosphere are therefore called by the soul which speaks 'the sharers of our home'. ἀρχή, which may have come from ἀρχή γενέσεως above, has been substituted by error for some other substantive, possibly φύσεως.

[πλεὸν οὐδ' ἐπὶ ἀπὸ [μεγάλων τε καὶ λαμπρῶν]] [καὶ] τοῦ ιεροῦ περίψυματος καὶ (τόπου) πλησίου (πλουσίου MSS.) (τοῦ) πόλου (...). τὸ ιερὸν περίψυμα means the atmosphere. If the souls lived in the atmosphere, they lived not in the sphere of heaven, but near it; the meaningless πλουσίον must therefore be altered into πλησίον. Cf. § 3, where I have corrected ἀρχήν into ἀρχήν.

[ἐπὶ] τῆς μακαρίας μετὰ θεῶν πολιτείας (ἐπεισόδωρα). The μακαρία πολιτεία of which the souls are to be deprived is the life they have been living in the atmosphere. For πολιτεία in this sense, cf. πολιτεύεται in Exc. XXIV. 18 and Exc. XXVI. 19. The words μετὰ θεῶν, which would imply that they have hitherto dwelt in heaven, may have been added by the same person who inserted οὐρανοῦ in § 16.

§ 35. [[τί ταῖς δυστήναις... τούτων ἐξιόν;]] The question 'What have we done to deserve these punishments?' ought to stand at the end of the speaker's description of the punishments, and not in the middle of it; I have therefore transposed these words to the begin-
ning of § 37. But it is possible that § 37 originally followed immediately on § 35 *init.,* and that all that intervenes (οἱ ὕπειροι... κορδές ὄγκος) has been added by a later hand.

οἷς (δος Ρ) [ἡ πράξεις ὑπάρχει τῷ [ἐθανεῖ καὶ] ταχύ διαλύτω σώματι πορίζωμεν τὰ ἐπίτηδεα. Embodied souls are troubled by the necessity of providing for the needs of the body, and are forced by this necessity to do things unworthy of them. Cf. Corp. VI. 6 fin.

*ἀθανέτι* implies the same notion which was expressed by the interpolated words ὡς ἔκλιτον... τὸ πλαστὸν εἶναι in § 30.

§ 36. (οἱ) ὕπειροι [ὁ] χωρήσουσιν ὄλγαν (ὁλγαν MSS.), καὶ [ἐν] τούτοις τοὺς κύκλους ύγρά (τῶν ἐν τούτοις υγρῶν καὶ κύκλων MSS. (ὁντελέως μικρῶν)) τῶν ἑαυτῶν πρόγονον ὁδρανῶ δρώσαι στενάζομεν αἰτία. The souls have hitherto seen with 'the eyes of the mind'; they will henceforth have to see with bodily eyes instead, and this passage describes the disadvantages of the latter kind of vision. The bodily eyes 'have little room to take things in' (χωρήσουσιν ὄλγαν); that is, the images of things must be reduced to small compass if they are to enter the eyes; (this seems to be the writer's way of accounting for the fact that the apparent size of objects is diminished by distance;) and consequently, heaven, as seen by bodily eyes, will look 'very small'. Moreover, the eyes, being composed of watery matter, are ill suited for seeing the fiery sphere of heaven. [See Addenda in vol. iv.]

καὶ (βλέποντες δὲ) οὖ ὑπεμφεμέν Λάκτης (Αλήθης MSS.) δὴλαίας γὰρ κατακρίθη ἡμῖν (σκότος) (δὲλαία γὰρ κατακρίθημεν MSS.). The author probably wrote something to this effect, though his words cannot be restored with certainty. 'We shall not see clearly; for one cannot see unless there is light, and there will be little light in the place to which we are to be banished.' Light is at its maximum in heaven, and diminishes as one descends; so that, as compared with the home of the souls ἐν μεταροιφί, the surface of the earth, on which they are henceforth to dwell, is a region of darkness.

The quotation from Orpheus must have been appended by a reader. It appears to mean 'we see, not with our eyes, but with the light or fire contained in the eyes'.

τῶν συγγενῶν φως[ι][β]ότων ἐν ἀμίν πνευμάτων ἀκούομαι (ἀκούομαι MSS.) τηλικώς οἴσομεν ἕτε μὴ συμπνέομεν αὐτοῖς. Next to seeing comes hearing. But the speaker deals with the sense of sight in one way, and with that of hearing in another. We have been
told that the souls will see less fully and clearly than they did before; but we are here told, not that they will hear less clearly, but that something which they will hear will cause them sorrow.

τὰ πνεύματα here means the winds. Souls and winds are akin, because both alike are made of the gaseous materials of which the atmosphere consists; and the sound of the wind will remind them of their home in the atmosphere, where they were companions of the winds.

οἴκος (γὰρ) ἡμᾶς ὡστὶ τοῦ μεταρρυθμοῦ κόσμου τούτου ὁ βραχύς περιμένει καρδίας δύκος. κόσμος is here used in the sense of 'a region of the universe', as in §§ 14 and 17.

Chrysippus and most of the Stoics said that the soul permeates the whole body, but that the ἔνωσις of the soul resides in the heart. (See Arnim Sto. vet. fr. vol. ii. §§ 879–91.) The writer of the Kore Kosmu says that the embodied soul is confined to the heart; but the soul of which he is speaking corresponds to the ἔνωσις of the Stoics rather than to the ψυχή which, according to them, extends throughout the body.

§ 37. (διάταξαν ἡμῶν τίνας δροσῆς τῆς κολάσεως) (ei (dai MSS.) δὲ (αμετάθετος ἡ καταδίκη), ἐπιλήσας (ἀπολύσας MSS.) ἡμᾶς ἀφ' οίων (ὅν MSS.) εἰς οὐ καταβήμαν ἀπόλυτο τοῦ (ἀπολεῖ τὸ MSS.) λυπεῖσθαι.)

These petitions are wrongly placed in the MSS.: they ought to stand at the end of the speech. The spokesman of the souls prays for two distinct alleviations of their punishment, viz. (1) that limits may be set to the duration of their life in the body, and (2) that during their residence on earth they may be spared the sorrow of remembering their happier home above. We are told that both these requests were granted (ἐπίτυχον κ.τ.λ., § 38 init.). The first of them, however, is not granted unconditionally; God's answer to it is given in § 39, where he promises release from the body as a reward for good conduct, but at the same time announces that souls which do amiss in their human life on earth will incur the still severer punishment of reincarnation in the bodies of beasts. God's answer to the second request,—the petition for ἀλήθε,—is given in § 41 (τυφλωθησαί δ' ἐμών ἡ φρόνησις κ.τ.λ.).

§ 38. (λόγοι τοῦ θεοῦ.) If λόγοι is the right reading, the plural word must refer to §§ 38–39 and §§ 40–41, regarded as two different speeches of God. But it is possible that the man who inserted this superscription wrote λόγος.

God's speech, as given in the MSS., is incoherent; and in order
to make sense, it is necessary to assume that four distinct pieces of it have been shifted.

διαὶ τὴν ἀνήρατον μου σκηνοσχέειν ἑρμηνεύετε. This does not mean that there are some souls that refuse submission to God's rule; even those who resisted at first have now submitted, and the speech is addressed to all of them together. Cf. Θεοὶ, διαὶ τῆς κορυφαίας...

τὰ (πλησίον) τοὺ ὀφρανοῦ φιλεῖτε (οἰκήσετε MSS.) χωρία. In this phrase, and in the words τὸν ἑαυτῶν ὀφρανόν δοσάσεσθε and ὀφρανόν μὲν οὐκέτι οἰκήσετε in § 39, the text has been altered by some one who assumed that the souls dwelt in heaven before their incarnation. In each of these three places, some term denoting the atmosphere is needed.

καταδικασθείσαι) θυητοίς, καὶ αὐταὶ (τὸν τοῦτοις) προσμεμορια[σ]μένων χώρων [[ ]] οὖνικήσετε. The souls are sentenced to imprisonment in organs of the body (cf. καρδίας ὕγκος in § 36 βι.). and must therefore reside in the place assigned to carnal bodies, i.e. on earth.

For the dative with καταδικασθείσαι, cf. καταδικασθήμεν θανάτῳ in Diod. 13. 101. As there is good authority for the verb μοιράω, and none for μοιράζω, it is to be presumed that the author wrote προσμεμοραμένων.

§ 39. (εἰς) χαὶ δ' ἀλογα μετα(βάσαι, χαμαί) πλανώμεναι (μεταπλανώμεναι MSS.) (τὸ) λοιπὸν διατέλεσθε. The compound μεταπλανᾶθαι does not occur elsewhere; and some such change as I have proposed is needed to make the clause intelligible.

As the bodies of beasts are (according to the writer of this document) animated by ἵνττα, and not by ψυχή, it may perhaps be inferred that the degraded souls which incur this punishment will be transformed into mere ἵνττα.

§ 40. πάσαις αὐταῖς ἔχαρισατο πνεύματα. If πνεύματα is sound, the meaning must be that God wrapped or clothed the naked souls in πνεύματα (cf. Corp. X. 13 and 16), as a preparation for their incarnation in gross bodies. This would imply that a man consists of σῶμα, πνεῦμα, and ψυχή, whereas a beast consists of σῶμα and πνεῦμα alone. But as there is no mention of human πνεύματα elsewhere in the Kore Kosmu, it seems more likely that πνεύματα is a misreading for σῶματα or πλάσματα.

§ 41. (…) ἀρχῇ τοῖς [διαφορά] [τῆς] παλιγγενεσίας ύμῖν ητται ἢ τῶν σωμάτων [ὡς ἐφη] διαφ(θ)ορά, [εὐθεργεσία δὲ] καὶ (τῆς) πρόσθεν
EXCERPT XXIII: 39-41

εὐθαμονίας ἡ διήλυσις. The destruction of the body will result in the ‘rebirth’ of the soul; that is, the soul, when released from the body by death, will return to its home above, and will there begin a new and happier life. This promise must be understood to be conditional on the good conduct of the souls during their life on earth; it does not hold good in the case of those who do ill, and thereby incur the penalty of reincarnation in the bodies of beasts (§ 39 fin.).

[διαφορά] is a misplaced doublet of διαφορά; and [εὐφροσύνα δὲ] has come from εὐφροσύνα in the following sentence.

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This, like the preceding sentence, applies to those souls only who shall live good lives on earth; for it is in the case of such souls alone that death is ‘a change for the better’. The words εἰς τὸ ἀνάξιον ἐμοῦ δόξητε πράσσειν must therefore be struck out. ἀνάξιον ἐμοῦ is a strange phrase; perhaps it is a misreading for something like ἀνάξιον τῆς γενέσεως ὑμῶν, ‘unworthy of your origin’ (cf. τῆς ἑαυτῶν γενέσεως ἐμοὶ in § 40).

Death is, for good men, a change for the better; but men will be deluded into thinking that it is an evil for all alike, and will do all they can to postpone it. All men fear death,—except the few who have learnt that for them it is the entrance into a new and happier life; and even these few must have shared the delusion of the rest before they were enlightened.

αἱ δικαιότεραι δὲ ὅμων καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸ θείον ἐμεταβολὴν ἐκδεχόμεναι (. . .). ἡ εἰς τὸ θείον ἐμεταβολὴ would mean the transformation of souls into gods, or in other words, admission to heaven. In § 17, speaking to the souls before their fall, God set before them the prospect of admission to heaven as the ultimate reward for obedience; but as nothing appears to have been hitherto said about it in God’s speech to them after their fall (§§ 38-41), there is probably some error in the text. Perhaps τὸ θείον has been substituted for τὸ βελτίων. But τὴν εἰς τὸ (βελτίων ?) ἐμεταβολὴ would hardly have been written by the author so soon after τὴν δὲ εἰς τὰ βελτίωνα ἐμεταβολὴν in the preceding sentence; it may therefore be suspected that καὶ τὴν . . . ἐκδεχόμεναι is a later addition. In any case, the men spoken of in these words are the few who have attained to gnosis, and are no longer subject to the general delusion about death.
What was said about these 'more righteous souls', we do not know, as the rest of the sentence is lost.

§ 42. [eis μὲν ἀνθρώπους, βασιλεῖς δικαίων ... τοῦ τῶν ἄνθρωπων γένους.] The meaning of this section appears to be as follows: 'The noblest of the souls, when they are incarnated in human bodies, become righteous kings &c.; when in bird-bodies, eagles; when in quadruped bodies, lions; when in reptile bodies, dragons; and when in fish-bodies, dolphins.' But this is inconsistent with § 39 f.s. (where it is implied that vicious souls alone will be incarnated in the bodies of beasts), and cannot have been written by the same person.

The quaint statements about eagles, lions, dragons, and dolphins, by which the writer of the passage seeks to prove that these animals are the noblest of their respective orders, are of the same character as many that are to be found in the medieval 'Bestiaries', the contents of which are derived chiefly from the so-called Physiologus ¹ ascribed to Epiphanius (A.D. 367-403). The verbs in these statements ought to be in the present tense, but have been altered into the future by some one who was trying to make the passage agree with the context, when it had been inserted in the Kore Kosmu.

oduδε [πλήθοιν τούτων] ζῷον ἐτερων ἀδεθύνετερον τι αὐτῶν (αὐτῶ MSS.) ἄμμεξον ἄφθησεται. The writer of these words seems to have been unaware that eagles are birds of prey. ἄφθησεται and μεταλύσεται are probably two different attempts to fill the gap left by the loss of some such verb as ἀφίνεται.

[kai φύσεως ἐτυχείν ἀκομίμητο τρόπω τιν.] If these words are retained, οὔτε κοιμώμηται is mere iteration.

οὔτε γὰρ κάμωνον (κάμωνον MSS.) οὔτε κοιμώμηται. Cf. Aelian De animalibus 5. 39: λέγει Δημήκριτος τῶν ζῴων μόνον τῶν λέοντα ἐκπεπταμένους τίκτεσθαι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς. . . ἐφίλαξαν δὲ ἄλλοι καὶ καθεύθων οτι κινεὶ τὴν οὐρὰν, ἑνδεικνύομεν ὑσ το εἰκὸς ότι μὴ πάντη ἀτρεμεί, μηδὲ μὴν κυκλοσάμενοι αὐτόν καὶ περελθῶν ο ῥπνὸς καθελκ, ωσπορ ὅν καὶ τῶν ζῷων τὰ λαιτά. τοιούτων τι φυλάξαντας Αιγυπτίων ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ κομπάζειν φασὶ, λέγονται ότι κρειτῶν ὑπὸν λέων ἔστων, ἄγρυπνῶν δε. ταύτη τοι καὶ ἥλιω ἀποκράνειν αὐτὸν αὐτοὺς πέπνυμαι.

¹ Christ, Gesch. der griech. Litt. p. 911, says that the Physiologus is a Christian revision of a book which 'originated in Alexandria in the circle of the Hellenistic Jews, in the first half of the second century A.D.', and was 'a product of Egyptian and Hebrew beast-symbolism'. That book may have been known to the writer of Exc. XXIII. 42. The Physiologus has many points of resemblance with Aelian's book on animals.
EXCERPT XXIII: 42, 43-48

kal yap toi kai tov ἥλιον, θεῶν ὄντα φιλοποιώματον, κατὰ τὸ ἢ ἄνω τῆς γῆς ὅρασθαι ἢ τὴν κατῷ πορείαν ἔνας, μὴ ἕνυξάζοντα. See also Cramer Anecdot. Oxon. II. 235, 32.

(ὁ δράκων) ἰὼν οἴει (οὕς εἰς MSS.). Cf. Plin. Nat. hist. 29. 67: 'draco non habet venena.'

νεάζει (έσωρ MSS.) δὲ καὶ γηρᾶσαν. I. e. it casts off its old skin. This might be said of snakes in general. Cf. Aristot. Hist. an. 8. 17, 600 b 15: τῶν δὲ φιλούμενον ἐνοι τὸ καλούμενον γῆρας ἐκδύνουσιν ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ἐσχατον δέρμα. . . . ἐκδύνει δὲ τὸ γῆρας ὅσων (ἑ. φοιλιδωτῶν) τὸ δέρμα μαλακὸν . . . , καὶ μάλιστα πάντων οἱ ὅφεις.

τους μὲν ἐμπνοεῖς διακομίζουσιν (τὰ μὲν ἐμπνοα διακομίζουσιν MSS.) εἰς γῆν. The story of Arion was the best known instance.

tοῦτων δὲ θέσει εἰπὼν ἀφαρτος (ἀφθαρτος MSS.) [νοῦς] γίγνεται. ἀφθαρτος νοῦς cannot be right. Neither God nor νοῦς can at any time be other than ἀφθαρτος; and if God is νοῦς, he must have been νοῦς during his speech as well as before and after it. If we read ἀφαρτος, the meaning is that God, when he addressed the souls, assumed a form visible to them, and put off that visible form when his speech was ended.

God 'became invisible' to the souls at the time when they were embodied; possibly this is meant to imply that for embodied souls (i. e. for men living on earth) God is always invisible.

[§§ 43-48. τούτων οὕτω γενομένων . . . ἤδη τὸ ὅργανον ἐκνεύτω]. It is impossible to reconcile this passage with what has preceded. We have been told that God condemned the souls to incarnation as a punishment for their presumption. The condition to which the souls were about to be reduced by the infliction of this punishment (i.e. by the making of men) has been described as intensely miserable (§§ 31-37); and the misery which their incarnation involves is but slightly alleviated by God's subsequent announcements (§§ 38-41). But in §§ 43-48, the making of men is differently conceived. In this passage, there is no suggestion that incarnation is a punishment. We are here told that Hermes made men; that, if his first design had been carried out without alteration, the men he made would have been free from trouble and sorrow; and that a device by which they were subjected to trouble and sorrow was added by an afterthought. It is evident then that §§ 43-48 cannot have been written by the author of the preceding narrative; this passage must have been extracted from some other document, and inserted in the Kore Kosmu by a transcriber.
The word πνεῦμα is here employed as equivalent to δαίμων or δαιμόνιον,—a use which seems to indicate Jewish influence.

In the MSS., the name of this 'spirit' is not given until § 48 init., where he is incidentally spoken of as Momus (Μόμος ταῦτα λέγοντος). But the writer must surely have named him Momus when he first mentioned him.

In Greek literature, Μόμος is a personification of fault-finding, τὸ μομάσθαι.\(^1\) Pl. Rep. 6. 487 Α: οἴδ' ἂν ὁ Μόμος τὸ γε τουῦτον μέμψαιτο. Lucian Hist. 33: οὐδεὶς ἂν, ἀλλ' οἴδ' ὁ Μόμος, μαμήσασθαι δύνατο. Id. Dial. deor. 20. 2 (Aphroditæ log.): εἰ καὶ τὸν Μόμον αὐτὸν ἔπιστήσασις ἡμῖν διδαστήν, βαρβαίσα βαδιοῦμαι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθείειν τι γὰρ ἂν καὶ μαμήσασθαί μοι; Id. Icaromen. 31: ὥσπερ ὁ Μόμος τὰ ὄντα τῶν ἄλλων γεγομένα συκοφαντῶ. In two of Lucian's dialogues, Deorum concilium and Zeus tragœdus, Momus takes part as finder-in of debates of the gods. But a closer parallel to the part assigned to Momus in Kore Kosmu 43-48 is to be found in a tale reported by Lucian Hermotimus 20: ὁ γοῦν Μόμος ἀκρικός, οἶμαι, ἄτινα ἤγιασατο τοῦ Ἡφαίστου . . . φησι γὰρ ὁ μίθος ἐρᾶσε Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ Ποσειδῶνα καὶ Ἡφαιστον ἐντυγγιάς πέρι, καὶ τὸν μὲν Ποσειδῶνα ταῦτον ἀναπλάσας, τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν δὲ οἰκίαν ἐπινοήσας ὁ Ἡφαιστος δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄρα συνειστήσατο. καὶ ἐπείπερ ἐπὶ τὸν Μόμον ἡμῖν, ἵνα πολιτείαν προελέννο. . . τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἄτινα ἤγιασατο περιττὸν ἄν εἰ ἡ λέγειν, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον δὲ τοῦτο ἐμέμψατο καὶ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτῶν ἐκέπλεξε τὸν Ἡφαιστον, διότι μὴ καὶ ὑπείρας ἐποίησεν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸ στέρων, ὡς ἀναπταθειοῖς γνώμης γίγνονται ἄπαισον ἀ βούλεται καὶ ἐπινοεῖ, καὶ εἰ ποίησαν ἠ ἀληθείαν. Lucian's evidence shows then that there was current in the second century a.D. a tale according to which Momus found fault with a god engaged in making men, and pointed out to him how he might have done his work better. This tale was put into verse by Babrius,\(^4\) Fable 59 (Rutherford), who differs from

1 The name occurs in Hesiod Theog. 214: δίντερον αὖ Μόμον καὶ Οὐκίων ἀληθέσσαν (sc. Νεῖς ἔτεσαι). It is on the authority of this Hesiodic verse that Momus is called 'son of Né' in Lucian Deor. conc. 14.
2 Lucian was doubtless thinking of this story when he wrote Dial. deor. 20. 2, quoted above.
3 What fault Momus found in the construction of the bull, we are told by Lucian in two other passages, which evidently refer to the same tale. Nigrinus 32: τοῖς Μόμῳ τοῦ λόγου μεμόρισμος ὅπ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ τοῦτον ἐμέμψετο τοῦ ταῦτον τὸ δημοφυρές θεόν (i.e. Poseidon) οὐ πρόβαλον τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τὰ κέρατα, οἷον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Vesta hist. 2. 3: οἱ δὲ ταῦτα οὕτω τὰ κέρατα οἷον ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν εἶχον, ἀλλ' ὡς τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς, ἀστερὰ ὁ Μόμος ἥλιον.
4 According to Rutherford, Babrius wrote in the reign of Alexander Severus, A.D. 222-235 (i.e. later than Lucian, who lived c. A.D. 120-180). Both Lucian
Lucian only in substituting Zeus for Hephaistos as the god by whom man was made. The story may very well have been known to the writer of Exc. XXIII. 43-48, and may have suggested to him his use of the name Momus. But his Momus manifests a malignant desire to thwart and harm mankind, which is not in accordance with the character of Momus as represented in the tale of which Lucian speaks, nor, as far as I know, with anything that is said about him elsewhere in Greek literature; and in this respect, the writer may perhaps have been influenced by the Jewish conception of Satan, διάβολος, who, as a 'fault-finder', had something in common with the Momus of the Greeks.

§ 43. ἀκατάληπτον μὲν περιοχῇ (περιοχὴς FP') σῶματος. He was of enormous size. Cf. Corp. I. 1, where Poimandres is described as ὑπερμεγέθης μέτρω ἀπεριορίστω.

τὸ σῶμα [μὲν] κατὰ (καὶ MSS.) τύπον ἄνθρωπος περικείμενον, καὶ καλὸν (⟨μὲν⟩) καὶ σεμνοπρεπὲς ὅ, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἄγριον καὶ πλήρες φόβου. τὸ σῶμα, following close on περιοχῇ σῶματος, is awkward. Possibly τὸ σῶμα κατὰ τύπον ἄνθρωπος περικείμενον may have been added by a later hand.

The words ἄγριον καὶ πλήρες φόβου would not be applicable to Momus as conceived by Lucian.

παρατίκη τὰς ψυχὰς εἰσιν οὕτως εἰς τὰ πλάσματα θεωρήσαν (θεωρήσαται ἀν MSS.). This is the only mention of previously unembodied souls in §§ 43-48. Perhaps this phrase may have been added when the passage was inserted in the Kore Kosmu.

§ 44. Ἐρμῆ, τολμηρὸν ἄργων ποιήσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον . . . τούτον ἀμέριμνον καταλείψα τέκνικας, ἐγενεσσωργῆ . . .; In §§ 26 and 30, we were told that Hermes, acting under God's orders, made the bodies in which the souls were to be incarnated, and that God inspected and approved the bodies which Hermes made. But in §§ 43-48, Hermes makes men on his own initiative; there is no suggestion that God either told him to do so, or approved of his work when it was done; and it is implied that he made a mistake when he began, but saw and corrected his mistake when it was pointed out to him.

and Babrius say that Athena made a 'house' (οἶκος); and according to Babrius, Momus found fault with her for not having put the house on wheels, so that its owner might take it about with him when he travelled (a notion which may have been suggested by what Herodotus says about the Scythians). But why a house? Houses are made by men, and not by gods; and the story would have gone better if it had been said that Athena, like her two competitors, made some kind of animal.
Both Momus in his advice, and Hermes in his acceptance of it, manifest that disposition towards mankind which some Greeks ascribed to the gods under the name of φθόνος. (Herodotus 3. 40: τὸ θεῖον ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἐστὶ φθονερόν.) The gods, it was thought, took care that men should not be powerful or prosperous beyond certain fixed limits.

Λύχνου (Λύχνων MSS.) (γεύσει, καὶ (τρυφερῶν?)) ὀσφρῆσει. As four of the five senses are spoken of, there can be little doubt that the fifth also, viz. γεύσις, was mentioned.

§ 45. (ἐίτα [οὐ καὶ μέχρις οὐρανοῦ περιέργον ὀπλισθήσονται (ὀπλισθήσεται MSS.) τόλμαν οὕτως;] οὐκ [ἀμερίμνους] [ἐκτενόσεις] ἐπ[ε]; [καὶ] τὰ στοιχεῖα [τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν] ἐκτείνουσι MSS.) χείρας;) The words ἐίτα . . . στοιχεῖα are out of place in § 46; a general statement such as this ought to precede, and not to follow, the particular instances of audacious action which are given in § 45. But if we place the words here, καὶ μέχρις οὐρανοῦ must be rejected, because it unduly anticipates τὰ [μέχρις] ἀνώ διάσώσουσι below. Meddling with heaven is the climax of men's audacity, and ought not to be mentioned until their dealings with things on earth (ῥίζας, λίθων φύσεις, &c.) have been disposed of.

As to περιέργον ὀπλισθήσονται τόλμαν, cf. περιέργον ὀπλίζοντο τόλμαν in § 24. The author of §§ 43–48 was probably not the same person as the author of the narrative to which § 24 belongs; and it is unlikely that two men would independently hit on this same form of words. It therefore seems probable that οὐ καὶ μέχρις . . . τόλμαν οὕτως was added in § 45 after §§ 43–48 had been inserted in the Kore Kosmu, and that the interpolator borrowed the phrase περιεργον ὀπλισθήσονται τόλμαν from § 24.

The sentence which began with οὖκ ἐπὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα probably ended with τολμηράς ἐκτενόσεις χείρας (misplaced in the MSS.), whence [ἐκτενόσεις] by duplication. But if so, τόλμαν is too closely followed by τολμηράς; and this is an additional reason for bracketing οὖ . . . τόλμαν οὕτως.

[ἀμερίμνους] has come from ἀμέριμνον καταλεῖψαι in § 44, or from ἀμερίμνῳ βιώ in § 46.

ῥίζας φυτῶν ἀνασκάψουσιν ἀνθρωποῖ, καὶ [πολύτητας] ἔπεισάτωσι τύλων, λίθων φύσεις ἐπισκοπήσουσι. This refers to the use of plants and precious stones for medicinal or magical purposes. From the writer's point of view, certain kinds of magic might be hardly distinguishable from medicine.
The words ποιότητας ἡμών νυκτικοῦ χαλῶν, which describe what men do with the roots when they have dug them up, destroy the symmetry of the sentence, and must have been added by a later hand.

διὰ μέσον (μέσον F) ἀνατεμπόρησε τῶν ἰσίων τὰ δολογα, οὐ μόνον (δὲ ταῦτα), ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτοῦς. Dissection of the dead bodies of men as well as beasts was much practised in the medical schools of Alexandria under the Ptolemies;¹ and dissection of dead animals at least must have been in general use among physicians under the Roman empire also.² But as there is here no mention of dead bodies, the writer was probably thinking rather of vivisection. ἑαυτοῦς means 'fellow-men'.³ Vivisection of human beings is spoken of by Celsus,⁴ Prooem. p. 4 (Daremberg): 'Ii qui rationalem medicinan profissentur, cum in interioribus partibus et dolores et morborum varia genera nascantur, neminem putant his adhibere posse remedias, qui ipsas igno ret. Ergo necessarium esse incidere corpora mortuorum, eorumque viscera atque intestina scrutari: longeque optime fecisse Herophilum et Erasistratum, qui nocentes homines, a regibus ex carcere acceptos, vivos inciderint, considerantque, etiam num spiritu remanente, ea quae natura ante clausisset. . . . Neque esse crudele, sicut plerique proponunt, hominum nocentium, et horum quoque paucorum, suppletion populis innocentibus saeculorum omnium quaerenti.—Contra ii qui se μετρικούς . . . nominant . . . crudele (dicunt) vivorum hominum alvum atque prae cordia incidi, . . . cum praesertim ex his, quae tanta violentia quaerantur, alia non possint omnino cognosci, alia possint etiam sine scelere. . . . ne mortuorum quidem lacerationem necessarium esse, quae, etsi non crudelis, tamen foeda sit.' Celsus (ib. p. 12) gives his own opinion thus: 'Incidente autem vivorum corpora et crudele et supravacuum est: mortuorum, discentibus necessarium.' Tertullian

¹ See Puschmann, Hist. of medical education, Eng. tr. 1891, pp. 76-78, on the anatomical investigations of Herophilus and Erasistratus (third century B.C.).
² Greenhill (Smith, Dict. Biol. s. v. Galenus) says that he is not aware of any passage in Galen's writings in which it is distinctly stated that he dissected human bodies; while the numerous passages in which he recommends the dissection of apes, bears, goats, and other animals would seem indirectly to prove that human bodies were (cf. in Galen's time, second century A.D.) 'seldom or never used for that purpose.' In one passage however (De compos. medicam. sec. Gen. 3. 2, Kühn vol. viii, p. 604) he mentions, as something extraordinary, that those physicians who attended the emperor M. Aurelius in his wars against the Germans had an opportunity of dissecting the bodies of the barbarians.
³ Possibly ἀλλήλους after διαπορθμένους below may be a misplaced alternative for this ἑαυτοῦς.
⁴ Celsus wrote in or about the time of Tiberius.
De an. 10: 'Herophilus ille medicus aut lanius, qui sexcentos exsecuit ut naturam scrutaretur.'

It could not be said that the dissector is trying to find out 'how men or animals came into being'. Something must have been lost before έγένοντο. What the author probably meant might be expressed by writing τῶς (ἔμψυχοι) έγένοντο, 'how they have come to be alive'. The dissector is searching for the hidden cause or source of life.

The question τίς ενδοτέρω τῶν ιερῶν ᾑδότων φύσις ὑπάρχει, 'what thing exists further in than the holy sanctuaries', is meaningless. If ἄνω were substituted for ενδοτέρω, it might be possible to understand these words as referring to the impious curiosity of men who force their way into holy places in order to find out what is concealed in them. (The intrusion of Pompeius into the Holy of Holies at Jerusalem might serve as an instance.) But such conduct as that could not have anything to do with 'sailing across the sea', with which this question is connected in the MSS. A satisfactory sense may be got by placing καὶ τίς ... ὑπάρχει after ἐξετάζειν θέλοντες, and assuming that some such word as σαρκῶν has been lost, and that a transcriber inserted ἰερῶν ᾑδότων to fill the gap. The investigator cuts through the flesh of the body, in the hope of finding 'further in' some φύσις (thing) which will account for the phenomena of life.

They will cut down the woods which grow in their own country (αὐτοφυεῖς), in order to build ships in which they may sail across the sea and find out what lies beyond it. For διαπορθμεύσοντο θάλασσαν, 'they will ferry (themselves) across the sea', cf. Ps.-Pl. Aethicus 371 c: οὔς (sc. ποταμόις) χρῆ πορθμέσαντας ἄχθηναι ἐπὶ Μίνω. The mention of cutting down trees in this connexion may have been suggested by Eurip. Med. init.: εἰ ὁ οὖς 'Ἀγγείος μὴ διακτάσθαι σκύφος | ... μηδ' ἐν νάυσι Πηλίων πεσείν ποτέ τμήθεισα πεύκη. For the tone in which navigation is here spoken of, compare Hor. Od. 1. 3. 21 ff.: 'Nequicquam deus abscondit | prudentes Oceano dissociabili | terras, si tamen impiae | non tangenda rates transilunt vada. | Audax omnia perpeti | gens humana ruat per vetitum nefas. | ... Nil mortalibus ardui est: | caelum ipsum petimus stultitia.'

(ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων τῆς δοχάτην τῶν ὑπογείων ἑρευνήσωσι νῦκται.— (ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων τῆς δοχάτην τῷ θέλειν ἑρευνήσωσι νῦκτα MSS.).)
the traditional text, the unintelligible words ἄλλα...νῦκτα occur after τὰ ἄνω διώξουσι κ.τ.λ. But it is clear that in the phrase which ends with ἐρευνήσουσι νῦκτα the writer must have given an instance of men's audacity comparable to navigation (διαπορθέσθωσι θάλασσαν), and that τὰ ἄνω διώξουσι (which corresponds to Horace's caelum ipsum pelimus) must have been the climax with which the series concluded. Now it is beneath the surface of the earth that 'the uttermost darkness' is to be found; and searching for what is hidden under the earth may very well be put on a par with searching for what lies beyond the sea. I therefore conjecture that these words referred to mining; and I have accordingly altered ἄλλα into ὑπόστασις μετὰ τὰ ἄλλα, and inserted τῶν ὑπογείων, out of which the meaningless τὸ θέλειν may possibly have arisen by corruption.

παρατηρήσας βουλόμενοι τις ὁδρανοῦ (οὐν ΜSS.) καθότεκε κίνησις. οὐν is a corruption of the compendiun αὐτοῦ. Men cannot actually climb up to heaven; but they can and do violate the sanctity of heaven by investigating the movements of the heavenly bodies.

[λείπει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐπὶ πλὴν γῆς τόπος ἐσχάτος.] This is probably a note appended to τὴν ἐσχάτην (τῶν ὑπογείων) ἐρευνήσουσι νῦκτα.

§ 46. [Ἰνα ἔχωσι καὶ τῆς ἀποτυχίας τὸ καλέσαι φοβηθῶμεί.] This is an alternative for the following words, ἵνα τῷ τῆς λύπης διακυηφῇ δαμασθῶν, τῶν ἐπιξείων ἀποτυχήσει. Even when one of these two clauses has been struck out, there is still too much iteration in this section.

χρεωκοπείσθω [τῶν ψυχῶν] αὐτῶν τὸ περίεργον ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ φόβοις καὶ λύπαις καὶ ἐπίση πλάνωσι. χρεωκοσία is equivalent to χρεῶν ἀποκοπή, 'cancelling of debts'. Hence χρεωκοσία comes to mean 'to disappoint (an expectation)'. Cf. the Mithraic Apathanatmos (Dieterich Mithrasliturgie) p. 4, 1. 24: ἡν (sc. δύναμιν) ἐγὼ πάλιν μεταπαραλήψωμαι... ἐχροκοσίην. (The speaker will be deprived of a certain power for a time; but it will afterwards be restored to him 'without annulment of the debt'; i.e. he expects to receive it back again, and his expectation will not be disappointed.)

τὸ περίεργον, 'their meddlesomeness', is hardly a suitable subject for χρεωκοπείσθω; one might propose τὸ περισσὸν followed by some word in the genitive: 'let their excessive expectations be disappointed'. But their expectations could not be disappointed 'by desires... and deceptive hopes'; I have therefore bracketed ἐπιθυμίαις... πλάνωσι.

1 Cf. Hor. Od. 3. 3. 49: 'aurum irrepertum et sic melius situm, | cum terra celat.'
In every case a (and) the πετυχαί has Ἡ ὁδεῖρ ἦ ἐστι ἀνθλήσιν τελειοτέρων ἑαυτῶν. ἐστι ὁδεῖρ ἦ is subject and ἀνθλήσιν predicate. ἀνθλήσιν is hardly the right word; perhaps it would be better either to bracket ἐστι ἀνθλήσιν, or to strike out αὐτῶν and alter ἐστι ἀνθλήσιν into τοῖς ἁθλίοις. ἀνθλήσιν ἑαυτῶν would then mean ‘a bait to allure them into miseries’; cf. ἡ δονήν, μέγιστον κακοῦ ἀνθλῆσιν, Pl. Tim. 69 d.

'Βαρεῖτον πυρετὸς αὐτῶν, ἦν ἐκκακήσαντες κολάσωσε τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.' πυρετὸς cannot be right. Possibly the author wrote something like καίετο αὐτῶν τὸ πῦρ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ἦν . . . κολασθῶσι. For desire regarded as a fire by which men are tortured, see Corp. I. 23.

§ 47. [Ἀντη, τέκνον Ὀμρ, τάδε (ἀκούων); . . . ὀτι (τὸ MSS.) δεινότερον ἐπάκουσον.] For the form of expression, cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 25: ‘Quid fies, ο Asclepi? Et his amplius multoque deterius’ &c.

What are ‘these things’ (τάδε)? In the words which follow, τάδε is explained as meaning τῶς ὁ τάλας ἀνθρώπος ἔπαιρθη. But in §§ 43–46, Horus has not been told that man ‘was weighed down’, but only that Momus advised Hermes to inflict trouble and sorrow on mankind; and it is not until after this that Isis tells her son that Hermes did what Momus had advised. Moreover, the contents of § 48 (ἐπίρρεπτο Ὑμών ταῦτα λέγοντος ἔρμης κ.τ.λ.) cannot be described as ‘still more terrible’ (ἢ δεινότερον) than those of §§ 43–46. It is evident therefore that § 47 is out of place. It may possibly have stood at the end of a lost passage which preceded νεωτέρα γὰρ αἰ ψυχαὶ κ.τ.λ. in § 53. In that case, the δεινότερον would be the contents of § 53.

§ 48. [Ἀλλὰ οὐκέτι δρυγ (οὐκ ἐναργῇ MSS.) γενήσεται [πνεύματος θείου] φῶς ἡ τοῦ περίκομος. ‘The nature (or substance) of the atmosphere’ has nothing to do with the topic of § 48, viz. the machinery constructed by Hermes for the purpose of frustrating men’s hopes. This misplaced fragment may perhaps have belonged to the passage which deals with the making of souls; cf. § 14 init. as amended: οὐκέτι βουλόμενος ἄργον τὸν ὑπονάον θάνατον εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

[ἐπε γὰρ εἶναι με ταμίαν καὶ προνοητὴν ὃ τῶν συμπάντων δεσπότης.] With the exception of this disconnected sentence, there is no mention of the supreme God in §§ 43–48.

ταμίαν and προνοητὴν require dependent genitives. If we assume that the original reading was ταμίαν (πνεύματος θείου) καὶ προνοητὴν (τῶν τῶ ὑπερφέρον ὑποτότις), that might account for the insertion of [πνεύματος θείου] above, and [τοῖς τα γῆς] below.
If Adrasteia was spoken of anywhere in § 48, it must have been at the end of the section. Hermes constructed his 'engine'; and when he had done so, Adrasteia took her stand above it to supervise its working. But if we put the words there, the future verb ἔσται must be altered into an aorist, and τοῖν, as well as τα γῆς, must be struck out. A satisfactory sense may be got by writing ἐπόπτευτα δ' ἐπώτη. The ὄργανον which Hermes devises and constructs is the astral system, which is the instrument by means of which Heimarmene operates on human life and on all terrestrial things (see Exc. XII). The name 'Ἀδράστεια' is here used as a synonym for Ἐιμαρμένη. The working of the stars is regarded as mainly maleficent; it is by their action that men's hopes are thwarted.

This section is incompatible with the preceding narrative of the Kore Kosmu. If God made the stars (§ (11)) before he made the souls, and 'arranged the Zodiac and bestowed on it παντούργον διώμαις' (§ (20)) before the souls were incarnated, the ὄργανον was already in existence at the time spoken of in §§ 43–48, and it could not have been left to Hermes to construct it.

§ 49. [καὶ ἐπαίνου ὑπὲρ τῶν γεγομένων αὐτὸς ἐτυχεν (ἐτυχον MSS.).] Does this mean that Hermes was praised by God (cf. § 30, ἐπεκαλεσάμην τὸν μόναρχον θεωρῆσαι: ὅ δὲ καὶ ἐδει καὶ ἐχάρη), or that God was praised by his creatures (cf. § 27, ἡχρα τότε τὰ ἡθη γεγονότα μένει ἄνεγκωμιάτα;)? In either case, the words are out of place here.

§ 53. [καὶ τὴν ἐπίπειαν μὴ φήμουσαι]. This is hardly relevant. It is not clear what the fact that the incarnated souls found their degradation unendurable has to do with their fighting among themselves,
which is the topic of this section; and it certainly can have nothing to do with the misplaced fragment which follows in the MSS. (τοις ἐν οὐρανῷ θεοῖς φιλονεῖκοι κ.τ.λ.).

καὶ οἱ κρείσσονες, τοῖς λειπομένοις ἀνθρώποις ὀργάνους χρώμενοι (ναι MSS.), ἐποίουν αὐτοὺς έκατοτε ἐπιτίθεσθαι. Μen in the mass do not themselves desire war, but are driven into it. Kings quarrel, and make their subjects do the fighting.

καὶ [κατὰ τῶν ιερῶν] τούτο μὲν ξώντας (Ἀνδραπαθίζων), τούτο δὲ καὶ νεκροῦς ἔρρητον ἄθαντος [κατὰ τῶν ἀδύτων]. κατὰ τῶν ιερῶν is a doublet of κατὰ τῶν ἀδύτων. But at this stage there can have been no ιερά and no ἄδυτα; for men were άθεοι (§§ 56 and 61) until worship of the gods was introduced by Osiris and Isis (§ 65).

§ 55. [οὐκ ἔσσι . . . τῷ ἄφθαρτῳ] (μ.ς.αύτοις γάρ . . . ἀναγκαζομαι τήκειν.) In the MSS., these two statements stand (in inverse order) at the end of the speech (§ 56 fin.). But the speaker ought to state his grievance first, and then go on to ask that it may be remedied (ἀνάφεισιν ἡς σεαυτῶν κ.τ.λ., § 56). When this error has been corrected, the speech ends suitably, with the words ὅτα . . . εἶδοις ατμοῦς αὔτοις ἐσχάρας προσέμειψον σοι.

παραχαράσσοντες οἱ καθηκόντως τῷ ἄφθαρτῳ. This is a metaphor from coinining. Fire is the metal; the use men make of fire is the stamp impressed on the metal.

§ 56. [καὶ τοῦ βίου τὸ ἄγριον λύσον. (μ.ς.αύτοις χάρισε κ.τ.λ. MSS.)]—(κ. τ. β. τ. δ. μήπον εἰρήνης χάρισε κ.τ.λ. MSS.) μνεῖν requires a personal object, and τοῦ βίου τὸ ἄγριον is not a person. Moreover, μήπον εἰρήνης is an impossible phrase; and even μήπον εἰρήνης, though it might be somewhat better, (cf. τὰ ἔρωτικά μυθῆται, Pl. Sympr. 209 e,) could hardly be accepted. λύσον (οἱ καθάλοντος) gives the sense wanted.

[ἐπάθης ἄμαρτημάτων μισθοῖς δὲν ἀπολάβωσιν οἱ ἄμαρτόντες, φυλάξουνται οἱ λοιποὶ τὸ ἀδίκειν.] This is presumably a marginal paraphrase of φοβεῖσθωσαν . . . ἄμαρτῆσαι, which expresses the same thought more concisely. οἱ ἄμαρτόντες, or something of the sort, must be inserted, to give a meaning to οἱ λοιποί.

[φοβηθήσονται δρκοὺς, καὶ οὔδε εἰς ὑπόν θρονῆσαι.] φοβηθήσονται has probably been written by error for φοβεῖσθωσαν. If so, the sentence is of the same form as the preceding φοβεῖσθωσαν . . . ἐκδίκασα, καὶ οὔδεις ἄμαρτῆσαι. It has most likely been added by a later hand.

("εἰρήνης χαρισάμενος (εἰρήνης χάρισε νόμους MSS.) τῷ βίῳ [χάρισαι]
EXCERPT XXIII: 55-59

νυκτὶ χρησμούς πλήρωσον καὶ διὰ δύναμεν πάντα). In the MSS., the petitions are arranged thus: (1) confer benefits on men; (2) let them be threatened with punishment; (3) let them give thanks for the benefits they have received. But that is evidently wrong. The order ought to be (2), (1), (3); i.e. the mention of benefits to be conferred on men (εἰρήνη...πάντα) ought to precede immediately the mention of thanksgiving.

‘Give oracles to night’ is meaningless. If the writer had meant to say ‘give oracles by night’, he would have written νυκτός, not νυκτὶ; but oracles are given by day as well as by night, and there is no reason to speak of night at all in connexion with them.

The sense might be improved by striking out διὰ πάντα, which is hardly consistent with ἐν εἰρήνῃς in the following clause. Men give thanks for benefits already received, not for hopes of benefits to come.

[παρὰ λαβαίσ] παρὰ θυσίαις ὑπηρετουσ ἐγὼ (ὑπηρετήσω MSS.) τὸ πῦρ.

Fire renders service at sacrifices, but not at libations.

§ 58. πάντα καὶ τῆς διὰ σὲ πάντα γεννώσης ποιητὰ φύσεως. All organisms on earth are generated by φύσις; and φύσις has been made by God.

(Cf. § 10.) On the relation between God and φύσις, see Corp. III. Nature generates things ‘on account of’ God (διὰ σὲ).—i.e. to please God, or in obedience to his will; cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 3 c: ‘natura...producit cuncta dei visibus placitura.’ But διὰ σὲ is perhaps superfluous here.

[ἡ] (δεῖ) λάρ άπολύουσιν ποταμοί καὶ θάλασσας τοὺς φωτεύσαντας [ἡ] (καὶ) δέχονται τοὺς φωτεύοντας. ‘Either...or’ is wrong. The waters are polluted in two different ways; they both wash off the blood with which the hands of the slayers are defiled, and receive the corpses of the slain that are flung into them.

§ 59. τάξισθαι τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων). This is probably a corruption of something corresponding to πρῶτον γὰρ ἔχει τὴν τοῦ λέγειν ἐξουσίαν in § 55, and ἔχει...τὴν τοῦ λέγειν ἔχειν ἐξουσίαν in § 58.

ἐξ ἐν [αὐξήσεως καὶ μειώσεως] ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὰ πάντα, εἰς ἐκ καὶ τῶν καταληγόντα ἀναγκαίως ὀφείλομεν τέλος ἔχειν. τὰ πάντα means all terrestial organisms.

Things do not get μειώσεως ἀρχὴν (‘the beginning of their diminution’) out of the elements. It might perhaps be said that they get out of the elements αὐξήσεως ἀρχὴν (‘the beginning of their growth’)
but even this would be somewhat obscure, and it seems best to cut out αὔθησεως as well as καί μεμώσεως.

καταλήγοντα τέλος ἔχει is tautologous; and the two clauses (ἐξ δὲ κ.τ.λ. and εἰς κ.τ.λ.) would match better if ἀναγκαῖος (or ἀνίγκη;) ὄφειλόμενον were struck out. The meaning might be more clearly and compactly expressed by writing ἐξ δὲ συντιθέμενα ἄρχην ἔχει τὰ πάντα, εἰς καὶ πάλιν διαλύμενα τέλος ἔχει.

[ἄλογοςτος, καὶ πολυτύμητα, καί ἄθεος] [ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐν' ἐμὲ χορός ἐπεστὶ.] From this point onward, Earth's speech, as given in the MSS., is in great confusion. In my attempt to reconstruct it, I have assumed that it falls into three distinct parts. In the first part (Βασιλεῖ ... φέρω πάντα καὶ ...) δέχομαι Earth describes the functions of the elements, and distinguishes her own function from those of the others; in the second part (ἀντιμοίραι δὲ ἡδη ... σωμάτων χυλοίς) she states her grievance; in the third part (ἐντεῦθεν, κύριε ... ἵππαν ἀπόρρουσι) she petitions for redress.

The words ἄλογοςτος ... ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐν' ἐμὲ χορός ἐπεστὶ (ἐπέστῃ Meineke) apparently refer to the misdeeds of men from which Earth suffers. If so, they are out of place in the first part of the speech, and ought to stand in the second part. But they could not be put there without alteration. 'A band is upon me (or has risen up against me) from men' is meaningless. Heeren and Wachsmuth strike out ἀπ'; but that is not an adequate remedy, for the human race as a whole could not be called ἀνθρώπων χορός. There can be little doubt that χορός is a misreading; perhaps it has been substituted for some such word as θώρυβος. Moreover, ἄλογοςτος, 'unreasoning', is hardly appropriate; and ἄθεος unduly anticipates the contents of § 61. It seems best then to cut out ἄλογοςτος ... καί ἄθεος, and to place ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ... ἐπέστη immediately before πάντα γὰρ ... παρανομούσι, § 60.

[(Στοιχείων τιμωτέραν τῶν ἄλλων τὴν γῆν ἐποίησας (τὴν γῆν μετεποίησαν MSS.))] Something must have been lost before αἰτή γάρ κ.τ.λ.; and these words serve very well to fill the gap. They deal with the same topic as the preceding clauses, in which the elements are spoken of; and if we put them here, τιμωτέραν ... ἐποίησας leads on to ἀντιμοίραι δὲ ἡδη.

μετ' may have arisen out of ἐμὲ; but ἐμὲ beside τὴν γῆν would be superfluous.

§ 60. πάντα γὰρ, ὂς φοβηθῶσιν οὐκ ἔχοντες, παρανομοῦσι. The words ὃς φοβηθῶσιν οὐκ ἔχοντες hint at Earth's most pressing reason for
EXCERPT XXIII: 60, 61

desiring to have gods sent down to her (cf. § 56, φοβεῖσθοισαν ἀνθρωποὶ τὴν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἱκδικίαν, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἔμαρτήσει). But we should have expected this reason to be more plainly and directly stated; and we should also have expected the statement of it to occur at a different place. It ought rather to come at the end of the second part of the speech (§ 60 fin.), and make connexion between that and the third part (ὑπείθεν κ.τ.λ., § 61 init.). Besides, the order of the words in this sentence is not satisfactory; πάντα γάρ is awkwardly separated from παρανομοῦσι by the intervening ἐ. . . ἔχοντες. It may be suspected therefore that ὅ φοβηθῶσιν ὅν τὰ ἔχοντες has been shifted, and originally formed part of a sentence, now lost, which stood between § 60 and § 61.

πάση ποιητε τέχνη (φονεύμενοι) καταπίπτουσι. π. π. τέχνη requires some participle; and if the missing word is φονεύμενοι, this may have given rise to [τὰ φονευθέντα] above.

καταβρέχομαι δὲ πάσα διαφθειρόμενων (-μέν MSS.) σωμάτων χυλίδος. As to this complaint of Earth, and the similar complaints of the other elements, compare Ascl. Lat. III. 24 b: ‘tunc terra ista sanctissima . . . sepulcrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima: . . . undaeque divinae (of the Nile) non solum polluentur sanguine, sed totae (cor)rumpentur.’ In Ascl. Lat. III, Hermes says that such things will take place when men cease to worship the gods; in Kore Kosmu, we are told that such things did take place until men began to worship the gods.

Compare also the letter written in or about A. D. 262 by Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, Euseb. H. E. 7. 21: ἀεὶ δὲ ἀματὶ καὶ φόνοι καὶ καταπνοτισμοῖς κάτωσι μεμασμένοι (ὁ ποταμός), κ.τ.λ. The writer of Ascl. Lat. III had probably witnessed the calamities of which Dionysius speaks (see Introduction to Ascl. Lat.); and it is possible that the writer of Kore Kosmu also had lived in Alexandria during those same events, and had seen there such horrors as he describes.

§ 61. οὖ γὰρ σὲ χωρεῖν ὑπομένω. Cf. Corp. II. 14: σώμα γὰρ ἐστι καὶ ψυχή τόπον οὐκ ἔχοντα χωρῆσαι δυνάμενον τὸ ἄγαθόν.

[μόνη γὰρ αἰχέων τῶν ἀπὸ σοῦ πρέπει τὰ πάντα παρεχοῦσῃ]. This is obscure. If it was intended to follow στοιχείων τιμωτέραν τῶν ἄλλων τὴν γῆν ἐποίησας, the meaning might perhaps be expressed by writing μόνη γὰρ αἰχέων τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ πεποιημένων πρέπει τῇ πᾶσι τροφήν παρεχοῦσῃ: ‘Earth alone of all things made by thee has a right to boast, because it is she that supplies sustenance to all.’

N n 2
If on the other hand it was intended to follow χάρωσαι τῇ γῇ... σαντοῦ τίνα ἵκραν ἀπόρροιαν, it may be a corruption of something like μόνη γὰρ ἀπολαίειν τῶν ἀπὸ σοῦ προβληθέντων (i.e. to enjoy the presence of gods emitted from thee) πρέπει τῇ ν.τ.λ. But in either case, it is not needed.

§ 62. δειος ἐστιν τῶν πραττόμενων ἐπόπτης. This is inconsistent with § 39, where the supreme God says ἐγὼ γὰρ [καὶ οὕτως ἔχομεν] ἐπόπτης οὕτως [ ] ἐσχομαί; but the inconsistency is one that might easily escape the notice of the writer.

Τῶν μὲν κριτῆς ἀμέθοδους, φρικτὸς δ(ὲ) [ ] τῶν ὑπὸ γῆν τύραννος. This is Osiris, who was known to the Egyptians as 'king of the dead', but was also thought to watch over the living.

κριτῆς ἀμέθοδους, 'a judge that cannot be turned aside from his course'. This might mean either one that cannot be turned aside by entreaty from the course he has decided on, i.e. 'inexorable'; or one that cannot be turned aside by deception or cunning devices from deciding rightly (no culprit can 'pull his leg'). The instances of μεθοδεύω and μεθοδεία given in Liddell and Scott tell in favour of the latter meaning.

Who are οἱ ῥύπο γῆν? We have been told that after death the souls of good men return to their home above, and the souls of bad men are reincarnated in the bodies of animals. If then the writer assumed the existence of a subterranean Hades, he must have thought of it as a prison in which wicked souls are confined in the interval between death and reincarnation. But more probably he took over the phrase τῶν ὑπὸ γῆν τύραννος from popular descriptions of Osiris, and made no attempt to reconcile it with his own theories.

§ 64. Παρατιθέμαι [[ ] [ ] σῆς σπορᾶς καταλέγειν ἄρως, ὡς μεγαλοθενθές ἄρεν. οἱ γὰρ θεμίτων [ ] θεῶν οἵ γένεσιν ἱστορεῖν]. There is evidently some dislocation; and this rearrangement of the words gives the sense required.

The sending down of 'an efflux of God' to earth means the incarnation of the deities Osiris and Isis in human bodies. The question asked by Horus is therefore equivalent to the question 'How did that incarnation take place?' or 'By what process was the birth of the deities Osiris and Isis in the form of human beings on earth brought to pass?' As Horus is son of Osiris and Isis,—and presumably a son born to them during their residence on earth,—to answer that question would be to explain 'the source of the
EXCERPT XXIII: 62–65

begetting of Horus' (σῆς στορμᾶς ἀρχῆν). But such things are holy secrets, and must not be revealed to the readers of this libellus; the writer therefore makes Isis refuse to reveal them. He probably had in mind a ἱερὸς λόγος which had been told to him, but which he was forbidden to repeat to others. It may have resembled the myth reported by Plutarch, Is. et Os. 12, which describes the birth of the gods Osiris, Arueris (i.e. Har-urer, 'the elder Horus'), Typhon (Set), Isis, and Nephthys, and contains things at which the profanum vulgus would be apt to scoff.

[ὅσι μήποτε οὕτερον εἰς ὑθρόπους ἀθανάτων (δὲ) Ἀθής γένεσις]. The grammatical connexion of these words with the context is faulty; ὅσι μήποτε . . . διὰ τὴν can hardly be made to depend either on οὗ γὰρ θεμυτῶν or on παραιτοῦμαι. Moreover, γένεσις stands too close to γένεσις ἰστορεῖν. It therefore seems best to assume that this clause has been added by a reader. It is an attempt to answer the question why Isis should be unwilling to reveal the truth to her son. But it does not answer that question satisfactorily.

Since Osiris and Isis were gods, their son Horus also must have been a god (though perhaps, at the time spoken of, a god incarnate); and a god might surely be permitted to know the facts, and might be trusted not to reveal to men what ought to be kept hidden from them. The true explanation is rather that the writer was thinking of his own obligation not to reveal the secret to his readers, and did not stop to ask himself whether Isis had any good reason for not revealing it to Horus.

ὅ τῶν συμπάντων [κοσμοποιητὴς καὶ] τεχνίτης. κοσμοποιητής could not stand with συμπάντων. It is an alternative, not for τεχνίτης alone, but for τῶν συμπάντων τεχνίτης. It may be a misreading for κόσμον ποιητῆς; but neither the one nor the other can have been written by the author.

καὶ τὴν μεγίστην θεὰν ηὐσιν. Both in this phrase, and in the reiterated οὕτοι of §§ 65–68, Isis somewhat strangely speaks of herself in the third person. This might be accounted for by assuming that the writer of Exc. XXIII took over the contents of the passage beginning at ὥ μόναρχος θεὸς in § 64, down to the end of § 68, from some document in which the teaching was not put into the mouth of Isis. In § 69, the first person is again employed (*Οσιρᾶς τε καγώ, . . . ἀπητούμεθα).

§ 65. οὕτοι, (τοῦ) θεοῦ (βίου MSS.) τῶν βίων πληρῶσαντες (ἐπλη- ρωσαν MSS.), [οὕτοι] τὸ τῆς ἀληθινοφοινίας ἐπαυσαν ἅγιον. The
Elements had prayed God to put an end to the mutual slaughter of mankind by sending gods down to earth; and we are now told how God did what the Elements had asked him to do. Osiris and Isis, sent down by God (i.e. incarnated on earth, and reigning as king and queen of Egypt), introduced religion among men (who had till then been οίοι), and thereby put a stop to ἄλληλοφοια.

Thus the climax to which the narrative of Exx. XXIII leads up, and with which it concludes, is the institution of religion; and the chief lesson which the story is intended to teach is that religion is indispensable for the welfare of human society.

What follows in §§ 65–68 ought to be merely an amplification of the statement of ό πάνταν ἄγρων. But the text of these sections has been corrupted by the insertion of irrelevant matter.

With this list of boons conferred on men by Osiris and Isis may be compared an inscription found in the island of Ios (C. I. G. xii. v. 14; Kaibel, Epigrammata Gr. ex lapid. cons. p. xxi) in which Isis says (ε)γὼ τὸ δίκαιον ἰσχυρὸν ἐποίησα. εγὼ (γ)ναί(κ)α καὶ ἄνδρα συνήγαγα· εγὼ γναί(κ)α δεκα(μ)ην βρέφος ἔνεαζα.1 εγὼ ἐν τού οὐκέτι γονεῖς φιλοστουργέσθαι ἐνομοθέτησα· εγὼ τοὺς ἀστραγγας γ'ονεύσα διακεμάνοι(ς) τεμπερίαν ἐπέθηκα. εγὼ μετὰ τοῦ αἰδελφοῦ 'Οσιεὶ(ρ)ος τὰς ἀνθρωποφαγίας ἐπαναζ; εγὼ πο(ρ)τος ἀνθρώπους ἀνέδειξα. εγὼ ἀγάλματα (ιστ)άνεν ἄθ(άκ)α· εγὼ τεμενή θεῶν ε(ι)δόσραμήν. (ε)γὼ τυρά(ν)ω(ν) ἀρχὰς κατέλυσα· εγὼ στέργεσθαι (γ')ναί(κ)α(ς) ἐπ' ἀνθ'ρωπον ἐνάνκαισα. (ε)(γ)ω τὸ δίκαιον εἰσχυρότερον χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργυροῦ ἐποίησα· εγὼ τὸ ἀληθὲς καλὸν ἐνομοθέτησα ν(ο)μ(ί)ζον(τα)ι. εγὼ συνεγράφας 'Ε(ρμοῦ;) ... Compare also a hymn to Isis (C. I. G. xii. v. 739, Kaibel 1028, Abel Orphica p. 295 ff.) which was probably composed in the fourth century A.D., and was found inscribed on stone in Andros. Lines 26–47 of the Andros hymn are a versified paraphrase of the contents of the Ios inscription. Another document of similar character is Oxyrhynchus Pap. (1915) no. 1380, early second century A.D.,—an invocation of Isis, probably written by a priest of the goddess. Cf. a magic invocation in Pap. mag. Lond. 46. 101 sqq.: σὺ εἶ ὁ Ὀσιρός ὅμοψυρμα (i.e. Osiris Wen-nofre) ... σὺ διάκρινες τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. σὺ ἐποίησας θῆλυ καὶ ἄρρεν. σὺ ἔδειξας στοράν καὶ καρποὺς. σὺ ἐποίησας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἄλληλοφιλεῖν καὶ (μή) ἄλληλομιστεῖν.

1 ἔνεαζα inscr.: ἐνεάζα Wilamowitz: ἐνεάζα Kaibel. Perhaps σύνεαζα, 'ordained' or 'prescribed'.

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The establishment of religious worship ought to be placed at the beginning of the list of benefits; and the mention of ἱεροποιίας ought to be closely connected with that of τεμένη. I have therefore transposed this sentence from § 68 to § 65.

The adjective πρὸς κάθετον does not occur elsewhere. κάθετον means ‘a plumb-line’, Lat. perpendiculum; and πρὸς κάθετον sometimes means ‘perpendicularly’ or ‘vertically’. Plut. Fac. in orbe lunae 24. 7, 938 a: τοῦ ἥλιου πρὸς κάθετον αὐτοῖς ἐφισταμένον, ‘vertically overhead’. Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 353: Thales said ἐκλίθεσαν τὸν ήλιον τῆς σελήνης αὐτὸν ὑπερχωμάνης κατὰ κάθετον, ‘perpendicularly beneath’. If πρὸς κάθετον is to be taken in this sense, some participle such as ὑπερχωμάνης is needed to go with it. But we should expect to be told, not that earthly rites ‘are situated perpendicularly beneath’ the mysteries of heaven, but that they ‘correspond exactly to’ the mysteries of heaven; and it seems best to take πρὸς κάθετον as here meaning ‘exactly’ (compare the metaphorical use of ad perpendiculum and ad amussim), and to assume that the missing participle is ὑμολογοῦσα or some word of similar sense.

For the thought, cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 24 b: ‘An ignoras . . . quod Aegyptus imago sit caeli, aut . . . translatio aut descensio omnium quae gubernantur atque exercentur in caelo?’

The words πρὸς κάθετον . . . συμπαθεῖν τοῖς ἄνω ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμιουργοῦ διετάγῃ. The words πρὸς ἑρμοῦ μαθώντες occur three times in the traditional text of §§ 65–68; but each of these three mentions of Hermes was probably inserted by a transcriber. μαθώντες ὡς τὰ κάτω . . . διετάγη was written to explain the following words πρὸς κάθετον . . . ἐν γῇ; but the explanation is not needed. As to the συμπάθεια of τὰ κάτω with τὰ ἄνω, see note on Exc. XX. 8.

The word προγόνοις seems intended to prevent the reader from supposing that Osiris and Isis dedicated temples to themselves. (One of these ‘gods of earlier generations’ might be Kamephis; see § (32).) But if the following clause is to be retained, θεοῖσι appears to be contrasted with θεοῖς, and this contrast is impaired by the addition of an epithet to θεοῖς; perhaps therefore it might be better to bracket προγόνοις.

As θυσία are included under ἱεροποιία, which (if my transposition
of ovtou... en γῆ is accepted) have just been spoken of, kai θυσίαις is superfluous; and the verb καθιέρωσαν, which goes well with τεμένη, does not go so well with θυσίαις. I am therefore inclined to think that kai θυσίαις ought to be cut out.

οτοί καὶ τροφὰς θυντοίς καὶ σκέπῃς ἔχαρισαντο. As to τροφή, cf. the epitaph of Isis, Diod. 1. 27. 4, in which she says εγὼ εἰμὶ ἡ πρώτη καρπόν ἀνθρώποις εὕροισα. Ios inscr.: εγὼ πυ(ροί)ς ἀνθρώποις ἀνδειεία. Augustine Civ. dei 8. 27: 'parentibus suis illé (sc. Isis) cum sacrificaret, invenit hordei segetem, atque inde spicas marito regi (Osiris) et eius consiliario Mercurio (Thoth-Hermes) demonstravit; unde eandem et Cererem volunt.' But in those passages, grain or vegetable food alone is spoken of. How did the writer of Ἑκκ. XXIII suppose that men had lived during the time of ἀλληλοφονία? They must at least have had some kind of τροφή, if not σκέπη (clothes and houses) also. Moreover, τροφή and σκέπη are not directly connected with religion, which is the main subject of this list of benefits. It may therefore be suspected that kai τροφὰς... ἔχαρισαντο is a later addition. It is possible that the text originally ran thus: οτοί τεμένη θεωīς καθιέρωσαν, καὶ πρὸς κάθετον ὡμολογοῦσα τοῖς ἐν οὐρανῷ μυστηρίοις ἱεροποιίαις ἀνάτομησαν ἐν γῆ.

§ 66. "οτοί τὰ κρυπτά", φησὶν Ἑρμῆς, "... ὄβελικοις χαράξουσιν." This section is evidently out of place. In no other part of the list of benefits (§§ 65-68) does Isis say that she is repeating words spoken by Hermes; and the verbs in § 66 are in the future tense, whereas in the rest of the list they are in the aorist.

As this fragment has no connexion with its present context, oτοι does not necessarily mean Osiris and Isis. It would be possible to put the passage at the end of the speech of Hermes in § 8. If it were placed there, oτοι would mean the men who were destined to discover in a later age the books which Hermes had written and hidden.

"αὐτοὶ κατασχῶσιν" is probably a corruption of some phrase meaning 'they will keep secret'. The persons spoken of will read the books of Hermes, and will divide their contents into two parts. One part they will keep to themselves; the other part they will inscribe on slabs of stone (exposed in public places) and on obelisks, so that all may read it. Cf. § 5 fin., where it is said that Hermes himself did something partly similar to this.

§ 67. [οτοί πρῶτοι δείξαντες δικαιότητα] [[κύρομίας τὰ σώματα καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐπιλήψαν.]] Justice and obedience to law may be
enforced on men either by fear of punishments inflicted by human judges, or by fear of punishments inflicted by the gods. *dikaiotēs* have to do with punishments inflicted by men; 'the great god "Opros" has to do with punishments inflicted by the gods. But as Osiris and Isis are in §§ 65-68 regarded chiefly, if not solely, as the introducers of *religion*, it is the religious enforcement of εὐνομία, rather than the civic, that ought to be here spoken of, and the mention of *dikaiotēs* seems irrelevant. (Cf. § 56: Φοβεῖται ἀνθρωποί τὴν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἐκδίκαιαν, καὶ οἰκεῖς διαρτήσει. ... [φοβηθήσονται ὄρκος; καὶ οἶδε ἐ tz ἀνάσων φρονήσει.] I have therefore bracketed οὕτω ... *dikaiotēs*, and placed πίστεως ... ἐπλήρωσαν after "Ὅρκον εἰσαγαγόντες εἰς τὸν βίον.

If courts of justice were to be spoken of at all, the mention of them would be better placed after the sentence about νομοθεσία in § 68.

δεξίας καὶ πίστεως ἀρχηγέτης (ἀρχηγέται γενόμενοι καὶ MSS.) τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν "Ὅρκον εἰσαγαγόντες (εἰσαγάγοντο MSS.) εἰς τὸν βίον. The middle verb εἰσαγάγοντο cannot be defended.

"Opros meant primarily the thing by which a man swears, and thence the oath itself. To swear an oath ("Opros in the latter sense) is to bind oneself to fulfil an engagement (δεξία καὶ πίστεις) by praying the gods to punish one if one breaks it. The thing sworn by ("Opros in the former sense) is some object in which divine force is believed to be inherent, and with which the swearer puts himself in connexion (sometimes by touching it, sometimes by invoking it verbally), in order to ensure that the gods will hear the prayer and act accordingly. In primitive times it was assumed that only when the gods had been brought into action by such a rite would they concern themselves about the fulfilment of a contract, or punish its violation. 'The great god "Opros' is a personification of the divine force which is put in operation by the swearing of an oath; he is therefore rightly described as δεξίας καὶ πίστεως ἀρχηγέτης.

The god "Opros occurs in Hesiod, Theog. 231: "Ορκὸν θ' (sc. "Ερις τέκε), δὲ δὴ πλείστον ἐπιγόνοισιν ἀνθρώποις | πημαίνει, ὅτε κὲν τις ἐκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀμόση. See also Hes. Op. 219 and 804; Soph. O. C. 1767; Orac. ap. Herodot. 6. 86.

(τὸ φθορίμον τῶν σωμάτων ἐπιγόντες). In the MSS. this is connected with τὸ ... τῶν προφητῶν ἐπιχνάσαντο in § 68. But the fact that bodies decay has nothing to do with the functions
of prophets; and the words must have been intended to go with
what is said about the burial of the dead (τοὺς παυσαμένους . . .
περιστέλλειν ἐδίδαξαν). It may be suspected however that they did
not occur at all in the original text, but were added in § 67 by a
later hand, and afterwards transposed to § 68.

τοὺς παυσαμένους τοῦ ζήν ὡς δύον ἠτί περιστέλλειν ἐδίδαξαν (ὡς
δύον ἠτίν ἐδίδαξαν περιστέλλειν MSS.). We were told in § 53 that
one of the bad things done by men in the time of ἀλληλοφονία was
the casting out of corpses without burial. The burial of the dead
was a religious rite; its introduction is therefore rightly included
among the boons conferred by Osiris and Isis. περιστέλλειν, 'to
enwrap', is used in Greek literature, from Homer downward, to
describe the process of preparing a corpse for burial; but the writer
was probably thinking of the Egyptian practice of swathing mummies
in linen bands.

οὗτοι . . . ἔγνωσαν ὡς τοῦ ἐξεθεν (ἐκεῖ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλάσματα)
(ἐσελθόντος) πνεῦματος φιλωποστρόφου τυγχάνοντος [ ][ ] ἐὰν ὀστερῆῃ
ποτὲ, ἀνάκτησιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν ἔργασαι νο[ι]ποθυμίας. The meaning
of this passage was probably somewhat as follows: 'They (who?—
hardly Osiris and Isis) discovered the cause of death; they found
out that the πνεῦμα (life-breath or vital spirit) tends to quit the
body and return to the atmosphere, from which it came, and that
if it quits the body partially, the man falls into a swoon (λιποθυμία),
but if it quits the body wholly, it does not come back, and so the
man dies.' I take φιλωποστρόφου to mean 'apt to return to the
place whence it came'; and I suppose τοῦ . . . πνεῦματος φιλωπο-
στρόφου τυγχάνοντος to be a genitive absolute. But it is difficult
to reconstruct the last part of the sentence. One might propose
something of this sort: ἐὰν (μὲν) ὀστερῆῃ ποτὲ (ἀυτὸν ὁ ἀνθρωπος,
κατίστει) (ἐκεῖνοι) (λιποθυμία), (ἐὰν δὲ παντάπασιν ἀποστερηθή,) ἀνάκτησιν
οὐκ ἔχων (ἀποθνήσκει). 'If the man runs short of it (or fails to
get enough of it), he swoons; but if he is wholly deprived of it,
he cannot get it back, and dies.' Compare Exc. XXVI. 12.

The insertion of this inopportune explanation of the process of
death was doubtless suggested by τοὺς παυσαμένους τοῦ ζήν in the
preceding sentence. The words λιποθυμία, ἀνάκτησις, and φιλω-
ποστρόφος occur as medical terms in the Hippocratic writings.

οὗτοι, τὸ περιέχον δὲ δαμόνων ἀπελθόθη παρὰ Ἐρμοῦ μαθώντες,
(τὰ ἀνάματα (ορ τὰς ἐπικλήσεις) αὐτῶν (?) ἐν) κρυπταίς στήλαις ἐχάραζαν.
What was it that Osiris and Isis (or possibly some other persons)
engraved on hidden tablets'? It cannot have been merely a statement of the fact that 'the atmosphere is full of daemons'; for that was no secret to be concealed from the profane, but a thing well known to every Greek and Egyptian. There must therefore be a lacuna before κρυπτᾶς στήλαις ἔχαραζαν. A good sense may be got by inserting τὰ ἀνόματα αὐτῶν. Knowledge of the names by which daemons could be invoked was highly valued by the practitioners of magic and theurgy; and those who used these names in their invocations were sometimes unwilling to let them become known to the general public. But the invocation of daemons belongs to magic rather than religion, or at any rate has little to do with the kind of religion by which men are restrained from crime; there is therefore no occasion to speak of it in this list of benefits, and it seems best to regard the sentence as an interpolation.

§ 68. οὖν τῶν οὕτω τοῖς κρυπτῶσι νομοθεσίαις τοῦ θεοῦ [παρὰ 'Ερμῷ] μαθόντες, ταῖς καὶ ἑπιστήμων καὶ ἑπιτηδευμάτων ἀπάντων εἰσηγηταὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγένοντο [καὶ] νομοθεταί. This sentence, as given in the MSS., implies that the arts and sciences are based on 'the secret lawgivings of God'. But that cannot be right. The arts and sciences might be said to be based on what we call 'the laws of nature'; but to a Greek, αἱ νομοθεσίαι τοῦ θεοῦ would mean, not the establishment of the laws of nature, but the laying down of the principles of morality; and with this the arts and sciences have no connexion. The reading of the MSS. seems to have resulted from the intermixture of two distinct statements, viz. οὖν, τὰς κρυπτὰς νομοθεσίας τοῦ θεοῦ μαθόντες, τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγένοντο νομοθεταί, and οὖν τοῖς ἑπιστήμοις καὶ ἑπιτηδευμάτων ἀπάντων? εἰσηγηταὶ ἐγένοντο. The latter statement is hardly to the point; knowledge of arts and sciences does not prevent mutual slaughter, and the men who slaughtered one another before the coming of Osiris and Isis must at least have known something of the art of war. But the former statement, οὖν . . . τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγένοντο νομοθεταί, may have formed part of the original text. The distinction between the law of God and human laws was familiar to the Greeks, from the time of Sophocles (Ant. 449 ff.) onward.

tο γὰν ἔπασι τιλεῖον ἑν τῶν προφητῶν ἐτεχνάσαντο. Α προφητής, in

1 We should have expected πεσθαται rather than ἐκληρόθη. The tense may have been altered when the sentence was inserted into the Kore Kosmi.
the wider sense of the term, is a man who makes known to other men the will of a god, or of the gods. But προφήτης also meant a member of a certain class or order of Egyptian priests;¹ and as the προφήται spoken of in this passage have to do with healing the sick as well as with philosophy, it seems clear that the word here means Egyptian priests, or a certain class of them. The writer may possibly have been himself an Egyptian priest of this class; if so, he might think fit to conclude his list of the benefits which Osiris and Isis had conferred on mankind by saying that his own order or profession had been instituted by them.

The genitive τῶν προφητῶν must have been dependent on some word (e.g. ἔθνος or γένος) which could serve as subject to τρέφω and σῶζω below; and the meaningless ἐν ἄπασι τέλειοι may be a corruption of a phrase by which the missing substantive was qualified. Sense might be made by writing τὸ ἐν ἄπασιν ὄφελμον (ἔθνος) (οί τέλειοι ἐμπευροὶ) τῶν προφητῶν.²

[ἀς μὴ ποιησε τὸ μέλλων θεὸς προσάγει αὐτῷ προφήτης ἄγος τι τῶν (ἐνὸντων)]. This clause appears to have been written as an alternative for the following ὅλα... τρέφει κ.τ.λ. It evidently refers to those Egyptian priests whose duty it was to enter the innermost sanctuary of the temple in which they served, and perform there certain prescribed ceremonies (τὰ δεινα), especially that of clothing the image, which would necessitate 'laying hands on the god'. (See Otto, op. cit. I, pp. 83-86.) The priests to whom this duty was assigned are described in the Canopus and Rosetta inscriptions as οἱ εἰς τὸ ἄθυτον εἰσπορεύμαν ἀφὸ τῶν στολημόν τῶν θεῶν. They were called στολισταὶ (Plut. Is. et Os. 39), ἱεροστόλου (ib. 3), or ἱεροστολισταὶ (Porphyry. De abst. 4. 8), and were commonly distinguished from the προφηταί; but the writer of this clause apparently included them under the term προφήτης.

[ἐνα φιλοσοφίᾳ μὲν [καὶ μαγείᾳ] (τὴν) ψυχὴν τρέφει (εἰς τὸ τῶν προφητῶν ἔθνος?)] It might be said of the Egyptian priests called προφήται, that it was their business to study and teach 'philosophy',

¹ See Otto, Priester und Tempel in hellen. Ägypten, I, pp. 75-83. Otto says that προφήται 'held the most eminent position in the Egyptian priesthood, with the exception of that of the presidents of temples'; and that the title borne by priests of this order (i.e. the Egyptian title for which προφήτης is the Greek equivalent, was ἅγιος, 'servant of the god').

² It has occurred to me that τὸ ἐν ἄπασι τέλειοι may possibly have arisen out of some phrase equivalent to τὴν τελετὴν, 'the initiatory rite' by which the priests called προφήται were consecrated. That rite might be said to have been 'devised' by Osiris and Isis; but ἡ τελετὴ would not be a suitable subject for τρέφει and σῶζω.
which, to the Hermetists, was indistinguishable from theology. Cf. Diog. Laert. proem. i : Ἀιγύπτιοι μὲν γὰρ Νεῖλον (φασὶ) γενόταθι παῖδα Ἡφαιστον (Ptah), δν ἀρξαί φιλοσοφίας, ἦς τοὺς προφητεύτας ἱερέας εἶναι καὶ προφήτας. Clem. Alex. Strom. i. 15. 71: φιλοσοφία . . . πάλαι μὲν ἡμισε παρὰ βαρβάροις . . . προφητεύσαν δ’ αὐτῆς Αἰγυπτίων τε οἱ προφῆται, κ.τ.λ. Ἱθ. 6. 4. 37: (ὁ προφήτης) τὰ ἱερατικά καλοῦμενα δέκα βιβλία ἐκμετάλλευεν· περίερχε δὲ (ταῦτα) περὶ τὸ νόμον καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς δυνής πανίδειας τῶν ἱερεῶν. Porphyr. De abst. 4. 8: τὸ μὲν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν φιλοσοφοῦν ἐν τοῖς προφήταις ἦν καὶ ἱεροσυλλογία καὶ ἱερογραμματεύειν, ἔτι δὲ ὅρολόγοις.

§ 69. (ἀπητούμεθα λοιπῶν) (. . .) Having done all that they had been sent down from heaven to do, Osiris and Isis asked the supreme God to permit them to quit the earthly bodies in which they were incarnated, and return to their home above. During their residence on earth they must have lived as human beings, and reigned as king and queen of Egypt; they differed from the men and women among whom they lived in this respect only, that they were incarnate θεοί, whereas men and women in general are incarnate ψυχαί.

ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἦν ἀνελθεὶν πρὶν ὡμηρή ἐπικαλεσάθαι τὸν μόναρχον. It is
necessary to insert ὑμωθ here, in order to give a meaning to the words κἀμοι χάραι τήν τοῦ ὑμωθ ἐπίγνωςαν in the following section.

ἀδοὶ τε εὐπαράδεκτοι (-δεκτον MSS.) [εὐπαράδεκτο] (ποιησάμεθα) τήν ἀνάβασιν. Either εὐπαράδεκτο or εὐπαράδεκτο is redundant. The reading of the MSS. appears to be a mixture of the two alternatives ἀδοὶ τε εὐπαράδεκτοι ποιησάμεθα τήν ἀνάβασιν and ἀδοὶ τε εὐπαράδεκτοι τήν ἀνάβασιν.

[χαῖρε γέρ ὑμωθι δ θεός.] This is superfluous, and makes the speech of Isis end feebly. It was probably added by a reader. Cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 9: 'hominum enim admirationibus, adorationibus, laudibus, obsequiis caelum caelestesque delectantur,' &c.

§ 70. κἀμοι χάραι τήν τοῦ ὑμωθ ἐπίγνωςαν. Cf. Corp. XIII. 15, where Tat asks Hermes to repeat to him the hymn sung by the Powers.

Πρόσεχε, παῖ. In the Kore Kosmu, the hymn must have followed. But it was either omitted by Stobaeus, or lost at some stage in the transmission of his text to us.

The libellus probably ended either with the hymn itself, or with a short passage which followed it, and in which the return of Osiris and Isis to heaven was described.

EXCERPT XXIV

The superscription Ἐν ταύρῳ, if strictly interpreted, would mean that Exc. XXIV is a part of the same book from which Stobaeus got Exc. XXIII,—i. e. that this piece also is an extract from 'the holy book of Hermes Trismegistus which is entitled Kore Kosmu'. But Stobaeus may have meant by his superscription merely that he took Exc. XXIV from the same volume of Discourses of Isis to Horus' from which he took Exc. XXIII. It is also possible that the title Kore Kosmu, though originally belonging to one libellus alone of the Isis to Horus collection, had, by the time of Stobaeus, come to be applied to the collection as a whole (just as the heading Poimandres, which properly belonged only to Corp. I, came to be used in recent times as the title of the whole Corpus). The superscription of Exc. XXIV cannot therefore be considered to prove that this Excerpt was a part of the same libellus as Exc. XXIII (or the narrative which forms the bulk of Exc. XXIII); and the question whether it was so or not must be decided on other grounds. Both
EXCERPTS XXIII: 70; XXIV: 1

the difference of form and certain differences in doctrine (see especially the description of the four regions in Exc. XXIV. 1) make it probable that it was not so.

Exc. XXIV consists of answers given by Isis to a series of questions asked by Horus. All the six questions asked are questions about human souls. The libellus from which the Excerpt was taken may have included questions and answers on other subjects also; if it did, only that part of it which dealt with the soul would be suitable for insertion in the chapter (headed Περὶ ψυχῆς) in which Stobaeus has placed it, in his Anthologium, and he would necessarily reject the rest.

The first four of the questions are expressed in the same form (Πῶς γίνονται κ.τ.λ.); the fifth is a sequel to the fourth, being a further question on the same subject of σύνεσις; and the sixth, though the word σύνεσις does not occur in it, is also concerned with human intelligence. It seems therefore that the document from which the extract was taken was at least so far continuous, that questions and answers on connected topics were grouped together. But a string of quaestiones such as this would admit of and invite additions; and we can have no certainty that the several paragraphs were all written by the same person.

In any case, Exc. XXIV probably originated in the same group of Isis-worshippers as Exc. XXIII.

The writer of §§ 11-16 (if we assume the two answers contained in those sections to have been written by one man) must have been not only an inhabitant of Egypt, but an Egyptian by race. He had learnt to write Greek with ease in the literary style of his time, but shows ignorance of things which he would have known if his schooling in Greek science and philosophy had been more than rudimentary. In other paragraphs, we find the Platonic doctrine of unembodied souls assumed, and, as in Exc. XXIII, there are traces (e.g. in § 3 and § 7) of the special modification of that doctrine which was taught by Posidonius.

§ 1. εἰ τι θελείς ἐπερον ἐπερώτα. These words show that, in the libellus from which this piece was extracted by Stobaeus, at least one question and answer had preceded.

πῶς γίνονται βασιλικαί ψυχαί. This probably means 'how kingly souls come into being', the souls of kings being assumed to be different in quality from those of other men. But it would be grammatically possible to translate 'how souls become kingly'; and the
person who inserted αί before ψυχαί in § 10 init. took the adjective αυτεραί as a predicate.

[ἐπεὶ γὰρ] τότε τέσσαρες εἰσιν ... καὶ ἄνω μὲν ... θεοὶ κατοικοῦσιν. The construction of this passage has been confused by some slight alteration of the text. Meineke hesitates between (1) putting a comma after γῆ and bracketing καὶ before ἄνω, and (2) putting a full stop after γῆ and writing εἰσὶ γὰρ τότε τέσσαρες in place of ἐπεὶ γὰρ τότε τέσσαρες εἰσιν. Wachsmuth adopts the first of Meineke’s two proposals. I have made sense in another way, by putting a full stop after γῆ and bracketing ἐπεὶ γὰρ.

τότε τέσσαρες εἰσιν ἐν τῷ παντὶ, οίτινες ἀπαραβάτης νόμῳ καὶ (βασιλείᾳ) προστασίᾳ ὑποστηθοῦσιν. The thing which the writer is seeking to show is that the function of the human king on earth is analogous to that of God, who is king of the gods in heaven; to that of the Sun, who is king of the stars in the aether; and to that of the Moon, who is queen of the unembodied souls in the air. The προστασία spoken of in this preliminary statement must therefore be κινδυνος rule; and the connexion of thought is more clearly brought out if we insert βασιλεία before προστασία.

ἀπαραβάτης νόμῳ seems irrelevant; and as the laws enacted by earthly kings are often transgressed, it can hardly be said that they are ἀπαραβατικοί. It may therefore be suspected that ἀπαραβάτης νόμῳ καὶ has been added by a later hand.

δὲ τε οὐδανός ... καὶ ἥ [ἰερωτάτη] γῆ. There is no reason why γῆ alone of the four substantives should have an epithet; and earth could not be thought more holy than heaven. The addition of ἱερωτάτη may have been suggested by τῆς ἱερωτάτης ἡμῶν χῶρας in § 11 and ἥ ... ἱερωτάτη χώρα in § 13 (the land of Egypt as opposed to other lands).

ἐν οὐρανῷ θεοὶ κατοικοῦσιν, ... ἐν δὲ τῷ αἰθρὶ ἀστέρες. The writer of this paragraph agrees with the author of Ἐξε. XXIII in dividing the space between heaven and earth into two regions, the higher of which is called αἰθρί, and the lower, αἰρό. (See note on Ἐξε. XXIII. 17.) But he differs from him, and from the Hermetists in general, as well as from most other Pagan writers of his time, in distinguishing the stars from the gods, and in saying that the stars are situated, not in heaven, but in a region below heaven. The prevailing opinion was that the stars were gods, and, if not the only gods, were at least a very important class of gods. Platonists might speak of an order of νομοτοὶ θεοὶ whose abode was above the
stars, but placed the star-gods in heaven; and in locating the stars not in heaven, but below it, this writer implies a cosmology differing widely from that of any of the recognized Greek schools of thought.

The peculiarity in his arrangement of the several regions and their inhabitants may possibly have resulted from a confusion between two different uses of the word αἰθήρ. A Greek might say that the stars were ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι, using αἰθήρ as a synonym for οὐρανός (see for instance Exc. VI. 12: ἐν οὐρανῷ φερόμενοι αὐτέρες . . . φέρονταί ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι αἰωροῦμενοι); another Greek might say that αἰθήρ was below οὐρανός, meaning by αἰθήρ the higher part of the atmosphere, cf. the Epinomis; and half-educated Egyptians, putting these two statements together, might infer from them that the stars are not in heaven, but in a region below heaven.

Of what nature are the 'gods' who dwell in heaven? As the stars are not in heaven, the gods spoken of cannot be star-gods. We are told that their king is the supreme God (ὁ τῶν διών δημομυργός). They seem to correspond in some respects to the νοττοί θεοί of the Platonists; but it is unlikely that this writer had any clear conception of νοττά. Perhaps he was thinking of the gods of popular Egyptian worship,—Isis, Osiris, &c.,—and assumed that these gods lived in a place called οὐρανός which was situated above the stars.1

ἐν δὲ τῷ αἰθέρι ψυχαὶ [ἐς μόναι]. Meineke alters ἐς μόναι into δαμόναι. If we accept his conjecture, we must take ψυχαί δαμόναι to mean souls in the condition of daemons, i.e. unembodied souls. (Cf. Exc. XXIII. 10 as emended: ταῖς ἐς δαμικητακτησίας ψυχαῖς, . . . ταῖς . . . ἱεροὶς δαμόνωι μετακεκλημένως.) But as the corresponding substantives θεοί, αὐτέρες, and ἀνθρωποί have no epithets, the sentence reads better if ψυχαί also stands without an epithet; and it is more probable that ἐς μόναι has arisen out of δαμόνες written as a substitute or alternative for ψυχαί.

ἐν ἀρχεί σελήνη. The air then extends from the earth up to a limit immediately above the moon; and the aether, in which are situated the sun and the stars, begins immediately above the moon, and extends thence up to the lower limit of heaven.

The view that the moon has more in common with the earth than

1 I have assumed that αὐτέρες means 'stars'. But the word was sometimes used to mean 'planets', and not stars in general. It is therefore possible that the writer located the gods and the fixed stars in heaven, and the planets alone in a region called 'aether' which is below heaven. But if so, he would still be contradicting the commonly received opinion that the planets are gods, and are situated in heaven.
with the other heavenly bodies, and is included in the terrestrial atmosphere, is maintained (by a Platonist, in opposition to the Stoics,) in Plut. De facie in orbe lunae; and the notion that the moon presides over disembodied souls, or at least has much to do with them, is to be found in that dialogue, and in some of Plutarch's other writings.

ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς γῆς (κατοικοῦσιν) ἄνθρωποι [καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἡμᾶς], δὲ ἀρχεῖ δ... βασιλεὺς. There would be no point in saying that the reigning king or emperor governs the cows and sheep. It is therefore most likely that καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἡμᾶς was added by some one who disregarded the following words δὲ ἀρχεῖ δ βασιλεὺς, and thought fit to supplement the statement ‘upon earth dwell men,’ by mentioning the beasts also.

δὲ ἀρχεῖ δ... (κατὰ καιρὸν) γενόμενος βασιλεὺς γενώσι γὰρ (κατὰ καιρὸν), ὡς τέκνοι, βασιλεῖς ἄνθρωποι οἱ θεοὶ ἐπάξιοι (ἐπάξιοι MSS.) τῆς ἐπιγείου ἡγεμονίας (γονῆς MSS.). κατὰ καιρὸν, at the right time, does not go well with γενόμενος βασιλεὺς. A better sense is got by writing δὲi (‘at any given time’) here, and transposing κατὰ καιρὸν into the following clause. The rulers of the three higher regions hold office permanently; but men on earth are governed by a succession of kings; and in order that they may never be left without a king, the gods supply a man fit for the post ‘at the right time,’ i.e. cause him to be born at such a time that he will be ready to become king when a vacancy occurs. (γενόμενος was inadvertently omitted from the text.)

If βασιλεὺς is retained, the following words ἐπάξιοι κ.τ.λ. become superfluous. What the writer meant to say was, not that kings are generated by the gods, but that the gods take care that there is at hand a man who is worthy to be made king when a new king is wanted. It would be possible to write ἄνθρωποι ἐπάξιοι; but as the king is spoken of in the singular in the preceding clause, it is most likely that here also the singular was used. The writer speaks as if there were only one king at a time on earth; that is, he is here thinking only of the Roman empire, and ignores all other kingdoms.

gενώσι probably means, not ‘beget’ or ‘engender’ in the literal sense, but merely ‘cause to come into existence’. All men are ‘sons’ of the gods, in the sense that they have been brought into being by the creative activity of the powers above; and the man who is worthy to be king is a son of the gods in that sense, but not in any sense peculiar to himself. It is true that the Egyptians had in ancient times imagined each of their native kings to have been begotten by a god; but the writer of Exc. XXIV does not appear to
have had any such notion in his mind. According to him, the souls of kings, like those of other men, are pre-existent (§§ 3 and 4); and their bodies are presumably produced by the same process as other human bodies.

§ 2. καὶ ἐσὶν οἱ ἄλλοι ἀρχόντες τοῦ (ἐν οὐρανῷ) βασιλέως ἀπόρροια. We have just been given a list of four ἀρχόντες, the first of whom is the supreme God; and οἱ ἄλλοι ἀρχόντες are the other three, viz. the Sun, the Moon, and the earthly king. The Sun and the Moon, being gods, might be called ‘effluxes’ of the supreme God (see Exc. XXIII. 64, where the word ἀπόρροια is used with reference to Osiris and Isis); but as the writer of Exc. XXIV holds earthly kings to be men and not gods (§ 3), it is difficult to see what he could mean by saying that the earthly king is an ἀπόρροια of the supreme God; for the term, if not wholly inapplicable to him, would be applicable only in a sense in which it might equally well be applied to all other men also. It may therefore be suspected that § 2 is an addition by another hand. If it were absent, it would not be missed; for § 3 is quite as well suited to follow § 1 as to follow § 2.

§ 3. πρῶτος ἢ ἅθρωτων. Here the writer plainly and unmistakably says that the king is a man; and any phrases which appear to imply that he thought the king to be a god must be corrected accordingly. The preceding words (τῶν μὲν ἄλλων θεῶν ἐστιν ἀσχατος) must therefore be altered into τῶν μὲν τεσσάρων ἀρχόντων ἐστιν ἀσχατος, or something equivalent. And for the same reason I have written παρ(ά τοῖς ἄλλους) ἅθρωτων below.

This writer differs from those who believed (and those who said without believing) that the living emperor was an incarnate god; though at the same time he holds that the emperor’s soul may become a god after death (μέλλονσαι ἀποθεοῦσθαι, § 4), and in this respect agrees with the view which found expression in the state-established cult of the Divi.

τῆς μὲν ἄλθους θε[ι]ότητος ἀπήλλακται, ἐχει δὲ ἐξαίρετον τι παρ(ά τοῖς ἄλλους) ἅθρωτων (παρ’ ἅθρωτοι MSS), δ’ ἑμοὶν ἐστι τῷ θεῷ. The living king or emperor is not a god, but a man who has something godlike in him. This might be expressed by saying that he is not
§ 3. ος, but θεός ἄνθρωπος. (Cf. Pl. Soph. 216 B: καὶ μοι δοκεῖ θεὸς μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἐστιν, θεός μὲν.) We must therefore read θεότητος ἀπῆλλακταί, which means ‘he is not θεός’, and not θεότητος ἀπῆλλακταί, which would mean ‘he is not θεός’.

ἀπῆλλακταί is not a past tense; it does not imply that he was once a god and has now ceased to be one, but merely that he is not a god as long as he remains on earth (though his soul may be destined to become a god when it quits the body).

ἡ γάρ εἰς αὐτὸν καταπεμπομένη ψυχῇ ἄνευ ἐκ χωρίου (ἐκ έκείνου ἐστὶ τοῦ χωρίου MSS.) ὁ ὠπέραν κεῖται έκείνων ἀφ’ ὧν εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους κατα-

πέμπονται ἀνθρώπους. This shows that the writer of Exc. XXIV, like those of XXIII, XXV, and XXVI, holds that the atmosphere is divided into a number of distinct strata, and that each unembodied soul has a residence assigned to it in that particular stratum which corresponds to its quality. The ‘kingly’ souls are souls which, before their incarnation, have been residing in the highest of these atmospheric strata. In that respect, they correspond to the ‘advanced’ souls spoken of in Exc. XXIII. 19 (ταῖς εἰς [ ] τοῖς ἐγγοὺς ἀδρωμὸν τόπους (ἀναβάσαις)).

§ 4. καταπέμπονται δὲ εἰς τὸ βασιλεύειν διὰ δύο ταῦτα αἱ ψυχαί. Kingly souls are divided into two classes. Those of the first class are souls which have lived blameless lives in a series of previous incarnations,1 and have thereby made such progress that, after one more life on earth, they will be qualified to be transmuted from ‘souls’ into ‘gods’. Such a soul, when it is sent down to earth for the last time, is made a king, in order that, by doing a king’s work here below, it may get the training which it needs to enable it to discharge efficiently the functions of a god when it returns to the world above. Before this last incarnation, it resided in the highest stratum of the atmosphere; and we may infer that, when it quits the body and becomes a god, it ascends beyond the upper limit of the atmosphere, and thenceforth dwells in the abode of the gods.

But where is the abode of the gods? On this point § 4 seems inconsistent with § 1. According to § 1, the souls dwell in the atmosphere, and the gods dwell in heaven, but between these two regions is interposed the aether, in which are the stars. We should therefore have expected to be told that a soul which was sufficiently

1 This is probably what is meant by καλῶς καὶ ἀμέτρως δραμοῦσα τὸν πᾶν ἔγχον (alēva MSS.).
advanced to rise above the atmosphere would, to begin with, enter the aether, and become a star there, and that only after a further period of probation, if at all, would it be possible for it to rise to the still higher level of heaven, and become a god. But if that had been the writer's meaning in § 4, he would have written μέλλονσαι καταστρέψεσθαι instead of μέλλονσαι ἀποβευσθαι. If then we assume that § 1 and § 4 were written by the same person, we must conclude that he did not consistently adhere to the peculiar scheme of four regions which is set forth in § 1, and that in § 4 he speaks as if he accepted the commonly prevailing view, according to which the stars are gods, and the gods dwell in a heaven situated immediately above the atmosphere.

Kingly souls of the second class are souls of the highest quality (θεία, 'godlike'), and have, before their incarnation, been residing in the highest stratum of the atmosphere. So far, there is no difference between the one class and the other. But those of the second class have, while residing in that abode, committed some small offence; and they are sent down to earth and incarnated there by way of punishment. They are made kings, because it is fitting that these souls, though not wholly blameless, should still, in virtue of their higher quality, be exalted above the rest, and the position of a king, though inferior to that which the soul held above while unembodied, is superior to that of other men on earth.

We are not directly told what becomes of kingly souls of the second class when they depart from the body; but as it is not said of them, as it is of those of the first class, that they are 'about to become gods', we may infer that they remain 'souls', and accordingly, that, at the termination of their life on earth, they return to the place from which they came, i.e. to the highest stratum of the atmosphere.

What was the writer's reason for dividing kingly souls into these two classes? Would he have put some of the Roman emperors into the one class, and some of them into the other? And if so, on what principle would he have distinguished them? There was this manifest distinction among the emperors, that after their deaths some of them were, by order of the Roman government, worshipped as Divi at Alexandria and throughout the empire,1 and others were not; and that might perhaps be thought to afford ground for saying that some kingly souls become gods when they quit the body, while others remain mere 'souls'.

1 See note on Asc. Lat. III. 27 d, p. 236 ff.
The adjective ἐνθεός, ‘inspired’, would be applicable only to a man, and is meaningless in this connexion. γνώμονα means a carpenter’s square, and metaphorically, a ‘rule’ or ‘regulation’ (norma). In the Egyptian civil service, a code of regulations was called γνώμονα. A document written about A.D. 150, which is discussed by Prof. Stuart Jones, *Fresh light on Roman bureaucracy*, Oxford 1920, begins thus: το(ῦ γ)νώμον(ος), ὅπερ ὁ θεὸς Σαβαστὸς ἔτη τοῦ ἱδίου λόγου ἑπταοκτώ (παρεστήσατο, . . . τὰ ἐν μέ(σ)] ο(κ) άλαια συντετομήν ἡπέταξ(ά) σοι. ‘I have made an abridgement of the middle chapters of the code of regulations drawn up by Augustus for the department of the ἱδιος λόγος.’ Taken in this sense, γνώμονα may be retained, and there is no need to alter it into νόμον. Cf. Exe. XXVI. 2 : (παρά) . . . τῆν τοῦ θείου νόμου παραγγελίαν πεπραχώνα.

§ 5. οἱ μέχρι τὰ ἡμέρα τῶν βασιλευόντων γεγονόμεναι διαφοράς κ.τ.λ. Kings differ from one another in disposition and conduct; one, for instance, is eager to wage war, another seeks to maintain peace. If all kingly souls alike are ‘godlike’, how are these differences to be explained? The writer answers this question by saying that the conduct of the king or emperor is determined, not by the character of his own soul, but by that of the ‘angels and daemons’ by whom his soul was escorted down to earth.

The writer does not say ‘some kings are good and others bad’, and the instances which he gives are not instances of moral virtue and vice. It would seem that he did not presume to judge or criticize the moral characters of the Roman emperors; for him, the soul of Nero and that of Marcus Aurelius alike are ‘godlike’. But he could not help being aware that emperors differed in their pursuits and aims; and he tried to devise a theory by which these differences might be accounted for. His explanation is a strange one. If the activity of the king’s soul is suspended during its residence on earth, and he is merely a passive instrument in the hands of superhuman agents, a king might just as well have been provided without sending down a soul at all; a human body animated by a group of angels and daemons would have served the purpose, and would indeed have been, in practical effect, the very same thing. Moreover, a soul in a state of suspended activity would not get the training which is spoken of in § 4.
EXCERPT XXIV: 5-7

οἶκ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς φύσει (κρίσει MSS.) κρίνονται. For φύσει, cf. τῆς μὲν ἰδίας φύσεως ἐπιλαβόμεναι in § 6.

οἶδε γὰρ ἡ ἄνω δίκη τῆς ἀδίκητη νέμειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἑθιμορούσης χώρας ἀποδιδότα (ἀποδωται MSS.) ἡ ἄνω δίκη ἐστι θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη, momentarilypersonified. θείαι ψυχαί are worthy to be conducted by an escort of angels and daemons, even if they have committed some slight offence, and have been sentenced to incarnation as a punishment; other souls are not worthy of that honour.

ἡ ἑθιμορούσα χώρα, 'the Happy Land', means the abode of the θείαι ψυχαί, which, according to this writer, is the highest stratum of the atmosphere. Did the 'angels and daemons' reside in that same stratum?

§ 6. τοιῶν γὰρ περικρατεὶ τῆς γνώμης ἡ ψυχή, ἐπιλαβομένη τῶν εὐιδίκητη ἐργῶν (Ἐνεργείων;), μόνων δὲ μεμημένη τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἱερᾶς συνοδίας προσεγγιστῶν (προσεγγιστῶν;)—(τοιῶν περικρατείν τῆς γνώμης ἡ ψυχή ἔχει ἐπιλαβομένη τῶν εὐιδίκητη ἐργῶν, μάλλον δὲ μεμημένη τοῖς μέχρι τῶν τῆς ἑτέρας συνοδίας προσεγγιστῶν MSS.)]. This appears to be a misplaced and badly corrupted doublet of αἱ ψυχαί αἱ τῆς καταγόντων περικρατοῦσι γνώμης κ.τ.λ. at the end of the section. With the corrections which I propose, it expresses the same meaning as that passage.

περικρατεῖ here means 'keeps hold of' or 'clings to'. Similar instances occur in Esx. XXIII. 53, (24), where περικρατοῦσα is coupled to ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι, and in Exe. XXVI. 4 (ὅπως ἡ φύσις . . . περικρατή τοῦ . . . τοῦ).

The meaningless ἔχει ἡ may perhaps be a corruption of ἔχεται, written as a substitute for περικρατεῖ.

συνοδία means a party of people travelling in company. ἡ ἱερὰ συνοδία then is the troop of angels and daemons by which the kingly soul is escorted on its way down to earth.

ὅταν δὲ μούσικοι, τότε καὶ αὕτη φώνη. The instance in the writer's mind was probably Nero, whose musical performances were long remembered. (He may possibly have heard of King David also.) Marcus Aurelius might be his instance of a king who φιλοσοφεῖ.

§ 7. πῶς δὲ εὐγενεῖς γίγνονται ψυχαί. This section appears to have been written without regard to the preceding question and answer. A man who, after speaking of 'kingly souls', went on to speak of 'noble' souls, might be expected to explain the relation between the two classes; he might say, for instance, that kingly souls are
εὐγενέσταται, but that there are lower degrees of εὐγένεια also. But nothing of the sort is said here. Moreover, in the statement that the souls τῶν έξοντων ὅσον ὄρμωσιν κ.τ.λ., we are told, as if it were previously unknown to us, a thing which we have already been told in § 3 fin. It is probable then that § 7 was originally written independently of §§ 1-6, but was afterwards appended to those sections because of the similarity of its subject-matter.

eἰσὶ τινες πολιτείαι διαφέρουσαι ἄλληλαι. τινες and ἄλληλαι do not go well together. We might either strike out τινες, and translate 'there are πολιτείαι which differ from one another', or, retaining τινες, alter ἄλληλαι into τῶν ἄλλων, and translate 'there are certain πολιτείαι which are superior to the rest'.

πολιτεία seems here to mean a man's civic or social status. In what follows, it is implied that the status of a free man and the status of a slave are instances of πολιτείαι διαφέρουσαι ἄλληλαι.

ἡ ἀπό τοῦ ἑνδοστέρου τόπου ἀρμηνεία. This means the soul which, before its incarnation on earth, resided in a higher atmospheric stratum than the other soul with which it is compared.

tὸ γὰρ ἐπερέχον καὶ βασιλικὸν δουλοποιεῖ(ταί) τὸ ὑπερχόμενον ἐξ ἀνάγκης. The fact that the one man is a master and the other a slave proves that the former is superior to the latter; and he who is superior must be εὐγενέστερος.

βασιλικὸν seems to be here used as a synonym for εὐγένεια. It could hardly be thus used by a man who had just written §§ 1-6. But perhaps it would be best to strike out καὶ βασιλικὸν.

§ 8. ai ἰσχαί . . . ὅμοιοις εἰσιν ἓναταῖς, καθάπερ εἰς ἑνὸς ὀδοὺς χωρίον. This is inconsistent (verbally at least, if not necessarily in meaning,) both with τοῦ(ν ἐκ) [τοῦ] χωρίον ὁ ὑπεράνω κεῖται ἑκείνου κ.τ.λ. in § 3, and with ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνδοστέρου τόπου ἀρμηνεία in § 7. The χωρίον spoken of in § 8 may be taken to be the atmosphere as a whole.

ἐν ὧν αὖτας διεισώπωσεν (διατυπώσαται or διατυπώσαν MSS.) ὁ δημοτικὸς. This is a reference to some known description of the making of souls, which might be that in the Timaeus, or that in Exc. XXIII, or possibly some other which is not extant.

§ 9. How did ἐσφαγῆς come to mean ‘delicate’? Perhaps the notion is ‘needing to be handled carefully’.

Γ ’ό αὕρ ἄστι, τέκνον ὄρε, ἐν ἃ πάντα γίγνεται. ἀνρ δὲ ψυχῆς ἐστί(Ὁ ... ἂν ἄντο τὸ σῶμα δ ἐπεξελθεῖ. It would be possible to make sense of this by cutting out the words πάντα γίγνεται and ἀνρ δὲ ψυχῆς ἐστίν, and writing ἡ δὲ αἰτία τοῦ ... εἶναι ... εσφαφεὶς (οὐχ) δ ἄνρ ἄστι, τέκνον ὄρε, ἐν ἃ [ ... ] (οὗτος ἐναρμονισθεῖσα ἡ κεῖ ὑπερή(ʔ), ἀλλὰ) αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα δ ἐπεξελθεῖται (κα. ὑπερή). Assuming that the author wrote something to that effect, we might take ἀνρ δὲ ψυχῆς ἐστίν (οὔπω ἐναρμονισθεῖσα ἐκχειρήματος) to be a note appended to the preceding words. But I can make nothing of πάντα γίγνεται.

§ 10. Ποιοὶ ότι οἱ χωτεῖνοι πυκνοὶ ὁσὶ καὶ παχεῖς, ὀμβλυπνεῖ (ὁμωπνεῖ...}

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EXCERPT XXIV: 8-10 569

§ 9. η δὲ [ ] (αἰτία) τοῦ τὰς μὲν (τῶν ἄρρενων) ὄβρυμωτέρας (обрυμωστέρας MSS.) εἶναι, τὰς δὲ (τῶν θηλείων) εὔφαφεῖς, (. . .). ὄβρυμωτέρας (more grim’) cannot be right; what is wanted is an adjective similar in meaning to ἁραχεῖα and ἔργασίκωτεραι at the end of the section.

How did ἐσφαγῆς come to mean ‘delicate’? Perhaps the notion is ‘needing to be handled carefully’.

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Ποιοὶ ότι οἱ χωτεῖνοι πυκνοὶ ὁσὶ καὶ παχεῖς, ὀμβλυπνεῖ (好象 was appended to the preceding words. But I can make nothing of πάντα γίγνεται.

Ποιοὶ ότι οἱ χωτεῖνοι πυκνοὶ ὁσὶ καὶ παχεῖς, ὀμβλυπνεῖ (好象...}
§ II. Ἔκατον ὁ περὶβόλαια, τῶν ἀναμνήσεων, κ.τ.λ.

The envelopes at least must be material; and there can be little doubt that the writer of this passage regarded the soul itself as material also. If a man who held the soul to be an immaterial thing were to say, as it is here said, that the soul is enveloped in material wrappings, and that its sight is obstructed by these wrappings, it would be necessary to take his words as spoken metaphorically. But as the word ἀναμνήσεως is here applied to the soul and its envelopes without distinction, it is to be presumed that the writer did not consider the soul itself, any more than its envelopes, to be absolutely incorporeal. His meaning must be merely that neither the soul nor its envelopes consist of gross matter. Both alike are invisible and impalpable, and therein differ from the visible and palpable body. If the envelopes consist of air, the soul, perhaps, consists of fire, or of a mixture of fire and air. That is Stoic doctrine, not Platonic.

§ II. Ἡ γῆ μέσον τοῦ παντὸς ὑπίπτει ψευτῇ, κτεῖα, ἄπερ ἄθρωπος, κ.τ.λ. The earth was personified in the form of a woman by the Greeks, and by many other races; but the notion of picturing the earth as a woman lying on her back with her head to the South and her feet to the North could hardly have arisen in any other country than Egypt. It would be natural to speak in this way of the land of Egypt; for Egypt is nothing but the Nile-valley, and the Nile-valley is a long and narrow strip of land stretching from South to North. The fact that the Nile flows northward, and the caput fluminis lies to the South, would be a sufficient reason for placing the woman with her head to the South rather than in the reverse position. It is true that the writer of Exc. XXIV is speaking, not
of Egypt, but of the surface of the earth as a whole; but the person who first spoke thus of the earth must have been an Egyptian, who thought of the orbis terrarum as a larger Egypt, and applied to it what had doubtless been originally said of his own country.

The Egyptians sometimes depicted their earth-god (Seb) in the form of a man lying on the ground, with the sky-goddess (Nut) arching her body above him. (See Maspero, Dawn of civilisation, Eng. tr. 1894, p. 129, and Wiedemann, Religion of the ancient Egyptians, Eng. tr. 1897, p. 231.) Such pictures may perhaps have helped to suggest the description of the earth as a recumbent human figure in Exe. XXIV. But Seb was male; and in making the earth female, the writer follows Greek and not Egyptian usage.

All educated Greeks of the period held the earth to be spherical. That view was either unknown to the writer of this passage, or deliberately disregarded by him. He probably had no clear conception of the shape of the earth as a solid body; he was thinking chiefly of its upper surface, which he must have assumed to be approximately level. He did not think of this surface as circular; he imagined its length from North to South to be much greater than its breadth from East to West, and pictured it to himself as more or less resembling in its outline a recumbent human body.

[ἔμβλητε] δ' (βλέπει δ' εν MSS.) οὐρανῷ καθάπερ πάτρι ἱδίω, διότι ταῖς ἐκείνοις μεταβολαῖς καὶ άδη [tà ἱδία] συμμεταβάλλη.] The seasonal variations of temperature, vegetation, &c. on the surface of the earth result from the varying positions of the heavenly bodies.

[tà ἱδία] has doubtless arisen out of the preceding ἱδίω.

The connexion between the preceding clause (μεμφρεται δὲ καδ' ὅσα μέρη ὁ ἄνθρωπος μεριζέται) and those which follow (καὶ πρὸς μὲν τῷ νότῳ . . . έχει τήν κεφαλήν, κ.τ.λ.) is broken by the interposition of ἔμβλητε δ' . . . συμμεταβάλλη. If these words are to be retained, they must be transposed, and placed immediately after (πρὸς) οὐρανὸν βλέποντα. But they are not needed there; the writer's present object is simply to describe the position in which the woman is lying, and for that purpose, the statement that she is 'facing towards the sky' (i.e. lying face upward) is to the point, but an explanation of her reason for choosing that position is
irrelevant. It is therefore most likely that (ν.μ.)βλέπει δ' . . . συμ-
μεταβάλλει is a marginal note on (πρός) οὐφρανόν βλέπουσα.

πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἀπηλιωτῷ (τῶν) δεξιῶν ἀδέμον, (πρὸς δὲ τῷ λιβί τῶν
εὐώνυμων,) ὑπὸ (δὲ) τὴν ἄρκτον (τάς ἄρκτος MSS.) τῶν πόδας, [τὸν
δὲ εὐώνυμον ὑπὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν τῆς ἄρκτου]. Ας μετὰ τὴν ἄρκτον
follows very shortly, it is to be presumed that here also the writer
spoke of the Great Bear only, and not of the two Bears. The
following τοὺς might easily cause ἄρκτον to be altered into ἄρκτους.
The phrase ὑπὸ τὴν ἄρκτον means merely ‘in the extreme north’; it
does not indicate any more definite position.

Heeren and Wachsmuth retain τὸν δὲ εὐώνυμον ὑπὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν
tῆς ἄρκτου, and insert (τὸν μὲν δεξιὸν ὑπὸ τὴν οὐφρανὸν) before τὸν
dὲ εὐώνυμον. But it is better to bracket τὸν δὲ . . . τῆς ἄρκτου. The
statement that the woman’s right shoulder lies to the East, and her
left shoulder to the West, is of some use, because it helps to make
the reader clearly understand how she is placed. But when we have
once been told this, nothing could possibly be gained by going on to
talk about the respective positions of the two feet.

The addition of τὸν δὲ . . . τῆς ἄρκτου may be accounted for by
assuming that the words (πρὸς δὲ τῷ λιβί τῦν εὐώνυμον), which must
have occurred above, were accidentally transposed, and came to be
read, in a mutilated form, after ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἄρκτον τοὺς πόδας. We
may suppose that a transcriber found a meaningless τὸν εὐώνυμον here,
and tried to make sense by expanding it into τὸν μὲν εὐώνυμον ὑπὸ
tὴν κεφαλὴν τῆς ἄρκτου.

[For the view that the East was to the right and the West to the
left, see Aetius (Diels, Doxogr., p. 339: Τίνα δεξία τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τίνα
ἀριστερά. Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων Αριστοτέλης δεξιά τοῦ κόσμου τὰ ἀνατολικὰ
μέρη, αὖ ἃς ἢ ἄρχη τῆς κυνῆσεως, ἀριστερά δὲ τὰ δυτικά. Cf. Pl. Laws,
760d, and Ar. De Caelo, 285 b 16: δεξιῶν γὰρ ἐκάστου λέγομεν, οὖν
ἡ ἄρχη τῆς κατὰ τόπον κυνῆσεως τοῦ δ’ οὐρανοῦ ἄρχη τῆς περιφορᾶς, οὖν
αἱ ἀνατολὴ τῶν ἀστρων, ὅσπερ τοῦτ' ἃν εἰ ἀρξῆν, οὐ δ’ αἱ δύσεις, ἀριστερῶν.
εἰ οὖν ἄρχεται τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ δεξία περιφέρεται, ἄναγκη τὸ
ἀνω εἶναι τὸν ἀφανῆ πόλον εἰ γὰρ ἑσταῖ αὐτὸς ἀφαιρέω ἐν ἀριστερὰ ἐστώ ἡ
κύνησις, ὅπερ οἱ φανεροὶ. δήλων τούτων δι’ ὅ τι ἀφανὴς πόλος ἐστι τὸ ἀνω.
καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐκεῖ ὁκούντες ἐν τῷ ἀνω ἐστίν ἡμουσίως καὶ πρὸς τοῖς
δεξιοῖς, ἡμεῖς δ’ ἐν τῷ κάτω καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἀριστεροῖς, ἐναντίως ἡ ὡς οἱ Πυθα-
γόρειοι λέγουσιν.

[τὰ δὲ μέσα ἐν τοῖς μέσοις]. As we already know that the woman is
the earth, it is superfluous to tell us that the middle of the woman is
in the middle of the earth. The statement that Egypt 'is situated in the middle of the earth', to which all the rest leads up, comes, where it ought to come, in § 13.

§ 12. τὸ τοὺς μὲν τοπαίως ... εὐκορόφους (<εἰναί>) καὶ καλλιτριχασ. The 'men of the South' must be the negroes. κορυφή means, not the whole head, but the top or crown of the head; and the writer was doubtless thinking of the thick and woolly hair of the Soudanese negroes or 'Fuzzy-wuzzies'. [Cf. the Posidonian passage in Strabo, 2. 3: έχειν γάρ τι ίδιον τάς κύωνας καύτας, αὐχμηράς τε ίδιως καὶ δραμάδεις υπαρχούσας ... ὁρῇ γάρ μὴ εἴηει πλησίον ὅστε τά νεφή προσπίπτοντα διμβροὺς ποιεῖν ... διάπερ οὐλότριχας καὶ οὐλόκερως καὶ προχείλους καὶ πλατφίττας γεννάσατε' τά γάρ ἀκρα αὐτῶν συντρέφεσθαι. The attempt to connect climate and character in these passages is Stoic. See Strabo passim and Addenda in vol iv.]

tοὺς δὲ ἀπιλειτοκούσι πρός μάχην προχείρους [[εἰναί]] καὶ τοξικοῦς (τοξικοῦς FP),—κρείττων γάρ τούτων (αιτία γάρ τούτων MSS.) ἡ δεξία χεῖρ ἐστιν. The Parthians, for instance, were famous for their archery; and both they and the Persians, who succeeded them, and were the dominant race in the East from A.D. 226, must have been known in Egypt, no less than elsewhere, to be formidable fighters. It is possible that the defeat and capture of the Roman emperor Valerian by the Persians in A.D. 260 was a recent event at the time when this passage was written.

It is here implied that it is the greater strength of their right hands that makes the men of the East good bowmen. The bowstring was commonly drawn back with the right hand, while the left, with which the bow was held in position, remained motionless. When the bow was handled in this way, the chief part of the work was done by the right hand.

tοὺς δὲ ἐν τῷ λαβῷ ... ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλειστὸν ἀμπελομάχους. Was this strange notion suggested by some peculiarity in the drill or equipment of the Roman soldiers by whom Alexandria was garrisoned?

[καὶ ἡ δοῦς (καὶ δοῦν MSS.) ἀλλοι τῷ δεξιῷ μέρει ἐνεργοῦσιν, αὐτοὺς τῷ ἐδώνυμῷ 'προστιθεμένους']. This amounts to saying that the men of the West are left-handed in other things as well as in fighting. But the balance of the clauses is improved by omitting these words; and it seems probable that they were added by another hand.

προστιθ. may have come from πρός τις in the following clause, or vice versa. The text is corrupt in both places. It may be worth noting that πρός (τις) occurs again a few lines below.
Perhaps the northern barbarians employed in the Roman armies had a reputation for good marching. There may have been a corps of them stationed in Egypt.

Those who come after' the Northerners 'and a little further on' (sc. as you go from North to South) are, no doubt, those who live in or near the latitude of Italy and Greece. But there are good reasons for bracketing 'to νόν . . . Ἑλλαδικόν. As no nations or countries are mentioned by name in the rest of the paragraph, it is unlikely that Italy and Hellas would be mentioned here. The words have no grammatical construction; and νόν, which is meaningless if spoken by Isis, would have a meaning if we suppose the phrase to have been written by some one who said to himself 'at the time when this dialogue is supposed to have taken place, the names of Italy and Hellas had not come into use'. We may conclude then that 'to νόν . . . Ἑλλαδικόν is a marginal note written to explain (and rightly explaining) what is meant by οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους καὶ μικρῷ πόρρῳ.

If the writer was thinking chiefly of the Greeks, the notion that the people of the region spoken of are καλλιμήροι καὶ εὐπυγότεροι may perhaps have resulted from the Greek practice of stripping for exercise in the gymnasia; for it was only where some such usage existed that these parts of the body would be habitually seen.

The following words ὡστε . . . ὁμολαία were probably added by a nasty-minded reader. A piece of confirmatory evidence is no more needed in this case than in that of the feet and legs of the Northerners.

It is possible, however, that the whole passage οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους . . . ἀρρένων ὁμολαία is a later addition. This passage is connected with the preceding mention of the thighs in § 11 fin. (τοὺς δὲ μηροῖς ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὴν ἄρκτον); but perhaps both might be omitted with advantage. The use of μετὰ to describe the region meant, both there and here, is somewhat awkward; and the mention of an intermediate region, in one direction only, impairs the symmetry of North, South, East, and West.

§ 13. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη (μέλη MSS.) (τῆς γῆς) πρὸς (τινὰ μὲν ἔνεργα δύτα, πρὸς δὲ) τὰ ἄλλα ἄργα. When applied to land, ἔνεργος means 'productive', and ἄργος 'unproductive'.

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These words seem to imply that both Isis and Horus, at the time when the dialogue took place, were human beings, descended from human ancestors,—or from ancestors who were formerly human, though they may have become gods after their deaths. See notes on Exe. XXIII. 1 and (50).

This was the Stoic view. But it was doubtless also the view of native Egyptians who knew nothing of Greek philosophy or science.

The Egyptian writer takes it for granted, as a thing well known and beyond dispute, that his countrymen are more intelligent than men of other races; for him, the only question is, what is the cause of this superiority.

His assumption, absurd as it may seem to us, would have been admitted by many Greeks. Among the Greeks, from the time of Herodotus and Plato, and perhaps still earlier, the wisdom of the Egyptians was held in high esteem. Centuries before this document was written, it had come to be accepted as an undoubted fact that Pythagoras and Plato were pupils of Egyptian teachers; and in the writer's time, many Pagans believed that Greek philosophy was derived from the teaching of the Egyptian Hermes Trismegistus, just as many Jews and Christians believed that it was derived from the teaching of the Hebrew Moses.

Egypt is the heart of the earth. Cf. Plut. Is. et Os. 33: the Egyptians θην Αίγυπτου... καρδία παρεκάζοντο: θερμή γάρ ἐστι καὶ γύρα, καὶ τοὺς νοτίους μέρους τῆς οἰκουμένης, ὀστήρ ἡ καρδία τοὺς εὐνομίους τοῦ ἄθρωπων, μάλιστα ἐγκέκλειται καὶ προσκεκάλυπται. In Plutarch's Egyptian source, οἱ οἰκουμένη (i.e. the orbis terrarum, the inhabited surface

1 Cf. Diod. 1. 96: ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς Ἑλληνίδα θεοδοσία οἱ συνέται καὶ πατειδία παρέβαλον οἰς Αἰγυπτοῖς εἰς τοὺς άρχαίους χρόνους, ἵνα τῶν ἱστορία ψηφίσματα καὶ τῆς πατειδίας μετάχωσιν. οἱ γάρ οἱ Αἰγυπτίων ιστοροῦσιν καὶ τῶν ἀναγραφῶν τῶν εἰς τοὺς ιστορίας βιβλίοις παραβαλεῖν ὡσ τοινυδείς τῶν παλαιὸν Ὀρθρία τι Μουσαῖον καὶ Μελαμποδία καὶ Δαίδαλον, πρὸς δὲ τούτους Ὀμηροὺς τοῦ τοῦ ποιητήν, καὶ Λυκόφρον τοῦ Παρισιάτην, ἱκανόν Λόων τοῦ Ἀθηναίων, καὶ Πλάτωνος τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦ, ἑλκεὶ δὲ καὶ Πυθαγόρας τῶν Σάμων, καὶ τῶν μαθητικῶν Εὐδόκου, ἵκανόν Δημοκρίτου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων, καὶ Ὀλυπεύρην τοῦ Χίουν, πάντων δὲ τούτων σημεία δείκνυσιν τῶν μὲν εἰδών, τῶν δὲ τῶν ἣ κατασκευασίαις ὁμορραγῶσας, ἐκ τῆς θεάτης ἡθελείας πατειδίας αὐθεντεῖς φέρεισθαι, συνιστάνται δὲ Αἴγυπτος μετενεργεύοντα πάντα δὲ διὸ παρά τοῦ Ἑλληνίδα θεαμαῦσθαι. As to Plato and Eudoxus, see Strabo 17. 39, p. 806. Compare also Abammonis resp. 1. 1 b (Testim.).
of the earth) was doubtless likened to a man or woman lying face upward, as in Exe. XXIV; but it must have been assumed that the head lay to the East, and not, as in Exe. XXIV, to the South. See also Horapollo 1. 22. Reitzenstein (Porth. p. 140) quotes Hephaestion, "Apostolosmarta, p. 23 Eng. : Χρυσοῖς ως κύριον δυνα τοῦ στήθους τοῦ κόσμου (i. e. lord of Egypt?).

§§ 14, 15. άλλως τε, ο μὲν νότος ἐπείδησεν. This is a second answer to the question asked by Horus in § 11 init. The two answers have this much in common, that in both of them the conception of a spherical earth is ignored or tacitly rejected, and Egypt is placed in the middle of the earth's surface. But in all else, there is little connexion between them; and either of the two might very well stand alone. Whether both were written by the same person or not, we have no means of knowing.

§ 14. διὰ τὴν οὖσιν αὐτῶν γενομένων ἐκείσε ἀνακομμαθην (ἐκεί κατακομμαθην MSS.) ἐκείθεν μείν λέγοισιν καὶ τῶν ἕμετερων ποταμῶν, λυμάσης ἐκεί τῆς πάχνης (al. τέχνης)1. The flow of the Nile is adduced as evidence in support of the view that the South is a cloudy region. The argument is this: since the Nile flows from the South, there must be a heavy rainfall in the South; and where there is a heavy rainfall, there must be much cloud. The writer's theory appears to be that clouds formed in the more northerly regions are (by some force the nature of which was probably explained in the lost passage which preceded this sentence) driven to the South, and massed together there; that they there discharge themselves in rain; and that this rain supplies the water which flows down the Nile. He seems to have had some knowledge of the tropical rains of central Africa. Cf. Ammianus Marcell. 22. 15. §: 'Adfirmant aliqui physicorum in subiectis septentrioni spatis, cum hiemes frigidae cuncta constringunt, magnitudinem nivium congelascere, easque postea vi flagrantis sideris resolutas, fluxis umoribus nubes efficer e gravidas, quae in meridianam plagam etesii flantibus pulsae, expressaeque tepore nimio incrementa ubertim suggerere Nilo creduntur. Ex Aethiopicis imbribus, qui abundantes in tractibus illis per aestus torridos cadere memorantur, exundationes eius erigitanni temporibus adserunt aliipraestitutis.'

αὐτῶν means τῶν νεφῶν; and οὖσις γενομένων refers back to ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος σωσταμένων, or to some fuller explanation of the process by which the clouds which travel to the South have been produced.

1 In Exe. XXIV. 14, it may very likely have been said, in the lacuna after σωσταμένων νεφῶν, that the clouds are driven to the South by the Etesian winds.
katakomĩdhn cannot be right. katakomĩzein means (1) to bring down to the coast from inland, (2) to bring in to shore from the high sea, (3) to bring to one's own place from elsewhere. But none of those three meanings is here possible. The writer appears to be speaking of the conveyance of clouds from North to South, which, in Egypt, would be conveyance from the coast to the inland parts, and from the mouth of the Nile towards its source; and that could not be called katakomĩdhn. The word which means 'to convey up stream' or 'up country' is ánakomĩzein. It therefore seems best to write τὴν ... αυτῶν ... ἐκεῖσε ἀνακομῳδῆν, 'the conveyance of the clouds up country to the South'. There is some awkwardness in the combination ἐκεῖξε ... ἐκεῖθεν ... ἐκεῖ; possibly the first ἐκεῖ (or ἐκεῖσε) may have been substituted for some phrase meaning 'to the South'.

[If πάρχη is interpreted as 'snow and ice' on the mountains, the argument is that the precipitation upon the high Ethiopian hills, which causes the Nile floods, gives evidence of the cloudiness of the south. The reading πάρχη is explicable as a corruption of πάρχης, and πάρχη may easily have acquired the same range of meaning as pruina; cf. Virgil Georg. 3. 368: 'stant circumfus apruinis | corpora magna bomum'. On the connexion of the Etesian winds with the rise of the Nile see Gisinger, Die Erdbeschreibung des Eudoxus von Knidos, p. 38 ff. For λυμαῖνης cf. Procl. In Tim. 1. 119 Diehl: Πορφύριος μὲν δὴ φησιν, ὅτι δέξα ἣν παλαιὰ Αἰγυπτίων τὸ ὄξορ κάταθεν ἀναβλυσθαίνειν ἐν τῇ ἀναβάσει τοῦ Νείλου, . . . οὐχ ὅτι ἤ χιὼν λυμαῖνῃ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὑδάτων ποιεῖ. See also Strabo, 2. 2–3, and Addenda in vol. iv. for Posidonius.]

τὸν ὑποκείμενον ἧχλουσαν ἄφρα, καὶ τρόπον τινὰ καπνοῦ κατέπλησε (κατεκόμισε MSS.). καπνὸς usually means smoke, not mist; and clouds do not fill the air with smoke. But τρόπον τινὰ is a hint that καπνὸς is not to be taken literally. Polybius 9. 16. 3 speaks of καπνώδης καὶ συννεφής ἄφρα.

The false reading katekomise must have some connexion with the false reading katakomĩdhn above. Possibly ánakomĩdhn caused katekomise to be altered into katekomĩse, and katekomĩse caused ánakomĩdhn to be altered into katakomĩdhn.

ἀνελὼν οὐ μόνον ὄμματων (ἀνομάτων MSS.) ἐστὶν ἐμφόδιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦ. The notion is similar to that in § 10, where we were told that the embodied soul is wrapped in layers of air, and that when this internal air is thick and turbid, like the external air in stormy weather, the soul cannot see clearly. In both passages, the writer
speaks as if the sight of 'the eyes of the mind', no less than the sight of the bodily eyes, could be obstructed by material things.

If we read συνεχῇ, we must take it to mean 'contiguous', or 'in close proximity'. συνεχῆς sometimes has that meaning; but as the word occurs in a different sense a few lines below, where it means 'continual', it seems better to write σύνεγγυς here.

These words imply that the surface of the earth is flat, and has a definite edge; and that the sun is close to that edge on the eastern side when it is rising, and on the western side when it is setting. A similar notion occurs in Hdt. 3. 104, where we are told that in India, 'which is the farthest region of the inhabited world towards the East', it is very hot in the morning, and very cold at sunset. But science had advanced since the age of Herodotus; and a man who speaks in this way in Egypt under Roman rule shows ignorance of things which were known to all educated Greeks of his time.

§ 15. τὸ δὲ μέσον τοῦτων, [ἐλικρυνεὶς δὲ καὶ] ἀτάραχον (δὲν). τὸ μέσον τοῦτων is the land of Egypt. Air may be called ἐλικρυνὴ literally, and intelligence may be called ἐλικρυνὴ metaphorically; but a country cannot very well be called ἐλικρυνὴ in any sense. It is therefore most likely that ἐλικρυνὴς has come from ἐλικρυνὴ τὴν σύνεσιν (ἐλικρυνὴ ἐπίστασιν MSS.) above, and has been inserted here by error.

καὶ (ἀδύν καθ') ἑαυτὸ προέχει (καὶ ἑαυτῷ προέλεγε MSS.), καὶ τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ (γεννώμενοι) [πάσι]. It would be going too far to say that Egypt προέχει τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ πάσι, i.e. that all things in Egypt are superior to the corresponding things in other lands. The only thing that the writer is here concerned with is the fact that the men born in Egypt (οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ γεννώμενοι) are superior to the men of other lands, and superior in one particular respect, viz. in intelligence.

τῇ γὰρ συνεχείς ἐνημερία (ἀμεριμνᾷ MSS.) (συνετείχες) γενη. ἐνημερία, 'fine weather', gives the sense required. In Egypt, rain is rare, and the sky is almost always clear. According to the writer's view, Egypt is exempt from the cloudiness of the South, from the extremes of alternate heat and cold to which the eastern and western regions are daily subjected by the rising and setting of the sun, and from the permanent cold of the North; the weather in Egypt is therefore always mild and serene; and it is the perpetual serenity of the climate that makes Egyptians more intelligent than other men.
EXCERPT XXIV:  

καὶ (ἁλλοφιλοὺς δὲ) κοσμεῖ καὶ παιδεύει. From this point to the end of the section there is much corruption; but it is clear that in what follows the writer is speaking of what Egypt does for foreigners, and it seems most likely that κοσμεῖ καὶ παιδεύει (as opposed to γεννᾷ) has to do with that topic.

καὶ (γὰρ) μόνον δοσὶς ἐρίζει, τοσοῦτοι καὶ νικᾷ, καὶ νικήσαν, ὥσπερ σατράπην ἀγαθὸν τοὺς νεικημένους ἐπιστήμην τὴν ἱδίαν ἐπιδίδωσι. — (καὶ μόνον τοῖς τοσοῦτοι ἐρίζει καὶ νικᾷ καὶ ἐπιστάμενον τὴν ἱδίαν νίκην ὥσπερ σατράπης ἀγαθὸς τοὺς νεικημένους καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι MSS.) My reconstruction of the passage gives what the writer probably meant, though it may be doubted in what words he said it. There is a play on the two meanings of νικᾶν, 'to defeat in a competition' and 'to conquer in war'. Egypt defeats all her competitors, i.e. surpasses all other countries, in intelligence; but having won the prize in the competition, she treats her defeated rivals as a wise king treats a country which he has conquered. As such a king benefits his conquered enemies by appointing a good satrap to govern them, so Egypt benefits men of other lands by imparting to them, for the guidance of their lives, the knowledge which she has acquired. That is to say, Egypt has taught the Greeks philosophy, and in so doing, has been the educator of the human race.

The MSS. give σατράπης ἀγαθὸς; but there can be little doubt that we ought to read σατράπην ἀγαθῶν. The conqueror must be a king; a satrap is not a man who makes conquests for himself, but a man who is appointed by his king to rule over a conquered country. In the simile implied, the victorious king corresponds to Egypt, and the satrap, to the wisdom which Egypt teaches to foreign nations.

The occurrence of the word σατράπης in this passage has been used as an argument to prove that Exc. XXIV and Exc. XXIII were written at a time when Egypt was under Persian dominion, i.e. before 332 B.C., and even that they were written before 405 B.C.¹

¹ Flinders Petrie, Personal religion in Egypt before Christianity, 1909, p. 40:
'It would seem impossible for the allusion to the government of a satrap to be preferred by an Egyptian, except under the Persian dominion. And such a reference to wise government could not occur in the very troubled years of plunder and confusion, 342 to 332 B.C. We must go back to the days of wise and righteous rule of Persia, 524-405 B.C., to reach a possible comparison with a wise satrap.' Dr. Petrie thinks that the Kore Kosmu (of which he takes Exc. XXIV to be a part) was most likely written about 510 B.C.; 'but in any case', he says, 'we must, by this allusion to a satrap, date it to within a century after that.' The date 510 B.C., which he considers to be the most probable, is, at the very least, certainly as much as 460 years too early, and is probably 660 years (if not more) too early.
It may therefore be worth while to mention some of the many instances of the use of the word *satrap* in much later periods. To the references given by Liddell and Scott for *σατράπης* and *σατραπικός* in Plutarch, Pausanias, Lucian, and Alciphro, may be added Philo *De decalogo* 13. 61, Cohn vol. iv, p. 282; Aelius Aristides (Keil) II, p. 343 and p. 99; Celsus, in Orig. *Cels.* 8. 35; Philostratus *Vita Apollon.* 1. 27; and the Gnostic Justinus *ap. Hippol.* *Ref. haer.* 5. 26. In the reign of Diocletian, the governors of certain districts subject to the Roman emperor were entitled satraps. ¹

§ 17. Τῶν ζώων (*ζώων* MSS.) τὰ μὲν φέκειται πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, τὰ δὲ . . . τὰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ δλα. Ας ζώων has just been used with reference to men, ζώων is better here.

The point of the passage is that this or that animal has a preference for one or more of the four elements, and is averse to the others. It would be nonsense to speak of a preference for all four elements. If there were any animal that was equally at home in all the four, there would be no reason to mention it; and there could not be an animal that was alien or averse to all four elements, i.e. to the material world as a whole. Both τὰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ δλα here and τὰ δὲ τῶν ζώων below must therefore be struck out.

§ 18. [οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ τινα τῶν (ἄλλων) ζώων φελεῖ τὸ πῦρ, οἶον οἱ σαλαμάνδραι, κ.τ.λ.] The original writer mentioned, as an instance of animals which love fire, the high-flying birds. His meaning was that eagles and other such birds show love of fire by flying so high that they get near the sun, or the fiery sphere of heaven. The words οὐ μὴν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. are a note added by some one who thought the salamander ought to be mentioned as another instance. According to Aristotle and Aelian, the salamander is a fire-extinguisher; and according to Aelian, it does not love fire, but hates it. *Ar. Hist.* an. 552 b 15: ὅτι δὲ ἐνδέχεται μὴ κάσθαι συντάσσεις τινὰς ζώων, ἡ σαλαμάνδρα ποιεῖ φανερὸν αὐτή γὰρ, ὡς φασί, διὰ πυρὸς βαδίζουσα κατασβίννυτι τὸ πῦρ. *Aelian De animal.* 2. 31: ἡ σαλαμάνδρα τὸ ζώον οὐκ ἔστι μὲν τῶν πυρὸς ἐκγέννων, . . . θαρρεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ, καὶ χωρεῖ τῇ φλογὶ ὀμόσε, καὶ ὡς αὐτόπαλον τινα στεύει καταγωγόσαθαι.

§ 19. (. . .) ἔκαστον γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων περιβολή ἐστὶ τῶν σωμάτων. ¹

The argument has been obscured by the loss of a passage at this point. What have the likings and dislikes of animals for this or that element to do with the state of the embodied human soul? The connexion of thought was probably as follows. As some of the elements are alien to a fish, and some to a bird, so all the four material elements are alien to the human soul, the true home of which is in an immaterial world; and when the soul is incarnated in a body composed of earth, water, air, and fire, it is, so to speak, 'out of its element', and is like a fish out of water. Consequently, an incarnated soul is never at its ease, and cannot think clearly.

If that is what the writer meant, it seems to be implied in this paragraph that the soul is ἀσώματος in the strict sense, and not merely, as in § 10, that it does not consist of the grosser material elements. Supposing that it were made of fire, for instance, a body of fire would suit it perfectly, and even in a body composed of all the four elements it would find something at least that was congenial to it. Possibly, however, the writer of this passage may have held that the soul is composed of the Aristotelian 'fifth substance', and that its true home is heaven, which consists of that substance.

καὶ γὰρ εἰκός ἐστι καὶ ταῦτην τις μὲν τοῦτων τέρπεσθαι, τις δὲ ἑκχεισθαι.] This must have been added by some one who failed to understand the passage. If the soul is weighed down and crushed by (all) the four elements', as we were told in the preceding sentence, it cannot 'find pleasure in some of them'.

ἐὰν μὲντοι [καὶ] τοῦτο (ταῦτα MSS.) σαλὸν λάβῃ καὶ ταραχὴν ἑτοι ἀπὸ νόσου ἢ ἰδέαν, τότε καὶ αὐτὴ δοκεῖ ἐν χυθῷ (πενών) ἀνθρώπου ἐνεκυμαινεται. Incarnation even in a healthy body hinders the soul from thinking clearly; but when the body itself is thrown into confusion by disease, then the soul is as helpless as a man who has fallen overboard in a storm, and it cannot think at all. Bodily disease is likened to a storm at sea; and the sick person's soul is compared to a man who has fallen into the sea, and is tossed about by the waves.

It is only in this last sentence of the answer that the question asked by Horus in § 17 is directly dealt with; down to this point, Isis has been speaking of incarnated souls in general, and not of the state of things ἐν ταῖς μακραῖς νόσοις. Perhaps we are meant to understand that incarnation even in a healthy body is a sort of disease for the soul; but the connexion is not explained, and it may
be suspected that some words which would have made it clearer have been lost before ἵνα μέντοι καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.

Fear is a state of the soul, and not of the body; φόβου must therefore be a wrong reading. One might write in place of it some such word as μέθης; but perhaps ἀλλον τινὸς is better.

Wachsmuth follows Meineke in altering ὀπτερὶ ἐν βυθῷ ἀνθρώπος into ὀπτερεὶ βυθῷ ἀνθέρκος. Meineke compares Callimachus H. in Del. 193: παλαραγη ἐπινήχται ἀνθέρκος ὡς. That passage may serve to show that 'to float with the current like an ἀνθέρκος' (as we might say 'like a straw') was a phrase in use; but ἀνθέρκος suits the context in Exc. XXIV no better than ἀνθρώπος; and if we insert πεσῶν after ἐν βυθῷ, we get a quite satisfactory sense.

EXCERPT XXV

§ I. διηγήσω ... ὅπερ τῆς θεωματίης ψυχοποιίας τοῦ θεοῦ. The making of souls by God is described in Exc. XXIII. 14-16, and is the central incident in the story told in that document. It is therefore probable that these words refer to Exc. XXIII. If so, Exc. XXV was written as a sequel to Exc. XXIII. But it does not necessarily follow that it was written by the same person.

οὖν δὲ μοι ἀπήγγειλας ποῦ τῶν σωμάτων ἀπολυθείσαι χωροῦσιν αἱ ψυχαί. ποῦ here means 'whither'. The word is often thus used in late writers; there is therefore no need to alter it into ποῦ.

In Exc. XXIII. 39, Horus was told that embodied souls, if they behave well during their life on earth, will, when they quit the body, be permitted to return to their home above, but that if they behave ill, they will be reincarnated on earth in the bodies of beasts. That is an answer to the question which is here asked; but it is a short and summary answer only, and the writer of Exc. XXV, supposing that he had Exc. XXIII in his hands, may have either overlooked it, or considered it inadequate.

τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης μόνης γενόμενος. The doctrine spoken of is a μυστήριον, i.e. a holy truth which must be kept secret from all except the few who are worthy to receive it, or which at any rate has been kept secret hitherto.

ἀδενατε μὴτρ. Here we are plainly told that Isis was a goddess at the time when the dialogue took place. (Cf. τῆς ἀδενάτου φύσεως
As far as this passage is concerned, we are free to suppose either that she had been a goddess from the first, or that she had been a mortal woman, and had become a goddess after her death. But on the other hand, the words δὲ απὸ σελήνης ἐστὶ ἡμᾶς in § 9 seem to imply that both Isis and Horus are human beings living on earth. Perhaps the two passages might be reconciled by assuming that in this dialogue Isis is a goddess, but a goddess incarnate in a human body. See notes on Exc. XXIII. 1 and (50).

In the MSS., this passage stands in § 4, where it is interposed in the middle of an argument on the question whether the soul is dispersed when it quits the body. It is manifestly out of place there. As it contains a promise to give a detailed explanation of things (διεξελεύσομαι σοι τῶν ὄντων τὸ καθ' ἓκαστον), and gives the hearer reasons for accepting as unquestionably true what Isis is about to say concerning them, it must have been intended to stand at the beginning of one of her discourses; and if it occurred anywhere in Exc. XXV as originally written, it must have stood at the place where I have put it.

μύστης, if not deleted, should be corrected into μύστις. Isis might call herself μύστις τῆς θείας γνώσεως or something of the sort (cf. τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης μύστης above), but hardly μύστης τῆς ἀθανάτου φύσεως; and it is most likely that μύστης has been repeated here by error. The meaning probably was ‘I am one of the Immortals’; and that may be expressed by writing ἐγὼ δὲ, τῆς ἀθανάτου φύσεως καθή μετέχομαι. There must be some mistake in δῶσερ; we might either strike it out, or alter it into ὅς, or transpose it and put it before ἀδεικνύω.

ἀδεικνύω διὰ τοῦ πεδίου τῆς ἀληθείας. This phrase has come directly or indirectly from Pl. Phaedrus 248 b, τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδέαν πεδίον. In Ps.-Pl. Axiocbus 371 c, the place in which Minos and Rhadamanthus sit as judges of the dead is called πεδίον ἀληθείας. Cf. Plut. De defectu orac. 22, 422 b (in an account of a curious cosmologic system attributed to a hermit who lived on the shore of the Red Sea): τὸ δὲ ἐντὸς ἐπίπεδον τοῦ τριγώνου κοινῆς ἐστίν εἷνα πάντων, καὶ πεδίον ἀληθείας, ἐν ὃ τῶν λόγων καὶ τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων ἀκύρωτα κύωσιν, καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ τοῦ ἀιῶνος ὄντος οἷον ἄπορρηθή ἐτι τοῦ
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κόσμους φάρεσθαι τὸν χρόνον. (If the hermit said this, he must have read Plato.)

τὸ συνεστὸς καὶ μὴ ἀφανίζόμενον χῶρον ἔχει. These meaningless words appear to be the remains of an axiom or fundamental proposition which Isis stated at the beginning of her discourse, in order to prepare the way for her teaching about the soul. Its meaning may perhaps be inferred from the words σῶμα . . . ἐκ πολλῶν συγκεκριμένων and τὸ . . . ἔξ ἐνὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πολλῶν in § 4 (as emended), where this general statement seems to be applied to the case of body (which is ἐκ πολλῶν συνεστός) on the one hand, and soul (which is not ἐκ πολλῶν συνεστός) on the other hand. Cf. Pl. Phaedo 78 c: τῷ μὲν συνεστόν τε καὶ συνετέμενον νοτί φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαρθέσθαι ταῦτα ἂν συνεστήθη εἰ δὲ τι τυχάνει δι᾽ ἄξωνθεν, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μῆ πάσχειν ταῦτα. The author may have written something like τὸ μὲν συνεστός καὶ διαλυσται, τὸ δὲ μὴ συνεστός, ἀφανίζόμενον, χῶρον ἔχει εἰς ἓν αὐτέρχεται (οὐ ἄπερχεται). The soul is 'visible' to us (in its effects, though not in itself,) as long as it animates a body; when the man dies, it disappears from our view, but, not being composite, it does not perish, but departs to some other place. For ἀφανίζόμενον in this connexion, cf. Corp. XI. ii. 15 b: τὸ μὲν σῶμα διαλυσθαί, τὴν δὲ ζωὴν εἰς τὸ ἀφανῆς χωρεῖν.

§ 3. ἄλλῳ ὅπερ γὰρ ἐρεῖ τις, ὡς δὴς [λόγος ἐμὸς] κ.τ.λ. The words ὅπερ ἐρεῖ λόγος ἐμὸς could only be translated 'my discourse will speak thus'; but that would be superfluous and pointless. Besides, 'my discourse' would be ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος rather than λόγος ἐμὸς. It seems probable that ἐμὸς is a corruption of some numeral adjective, e. g. τρίτος, πέμπτος, ἕκτος; that Δόγος (πέμπτος ?),—the (fifth ?) discourse of Isis,—together with the following words Ποῦ . . . αἱ ψυχαί, was intended to stand as a superscription at the head of the paragraph; and that this superscription, having been written in the margin, was by mistake inserted into the text after the first words of the paragraph (ἄλλῳ ὅπερ γὰρ ἐρεῖ) instead of before them.

[ὁδ γὰρ, διὰ θουμαστῇ καὶ μεγάλου πατρὸς οὐσίας μέγα τεκνῶν.] The passage to which these words are prefixed in the MSS. is a statement of a view which Isis rejects; but as her rejection of it is sufficiently expressed by the words ἄλλῳ ὅπερ ἔχει οὕτως in § 4 iniit., there is no necessity for an ὃ at the beginning. And the statement of the view rejected (εἰς ἀβρα ἀναχύνονται . . . εἰτα οὐκέτι δύνασθαι

1 Possibly c'os, an abbreviation for πέμπτος.
... παλινδρομήσατα... καθάπερ οὖθε... ὦδωρ... ἐστὶ δυνατόν, κ.τ.λ.) is too long and complicated to have been introduced merely by ὦ γὰρ ('it is not true that...'); it must have been preceded by something like ἐρεῖ τις ὥς. Besides, if we assume that the whole depends on ἐρεῖ or some such verb, the infinitive δύνασθαι can be retained; otherwise, it would be necessary to alter it into δύνασθαι. And as we find ἀλλ' ὦδω γὰρ ἐρεῖ standing in the text, it is most likely that these are the words by which the statement of the view against which Isis contends was introduced, and that all that separates them from τῶν σωμάτων προσληψίας κ.τ.λ. ought therefore to be cut out.

Moreover, the words ἦ... μέγα τέκνον, in which the parentage of Horus is spoken of more fully than elsewhere, would seem more appropriate at the beginning of the dialogue than in the middle of an argument. It is possible that these words originally stood in § 2, where we may suppose the author to have written somewhat as follows: Πρῶτες, πατι... ἐν (μεν) γὰρ, ὦ [θαυμαστε καὶ] μεγάλου πατρὸς Οσίρεως μέγα τέκνον, ἦ... ἐν (τίς ἀδιανάτου φύσεως καθῇ μετέχουσα, ἦ... διεξευκονομεῖ σοι κ.τ.λ.].

[[ἀκρίτως]] καὶ ὁμολογήσω τῶν σωμάτων προσληψίας εἰς ἄναχεν-νοταί [τε] [[ἀκρίτως]] κ.τ.λ. The adverb ἀκρίτως, 'indistinguishably', or 'so as not to be distinguishable (from the air)', must have been intended to qualify ἀναχένοντα, and not προσληψία; it is therefore necessary to transpose it.

ὁμηροδ is unintelligible. As far as I know, the word does not occur elsewhere. In Liddell and Scott it is translated 'impetuously'; but that meaning would not suit the context.

We are here plunged in medias res; and it is to be presumed that a passage, now lost, intervened between the general statement τὸ συνεστός... χῶρον ἐκεῖ', with which Isis began, and the section in which she speaks of a view that she holds to be erroneous. The subject αἰ ψυχαί, which must be understood in this sentence, was doubtless expressed in the lost passage which preceded.

The view here stated and rejected is mentioned in Pl. Phaedo 70 A: τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀποίπαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ... εἰδινὴ ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα ἀπὸ πνεῦμα ἣ καπνὸς διακειδαθεῖσα ὀξύτα ἐπιτομή. It was taught by Epicurus; Sext. Emp. Math. 9. 72: καὶ καθ' αὐτῶ δὲ διαμένωσι (sc. αἰ ψυχαί), καὶ σὺ, ὦς ἔλεγαν ὃ Ἐπίκουρος, ἀπολυθώσατα τῶν σωμάτων καπνοῦ δίκην σκιάνωσι. Iamblichus ap. Stob. i. 49. 43, vol. i,
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p. 384 W.: ei δέ . . . ένευτόν ἡ ψυχή τῷ σώματι καθαπερὶ ἀσκῷ πνεύμα, . . . δηλόν τοῦ . . . ότι έξειόν μὲν ἄπο τοῦ σώματος, εἴ δὲ τῷ ἐκβαινάν
dιαφορεῖται καὶ διασκεδάζεται, ὡσπερ Δημόκριτος καὶ Ἐπίκουρος
ἀποφαίνεται. Lucr. 3. 434 ff.: 'quoniam quassatis undique vasis|
diffluere umorem et laticem discedere cernis, et nebulas ac fumus
quoniam discedit in auras, | crede animam quoque diffundi
mulitoque perire | ocius . . ., | cum semel ex hominis membris ablata
recessit.' Ibd. 455: 'ergo dissolui quoque convenit omnem animai |
naturam, ceu fumus, in altas aeris auras.' Cf. Plut. De sero
minis vindicta 17, 560 c: τάς ψυχὰς τῶν τελευτῶν ἀπολλυμένας
ἐπιστάμενος εὐθύς, ὡσπερ ὀμίχλας ἡ κατανοῦ ἀποπνεούσας τῶν
σωμάτων.

eίσα οὖκετί δύνασθαι . . . παλινδρομήσαι, [[[ álllā]]] oūδὲ (μηδὲ MSS.)
eἰς ἐκείνον ἐπὶ τῶν χώρων [ἐναι], δὲν ἠλθὼν τὸ πρότερον, ἀναστρέψειν.
The variant οὔατε, given by P² marg. in place of eίσα, is adopted
by Wachsmuth. But after οὔατε, it would be necessary to write
μηκέτι δύνασθαι in place of οὐκετί δύνασθαι. On the other hand, if
we follow the authority of the MSS. in reading eίσα oὐκετί δύνασθαι,
we must alter μηδὲ into oūδὲ.

[ἐναι] may have arisen out of ἐναι or ἀνείναι, written as an alterna-
tive for ἀναστρέψειν.

καθάπερ oūδὲ τὸ λαμβανόμενον ἐκ τῶν κάτω ἄγγειῶν ὁδῷ· εἰς τοὺς
αὐτοὺς τόπους δέν ήλθῇ ἑπέχειν ἕστι δυνάτων, [ἀλλ' oūδὲ' [αὐτό
παραντικά λαμβανόμενον καὶ χέδομεν τὴν ἱδίαν λαμβάνει χώραν]],
πλὴν ἀναμίγνυται τῷ παντὶ τοῦ ὅδατος χώματι. The water corresponds
to the soul, and the ἄγγειον to the body. (Cf. 'quassatis undique
vasis diffluere umorem . . . cernis', in Lucr. 3. 434 ff., quoted above.)
We have just been told that the soul, when it quits the body, is
dispersed, and that consequently (1) it cannot afterwards enter
another body, and (2) it cannot return to the place from which it
came when it entered the body. (Since the two clauses eίσα . . . (l. 9)
and [[[[ álllā]]] oūδὲ (l. 10) do not correspond to καθάπερ oūδὲ . . . ἀλλ'
oūδὲ here, and since the latter pair appear to repeat one another, the
editor suggests that they are doublings and that καθάπερ . . . δυνάτων
represents what the Hermetist wrote. On this assumption he would
emend the text in some such way as this: καθάπερ oūδὲ τὸ λαμβανό-
μενον) ἐκ τῶν κάτω) ἄγγειον ὁδῷ εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τόπους
δέν ήλθῇ ἑπέχειν ἕστι δυνάτων,

[ [ἀλλ'] oūδὲ [αὐτὸ [[[παραντικά]]] λαμβανόμενον καὶ]] (ἐκ)χέδομεν
(ὁδῷ) τὴν ἱδίαν (ἄνα) λαμβάνει χώραν,

πλὴν ([[παραντικά]]) ἀναμίγνυται τῷ παντὶ τοῦ ὅδατος χώματι.
An alternative interpretation may be offered. Both clauses do refer to the second clause above. The question is whether a soul can return to the place whence it came, and it is replied that it cannot, because it will be dispersed in air. This analogy substitutes for the soul and the air a bucket, say, of water drawn from a body of water and then poured back, only to be lost in the whole mass. τὰ κάτω ἀγγεία answers to τὸ ἀπειρον πνεῦμα, and may perhaps be rendered ‘the reservoirs below’, that is, the masses of water on earth as compared to the air above. ἐπέχειν should be emended to ἐπίχειν. The second clause simply strengthens the figure: no, no matter how instantaneously it is drawn out and poured back, it itself does not occupy its own place, &c.]

§ 4. ἐκ πολλῶν συγκεκριμένων (συγκριμάτων MSS.) παρατεθλημένων (-μένων MSS.) εἰς χύσιν. Water was commonly said to be an element, and not a compound. But water as known to us, the liquid with which we fill our pitchers, is not the pure element, but a mixture, in which the element water predominates, but in which portions of the other elements, or of things made of them, are also present. See Exc. II A. 2, where the pure element water is called ὑδωρ αὐτοῦ ὅπωρ.

Our water contains portions of solid substances (e.g. of earth washed away from a river's banks); but they are broken up into minute particles, and thereby made fluid (παρατεθλημένα εἰς χύσιν).

ἡ δὲ ψυχή . . . ἔργον τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ χειρῶν τε καὶ νοῦ. The writer was probably thinking of the making of souls in Exc. XXIII.

τὸ τοίνυν ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ όλου ἐκ πολλῶν (οὖκ ἐξ ἄλλου MSS.). According to Exc. XXIII, the soul is composed ἐκ πολλῶν; for it is there said that the souls were made of a mixture of πῦρ, πνεῦμα, and certain ‘unknown’ materials. But the writer of Exc. XXV may have regarded that passage as mythical, and declined to accept it literally.

Cf. Exc. II A. 11: τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς ἔστι (τοῦ) [καὶ] ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνον τὴν σύστασιν ἔχου, . . . δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἐκ πολλῶν συνάστηκε.

‘αὐτῷ θ’ ἑαυτῷ’ εἰς νοῶν δηηγοῦμενον. This seems to be a passing mention of the end towards which the soul’s course ought to be directed. A human soul embodied upon earth is not ἐννοοῦ from the first, but is capable of becoming ἐννοοῦ, or even of becoming νοῦς and nothing else, if rightly guided. (Cf. Corp. X. 19a: ψυχῇ δὲ ἄνθρωπην, οὐ πάσα μὲν, ἡ δὲ εὐσεβής, . . . ὅλη νοῦς γίνεται.)
Sense might be made by writing αὐθός τε ἐν ἀυτῷ (i.e. ὧπο τοῦ θεοῦ) εἰς νοῦν ὁδηγομένων. The soul owes its origin to God's νοῦς, and, if it follows God's guidance, finds its way back to νοῦς.

Such a thought as this, however, is hardly in keeping with the rest of the piece; we should rather have expected to be told that souls find their way back to this or that stratum of the atmosphere. It may therefore be suspected that these words have been added by another hand.

ἀδεν δεῖ (ἡ MSS.) καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα αὐτῆς σύνδον [ἀρμονίαν θεοῦ] ὑπὸ ἀνάκης γεγομένην εἶναι (perhaps γεγομέναι). Since the soul has no natural affinity to the body, force or compulsion must have been employed to join them together. The reluctance of the unembodied soul to submit to this compulsion is described in Exe. XXIII. 33 seqq. ἀρμονίαν θεοῦ (a coadjustment—sc. of soul and body—effected by God ?) may perhaps be a remnant of a marginal note on this sentence.

§ 5. ἐπὶ δὲ οὕτω εἰς ἐνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον (πάσας) χοιδαίς, οὕτε εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἐτυχευ [[Διλλά]] ἐκάστη, ⟨Διλλά⟩ ἐπὶ τὴν ιδίαν ἀναπέμπεται χώραν. The two things to be proved are (1) that the souls, when they quit the body, do not all go to the same place, and (2) that the particular place to which this or that soul goes is determined by fixed laws, and not by mere chance. (ἐπὶ τὴν ιδίαν, 'to the place which properly belongs to it', or 'to which it properly belongs', stands in contrast to εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἐτυχευ.) Both these things are proved by the similitude which follows in § 6.

φανερῶν καὶ ἔξ ἔτε ἐν τῷ σώματι οὕτω [καὶ τῷ πλάσματι] πάσας (καὶ) [γάρ] παρὰ τὴν ιδίαν φῶς ἐπανχυμάτη (χυμένη Φ). πλάσματι is an alternative for σώματι.—γάρ may have arisen out of παρὰ by duplication; or it may have been shifted to this place from the following sentence, where a γάρ is wanted.

[πεπαχυμάτη is a reminiscence of Pl. Phaedo 61 D. Cf. Proclus In Remp. i. 119. 10 Kroll: καὶ τὰ περιβλήματα τὰ αὖγοειδή καθάρα φέρειν ἀνάγκη, καὶ μὴ ἐπιθολογοῦμεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνύλων ἀτμών μηδὲ παχυνόμενα ὑπὸ τῆς γηῆς φίςεως.] The souls of the men and beasts spoken of in §§ 6–8 are in this condition.

§ 6. πρὸς(ο)χές . . . τῷ λεγομένῳ ὁμοἴωματι. Does τῷ λεγομένῳ mean 'which I am about to tell', or 'which is commonly told'? Neither is quite satisfactory; and perhaps it would be better to strike out λεγομένῳ, and write τῷ ὁμοἴωματι.

ἀδεν ὑπὸ και πειρατεράς κ.τ.λ. This list of animals is much longer
than the argument requires; and it is probable that it has been lengthened by transcribers.

If we shift δφεις in § 6 to the place that corresponds to that in which it stands in § 7, there is a definite plan of arrangement. After men, who are regarded as a class apart, come first animals that fly in air (τὰ πτηνά, including flies as well as birds); then, quadrupeds, which walk upon the earth, and snakes, which crawl on it and live in holes below its surface; and lastly, animals that live partly on land and partly in water. The animals are classified according to their relations to the several elements, and the writer names in succession specimens of each of the chief classes, with the exception of the fishes. He could not include fishes in his list, because they would die in any place in which men, birds, flies, quadrupeds, and snakes could live, and for that reason one could not assume them to be shut up along with the rest; he therefore mentioned in place of them amphibious animals, i.e. beasts which live partly in water, though not wholly.

[Was the notion of the συνεχετήριον suggested by the περιστερεών in Pl. Theat. 197 c?] 
καὶ κύκνων καὶ ἰέρακας καὶ χελιδόνας καὶ στρουθοῦς. The similitude would serve the writer's purpose better if these words, and the corresponding clauses in § 7 (οἱ δὲ ἰέρακες . . . αὐτοῖς δὲνεὶν), were omitted. In that case, we should have three specimens only of πτηνά, viz. (1) eagles, which, when released, fly up into the upper air, (2) doves, which fly up into the lower air, and (3) flies which keep near the ground. That would be an exact parallel to the behaviour of the souls, which, when released from the body, betake themselves to different strata of the atmosphere. It may therefore be suspected that the swans, hawks, swallows, and sparrows have been added by another hand. In § 7 (eagles ἐσ τὸν αἰθέρα, doves ἐσ τὸν πνεύμον ἀέρα, hawks ὑπεράνω τούτων), the mention of the hawks involves a departure from the natural order in respect of the atmospheric strata. The swans, which come first of the four in § 6, come last of the four in § 7; and the description of the place to which the swans go (ὅπου ἔζεστιν αὐτοῖς δὲνεῖν, § 7) is a poor makeshift; one would have supposed that a singing bird could sing in any place in which it could keep alive.

In the case of the quadrupeds, snakes, and amphibious beasts, the similitude is not quite so appropriate, because there is no resemblance between the places to which these animals go and the
places to which the souls go. It is possible that in the earliest form of the document τὰ πτυχὰ alone were spoken of, and that all the rest of §§ 6 and 7 is a later addition.

καὶ βόας καὶ ποῖμα. ποῖμα, properly 'flocks', here means 'sheep'. This use of the word occurs in Longus, Daphnis and Chloe (second century A.D.) 1. 8: ἡ μὲν ἐς ποῖμαν (ἐκ. the ewe that suckled her) ἀναφέρουσα τῆς σωτηρίας τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅ δὲ μεμημένος ὡς ἐκκείμενον αὐτὸν αἰς ἀνέθρεψεν.

καὶ τῶν τῆς κοινότητος ἐχομένων τῶν. Some phrase meaning 'amphibious' is needed; and it seems most likely that τῆς is a corruption of γῆς (τε καὶ θάνατος).

§ 7. λαγωνοὶ δὲ (εἰς) δρυμοῖς, καὶ βόες (εἰς) αἰδευτήρια [πεδία]. These two phrases differ from the context in the omission of the article before the substantives, as well as in the omission of the indispensable εἰς. Perhaps it would be best to bracket them, and to bracket also καὶ λαγωνοῖς καὶ βόας in § 6. We should then have wild animals (lions, leopards, wolves) mentioned first, and domestic animals (dogs and sheep) after them. If we retain the hares, wild and tame animals are intermixed.

ἐκάστοτε εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν χώραν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐκδον κριτήριον ἀνατρεπτομένου.

The word κριτήριον is used twice by Plato in the sense of κριτήριον ἀληθείας, 'that by which we decide whether something is true or not'. Rep. 582 a: τίνι χρή κρίνασθαι τὰ μέλλοντα καλῶς κριθήσεται; ἀρ' οὖν ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ; ἢ τούτων ἔχω ἂν τις βλέπων κριτήριον; Theaet. 178 b: πάνων μέτρων ἀνθρώπῳ ἔστω . . . ἐχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐ πάσχει τοιαύτα οἶδαμεν, ἀληθῆ τε οἰεται αὐτῷ καὶ ἀντα. (In Legg. 767 b, the only other place in Plato where the word occurs, its meaning is different.) It is used once by Aristotle, Metaph. K. 1063 a 2: τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ κριτήριον τῶν λεγόμενων χρωμάτων. But the Stoics were the first to bring κριτήριον into common use as a philosophic term. Diog. Laert. 7. 54: κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τοῖς καταληπτικῶς φαντασίσαν, τούτῳ τίνι τῷ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθὼς φησὶ Χρυσίστους ἐν τῷ ἑβῶν τῶν Φυσικῶν, καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Βοσθὸς κριτήρια πλείονα ἀπολείπει, νῦν καὶ αἰσθησίν καὶ δρείαν καὶ ἐνιοτότηταν ὁ δὲ Χρυσίστος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ λόγου κριτήρια φησιν εἶναι αἰσθησίν καὶ πρόληψιν. . . ἄλλου δὲ τίνων τῶν ἀρχαίωτέρων Στοικῶν τὸν ὄρθον λόγον κριτήριον ἀπολείποντος, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ κριτηρίων φησί. Sextus Empiricus, Math. 7. 29, distinguishes two different uses of the word: τὸ κριτηρίου . . . λέγεται . . . διχώς.
EXCERPT XXV: 7, 8

καθ' ἐνα μὲν τρόπον, ὃ προσέχοντες τὰ μὲν ποιοῦμεν τὰ δὲ οὐδαμῶς: καθ' ἐτερον δὲ, ὃ προσέχοντες τὰ μὲν υπάρχων φαμέν τὰ δὲ μη ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ταυτὶ μὲν ἀληθῆ καθεστάναι ταυτὶ δὲ ψευδή. See also Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. 2. 14 (where τὸ κρυτήριον in the latter sense is called τὸ κρυτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας); id. i. 21; and Math. 7. 126—131. The κρυτήριον spoken of in Exc. XXV is not a κρυτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας, but one of the other kind, ὃ προσέχοντες τὰ μὲν ποιοῦμεν τὰ δὲ οὐδαμῶς; it is something in the animal which determines its movements, and impels it towards a certain place. It is a ὀρμή, or (as Boethus would perhaps have called it) an ὀρεξία. We might call it an instinct; and the writer would probably have said that it was implanted in the animal by φύσις (see Exc. IV B).

§ 8. ἐκάστη ψυχή, καὶ ἀνθρωπευμένη καὶ ἄλλης ἑπιγείζουσα. It is here implied that beasts as well as men are animated by ψυχή. That is inconsistent with Exc. XXIII, according to which men alone are animated by ψυχή, and a beast has no ψυχή, but only a πνεῦμα (except in the case of a beast in which a human ψυχή has been reincarnated as a punishment for a bad life on earth).

πλὴν εἰ μὴ τίς τῶν Τυφώνων... λέγοι κ.τ.λ. πλὴν εἰ μὴ occurs again in Exc. XXVI. 2. It would be more correct to say either πλὴν εἴ or εἰ μή. But Lucian (Pseudosophistes 7) mentions πλὴν εἰ μή as a common solecism: and the incorrect phrase may have been written by the author.

οἱ Τυφώνοι are the followers of Typhon (Set). According to the Egyptian myth, they fought against Osiris and Horus. Isis would therefore hate and despise them; and the writer makes her name them when she wishes to give an instance of people notorious for perversity. If he had been speaking in his own person, he might perhaps have said, instead of ‘some Typhonian’, either ‘some Epicurean’ or ‘some Christian’.

ὡς μηδὲν παρὰ τάξιν πράσσειν κἂν κολαξώνται. Those who are undergoing punishment might be expected to feel resentment against their punishers, and obey them only under compulsion, if at all; yet in this matter the embodied souls spontaneously obey the ordinance (τάξις) of God, or of Nature, who is God’s viceregent upon earth.

κόλασις γὰρ αὐτάς ἡ ἀνωμάτωσις. Cf. Exc. XXIII. 25—41. This notion had come down from the early Pythagoreans. Philolaus ap. Clem. Alex. Strom. 3. 3. 17: μαρτυρούσαι δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι τὸ καὶ μάντες ὡς διὰ τινας τιμωρίας ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι συνέζεται.

Diels: ἄφων ἀνάγκης χρήμα, θεῶν ψυχῶν παλαιών, . . . εὗτε ἥν ἀμφιλαίμποι φῶν φίλα γυνία μήνη, | (Νείκει θεόν) δὲ κ’ ἐπιτόρκιον άμαρθήσας ἐνικόμησα, | δαιμόνια οὗτοι μακραῖνον λαλάκαι διόι,—τρίς μνείν μαρίας δήμας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησα, | φυσικόν παινών διὰ χρόνων εἰδερ θητῶν | ἀργαλείας βιότου μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύοντο. | . . . τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἴμη, φυγαίς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης, | Νείκεις μανωμένων πίστωσ.¹

Plotinus 4. 8. 1: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε, εἰπὼν ἀμαραγνοῦσας νόμον εἰναί ταῖς ψυχαῖς πτείναι ἐνταῦθα, καὶ αὐτὸς "ψυχαίς θεόθεν" γενόμενοι ἔχειν "πίστων μανωμένων Νείκει" τοσοῦτον παρεγόνων ὅσον καὶ Πυθαγόρας, οἶμαι, καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου ψυχεῖν περὶ τινῶν περὶ τε πολλῶν ἄλλων. τὸ δὲ (κ. Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ) παρὴν καὶ διὰ ποιήσαν οὐ σαφεῖ εἶναι.

§ 9. ( . . .) ἔχει δὲ ἢ (τῶν) (ἐνυ) διατάξεις [ἡ ἱερετήτη] οὔτως. ἡ ὑδη ποτέ [[ἐνυ]], ὡς μεγαλοφυστάτα παί, βλέπε [ψυχῶν διατάξεις]. The transition to a fresh topic is abrupt; some connecting words or sentences have probably been lost.

βλέπε ψυχῶν διατάξεις is impossible. One might say ἤνω βλέπε, ‘look upward’; but the ἤνω in the text is too far separated from βλέπε, and has most likely come from the preceding sentence, where τῶν ἤνω, or something of the sort, is needed to go with διατάξεις. More probably, βλέπε was followed by εἰς with a substantive, and the words ἥδη ποτέ . . . βλέπε are the beginning of an unfinished sentence, which is out of place here, but may perhaps have formed part of the lost passage that preceded ἔχει δὲ κ.τ.λ. It may be conjectured that ψυχῶν διατάξεις is a remnant of a superscription (e.g. Περὶ τῆς τῶν ψυχῶν διατάξεως) written at the head of the paragraph; compare the superscription [Ποῦ τῶν σωμάτων ἀπολυθέσας διαιρέσαναι αἰ ψυχαί] at the beginning of § 3.

¹ I.e. men and beasts are ‘daemons’ (= unembodied souls) that have been sentenced to a series of incarnations as a punishment for some crime. The two crimes mentioned by Empedocles are murder and perjury. But how could an unembodied soul commit murder? The nature of the offence by which the Pythagoreans supposed the soul to have incurred the penalty of incarnation is left unexplained. It may have been explained in some ἐσχῆ λόγος which has not been transmitted to us; the words of παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι εἰς καὶ μάντεις in Philolaus perhaps refer to something of the sort. (It cannot have had anything to do with the Orphic myth of the rending of Dionysus by the Titans; for the Titans were not unembodied souls, and it was not by incarnation that they were punished for their crime.) The author of the Κορή Κόσμου makes an attempt to answer the question how the souls had offended; see Exe. XXIII. 24.
EXCERPT XXV: 9, 10

τό ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ κορυφῆς μέχρι σελήνης θεῶν καὶ ἄστρων καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ προοίμω σχολάζει. τῇ ἄλλῃ προοίμῳ apparentely means 'deity in general'. But what other form than that of gods and stars could deity assume? Was the writer thinking of the fiery element of which the heavens were held to consist, and did he identify the celestial fire as a whole with 'Providence', i.e. with the divine power by which the universe is governed? He could have found Stoic authority for doing so.

σχολάζει means 'is left vacant for', or 'is reserved for'; cf. Plut. C. Gracch. 12: τὰ θεωρητήματα καθείλε καὶ τῷ δήμῳ σχολάζοντα ... ἀπέδειξε τὸν τόπον.

If the words θεῶν and ἄστρων are to be taken as denoting two different classes of celestial beings, and not merely as two names denoting one and the same class, we must understand that there are 'gods' who are not stars, but live in the same region as the stars, and are closely associated with them. There is no trace here of the peculiar system of Exc. XXIV. 1, according to which the 'gods' live in heaven, and the ἄστρων (stars in general? or planets?) are situated in another region, called αἴθηρ, which is below heaven. The writer of Exc. XXV knows nothing of this latter region; he uses the word αἴθηρ differently, applying it to a part of the ἄηρ, and even to a part of it which is much nearer to the earth than to the lunar sphere; for he says that eagles fly in the αἴθηρ (§ 7), and that no bird can fly above the twelfth of the 60 χώραι into which the ἄηρ is divided (§ 11). He does not expressly tell us where the lower limit of οὐρανῶς is situated; but it is to be presumed that he would have placed that limit, as most people did, at the lunar sphere, and would accordingly have said that οὐρανῶς and ἄηρ are contiguous.

§ 10. ἔχει μᾶκτοι ... ἔλαιον ὄδωρ. This section breaks the connexion between § 9 and § 11. If we retain it, τὸ δὲ διάστημα τότῳ in § 11 init. is obscure; if we cut it out, τὸ δὲ διάστημα τότῳ refers to the closely preceding words τὸ ἀπὸ σελήνης ἱμᾶς in § 9 fin. Moreover, these remarks about the movement of the air and the movements of the souls have no connexion with the main topic of §§ 9-13, which is the διάστασις of the atmosphere. What the writer had occasion to say about the wind is sufficiently said in § 11; and in that section there is no indication that the wind has been spoken of shortly before. § 10 appears to be an extract from another document; and we may suppose that some one was led by the mention of ἀέμοιον κινήσεως in § 11 to copy into the margin another
passage about the wind which he had found elsewhere, and that it subsequently got into the text.

ἐξει μέντοι ἐν ἀετῷ [δῶν] (κίνησιν (ἰδίαν;?) δ [τοσοῦτος] ἀηρ, ἐν ἀνεμον καλεῖν ἔδος ἐστὶν ἦμῖν, [ἰδίον] [μέγεθος ἐν ἡ] (ἀρ) κυνεῖται πρὸς ἀνάψυξιν τῶν ἐνεχειῶν. ὅδειν is certainly wrong; the wind is not a ὅδος, but a κίνησις ἀετῶς, and the substantive wanted is κίνησιν. But it seems probable that the original reading was κίνησιν ἱδίαν. The word ἱδίαν may have given rise both to ὅδοιν by corruption, and to the meaningless ἱδίον below by a misplaced duplication; and it would serve to emphasize the distinction between the movement which belongs to the air itself (cf. πρὸς ταυτίν κινούμενον below) and the movement of the souls in the air. Perhaps in the original context of the passage something had been said about the movements of the unembodied souls in the air, and the writer then went on to say ἐξει μέντοι ἐν ἀετῷ κίνησιν ἱδίαν ὅ ἀηρ κ.τ.λ.: 'the air has a movement of its own, which we call wind; but that movement does not interfere with those movements of the souls of which I have been speaking.'

tοσοῦτος is unintelligible. It may possibly have been explained by something in the lost context which preceded; but it seems more likely that [τοσοῦτος] and [μέγεθος ἐν ἡ] are fragments of a marginal note, which may have contained the words ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον μέγεθος.

δ (or περὶ) ὅ;) δὴ καὶ διστερον ἔρω. If this points forward merely to the passing mention of the wind in § 11, it was not worth while to say it. But it probably refers to something that came later on in the document to which § 10 originally belonged.

§ 11. τὸ δὲ διάστημα τοῦτο . . . μοῖρων μὲν ἐστὶ γενικῶν τεσσάρων, ἔδικῶν δὲ χώρων ἐξ ἁκορτα. The words γενικός and εἰδικός are not quite accurately used here; for the relation between a μοῖρα and the χώρα contained in it is not the same as that between a genus and its several species. But the meaning is clear enough. The position of a soul might be described 'generally' by saying that it was in the second μοῖρα of the atmosphere, and more 'specially' or 'particularly' by saying that it was in the third χώρα of the second μοῖρα (i. e. the seventh of the sixty χώραι, counting upward from below).

The writer had in his mind, if not before his eyes, a diagram such as is here appended.

In the partly similar system of Posidonius (Plin. Nat. hist. 2. 23. 85), clouds and wind extend upwards to a distance of 40 stadia (five
miles) from the earth, and the space from the upper limit of the windy region up to the moon is filled with pure bright air, the vertical extent of which is 2,000,000 stadia (250,000 miles). Did the writer of Exe. XXV mean it to be understood that all the χώρας are equal in vertical measurement? It seems most likely that he did; and if so, the vertical extent of the windless region is, in Exe. XXV, four times that of the windy region. But according to Posidonius, who knew more about astronomy than the author of Exe. XXV, and was nearer to the truth in his estimate of the distance from earth to moon, the vertical extent of the windless region is 50,000 times that of the windy region. Supposing that the writer of Exe. XXV agreed with Posidonius in putting the upper limit of the windy region five miles above the surface of the earth, each of his χώρας would be five-twelfths of a mile in height, and his estimate of the distance from the earth's surface to the moon would consequently be 25 miles. He would hardly have differed so widely from Posidonius in this respect if he had read what Posidonius had written; we must therefore suppose that a partial and imperfect knowledge of the system of Posidonius had been transmitted to him through ill-instructed intermediaries.
The διάταξις of Exc. XXV is a fuller and more detailed working out of that in Exc. XXIII. 16, where we are told that there are sixty classes or grades of souls, to which habitations are assigned in a corresponding series of divisions of the atmosphere. But in Exc. XXIII the divisions of the atmosphere are called, not χώραι, but τμήματα [καὶ ταμεῖα]; and there is no mention there of the four μοῖραι spoken of in Exc. XXV.


This is obviously out of place in the midst of a description of the second μοῖρα of the atmosphere. It ought to stand at the beginning of §§ 9-13, or of some similar paragraph. It is very likely that the missing passage which preceded § 9 began with these words; but it is also possible that they have been shifted to this place from the beginning of Exc. XXVI.

ἐξεῖ μέντοι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ταύτης τὴν ἐξουσίαν ὁ ἄθροι ὦτος, ὡστε καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἱδίαις δεκτῶ χώραις καὶ ἐν ταῖς γῆς τέθαρσι περιτολεῖ(ν) μεθ’ ὅν ἐξεῖ ζωῶν. ὁ ἄθροι ὦτος must be taken to mean the air of the second μοῖρα, i.e. the windy air. The writer assumes that the second μοῖρα is the proper domain of the windy air, and that the first μοῖρα belongs to the earth; and he accounts for the fact that there is wind close to the earth by saying that the windy air is allowed to pass the lower boundary of its own region, and descend into the first μοῖρα. If the words μεθ’ ὅν ἐξεῖ ζωῶν are to be retained, he also assumes that the proper home of the birds, or of some birds at least, is the second μοῖρα, and that when we see them in the first μοῖρα (i.e. near the earth) they have come down from the second μοῖρα along with the wind. The latter assumption seems strange; but it is not quite impossible, provided that we take the ζώα spoken of to be, not birds in general, but high-flying birds, such as eagles. It was said in § 7 that the proper home of eagles is the αἰθήρ; and perhaps the word αἰθήρ there denotes the region which in § 11 is called the second μοῖρα.

§ 12. ἡ δὲ τρίτη . . . ἡ δὲ τετάρτη . . .. Of the third and fourth μοῖραι we are told only that the third contains 'fine and pure air', and the fourth contains 'very fine and very clear (and transparent?) air'. But there is little point in speaking of them at all, if nothing is to be said about the distinctive qualities of the souls or other beings by whom each of these μοῖραι is inhabited; and we must suppose
that something of the kind followed, if not in this document itself, at least in the source from which the writer got these details.

..."diopm..." tovs [anw] oorannwos. tovs oorannwos means the different spheres or strata of which heaven consists. But there can be no reason here for distinguishing those of them which are above (tovs anw) from those of them which are below; we must therefore strike out anw. It may have come from anwdev in the following sentence.

The boundary of which the writer is speaking must be that between 'the heavens' as a whole and the atmosphere; and as it may be inferred from § 9 that he held heaven to extend downwards 'as far as the moon', there can be little doubt that the missing subject of the sentence is o küklos tis selênhs.

§ 12. [akollhít] has come from akollhít in § 10 fin.

ai einaie moirai [genikás] mév téssarás, [diastmatikás de déwdeka,] chora de ékhoonta. What are the diastmatikai moirai? The only diasthma that has been spoken of is the whole space between the moon and the earth (§ 11 init.); and it is impossible to discover any method of dividing that space, or any part of it, into twelve moirái, that could be combined with the writer's division of it into four moirái and sixty χώραι. Perhaps diastmatikas is a corruption of tov diastmatos (sc. tov ápdo géis mékri selênhs). When diastmatikas dé had got into the text, genikas (suggested by § 11 init.) may have been inserted before mév to correspond to diastmatikas, and déwdeka (a number chosen under some misunderstanding, if not merely at random,) may have been added to correspond to téssarás.

§ 14. tines mév ón eis ékdástan (ékatera MSS.) tovton (sc. twn χωρών) anallóousai ψυχai, éntwthn soi pali... kataleígnan árboimai. anallóousai means 'depart' from earth, or from the body; cf. Kaibel Epigr. Gr. 340. 7, Ís ðeivòs ánélusa.

If this promise was fulfilled, the writer must have gone on to mention, one by one, sixty distinct classes of souls (beginning, no doubt, with those of kings, and ending with those of reptiles), and must have said that the souls of kings, when they depart from the body, go to the highest of the sixty χώραι, and so on, until he came to the souls of reptiles, which presumably go to the lowest of them. That would be a complete answer to the question asked by Horus in § 1, ποι τών σωμάτων ἀπολυθέωσαι χωρώσων αἱ ψυχαί. But Stobaeus ended his extract from the libellus at this point, and omitted the details given in the remainder of the document.
This Excerpt is broken into two pieces by a lacuna between § 2 and § 3. It is possible that §§ 1–2 and §§ 3–30 were originally unconnected, and were taken from two distinct libelli; but it is also possible that they were parts of one and the same libellus, and were linked together by a passage which has been lost.

In §§ 1–2, the writer speaks of the situation of souls before and after their life on earth, and deals both with the question whence souls come when they enter the body, and with the question whither souls go when they quit the body. (The latter question is that which is asked and answered in Exc. XXV.)

In §§ 3–30, the question whither souls go when they quit the body is nowhere spoken of (except that it is briefly and indirectly touched on in § 12); and the question whence they come when they enter the body holds a subordinate position, being dealt with only in §§ 10 and 11. The main subject of §§ 3–30 is the question what is the cause of the differences between one embodied soul and another. The writer’s answer is that these differences are caused (1) by the fact that the souls come from different strata of the atmosphere, and bring with them qualities which they already possessed when they resided in those strata (§§ 3–12), and (2) by differences in the composition of the bodies in which the souls are incarnated (§§ 13–30).

In the MSS. of Stobaeus, Exc. XXVI has no heading analogous to the lemma of Exc. XXV (‘Ερμιτό πόλος ίσας πρός Ωρον); the only superscription is Περί ψυχικώως καὶ μεταψυχικώς. It is possible that Stobaeus marked Exc. XXVI as a separate extract by writing a lemma of the usual kind at the head of it, and that his lemma has been accidentally lost. But if it was not so, it would seem to follow that he took Exc. XXVI to be a continuation of Exc. XXV, and regarded XXV. 1–XXVI. 30 as a single document. He may perhaps have done so; but if he did, he was probably mistaken.

Wachsmuth treats Exc. XXVI as a continuation of Exc. XXV; he brackets the superscription of XXVI (Περί ψυχικώως καὶ μεταψυχικώς), and says ‘cohaerent haec (i.e. XXVI) cum priore ecloga (i.e. XXV)’. But it seems to me evident that XXVI does not ‘cohere’ with XXV. The subject of Exc. XXV is the question whither souls go when they quit the body; that is the only question dealt with in XXV, and the extract ends with a promise to answer it.
EXCERPT XXVI

in fuller detail, which promise is not fulfilled in XXVI, and must have been fulfilled in a following part of the *libellus* from which XXV was extracted by Stobaeus. In XXVI. 1–2, the same question is dealt with (together with the different but connected question whence souls come when they enter the body); but it is dealt with in language which could not have been used by a man who had just written XXV. The atmospheric χώραι, of which a full and detailed description has been given in XXV, are spoken of *de novo* in XXVI. 1; in the latter passage, the reader is not supposed to have any previous knowledge of them, and is told, as if they were new to him, things which, if *Exc. XXV* had preceded, he would have read just before. (Compare, for instance, ἐκάστη ... κατὰ τὴν ἄξιαν καὶ χώραν ἔχει κ.τ.λ. in XXVI. 1 with δοσὺ γὰρ ἐκάστη τῶν χωραν ... τοσούτῳ καὶ (αδί) ἐν αὐτὰς ψυχαί κ.τ.λ. in XXV. 13.) Moreover, three synonyms for the term χώραι are mentioned in XXVI. 1; but if the two extracts had been parts of one *libellus*, the proper place for mentioning these synonyms would have been XXV. 11, where the χώραι are first spoken of.

It is clear then that in XXVI. 1–2 we have, not a continuation of XXV, but a separate and independent treatment of the subject dealt with in XXV. And in XXVI. 3–30, the question discussed is a different one from that discussed in XXV. We must therefore conclude that *Exc. XXV* and *Exc. XXVI* are extracts from different *libelli*.

When and by whom the superscription Περὶ ἐμφύκωσεως καὶ μετεμψυχώσεως was written, we have no means of knowing. It is possible that it is on a par with certain paragraph-headings which have got into the text elsewhere (see *Exc. XXV*. 3 and 9, and *Exc. XXIV*. 7, 8, and 10), and that, like them, it was not intended to mark the beginning of a fresh document, but merely to describe the contents of the passage which immediately follows it. It is not, however, a correct description of the contents either of *Exc. XXVI*. 1–2 or of *Exc. XXVI* as a whole. ἐμφύκωσις (the incarnation of souls) is spoken of both in §§ 1–2 and throughout §§ 3–30; but nowhere in *Exc. XXVI* is anything said about μετεμψυχώσις, i.e. the reincarnation of a soul in another body after a previous incarnation. Either the man who wrote the heading blundered in adding καὶ μετεμψυχώσεως, or he had before him a document of which our *Exc. XXVI* (περὶ ἐμφύκωσεως) was the first part only, and which contained together with it another part, now lost, concerning μετεμψυχώσις.
The words most commonly used to signify incarnation and re-incarnation were ἐνυψώματος and μετενυψώματος; ἐμψύχωσις and μετεμψύχωσις are rarer. ἐμψύχωσις, which properly means ‘the process of making (a body) ἐμψύχων’, i.e. that of putting soul into a body, occurs in Plotinus 4. 3. 9. μετεμψύχωσις occurs in Diod. Sic. 10, fr. 6 (ὅτι ὁ Πυθαγόρας μετεμψύχωσαν ἐδόξαζε, . . . πάντων τῶν ζων τὰς ψυχὰς μετὰ θάνατον εἰς ἔπεα ζωὰ λέγων εἰσηρχεσθαι); 1 Alexander Aphrod. in Arist. de an. p. 27. 18; Porphyry De abst. 4. 16; Sallustius De diis et mundo 20; Proclus in Pl. Rep. vol. ii, p. 340, l. 23 Kroll; Jerome Epist. ad Avitum p. 764; Theol. arithm. p. 40 Ast (Diels Vorsokr. I, p. 24); Schol. in Iambi. Protrept. 14; Suidas s.v. Φερεκύδης.

§ 1. οἴ θεῶν τῶν προγόνων καλοῦνται ὅφε ἐν μὲν ζωὰν, ὅφε ἐν τε στρατωματα, ὅπε ἐν τε ἐποίησαι πτυχαί. The προγόνοι of Isis would be Egyptian gods, or early rulers of Egypt who had become gods after death (e.g. Kamephis, who is called θρόνατος in Exc. XXIII. (§21)). But the writer must have been thinking rather of Greek authors who had used the terms of which he speaks; and one of these authors may perhaps have been Posidonius. The use of στρατωματα to denote atmospheric strata had doubtless been suggested by Genesis 1. 6-8. For πτυχαί, which means ‘layers’ (e.g. the superimposed sheets of leather or metal in a shield), cf. Eur. Or. 1636; ἐν ἀλθόν πτυχαί: Eur. Hel. 44, ἐν πτυχαίσιν ἀλθόν: Eur. Phoen. 84, ὁ φαινάται ὀβραν ναιών πτυχαίς Ζεῦ. For ζωὰν, cf. τὰς ἀκίδιοι ζωὰς in Exc. XXIII. 8 as emended, and the planetary ζωὰς in Corp. I. 25.

τὰς μὲν θεῖας καὶ βασιλικὰς (ψυχὰς) ἐν τῇ ὑπεράνω πάντων (χώρα) κατοικεῖν. Cf. Exc. XXIV. 4 and 5, where βασιλικαὶ ψυχαὶ are called θεῖα.

§ 2. οἴ μὲν ὅπε εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν κατατεμπολοῦνται . . . ἐκ τῶν ὑπεράνω ζωῶν κατατέμπολοι. τὸ ἄρχειν presumably means τὸ βασιλεύειν. But if so, τῶν ὑπεράνω ζωῶν (plural) is inconsistent with τῇ ὑπεράνω πάντων (singular) in § 1.

καὶ λυθείσαι εἰς τὰς αὐτὰς ἡ καὶ ἐτί ὑπεράνῳ ἀνέρχονται. If the souls of kings come from several different χώραι or ζωὰν of the atmosphere, as is said in § 2 init., a kingly soul which had resided, for instance, in the second χώρα before its incarnation might rise to the first and highest χώρα after its incarnation. But if all kingly souls come

1 There is no proof that Diodorus used the word himself; this passage is an epitomator's summary of what Diodorus wrote.
from the highest χώρα of the atmosphere, as is said in § 1 fin., to rise still higher would mean to rise above the atmosphere, and enter heaven.

A conditional clause ('if they have obeyed God's law', or something to that effect,) must have been lost before εκ κατωτέρων . . . ανάγει.

§ 3. (...) εἰςι γὰρ 'ἀνωθεν οὖν (. . .), δορυφόροι δυτες τῆς καθόλου προνοίας, δι` δὲ μὲν ψυχοταμίας, δι` δὲ ψυχοτομπός. In §§ 3–12, the writer speaks of the descent of souls from their homes in the atmosphere, and their incarnation upon earth. How the paragraph began, we do not know; but in § 3, we find him speaking of two superhuman beings in whose charge the unembodied souls are placed. One of these beings who is called the ψυχοταμίας, has the souls in his keeping during their residence in the atmosphere; the other, who is called the ψυχοτομπός, sends souls down to earth (ἀποστέλλει, προίησι) when they are to be incarnated, and 'puts them in their several places' (διαπάνεια), i.e. takes care that each soul is placed in the sort of body that is suited to it.

The function of the ψυχοταμίας is similar to that which is assigned to the Moon in Exc. XXIV. 1; but neither of the two beings spoken of in XXVI. 3 can be identified with Σελήνη, as both of them are masculine (δι` δὲ . . . δι` δὲ). In Diog. Laert. 8. 31 Hermes is called ταμίας τῶν φυχῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τομπαίος. The word ψυχοτομπός is applied to Charon by Euripides, Alc. 361; to Hermes by Diodorus, i. 96; and to an unnamed Greek god (Apollo?) by Plutarch, Amatorius 15. 6, 758 B. But the writer of Exc. XXVI was probably thinking of two Egyptian gods. Osiris, who is βασιλεύς ἀπογεγονότων (§ 9), might very well be called ψυχοταμίας; and perhaps Anubis, who was worshipped by Egyptians under the name of 'the Opener of the Way' (Wiedemann, Rel. of Anc. Eg., Eng. tr., p. 230), might be called ψυχοτομπός.

καὶ δὲ μὴν τηρεῖ, δι` δὲ προίησι (πρόεις MSS.) κατὰ γνώμην τοῦ θεοῦ. The emphasis is on κατὰ γνώμην τοῦ θεοῦ; in the discharge of their functions these two beings execute the will of the supreme God. But as we have already been told that the ψυχοταμίας and the ψυχοτομπός are δορυφόροι τῆς καθόλου προνοίας, this further statement contains nothing but superfluous repetition; and perhaps it ought to be bracketed.

§ 4. 'τῷ οὖν λόγῳ τούτῳ, δ' παί, καὶ τῇ ἐνω τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξαλλαγῇ καὶ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐστὶν ή φώσις. The meaning must have been that the function of φώσις and her two assistants on earth (viz. that of

1 It is possible that ἀνωθεν οὖν is a corruption of ἀνω θεοῦ (ὅν).
making the bodies in which the souls are to be incarnated) corresponds to that of πρόνοια and its two subordinates in the world above (viz. that of taking care of the unembodied souls and superintending their incarnation); and that, in discharging these functions, πρόνοια and φύσις do their respective parts in effecting one and the same result (viz. the incarnation of each soul in a body suited to it). This meaning might be expressed by rewriting the sentence as follows. [τῷ] ὀμόλογος (δὲ) τοῦτο, οὐ παί, καὶ τῇ ἀνω τῶν πραγμάτων (οἰκονομία κατ') ἐπιλαμβάνει (ἀντίστροφος) [καὶ] ἐπὶ γῆς ἑστὶν ἡ φύσις. The words ἡ ἀνω τῶν πραγμάτων οἰκονομία (οτ διοίκησις or some other synonym) are equivalent to 'the operation of πρόνοια'; and κατ' ἐπιλαμβάνει would mean that the work of πρόνοια and that of φύσις 'fit in with one another', each of them supplementing what the other does. For the literal sense of ἐπιλαμβάνει, cf. ὀδόντες ἐπιλαμβάνοντες in Aristotle (Part. an. 3. 1, 661 b 18 &c.), meaning rows of teeth which fit into one another.

σκηνοποιοῦσα ὀδός, καὶ πλάστρια (πλάστρια γὰρ ὀδός καὶ σκηνοποιοῦσα MSS.) (τῶν) ἀγγείων ἔλς (ἐς ἐς) ἐπάλυεται αἷ ἐφχαί. The combination σκηνοποιοῦσα ἀγγείων is impossible. If we interchange σκηνοποιοῦσα and πλάστρια, the words πλάστρια (τῶν) ἀγγείων κ.τ.λ. may be taken as an explanation of the meaning of σκηνοποιοῦσα.

Heeren alters πλάστρια into πλάστερα. But πλάστερα, though not found elsewhere, is a possible form; cf. ψάλτρια.

ἡ μὲν μνήμη (γνώμη MSS.) ἔργον ἔχει τούτο, ὅπως ἡ φύσις [τηρῇ καὶ] περικρατῇ τοῦ [τῆς ἐκάστου] τύπου (τοῦ) ἐξ ἀρχῆς καταβεβλημένου. περικρατοῦσα means 'to keep hold of' or 'cling to'; cf. Exc. XXIII. 54, (24) and Exc. XXIV. 6. τηρῇ, which would require an object in the accusative, has been added to explain περικρατῇ.

The τύπος ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς καταβεβλημένος is the Platonic or Aristotelian ἑδος of the species. The form or type of the horse, for instance, has been determined once for all; and when Nature is constructing the body of an individual horse, she 'remembers' that form or type, and reproduces it in the individual.

καὶ τοῦ παραδείγματος (φυράματος MSS.) τοῦ ἀνώ (ἐκάων) γίγνεται (γίγνεται MSS.) (τὸ πλασμόμενον σῶμα;?). With these corrections, we have here a repetition, in other words, of what was said in the preceding clause. τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ ἀνώ, 'the pattern laid up in heaven', is a Platonic term equivalent to ὁ τύπος ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς καταβεβλημένος. The false reading φυράματος may have been suggested by τοῦ φυράματος in § 13.

ἡ δὲ ὁμοιειρία (ἔργον ἔχει τούτο), ὅπως [τῷ] ἀνάλογον ἐκάστης τῶν καταβαινομοσχὼν ψυχῶν... καὶ τὸ πλάσμα [. ] γίγνεται. Nature's μνήμη
EXCERPT XXVI: 5

is employed in adhering to the species-type; her ἐμπειρία (skilled craftsmanship) is employed in producing individual variations. It results from the working of her μυήμη that the body of every horse has those qualities by which horses are distinguished from other animals; it results from the working of her ἐμπειρία that the body of this or that individual horse has certain qualities in which it differs from other horses. And the purpose by which Nature's work is guided in these variations is to make each individual body perfectly suitable for the particular soul which is to inhabit it.

καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἱδρέοι τῶν ψυχῶν ἱδέα γένται καὶ τὰ σώματα, ταῖς δὲ βραδέοι βραδέα... καὶ ἀπαξαπλῶς ἑκάσταις κατὰ τὸ εἰκός. This is an explanation of ὅπως πρὸς ἀνάλογον ἐκάστης... καὶ τὸ πλάσμα γένται. The meaning of ταῖς μὲν ἱδρέοι... βραδέα is clear enough; the body of a race-horse, for instance, has been made 'quick', in order that it might be suitable for a 'quick' soul, and the body of a cart-horse has been made 'slow', in order that it might be suitable for a 'slow' soul. But there are difficulties in what follows. ταῖς δὲ ἐνεργοσίν ἐνεργή καὶ ταῖς νωθραίς... νωθρά is superfluous repetition; for ἐνεργή and νωθρά are hardly distinguishable in meaning from ἱδέα and βραδέα. And what can be meant by δόλα σώματα? Deceitfulness is an attribute of souls alone, and not of bodies. Moreover, we should have expected καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἐνεργοσίν... ταῖς δὲ... καὶ ταῖς μὲν δυναταῖς... ταῖς δὲ... rather than ταῖς δὲ ἐνεργοσίν... καὶ ταῖς... καὶ ταῖς δυναταῖς... καὶ ταῖς... Also, κατὰ τὸ εἰκός is unsatisfactory; in place of it, something equivalent to ἀνὰ λόγον is wanted. It may be suspected that either the whole passage καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἱδρεοῖ... κατὰ τὸ εἰκός, or some part of it at least, is a later addition.

§ 5. (... ) οὐ γὰρ ἀσκότως πτηνᾶ μὲν ἐπιλοσσε(ν ἡ φύσις), κ.τ.λ. The qualities here spoken of are such as belong to a whole species, not such as belong to some individuals of the species and not to others. (E.g. all birds are feathered.) They are therefore qualities that are produced by Nature's μυήμη, and not by her ἐμπειρία. That being so, οὐ γὰρ ἀσκότως κ.τ.λ. cannot have followed immediately on § 4 fin., in which the work of nature's ἐμπειρία was spoken of; and a connecting passage must have been lost.

The contents of this section were doubtless derived from a Stoic source. From a similar source, if not from the very same Stoic document, must have come Minucius Felix 17.10: ‘quidve animantium loquar adversus sese tutelam multiformem: alias armatas cornibus, alias dentibus saeptas, et fundatas ungulis et spicatas aculeis, aut
pedum celeritate liberas aut elatione pinnarum?" There is a still closer resemblance to *Exc. XXVI. 5* in Lactantius *De opif. dei* 2. 1-4: 'Dedit enim homini artifex ille noster ac parens deus sensum atque rationem . . . . Ceteris animantibus, quoniam rationalem istam vim non attribuit, quemadmodum tamen vita eorum tutor esset, ante providit. . . . Singulis autem generibus ad propulsandos impetus externos suas propria munimenta constituit, ut aut naturalibus telis repugnet [fortioribus]¹ aut quae sunt inbeciilliora subtrahant se periculis perniciatis fugiendi, aut quae simul et viribus et celeritate indigent, astu se protegang aut latibulis saepiant. Itaque alia eorum vel plumis levibus in sublime suspensa sunt vel susflata ungulis vel instructa cornibus; quibusdam in ore arma sunt dentes, aut in pedibus adunci ungues: nulli munimentum ad tutelam sui deest.'

Lactantius is known to have made use of Minucius Felix. He may perhaps have read Herm. *Exc. XXVI* also; but we have no proof that the *Isis to Horus* documents were known to him, and the resemblance may be equally well accounted for by assuming a common Stoic source.

¹ I have bracketed fortioribus. If any word in the datives stood here, it must have been a word meaning 'their assailants'. But perhaps we ought to read fortiora (sc. genera), in contrast to quae sunt inbeciilliora.
have expected the writer of *Exc. XXVI* to do the same. If he did, what he said about it has been lost.

If a man says [καὶ τοῖς] ἄδοκοιν ἔχαράκωσεν, ἠν δὲ τοὺς ὅγκους ἀφέρησα (ἠφίσας MSS.) δύναμην περιθηκεύειν. These words refer to reptiles, and describe the means of self-defence with which Nature provides them. The reptiles which are equipped with teeth must be the venomous snakes; the description of the other kind of reptiles would apply to boas and pythons, and to the semi-fabulous ὀπλοκό. The verb ἔχαράκωσεν is hardly the right word to use in speaking of a pair of poison-fangs; but perhaps the writer had never examined the mouth of a venomous snake, and imagined such snakes to be armed with a ‘palisade’ of teeth.

§ 6. εἰς μὲν ἄνθρωπον χαρέω τὰς κριτικάς. κριτικάς is here equivalent to λογικάς. The souls of men are distinguished from those of beasts by the fact that they have in them a κριτήριον ἀληθείας. See note on *Exc. XXV*. 7 fin.

εἰς δὲ τὴν τὰς ἀπανθρώπους. ‘The souls that hate or shun men’ cannot be right. It is true that wild birds shun men; but so do wild quadrupeds also. ἀπανθρώπους has probably come from εἰς μὲν ἄνθρωπος above, and has driven out the original adjective, which may have been some word meaning ‘light-minded’, ‘flighty’, or ‘volatile’. κούφος or ἀνεθράστος would serve the purpose; see § 15.

The false reading ἀπανθρώπους has given rise to the interpolation καὶ τὴν τῶς ἀπανθρωπίας ἐκπεσεῖν in § 7.

εἰς δὲ τετράποδα (τὰς) ἀκρίτους. Here, again, an inappropriate word has been substituted for the adjective written by the author. ἀκρίτος is the opposite of κριτικός (= λογικός), and would be equally applicable to all kinds of animals as opposed to men. Possibly ἀκρατός, in the sense of the Latin impotens (sui), ‘violent’.

νόμος γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἐστὶν ἡ ἁγιός. Quadrupeds ‘know no law but the law of the stronger’. Does this mean that the stronger among them lawlessly prey on the weaker? If so, we might compare Pl. *Gorg.* 484 b, where Callicles quotes Pindar (νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλείων κ.τ.λ.) in support of his thesis that ‘might is right’. But the words might also be taken to mean that quadrupeds are subject to the compulsion applied to them by beings stronger than themselves, i.e. by men; (horses and oxen, for instance, are forced to

1 Or possibly from ἀπανθρωπίζω, ‘become men’, which may have occurred in a note on εἰς μὲν ἄνθρωπον χαρέω τὰς κριτικάς. Cf. ταῦτα ἀπανθρώπισται in § 20.
labour;) and perhaps the latter interpretation agrees better with τετραπόν δὲ τὴν ἀνάγκην παραλλαξάι in § 7.

§ 7. ἀνθρώπον μὲν . . . τὸ κριτικὸν ὑπερβῆναι. ὑπερβῆναι means 'to transgress'. Man is a rational animal; yet men sometimes disobey the dictates of reason.

[[καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ τῆς διαθέσεως τῶν ἀνω καὶ τῆς καταβάσεως αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς σωματουργίας τοσσάντα.]] These words are manifestly out of place. They ought to stand at the end of a discussion of the subjects mentioned in them; but the writer continues to speak περὶ τῆς διαθέσεως τῶν ἀνω καὶ τῆς καταβάσεως αὐτῶν in §§ 8—12. I have therefore transposed καὶ τὰ μὲν . . . τοσσάντα to the beginning of § 13, where something of the sort is desirable, if not necessary, to mark the transition to a fresh topic. But if we place the sentence there, it seems best to bracket καὶ τῆς σωματουργίας; for the making of bodies has been spoken of only in §§ 4 and 5, and there is nothing about it in §§ 6—12.

§ 8. συμβαίνει δὲ, ὡ τέκνον, ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἰδεὶ (ἀνθρώπων) εὐρίσκεσθαι [καὶ γένει τῶν προκειμένων] βασιλικάς τινας ψυχὰς. In §§ 8—11 men alone are dealt with, and not beasts; we must therefore either insert or understand ἀνθρώπων after εἰδεί. Instances of the different εἰδη of men (teachers, physicians, &c.) are given in § 9.

βασιλικάς ψυχαὶ have already been spoken of in §§ 1 and 2. Compare Exc. XXIV. 2—6.

[[καταβαίνει δὲ καὶ ἄλλας . . . βασιλευόσθης ψυχῆς.]] This passage breaks the connexion between ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἰδεὶ (ἀνθρώπων) εὐρίσκεσθαι βασιλικάς τινας ψυχὰς and πολλαὶ γὰρ εἰσὶ βασιλείαι κ.τ.λ. If we alter καταβαίνει δὲ into συμβαίνει δὲ (εὐρίσκεσθαι), the passage fits in well at the end of § 10; and when it is placed there, οἱ (αι MSS.) μὲν ἀπὸ βασιλικοῦ διαζώματος is brought into connexion with οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ἐπιστημονικοῦ καὶ τεχνικοῦ in § 11.

§ 9. πολλαὶ γὰρ εἰσὶ βασιλείαι. οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶ (γὰρ εἰς MSS.) 'ψυχῶν αἱ δὲ σωμάτων'), αἱ δὲ τέχνης καὶ (αι δὲ τέχνης αἱ δὲ MSS.) ἐπιστήμης. The meaning must have been 'besides political kingship, there are also kingdoms of other kinds; for instance, there are kingdoms of art and science'. ψυχῶν αἱ δὲ σωμάτων must therefore be a corruption of some phrase describing kingship in the literal sense, i. e. political supremacy, as opposed to supremacy in other things. In what follows, we are told that Osiris was a king ἴοχὸς καὶ βῶμος, which appears to mean that he was supreme in political power; and the sense required here might be expressed by writing ἴοχος καὶ βῶμος in place of εἰς ψυχῶν αἱ δὲ σωμάτων.
EXCERPT XXVI: 7-9

Osiris was commonly described as 'king of the dead'. (Cf. Exc. XXIII. 62, where he is called πριντός τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς τύμανος.)

The 'kingships' with which this paragraph (§§8–11) is concerned are those held by incarnate souls, i.e. by living men. But the king of the dead cannot be a soul incarnated on earth; the mention of him is therefore irrelevant to the main argument. Perhaps the writer put it in merely because he was unwilling to miss an opportunity for speaking of Osiris.

If my corrections of the text are right, the contrasted terms ἀπογεγονότων and ζωντων have been altered into ἐπογεγονότων ἄθη ψυχῶν and σωμάτων by a transcriber; and it was probably the same man that wrote καὶ ἀποτέλεσμά ταύτα above in place of some other phrase.

καθηγητικὴς (καθηγητής MSS.) ὁ τρισμέγιστος Ἑρμῆς. Hermes is 'king of the art of teaching'; that is to say, he is the supreme philosopher or teacher of religion. Hermes and Asclepius are here regarded as men, and not as gods; their souls are 'kingly souls' which have been incarnated on earth.

Οὐκόσι δὲ καὶ βάρμης πάλιν Ὀσίρις, μεθ’ ὑπ’, ὁ τέκνον, αὐτός σύ. This must be taken to mean that Osiris, during his life on earth, was king of Egypt, but he has departed from this life, and his son Horus now reigns in his stead.

Osiris then is here spoken of as an instance of an ἐθνος ἱγεμόν. But he was mentioned above as 'king of the dead', and as such, was distinguished from ὁ ἐκάστου ἐθνος ἱγεμόν. If the two statements are to be taken together, we must understand that Osiris was formerly king of Egypt, but that his soul, having departed from the body, has been transformed into a god, and is now king of the dead. But if that is what the writer meant, it is strange that he has left the relation between his two statements about Osiris unexplained; and if Osiris and Horus are mentioned as instances of ἐθνος ἱγεμόνες, they ought to have been mentioned as such at the point where ὁ ἐκάστου ἐθνος ἱγεμόν is first spoken of. There
is therefore a strong reason to think that ἵστος δὲ . . . αὐτὸς σὺ has been added by a later hand.

Philosophos δὲ Ἀρνεβεσχήμης. Reitzenstein, P. 135, referring to Spiegelberg, Demotische Studien, I, pp. 28* and 41, says that Ἀρνεβεσχήμης means 'Horus, lord of Letopolis' (a town near the apex of the Delta). But the writer of these words in Exc. XXVI must have regarded Har-neb-eschenis as a person distinct from Horus the son and pupil of Isis.

As far as I know, there is no other evidence that this obscure local god was believed to have been a teacher of philosophy. Perhaps the man who wrote these words was an inhabitant of Letopolis, and was referring to a local tradition. In the view of the Hellenized Egyptians in general, the supreme philosopher was Hermes Trismegistus; and that is the view implied above, where Hermes is called βασιλεὺς καθήγητις. The two statements can hardly be reconciled; it is therefore probable that the mention of Ἀρνεβεσχήμης is a later addition.

ποιητικής δὲ πάλιν [ὁ] Ἀσκληπιὸς (ὁ καὶ) ἴμωθης. As to Ἀσκληπιὸς (ὁ καὶ) ἴμωθης, cf. Exc. XXIII. 6. But if his Egyptian name ἴμωθης (Imhotep) was to be given at all, why was it not given when he was mentioned above?

Being well known as a healer of the sick, Asclepius might very well be called βασιλεὺς λατρικῆς; but it is not clear why he should be called βασιλεὺς ποιητικῆς. According to Breasted, History of Egypt, 1906, pp. 83, 107, 112 f., 575, Imhotep, who was worshipped as a god from the time of the Sai'ted dynasty onwards, was vizier or counsellor of Zoser, one of the early kings of Egypt, and was the reputed author of a collection of proverbs well known in later times. Cf. the 'Lay of the Harper' (ib. p. 206): 'I have heard the words of Imhotep and Harzozef, whose utterances are of much reputation.' It is possible that the proverbs of Imhotep were composed in poetic form; but even if they were, that is hardly a sufficient reason for calling him 'king of the art of poetry', i.e. supreme above all other poets.

As the second mention of Asclepius, as well as the second mention of Osiris, gives rise to difficulties, it seems best to bracket the whole passage ἵστος δὲ καὶ ρώμης . . . ἴμωθῆς.

§ 10. ὁ μὲν πάντων κρατῶν, τέκνον, ἐκ τῆς ὑπεράνῳ (πάντων) χώρας ἐστὶν, οἱ (ὁ MSS.) ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος (ἐκ τῶν κατωτέρων;). For ὑπεράνῳ (πάντων), cf. § 1 fin. ὁ πάντων κρατῶν probably means the
supreme political ruler,—in the time of Isis, for instance, Osiris or Horus, and in the writer's time, the Roman emperor. oί τῶν κατὰ μέρος (κρατοῦντες) may be taken to mean those who are supreme in this or that particular department, e.g. Hermes, who is βασιλεὺς καθηγητικὴς, and Asclepius, who is βασιλεὺς ἱατρικής. If 'kingly souls' reside in more than one χώρα, as is implied in § 2 init., the souls of the 'kings of art and science' may come from places which are below the highest χώρα of all.

οὑμβαίνει (καταβαίνει MSS.) δὲ (εὑρίσκεσθαι) καὶ ἄλλας ἄλλοις (ἄλλοις codd.), τάς μὲν διαπόρους κ.τ.λ. ἄλλας means souls which are not 'kingly'. There are differences among souls of other kinds, as well as among kingly souls.

οὑμβαίνει δὲ (καὶ) τούτο παρά τὴν τῶν τόπων θέσιν κ.τ.λ. As something very like this was said about kingly souls in the beginning of the section, it seems necessary to insert καὶ before τούτο, which means the fact that there are differences among souls which are not kingly.

οὑμοιώτατος (κατ' MSS.) μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ βασιλικοῦ διαζώματος κατατηρήσαντες (κατατηρήδος τῆς MSS.) ὁμοιοίωτοι! βασιλεύοντο (βασιλευοῦσης MSS.) (ψυχὴς). It would be possible to write either αἱ μὲν . . . κατατηρήσασαι (ἐς. ψυχαί) or αἱ μὲν . . . κατατηρήσαντες. But as the subjects in the corresponding clauses of § 11 init. (οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ἐγγροῦ ... οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ... οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ἀργοῦ) are masculine, it is most likely that the author wrote αἱ μὲν and not αἱ μὲν here.

ὁμοιοτάτου is probably a corruption of some phrase by which βασιλεύοντο was qualified.

διαζωμα is here used as a synonym for ζώην or χώρα. A βασιλικόν διαζώμα is a χώρα in which βασιλικὴ ψυχαὶ reside. The absence of τοῦ before βασιλικοῦ διαζώματος implies that there are several such χώραι; this agrees with § 2 init.

§ 11. (οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ἐγγροῦ) ὁ (διαζώματος κατατηρήθητες (τετευχότες MSS.) [πυρὸς] ἔργαται γίγνονται καὶ τροφεῖς (τροφῆς MSS.)). ἔργαται καὶ τροφεῖς apparently means manual labourers, who maintain the community by their industry. But this notion is not very clearly expressed. Possibly τροφής may be a remnant of some such phrase as τροφής πορισταῖ.

πυρὸς ἔργαται is impossible. It is probable that πυρὸς was inserted by some one who misunderstood the author's meaning, and supposed that the different διαζώματα were distinguished by the presence of different elements in them, and that there was a fiery διαζώμα and

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**EXCERPT XXVI: I0, II**
a watery διάζωμα. The same misunderstanding seems to have caused the insertion of \[\text{[ol8« diro vypov or vypoi?&ia£a<fia(Sia^ukriv?) \]}\] above, and possibly also that of τὰς μὲν διαστώρους τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς in § 10.

§ 12. καὶ πάλιν ἀνέφηται (πάντα ἐκεῖσε θεῖον) κατεβῆ (ἐνα καταβῆ MSS.). This applies in the first place to incarnate souls; e.g. a βασιλικὴ ψυχὴ, when it quits the body, returns to one of the βασιλικὰ διαζώματα of the atmosphere. (Cf. § 2.) But the return of souls to their home above is only one instance among others of a law which holds good universally; all things on earth come from above, and return to the place from which they came. Compare Heraclitus, fr. 6o Diels, ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ωτῆ, and the quotations of that saying in later writers. Diog. Laert. 9. 8: καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν ὁδὸν ἄνω κάτω τόν τε κόσμον γίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτὴν. πυκνούμενον γὰρ τὸ πῦρ . . . γίνεσθαι ὁδὸρ, πυγνοῦμεν δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς γῆν τρέπεσθαι· καὶ ταυτήν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω εἶναι. πάλιν τε [αὐτὴν] τὴν γῆν χεῖσθαι, ἐς ἤς τὸ ὕδωρ γίνεσθαι, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὰ λοιπὰ . . . αὐτὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἦ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω ὁδὸς. Cleomedes De motu circ. corp. cael. i. 11. 61 Ziegler: ἡ γῆ . . . οὐκ ἔστων ἀδύνατον ἀναπτύσσειν τροφὴν τῷ ὄφραν· καὶ τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ, ὁδὸν ἀν ἐξαμβλωθεί (ἀλ. ἑξαμελθεί) τούτου ἑνεκα, ἐν μέρει καὶ αὐτῇ ἀντιλαμβάνοντα τυνα τε ἐκ τῶν ἀνερῶν καὶ εἰς ὄφραν. ὁδὸς γὰρ ἄνω κάτω, φησιν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος, 'ὅτι' (τῆς;) ὁλης όδοιας τρέπεσθαι καὶ μεταβάλλειν περικυκλώ. Philo De incorr. mundi 21. 109: περιθεῖ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου ταῖς ἄλλαις μεταβολαῖς, (καὶ) . . . θυνήσεις δοκοῦντα, ἀθανατίζεται, . . . τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω συνεχῶς ἀμείβοντα. Maximus Υγ. 41. 4: μεταβολὴν ὄρας σωμάτων καὶ γενέσεως ἀλλαγῆν, ὁδὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω, κατά τὸν Ἡράκλειτον. Iamblichus Περὶ ψυχῆς, Stob. 1. 49. 39, vol. i, p. 378. W.: Ἡράκλειτος μὲν γὰρ ἀμαβάς ἀναγκαὶς ἔτετεῖ ἐκ τῶν ἑναντίων, ὁδὸν τε ἄνω καὶ κάτω διαπορεύεσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς ἐπειλήφη.

The writer finds an illustration of the law of παλυνδρομία in the process of respiration. We draw our breath from the atmosphere, and breathe it out again into the atmosphere.

tότε (αὐτῶ) ἡμῶς οὐκέτι ὄδη ἑσμε, ἄλλ' ἀναβεβήκαμεν: that is, the man dies. Compare the explanation of the cause of death in Exc. XXIII. 68.

ἡμῶς implies that the writer assumes Isis and Horus to have been human beings, and not gods, at the time when the dialogue took place. Cf. ἡμῶς in § 13.

§ 13. προσεπιγίγνεται δὲ . . . καὶ ἐτερά τινα ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῆς (ἐκτὸς MSS.)
EXCERPT XXVI: 12, 13

In §§ 3-12, the writer has been speaking of qualities which the soul brings with it from its abode in this or that stratum of the atmosphere. In §§ 13-30, he speaks of qualities produced in the soul by the influence of the body in which it resides on earth. The contents of these two parts of the *libellus* were probably derived from different sources; and the connexion between them is not fully worked out. The writer's theory of unembodied souls and atmospheric strata (§§ 3-12) is based on the Platonic doctrine of unembodied souls, as adopted and modified by Posidonius; his theory of the influence of the body on the soul (§§ 13-30) may have been based on some Stoic treatise in which unembodied souls were ignored. According to one school of thought, it might be said that the differences between one man and another were already in existence, as differences between soul and soul, before the souls were incarnated; according to another school of thought, it might be said that these differences are caused by differences in the composition of the body. The writer of *Exc. XXVI* has sought to combine these two views, by saying that some of the differences between soul and soul existed before the incarnation of the souls, and others have resulted from their incarnation in bodies differently composed; but he does not tell us which of the qualities of souls are pre-existent and which of them are produced by the influence of the body, or how the pre-existent qualities are to be distinguished from the others.

The *φύραμα* is the body, regarded as a dough-like mass composed of portions of the four elements 'kneaded' or mingled together. Cf. Philo *De sacr. Abelis et Caini* 33. 107, Cohn I, p. 246: "Ὅταν ἐνθίσθη ἀπὸ τῶν ἄρτων τῆς γῆς, . . . ἀπαρχὴν φυράματος ὑμῶν ἄρτον . . . ἀφελείτη . . ." (Num. 15. 19). τὸ τοῖνον φύραμα κυρίος, εἰ χρή τάληθες εἰπείν, ἡμεῖς ἔσμεν αὐτοί, συμπειρομένων καὶ συγκεκριμένων πλείστων οὐσιών ἦν ἀποτελεθήμεν' ψυχήν γὰρ θερμῆν καὶ ξηρὰν ψυχήν, δυνάμεις έναντίας, ἀναμίξας καὶ ἀνακρατάμενος δ ἡμοπλάστῃ, ἐν ἐκ πασῶν ἑκατον ἡμῶν ἀπειράξετο συμφόρημα, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ φύραμα εἰρηται. 1 Marc. Aur. 7. 68: καὶ τὰ θρημα διασπᾶ τὰ μελιθρία τοῦ περιτεθραμμένου τοῦτον φυράματος (i.e. of the body).

συσταθμία means a coadjustment of weights or quantities; and

1 Philo ἵ, goes on to say τούτου τοῦ συμφορήματος, δ (οropsych) καὶ σῶμα δύο τὰ ἀριθμάτων τρήματα κεκλήρωσαι, τὰ ἀπαρχαὶ αὐτοτροφῶν: that is, the soul and the body are two of the things which are mixed together in the φύραμα. But that is a different application of the term φύραμα; in the preceding words, the φύραμα is the body, and the ingredients which are mixed together in it are 'hot, cold, moist, and dry', that is to say, the four elements.
The 'vapour' here spoken of is a thing in which the embodied soul is wrapped, and which acts as intermediary between the body and the soul. It is identical with the πνεῦμα spoken of in Corp. X. 16 f., where we are told that the πνεῦμα is the περιβολή of the soul. But the writer of Exx. XXVI uses the word πνεῦμα only to signify the element air, and employs ἀτμός, instead of πνεῦμα, to describe the 'envelope' in which the soul is wrapped. The ἀτμός is a material thing of gaseous substance; and the writer doubtless regarded the soul also as material, and thought of it as a thing consisting of more highly rarified gas.

The Stoics called the soul itself a πνεῦμα. But many people, while adopting the Stoic conception of the πνεῦμα σύμφωνον ἡμᾶς, distinguished the ψυχή from it, and interposed the πνεῦμα between the gross body and the ψυχή; and the author of this document interposes his ἀτμός in the same way.

Regarding the soul as a πνεῦμα, i.e. a sort of vapour, the Stoics said that it is an ἀναθυμιάσις given off by the watery material contained in the body, or by the blood. Arius Didymus 39. 2, Diels Doxogr. p. 470 f.: περὶ δὲ ψυχῆς Κλεάνθης . . . φησὶν ὅτι Ζήσων τὴν ψυχήν ἔλεγεν αἰσθητικῶς; καθάπερ Ἴρακλείτος. But many people, while adopting the Stoic conception of the πνεῦμα σύμφωνον ἡμᾶς, distinguished the ψυχή from it, and interposed the πνεῦμα between the gross body and the ψυχή; and the author of this document interposes his ἀτμός in the same way.

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2 The words ἀναθυμιάσις and ἀναθυμιάσις do not occur in Plato, but were frequently used by Aristotle and by the Stoics.


4 Cf. Ar. De an. 1. 2, 405 a 25: καὶ Ἴρακλείτος δὲ τὴν ἄρχην ἔλεγεν φορὶ ψυχῆς,
EXCERPT XXVI: 13

γάρ ἐμφανίσατι τι αἰ ψυχαί ἀναθυμώμεναι [νοεραί] \(^1\) ἂν γίνονται, ἀκαπν ἄετα τοῖς ποταμοῖς, λέγων οὕτως: "ποταμοίς τούσιν αὐτοῖς ἑμβαίνουσι."  \(^2\) (τοῖς γάρ ποταμοῖς) ἑτέρα καὶ ἑτέρα ὅθεν ἑπίρρειτ· καὶ ψυχαί δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὕδατός ἀναθυμώμεναι· ἀναθυμώμεν μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως τῷ Ἑρακλείτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποφαίνει, Ζήνων ἀισθητικὴν δὲ κ.χ.λ. Ἱδ. 39. 4: ἐδείκτηκεν ἐπὶ τῇ προσφέρειν, ὡσεὶ καὶ ὡσεὶ ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι διαμάθηνα γάρ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἀναθυμώντων ψυχής. \(^4\) Aetius, Diels ib. p. 389: Ἑρακλείτος τὴν μὲν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν ἀναθυμώμενον ἑκ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὕδατον, τῇ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ψυχαῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτος καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναθυμώμεσσος ὅμοιος. \(^5\) Diogenes Bab. (Stoic) ap. Galen Hipp. et Plat. 2. 8, Kühn V, p. 282: τὸ κινοῦν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τᾶς κατὰ προαιρέσεις κινῆσις ψυχῆς τῆς ἀναθυμίας. Longinus ap. Euseb. Pr. ev. 15. 21. 3: Ζήνων μὲν γάρ καὶ Κλεάνθης νεμοσύνης τής ἀν δικαίως, τοῦ ἐκφυγόν σώματος ἐδείκτηκεν τῇ ψυχήν ἀναθυμώμεις φύσις. τῇ γὰρ, ὡς πρὸς θεον, κοινὸν ἄλογον ἀναθυμίας καὶ ψυχῆς; Galen Comm. 5 in Hippocr. Epit. 6: ὅσος γὰρ οἰονίζει τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξεπεμένει, διασφάλισθαι λέγοντος αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀναθυμίας τοῦ αἰματος καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰσηκον ὄλκομνον διὰ τῆς πραξεῖς ἀρτηρίας εἶνα τοῦ σώματος (δέρος). \(^7\) ἐνεκα τῆς ἀναθυμίας, ἓν ἢ τάλα εὐνώμην. That sentence is obscure, and probably corrupt. There is no reason to think that the word ἀναθυμίας was used by Heraclitus himself; but it occurs repeatedly in reports or interpretations of his doctrine.

\(^1\) Diels says 'sinilitudinis gratia eterai dei exspectes' (in place of νοεραί dei). But it seems better to bracket νοεραί. The point is that souls, like rivers, are not permanently existing things, but 'are ever coming into existence' afresh.

\(^2\) Something equivalent to ὅπως ἐστιν διὰ ἐμβηται is wanted. (Cf. Heraclitus fr. 49 a Diels: ποταμοί τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἑμβαίνουμεν τε καὶ ὅμεδραν συνεβαίνουμεν'. Ἱδ. fr. 91: τοσοῦ ἤδε ὅπως ἐστιν ἐμβηται διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καθ' Ἑρακλείτου. Πλ. Κρατ. 402 α : Heraclitus λέγει ὅπως ἐστιν τῶν αὐτοῖς ποταμών ὅπως ἐστιν ἐμβηται. Ατ. Μελ. 3. 5, 1010 α 13: Ἑρακλείτου ... εἰσιντι διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ποταμοῦ ὅπως ἐστιν ἐμβηται.) The words ἑτέρα καὶ ἑτέρα ὅθεν ἑπίρρειτ· are not quoted from Heraclitus; they are a part of the writer's explanation of Heraclitus' meaning; and τοῖς γάρ ποταμοίς, or something of the sort, must have been lost before them.

\(^3\) αποθεούναι τῇ ... ἀναθυμιάσαις von Arnim: περὶ τὴν τὸν ... ἀναθυμιάσεις MSS.: περίερχονται τῇ ... ἀναθυμιάσεις (misprint for -αθθθατας) Diels.

\(^4\) In this last clause the doctrine of disembodied souls resident in the atmosphere presents itself in a simple and undeveloped form. That doctrine was further elaborated by Posidonius, who combined it with the Platonic notion of pre-existing souls; and it was adopted from Posidonius, with some variations, by the authors of Exc. XXIII-XXVI.

\(^5\) Perhaps: τὴν δὲ ἐν τοῖς ψυχαῖς ἀναθυμιάσαις καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀναθυμώμενος ὅμοιος.

\(^6\) It would have been more correct to say τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ὄγρων, et τοῦ αἰματος. Cf. Galen Hipp. et Plat. 2. 8: et δὲ τοῦ ψυχής (sc. Διογένης et Βαβ.) Κλεάνθης καὶ Χρυσόφως καὶ Ζήνων, τρέφοντας μὲν καὶ ἀιματος φήσαι τῇ ψυχής, ὡσεὶ δὲ αὐτὴς ἐκεῖν τῷ πνεύμα κ.χ.λ.

\(^7\) δέρος add. Arnim.
The writer of *Exc. XXVI* has adopted the word *anathymiasis* from the Stoics, but employs it somewhat differently; instead of speaking of an *anathymiasis* given off by the watery matter in the body, he speaks of an *anathymiasis* given off by the ‘mixture of the four elements’ of which the body consists. As used by the Stoics, *anathymiasis* meant an exhalation of vapour formed by the transmutation of earth or water into air or fire; and in that sense, an *anathymiasis* could be given off only by earth or water, not by fire or air.

The writer’s object in speaking of the *drumos* is to explain how the body acts on the soul. He says that the body produces an *drumos*, and that this *drumos* derives qualities from the body, and produces corresponding qualities in the soul. But why should he say that the *drumos* imparts qualities to the body also? The statement in the text, as far as it concerns the body, amounts to this: ‘if there is an excess of fire, for instance, in the composition of the body, there results thence an excess of heat in the *drumos* produced by the body, and from this again results an excess of heat (or a quality associated with an excess of heat) in the body’. That is a purposeless and unmeaning complication. If qualities of the body are to be spoken of at all in this connexion, it would surely be better to say merely (as is said in §§ 15–17) that they result from an excess or deficiency of this or that element in the composition of the body, and not to attribute them to the influence of the *drumos*. The passage, as it stands in the MSS., shows confusion of thought; and I am inclined to think that the words in which the body is mentioned have been added by a blundering transcriber, and that the text originally ran thus: *ex * (i.e. from the mixture of the four elements of which the body consists) *anathymaταί τις * *drumos*, δι περιτλείται τῇ ψυχῇ, μεταδιδόμενος αὐτῇ τῆς ίδιας ποιότητος, καὶ οὗτος αὐτί διαφορά τῶν ψυχῶν γίνονται. See § 29 fin., where the text has been similarly altered by the addition of *ή τῆν τοῦ σώματος.*


*τὸ τηνικαῖα ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς θερμῆ τῆς φύσιν ὑπάρχουσα καὶ ξέρειν θέρμῶν προσλαβοῦσα ἀκαυρωδεστέρα γενομένη ποιεῖ τὸ ξύλον ἐνεργητέραν.*
There is something wrong here. Perhaps ἐκπυροδεστέρα ἁγενομένη is an alternative for ἔτερον θερμὸν προσλαβόντα, and ought to be bracketed. Omitting those two words, we might translate 'the fact that the soul is hot by nature and has received an addition of heat makes the animal more energetic'. But that is not satisfactory; and it is most likely that there is some more extensive corruption. The meaning wanted might be better expressed by writing τὸ τημικαῦτα, τῆς ψυχῆς θερμῆς τὴν φύσιν ἐπαρχοῦσης καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄτμου, ἐκπυροδεστέρου δυνατόν, ἔτερον θερμὸν προσλαβόνσης, ἐνεργότερον γίνεται τὸ ζῷον. But perhaps the best remedy would be to bracket τὸ τημικαῦτα ἡ ψυχή . . . ἐκπυροδεστέρα γενομένη, and alter ποιεῖ τὸ ζῷον (acc.) into ποιεῖται τὸ ζῷον (nom.).

[τὸ δὲ σῶμα δεῖ καὶ εὑκώντων]. If these words are to be retained, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν οὐ τῷ μὲν ψυχῇ must be inserted before ἐνεργότερον. But it would be impossible to say ἡ ψυχὴ ποιεῖ τὸ σῶμα (οὐ ποιεῖ τὸ ζῷον τῷ σῶματι) δεῖ; for it is not the soul, but the συσταθείμα τῶν στοιχείων in the composition of the body, that produces bodily qualities. It is probable then that in this section qualities of soul alone were originally spoken of, and that τὸ δὲ σῶμα δεῖ καὶ εὑκώντων is a later addition. And that being so, there is some reason to suspect that in the following sections also the words which have to do with qualities of the body (viz. μὲν in § 16 init. and τὰ μέντοι σῶματα . . . καὶ δύσιν ἐκπύνστε in § 16 fin.; μὲν in § 17 init. and τὸ δὲ σῶμα . . . μετακινοῦμενον in § 17 fin.) have been added by a later hand. See § 29 fin.

§ 15. κοφὸν καὶ πτητικὸν καὶ ἀνεδραστὸν γίνεται τὸ ζῷον καὶ ψυχῇ καὶ σῶματι. The writer must have been thinking of birds when he selected these three adjectives. Birds (and bird-like men) have an excess of air in the composition of their bodies; and this makes them not only literally 'light' and 'apt to hop about' and 'not apt to settle down' in body, but also metaphorically 'light' &c. in soul. The words καὶ ψυχῇ καὶ σῶματι, supposing them to have been written by the original author, may be taken as equivalent to ὡς τῷ σῶματι, οὕτω καὶ τῷ ψυχῇ.

§ 16. τὸ ζῷον τῇ [μὲν Ὁ] ψυχῇ γίγνεται εὑροῦν (ἐὑχροῦν MSS.) [καὶ εὐφώς] καὶ εὑρείκτων, ἰκανῶς τοῖς ἄλλοις (ἐπισκοπέων καὶ Ὁ) κολληθῇ-ναι δυνάμενον. τὸ ζῷον means the living being, which consists of body and soul in combination. It may be either man or beast; and in this sentence the writer seems to be thinking chiefly of men.

1 Either πυροδεστέρα or ἔκπυροδεστέρα would be better than ἐκπυροδεστέρα.
When there is an excess of water in the composition of the body, the result is that the soul, like water, 'flows freely', and 'diffuses itself readily'; and in that case the man is well able to 'cleave to the others', or unite with other men or things, as water unites with things into which it soaks, or dissolves into itself things which are soaked in it. Does this mean that the man is of a social disposition,—that he is ready to make friends with his neighbours, and is able to influence them and apt to be influenced by them? Or does it refer to intellectual qualities, and mean that he readily brings his mind to bear on things and readily receives impressions from them? τοίς δὲ ἄλλοις (sc. ζῴως;) seems to agree better with the former interpretation; if external objects in general were meant, we should have expected rather τοῖς πράγμασιν, οί τοῖς ἐκτὸς. But καὶ ἐφύσει was probably added by some one who thought that the sentence had to do with intellectual ability.

διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἑνωτικὸν καὶ κοινωνικὸν τοῦ ὤδατος ἐφιζάνει (ἐνοῦται) γὰρ πίσι (sc. τὸ ὀδορ). There is no sense in saying that water 'sits upon' or 'settles down on' all things; ἐφιζάνει must therefore have been substituted by error for some other verb. If ἑνωτικὸν is retained, it must be taken to mean 'apt to unite itself with things', from ἐνοῦσθαι, and not 'apt to unite things', from ἐνοῦν. But it is probable that the missing verb for which ἐφιζάνει has been substituted is ἐνοῦται, and that ἑνωτικὸν has arisen out of ἐνοῦται misplaced.

καὶ πολὺ μὲν ἐν (καὶ περιλαβὸς) εἰς ἑνωτικόν ἀναλύει [καὶ περιλαμβάνει], ὁλίγον δὲ ὑπάρχον καὶ καταδύον (καταδύον MSS.) ἐκεῖνο γίγνεται ὁ ἔμυγή. καὶ περιλαμβάνει has probably come from πολὺ μὲν ἐν (καὶ περιλαβὸς), written in correspondence to ὁλίγον δὲ ὑπάρχον καὶ καταδύον. (It is possible, however, that the author wrote merely πολὺ μὲν ἐν εἰς ταύτῳ ἀναλύει, ὁλίγον δὲ ὑπάρχον ἐκείνο γίγνεται ὁ ἔμυγη, and that both καὶ περιλαβὸν and καὶ καταδύον were added by some one else.) If a large quantity of water is poured on a small quantity of earth, for instance, the water envelopes the earth and dissolves it. If a small quantity of water is poured on a large quantity of earth, the water sinks into the mass of earth, and disappears: and in the latter case it might be thought that the water was transmuted into earth (ἐκεῖνο γίγνεται ὁ ἔμυγη).

[καὶ τοῦ ῾ιδίου σύνθεσιν κατ' ὁλίγον ἐκπύπτει]. What is the point of ῾ιδίου? Possibly the meaning is 'the bond which holds together the parts of the body itself, as opposed to the bond which holds together the body and the soul; but the phrase is obscure.
EXCERPT XXVI: 17

οὐκοὖν, 'little by little', is also difficult to explain; we should rather have expected something equivalent to μικρὰ τινὶ ἀφορμὴ. The words καὶ τοῦ . . . ἐκπίπτει are not needed, and may be omitted with advantage; perhaps they may have come from a marginal note on the preceding clause.

§ 17. ἀμβλεία [μὲν] τοῦ ζῴου ἢ ψυχῆ γίνεται. μὲν is out of place. It seems intended to point forward to τὸ δὲ σῶμα κ.τ.λ.; but if that was the writer's intention, he ought to have written ἢ μὲν ψυχῆ τοῦ ζῶου ἀμβλεία γίνεται. This confirms the suspicion that the mentions of bodily qualities in §§ 15–17 are later additions.

οὐκ ἔχουσα τὴν [σωματικήν] ἐκπονθητα ἐλύτου, [οὔδε . . . ἀλλ' ἐμφνοι μὲνει παρ' ἐαυτῷ,] ἐπὶ [βάρους καὶ] τῆς πυκνότητος τοῦ ἀτμοῦ; πεθηκέωσα. There can be little doubt that the two participle-clauses, οὐκ ἔχουσα τὴν . . . ἀραιότητα ἐλύτου and ἐπὶ . . . πυκνότητος . . . πεθηκέωσα, were meant to be contiguous, and that the passage οὔδε . . . ἐαυτῷ in which the verbs are in the indicative, has been wrongly interposed between them. If that passage occurred at all in the original text, it must have stood after πεθηκέωσα; but it seems more probable that it is a note added by a reader.

σωματικὴν ἀραιότητα is impossible. It is not the body, but the soul, that is ἀραιόν; and in the case here spoken of, the body must be πυκνὸν or στερεὸν even beyond the average of bodies, since it contains an excess of τὸ γεώδες. If we write τὴν ἰδίαν ἀραιότητα, the words may be taken to mean that the soul, though itself ἀραιόν, cannot easily free itself from the πυκνῶν in which it is enveloped or entangled.

βάρος may have come from ἄργον καὶ βάρι below.

(τῆς) πυκνότητος must have been followed by some substantive in the genitive. As the writer held that it is by means of the ἀτμός that the body acts on the soul, his view would be best expressed by writing ὑπὸ τῆς πυκνότητος τοῦ ἀτμοῦ πεθηκέωσα. But in §§ 15 and 16 he speaks of the influence of the body on the soul without mentioning the ἀτμός by which the influence is conveyed; and supposing that he did so here also, he may have written τοῦ σῶματος, or τοῦ φυράματος.

οὔδὲ 'τοῦ δὲ' οὖθ᾽ ἐκ (πηθῆσαι) (δύνα)ται (πηθῆσαι MSS.) πεπαχυκ(ς)-

μένων τῶν αἰσθητικῶν (τοῦ σῶματος;) μερῶν (μελῶν MSS.), ἀλλ' ἐνδον μένει παρ' ἐαυτῷ.] τοῦ δὲ οὖθ' seems to have taken the place of some phrase by which ἐκπήδησα was qualified. It may have come from τοῦ ἰδίου in § 16 fin.; or possibly the original reading may have been οὔδε (ἐκ) τοῦ (ἐδίου ἢ τόπου;) εκ(πηθῆσαι (δύνα)ται.
... means the bodily organs of sense; and τὸ σῶματος must be either inserted or understood. The sense-organs (especially, perhaps, the eyes) are here regarded as doorways or passages through which the soul issues forth from its abode (in the heart) to get knowledge of the external world. When there is an excess of earth in the body, these organs are exceptionally thick or dense, and the soul consequently cannot make its way through them; it has to stay within and remain in ignorance.

The writer of this statement ignores the theory of an ἀτμός interposed between body and soul, and assumes that the activity of the soul is directly and immediately affected by the density of certain parts of the body.

A mention of the 'thickening of the bodily sense-organs' would have been more appropriately placed in the following passage, τὸ δὲ σῶμα κ.τ.λ., supposing that passage to have been present in the original text.

§ 18. τὸ τῷ θερμὸν μέν (μέν) εἰς πράξειν, καύσῳ δὲ εἰς κίνησιν, ἑὐκρατοῦ δὲ εἰς ἁφήν, [γενναίον] δὲ εἰς ποταμοὺς κατασκευασταί. The adjectives are probably intended to apply both to the body and to the soul, as in § 15; we may supply in thought καὶ ψυχῆ καὶ σώματι, or ὡς τῷ σῶματι, οὕτω καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ. A satisfactory sense might be got by altering εὐκρατοῦ δὲ εἰς ἁφήν into εὐπερίκλετον (or εὐμυτοῦ) δὲ εἰς συναφῆν, 'readily diffusing itself so as to unite with things' (cf. εὐρόν καὶ εὐπερίκλετον κ.τ.λ. in § 16, and εἰς συμπαγίαν περίχυσις in § § (27)). [γενναίον indicates fixity or firmness: cf. Ar. H.A. 488 b 19; Physiogm. 809 b 10.]

(§ 27. τὸ μὲν γάρ (αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ MSS.) γεωδής ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ σῶματος πῆςίς κ.τ.λ.). This section is out of place where it stands in the MSS. It must have been written to follow § 18; but it may have been added (in that place) by a transcriber. Earth and water are apparently here spoken of as affecting the body alone (ἡ τοῦ σῶματος πῆςίς, and ἡ ἐν τούτῳ—i. e. τῷ σῶματι—περίχυσις), and air and fire, as affecting the ζῷον as a whole (ἡμῶν), i. e. the body and soul in combination. That is hardly in agreement with the doctrine taught elsewhere in §§ 13–30, that an excess or deficiency of any of the four elements in the composition of the body affects both the qualities of the body (immediately) and those of the soul (through the operation of the intervening ἀτμός).

§§ 19–23. δοκεὶ δὲν... διὰ τὸ συγγενέσις κατοικεῖ. In these sections it is said that, if the quantities of the several elements of which the body is composed are proportioned to one another in a certain way,
the ζυζον produced is a bird; if they are proportioned in another way, the ζυζον produced is a man; and so on. This has little connexion with the preceding sections, and is hardly consistent with them. In §§ 13–18 we have been told that an excess of fire, for instance, in the composition of the body produces certain qualities in the soul (and body) of the ζυζον. That is apparently intended to apply both to men and to beasts, but more especially to men (ἡμύν, § 13), and to account for the fact that one man differs from another in quality of soul. But in §§ 19–23, we are told that if there is a large proportion of fire in the composition of the body, and also a large proportion of air, the ζυζον is a bird, but if there is a large proportion of fire and only a small proportion of air, the ζυζον is a man. If these statements are to be brought into connexion with one another, we must assume that the soul-qualities which, according to §§ 13–18, are produced by an excess of fire (viz. 'energy and spiritedness') are qualities which all birds and all men possess in common. But nothing of the sort is said in the text; and no attempt is made to show how the contents of §§ 19–23 are to be reconciled with those of §§ 13–18. It is therefore most likely that this paragraph (§§ 19–23) was not written by the author of the document, but was inserted in it by a later hand.

The meaning of the paragraph has been obscured by some corruptions of the phrases in which the proportions of the several elements are stated in each of the five cases dealt with. With the corrections which I propose, we get a scheme which, if we substitute definite numbers for the vague πλείων, μέτρων, and ὄλγον of the text, and assume in each case a total of eight parts, may be represented in tabular form as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birds</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Quadrupeds</th>
<th>Reptiles</th>
<th>Fishes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fire, 3</td>
<td>fire, 3</td>
<td>fire, 1</td>
<td>fire, 0</td>
<td>fire, 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>air, 3</td>
<td>air, 1</td>
<td>air, 1</td>
<td>air, 2</td>
<td>air, 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>water, 1</td>
<td>water, 2</td>
<td>water, 3</td>
<td>water, 3</td>
<td>water, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>earth, 1</td>
<td>earth, 2</td>
<td>earth, 3</td>
<td>earth, 3</td>
<td>earth, 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this table, μέτρων is taken to mean two parts out of eight, πλείων three parts, and ὄλγον one part, in the case of birds, men, quadrupeds, and reptiles. In the case of fishes, πλείων is taken to mean six parts and ὄλγον two parts, so that the proportion between πλέον and ὄλγον is the same as in the other cases, though the quantities are doubled.
In §§ 13-18, the point insisted on was the connexion between an excess or deficiency of this or that element and the presence of corresponding qualities of soul. In §§ 19-23, a connexion of that kind is mentioned in the case of men (τὸ περισσὸν τοῦ θερμοῦ εἰς σύνεσιν ἑτράπη), quadrupeds (τῇ δὲ τοῦ θερμοῦ πιευστὶ ἀλκιμώτερα γέγονε), reptiles (τῇ τοῦ πυρὸς στερήσει ἀτολμία γέγονε), and fishes (τῇ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ δέρος στερήσει δειλά ἐστι), but not in the case of birds.

But in constructing his scheme of the proportions of the four elements in the composition of the several kinds of ζῷα, the writer seems (except in the case of men) to have been thinking chiefly of the creature's place of abode. Birds fly aloft; they must therefore have in their composition much of τὰ ἀνωφερὴ αἰσθήσει (fire and air), of which the atmosphere consists, and little of τὰ κατωφερὴ (water and earth). Quadrupeds walk on the ground; they must therefore have in their composition much of τὰ κατωφερὴ, and little of τὰ ἀνωφερὴ. Reptiles, like quadrupeds, live on the surface of the earth, and must therefore, like quadrupeds, consist chiefly of τὰ κατωφερὴ; but as they stand lower than quadrupeds in the scale of existence, the writer assigns to them no fire and two parts of air, as against the one part of fire and one of air assigned to quadrupeds. Fishes live in the water, and die if taken out of it and placed in air; hence it may be inferred that they have in them no ἀνωφερὲς at all, but consist wholly of τὰ κατωφερὴ,—much water, combined with a little earth to give solidity to their bodies, which would be fluid if composed wholly of water. The case of men is exceptional. Since men, like quadrupeds and reptiles, live on the surface of the earth, they ought, according to the principle which is applied in the other cases, to have in them the same preponderance of τὰ κατωφερὴ; but owing to the Stoic association of fire with intelligence, the writer felt it necessary to assign to men a large proportion of fire, and consequently to cut down their allowance of the other elements. He tells us that the excess of fire in men 'is converted into intelligence'. He assigns an excess of fire to birds also; but it must be supposed that in the case of birds the extra fire is not converted into intelligence, but takes effect in some other way.

It is strange that men are placed between birds and quadrupeds. Possibly the paragraph originally dealt with irrational animals only, and the mention of men was inserted later.

§ 19. ὅσα οὖν (τ. ζῷα) [τὸ βε τῷ λόγῳ] κεκοινωνηκε πλείωνοι μὲν πυρὸς καὶ πνεύματος, (ἄλιγου δὲ ὑδάτω καὶ γῆς) ταῦτα ἀπωρεῖται. Does
The proportion of each of the four elements ought to be stated in each of the five cases; and the μέν after πλείονος shows that a corresponding statement about water and earth must have followed. The adjective might be either ὕδατος or ἐλάσττων; but as ὕδατος is the word used in §§ 20, 21, and 23, I have written it here also.

§ 20. πλείονος μὲν πυρὸς, ὕδατος δὲ πνεύματος, ὕδατος δὲ (μετρίων) καὶ γῆς ἱσης. ὕδατος καὶ γῆς ἱσης is unintelligible. ὕδατος καὶ γῆς ἱσης might mean 'water and air in equal proportions'; but that would be too indefinite. If we insert μετρίων after ὕδατος δὲ, and take ἱσης to mean 'likewise μετρίας', we get the proportions which the scheme requires.

ο γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς θερμὸν τι χρῆμα ἔστιν. This is Stoic doctrine. Compare the Stoic speaker's exposition in Cic. Nat. deor. 2. 23-32, which is probably based on Posidonius.

διαδύνει δὲ [κατὰ] (διὰ) πάντων [καὶ ἐπίσταται]. ἐπίσταται is probably a misplaced variant for the preceding οὐδὲ.

§ 21. πλείονος μὲν ὕδατος, πλείονος δὲ γῆς, [μετρίων δὲ] (ὁ ὕδατος δὲ) πνεύματος καὶ [ὁ ὕδατος δὲ] πυρὸς. The meaningless δὲ before πυρὸς shows that there is something wrong in the text of the MSS.; and in connexion with πνεύματος, μετρίων (the average amount) cannot be right. If there is more than the average of both water and earth, there ought to be less than the average of both air and fire. μετρίων has doubtless come from § 20, where it is needed; and ὕδατος δὲ, which ought to stand before πνεύματος, has been transposed.

ταῦτα ἀποτεθηρίσθησαν. By θηρία the writer means quadrupeds. He wanted to use a verb, and did not venture to coin such a word as ἀποτετερατοῦσθαι.

τῇ δὲ τοῦ θερμοῦ παροικία (περιοικία MSS.) ἀλκιμότερα γέγονε τῶν ἄλλων. τῇ τοῦ θερμοῦ περιοικία is inconsistent with ὕδατος πυρὸς. Reading παροικία, we may take the meaning to be that quadrupeds, having in them some fire (though not much), are thereby made more pugnacious than 'the other animals' (viz. the reptiles and the fishes), which have no fire in them.1 τῶν ἄλλων must be understood to

1 The writer overlooks the fact that some quadrupeds (e.g. hares) are hardly more pugnacious than snakes and fishes.
mean, not ‘all animals other than quadrupeds’ (which would include birds and men), but ‘animals other than those of which I have already spoken’. Birds and men have much fire in them, and therefore, if the writer’s theory holds good in their case, ought to be even more ἀλκιμα than quadrupeds; but about that he says nothing.

§ 22. οὐδεὶς γῆς (μὲν) καὶ ὀδατος [ἴσων] (πλείωνος) κεκοινωνηκε, (πνεύματος δὲ μετρίων, πυρὸς δὲ οὐδενός,) ταῦτα ἀφηρητῶται (ἀφειρητῶθη MSS). The addition of πυρὸς δὲ οὐδενός is made necessary by the following words τῇ τοῦ πυρὸς στεφήσει. But what are the proportions of the other three elements? Reptiles must surely have in them as large a proportion of τὰ κατωφερὴ as quadrupeds; and if so, πλείωνος is the word wanted in connexion with earth and water. It might perhaps be possible to take ἰσων as referring to πλείωνος μὲν ὀδατος πλείωνος δὲ γῆς in § 21, and assume that it means ‘in the same proportion as in the preceding case’. That would make ἰσων equivalent to πλείωνος; but the meaning would be obscurely expressed, and it seems better to substitute πλείωνος for ἰσων. And if there is πλεῖον of earth, πλεῖον of water, and no fire, the proportion of air required to make up the right total is μέτριον. (3 + 3 + 2 + 0 = 8.)

Τῇ δὲ τοῦ ὀδατος [κοινηνία] (περιουσίᾳ) ὑγρα (ψυχρά MSS.) ἐγένετο, τῇ δὲ τῆς γῆς βαρέα καὶ νωθρα, τῇ δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος (κοινηνία) 'εὐκίνητα εἰ προαρέσει τῷ κινείσθαι'. The right word to correspond to πλείωνος is περιουσία, and not κοινηνία, which, like κεκοινωνηκε above, would be equally applicable whether the quantity of the thing were πλεῖον, μέτριον, or ὀλίγον. Consequently, if we write πλείωνος above, we must substitute περιουσία for κοινηνία in connexion with earth and water, and make κοινηνία apply to air alone, the quantity of which is μέτριον.

According to the Stoics, air is τὸ ψυχρόν, and water τὸ ὑγρόν. For this reason, we expect to be told that a surplus of water makes things ὑγρά, rather than ψυχρά; and it is most likely that ψυχρά is a misreading for ὑγρά. Cf. τῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑγρότητα, said of reptiles, in § 5.

The words εὐκίνητα εἰ προαρέσει τῷ κινείσθαι, with some alteration, might be made to mean ‘able to move easily or quickly if they choose to move’. εὐκίνητα seems hardly consistent with βαρέα καὶ νωθρά; but the writer may have meant that a snake usually moves slowly or lies motionless, and yet is capable of making a quick and sudden dart.

§ 23. πλείωνος μὲν ὑγροῦ, ὀλίγου δὲ ἕρποι, (πυρὸς δὲ καὶ πνεύματος οὐδενός). πυρὸς δὲ καὶ πνεύματος (ἢ θερμοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀέρος) οὐδενός must
be added here, because τῇ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ ἄρος στερήσει follows. Fishes are δειλά because of the absence of τὸ θερμόν in their composition, and καταδυτικά (i.e. κατωφερή in the extreme) because of the absence of air and fire (τὰ ἀνωφερή).

τῇ δὲ τοῦ ὄγρου περιουσίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοῦ γεώδους παρουσίᾳ (περιουσία MSS.) ἐν ὁλευμένῃ γῇ καὶ ὅδα διὰ τὸ συγγενές κατοικεῖ. Here again, as in § 21, παρουσία has been wrongly altered into περιουσία. The proportion of earth is ὀλέγον.

ὁλευμένη γῇ καὶ ὅδα must be a corruption of some phrase meaning ‘water which has a little earth dissolved in it’. Fishes are composed of much water and a little earth; and they live in an environment composed of the same elements. The water of rivers, lakes, and seas is not the pure element water; it always contains some earth.

For the notion that the differences between the several kinds of animals result from the different proportions of the four elements in the composition of their bodies, cf. Schol. in Hermog. ideas, Walz Rhet. Gr. VII, p. 884 (Arnim Sto. II, § 789): οἱ μὲν γὰρ Στωικοὶ λέγουσι μή (ἀσώματον;) ἐίναι (τὴν) ψυχὴν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς κράσεως τῶν στοιχείων ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν γένεσιν (αὐτῆς;) ὅταν μὲν γὰρ πλεονάσῃ τὸ θερμόν, ποιεῖ τὸν λέοντα, ὅθεν, φησί, καὶ θυμικὸς ἤστων; ὅταν δὲ κατὰ λόγον καὶ σχεδὸν ἐξ ὅσον σύνεκλη, ποιεῖ τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ταύτης τῆς δόξης προστάτης ἐγένετο καὶ Γαληνός.

§ 34. ἐκινητός μὲν . . . στοιχείων οὐσιομετρίας.1 This passage, as given in the MSS., is meaningless; but it evidently dealt with the proportionate quantities of the several elements in the composition of living bodies. It is to be inferred from the words τὰ λουτὰ ἔξα that men were spoken of in the earlier part of the section; we may therefore insert τῶν ἀνθρώπων in connexion with τὰ σώματα. It seems probable that ὀλιγομετρίαν is a corruption of ὀλιγομορίαν (meaning τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῆς μορίας), which would be a suitable term to stand in contrast to τῆς μοίρας τῆς ὑπεροχῆς (περιουσία MSS.); and it is not unlikely that οὐσιομετρίας also is a corruption of ὀλιγομορίας (or possibly of ὀσμομετρίας). The text cannot be restored with any certainty; but we can see what the passage was about; and its writer (whether the author of the libellus or a transcriber) may have intended it to follow §§ 18 and 27.

1 Cf. Exc. XXVI. 14: εἰ μὲν γὰρ . . . πλεονάσει τὸ πῦρ, . . . ποιεῖ(ταῖς;) τὸ ζῷον . . . θυμικόν.

2 The theory here reported differs in detail from that of Exc. XXVI. 19-23, according to which the proportions of the four elements in man are not equal; but it is constructed on similar principles.
§ 25. [ἡ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην σύνδον γενομένη κράσις καὶ ὁ ἐκ ταύτης ἀναθαμμένος ἄτμος.]

This is a misplaced alternative for ὁ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης σύνδος καὶ κράσεως τῶν στοιχείων γεγομένου ἄτμος in § 28.

εἴ δέον (μὲν τὸ φύραμα) τὴν ἰδίαι τηρεῖ ποιότητα (τὴν ἰδίαι τηροῦσιν ἰδιότητα MSS.). The missing subject must have been τὸ φύραμα or some term of similar meaning, e.g. τὸ σύγκραμα (§ 29), or ἡ σύστασις τοῦ σώματος. The presence of two nominatives (κράσις and ἄτμος) in the misplaced scrap which precedes has caused τηρεῖ to be altered into τηροῦσιν.

The phrase τῆς ἰδίας ἰδιότητος occurs in Exc. XVI. 6, and may perhaps be there justified by the context; but τὴν ἰδίαιν ἰδιότητα is hardly possible here.¹ The word ἰδιότης is equivalent to ἰδία ποιότης; and the sense wanted may be got by writing either τὴν ἰδίαι τηρεῖ ποιότητα or τηρεῖ τὴν ἰδιότητα.

In §§ 13–18, the writer has been speaking of the proportions in which the four elements are present in the body when it is first formed. In §§ 25–29, he goes on to say that these proportions may be altered during the life of the ζῷον, and explains the effect of such alterations. Health consists in the maintenance of the original proportions, whatever they may be in the particular case;² and when the original proportion of any one of the four elements is increased or diminished, disease results. (An increase of τὸ θερμόν, for instance, might produce fever.)

1 In Sap. Sal. 2. 23, ὁ δεδ. ἔκται τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ἀρθαρίᾳ, καὶ ἐτέλος τῆς ἰδίαις ἰδιότητος ἐκφέρεσιν αὐτῶν (Swete), it is almost certain that the right reading is τῆς ἰδίαις ἰδιότητος. See Goodrick's note ad loc.

² It may be inferred from §§ 13–18, if I have understood that passage rightly, that the writer holds not only that the original proportions in the case of a man differ from the original proportions in the case of a bird or a fish, but also that the original proportions in the case of one man differ from the original proportions in the case of another man.
The emendation ΟΥΚΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΛΕΓΩ for ΟΥΚΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΛΛΕΓΩ may be accepted as certain. The writer guards against misunderstanding by mentioning two other kinds of alterations, and explaining that his statement does not apply to them. The second of these is described in the words τῇ κατ' αδίκησιν γυνομένη μεταβολή τῶν σωμάτων, the meaning of which is clear. As a child grows, the quantity of each of the four elements of which its body is composed necessarily increases; but provided that the proportions of the four elements to one another are maintained without change, there is no disease, and the healthy child grows into a healthy man. But what is the first of the two kinds of alteration that the writer says he does not mean? His description of it has been corrupted into ἐνεργεὶ ἀλ τῆς περιοχῆς. A satisfactory sense might be got by writing τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ περι- ἔχουσος, 'I do not mean (an increase or diminution which is effected) by the operation of the environment'. If a man is exposed to a hot sun, or stands before a fire, his body is heated; that is, the amount of τὸ θερμὸν in it is in some sense increased. But that is not the sort of increase that this paragraph is concerned with; you do not fall ill every time you warm yourself. We may suppose that in such cases the θερμὸν added from without merely penetrates the body, and is not organically combined with it; the additional 'fire' (or heat, regarded as a material substance,) does not enter into the σύστασις in such a way as to become a constituent part of it. If in some instance the heat of the sun does so enter into the bodily σύστασις as to alter its proportions, we have a case of sunstroke.

[οὖς] has come from § 26 init.

§ 26. [ἐπὶν γὰρ οὖς διατηθῇ τὸ τε θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ἀρώδες, ἡ δὲ σύσκεψη ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸτε ἐν 'ἀλληγορίαις' καὶ ἐκφάντασις γίνεται τὸ ζων. If this is read in connexion with the preceding sentence, οὖς διατηθῇ must mean 'are increased or diminished'. We should have expected to be told that, when the fire in the body is increased or diminished, the ζων falls into certain diseases, and when the air is increased or diminished, the ζων falls into certain other diseases. But instead of that, we are here told that when both the fire and the air are increased or diminished, the ζων falls into 'alllegories and ecstasies'. Εκφάντασις might perhaps mean ἐκφάντασις μανική, i.e. some form of mental disease (insanity, delirium, or loss of consciousness); but ἀλληγορίαι are not diseases.1

1 I have thought of proposing ἡγγορολαία (or ἡγγορολαίας), in the sense of 'attacks of insomnia'. (In the magic papyri, there are spells which are expected to pro-
We are also told that τὸ θερμὸν and τὸ ἀέρωδες (the fire and air in the body? or fire and air in general?) are σύσκεψις τῆς ψυχῆς. What does that mean? According to the preceding sections, the four elements are mixed together in the body, and an embodied soul, if it is σύσκεψις with any of them, must be σύσκεψις with all four; though it would be more correct to say that the σκέψις of the soul (i.e. the body) is composed of the four elements. An unembodied soul might be said to be σύσκεψις with fire and air, inasmuch as it resides in the atmosphere, which consists mainly of air, but contains also some fire diffused through the air or intermixed with it; but in this part of the document we are not concerned with unembodied souls.

This sentence then must be a detached fragment inserted here by error. (See § 30.)

Περικοκείται γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα δι’ ἀποπειρέται τὰ σώματα. This is unintelligible. One might conjecture περικοκείται γὰρ (…) τὰ (κατωφερή) στοιχεῖα (…) νόσοι; δι’ ἀποπειρέται τὰ σώματα. Thus altered, the words might be a remnant of a statement connected with and parallel to the preceding sentence; and the meaning of the section as a whole might be something of this sort: 'when certain changes take place in the fire and the air, the ζῷον falls into diseases of the soul; when certain changes take place in the water and the earth, the ζῷον falls into diseases of the body.'

§ 28. Αὐτῷ ἐδὲ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης συνόδου καὶ κράσεως τῶν στοιχείων γιγνόμενος ἀτμὸς [καὶ ὅσανεὶ ἡμαῖς καὶ ἀναθυμίαση], ὅτι οἶδα καὶ κ.τ.λ. In § 25, we were told that an alteration in the proportions of the elements in the body produces (bodily) disease. In § 28, the writer goes on to say that such an alteration produces certain effects in the soul also. But as it is through the medium of the ἀτμός that the influence of the elements contained in the body as originally composed is brought to bear upon the soul (§ 13), so it is through the medium of the ἀτμός that alterations in the composition of the body produce effects in the soul. If, for instance, the proportion of fire in the body is increased, the ἀτμός becomes more fiery, and thence results a corresponding alteration (presumably a morbid alteration) in the soul. Cf. Pl. Tim. 86 b–c: καὶ τὰ μέν περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσήματα ταύτης ξυμβαίνει γιγνόμενα, τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς διὰ σώματος ἔζων, τῆδε… ὅτου duce the effect of depriving the victim of sleep; and in one of them, there is given a recipe for a magic operation by which a woman can be kept awake until she dies for want of sleep.) But I have not found any instance of the word ἕργον κοίας εἰς ἑργονοδία.
The terms ἐξαφις and ἄναθυμιάς are here given as equivalents for ἄτμος. We were told in § 13 that the ἄτμος ἄναθυμιάται; but ἐξαφις (‘a kindling’ or ‘a setting on fire’) is not a suitable word to describe this ‘vapour’; and as its nature has been sufficiently explained before, the words καὶ ... ἄναθυμιάς are superfluous.

[ὅς ἐν ἕχῃ φύσεως, εἴτε σπουδαίως (σπουδαίος MSS.) εἴτε μή]. We must understand εἴτε σπουδαίως (ἕχει) εἴτε μή. But this phrase is redundant after ὅπως ἐν τῇ; and the implied statement that the ἄτμος produced by the original κρᾶς ς ἄνωκειον sometimes ὅπως σπουδαίως ἕχει is inconsistent with § 25, where we were told that, as long as the original proportions are maintained, τὸ ζώον ἐγναίνει. The phrase ὅπως ἐν τῇ is not open to this objection; for it implies merely that the ἄτμος (when first formed), like the φύραμα which produces it, is differently composed in different cases, and not that it sometimes has bad qualities.

§ 29. τῇ (μὲν) γάρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς (μιαθέσες;?) πρὸς αὐτῶν οἰκειότητι καὶ συντροφίᾳ ἐπιμένουσα ἡ ψυχή τὴν τάξιν διατηρεῖ. πρὸς αὐτῶν (εἰ. τὸν ἄτμον) οἰκειότητι καὶ συντροφίᾳ makes nonsense here; for the οἰκειότης and συντροφία between the soul and the ἄτμος never ceases; if the ἄτμος is altered, the soul is altered correspondingly. The phrase may perhaps have come from the lost passage, beginning with οὖν καὶ, which followed ὅσπερ ... ἔστελν in § 28.

The sentence ought to end with something equivalent to τὴν ὄρεσιν διατηρεῖ. If we retain τὰξιν, we must take it as meaning εἰς ταξίν; but perhaps it would be better to write εἰς ταξίν.

ἡτοι τῷ ὄλῳ συγκράμματι καὶ [μέρεσιν ἡ], μέρει (τοῦ) αὐτοῦ. μέρεσιν ἡ may be a corruption of μέρει τών. But why should the writer speak of an addition of fire, for instance, to a part of the σύγκραμα? Perhaps his meaning may have been that an increase of fire may take place, not in the body as a whole, but in some one part of it, e. g. in the heart or in the stomach; and that the alteration in the ἄτμος and the soul caused by an increase of fire in the heart would be different from the alteration caused by an increase of fire in the stomach.
A mention of changes in the body is out of place here. That topic was disposed of in § 25. In §§ 26-28, the writer has gone on to speak of changes in the soul; and he could have no reason for recurring to the subject of bodily disease. Besides, it is wrong to say that changes in the ἄρμος cause changes in the body; it is the soul, and not the body, that is affected by the ἄρμος. See note on § 13.

§ 30. [τὸ (μὲν) γὰρ πῦρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα κ.τ.λ.] We are here told that the fire and the air (i.e. the portions of fire and air which have entered into the composition of a given body?) ‘run up to’ the soul, but the water and the earth ‘settle down on’ the body. This seems to imply that the soul is in one place and the body in another, that is, that the soul is unembodied. But in the preceding sections, the writer has been speaking only of embodied souls; and an embodied soul is either diffused throughout the body or seated in some central organ of the body. Moreover, as long as the life of the ζῶν continues, the four elements are mixed together in the body, and it could not be said that two of them go to one place and the two others to another place. This section then is inconsistent with the context. It seems to have been written from the same point of view as § 26, which speaks of τὸ τε θερμῶν καὶ τὸ ἀερῶδες, ἀ δὴ σύστημα ἐστὶν τῆς ψυχῆς; and it may very likely have been extracted from the same document, and inserted in Exc. XXVI by the same person.

If we read ὅμοιόχωρον and ὅμοιοδήρω, we are told that the place of the soul is similar to the place of the fire and the air, and the abode of the body is similar to the abode of the water and the earth. If we read ὅμοχωρον and ὅμοιόδήρω, we are told that the place of the soul is the same as that of the fire and the air, and the abode of the body is the same as that of the water and the earth. The latter reading seems the more probable, and agrees better with what is said in § 26; but in either case the statement is obscure.

EXCERPT XXVIII

Exc. XXVIII is not a Hermeticum in the same sense as Excerpts I–XXVII; it is an extract from a gnomologium, i.e. a collection of apophthegms, each of which was ascribed to some wise man. But it is possible that the compiler of the gnomologium found the phrases ὅ τῶν ὄλων ἰδιούργος and σοφότατος νοῦς καὶ ἀδιός in Hermetic
libelli of the same type as those with which we have been dealing. For the former, cf. ἐκάνες τῷ δῖον ἰδημοοργητην in Ex. XXI. 2.

EXCERPT XXIX

These verses are ascribed to Hermes in the MSS. of Stobaeus. But it is possible that the lemma Ἐρμοῦ is wrongly placed, and belonged to an ecloga which has been lost; and whether that is so or not, there is no reason to suppose that the verses were attributed to Hermes by the man who composed them. They are given without any author’s name in the Anthologia; and in three MSS. reported in Catal. codd. astr. Græc. III; and in two other MSS. reported ibidem, they are ascribed to Empedocles.¹

There is a similar instance of the attribution of hexameters to Hermes in the case of the Περὶ σεισμῶν (Abel, Orphica, pp. 141-143, ψεύτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τίκων, κ.τ.λ.), which in some MSS. is ascribed to Orpheus, but in others (e.g. Catal. codd. astr. Gr. Venet. 5, f. 289) to Hermes Trismegistus. In Catal. codd. astr. Gr. III. 5, f. 100, i. d. 24, f. 20, and i. d. 31, f. 24 v., the title is Ἐρμοῦ τοῦ τραυμαγέστου περὶ σεισμῶν ἐν ἄλλω Ὀρφέως. And a prose paraphrase of these verses about earthquakes, which is printed in Catal. codd. astr. Gr. VII, pp. 167-171, bears the title Ἐρμοῦ τοῦ τραυμαγέστου περὶ σεισμῶν.

The heading περὶ εἰμαρμάνης is inappropriate. It may perhaps be, as Wachsmuth suggests, a misplaced repetition of the superscription (περὶ εἰμαρμάνης κ.τ.λ.) which stands at the head of the chapter of Stobaeus in which this ecloga is placed.

¹ In Anthol. Gr. ed. Jacobs, 1813-1817, vol. ii. p. 768, the superscription τοῦ αὐτοῦ, Ἔρμου is printed at the head of these verses (Append. nr. 40); and τοῦ αὐτοῦ means Θεόνος Ἀλεξάνδρου, which is there printed at the head of nr. 39 (an encomium on Ptolemy the astronomer). But Jacobs says that nr. 40 'sactoris nomine caret in Append. Plan. p. 494 (i.e., I suppose, in the MS.). Quum in Palat. p. 442, nr. 491 versus septimus Theonis nomine inscriptus sit (see note on Μήνη, Ζευς, κ.τ.λ. below), totum hoc poemaion Theon tribuendum censebat Brunckius.'

As to nr. 39, Jacobs writes 'Theonis Alexandrini. Hoc poemaion, quod in Append. Plan. p. 494. St. legitur, Brunckius non dubitavit Theoni tribuere ei, qui commentarios scripsit in Ptolemaei Magnum Constructionem.' Does this ambiguous note mean that nr. 39 also is anonymous in the MS., and that its ascription to 'Theon of Alexandria' is merely a conjecture! Or, that Θεόνος is given in the MS., and Brunck added Ἀλεξάνδρου! Or, that Θεόνος Ἀλεξάνδρου is given in the MS., and Brunck took that to mean the man who wrote the commentary on Ptolemy!

² Perhaps some better readings of the text might be found in the MSS. mentioned in Catal. codd. astr. Gr.
The region of the planet-spheres might perhaps be regarded as the ‘threshold’ of the heaven of the fixed stars, which is situated beyond it. But that seems a far-fetched interpretation; and it is difficult to picture seven star-gods moving in circles along or upon a threshold. Is it possible that οὐσός is here used as a synonym for ὄδος? In that case, the ‘Olympian path’ along which the planets move would be the Zodiac. It has been suggested (Autenrieth, Hom. Wörterb.) that in the Homeric phrase ἡ γῆς ὀδός the word means ‘path’. Cf. Apollonius, Lex. Hom. 123. 33: ὀδός . . . ἀπὸ τοῦ δ' αὐτῶν ὄδων (Ebeling, Lex. Hom. s. v.).

μετὰ τούτων δὲι περνύσεται αἰών.—(μετὰ τούτων δὲῖσπαρήσεται αἰών MSS. Stob.: καὶ τοῦτον δὲῖκανονιζέται αἰών Anth.). κανονιζέται ('is measured?') is hardly possible; and περνύσεται (conjectured by Jacobs) is a suitable word to describe the recurrent movement of the seasons and the years. Cf. ἀνίκη Καρυνίου περνύσεται ὥρα (Eur. Alc. 449), and περιτελλομένων ἐναντίων. Time is measured by the movements of the heavenly bodies, and was sometimes said by the Greeks to be constituted by those movements.

'παυτοφόρος' Παφίη. παυτός means a bridal chamber. In certain cults, the chamber in which a ιερός γάμος was supposed to take place was called the παυτός, and small models of such a παυτός were carried by priests, who were thence called παυτοφόροι. It may be that some such usage existed in the cult of Aphrodite at Paphos or elsewhere; and the epithet which properly applied to the priest might possibly be transferred to the deity. But in this verse, an adjective referring to a detail of ritual would be out of place. What is wanted is some word comparable to σπυρός, ὦδος, and θραύς, and describing broadly the most prominent characteristic of the goddess; and as we are told that Aphrodite is ὅρες, we should have expected something like ‘bringing desire’. παυτοφόρος, omnium ferax, would be a possible epithet for alma Venus, and would at least be better than παυτοφόρος.

εὐπετερος Ἠρμῆς. Hermes is not only the winged messenger of the gods, but also the author or patron of ἔπεικη περέσπευτα; cf. λόγος Ἠρμῆς below. The connexion of Hermes with λόγος (speech) was
felt to be implied in the verb ἐρμηνεύειν. A philosopher might identify Hermes with human reason, or with the λόγος of God, in the sense in which that term is used by Philo; but such notions would hardly be in keeping with the simple and popular tone of these verses.

Zeus ἄργυρός ἐσθος, ἄρτ' οὐ φύσις ἰδιότητεσσεν. This is an expansion of Zeus γένεσις. Zeus is πατήρ ἄνδρων τε θεῶν τε, and the author of all life.

协办 8' ἐν ἡμίν Μήνη κ.τ.λ. The planet-gods are within us; that is, we feel their workings or influences (ἐνέργειαι or ἀπόρροιαι) within us. Similarly, δικρύ μὲν ἄτι Κρόνος κ.τ.λ. means λύσθ ἄτι Κρόνου ἐνέργεια or ἀπόρροια, κ.τ.λ.

Μήνη, Ζεύς, Ἀρης, Παφίη, Κρόνος, Ἡλίος, Ἑρμῆς. The almost identical verse Zeus, Ἀρης, Παφίη, Μήνης, Κρόνος, Ἡλίος, Ἑρμῆς occurs, with a different context, in Manetho, Ἀποτελεσματικά, Koechly (Teubner), 5 [6]. 34. And in Anthol. Pal. p. 442 nr. 491 (Jacobs vol. ii, p. 175: Stadtmüller vol. iii. i, p. 488), that same verse (Zeus, Ἀ., Π., Μήνης, Κ., Ἡ., Ἕ.) is given under the superscription Θεώνος1 μονόστιχον εἰς τὴν ἱσβομάδα. The order of the seven names in Manetho and the μονόστιχον of Anthol. Pal. seems preferable (ἀδ ἑν ταῦτα πρωτέον); and it is very likely that in the poemation of Stob. and Anthol. Append. the order was originally the same, and Μήνη has been shifted by accident.

There were many Theons; (five Theons of Alexandria, as well as a good many other men named Theon, are mentioned in Smith's D. B.;) but the man meant by Θεώνος in the superscription of the μονόστιχον in Anthol. Pal. may perhaps be the Theon of Alexandria (c. A.D. 380) who was the father of Hypatia, and was well known as an astronomer and geometer; and it is not unlikely that he was the writer of this little poem on the planets.2

1 Wachsmuth says 'in Palat. p. 442 n. 491 versus sequito'ns (of Stob. 1. 5. 14, i.e. Μήνη... Ἑρμῆς) Θεωνι Alexandrinis adscibitur'. But what authority has he for 'Alexandrinus'? 2 Joh. Malala 343 (Migne, Tom. 97, col. 512) says that in the reign of Gratianus (A.D. 367-383) Θεων ὁ σοφάτατος πολιτισμος ἱδίατα καὶ ἠμήρευς (al.-revs) τὰ ἀστρονομικα καὶ τὰ Ἑρμοῦ τοῦ τραμεγέλοντο συγγράμματα καὶ τὰ Ὀρφικα. This doubtless refers to Theon, the father of Hypatia. That Theon is known to have written commentaries on the astronomical writings of Ptolemy; and if he was interested in the Orphic poems, that makes it the more likely that he sometimes wrote verses himself. These verses then may possibly have been written by him. But even if they were, they can have had nothing to do with his commentary on the Hermetica, and it can hardly be supposed that he ascribed them to Hermes.
In place of μεμορήκεθα, something equivalent to εἰμαρταί ἡμῶν is wanted. Meineke conjectures μεμορήκεθα; if we accept this, we must assume that μεμορήκεθα is here used metri gratia for μεμορήκεθα, sortiti sumus, from μοράω. The word μεμόρημα occurs, with a dative, in Anth. Pal. 7. 286 (πολίῳ μεμορημένε (ἀλ. μεμοραμένε) τόνῳ); Manetho Apotele. 6 [3]. 13 συνέσσει τε τοὺς ἑκάστοις ἀθρόστοις μεμόρημα); and Nicand. Alexiph. 229 (πυρὸς μεμορημένος αὐγᾶς); but in all three passages the meaning is doubtful. 

Ἄλκειν means 'to breathe in'; the ἀπόρροιαι of the planets are spoken of as if they were things that we draw in with our breath, or like our breath. ἀλθέριον πνεῦμα is the aether of heaven, from which the planetary influences come down to us. The word πνεῦμα is more usually applied to the atmosphere than to the celestial aether which is situated above it; but the latter also is a gaseous substance, and any gaseous substance might be called πνεῦμα. Perhaps the writer meant to suggest that the celestial aether is the life-breath of the universe, and that the planetary ἀπόρροιαι which we 'breathe in' are, so to speak, detached portions of that universal life-breath.

Ζεὺς ἵππος γίνεται (ἵππος Anth. : ἵππος MSS. Stob. : ἵππος Jacobs). ἵππος is meaningless; and ἵππος, whether preceded by ἵππος or not, is intolerable. Sense can be reconciled with metre by writing γίνεται δὲ Ζεὺς.

τὸτε γὰρ ἀπαστὶ δικαίως καὶ θυρηθῇ διάνοια γελά. 'Every mortal mind laughs justly by means of the sun' is nonsense. A phrase meaning 'laughs by reason of the sunlight' would make sense; and that might be expressed by writing τὸτε ... δὲ αὐγᾶς.

1 In Clem. Alex. Paed. 2. 1. 7, οἱ περὶ τὰς λαβάταις ἀνεχολούμενοι καὶ τὰς μεμορημέναις τῶν ἠθυσμάτων περιγραφαί, it seems certain that μεμορημέναις is a misreading.
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