HERMETICA

THE ANCIENT GREEK AND LATIN WRITINGS WHICH CONTAIN RELIGIOUS OR PHILOSOPHIC TEACHINGS ASCRIBED TO HERMES TRISMEGISTUS
HERMETICA

THE ANCIENT GREEK AND LATIN WRITINGS WHICH CONTAIN RELIGIOUS OR PHILOSOPHIC TEACHINGS ASCRIBED TO HERMES TRISMEGISTUS

EDITED WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES

BY

WALTER SCOTT

VOLUME II

Notes on the Corpus Hermeticum

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1925
HERMETICA

Plan of the Work


Vols. II & III. Commentary.

Vol. IV. Testimonia, Appendices and Indices.

The man who speaks was visited in his sleep by the supreme Mind, who taught him as follows.

The beginning of things. In the beginning was God (who is pictured as a boundless expanse of light), and God alone. Then, formless matter (pictured as a cloud of darkness) came into being. The formless matter first assumed form by changing into a watery substance. And from God came forth a Word (hypostatized, and called son of God), who worked upon the watery substance. §§ 4–6.

In God are included innumerable Powers; and the Intelligible World,—the archetype of the Sensible World,—is made up of these Powers of God. §§ 7–8a.

Formation of the Sensible World. The watery substance, by the operation of the Word, was differentiated into (1) fire, which rose aloft; (2) air, which occupied the region next below the fire; and (3) gross matter (earth and water intermixed), which remained below. §§ 8b, 5b. (Later on, earth and water were separated, § 11b.)

The making of living beings. The supreme Mind (i.e. God) gave birth to a second Mind, called 'the Demiurgus', whose station is the highest sphere of the region of fire; and the Demiurgus made out of fire and air the seven Planets, whose function is to govern the sublunar world. Acting in conjunction with the Word (who now quitted the grosser elements below, and flew up to the region of fire), the Demiurgus set the Planets circling in their several spheres. §§ 9–11a.

Then, at the bidding of the Demiurgus, the earth and the water brought forth the irrational animals. § 11b.

The origin of man. The supreme Mind (i.e. God) gave birth to (incorporeal) Man, a Being like to God himself. This Man at first took up his abode in the highest sphere of heaven, beside his brother the Demiurgus. Thence he descended to the planetary region;
and from each of the seven Planets he received something of its special character. He then looked down from the lowest sphere of heaven into the world of gross matter, the abode of corporeal Nature. He saw in the material things of the world below the reflected image of his own God-derived beauty; and attracted by it, he descended into the region of gross matter, and took corporeal Nature to him as his bride; and the two were joined in one (i.e. the human soul was incarnated). §§ 12-14.

Hence it is that men, though incorporeal and immortal in respect of their true being, are yet in part corporeal and mortal. § 15.

Corporeal Nature, married to the incorporeal Man, brought forth seven Men, who bore the several characters of the seven Planets. Each of these seven Men was (like ourselves) composed of (1) a gross body, made of earth and water; (2) a vital spirit, made of fire and air; and (3) an incorporeal soul and mind.

The seven Men were bisexual (as were the beasts also); and in that state they dwelt on earth until the end of the first age. §§ 16, 17.

Then, each of the seven bisexual Men (as well as each of the bisexual beasts) was divided into two separate beings, the one male, and the other female. God bade the seven couples breed; and from them is descended the existing race of men and women. § 18 a.

The conditions of man's life on earth. If men yield to carnal desire, and love the body, they fall under the power of death; but if they identify themselves with that in them which is incorporeal, they are immortal, and attain to the Good (i.e. to union with God). §§ 18 b, 19.

The men who fail thus to 'recognize themselves' deserve the death which they incur, (because they are guilty of the sin of loving the body;) for the body is composed of matter, and matter is the source of all evil. But those who 'recognize themselves' attain to the Good, because the incorporeal self which they recognize is of one substance with God, and in virtue of it they are sons of God. §§ 20, 21.

But a man cannot 'recognize himself' unless he has Mind in him. Mind enters into men that are good and pure; and its presence in them makes them devote themselves to loving worship of God, and excludes the evil promptings of the bodily senses. But when
men are wicked, Mind abandons them, and its place is taken by the Avenging Daemon, who tortures them with the fires of evil passion. §§ 22, 23.

The ascent of the disembodied soul. At death, the gross body is resolved into earth and water; the (vital spirit), with the bodily senses (of which it was the organ), is reabsorbed into (the atmosphere); and stripped of these integuments, the man rises above the sublunar world, and enters the region of the heavens. As he mounts upward through the planetary spheres, he gives back to each planet in succession the evil passion which had come to him from that planet; and thus cleansed from all corruption, he takes up his abode for a time in the highest sphere of heaven. Lastly, he quits the material universe, and enters the incorporeal world above it, where dwell the Powers of God; and himself becoming one among these Powers, he 'comes to be in God'. §§ 24-26 a.

(ii) The Thanksgiving. §§ 30-32.

The man woke from his sleep, full of joy at the revelation that had been vouchsafed to him, and gave thanks to God in a hymn of praise.

(iii) The Preaching. §§ 27-29.

Then, in obedience to the injunction of his divine visitant (§ 26 b), he proceeded to make known to his fellow men what had been made known to him, and teach them how they might be saved. 'Shake off your drunken sleep,' he said; 'repent; cease to give yourselves up to death; accept immortal life.' And some mocked; but others besought him to teach them, and he taught them.

The theology of Corp. I may be summarized as follows. There is a supreme God, who is described as 'Mind' (νοῦς), and as 'Life and Light'. The supreme God has three sons, viz. the Logos, the Demiurgus-Nous, and the Anthropos. The Logos and the Demiurgus-Nous are God's agents in the making of the world. The Logos operates in the first stage of the cosmopoiia, viz. the separation of the elements. The Demiurgus-Nous operates in the later stage, viz. the making of living beings (other than man); it is he that makes the heavenly bodies (immortal ζωή), and causes the lower elements to bring forth the mortal and irrational ζωή. But the Logos and the Demiurgus-Nous are 'of one substance', and ultimately
coalesce into one. Anthropos, the third son of God, is a personification of the incorporeal part of man, which has issued from God, and is destined to go back into God.

Side by side with the conception of the three Sons of God stands that of the 'Powers' (δύναμεις) of God. According to this second conception, God contains or is made up of innumerable Powers; and individual human souls, if they are true to themselves, will ultimately become Powers of God, and take their place as such among his other Powers. It would be possible to bring these two conceptions into connexion, by saying that the three Sons of God are his three highest Powers; but the author himself has not thus connected them. (Perhaps however the δύναμεις μεγίστη which is spoken of in § 5 b may be identified with the Demiurgus-Nous.)

Corp. I is the only Hermeticum in which the notion of a transcendental Person named Anthropos presents itself. But a more or less similar use of the name Anthropos occurs repeatedly in Christian Gnostic writings.

There can be little doubt that "Ἀνθρωπός, thus employed as a person-name, first came into use as a translation of the Hebrew name Adam, which means 'man'. Even among Jews who were uninfluenced by Greek philosophy, there was a tendency to magnify Adam into something more than a mere man. Some of their Rabbis said that Adam was bisexual; that his body was at first of such huge bulk that it filled the world from end to end; and that, before his fall, he was in possession of the 'heavenly radiance' or 'glory', and shone with such brightness that he obscured the sun.1 But an Adam more closely resembling the Anthropos of Corp. I is to be found in Philo, De opif. mundi 23. 69—29. 88. Philo there explains that the 'man' whose making is described in Gen. 1. 26 (ποιήσωμεν ἀνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν κ.τ.λ.) is not an individual man, but the ιδέα of man (in the Platonic sense of ιδέα) or the γένος man. De opif. mundi 24. 76: πάντα δὲ καλῶς, τὸ γένος ἄνθρωπον εἰπὼν, διέκρινε τὰ εἰδή, φύσας ἄρρεν τε καὶ θῆλυ δεδημουργηθαι, μήπω τῶν ἐν μίρει μορφῆν λαβόντων, ἐπειδή τὰ προσεχόστατα τῶν

1 See Bousset Hauptprobleme der Gnosis, 1907, p. 198, where references to the Talmud are given. In Kap. IV ('Der Urmensch') of that book, Bousset has brought together much material that is valuable as bearing on the origin and history of the Anthropos-doctrine; but I find myself unable to agree with some of his conclusions. Bousset has dealt with the same subject more briefly in his Religions des Judentums im Neutest. Zeitalter, 1906, pp. 404-407.
eides inuparxiei tiv geni, kai wosper en katoptre diafaivetai tois de
kathorai dinnedemos. Afterwards, commenting on Gen. 2. 7 (επλασεν
o theos ton andropoun chous apo tis thes k.t.l.), he says that the man
whose making is described in this latter passage is the individual
man Adam, the ancestor of all individual men of later generations.

Ib. 46. 134: diafora pamefigheis esti tou te ein plastos ton andropoun
kai to kata tin elikona theou genovostos proteron. o miv gar dialexisteis
aiosthotos hou, metaexous poostos, ek somatos kai psykhes synestos, anhp
h gyni, phous thetous. o de kata tin elikona (i.e. the 'man' spoken of
in Gen. 1. 26) ideia tis h genos h etpargis, nositos, asomatos, ou'
arman outhe thlai, panaionis fousi. The Anthropos of Corp. I
corresponds to the andropous of Gen. 1. 26 as interpreted by Philo,
insasmuch as he is a personification of the ideia or genos of humanity;
but he also corresponds to the andropous of Gen. 2. 7 as interpreted
by Philo, insasmuch as he is the ancestor of the human race.4 The
author of Corp. I must have got his conception of Anthropos from
Jewish thinkers whose speculations were closely connected with
those of Philo. His Anthropos is not the Adam of Genesis, but
a transcendental Adam evolved by philosophic Jews out of a
combination of data supplied by Genesis with the Platonic conception
of the ideia andropou or astoandropou.

1 Philo also says that o kat elikona theou andropous is the human noos. Ib. 23. 69:
tin di emfiexei (i.e. the likeness of man to God, implied in the words kat elikona)
modh elaxetw somatos xaraxhnes. . . . o di elikos allecta kata ton tin psykhes
ygefona noos. pro gar ena ton ton ollon omhneton en de arxhitunon o en elatun
kata meros aneunosth. It is not clear how this is to be reconciled with the state-
ment that the 'man' in question is the ideia of man, or the genos man.

2 eptargis here means the one seal by which many similar impressions are
stamped,—the 'type'.

3 Bouset Keil des Jud. p. 405 (see also Hauptproblems der Gnosis, p. 195)
says 'Philo hat nun diese Ausfiihrungen nicht aus Gen. 1 u. 2 herausgesponnen,
sondern sie an diesen Bericht herangebracht. . . . Wir haben auch gar keinen
Grund, hier eine Anleihe Philos bei der hellenischen Philosophie anzunehmen,
wo so mannigfache und bedeutende Parallelen auf einen Einfuss vom Orient her
schliessen lassen'. (One of the Oriental parallels to which he refers is that of the
Persian 'Urmensch' Gayomarth.) But I think that Bouset is here mistaken. It
seems to me that Philo's Adam (and likewise the Anthropos of Corp. I) can be
adequately accounted for as a result of the interpretation of Genesis by Jews
acquainted with Greek philosophy, and that there is no need to assume Persian or
other Oriental influence.

4 Irenacus 1. 18. 2 says that some of the followers of the Gnostic Marcus allan
thelous ton kathelikova kal atomov theou genousta aperneidh andropous, kal
protos elai ton neuromaton andropous oiv to en to tin genous. This explanation
of Gen. 1. 26 and 2. 7 closely resembles that of Philo, who says inter alia that
o kat elikona theou andropous is the human noos (= the neuromatous andropous of the
followers of Marcus, and the otholous andropous of Corp. L 18).

5 Cf. Plotinus 6. 7. 6: o de andropous (echei en mutho) to pro politon ton
andropoun andropous (= the 'idea' of man). But it is possible that the figure
SOURCES. The doctrine of Corp. I is fundamentally Platonic. The Platonic contrast between νοεῖ and ἀνοεῖ, νοεστά and ἀνοεστά, things incorporeal and things corporeal, presents itself throughout; and the passage about the νοεγδός κόσμος (§§ 7, 8 a) implies acceptance of the Platonic theory of ideal παραδείγματα. The writer speaks as a Platonist in his description of the twofold nature of man (§ 15); and he is an adherent of Platonism in his conviction that the human soul has descended from a higher world, and is destined to return to the higher world whence it came.

In his account of the differentiation of the sexes (§ 18), he has been influenced by Plato's Symposium; and reminiscences of particular passages in Plato's writings may be recognized, with more or less probability, in § 12, οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὁ οἶκον τούκου κ.τ.λ. (Pl. Tim. 37 c): § 21, οὐ πάντας γάρ ἄνθρωπον νοεῖν έξουσίων κ.τ.λ. (Pl. Tim. 51 e): § 19, ἐκ πλάνης ἑρωτός (Pl. Phaedr. 238 b). The term τὸ γάγαθον, as used in §§ 19, 26 a, is of Platonic origin.

In distinguishing a first νοεῖ and a second νοεῖ, and assigning the name δημοποργός to the second, the writer is in agreement with certain Platonists of the Roman Empire, and especially with Numenius.

On the other hand, he ignores the Platonic doctrine of metempsychosis or reincarnation; and while he is in accord with the Platonists in regarding ἡλή as the source of evil, he appears to reject the Platonic view that ἡλή is without beginning (§ 4).

A trace of Aristotelian influence may perhaps be seen in what is said in § 11 a concerning the eternity of circular motion.

In his physics, the writer's position resembles that of the Stoics. His account of the separation of the four cosmic elements (§ 5 b) agrees with Stoic descriptions of the diacosmosis; and the separated elements are disposed by him, as by the Stoics, in a series of concentric spheres (region of fire, divided into the sphere of the fixed stars and the seven planetary spheres; atmosphere; water and earth). The main lines of this system of cosmology had been laid down by Plato and Aristotle; but it was by the Stoics that it was formulated employed by Plato in Ῥεπ. 9, 588 c.d also contributed. It is there said that the human soul is made up of three things joined together, viz. (1) a many-headed beast (τὸ ἐπιθυμτικόν), (2) a lion (τὸ θυμοειδὲς), and (3) an ἄνθρωπος (τὸ λογιστικόν). Cf. Iambi. Prat. Prat. § 1: τῶν ἐν ημῖν θείων ἄνθρωπων τῶν πολυσφάλων θρήνων ἑκατάρχην πνεύματος. This 'divine ἄνθρωπος in us' is the οἰκία ἄνθρωπος of Corp. I. 15.

On the Jewish side, the conception of the Anthropos may have been influenced by speculations based on the passage about 'one like unto a son of man' in Daniel 7. 13, and on the use of 'the son of man' as an appellation of the Messiah in Jewish apocalyptic writings (Enoch &c.).
and popularized in the very shape in which we find it in this document. And as we know that Platonism was affected by Stoic influence from the first century B.C. onward, it is probable that the writer’s immediate teachers were Platonists of the syncretic school which came into being at that time.

Among the terms and conceptions of Stoic origin which occur in *Corp.* I may be noted κατωκρήμνη, § 4 &c.; εἰμαρμέρη, § 15 &c.; πνεύμα (material), in the two senses air (§ 9) and vital spirit (§ 17): πρόνοια, § 19. In identifying εἰμαρμέρη with the influence of the heavenly bodies (§ 9 fin.), the writer is in accord with the Stoics of the Roman Empire rather than with Chrysippus.

So far, the doctrine of *Corp.* I may be described as that of a Stoicizing Platonist. But with this Hellenic doctrine are combined ingredients of Jewish origin.1 From the ‘watery substance’ onward, the cosmogonia of §§ 8 b ff. is constructed on the same plan as that of *Genesis*; and verbal reminiscences of *Genesis* may be seen in § 5 b fin., τὸν (ἐπάνω τοῦ θανάτου) ἀντιφαρόμενον πνευματικὸν λόγον (Gen. 1. 2): § 11 b, ἐξήνευσεν (ℵ. γη) ζωὴ τετράκτιων κ.τ.λ. (Gen. 1. 24 f.): § 12, ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκάνα ἐχον (Gen. 1. 26 f.): § 17, ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπως . . . ἐγένετο ὁ θεὸς πρὸς καὶ νοῦν (Gen. 2. 7): § 18, ἀπεξάνεσθε . . . καὶ πληθώνεσθε (Gen. 9. 17 and 1. 22, 28). The notion of the splitting of bisexual beings may have been connected in the writer’s mind with Gen. 2. 21–24, as well as with Pl. *Sympos.* The ‘end of the first period’, and the following ‘speech of God’ (§ 18), correspond to the Deluge and the speech of God to Noah in Gen. 9. 16 ff.; and the marriage of ‘Man’ and ‘Nature’ in § 14 corresponds to the story of Adam and Eve in Gen. 2.

But among the Jewish ingredients of the doctrine of *Corp.* I are included things which could not have been suggested by a mere reading of the text of *Genesis*; viz. the conception of the δυνάμεως of God, that of the Logos, and that of the transcendental Anthropos. These conceptions must have originated in a school of Jewish thinkers who had brought to bear on the study of their sacred books a knowledge of Greek philosophy.

Now in every one of the points that I have spoken of, the writer’s position closely resembles that of Philo Judaeus. Philo also taught a form of Platonism modified by an intermixture of Stoic conceptions,

---

1 The fact that the contents of *Corp.* I are partly derived from Jewish sources is recognized in a scholion on *Corp.* I 18, which is ascribed to Psellus. See Psellus in *Testim.*
and so interpreted the narrative of *Genesis* as to bring it into accordance with this Hellenic doctrine. The conceptions of the λόγος and the ὄνταμεν of God which we find in *Corp.* I are similar to those which we find in Philo; and the Anthropos of *Corp.* I is in the main identical with the Adam of *Gen.* 1 and 2 as explained by Philo. The writer of *Corp.* I cannot have been himself a member of the Jewish community; for there is no trace in this document of that submission to the Jewish Law, and that interest in the Jewish nation, which are conspicuous in Philo's writings. We must conclude then that he was a man of Gentile race and Hellenic education, who had accepted the teachings either of Philo himself, or of Jews of the same school as Philo. How much of his Platonism was transmitted to him by these same Jewish teachers, and how much of it he had learnt directly from Pagan authorities, it is impossible to say.

This would suffice to account for the main body of doctrine in *Corp.* I. But there are certain notions which seem to have been derived from other sources. In his use of the terms *light* and *darkness*, the author may possibly have been influenced by the teaching of the Zoroastrians. His description of the descent and ascent of the soul through the planetary spheres (§§13 a and 25) may have been suggested by the similar doctrine of the Mithraists.

The name Poimandres appears to be of Egyptian origin; but apart from this, there is little to indicate that the writer was influenced by the indigenous religion of Egypt. It is possible however that his application of the term ἀρσενόθηκας to God, and his use of ζωή with reference to God, may have been derived from Egyptian sources.

In reading *Corp.* I, we are here and there reminded of passages in the New Testament; e.g. in the phrase ζωή καὶ φῶς (cf. *Ev.* Joh.), and the words παρέδωκας αὐτῷ τὴν πάσαν ἐξουσίαν, § 32 (cf. *Ev.* Matth. 28. 18). There are also things in which *Corp.* I resembles the writings of some of the Christian Gnostics; e.g. the description of the descent and ascent of the human soul; the notion of the διημορφηγός as a subordinate Being who resides in the highest sphere of heaven; the conception of the Anthropos; and the use of the terms ἡ αἰθαντία and ἡ διαφανεία φύσις. But these resemblances are not to be taken as proofs of borrowing on either side; they rather indicate the use of common sources. The Christian Gnostics, like the author of *Corp.* I, derived a part of their doctrine from a Platonism modified by Stoic influence, and another part of it from Jewish speculations; and so far as their sources were the same, they spoke in similar lan-
guage. But if the author of Corp. I had read the writings of Christian Gnostics, we might expect to find in this document some traces of the Christian element of Gnosticism also. The most distinctive characteristic of Christian doctrine, as compared with that of other religions of the time, was the conception of a 'Saviour', i.e. a divine Person who has descended from a higher world to rescue human souls from their fallen condition;¹ and of this conception, which is prominent in the systems of the Christian Gnostics as well as in that of the Catholic Christians, not the slightest trace appears in Corp. I. If the writer has been in any way influenced by his Christian neighbours, it is not in his doctrine that this influence is to be recognized, but rather in his view of his own function as a teacher. He regards himself as one on whom is laid the task of calling mankind to repentance, and 'teaching them how they may be saved'; and it is not impossible that in this respect the author of Corp. I was following the example set by the preachers of the Christian Gospel.

Relations of Libellus I to other Hermetica. The author of Corp. I seeks to make known to all mankind the truth which has been revealed to him. In this respect, his attitude is very different from that of the Hermetists in general, who depict the teacher as speaking in private to one or two select pupils, and in some instances, expressly bidding his disciples keep secret what they learn from him. (See Corp. XIII fin.; Ascl. Lat. i b; Stob. Exc. XI. 4, 5.) The writer of Ascl. Lat. I does indeed (in c. 12 b) protest against the φθόνος of those who would debar men from the gnosis; but even there, no public preaching is suggested; and apart from Corp. I, the only Hermeticum in which the teacher offers himself as a guide to men at large is Corp. VII. That document is a fragment of a missionary sermon of precisely the same kind as that of which the heads are given in Corp. I. 27 f.; and Corp. VII so closely resembles Corp. I in thought and diction, that it seems probable that both were written by the same person.

The writer of Corp. XIII refers to Corp. I as a document known

¹ Analogies to the Christian notion of a 'Saviour' may, no doubt, be discovered here and there in other religions of the Roman Empire. For instance, such an analogy may be seen in the Κορε Κόσμου, where we are told that Isis and Osiris came down from heaven to earth to civilize mankind. But in the main, the distinction holds good. The gods of the Pagan mystery-cults might be called 'saviours', but were not held to have 'come down' in the same sense as the Christian Saviour.
to him and his readers. In his time, it was already assumed that the unnamed prophet who speaks in Corp. I is Hermes Trismegistus.

The words of Corp. XVI. 16 (γαίην δὲ τὴν διοίκησιν Ἐρμής εἰμαρμάνην ἱκάλεσων) look like a reference to Corp. I. 9 (ἡ διοίκησις αὐτῶν εἰμαρμάνη καλῶται); and if it is so, the writer of Corp. XVI also must have read Corp. I, and identified the man who speaks in it with Hermes. But this cannot be considered certain; for it is possible that both authors got the phrase from some document unknown to us. The words ἔρως . . . ὁ πλανώμανος καὶ πλανῶν in Corp. XVI. 16 resemble ὁ πλανής ἐρωτος in Corp. I. 19; but this resemblance counts for little, as the expression may have been suggested to both writers independently by the language of Pl. Phaedrus 238 b.

The cosmogonia of Corp. III resembles that of Corp. I, both alike being based on Genesis; and the phrase αὔξάνονθαν ἐν αὔξησι καὶ πληθώνωσθαι ἐν πλήθει, which occurs in both, must have been either borrowed by one of the two writers from the other, or taken by both from a common Jewish source. But on the other hand, these two documents differ widely in doctrine. The writer of Corp. III holds that men cease to exist at death; the writer of Corp. I asserts with the strongest emphasis the immortality of human souls. The Hellenic element in Corp. III is Stoic, and not Platonic; the Hellenic element in Corp. I is mainly Platonic. It is in the Jewish ingredient that the resemblance consists; but even in this, there is a difference; for the Jewish element in Corp. III appears to be derived immediately from the text of Genesis (or, in the case of the phrase αὔξάνονθαν κ.τ.λ., from a paraphrase of Genesis), whereas the Jewish element in Corp. I includes conceptions evolved from Genesis by speculation closely related to that of Philo. It may be considered certain then that Corp. I and Corp. III were not written by the same man; and notwithstanding the points of resemblance, it is doubtful whether either of these two documents was known to the writer of the other.

Ascid. Lat. I. 7 ('homo duplex est, et eius una pars . . . οὐσίωδης', &c.) closely resembles Corp. I. 15; and the interpolated passage Corp. X. 19 b–22 a has much in common with Corp. I. 22 f. But in these cases also, it is impossible to say whether the similarity is due to direct borrowing, or to the use of common sources.

We may conclude then that Corp. I was certainly known to the
writer of Corp. XIII, and may or may not have been known to the writers of Corp. XVI, Corp. III, Ascl. Lat. I, and Corp. X. 19 b–22 a. But there is nothing to suggest that it was known to any of the Hermetic writers except these; and on the whole, Corp. I (together with Corp. VII, which may be regarded as an appendage to it) stands apart from the main body of Hermetic literature. In his open proclamation of the truth to all who are willing to hear it, this author differs from the Hermetists in general (including the writer of Corp. XIII). The name Poimandres occurs nowhere else in the extant Hermetica, except in the passage in Corp. XIII where it is mentioned in connexion with Corp. I; the conception of the transcendental Anthropos does not occur in any of the other documents; and that of the hypostatized Logos is hardly to be found elsewhere in the Hermetic writings, except in a few sentences quoted by Cyril. There is reason to think that Corp. I and Corp. VII were not originally attributed to Hermes; and it seems probable that they were written in complete independence of the Hermetic tradition; that their author was an Alexandrian Platonist who had come under the influence of Jewish teachers; and that it was not until most of our Hermetica were already in existence, that these two documents passed into the hands of a Hermetist, and were ascribed by him to the legendary founder of his religion.

Date. The fact that an extract from Corp. I (viz. the eulogia, §§ 31, 32) occurs in a Papyrus of the third century A.D. makes it certain that this Libellus was written before the end of that century. The intermixture of Stoic conceptions with its Platonism makes it certain that it was not written before the first century B.C. Its close connexion with Philo makes it almost certain that it was not written until after the Christian era; and the importance attributed to the influence of the planets points in the same direction. The affinity of Corp. I with the teaching of Numenius (who wrote between 150 and 200 A.D., and is the earliest Pagan Platonist that is known to have been influenced by Jewish speculation) suggests the second century A.D. rather than the first; and its resemblances to the writings of the Christian Gnostics also tell in favour of the second century. As the writer of Corp. XIII refers to Corp. I as a known document, and attributes it to Hermes, it must have been in existence for some considerable time when Corp. XIII was written. There is reason to think that all our Hermetica (or at any rate almost all of
them) were written before A.D. 300; and if Corp. XIII is to be dated before A.D. 300, the date of Corp. I must be placed a good deal earlier. It is probable then that Corp. I was written between A.D. 100 and 200.

**Title.** The superscription 'Ερμοῦ τρισμεγίστον was probably not written by the author of Corp. I. In § 1, the speaker says that Poimandres 'called him by his name'; why is the name not given there? And it is again withheld in §§ 20, 21, where Poimandres says ὁ ὀνόματος. If the author had meant his readers to understand that the man who tells the story is Hermes Trismegistus, he would have written λέγειν Ὁ Ἐρμῆς κ.τ.λ. in place of καλῶν μου ὅσομα in § 1, and ὁ Ἐρμης in place of ὁ ὀνόματος in § 20 f. In the text of the document, the writer refrains from naming the man whose vision and preaching he describes; hence it seems to follow that he must have refrained from naming him in the title also, and consequently, that Ἐρμοῦ τρισμεγίστον is a later addition.

If the author had intended to put the narrative into the mouth of a well-known personage, he would have named that personage. On the other hand, if he was speaking in his own person, and narrating what he had himself experienced, his withholding of the name can be more easily accounted for; he may have shrunk from obtruding himself, and felt that it was his message alone, and not his name, that mattered. There is therefore reason to think that the τῆς of this document is the author himself, and that Corp. I is in substance an autobiography, though the man who speaks has compressed the story of his life into the space of a single night of vision and a single day of preaching. We know from his own words that he was one who set forth to convert mankind, and teach men how they might be saved. In the first three centuries of the Christian era there were many men who took that task upon them. But no other record of him has come down to us; and there is nothing to tell us what success he met with in his enterprise, or how far his influence spread.

§ 1. μετεπιφυσιάζον μὲν (μοι MSS.) τῆς διανοίας σφώνη, (Ἰδιπεύ) τε κατασκευῆσθαί μου τῶν σωματικῶν ἀισθήσεων. It is necessary to insert ἔτη here; for as the prophet afterwards assumes it to be known that he was asleep when the revelation came to him (§ 30, ὅ του σώματος

1 A good many of them, if not all, were known to Lactantius, about A.D. 310.
2 Except Corp. XIII, from which it may be inferred that at some later time there was a small fraternity in which Corp. I was regarded as a sacred book.
he must have said so in the first section. In sleep the bodily senses are suppressed, and the mind is for that reason free to rise to loftier heights than in waking life. Cf. Pindar, fr. 131, speaking of prophetic dreams: τὸ γὰρ (sc. the soul) ἐστὶ μόνον | ἐκ δὲ δεύοντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὐδὸν ἔστι πολλῶν ὀνείρων | δείκνυα τερπνῶν ἐφέρτουσαν ψυχήν τε κρίσιν. Aristotle, fr. 12: ἐκ τῶν ... ἐν τῷ ψυχῶν καθ’ ἐναντίον γίνεται ἡ ψυχή, τότε τὴν ἰδίαν ἀπολαβοῦσα φύσιν προμαντεύεται καὶ προαγορεύει τὰ μέλλοντα. Cic. Div. i. 115: ‘vigit enim animus in somnis, liberque est sensibus et omni impedi- tione curarum, iacente et mortuo paene corpore’. Philo Quis rer. div. heres 51. 257, Wendland III, p. 59: ψυχήν γὰρ νῦν ἐγρήγορος ἄνωθεν, καὶ γὰρ ἐγρήγορος διανοίας αἰσθήσεως ἀπαφαίνονται.

(οδ. μένος) καθάπερ (τοῦ) ἴσος (τῆς) Βεβαισμένος(ς) ἐκ κόρου τροφῆς ἢ ἐκ κόπου σώματος. Cf. Aristot. Περὶ ψυχῆς 456 b: μᾶλλον γίνονται ἐκ τροφῆς. ... ἐκ δὲ κόπου ἐνώπιον. But the prophet cannot have said that his condition was like that of one who has fallen asleep after a heavy meal. A man gorged with food would be in no fit state to receive a divine revelation. See Pl. Rep. 9. 571 c–572 a.

Cic. Div. i. 60 f.: in our dreams, ‘onusti cibo et vino perturbata et confusa cernimus’. Ib. 115: ‘(Animus in somnis) omnia quae in natura rerum sunt videt, si modo temperatis escis modicasque potionibus ita est affectus ut sopito corpore ipse vigilat. Haec somniantis est divinatio’. Maximus Tyrius 10. 1, p. 111 Hobein: ἐν ὑπνοῖς γὰρ τι ἐστιν ἄτεχνος οὕτως ὁ δεύορ βίος, καθ’ ἐκτὸς ἡ ψυχή, κατορθωμένη ἐν σώματι, ἐπὶ κόρου καὶ πλησμονῆς μόγις ποις ὀνειρῶτα τὰ ὄντα, ἔρχονται δὲ ταῖς μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῶν ὀνειροὶ δὲ ἐλεφαντίνων πυλῶν (Hom. Od. 19. 562 ff.). οἶ μὲν τοῦ τάγη ἐστὶν καθαρὰ ψυχή καὶ νυφαλίος, καὶ ὀλέγα ὑπὸ τοῦ δεύρο κάρου καὶ τῆς πλησμονῆς ἐπισταρωλεμένη, εἰκὼς ποι ταύτῃ ... ἀπαντῶν ὀνειρίας σαφῆ ... καὶ ἐγγύτατα τῷ ἀληθείᾳ. It is possible that the words καθάπερ ... ἐκ κόπου σώματος have been inserted by a later hand; but if they were written by the author, he must have meant to say that the sleep in which the vision came was not like that which results from bodily repletion or fatigue. I have therefore inserted οὐ μένοι.

Fulgentius quotes the words ἐκ κόρου τροφῆς ἢ ἐκ κόπου σώματος, but appears to have read κούφου in place of κόπου. The passage occurs in a chapter entitled Fabula de novem Musis, and runs thus: ‘Septima (Musa appellata est) Terpsicore, id est delectans instructione’ (πίστε?). Unde et Hermes in Opimandrae libro ait “eccurutrofes et cufusomatos”, id est, absque instructione esca et vacuo.
corpore. Ergo post inventionem¹ oportet te etiam discernere ac
diuicicare quod 'invenies' (inveneris?). Thus he quotes the phrase
merely to illustrate the meaning of the second half of the name
Terpsicore. He identifies this -core (i.e. -chore misspelt) with κόρος,
and translates κόρος by instructio. But what does he mean by
instructio? The context seems to show that he means 'digestion'.
He takes κόρος τροφής to signify 'digestion of food' in the literal
sense; and Terpsicore is she who 'delights'² in digestion' in a meta-
phorical sense, i.e. finds pleasure in the discretio and diiudicatio of the
material supplied by inventio.

He seems to have felt the difficulty involved in making the prophet
say that he was like one who has just eaten a heavy meal, and to have
tried to evade it by writing 'absque instructione escae' as his transla-
tion of ἐκ κόρου τροφῆς. But ἐκ cannot mean absque.

The prophet does not describe the appearance of his visitant, and does
not even say here that he saw him, but only that he was aware of
a vast and undefined presence, and heard a voice. Indeed the words
μέτρῳ ἀπειρορίστῳ imply that there was no definite form or shape to
be seen. Cf. § 4 init., ὧρᾳ θεών ἀφιένσαι, viz. the boundless light
by which God, or the divine, Mind, is symbolized. ὑπεμεγέθη μέτρῳ
ἀπειρορίστῳ is a clumsy phrase; and it may be suspected that the
author wrote των μέτρων ἀπειρορίστων, and that ὑπεμεγέθη is a gloss.

The writer has in mind the distinction between αἰσθήσεις and νόησις.
The pupil must first hear (the teacher's words) and see (the vision
presented to him), and then exert his thought to apprehend the
meaning of what he has heard and seen (νόησας μαθεῖν καὶ γνῶναι).

§ 2. Ἡγῶ μὲν, φησίν, εἰμὶ ὁ Ποιμάνδρης, ὁ τῆς ἀδιαβρίας νοῦς. The
name Poimandres is employed in Corp. I as a designation of the
divine νοῦς. It occurs again in Corp. XIII. 15. It is once used by
the alchemist Zosimus 3. 51. 8³ (A. D. 300–350?): τῶν φυσικῶν τῆς
ἐλπίς κατάπτυνον, καὶ καταδραμοῦσα ἐτε τὸν 'Ποιμάνδρα'⁴ (Corp. I)
καὶ βασιλεύουσα τῷ κρατήρι (Corp. IV) ἀνάδραμε ἐτε τὸ γένος τὸ σῶν.
And Fulgentius (c. A. D. 500), quoting Corp. I. 1, says: 'Hermes in

¹ The preceding Muse in his list is she who presides over inventio.
² I assume delectans to be used as the participle of delecter, regarded as a
deponent verb.
³ Zosimus ii. 8 in Testim.
⁴ Read Ποιμάνδρης.
Opimandae¹ libro ait &c. These are, as far as I know, the only occurrences of the name elsewhere in ancient literature; and in each of these three passages, the writer is referring to Corp. I.

The name Poimandres has been commonly supposed to be a Greek word derived from ποιμάς and ἄρης, and meaning 'shepherd of men'.² It is possible that the author of Corp. XIII took the name to mean this; for in § 19 he writes λόγον γάρ τοῦ «οτὲν» (ἐνοῦ?) ποιμαίνει (ποιμαίνει σύ?) ὁ νῦν, and this phrase may have been suggested to him by the name Ποιμάνδρης. The man who wrote our text of Zosimus certainly took it to mean 'shepherd of men', and consequently altered Ποιμάνδρης into Ποιμάνδρα. But there is not the slightest reason to suppose that the author of Corp. I was thinking of a shepherd when he used the name. There is not a word about sheep or shepherding in the document; the prophet does not depict his divine instructor in the guise of a shepherd, and indeed ascribes to him no definite shape or appearance of any sort, but merely says that he was 'very big'. Moreover, a Greek word derived from ποιμάς and ἄρης could not take the form ποιμανδρης. The nearest approach to it that could occur in Greek is ποιμανδρης, which might be a shortened form of ποιμανδρης.

¹ Opimandae is the genitive of Opimandres, i.e. Ποιμάνδρης taken as a single word.
² Reitzenstein, Poin, pp. 11 ff., starting from the mistaken assumption that the Poimandres of Corp. I is a shepherd, tries to establish a connexion between Corp. I and the Shepherd of Hermas. But his argument is not convincing. Hermas, in one of his visions, is visited by a person in the garb of a shepherd; the prophet who speaks in Corp. I is visited by a Being who is not said to be like a shepherd. Between the contents of the two visions there is not the slightest similarity.

Reitzenstein, ib. p. 8 and p. 314 f., speaks of a 'Poimandres community', and says that this community possessed 'a sacred writing, the Sayings of Poimandres'. But I have failed to find any evidence for the existence either of any such writing, or of any community named after Poimandres. The passages (Corp. XIII. 15 and Zosimus, i.e.) which he adduces in support of his statement are to be otherwise explained.

§ 19 of Corp. XIII. reads λόγον γάρ τοῦ «οτὲν» (ἐνοῦ?) ποιμαίνει (ποιμαίνει σύ?) ὁ νῦν. The nearest approach to it that could occur in Greek is ποιμανδρης, which might be a shortened form of ποιμανδρης.
As the name Poimandres is not Greek, and as it first occurs in Corp. I, which was presumably written in Egypt, it is most likely of Egyptian origin. F. Granger (The Poimandres of Hermes Trismegistus, J. H. Stud. vol. v, no. 191, p. 400) suggested that it is a transliteration of the Egyptian \( \text{pj mtr} \), which means ‘the witness’. The pronunciation of the term thus written in Egyptian may be inferred from its Coptic equivalent, which, according to Granger, is \( \text{pj} \text{mtr} \). (Erman, Aeg. Glossar, gives \( \text{mπρε} \) as the Coptic form of the Egyptian \( \text{mtr} \), ‘a witness’.) As far as the form of the name is concerned, this explanation seems fairly satisfactory; but it is difficult to account for the substitution of the diphthong \( \text{oi} \) for the faint vowel-sound of the Coptic article. As to the meaning, it might be said that Poimandres, the divine \( \text{νοῦς} \), is the ‘witness’ by whom the truth is made known to the prophet; and we might compare Corp. XII. i. 8, where Hermes, speaking of the Agathos Daimon, says that \( \text{εκείνος μόνος, ὃς προφήτησις θεός, τὰ πάντα κατιδών, θείος ἀληθὸς λόγους ἐφημεῖσα} \) (which implies that the Agathos Daimon is the ‘witness’).

Granger’s explanation of the name might be accepted, if a better one could not be found. But Mr. F. Ll. Griffith, who has kindly allowed me to consult him on this question among others in which knowledge of the Egyptian language is involved, proposes another derivation, which seems preferable; namely, that \( \text{Ποιμάνδρης} \) is the Coptic \( \text{n-em-f-πκν} \), ‘the knowledge of the Sun-god’. (He tells me that \( \text{πκ} \), ‘the sun’, is usually preceded by the article \( \text{n} \), but that the omission of the article is not unparalleled in late times, and that \( \text{n} \text{πκ} \) without the article would have a more learned and solemn appearance than the ordinary \( \text{n} \text{πκ} \).)

As to the form of the transliteration, there seems to be nothing against this. The \( \text{δ} \) would almost necessarily be inserted by Greeks for euphony; and the representation of the vowel-sounds of \( \text{εικας} \)

As the name Poimandres is not Greek, and as it first occurs in Corp. I, which was presumably written in Egypt, it is most likely of Egyptian origin. F. Granger (The Poimandres of Hermes Trismegistus, J. H. Stud. vol. v, no. 191, p. 400) suggested that it is a transliteration of the Egyptian \( \text{pj mtr} \), which means ‘the witness’. The pronunciation of the term thus written in Egyptian may be inferred from its Coptic equivalent, which, according to Granger, is \( \text{pj} \text{mtr} \). (Erman, Aeg. Glossar, gives \( \text{mπρε} \) as the Coptic form of the Egyptian \( \text{mtr} \), ‘a witness’.) As far as the form of the name is concerned, this explanation seems fairly satisfactory; but it is difficult to account for the substitution of the diphthong \( \text{oi} \) for the faint vowel-sound of the Coptic article. As to the meaning, it might be said that Poimandres, the divine \( \text{νοῦς} \), is the ‘witness’ by whom the truth is made known to the prophet; and we might compare Corp. XII. i. 8, where Hermes, speaking of the Agathos Daimon, says that \( \text{εκείνος μόνος, ὃς προφήτησις θεός, τὰ πάντα κατιδών, θείος ἀληθὸς λόγους ἐφημεῖσα} \) (which implies that the Agathos Daimon is the ‘witness’).

Granger’s explanation of the name might be accepted, if a better one could not be found. But Mr. F. Ll. Griffith, who has kindly allowed me to consult him on this question among others in which knowledge of the Egyptian language is involved, proposes another derivation, which seems preferable; namely, that \( \text{Ποιμάνδρης} \) is the Coptic \( \text{n-em-f-πκν} \), ‘the knowledge of the Sun-god’. (He tells me that \( \text{πκ} \), ‘the sun’, is usually preceded by the article \( \text{n} \), but that the omission of the article is not unparalleled in late times, and that \( \text{n} \text{πκ} \) without the article would have a more learned and solemn appearance than the ordinary \( \text{n} \text{πκ} \).)

As to the form of the transliteration, there seems to be nothing against this. The \( \text{δ} \) would almost necessarily be inserted by Greeks for euphony; and the representation of the vowel-sounds of \( \text{εικας} \)

Tanagra chance to be known to the Greek-speaking Egyptian who first spoke of Poimandres. — The word \( \text{ποιμάνδρῳ} \) occurs in Aesch. Peri. 241.

1 Analogous uses of the words \( \text{μάρτυς} \) and \( \text{μαρτυρία} \) in the New Testament might be adduced. Rom. 8. 16; αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα (the \( \text{θεῖον νοῦ} \) of the Hermetists) συμμαρτυρεῖ τῷ πνεύματι ἡμῶν ὅτι ἵσμεν τέκνα θεοῦ. (Poimandres ‘hears witness to’ the same truth in Corp. I.) Apos. Joh. 1. 5: ‘Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, ὁ κύριος τῷ πνεύμω. Ἰωάννης 3. 14. Ev. Joh. 5. 31 sqq. and 8. 18. Ἐφ. Joh. 1. 5. 6 sqq.: τὸ πνεῦμα ἵστω τὸ μαρτυροῦν. . . . καὶ αὕτη ἵστων ἡ μαρτυρία, διὰ τοῦ μαρτυροῦν ἴστων τὸ κεφαλὴν ἰδίων δὲ θεοῦ ἠμῶν. (That is also the \( \text{μαρτυρία} \) of Poimandres in Corp. I.)

The words \( \text{μαρτυρία} \) and \( \text{αὕτην ἵστω} \) occur together in Const. Aposl. 5. 7. 30: λαβοῦτε ἐντολήν . . . μαθητεύουτε πάντα τὰ ἔθη καὶ βαπτίσατε ἐἰς τὸν αὐτὸν θάνατον ἐὰν αὕτην ἵστω τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ἰδίων . . . καὶ μαρτυρία τοῦ πνεύματος.
by ω and α may perhaps have been suggested by association with the verb θυμαίνειν.

The meaning given to the name by this derivation would suit the context. The Coptic word εἰσαι means 'knowledge' or 'perception'; it corresponds to the verb τῷ, 'to know', given as late Egyptian in Erman's Aeg. Glossar. If we assume that it is here used as an equivalent for the Greek νοῦς, Poimandres would mean 'the νοῦς of the Sun-god'; and seeing that not only in Egypt, but in the Roman empire at large, the Sun was very generally regarded as the supreme God, or an 'image' or symbol of the supreme God, this name might very well be taken to signify that which the writer of Corp. I says it denotes, namely, ὁ τῆς αἰθαντίας νοῦς, 'the Mind of the Sovereign Power' (i.e. of the supreme God).

The word αἰθαντία commonly meant (1) a man who does or has done something (e.g. has committed a murder) with his own hand; (2) one who acts by his own authority, and not in subordination to another. In the latter sense, it is equivalent to αὐτοκράτωρ; and hence αἰθαντία may be used to signify the 'supreme authority' or 'sovereignty' of God. It was thus employed by Cerinthus (Hippol. Ref. haer. 7. 33, repeated ib. 10. 21): Κ. Ἐλεγεν οὐχ ἐπὶ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ γεγονέναι τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ δυνάμεως τοῦς κεχωρισμένης τῆς ὑπὸ πάντα ἐξουσίας, καὶ ἁγιονύστας τὸν ὑπὸ πάντα θεόν... καὶ μετὰ τὸ βασιλεία κατελθεῖν εἰς (τὸν Ἰησοῦν) ἐκ τῆς ὑπὸ τὰ δόλα αἰθαντίας τῶν Χριστῶν. In that passage, ἐπὶ τὰ δόλα αἰθαντία is equivalent to ἐπὶ τὰ δόλα ἐξουσία and ἐπὶ τὰ δόλα θεόν.

Similarly Satornilus (Hippol. ib. 7. 28): τὸν ἀθρούτων δὲ ἀγγέλων εἶναι τοῦμα, ἀνωθεν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰθαντίας φωτεινῆς εἰκόνος ἐπιφανείης: and afterwards, οἰκείωσα αὐτὸν ἢ ἀνω δύναμις ἐπιμεθε ἀποθήκηα ζωῆς. (ἡ αἰθαντία is there equivalent to ἡ ἀνω δύναμις.) Epiphanius, Haer. 38, says of a sect of Gnostics, οὗτοι φασὶ τὸν Κάι ἐκ τῆς ἱσχυροτέρας δύναμις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τῆς ἀνωθεν αἰθαντίας. In the Latin translation of Irenaeus (1. 31. 1), ἐκ τῆς ἀνωθεν αἰθαντίας is rendered by a superior principalitate.¹

¹ αἰθαντία might also be used in the sense of 'authenticity' or 'genuineness'. Since αἰθαντία might signify 'one who has written or signed a document with his own hand', αἰθαντικός came to mean 'written or signed by the man himself', and hence 'authentic', 'genuine', or 'true'. E.g. in a magic papyrus (Dieterich Mysterien, p. 178) the magician says to his god (πάμ) σω τὰ ἀθήναν [δώμα] καὶ αἰθαντικά [δώμα]. And αἰθαντία seems to have been sometimes used as a substitute for αἰθαντικός in this sense. Pis. Sophia c. 126 (C. Schmidt, p. 207): 'Der erster Archon... der mit seinem authentischen (αἰθαντικός) Namen Emichthonin genannt wird.' Ib., of the third Archon, 'Ein Hundesgesicht ist sein authentisches
The divine νοῦς assumes a personal form as Poimandres, and in that form speaks to the prophet. But is this νοῦς identical with the supreme God himself, or is it distinguished from the supreme God, and regarded as a Power which emanates from him,—the first and highest of his δυνάμεις? On this question, the language of the writer appears to vary. On the one hand, Poimandres repeatedly speaks of God (ὁ θεὸς) in the third person, as a being distinct from himself (§ 8 b, ἐκ βουλῆς θεοῦ. § 10, ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος. § 12, ὁ πατὴρ. § 18, ἐκ βουλῆς θεοῦ. Ἰδ., ὁ θεὸς εἶτεν. § 21, ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος. § 22, παραγινόμαι ἕγω ὁ νοῦς ... καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἱλάσκοντα. § 26 a, ὁ ἐμεῖ τὸν πατέρα ... ὁμοουσὶν τὸν θεὸν ... ἀνέρχομαι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ... ἐν θεῷ γίνονται. § 26 b, ὕπο τοῦ σωμάτι); But the force of this argument is diminished by the fact that in § 9 init., (where the MSS. give ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὁ θεὸς, but the true reading is probably ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὁ πρῶτος,) Poimandres speaks of the supreme νοῦς also in the third person, though the νοῦς there spoken of cannot be other than ὁ τῆς αἰθητικὰς νοῦς, i.e. Poimandres himself. And on the other hand, the divine νοῦς is expressly identified with the supreme God in the words ὁ νοῦς, ὁ πρῶτος (ὁ νοῦς MSS.) θεὸς § 6, and ὁ πάνων πατὴρ [[ὁ]] νοῦς in § 12. It seems therefore that in the theology of Corp. ὁ τῆς αἰθητικὰς νοῦς (also called ὁ νοῦς ὁ πρῶτος, ὁ πάνων πατήρ, and ὁ θεὸς) is the supreme Being; but the writer makes Poimandres, in the course of his teaching, use the forms of speech which are commonly employed by men, and speak of the supreme Being in the third person, although Poimandres is that very Being.

(adhēnti) Gesicht. Ἰδ. c. 127: 'Der Drache der äusseren Finterniss hat zwölf authentische (adhēnti) Namen.' (On the other hand, adhēnti appears to mean 'supreme' or 'sovereign' in Pisto. Sophia c. 91: 'Wer das absolute (adhēnti) Mystērium des ersten Mystēriums des Unaussprechlichen empfangen hat.' Ἰδ. c. 97: 'das zwölffte Mystērium ... d. h. das absolute (adhēnti) Mystērium.') Orac. Sib. 7. 69 (Christian): δι' ἐαυτὴν καὶ γαῖας καὶ ὅλους ἀναπελέγων οἰκοδομή 'γενετο' (γεννησον Αλεξανδρε) λόγος πατρ. (adhēnti there appears to mean γενος). The word αἰθητικὴ therefore might therefore mean 'authenticity' or 'genuineness'; but it cannot very well have that meaning in the phrase ὁ τῆς αἰθητικὰς νοῦς.

1 Starting from the assumption that the νοῦς is a person distinct from ὁ θεὸς, I thought at first of altering these two passages in which they are identified, by cutting out ὁ νοῦς in § 6, and νοῦς after ὁ πάνων πατὴρ in § 12. But I now see that these alterations of the text would not get rid of the identification: for it is clear that the being who is called ὁ πάνων πατήρ in § 12 is the same being who is called ὁ νοῦς ὁ πρῶτος in § 9. The νοῦς δημιουργὸς, who is son of ὁ νοῦς ὁ πρῶτος, is spoken of in § 13 as 'brother' of Anthropos, who is son of ὁ πάνων πατήρ: from which it follows that the two phrases (ὁ νοῦς ὁ πρῶτος and ὁ πάνων πατήρ) denote the same person.

The words ὁ Παμάδρης ἱμηη τοῖς δυνάμεις in § 46 b might be reconciled with either of the two views.
LIBELLVS I: §§ 2-4.

["οἶδα δὲ βούλει, καὶ σύνειμι σοι πανταχοῦ."] If we retain the words "οἶδα δὲ βούλει" where they stand in the MSS., they serve no apparent purpose, and bring into undue prominence the inconsistency inevitably involved in making an omniscient Being ask for information. If we place them after "φησίν ἐμοὶ πάλιν," they follow naturally on the prophet's answer to the question which Poimandres has asked. Reading "δὲ" καὶ σύνειμι σοι πανταχοῦ, we may take these words as an explanation of "οἶδα." The divine "νοῦς" knows all that is in man's heart, being always present there (if not in all men, at least in the ἐκνοῦν ἀνθρώπου, §§ 21 sq.); though it is only at rare moments that a man is so fully conscious of its presence as the prophet was in his vision.

§ 3. Μοι ἔτω τὰ ὅτα καὶ τοῦτο τὴν τούτων φύσιν, καὶ γενώθη τὸν θεόν. I.e. 'I wish (1) to understand the Kosmos, and (2) to know the supracosmic God.' Cf. Corp. XI. ii init.: σοὶ μοι περὶ τούτων (τοῦ παντός καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ) διασάφησον.

§ 4. οὕτως εἰκόνος (τοῦτο εἰκὼν MSS.), ἡλλάγη ("εὐθὺς πάντα μοι") τῇ ἰδικῇ καὶ [[ ]] ἡνοικτὸ ἤπτῃ. In the text of the MSS., the subject of ἡλλάγη is Poimandres. But as no 'form' has hitherto been ascribed to Poimandres, it could hardly be said here that he 'changed in form.' Besides, if he 'changed in form,' we ought to be told what new form he assumed; but nothing is said about that. (It is true that the expanse of light which the prophet now sees is meant to symbolize the divine Mind, and Poimandres is that Mind; but the prophet does not know what the light means until he is told its meaning in § 6.) On the other hand, we are told in the following sentence that πάντα (i.e. the visible world) changed into a boundless expanse of light; the subject of ἡλλάγη must therefore have been πάντα, and not Poimandres, who remains, as before, an undefined presence.

"φῶς [δὲ] πάντα γεγενημένα. The material world disappears, and there is nothing but φῶς ἀόρατον. The prophet has been transported in his vision to the time before the creation of the world, when Mind or God alone existed; and God is pictured as light diffused through boundless space.

καὶ μετ' ἄλγον, σκοτός κατωφερής ἦν ἐν μέρει (τινὶ) γεγενημένον. This is the first beginning of the Kosmos. In a certain part of the expanse of light (i.e. at the place where the Kosmos is subsequently to come into being), there appears a cloud of darkness. This darkness is ἀμορφὸς ἃλη, the raw material out of which the visible universe
is to be made. It is called κατωφέρεις, which is an epithet applied by the Stoics to the grosser and heavier elements, earth and water. This, if the writer thought the matter out clearly, ought to mean that the σκότος (like the 'watery substance' into which it presently changes) tended to gravitate towards a central point, viz. the centre of the future Kosmos. The author rejects the Platonic doctrine that ἄλη is without beginning, and has existed side by side with God from all eternity; but whether it was brought into existence by God's will, or came into being of itself, he does not tell us.

He is in agreement with the Platonists in holding ἄλη to be the source of evil; and he symbolizes its evil influence by picturing it as σκότος φοβηρὸν τε καὶ στοχαστὸν, in contrast to the φῶς ἐντὸς τε καὶ ἰδιαρὰν which stands for God. But the symbolical representation of the good God by light, and the evil ἄλη by darkness, must have been suggested to him by some tradition independent of Platonism. In Greek speculation, an early form of this notion appears in the system of Parmenides, who, in his account of the 'world of illusion', said that the first things were fire and earth, 'or rather, light and darkness' 1. But the identification of the good principle with light, and the evil principle with darkness, was especially characteristic of the Zoroastrians; and a Zoroastrian conception may very well have been transmitted to the author of Corp. I. Hippol. Ref. haer. i. 2. 12 (Diels Doxogr. p. 557): Δίδωμος δὲ ὁ Ἑρατρίδης (unknown) καὶ Ἀριστότέλους ὁ μονοκός (c. 300 B.C.) φασὶ πρὸς Ζαρατάν τὸν Χαλδαίον (i.e. Zoroaster) λαμβάνει τὸν θαυμαστὴν περί ὅν ἐκδήλωτα αὐτῷ δίδω μέν ἄλην ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τῶν ὀξύνων ἀπιάν, πατέρα καὶ μητέρα καὶ πατέρα μὲν φῶς, μητέρα δὲ σκότος: τοῦ δὲ φωτὸς μέρη θερμῶν ἕξον τοῖνος ταχύ, τοῦ δὲ σκότους ψυχρῶν ἡγοῦν βαρύ 2. βραδύν ἐκ τὸ τοῦτον πάντα τὸν κόσμον συνεστάναι, ἐκ θελείας καὶ ἀρρενος... ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκ γῆς καὶ 'κόσμου (perhaps οὐρανοῦ) γυμνόμενον τάδε φασὶ λέγειν τὸν Ζαρατάν. διὸ δαίμονος ἐναι, τῶν μὲν οὐρανίου, τῶν δὲ χθόνουν 3 καὶ τῶν μὲν χθόνοιν 'ανείαν τὴν


2 Cf. σκότος κατωφέρεις in Corp. I. 4.
3 I.e. the Power of Light and the Power of Darkness.
The 'Pythagorean' doctrine here spoken of is clearly connected with that of Parmenides. Aristoxenus or his authority presumably found this doctrine taught by some Pythagorean, and having noted its resemblance to what he had heard of the Zoroastrian cosmology, inferred that Pythagoras had learnt it from Zoroaster. Cf. Eudemus (c. 300 B.C.) in Damascius De princ. p. 382 Kopp (Mullach, Fr. ph. Gr. III, p. 288 f.): Μάγοι δὲ καὶ πάν τὸ Ἀρειον γένος . . . οἱ μὲν Τόποι, οἱ δὲ Χρόνον καλοῦσιν [τὸ νοητὸν ἀπαν καὶ] τὸ ἡμιμένον, ἡ δὲ διακρίνει τὴν θέαν ἀγαθὸν καὶ δαίμων κακὸν, ὁς αὐτὸς καὶ σκότος πρὸ τοῦτων, ὃς ἐνίον λέγειν. οὕτω δὲ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν ἀδίάκριτον φύσιν 'διακρινομένην πιούσι τὴν διητὴν συντοχὴν τῶν κρατήρων'.

The two principles of the Zoroastrians were adopted by Mani. Epiphanius Haer. 66. 14 gives the opening words of Mani's work on the 'Mysteries' as follows: ἦν θέας καὶ ἡλία, φῶς καὶ σκότος, ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν, τοὺς πάνω ἄκρως ἐναντία. Alex. Lykoprol. Contra Manichaeei opiniones 2 (Brinkmann): αἰχμὰς εἶδότο θεὸν καὶ ἡλίαν, εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν θεὸν ἀγαθὸν, τὴν δὲ ἡλιὰν κακὸν . . . τὸ δὲ λαμπρὸν καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ τὸ ἄνω, πάντα ταύτα σύν τῷ θεῷ εἶναι, τὸ ἀμυδρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ σκότος καὶ τὸ κάτω σύν τῷ ἡλίᾳ. As the use of the terms 'light' and 'darkness' in Corp. I closely resembles Mani's use of them, it seems probable that it was derived from the same source, i.e. from the Zoroastrians.

Plotinus repeatedly describes ἡλία as 'darkness'; e.g. 1. 8. 4: (ἡ ψυχή) σκότον ὅρα, καὶ ἔχει ὅδη ἡλίαν. Plot. 4. 3. 9 (on the formation of body by soul): ἐπὶ ἄκρους τοὺς ἑγκατοι τοῦ πυρὸς (= φωτὸς) σκότος ἐγένετο· ὅπερ ἤδυσα ἡ ψυχή, ἐπείπερ ὑπάνη (τὸ σκότος), ἐμφύσωσεν αὐτῷ.

1 The sense required is ἀνεώς (εἰς) τὴν γένεσιν τῆς καὶ ὅδωρ (οτ Γῆν μετέχουσαν ὅδατος).
2 'Fire which partakes of air' is what the Stoics called pneuma. The gross substance of the human or animal body consists of earth and water from below; the pneuma, which is the vehicle of life, consists of fire and air from above.
3 I. e. this second school of 'Magi'.
4 The text is corrupt here; but the general meaning is clear. There are two φύσεις ('substances'), viz. light and darkness, and in connexion with them, two συντοχίαι (series) of deities; the series of good deities is headed by Ormazd, and the series of evil deities by Ahriman.

In identifying the good God with light and the evil ἡλία with darkness, the writer of Corp. I agrees with the second of the two schools of Magi spoken of by Eudemus; but he differs from them in putting light at the beginning, and making the darkness come into being later, instead of positing an 'undiscriminated substance' out of which both light and darkness came by differentiation.
1% CORPVS HERMETICVM

'skolios tesxeriarmenov' \[\delta\ v e i k a s a m e\].1 \(\delta\ v e i k a s a m e\) is probably a misplaced doublet of \(\delta\ v e i k a s a m e\) a few lines below. \(\text{τεσκεραμένον}\) might possibly be a corruption of \(\text{τσαἴρομενον}\) (the darkness being pictured as consisting of wreaths of smoke curling upward); but \(\text{τσαἴρομενον}\) would be hardly consistent with κατοφερέως above.

\(\text{εἶδον (εἴδοτα MSS., εἴδοτα B)}\) μεταβαλλόμενον το σκότος εἰς ὑγρὰν τυνα ὕδων ἀφέτες τεταραγμένην. \(\text{εἴδοτα}\) may be a conflation of two readings, \(\text{εἶδον}\) and \(\text{εἶτα}\). The ὑγρὰ \(\phi\nu\v\) corresponds to the watery chaos which occurs in the Babylonian cosmogony, in \text{Genesis 1}, and in the Stoic \text{diacosmesis}.

Cf. \text{Corp. III. 1 b, ἦν γὰρ σκότος [ [ ] τὸ ἄβυσσον, καὶ ἦδρο (ἔστερον)}, and see notes \text{ad loc}. The writer of \text{Corp. I}, instead of putting the watery chaos at the beginning, as the Babylonians and the author of \text{Gen. 1} did, has prefixed a description of its origin. But from the watery chaos onward, his cosmogony is constructed on the same lines as that of \text{Gen. 1}.

καὶ καταν \(\alpha\piοδιδοῦσαν \ δ\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̃\̢
'to accomplish a noise', is hardly Greek; and there is probably some corruption. We should have expected ἱκουσα, to correspond to εἰσον above; and perhaps the author may have written something like ἱχνον ἀφιεῖτος ἱκουσα.

No 'noise' is mentioned in this connexion in Genesis; but in descriptions of the 'last things' in Judaeo-Christian Apocalypses, (some of the details of which, according to Gunkel, Schöpfung und Chaos, are derived from traditional descriptions of the 'first things',) we hear of 'the roaring of the sea' (Luke 21. 25: εν ἀπορίᾳ ἱχνους θαλάσσης καὶ σάλου).

... [εἰσα] βοη (γὰρ) ἐξ αὐτῆς αὐθαραθρος ἔχει γέμιστο. The writer contrasts the 'inaarticulate roar' of the watery chaos with the λόγος which issued from 'the Light', i.e. from God. λόγος means primarily 'speech', i.e. significant utterance; and the author, though he hypostatizes the λόγος, still continues to regard it as the 'spoken word' of God. The words φωνὴ φωτὸς must have been applied to the λόγος, and not, as in the MSS., to the 'inaarticulate roar'.

§ 5 a. λόγος ἄγος ἐπιφή τῇ (ὕγρᾳ) φύσει. This corresponds to πνεῦμα θεὸς ἐπιφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὄθεν in Gen. i. 2; but it also corresponds to ἔνεν ὁ θεός in Gen. i. 3 &c. The writer identifies the 'spirit of God' which 'moved upon the face of the waters' with 'the word of God' by which the world was made. Cf. § 5 b, διὰ τὸν ... ἐπιφέρομενον πνευματικὸν λόγον. Herm. Fragm. 27 : γὰρ λόγος αὐτοῦ ... ἔγκνω τὸ θαύμα ὑποίσχεν. (The θαύμα there spoken of is the ὕγρα φύσις of Corp. I.)

§ 5 b. [καὶ τῷ ἄκρατῳ ... πνευματικὸν λόγον.] This passage evidently belongs to the account of the origin of the elements, which is introduced by the question in § 8 b init. (τὰ στοιχεῖα τῆς φύσεως πόθεν ὑπέστη;) It must have followed, and not preceded, the description of the νοῦσος κόσμου in §§ 7, 8 a.

§ 6. [εἰς ἄκων] ὁ θεὸς Ποίμανθρα ἐφε [εἰς ἄκων] ἡμεῦ ... φησὶ. εἰς ἄκων is meaningless where it stands in the MSS. If we place it after Ποίμανθρα, it serves to mark the distinction between what the prophet saw in his vision and what he heard Poimandres say.

Τὸ φῶς ἀκείνο, ἔφη, ἐγώ, νοῦς, ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς (ὁ σῶς θεός MSS.). There is no reason why the supreme Mind should say 'I am thy God'; and σῶς is probably a corruption of ὁς or α'ς, an abbreviation for πρῶτος. See Corp. III init. An instance of πρῶτος written in the form α'ς occurs in Catal. codd. astro. Graec. II, p. 39.

ὁ δὲ ἐκ [ῥοδᾶ] φωνῆς ἐπὶ λόγος ὑπὸ θεοῦ. The thing to be explained
by Poimandres is the thing which the prophet has just perceived in his vision, viz. 'the Word which came forth from the light'; this therefore ought to be the subject of the proposition. The prophet saw the light, but did not see Mind, and did not perceive that the Word came forth 'from Mind'; εκ νος therefore can hardly be right. And the epithet φωτεινός is not suitable; we have been told that the Word came forth from the light, but not that the Word itself was 'bright' or 'shining'; it was a thing heard, not a thing seen. If we write ὁ δὲ εκ φωτος λόγος, all difficulties are removed. (We may suppose that νος is an accidentally misplaced doublet of the preceding νος, and that φωτος, which had been rendered meaninglessly by the insertion of νος before it, was altered into φωτεινος to make sense.) Poimandres explains to the prophet (1) that the light which he saw is God, and (2) that the Word which came forth from the light is son of God.

The λόγος is here hypostatized, as in Philo passim; and the conception of 'the Word of God' as a person, and a 'son of God', must have been adopted by the writer of Corp. I from Jewish speculations similar to those of Philo.1 On the Jewish hypostatization of God's λόγος, see Bousset, Rel. des Judentums, p. 399; Schürer, Gesch. des jüd. Volkes III, p. 708 ff.; Zeller, Phil. der Griechen III, Abth. ii (1903), pp. 418–434. Philo's notion of the divine Logos was based partly on the Mosaic account of the creation, and partly on the Stoic use of the word λόγος to describe the God who pervades the Kosmos and operates in it.2 Philo's Logos may be regarded as the Stoic God

---

1 Celsus (Origen c. Cels. 2. 31) represented a Jew as saying to the Christians εἰ γε ὁ λόγος ἐστιν ὑμῖν ὄνος τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ ἤμεις ἐκανόνιζομεν. To this Origen replies that he has never heard a Jew admit τὸ λόγον εἶναι τὸν ὄνος τοῦ θεοῦ. But the Jew Philo repeatedly asserts, if not precisely this, at least τὸ τοῦ λόγου εἶναι τὸν θεοῦ. E.g. Philo De agric. 12. 51, Wendland II, p. 105: ὁ πατὴρ καὶ βασιλεὺς θεὸς διάκονος all things in the universe, προορισμένος τὸν ὅρθον αὐτοῦ λόγον καὶ προτύπον υἱὸν, δι' τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τούτης ἀγάλματος αMouseListener τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ὀρκίσας διαδίδεται. See also De conf. ling. 28. 146, Wendland II, p. 257, τὸ πρωτύπον αὐτοῦ λόγον καθ' ἑαυτόν.

2 1 By the word of the Lord were the heavens made. Philo Legg. alleg. 3. 31. 96, Cohn I, p. 134: ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ . . . φιλάγγειρ ὑπὲρ προορισμένου εἰκοσμοῦ. De cherubim 35. 127, Cohn I, p. 200: εὐθύνει γὰρ αὐτῶν μὲν (τοῦ κόσμου) τοῖς θείοις, ἢ τοιχίων, ἢ τῶν τίταρα στοιχείων, ἢ τῶν συνεκαταστάσεως, ὁ λόγος δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ, δὲ τακτοσκέυασθαι. In Corp. I, it is in connexion with the making of the world that the Logos is spoken of.

3 The Stoics found (or thought they found) this use of the word in Heraclitus.

4 It has been thought by some that the influence of certain analogous doctrines taught by Egyptian priests also contributed more or less to the development of Philo's theory of the Logos. (Specimens of such Egyptian doctrines are given by Reitzenstein, Poimandres, p. 55 ff., and Moret, Mystères Égyptiens, 1913, pp. 108–139.) This is not quite impossible; but I do not think it can be held to have been
dematerialized, with a supracosmic God (the God of Platonism) set up above him. His distinction between God and the Logos is an instance of the distinction between a 'first God' and a 'second God' which presents itself in various forms in the teachings of the syncretic Platonists of the Roman empire; and this distinction, wherever it occurs in their writings, seems to have resulted from a combination of Platonic and Stoic conceptions. The transcendent God of Platonism being debarred from contact with matter, a second God was needed to operate in the world; and the immanent God of Stoicism was at hand to supply the need. The Platonists therefore adopted the God of the Stoics, but made him subordinate to their own transcendent God; and Philo, influenced in part by the Stoic use of the word λόγος, and in part by its use in the LXX to signify the 'word' or fiat by which God made the world (and the 'word of the Lord' by which He spoke to the prophets), gave the name Logos to the subordinate God of his system.

God's λόγος is already imagined as a person distinct from God in Ἁρμ. Σαλ. (time of Augustus?) 18. 15, in a description of the slaying of the first-born of Egypt: οὐαρσίναμος σου λόγος ἀπ' οὕρανων ἐκ θρόνων βασιλείων ἀπότομος πολεμιστής εἰς μέσον τῆς ὀλέθριας ἡλικίας γῆς, εἴφοι δὲ τὴν ἀνυπόκριτον ἐπιταγήν σου φέρων, καὶ στὰς ἐπλήρωσεν τὰ πάντα θανάτου καὶ οὕρανων μὲν ἤπειτο, βεβηκεῖ δὲ ἐπὶ γῆς. But this is an isolated instance; and Schurer says 'as it seems, Philo was the first to posit such an intermediate being between God and the world under the name of Logos'.

Οὔτω γνώθι, τὸ ἐν σοὶ βλέπων [ ζ' -] έπει καὶ ἐν σοὶ ὁ λόγος υἱός, ο δὲ νοῦς πατήρ. (Οὔτω γνώθι, τὸ ἐν σοὶ βλέπων καὶ ἀκούον (al. βλέπων καὶ ἀκούον) λόγος κυρίου, ο δὲ νοῦς πατήρ θεὸς MSS.). This sentence is meaningless in the MSS. Its restoration is doubtful; but with the alterations which I have made, we get a satisfactory sense. "What proved. At any rate, the chief sources of the Philonian Logos-doctrine, if not the only sources, were Jewish and Stoic; and it can be sufficiently accounted for as an outcome of Judaeo-Stoic speculation, without assuming any part of it to have been derived from the indigenous religion of Egypt.

1 The λόγος is here said to 'bear the command of God' as a thing distinct from himself; he cannot therefore be merely a figurative personification of that command, but must be regarded as an actual person.

2 Cf. Ps. 107. 20, ἀνδρεπίζω τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ καὶ λάσθανο αὐτοῦ, where the language makes it at least possible for a reader to regard the λόγος as a person. Origen (c. Cels. 2. 31) quotes that verse in support of the Christian doctrine of the λόγος.

3 Zeller (III, Abth. ii, p. 430) agrees in the main with Schürer on this point, though he speaks somewhat more guardedly.
do you mean', the prophet asks, 'by saying that the divine λόγος is son of the divine νοῦς?' Poimandres answers: 'The relation between the divine λόγος and the divine νοῦς is analogous to the relation between the human λόγος and the human νοῦς. Your λόγος (speech) may be called son of your νοῦς (mind or thought), because it issues from your νοῦς, and is inseparably connected with it; and in the same sense, the divine λόγος may be called son of the divine νοῦς.' Cf. Philo De cher. 2. 7, Cohn I, p. 171 (quoted by Clem. Strom. 5. 8; see Cohn I, p. lx): the name Abram was changed to Abraham, which means "πατήρ ἐκλεκτὸς ἥχουσα". ἤχει μὲν γὰρ ὁ γεγομένος λόγος, πατήρ δὲ τούτου ὁ νοῦς, ἔξελεγμένος δὲ τοῦ σπουδαίου νοῦς. Clem. Strom. 4. 162: ὅθεν καὶ διδάσκαλος "μόνος δὲ μόνος ψηφίστων ἄγνου" πατρός (διδάσκαλος μόνος ὁ λόγος, ύιὸς τοῦ νοῦ πατρός Schwartz), ὁ παθόμενος τῶν ἄνθρωπων.

Compare the Christian Hermippus (Kroll and Vieereck) I. 13. 97: ὅθεν (sc. from the combination of νοῦς, λόγος, and ψυχή καὶ πνεῦμα in ourselves) ἢμεῖς ὑμαμομένοι, καὶ ἐπὶ θεού τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις κατανοηθέντες σύβομεν, καὶ τὸ τῆς ζωρυχτῆς τριάδος ἁνακλιθθῆ Μυστήριον' δὲ γὰρ νοῦς ἐν ἡμῖν, τοῦτ' ἐν ἐκείνους πατήρ' δὲ λόγος, ύιὸς' δὲ δὲ ψυχή καὶ πνεῦμα, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔχαρτον καὶ ξωοποίου ὅτι πνεύμα. Cf. also a document Ἐκκλησία πατρός καὶ νοοῦ, probably written by Sarapion, bishop of Thmuis in Egypt, about A.D. 350 (Wobbermin, Texte und Unters. N. F. II. 3 b, p. 22): τῶς οὖν "ἀδικαὶ πατήρ" καὶ "ἀδικαὶ νοῦς" νοητάν ἀμενον; πατήρ εἰμὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἐμοῦ, καὶ δὴ βούλομαι τὸν λόγον μου προφέρω, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνος ἀκούσε φθάνων ὁ λόγος ὁ ἐμὸς ὁ δημιουθέτη ἐκ' ἐμοῦ. (And so it is in the case of the Father and the Son;) θλήμα γὰρ πατρός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ. πανταχοῦ ὃν διακονών τῷ πατρί, ὅπως ἀνακρίνεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. Ἰβ. p. 23: ἡνίκα δὲ λόγος ἐν τῷ νοί θρεμέτ, τότε σημάτω εἴτι δὲ βούλεται τὸ νοῦς φωνεῖ τὰ πάντα, ὁ λόγος προφέρεται πρὸς φωτισμὸν τοῦ πνεύμονος. For the explanation of divine things by a reference to what the pupil knows about himself, cf. Corp. XI. ii. 19 init., where the teacher says to the pupil τοῦτο λόγον ἀνδρικά λογοῦσαι τῷ σπουδαίῳ. Ἰβ. 12 a: τί μέγα τῷ θεῷ... τοιῶν, σοφοὶ τοσαίνα τοιοῦτος; Ἰβ. 14 a: θεὲ τοῖς σοι ἑγινώσκεται.

The text of Corp. I was presumably altered by a Christian, who failed to understand that the writer was here speaking of man's λόγος and man's νοῦς, and consequently introduced an irrelevant mention of 'the Word of the Lord' and 'God the Father'.

§ 7. εἶπον τοσαῦτα (εἰπώντος ταῦτα MSS.). 'He spoke (only) so much'; i. e. at this point he ceased to speak, and proceeded to influence me in a different way.
He 'gazed straight into my eyes'. Here Poimandres is for the first time spoken of as if he were visible in human form, and we are told that the prophet 'trembled at his appearance (ἰδέα)'. But even now, no definite human shape is described. What is meant is that the divine visitant imposes his influence on the prophet, as one man might influence and, so to speak, hypnotize another by a long and earnest gaze. Thus influenced, the prophet's νοῦς is raised to a higher potency, and enabled to see the vision of the νοητὸς κόσμος.

The prophet now sees that the 'Light' is not uniform and homogeneous, as it at first appeared to him to be. It is an organized whole consisting of innumerable δύναμεις, and may therefore be called a κόσμος; but it is not περισσοτέχνος, as is the αισθητὸς κόσμος. The δύναμεῖς of which it consists are, in one aspect, the Platonic ἰδεῖς, i.e. the παραδείγματα of the several parts of the sensible world; but inasmuch as the ἰδεῖς are 'thoughts which God thinks', these same δύναμεῖς are, in another aspect, parts of God himself, and the whole which is made up of them is the 'Light' which stands for God. 'God thinks himself' (ἐαυτὸν νοεῖ), as Aristotle said; and in the view of the writer of Corp. I, as in that of Plotinus, the divine νοῦς and the sum of its νοητά are identical.

Compare the doctrine of the Docetae, in Hippol. Ref. haer. 8. 9: κεκόσμητο μὲν ἄνενθεῖς (ἄνενθεὼς) πάσα ἡ νοητὴ φύσις, φώς δὲ

---

1 Philo retains the form of the Mosaic narrative, in which the creation is described as a series of events in time, though he is aware that in reality the νοητὸς κόσμος is not in time, and cannot have begun to be.
This has nothing to do with the vorûrosKoûpos; it is evidently a misplaced fragment of the account of the formation of the aîloûros kósmos, which begins at § 8 b init.

The ‘intelligible world’ can be ‘seen’ only with the eye of the mind. The lógos (‘speech’) of Poimandres, which caused the prophet to see it, is the preceding command, νόει τὸ φῶς καὶ γνώριζε τοῦτο. We might rather have expected to be told that he saw it διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ποιμάνδρου ἀντωπήσεως. But we may understand that the lógos and the ἀντώπησις operated together; the command worked like a spell, and its power was supplemented by the gaze.

The intelligible world was in existence before God began to make the sensible world out of formless ψῆφος. There is no meaning in saying that the ‘beginning’ of the sensible world was ἀπεράντος; but as an epithet of the νοητὸς κόσμος, the word ἀπεράντος may be understood in the same sense as ἀπερώμαστος above. Simon Magus called the supreme God τὴν μεγάλην δύναμιν, τὴν ἀπεράντον (Hippol. Ref. ἱερ. 6. 9).

The ‘physical’ (i.e. material) elements are fire, air, water, and earth, out of which the aîloûrosKoûpos is constructed. The first stage in its making is the formation of these four elements by differentiation out of the watery chaos. The writer uses the word φύσις to signify the material universe. The καλὸς κόσμος is the νοητὸς κόσμος. The βουλή theou, by which the aîloûros kósmos is made after the model of the νοητὸς κόσμος, corresponds to the πρῶνα theou of the Stoics, and the βουλήσια or θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ spoken of in some of the Hermetica. Its function is the same as that
of the creative λόγος of God in the writer's Jewish authorities (cf. Ps. 32 (33), 6, τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ παρθένου οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἐστερεώθησαν and Philo Legg. alleg. 3. 31. 96, quoted above); but having adopted the terms λόγος and βουλή from different sources, the author of Corp. I does not himself identify them. He here personifies the βουλή θεοῦ for the moment; but the personification is hardly more than a literary figure, and God's βουλή does not take part as a person in the mythical events which follow, as the λόγος does.

It is difficult to find any meaning in the statement that God's βουλή 'took' or 'received' the λόγος; and it seems best to assume that in the original text the phrase λαβοῦσα τὸν λόγον was applied to the ὄγρα φύσις, and was intended to refer back to λόγος ἄγων ἐπίβη τῷ ὄγρα φύσις in § 5 a. The λόγος 'took its stand upon' the watery substance, and the watery substance, having thus 'received the λόγος', was developed into an ordered world. Compare § 11 b, οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἐξεῖ τὸν λόγον (ἡ φύσις).

ἐκσωμοτομήθη, διακριθέντων ἐξ αὐτῆς τῶν στοιχείων, ἐξ ἐν καὶ τὸ γένημα τῶν ἐμφύσεων.—(κοσμοποιησείσα διὰ τῶν θεωτῆς στοιχείων καὶ γενημάτων ψυχῶν MSS.). The traditional text is mere nonsense; and I have rewritten it so as to express what I suppose to have been the author's meaning. It is to be presumed that he here spoke of the two stages of the κοσμοποίησις, viz. (1) the separation of the elements, and (2) the production of living creatures from these separated elements. The second of these two stages is the process described in § 11 b.

§ 5 b. καὶ (γὰρ) πῦρ ... κρέμασθαι αὐτῶν ἐκ' αὐτῶ. This passage, misplaced in the MSS., corresponds to the account of the separation of the elements in Corp. III 2 a (ἐπεξεργάσθη τὰ ἐλαφρὰ κ.τ.λ.). Both writers alike have substituted for the Mosaic description of the separation of 'the waters above the firmament' from 'the waters below the firmament' a description of the separation of the elements which is based on the Stoic physics.


ἀναβαίνων [τοσοῦτον] ἀναβαίνοντος αὐτοῦ MSS.) μέχρι τοῦ πυρός. If τοσοῦτον is the right reading, it must mean 'only so far'; the air rose till it reached the fire above, but no farther. But as this meaning is sufficiently expressed by μέχρι τοῦ πυρός, it is probable that τοσοῦτον has been added by a later hand.
In the parallel passage, Corp. III. 2 a, ἀνακρήμωσθαι occurs; but it is differently employed. In Corp. III, the fire is ‘suspended aloft’, and rests upon the air below it; in Corp. I, the air ‘appears to be suspended from the fire’, being situated immediately below the fire.

These words were probably suggested by the mention of a στερέωμα in connexion with the separation of the waters in Genesis. The meaning seems to be that the fire was (so to speak) solidified in the form of a firmly fixed sphere. The ‘mighty Power’ which operated as God’s agent in the fixing of the ‘firmament’ is probably the δημιουργὸς νοῦς spoken of in § 9, who resides in the outermost sphere of heaven (or in the space immediately beyond it?), ‘encompassing’ that sphere, and holding it in place. But as we have not yet been told of the existence of the δημιουργὸς νοῦς, the writer cannot at this stage mention him by his proper name, and therefore merely refers to him vaguely as a δύναμις μεγίστη.

Fire and air having been separated out from the ‘watery substance’ of the primal chaos, what remained of it was a mixture of earth and water. Cf. Philo De opif. mundi ii. 38, Cohn I, p. 11: after the making of the firmament, ἐπικύρω τῷ σύμπαν ὄσον εἰς ἄπασαν τὴν γῆν ἀνέκλειντο καὶ διὰ πάντων αὐτῆς ἐπεθοήτηκε τῶν μερῶν, οὐ στοιχίας ἀναπτυκτικῶς ἐκμάθα, ὡς ἐναι τέλμα[τα] καὶ βασίν πηλῶν, ἀμφοτέρων τῶν στοιχείων ἀναδειμένων καὶ συγκεκριμένων τρόπων φυράματος εἰς μίαν ἀδιάκριτον καὶ ἀμορφον φύσιν κ.τ.λ. In Philo, as in Genesis and in Corp. III, the separation of earth and water follows immediately; but in Corp. I, it does not take place (or at any rate is not mentioned in our text) until a later stage; see § ii b.

κινούμενα δὲ ἡν διὰ τόν (ἐπάνω) (τοῦ ὄσατος) ἐπιφερόμενον πνευματικῶν λόγων. It seems certain that the word ἐπιφερόμενον was suggested by Gen. i. 2, LXX (καὶ πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐπιφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὄσατος); and as τοῦ ὄσατος makes confusion where it stands in the MSS., the simplest remedy is to transpose it to this place, and insert ἐπάνω before it. The ὄσορ here spoken of must be the mass of mingled (or, more strictly speaking, still undifferentiated) earth and water; and this inaccurate use of the word ὄσοτος can be most easily accounted for by assuming that the phrase was taken over unaltered from the Greek Genesis. The meaning must be that
LI BELL VS I: §§ 5 b, 9.

the λόγος, which, before the separation of the elements, 'took its stand upon' the undifferentiated 'watery substance', now hovers close above that portion of the watery substance which still remains below in the form of undifferentiated earth and water. It afterwards quits that position and flies up to heaven (§ 10). For the epithet πνευματικός, cf. Ps. 32 (33) 6, where τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ stands in parallelism with τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ κυρίου. The author must have meant that the λόγος consists of πνεῦμα, i.e. gaseous substance, and 'moves' the watery mass below it, as the wind puts the surface of the sea in motion. From the Stoic point of view, there is no inconsistency in holding that the λόγος is a gaseous substance, and at the same time a living person.

§ 9. ο ἐς νοῦς ο πρώτος (νοῦς ο θεός MSS.), [μενοθελής ον], (δ) ζωή καὶ φῶς ὑπάρχον. ο πρώτος is wanted, to stand in contrast to ἐπορον νοῦν below. Most likely πρῶτος was written ἀος, as before (see § 6), and ἀος was corrupted into ὀς, i.e. θεός. Similarly below, where the MSS. give νοῦν δημιουργικόν, ὅς θεός ... ὄν, it is probable that θεός is a corruption of ὅς, i.e. δειτερος.

The phrase ἀρπενοθήλες ὄν is out of place; it must have been intended to go with and explain ἀπεκύρισεν, which is properly used of the mother, and not of the father. For the description of the supreme God as ἀρπενοθήλες, compare Ascl. Lat. III. 20 b, 21.

The phrase ζωή καὶ φῶς is repeatedly used in Corp. I as a known name or description of God. Compare the use of the words ζωή and φῶς in the Fourth Gospel.1 The use of φῶς to denote God may have been partly due to Zoroastrian influence; and that of ζωή may possibly have been derived from phrases used in Egyptian cults. (See prefatory note on Corp. XI. i.)

ἀπεκύρισεν(ν) [λόγῳ]. The word λόγῳ is meaningless here. Perhaps Reitzenstein is right in striking it out; but how did it come to be inserted? Sense might be made in another way, by writing ἐπορον τῷ λόγῳ, 'in addition to the Word'. We were told before that the Logos is son of God; we are now told that God has another son also.

ἐπορον νοῦν δημιουργικόν. The writer distinguishes a first νοῦς, who is the supreme God, and a second νοῦς, who is the immediate 'Maker' of the contents of the material universe. In this he agrees with Numenius. See Numen. ap. Euseb. Praep. ev. ii. 18, quoted in

1 And in the Old Testament; e.g. Ps. 35 (36). 10: παρὰ σοι πηγή ζωῆς, ἐν τῷ φωτὶ σωμ δημιουργή φῶς.
prefatory note on Corp. II. Cf. Oracula Chaldaica (c. A.D. 200?), Kroll, p. 14: πάντα γὰρ ἔξετθλεσε πατὴρ, καὶ νῦν παρέδωκε | δευτέρα, ἤν πρῶτον κληρίζετε πᾶν γένος ἄνδρων. In the Christian Gnostic systems also, the Demiurgus was distinguished from the supreme God; and in most of them, he was enthroned (as in Corp. I) in or immediately above the highest sphere of the material heavens. But most of the Christian Gnostics insisted on the inferiority of the Demiurgus to the supreme God more strongly than the author of Corp. I does, and separated the one from the other by a larger interval; and some of them regarded the Demiurgus as a positively evil power.

The Demiurgus-Nous of Corp. I begins his work only when the four elements have already been separated; his function is to make the ζωα, both ἄθανατα (the heavenly bodies) and θνητά, with the exception of man, who is of different origin. The making of plants, which is placed before the making of the heavenly bodies in Gen. 1, and is coupled with the making of mortal ζωα in Corp. III, is omitted in Corp. I.

The conception of the Demiurgus-Nous, which the writer of Corp. I has adopted from the Platonists of his time, corresponds to the Judaeo-Stoic conception of the λόγος; and one or the other is in reality superfluous. The author however sought to include both of them side by side in his system; and finding in Gen. 1 a mention of 'the spirit of God moving on the face of the waters', he identified the λόγος with this 'spirit of God', and accordingly assigned to the λόγος the preliminary work of separating the elements, while he reserved for the Demiurgus-Nous the function of making ζωα. But he is conscious of their fundamental identity, and shows it by saying in § 10 that the λόγος, after the completion of his task in the lower world, flew up to heaven, and 'was united with the Demiurgus-Nous; for he was of one substance with him'. From that point onward, the two are one.

The Demiurgus-Nous corresponds in some respects to the supreme God of the Stoics; and the Stoics located their supreme God in the highest sphere of heaven.
other six planets, of fire alone. But the author of Corp. I says that all seven are made of 'fire and pneuma'; and this presumably means that they are all alike made of fire and air in combination. The Stoic πνεῦμα was commonly regarded as a mixture of fire and air; but when the word πνεῦμα is so used as to exclude an inter-mixture of fire, it must be taken to mean air. πνεῦμα means the element air in Pl. Phileb. 29 a. Cf. Hippol. Ref. haer. 4. 43 (quoted in note on § 17 below) and Corp. III. 2 a.

This paragraph corresponds to Gen. i. 14-19 ('God said, Let there be lights in the firmament ... to rule over the day and over the night' &c.), and to Corp. III. 2 b (διηρήσθης (ἡ πυρίνη οὐσία) σὺν τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ θεοῖς κ.τ.λ.).

ἡ διοίκησις αὐτῶν εἰμαιρμένη καλεῖται. The notion that Heimarmene is brought to bear on things below by the movements of the heavenly bodies occurs repeatedly in the Hermetica. Cf. Corp. XVI. 16: ταύτην δὲ τὴν διοίκησιν (ἐκ τις administration of the sublunar world by the planets, through the agency of their subordinates the daemons) ἔρμης εἰμαιρμένην ἐκάλεσεν. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. XII. 2: ὁπλον γὰρ εἰμαιρμένης οἱ ἀστέρες κ.τ.λ. Corp. III. 4: πρὸς μοίραν δρομῆματος (ἡ)κυκλών θεῶν. The writer of Corp. I says nothing about the fixed stars, and takes into account the influence of the planets alone.

eἰμαιρμένη is a Stoic term. The identification of Heimarmene with the operation of the heavenly bodies is characteristic rather of the later Stoicism.

§ 10. κατωφερών στοιχείων (τῆς φύσεως) [τοῦ θεοῦ] οὐκ ἐν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος εἰς τὸ καθάρον [[τῆς φύσεως]] δημιούργημα. τὰ κατωφερή στοιχεία (a Stoic term) signifies the two heavy elements, earth and water. τοῦ θεοῦ has been duplicated by error, and τῆς φύσεως has been transposed. Cf. § 8 b: τὰ στοιχεῖα τῆς φύσεως πόθεν ὑπόστη; The καθάρον δημιούργημα is the material heaven, which has just been organized by the Demiurgus-Nous. It is καθάρον, because free from any intermixture of the grosser elements. The heavens apparently consist of fire alone, though their inhabitants, the planets, are made of a mixture of fire and air.

1 Chrysippus, in Aries Didymus, Diels Doxogr. p. 458: διὰ τῶν κατωφερῶν στοιχείων τινά ἡ τιμή ἢ καὶ πάντων τὰ λοιπά συνέστηκε διὰ μὲν τῶν κατωφερῶν, ὥστε τὰ ἐνὶ γῆς πάντα συγκρατείται διὰ δύον δὲ, ὡς ἡ σελήνη διὰ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος συνέστηκε διὰ ἄνω δὲ, ὡς ὁ ἥλιος ... ὁ γὰρ ἥλιος πῦρ ἐστὶν εἰλίκρινης.
The word ὅμοονόσιος was in use before it was brought into prominence by the disputes with which the Council of Nicaea was concerned. Plotinus 4. 7. 10: διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὅμοονόσιον. It occurs repeatedly in Gnostic documents quoted by Hippol. Ref. haer. (A. D. 220–230), e. g. 5. 17.

The Logos and the Demiurgus-Nous are ‘of one substance’; but is that substance material or immaterial? If the author had been asked that question, he might have been puzzled how to answer it. The phrase τὸν πνευματικὸν λόγον in § 5 b fin. seems to imply that the Logos is material; and in stirring the watery mass, it operates like a wind. But on the other hand, the Demiurgus-Nous is presumably of the same substance as his parent the supreme Nous, who is ζωὴ καὶ φῶς; and though φῶς in the literal sense is a material thing, the ζωὴ καὶ φῶς of this document is clearly not αἰσθητῶν, but νοητῶν. The truth is that the author has not completely succeeded in harmonizing the Stoic and Platonic conceptions which he has adopted. When speaking of λόγος, he speaks as a Stoic, and therefore as one who assumes all things to be material; when speaking of νοῦς, he speaks as a Platonist, and regards Mind as incorporeal.

§ II a. 6 καὶ ὑμωυργὸς νόος σὺν τῷ λόγῳ, [δ] περισχῶν τοὺς κύκλους καὶ διαὶρείτω, ἐστρέψε τα ἐαυτοῦ δημωυργήματα. The δημωυργήματα of the Demiurgus-Nous are the planets (and presumably the fixed stars also, though the latter have not been expressly mentioned). He ‘encompasses’ the spheres in which the planets are fixed; for his abode is in (or immediately beyond) the outermost sphere. On the arrival of the Logos, who henceforward ‘is united with him’ and co-operates with him, he sets in motion the planets which he has fashioned, and makes them move in circular orbits. The mention of the λόγος in this connexion is perhaps intended to suggest that the movements of the heavenly bodies are ‘rational’.

έπειτα στρέφονται ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἀριστοῦ εἰς ἀπέραντον τόλμης ἀρχεῖται γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἡ [δὲ] τοῦτων περιφορά. The movement is circular, and therefore everlasting; for a circle has no terminal point. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 40 b: ‘sic est enim rotunditas(ti)s volubilis ratio, ut ita sibi coartata sint cuncta, ut initium quod sit volubilitatis ignores.’ The phrase ἀρχεῖται ὁ λόγος is not quite accurate; for there is no point at which the movement ‘ceases’. But the writer’s meaning is that any point in the orbit may be considered the end of a circuit,
but that, if thus regarded, it must at the same time be regarded as the beginning of a fresh circuit.

The words *ἀπ' ἀφίξης ἀφοίμασθαι* seem to imply that the movement of the heavenly bodies is not only without end, but also without beginning; yet we have just been told that it *has* a beginning. Perhaps what is here said about circular movement was taken over unaltered from an Aristotelian source, in which the movement of the heavens was assumed to be without beginning, as well as without end.

II b. (*ἡ δὲ φύσις*), καθὼς ἤθελησεν ὁ νοῦς, ἐκ τῶν κατωθισμένων στοιχείων ἦγεγκεν ἄλογα. This paragraph corresponds to *Gen. i. 20–25*, and to *Corp. III. 3 a*. Having described the making of the heavenly bodies (τὰ ἀδίναμα ζωά), the writer proceeds to describe the making of τὰ θυγατρὰ ζώα.

The subject of the sentence has been lost; but the context makes it almost certain that it was *ἡ φύσις*. ‘Nature’ (i.e. either the force which operates in the sublunar world, or the sublunar world itself, regarded as a living agent,) brought forth animals ‘according to the will of νοῦς’. The νοῦς here spoken of must be the Demiurgus-Nous, since in § 12 *init.* (ὁ δὲ πάντων πατὴρ νοῦς κ.τ.λ.) the supreme Nous is contrasted with it; and as ὁ νοῦς without qualification is ambiguous, it may be suspected that some qualifying word (*δημιουργός* or *δημιουργός*) has been lost before νοῦς. The Demiurgus-Nous, being stationed in the highest heaven, does not directly act in his own person in the sublunar world; but he gives orders to φύσις, and by her his will is executed. Thus the words (*ἡ φύσις*), καθὼς ἤθελησεν ὁ (*δημιουργός*) νοῦς, ἐκ τῶν κατωθισμένων στοιχείων ἦγεγκεν κ.τ.λ. correspond to ‘God said, Let the earth bring forth’ &c. in *Gen. i.*, and to ἀνέκαθεν δέ κατωθισμένα (i.e. each of the lower elements) τὸ πρωτόκαθεν αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ. in *Corp. III.* In the κατωθισμένα στοιχεία air is here included as well as water and earth; all three are ‘downward-tending’ as compared with fire.

ἄλογα· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἐξοκέρυκας (ἐκ ἡ φύσις) τὸν λόγον. The Logos has quitted the sublunar world. His departure has left the sublunar world devoid of ‘reason’; and the animals which *φύσις* produces there are consequently ‘irrational’. The word *λόγος* here means ‘the faculty of reason’, by the absence of which beasts are distinguished from men. In §§ 5 a and 6, it rather meant God’s ‘speech’, i.e. his creative fiat; but the writer may have been hardly conscious that he was using it in different senses. The ἄλογα ζώα
are 'the animals which have not reason'; but they are also 'the animals which cannot talk'.

Diekechýrismo (dikekechýrismoi MSS.) δὲ ἄν' ἀλλήλων ἢ τε γῆ καὶ τὸ ὅφη. As we were told in § 5 b that earth and water 'remained intermingled', it was necessary for the writer to mention their separation at the point where he speaks of the different kinds of animals which earth and water respectively produced, if he had not mentioned it before. But in this position, the clause interrupts the narrative of the zoogonia by an awkward parenthesis; and it is possible that it has been misplaced, and ought to stand earlier. With the substitution of diekechýrismo for diakkechýrismoi, it might be put at the beginning of § 11 b, before ἢ δὲ φύσις κ.τ.λ.

[καθὼς ἠθέλησεν ὁ νοῦς.] As there is no apparent reason for repeating these words here, I take them to be a misplaced doublet of καθὼς... νοῦς above.

καὶ ἔζηγεγεν (ἡ γῆ) [ἀν' αὐτῆς ἢ ἔγει] ἡμᾶς τετράποδα (και) ἱππεῖα, θηρία ἄγρα καὶ ἡμέρα. I can make nothing of the words ἀν' αὐτῆς ἢ ἔγει. (Is ἔγει a corruption of ἔγει, an alternative for ἔζηγεγεν;?) The rest of the sentence closely resembles Gen. 1. 24 f.: καὶ ἔπεσεν δ' θεός ἐξαγαγέτω ἡ γῆ... τετράποδα καὶ ἱππεῖα καὶ θηρία τῆς γῆς κατὰ γένος... καὶ ἐποίησεν δ' θεός τὰ θηρία... καὶ τὰ κτήνη... καὶ πάντα τὰ ἱππεῖα. (Cf. Gen. 1. 12; καὶ ἔζηγεγεν ἡ γῆ βοστάνη κ.τ.λ.)

With the making of the irrational animals, the demiurgia in the narrower sense of the word is completed; and it only remains to explain the origin of man. The genesis of man is the climax in which the whole process of creation culminates, just as in Gen. 1 and in Corp. III. In his account of the origin of man, the writer is still influenced by the Jewish Genesis; but this part of his doctrine, though partly based on that of Genesis, has been developed into something which differs widely from it.

§ 12. ὁ δὲ πάντων πατὴρ [[ὅ]] νοῦς, [ὅ] ὁμ ζωῆ καὶ φῶς, ἄπεκόπησεν ἀνθρώπων αὐτῷ ἄμοιον (יוּנְיָו MSS.). The rest of the ζωᾶ, both ἀβάνατα and θηρία, were made by the 'second God', the Demiurgus-Nous. But man is of a different and higher origin. He is no mere product of nature; he is son of the supreme God, and peer of the second God. And though he has fallen from his high estate, and is now sunk in matter, he has before him the prospect of returning to his true home above, and resuming his lost glory.

In the myth which here begins, the human race is represented by a person named Anthropos, who is the archetype and the ancestor of mankind.
The author cannot have said that Man, even before his fall, was ‘equal’ (ἰῶν) to the supreme God. There cannot be two supreme Gods; and it is evident from the contents of Corp. I as a whole that the Anthropos is not equal to ‘the Father of all’. The right word is δύον: 1 cf. Gen. 1. 26, ποιήσωμεν ἀνθρωπον κατ’ εἰκόνα ήμετέραν καὶ καθ’ ὅμοιωσίν. The word δύον may have lost its first two letters and been changed into ἱὼν by mere accident; or a Christian reader may have bethought him of the doctrine that God the Son is ‘equal to the Father as touching his Godhead’, and tried to introduce it here by substituting ἱὼν for δύον,—though very inappropriately, as the Anthropos of Corp. I has little resemblance to the Second Person of the Christian Trinity.

The Anthropos of Corp. I is ‘like his Father’ in this respect among others, that he is ἀρενόθηναι. (§ 15.) It would be possible for one who held this doctrine to find support for it in Gen. 1. 27: ἐτύφθην ὁ θεὸς τῶν ἀνθρωπών κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ ἐτύφθην αὐτῶν ἄρην καὶ θηλή ἐτύφθην αὐτῶν. If a reader could persuade himself that αὐτῶν is here equivalent to αὐτῷ, he might take these words to mean that the first ἀνθρωπος was ἀρενόθηναι, like God who made him. Cf. Sir Thomas Browne, ed. Wilkin, vol. ii, p. 469: ‘Plato, and some of the Rabbins, . . . conceived the first man an hermaphrodite; and Marcus Leo, the learned Jew, in some sense hath allowed it; affirming that Adam, in one suppositum, contained both male and female.2 And therefore, when it is said in the text, that “God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him, male and female created he them”: applying the singular and plural unto Adam, it might denote that in one substance and in himself he included both sexes, which was after divided, and the female called woman.’

οὐ ἡγάθη (ἡγάθη MSS.) ὡς ἰδίων τόκου περικαλλῆς γὰρ (ἡν), τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς εἰκόνα ἵων. A father is not ‘enamoured of’ his son; and ἡγάθη is undoubtedly a corruption of ἡγάθη. (Cf. ἡγάθησαν in § 13 a.) It is only in the relation between ἁνθρωπος and Φύσις (§ 14) that ἰῶν is brought into action in the writer’s mythical narrative. The language of this passage is partly borrowed from Pl. Tīm. 37 c: ὡς δὲ κυνηθὲν αὐτὸ (εἰ. τοῦ κόσμου) καὶ ζῶν ἔνοιχε . . . ὡς γεννήσας πατήρ,

1 If we were to retain ἱὼν, it would be necessary to substitute for αὐτῶ some term denoting the second God. But that would involve a larger alteration of the text.

2 For the statement that ‘the first man was bisexual’, Bouset, Hauptprobleme der Gnosis, p. 198, refers to Bereshith Rabba cap. 8 on Gen. 1. 26; Bamidbar R. cap. 14; and Berachoth 61 a.
38 CORPVS HERMETICVM

ηγάζθη τε καὶ εὐφρανθεὶς κ.τ.λ. But in the Timaeus, the son in whom the father ‘takes delight’ is the Kosmos.¹ In Corp. I, the son spoken of is Man; but the writer has transferred to the relation between God and Man the terms used by Plato to describe the relation between God and the Kosmos. And there is another difference. In the Timaeus, the son (viz. the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος) is made in the likeness, not of the Father, but of the νοητὸς κόσμος; but in Corp. I, the son (viz. Man) ‘bears the image’ of the Father himself. The words τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς εἰκόνα ἔχων were doubtless suggested by καὶ εἰκόνα θεοῦ in Gen. 1. 26 f.

The same sentence of the Timaeus is imitated in Ascl. Lat. I. 8: ἡγάζθη τε καὶ πάνω ἐφίλησεν ὡς ἰδιω τόκων. (The son is there the Kosmos, as in Pl. Tim.) Another reminiscence of the Platonic passage occurs in Basilides, Hippol. Ref. haer. 7. 23: the Demiurgus (not the supreme God) ἔξωσε μὴ εἶναι μόνος, ἀλλὰ ἐποίησεν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐγέννησεν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ πολὺ κρείττονα καὶ σοφότερον. . . . ἰδιῶν ὄν τῶν ποιῶν θαύμασε καὶ γνάπτησε καὶ κατεπλάγη τουστόν γάρ τι κάλλος ἐφανέτο ὑιὸν τῷ μεγάλῳ ἄρχοντι.

καὶ παρέδωκεν αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ δημιουργήματα.—(καὶ παρέδωκε τὰ ᾿αυτοῦ πάντα δημιουργήματα MSS.) The reading τὰ ᾿αυτοῦ . . . δημιουργήματα, ‘the things which he himself (sc. the supreme God) had made’, cannot be right; for it is not the supreme God, but the second God, that is called ῥ δημιουργός in Corp. I.

As to the statement that God delivered over to Man ‘all things that had been made’, see note on ἔχων πᾶσαν ἐξουσίαν in § 14.

§ 13 a. (δ δι,) (γενόμενος εἰ τῇ δημιουργίκῃ σφαίρᾳ,) (κατενώθης τού ἄδελφου τὰ δημιουργήματα) (τού ἐπικείμενου ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρός). [καὶ] κατανόησας δὲ κ.τ.λ. This paragraph is in great confusion. I have rewritten it freely, by way of an attempt to make it express what the author presumably meant; but there is little hope of restoring his actual words. We should expect to be told where Anthropos was, before we are told what he did; I have therefore placed γενόμενος εἰ τῇ δημιουργίκῃ σφαίρᾳ at the beginning. And κατενώθης κ.τ.λ. ought to precede κατανόησας δὲ κ.τ.λ. The ‘demiurgic sphere’ is the sphere in which the Demiurgus-Nous resides, i.e. the highest sphere of heaven; and it is there that Anthropos also took up his abode when he first came into being. The ‘brother’ of Anthropos is the Demiurgus-Nous, both of them being sons of the supreme Nous; and ῥ ἐπικεί-

¹ A similar thought is expressed in Gen. 1. 31: ἦν δὲ θεός τὰ πάντα ὡς ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἦνοι καλὰ λιαν.
κατανοήσας ἃς τὴν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ κτίσιν ἐν τῷ πυρί (πατρὶ MSS.), ἢβουλήθη καὶ αὐτὸς δημιουργεῖν. 'The creation of the Demiurgus-Nous in the region of fire' is the making of the planets. Anthropos observes that the Demiurgus-Nous has made immortal ζωὴ in the heavens; and he seeks to emulate his brother, and produce a race of ζωὴ on his own account. He executes this design by generating mankind. The design must have been innocent in itself; for it was permitted (συνεχωρίθη) by the supreme God. But it was executed amiss. Perhaps we are meant to understand that Anthropos, being δροντόθελος, might and should have produced a race of living beings from himself alone. His descendants would then have been free from the contamination of σмер; they would have been, like their parent, incorporeal,—soul without body, or νοῦς without αὐτὴν; and as such, they would have been immortal. But he was misled by ἀγάθη, and fell into the error of uniting himself with φύσις. Hence his descendants have in them the 'darkness and death' which comes from their mother, φύσις (that is to say, from σмер), as well as the 'life and light' which comes to them from their father, the Anthropos. They are 'double'; and though immortal in respect of one part of their twofold nature, they are mortal in respect of the other part. This is our prophet's version of 'the fall of man'.

This appears to be the writer's meaning; for we are not told that Anthropos 'made' anything except his own descendants; and indeed, there was nothing else left for him to make. The verb γεννᾷ is frequently used as an equivalent for δημιουργεῖν (e.g. in Pl. Tim. passim); and here δημιουργεῖν seems to mean generare. Cf. Corp. II. 17 a: πατρὸς γάρ τὸ ποιεῖν.
missing passage, the writer must have said that Anthropos descended from the ‘demiurgic sphere’, and associated with the planets in the lower spheres of heaven.

ἐκαστὸς δὲ μετεδίδω τὴς ἑδίας φύσεως (τάξεως MSS.). τάξεως is meaningless; and from the words μεταλαβὼν τῆς αὐτῶν φύσεως in the following sentence, it may be inferred that the author here wrote φύσεως, or something equivalent to it. Cf. ἵχνων γὰρ αὐτοῦ . . . τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν in § 16.

This statement is explained by § 25, in which we are told that the human soul, in the course of its ascent to God, renders up to each of the planets one of the evil πάθη which cleaved to it during its residence on earth. The process spoken of in § 13 a must be the reverse of this; and the things which Anthropos receives from the planets in the course of his descent must be the same things which the soul gives back to the planets in the course of its ascent, viz. the evil πάθη. The planets are ἐμπαθεῖς; 1 and in his association with the planets, Anthropos receives from each of them the special kind of πάθος which belongs to it. This is the first stage in the process of his degradation or corruption, and the cause of the disastrous event which follows.

§ 13 b. καταμαθὼν τὴν τούτων ὁδιαν. What is the point of saying that Anthropos ‘learnt the being’ of the planets? Perhaps it is implied that he now came to know (and experience) the evil πάθη which are inherent in the substance of the planets, whereas hitherto he had known good alone. If so, we might compare ‘the tree of the knowledge of good and evil’ in Gen. 2.

ἡβουλήθη ἀναρρήξας τὴν περιφέρειαν τῶν κύκλων. The fiery firmament has been fashioned by the Demiurgus-Nous into a series of concentric spheres,—the sphere of the fixed stars, and the seven spheres of the planets; and as Anthropos has had dealings with all the planets in succession, we must suppose him to have arrived at the lowest of the celestial spheres, that of the moon. The lunar sphere is the barrier between the heavens and the sublunar world; and he now seeks to break through this barrier, and enter into communication with what lies below it. We are not told that this

1 This corresponds with the writer’s view that the planets are made of intermingled fire and air, and not of unmixed fire. The doctrine that an intermixture of air in the (material) soul goes along with an intermixture of πάθη in the character was taught by Posidonius. Perhaps it is implied that in the planetary region Anthropos assumes a body made of πῦρ καὶ πνεῦμα, like the bodies of the planets.
design was approved by God; and it seems to be at this point that the overt error or sin of Anthropos begins.

§ 14. [ο τού τῶν θνητῶν κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν ζών ἔχων πᾶσαν ἐξονισάν.] This is probably a reminiscence of Gen. 1. 26-28: ἀρχέτωσαν (οι ἄνθρωποι) τῶν ἱχθύων τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῶν πτερνῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν κτηνῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς γῆς καὶ πάντων τῶν ἄρτιτῶν τῶν ἄρπαντων ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς. . . καὶ κατακυριεύσατο αὐτής, καὶ ἀρχέτα κ.τ.λ. Here, the dominion of man over τὰ ἐπίγεια alone is spoken of, as in Gen. 1. But elsewhere, the author says that God has given man dominion or authority over τὰ οὐράνια also. § 12 fin.: παρέδωκεν αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ ἡμιουργήματα. § 15: πάντων τὴν ἐξονισίαν ἔχων. § 32 fin.: παρέδωκας αὐτῷ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐξονισίαν. Cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 6 a: 'omnia illi licent' (= πάντων ἐξονισίαν ἔχει). The true man (i. e. the νοῦς in man, or the man who has got gnosis) is superior to the whole material universe; or in other words, he is 'above Heimarmene'.

These phrases resemble Matth. 28. 18: εἰδόθη μου πάσα ἐξονία ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς.1 But there is no reason to think that the author of Corp. I borrowed from the First Gospel, or vice versa; the truth is rather that each of the two writers independently adopted a current phrase. The words are differently applied; in Corp. I the ἐξονία is given to Man (and, by implication, to every 'illuminated' man), but in Ev. Matth. it is given to Jesus.

It might perhaps be possible to retain the words δ τοῦ τῶν θνητῶν κ.τ.λ. where they stand in § 14, if we wrote ὦς in place of δ; but they are hardly to the point in this connexion, and it seems more likely that they have been shifted from some other position.

διὰ τῆς ἄρμονίας παρέκφυν, ἀναρρήξει τὸ κύτος (κράτος MSS.). For κύτος in the sense of 'the cosmic sphere', cf. Pap. mag. Par. i. 1119: χαίρε τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ διήθκω ἀπὸ οὐρανοῦ ἐπὶ γῆς, καὶ ἀπὸ γῆς τῆς ἐν μέσῳ κύτ(ε) τοῦ κόσμου ἄχρι τῶν περάτων τῆς ἁβύσσου (i. e. of space). Ib. 2828 (to the Moon-goddess): ἡ πολυχώρητον 'κόσμον νυκτος' (λέγε κόσμων κύτος) ἀμφιέσωσα.

Anthropos broke a hole in the lowest sphere of heaven, and looked down through the opening. The ἄρμονία is the structure of the heavens. The writer seems to have adopted the Pythagorean phrase

1 Moffatt, Theology of the Gospels, p. 156, says 'the phrase in Matth. 28. 18, "All ἐξονία is given to me in heaven and on earth" is an echo of the Danielic prediction that there was given to him (i. e. the Son of Man) dominion and glory and a kingdom". 
'the harmony of the spheres'; but he employs it in an altered sense. He is thinking, not of music, but rather of carpentry; the heavens are compared to the framework of a roof or dome fitted together by a builder.

καὶ ἔδειξε τῇ κατωφερέᾳ φύσις (τῇ κατωφερῇ φύσιν MSS.) τὴν καλὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μορφήν. The writer uses φύσις in the sense of the material universe as a whole, or the sum of the four στοιχεῖα; and accordingly, ἡ κατωφερής φύσις means τὰ κατωφερὰ στοιχεῖα, i.e. earth and water, or (if we include air also under τὰ κατωφερὰ στοιχεῖα, as in § 11 b,) the sublunar world. But in the writer's myth or allegory, this φύσις is personified, and is pictured in the form of a woman. The καλὴ τοῦ θεοῦ μορφή is the 'likeness of God' borne by the Anthropos.

The imagery of this paragraph was probably suggested, in part at least, by the story of the fall of Adam. ('The woman gave me of the tree, and I did eat'; and 'in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die'.) As the conception of Anthropos in Corp. I has been developed out of the Adam of Genesis, it may very well be that the part played by Φώις in the fall of Anthropos is the writer's version of the part played by Eve in the fall of Adam. It is true that in the Mosaic narrative itself the temptation to which Adam yielded is not said to be that of sexual desire; but in interpretations of the story which were commonly accepted by Jews and Christians at the time when Corp. I was written, the sexual motive was brought to the front, and the sin of Adam was held to consist in giving way to sexual impulse. Philo (De opif. mundi 56. 157 ff.) explains the Mosaic story as an allegory, in which Adam stands for νοῖς, Eve for αἰσθήσεις, and the serpent for ἡδονή; and thus interpreted, it has much in common with the account of the relation between Ανθρώπος and Φώις in Corp. I. But Pagan myths of the marriage of Heaven and Earth under various names (Uranos and Gaia, Zeus and Hera, &c.) may also have been in the writer's mind.

The descent of the incorporeal Anthropos into the world of gross

1 Cf. Mani, whose doctrine is given as follows in Milman, Hist. Christ. II, p. 266: 'Eve’s beauty was the fatal tree of Paradise, for which Adam was content to fall. It was by this union that the sensual or concupiscent soul triumphed over the pure and divine spirit (De mor. Manich. c. 19, Acta Archelai c. 10); and it was by marriage, by sexual union, that the darkening race was propagated.'

2 De opif. mundi 59. 165: ἐν ἡμῖν γὰρ ἄνδρῳ μὲν ἑξῆς λόγον τοῦ νοῦ, γενάκις δ' αἰσθήσεις ἡδονή δὲ προτέραις ἐντυχεῖσα καὶ ἱρομελεῖς ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, δὲ οὐ καὶ τὸν γέμισα νοῦν φεμαίς . . . δ' αὐτίκα διελευθερώθη ἐνός καὶ τὸν ἄγαμον θρόνον, καὶ δύσαν διεστήσατο, καὶ άντί καὶ πολύς φωνᾶς, καὶ θεητῶν δι' αδανατον γίνεται. Compare with this Corp. I. 15, where the result of the marriage of Ανθρώπος with Φωις is described in similar words: ἀδάνατος γὰρ οὖν . . . τὰ θεητὰ πάνω κ.τ.λ.
matter is comparable to the descent of Sophia (regarded as a symbol or prototype of the human soul) in some of the Gnostic systems. But though the thing signified is the same or similar, the symbolism is for the most part different; and that of Corp. I is more closely connected with Genesis.

\[\text{\textit{Laatvcpun ((ditop&JTu))((tou dt-Opfiirou)), [otc] Trjs KaXXiorns fip4>-qs[too AfdpuTrou] to ti8os tv tu uSoti (d.ea8)i8ouo-a,xal to 0-Kiao-u.aiirlTtjsyfjs. aKopcorrosis not a suitable epithet for KaXXos, but may very well be applied to } \text{\textit{eos}}\text{. The false reading ISowrapertverts the meaning of the sentence. The author cannot have said that } \text{\textit{os}}\text{ sees and falls in love with the reflection of the divine form in earth and water,—i.e. in herself. What she sees is Anthropos (the eik\textit{n} of the supreme God) looking down on her through the hole which he has broken in the sky. She 'smiles with passionate desire for him'; and her smile takes the form of a reflection or shadow of his beauty on the surface of land and sea. He sees this borrowed beauty of } \text{\textit{os}},—a reflection of his own beauty,—and Narcissus-like, he loves it.\]

\[\text{\textit{etfjiX-rjc,xal T}	extit{jouXrj0T}aorou oikcTi'. The word } \text{\textit{Xi/o-}}\text{ does not signify the passionate desire expressed by } \text{\textit{os}} \text{ akor\textit{e}stw}; \text{ it is not until Anthropos has actually descended into the lower world that he is said to be overcome by } \text{\textit{os}}\text{. Hitherto, he has only looked down from above; he now descends into the world of gross matter, and takes up his abode there.}\]

\[\text{\textit{etfjiX-rjc,xal T}	extit{jouXrj0T}aorou oikcTi'. The word } \text{\textit{Xi/o-}}\text{ does not signify the passionate desire expressed by } \text{\textit{os}} \text{ akor\textit{e}stw}; \text{ it is not until Anthropos has actually descended into the lower world that he is said to be overcome by } \text{\textit{os}}\text{. Hitherto, he has only looked down from above; he now descends into the world of gross matter, and takes up his abode there.}\]

\[\text{\textit{etfjiX-rjc,xal T}	extit{jouXrj0T}aorou oikcTi'. The word } \text{\textit{Xi/o-}}\text{ does not signify the passionate desire expressed by } \text{\textit{os}} \text{ akor\textit{e}stw}; \text{ it is not until Anthropos has actually descended into the lower world that he is said to be overcome by } \text{\textit{os}}\text{. Hitherto, he has only looked down from above; he now descends into the world of gross matter, and takes up his abode there.}\]

\[\text{\textit{etfjiX-rjc,xal T}	extit{jouXrj0T}aorou oikcTi'. The word } \text{\textit{Xi/o-}}\text{ does not signify the passionate desire expressed by } \text{\textit{os}} \text{ akor\textit{e}stw}; \text{ it is not until Anthropos has actually descended into the lower world that he is said to be overcome by } \text{\textit{os}}\text{. Hitherto, he has only looked down from above; he now descends into the world of gross matter, and takes up his abode there.}\]

\[\text{\textit{etfjiX-rjc,xal T}	extit{jouXrj0T}aorou oikcTi'. The word } \text{\textit{Xi/o-}}\text{ does not signify the passionate desire expressed by } \text{\textit{os}} \text{ akor\textit{e}stw}; \text{ it is not until Anthropos has actually descended into the lower world that he is said to be overcome by } \text{\textit{os}}\text{. Hitherto, he has only looked down from above; he now descends into the world of gross matter, and takes up his abode there.}\]

\[\text{\textit{etfjiX-rjc,xal T}	extit{jouXrj0T}aorou oikcTi'. The word } \text{\textit{Xi/o-}}\text{ does not signify the passionate desire expressed by } \text{\textit{os}} \text{ akor\textit{e}stw}; \text{ it is not until Anthropos has actually descended into the lower world that he is said to be overcome by } \text{\textit{os}}\text{. Hitherto, he has only looked down from above; he now descends into the world of gross matter, and takes up his abode there.}\]

\[\text{\textit{etfjiX-rjc,xal T}	extit{jouXrj0T}aorou oikcTi'. The word } \text{\textit{Xi/o-}}\text{ does not signify the passionate desire expressed by } \text{\textit{os}} \text{ akor\textit{e}stw}; \text{ it is not until Anthropos has actually descended into the lower world that he is said to be overcome by } \text{\textit{os}}\text{. Hitherto, he has only looked down from above; he now descends into the world of gross matter, and takes up his abode there.}\]

\[\text{\textit{etfjiX-rjc,xal T}	extit{jouXrj0T}aorou oikcTi'. The word } \text{\textit{Xi/o-}}\text{ does not signify the passionate desire expressed by } \text{\textit{os}} \text{ akor\textit{e}stw}; \text{ it is not until Anthropos has actually descended into the lower world that he is said to be overcome by } \text{\textit{os}}\text{. Hitherto, he has only looked down from above; he now descends into the world of gross matter, and takes up his abode there.}\]
The author cannot have written ῶφορφήν, but may have written ὄνωιαν or ὅλην. At any rate, his meaning must have been that Anthropos is henceforward domiciled in the sublunar world (which, as we were told in § 11 b, is ἀλογος,) and is 'clasped in the embrace of Φώσις and intermingled with her'; that is to say, the human soul is now incarnated. If the writer still adheres to his notion of an individual person named Anthropos, we must suppose him to imagine the hitherto incorporeal Anthropos as henceforward living on earth in bodily shape, a bisexual Adam. But it is difficult to picture his mode of existence after his incarnation. Where and how did he live? And what became of him? Did he die in course of time, as other men die? As the writer leaves these questions unanswered, it is to be presumed that he did not put them to himself. At this stage, the imagery of his myth is already fading away; and when he speaks of the incarnation of Anthropos, his meaning is, not that the hero of his story began an earthly life at a certain moment, but that all human souls are thus incarnated. The Anthropos here ceases to be imagined as a particular person with a life-history of his own, and his name becomes merely a name for any or every man; Ἀνθρώπος passes away into ᾿Ανθρώπος.

§ 15. Kal Σιατοῦτο... Καὶ προτραί. In this paragraph, the meaning of the myth, or the lesson to be learnt from it, is clearly set forth. We men are descended on one side from the incorporeal Anthropos, who is son of the supreme God, and whose substance is 'Life and Light'; and on the other side, from corporeal Φώσις, whose substance is ὅλη, which is connected with darkness and death. We are therefore of twofold nature. In respect of one part (the ὄνωιας ᾿Ανθρώπος in us), we are exalted above all that is material; in respect of the other part, we are subject to material things, and therefore to Heimarmene, the power by which material things are governed. The higher part is the true self; and before our incarnation, we were wholly of that higher nature. The lower part is an accretion which has resulted from the descent of the soul into the world of gross matter. And
there lies before us the alternative of salvation or perdition, 'life' or 'death', according as in our earthly life the one part or the other gets the upper hand.

This is the Platonic doctrine of the nature of man; and the writer's statement of it would have been accepted, in the main at least, by every Platonist of his time. Cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 7 b: 'solum enim animal homo duplex est; et eius una pars simplex, quae, ut Graeci aiunt, οὐσιωθης, quam vocamus divinæ similitudinis formam &c.'

οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, [ἕναμαν] (εἰμαρμένης) γέγονε δοῦλος. Elsewhere in this document, ἁμαρτία means 'the structure of the heavens'. ἁμαρμόνος should therefore mean either 'residing in the heavens', or 'having the heavens inside him'; but neither of these meanings suits the context. Moreover, δοῦλος requires a genitive. It is therefore probable that ἁμαρμόνος is a corruption of εἰμαρμένης.

ἀρρενοθήλες δέ ἐν ἐξ ἀρρενοθήλεως ἐν (τοῦ τοῦ) πατρός, καὶ ἀντων ἀπὸ ἀντωνοῦ, (ὁν ἐστως καὶ λήθης) κρατεῖται. God is bisexual. In Ascl. Lat. III. 20 b., where the same epithet is applied to him, the thoughts which it conveys are that God generates the universe from himself alone, and that human procreation is an antitype of God's generative activity. But in Corp. I, the word connotes rather absence of sexual differentiation, and consequently, freedom from sexual passion. Cf. Gospel acc. to the Egyptians, Clem. Alex. Strom. 3. 13. 92 (see also Clem. ad Cor. 2. 12. 2): death shall cease ὅταν τὸ τῆς αἰωνίας ἔνθαμα πατήσῃ, καὶ ὅταν γένηται τὰ δύο ἐν, καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν μετὰ τῆς θελίας οὔτε ἄρρεν οὔτε θῆλυ. The Naassene 'Attis-document', Hippol. Ref. haer. 5. 7: ἀτεκνήσας γάρ, φησίν, ὁ Ἀττίς (who in that document is identified with Anthropos or the 'Son of Anthropos'), τουτέστων ἀπὸ τῶν χοϊκῶν τῆς κτίσεως κάτωθι μερῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν αἰωνίαν ἄνω μετελήλυθεν οὐσίαν, ὅπως, φησίν, οὐκ ἑστιν οὔτε θῆλυ οὔτε ἄρσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κτίσις, καὶνὸς ἀνθρωπός, ὅσ ἐστιν ἀρρενοθήλης.

The ἀνυώσις ἀνθρωπος (i.e. man in respect of his incorporeal and immortal part) is, like God, 'bisexual', in the sense that he is neither male nor female, and therefore not liable to ἐρως (sexual desire); he is as the angels of heaven, who οὔτε γαμοῦσιν οὔτε γαμίζονται (Mark 12. 25). It is only the lower and earthly part of man that is concerned with sexual intercourse. The author of Corp. I, since he makes ἐρως the cause of death, must have held marriage to be evil. In this

1 Cf. Eph. Gal. 3. 28: ἡμεῖς ἐν εὐδοκίᾳ οἴκ τιν... ἀρσεν καὶ θῆλυ πάντες γὰρ ἁμαρτουσίν εἰς ἢστα ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.
respect he is at the opposite extreme from the author of Ascl. Lat. III, who regards sexual intercourse as a 'sacrament'.

God is also ἀνύνος; i.e. his νόρος is not intermittent, as is that of men. 'Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting'; and man's earthly life as a whole is often described as a sleep. Cf. Corp. X. 5, where it is said that in this life even those who are able to catch glimpses of the beatific vision κατακομβοῖονται πολλάκις ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος.

(ὑπὸ ἐρωτος καὶ λήθης) κρατεῖται. The author must have said what it is that 'holds' or 'masters' men; and he must have used two distinct terms, one with reference to ἀπειρόθελος, and the other with reference to ἀνύνος. The first of the two must certainly have been ἐρως; the second may very likely have been λήθη. But ἐν ἐρωτος καὶ μέθης would also be possible; cf. μέθη καὶ ὑπνός in § 27. Drunkenness is associated with sleep in Corp. VII also.

§ 16. καὶ αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐρῶ τοῦ λόγου. 'I too am mastered by ἐρῶs; I have a passionate desire to hear what yet remains to be told.' The verb ἐρῶ was suggested by the preceding mention of ἐρως. The prophet perceives that his divine teacher is now on the verge of revealing to him the origin of the human race; and he is eager to learn the truth concerning this matter above all.

tοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ [ ] μυστήριον (τὸ) μέχρι τὴν τῆς ἡμέρας (κεκρυμμένον). 'This' appears to be the doctrine which Poimandres immediately proceeds to set forth, i.e. that which is contained in §§ 16 and 17. It is a doctrine which 'has been kept secret until this day'; this must mean that it has never been taught before. The rest of the teaching of Corp. I is matter of tradition, restated and no doubt modified by the author, but not originated by him. But the doctrine of 'the seven Anthropoi' was his own invention; as it seemed to him, it had come to him from God by direct revelation; and it had been revealed to none before him.

μυστήριον here means 'a holy truth which has not been made known till now'. This is the sense in which the word is commonly used by Paul; see Armitage Robinson, Ep. to the Ephesians, p. 234 ff., 'on the meaning of μυστήριον in the New Testament'. (Compare especially Ephes. 3. 3-5.) There is no suggestion that the truth in question ought to be kept secret by the man to whom it is revealed; on the contrary, the prophet holds that he has a mission to proclaim to all mankind what has been revealed to him.

ἡ φύσις . . . ἀπεκούσεν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπους πρὸς τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἐπὶ διωκτητῶν, ἀπειρόθελας καὶ μεταρροί. These seven Anthropoi are
the issue of the marriage described above; their father is the first Anthropos, and their mother is Φῶτις. They must therefore have in them something of the nature of either parent. It is implied that they have inherited 'Life and Light' from their father, and the dark and deadly influence of ἀληθέω from their mother. But they have inherited from their father something else as well, viz. the 'natures' or distinctive characters of the seven planets, which, as we were told in § 13 a, he received into himself during his sojourn in the heavens; and it may be inferred from § 25 that these planetary 'natures' are seven evil πάθη.

It is not clear how the seven kinds of πάθη which mankind inherit through the seven Anthropoi from the first Anthropos are to be distinguished from the evil influences of ἀληθέω which they inherit from Φῶτις. It would seem that either without the other would suffice to account for the moral evil which exists in men. The truth is that the author has included in his system two different accounts of the origin of moral evil,—one, which attributes it to the influence of ἀληθέω, and has been taken over by him from the Platonists, and another, which attributes it to the influence of the planets, and is in part an innovation of his own,—and has left them standing side by side but unconnected.

We are evidently meant to understand that each of the seven Anthropoi bears the special character of one of the seven planets. One of them is characterized by the deceitfulness which comes from the planet Mercury, another by the lust which comes from the planet Venus, and so on. And as these seven Anthropoi are the ancestors of the human race, the writer's meaning must be that there are seven distinct classes or types of men, each of which is specially influenced by one of the seven planets, and shows an evil disposition derived from that planet. The men governed by the planet Mercury are deceitful, and the men governed by the planet Venus are lustful.

The notion that the character of the individual man is determined by the influence of the heavenly bodies (or by Heimarmene, using the heavenly bodies as her instruments,) was commonly accepted in the writer's time; and it was held by many that a man's disposition depends on the planet which was dominant at the moment of his birth. (Our language still retains a vestige of this astrological doctrine, in the use of the words 'jovial', 'mercurial', and 'saturnine'.) The author of Corp. I has adopted this belief from the society around him. According to his view, Heimarmene, i.e. the influence of the
heavenly bodies as a whole, is split up into seven distinct influences, corresponding to the seven planets; and mankind is divided into seven classes, each of which is specially subject to one of these seven planetary influences. When a man is 'illuminated', or has attained to gnosis, he is no longer subject to the baleful influence of his planet, and the 'ruling passion' derived from that planet is suppressed in him. But the many are 'slaves of Heimarmene', whose dominion manifests itself in the working of evil passions, and takes seven different forms, according as the man is subject to one or other of the seven planets through which Heimarmene operates on the world below.

The innovation introduced by the author of Corp. I consists in this, that he describes the planetary influence not as brought to bear directly on each individual man at his birth, or throughout his life, but as an inheritance which has descended to him from one of a group of seven primal Anthropoi, who in their turn had inherited it from their father, the first Anthropos. He tells us that the doctrine of the seven Anthropoi is a novelty; it had been 'hidden' till the day when the divine Nous revealed it to him. But though the notion as worked out by him and incorporated in his system is no doubt original, we may presume that it was suggested to him by some mythological tradition, and that he had in mind some well-known group of seven gods or superhuman persons, who might be used to serve his purpose. Perhaps the simplest hypothesis would be that he was thinking of the seven Greek deities after whom the planets were named.1 The euhemeristic theories prevalent in his time had changed these theoi into ἄνθρωποι, who were supposed to have lived at a remote time in the past; and it would be an easy step to represent the seven ἄνθρωποι named Kronos, Zeus, &c. as the 'supermen' from whom the human race is descended. But there were other groups of seven superhuman beings, more or less closely connected with the seven planets;2 and

1 Apollo and Artemis might stand for the sun and the moon.
2 E.g. the seven Archangels of the Jews. In the Mithrasliturgie edited by Dieterich, the supreme God, who resides at the North Pole, is attended by a group of seven youths and a group of seven maidens; these two groups appear to be the stars of the Great Bear and the stars of the Little Bear respectively, but their number might cause them to be associated with the seven planets also. If the two groups were fused into one, we should have a group of seven bisexual beings.

According to the Orphic tradition, there were fourteen Titans, seven male and seven female (Proclus in Pl. Tim. 5. 205 b, Abel Orphica fr. 95: πιαταν γαρ ἡ Γη, ἀνθρώπα τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἐς ὅμοι δ' θεόλατρος, ἤτα καὶ εἰσίτω εὐθεῖα κατά... ἤτα καὶ παῖδας ἀνδρώτας'); and the lower or earthly part of man was derived from the Titans. So far, the seven bisexual Anthropoi of Corp. I correspond to the seven pairs of Orphic Titans. There does not seem to have been any connexion between
as the writer has not given names to his Anthropoi, we have no means of knowing what particular form of mythological reminiscence suggested the conception to him.

In the text of the MSS., the seven Anthropoi are said to be μετάφως, i.e. ‘up aloft’, or ‘raised high in air’. The word would be applicable, for instance, to the Platonic daemons, whose abode is the atmosphere. But as the seven Anthropoi have bodies composed of gross matter, it necessarily follows that they live upon the surface of the earth, like ordinary men, from whom they differ only in the fact that they are bisexual. The word μεταφως therefore seems inappropriate. If it is to be retained, we must take it to mean ‘standing erect’, as opposed to the beasts. Cf. Philo De opif. mundi 51. 147, Cohn I, p. 51: γὰρ (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) μεταφώς (καὶ;) ἀπὸ γῆς ἄνωθεν εὐθρᾶς τὸ σῶμα (i.e. stands erect), λέγοντα ἀν ἐνδίκως ἄνθρωπον εἶναι.

μὴ ἐκτρεχε. ‘Do not digress.’ The prophet thought he was about to be told the origin of the existing race of men and women. That is what he is eager to hear; and when Poimandres interposes the doctrine of the seven Anthropoi, which appears to him to be less directly connected with his own interests, he can hardly restrain his impatience.

§ 17. ((κynthesis τὰ σώματα)) . . . ὡς ἄνθρωπος . . . ἐγένετο εἰς ψυχήν καὶ νοῦν. The composition of the seven Anthropoi is here described. They consist, like ourselves, of a material part and an immaterial part.¹ The material part, in their case as in ours, is a body composed of the material elements; and it comes to them from their mother Φύσις, who is a personification of the material elements. The immaterial part, in their case as in ours, is ψυχὴ and νοῦς; and it comes to them from their father, the first Anthropos. For the word εὐθρᾶς, cf. εὐθρᾶς (ἡ γῆ) ζώα τετράποδα κ.τ.λ. in § 11 b. Φύσις ‘brought forth’ the seven Anthropoi, as Gaia brought forth the Titans and the Giants; and if the author formed in his own mind any definite picture of their birth, he probably thought of them as the Orphic Titans and the planets; but this may be one of the innovations made by the author of Corp. I.

It is possible that the writer found support for his doctrine of the seven Anthropoi in Gen. 6. 4: οὐ δὲ γίγαντες ἦσαν ἐν τῇ γῆ ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις εἰκόνισας . . . εἰκόνισας ἡμῶν τῇ γῆς γίγαντες ὡς ἄνδρον, ὡς ἄνθρωπον ἦλθον αὐτοῖς. In the Hellenistic period, the γίγαντες of Greek mythology were often confused with the Titans.

¹ The material part corresponds to the ψυχὴ ἄνδρον in Gen. 6. 7: the immaterial part corresponds to the νοῦς ἄνδρον in the same passage. The phrase οὐ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἐγένετο εἰς ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν was probably suggested by ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζωὰς in Gen. 3. 7.
springing up out of the earth like plants. It was thus that, according to a notion widely spread among the Greeks, the first men had come into being. Something of the sort is implied in the phrase ἀνδρός γεγενείς addressed to mankind in § 27.

That part of them which was made of fire was ripe.' This is nonsense; and the words must have been inserted through some error.

That part of them which was made of fire was ripe.' This is nonsense; and the words must have been inserted through some error.
Epinomis. In the Oracula Chaldaica (Kroll, p. 35, Procl. in Tim. 154 e), ἀθρωπος is used as a synonym of ἄηρ; the Demiurgus is there said to have made the Kosmos ἐκ πυρὸς ἐξ θατοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ παντρόφου αἰθροῦ.

(κ.κ.) πρὸς τὸ εἴδος τοῦ ἀθρωποῦ. In the missing words, the author must have spoken of the incorporeal part, in contrast to τὰ σώματα above. The incorporeal part of each of the seven Anthropoi was derived from the first Anthropos, and resembled the first Anthropos as he was before his incarnation.

ὁ δὲ ἄθρωπος ἐκ ζωῆς καὶ φωτὸς ἐγένετο εἰς ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν. The first Anthropos, before his descent into the world of matter, consisted wholly of the substance of the supreme God, which is 'Life and Light'. He transmitted this incorporeal substance to his seven sons; and in them, the 'Life' became ψυχή, and the 'Light' became νοῦς.

Every part of their being has now been accounted for. Each of the seven was composed, as we ourselves are, of (1) a gross body, consisting of earth and water, (2) a pneuma, consisting of fire and air, and (3) a ψυχὴ and a νοῦς, consisting of the incorporeal substance of God. But they still differed from us, their descendants, in that they were bisexual. The making of men and women is completed by the differentiation of the sexes, which follows in the next paragraph.

μέχρι περιόδου τέλους. The state of things which has just been described remained unaltered until the end of one 'age', and the beginning of another.

Hesiod's list of the five 'ages' (γένη), beginning with the age of gold, and ending with the present age of iron, was known to every Greek schoolboy. In Hellenistic times, the notion of a series of ages into which the world's history is divided was modified by association with the astral and Stoic doctrine of apocatastasis, according to which things run in cycles, and at the end of each period, all things are made new. A division of history into successive ages (γενεαῖ) was adopted by Hellenistic Jews, and occurs repeatedly in the Jewish Sibylline Oracles; and the mention of a series of ages in Virg. Ecl. 4 ('magnus ab integro saeclorum nascitur ordo') was probably suggested in part by Jewish Sibyllina. To a Jew, the most obvious instance of 'the end of a period' and the beginning of another would be the Deluge; 1 the author of

1 Compare the narrative of the Flood in the Jewish Orac. Sib. 1. 125 ff., and...
Corp. I was probably thinking of the Mosaic narrative of the Flood. In *Genesis*, the Giants, to whom the seven Anthropoi correspond in some respects, are said to have dwelt upon the earth in the period which the Flood ended, and are spoken of immediately before the story of the Flood is told.

§ 18. πάντα γὰρ τὰ ζώα, ἄρρενοθήλεα ἄντα, διελύετο ἀμα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. We here learn, what we were not told before, that not only the seven Anthropoi, but also the birds, beasts, and fishes, the production of which was described in § 11 b, were bisexual until the end of the first age, and therefore did not begin to breed until the beginning of the second age. The bisexuality of the first Anthropos (from which that of his sons, the seven Anthropoi, follows) might, as has already been pointed out, be found in *Gen. 1* 27 by a reader disposed thus to interpret the words; and similarly, it would be possible to interpret the phrase δύο δύο, ἀρσεν καὶ θηλυ, which occurs repeatedly in the Mosaic narrative of the Flood, as meaning that down to that time the beasts also were bisexual, or in other words, that each individual among them was a still undivided pair.

The notion that men and women were brought into existence by splitting bisexual beings into two parts was doubtless suggested by the speech of Aristophanes in *Pl. Sympos.* 189–193. But a reader of *Genesis* might find support for it in *Gen. 2* 21–24, where we are told that God ἐλαβέν μιὰν τῶν πλευρῶν (τοῦ 'Αδών) ... καὶ φυκοδόμησεν ... τὴν πλευρὰν ... εἰς γυναῖκα ... ἕνεκεν τούτου ... ἔστησεν οί δύο εἰς σάρκα μιὰν. This amounts to saying that God divided the man into two parts, and made one of the two parts into a woman; and the resemblance might be made closer by taking μιὰν τῶν πλευρῶν to mean 'one of his two sides' instead of 'one of his ribs'.

ο εἰς θεὸς εὐθείας εἶπεν ἀγίω λόγῳ. Αὐξάνεσθε εἰς αὐξήσει καὶ πληθύνεσθε εἰς πλῆθος πάντα τὰ κτίσματα καὶ δημοφυγήματα. This corresponds to the words spoken by God in *Gen. 8* 15 ff.: καὶ εἶπεν Κύριος ὁ θεὸς τῷ Νώε λέγων Ἐξέλθε ἐκ τῆς κιβωτοῦ, σὺ καὶ ἡ γυνὴ σου κ.τ.λ., καὶ πάντα τὰ especially 11. 283 ff.: when Noah and his family came forth from the Ark, ἦθος αὐτὸς βιώσαν τὴν ἀνέπιε γενέσθη | χρυσάρα πρώτη, ἦταν πέλεθ' ἐκατ', ἄρσεν | ἐγὼ πρωτό-πλαστος ἄνδρα γένεσ'. In describing the Flood, the Sibyl speaks as an eye-witness; she was the wife of one of Noah's sons, and was herself one of the passengers in the Ark.

1 Reitzenstein (Polem. p. 110) refers to Bereshith Rabba (transl. Wünsche, p. 30), where a certain Rabbi is said to have taught that 'the first man, when he was first made, had two faces; but God sawed him into two halves, and formed out of him two backs, which were turned in opposite directions'.
In Genesis, the command 'increase and multiply' is addressed to fishes, birds, and men at the time of their first creation also (Gen. 1. 22 and 28); but the writer of Corp. I, having assumed that men and beasts alike were originally bisexual, and incapable of breeding, necessarily defers this injunction until the beginning of the second age, and makes it follow on the separation of the sexes.

There can be no doubt that the phrase αὐξάνεσθε καὶ πληθύνεσθε came to him from Genesis. But he has altered it by inserting εἰς αὐξάνεσθαι εἰς πληθυνθεί. (Cf. Corp. III. 3 b: εἰς τὸ αὐξάνεσθαι εἰς αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ πληθύνεσθαι εἰς πληθυνθεῖ.) This form of words is a Hebraism; but the Hebrew idiom of which it is a rendering is not employed in the command 'increase and multiply' as given in Genesis. We must therefore suppose that the writer's more immediate authority was not Genesis itself, but some document based on a Semitic original in which the words of Genesis were paraphrased or expanded.

καὶ ἀναγνωρισάτων ὁ ἄννου (ἀνθρωπος) ἐαυτὸν ἄντα ἀθάνατον, καὶ τὸν αἰτίον τοῦ θανάτου ἑρωτα [καὶ πάντα τὰ] ἄντα. It seems probable that πάντα τὰ came from τὰ πάντα τὰ κτίσματα above, and καὶ was inserted to make sense of it.

The writer makes God supplement the command 'increase and multiply' by a statement of the conditions under which men may escape death and attain to immortality. This might be called his version of God's Siad-qKi] with man; it takes the place of the Sia&j/o; in Gen. 9. 11 ff. (οὐκ ἀποθανέται πάσα σὰρξ ἐτί ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡθάνου τοῦ κατακλυσμοῦ κ.τ.λ.). But he may have had in mind also the speech of God in Pl. Tim. 42 λ, addressed to the souls about to be incarnated: ὅτε δὴ σώμασιν ἐμφυτευθένι ... , πρῶτον μὲν αἴθρῃσιν ἀναγκαίον εἶν ... πάσιν ... ἐμφυτον γίγνεσθαι, δεύτερον δὲ ἡδονή καὶ λύπη μεμγέμενον ἑρωτα ... καὶ δὲ μὲν εὖ τὰν προσήκοντα χρόνον βιώσι, πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἐννομοῦ πορευθεῖς ὄσκρον ὄστρου, βιών εὐδαιμόνα καὶ συνήθη ἔζοι. (The 'immortality' spoken of in Corp. I corresponds to the 'happy life' promised in Pl. Tim.)

Man is distinguished from the beasts by the fact that he is (at least potentially) ἐννοοῦ; and νοῦς is immortal. If he recognizes the

1 Compare the version of this speech of God which is given in Orac. Sib. 1. 267 ff.: εἰς ἄνον, ἐν ἀγαθωμενοι τοικτυ δίκαιοι, καὶ ἐν τοις ἐνομοις, καὶ ἐν ταῖς δικαιοσυναίς, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐναρκταινισι καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐνομοισιν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐναντοίοις, καὶ ἐν τις ἐνομοισιν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς δικαιοσυναίς, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐναρκταινισι. The 'immortality' spoken of in Corp. I corresponds to the 'happy life' promised in Pl. Tim.)
immortal νοῦς in him as his true self, or identifies himself with it, he has overcome ἐρως, and is freed from the power of death. If on the other hand he ignores the νοῦς in him, and yields to ἐρως, he is a mere mortal creature, like the beasts. The βάναυσις from which man may escape cannot be the dissolution of the body; for to this all men alike are liable. It is rather the condition of a soul wholly immersed in matter, and enslaved by the πάθη to which matter gives rise. The life of a man in whom the bodily affections have the upper hand is not life, but death. (Cf. Corp. VII 2 b, where the body is called οὗ τὸ βάναυσις κτλ.) What will become of such a man when his present life on earth is ended, the writer of Corp. I does not expressly tell us; but from § 24 it may be inferred that he will be resolved into the elements of which he was composed, and will cease to exist as an individual. νοῦς only is immortal; and in the man who fails to 'recognize' his true self, there is no νοῦς to survive.

'The cause of death is ἐρως.' It was through yielding to ἐρως that the first Anthropos was incarnated, and so fell under the dominion of death; and it is through yielding to ἐρως that men deprive themselves of immortality. ἐρως is (or is inseparably connected with) love of the body (§ 19); and he who would be immortal must 'hate his body' (Corp. IV. 6 b).

§ 19. Ἡ πρόνοια διὰ τῆς εἰμαρμένης καὶ ἀρμονίας τὰς μίζεις ἐποίησατο, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις κατέστησε. God's πρόνοια is momentarily personified here, as God's βουλή was in § 8 b. εἰμαρμένης and ἀρμονίας are probably alternative readings; either might stand, but hardly both together. It would, however, be possible to write διὰ τῆς ἀρμονίας καθ' εἰμαρμένην . . . τὰς γενέσεις κατέστησε. The births are determined by 'the structure of the heavens', i.e. by the influences of the heavenly bodies; and the heavenly bodies are the instruments by means of which Heimarmene works.


8 It is to be noted that there is no mention of metempsychosis or reincarnation in Corp. I.
The text from this point to the end of § 23 is a commentary on the preceding 'speech of God'.

No satisfactory sense can be got out of ἰπτοήθος; but τὸ ἰπτόηθος ἀγαθὸν may be taken to mean 'the supracosmic Good', and this would serve as a synonym for ἀθανασία. (Cf. τὸ ἰπτόηθος ἀγαθὸν in § 26 a fin.) Platonists said that the Good or God is 'above ὀσία'; the phrase was suggested to them by Pl. Rep. 6. 509 b (ἐπὶ ἐπικειμα τῆς ὀσίας). But the writer of Corp. I probably meant that the good to which ἰπτοήθος ἀατὸν attains is above ὀσία in the Stoic sense of that word, i.e. above all 'material substance'; it is incorporeal.

The tense of ἰπτόηθος is significant. He who has recognized his true self has already entered into immortality. Though in the body, he is no longer of the body; he belongs to another and a higher world.

δὲ ἰαματής οὐ δαῖμον ἐκ πλάνης ἤτρωσ (καὶ τοῦ) σώμα. For the phrase εἰκονά τοῦ ἤτρωσ, cf. Corp. XVI. 16 as emended: δὲ λόγον ὅθεν ἤτρωσ . . . δὲ πλανώμενος καὶ πλάνων. See Pl. Phaedr. 238 b.

§ 20. ἐπὶ προκατάφεται . . . τὸ σώμα συνέστηκεν. Death results from the body; and man is mortal so far as he is identified with his body. It must be so, because the body, being material, is derived from the 'grim darkness' spoken of in § 4. That 'darkness' is the substance of death, as the 'light' there spoken of is the substance of life.

This might serve as an answer to the question 'why are men subject to death?' But it is not an answer to the question which is here asked, viz. 'why do men deserve the death to which they are subjected?' If they deserve it (δίκαιοι εἰς τοῦθ), that must be because of some sin which they have committed. The sin of which death is the penalty was described in mythical language as that of the first Anthropos, who yielded to ἤτρωσ, and wilfully entered into union with matter; and it might be said that all men who 'love the body' sink themselves in matter by their own choice, and so repeat his sin in their own persons. Something like this must be the author's meaning; and we must assume that some words describing the sin of which death is the penalty have been lost after τὸ σώμα συνέστηκεν.

§ 21. ἰαματής (ἰπτόηθος MSS.) ἀατὸν εἰς (τῷ) ἀγαθὸν χωρεῖ (εἰς αὐτὸν χωρεῖ MSS.). The paraphrase of these words in § 19 makes it almost certain that the author wrote τὸ ἀγαθὸν here, and probable that he wrote ἰαματής.
ος ου γεγονεν ο ανθρωπος. ο ανθρωπος is here the true self, i.e. the incorporeal part of man (which is derived from the first Anthropos), as opposed to the body. 'The Good' is 'Light and Life', the substance of God; the true man is of that substance, and is reabsorbed into it.

Εδ φησ [λαλων (δι) φως ... ανθρωπος]. The words φως ... ανθρωπος are a mere repetition of the preceding sentence. This explanation of the meaning of εδ φης is correct, but superfluous; and it was probably added by a later hand.


§ 22. παραγινομαι εγω ο νοου τοις δοιοις κ.τ.δ. The νοου of the individual man is consubstantial with the divine νοου.

With §§ 2, 23 (παραγινομαι εγω ... τυρ τε τελειοι αυτεαι) compare Corp. X. 19 b–22 a. That passage is an addition to Corp. X by a different hand; and its writer may perhaps have read Corp. I. But he uses the word νοου differently; he distinguishes two kinds of νοου, viz. a good νοου which enters into the godly man, and a bad νοου which enters into the ungodly man. The good νοου and the bad νοου of Corp. X. 19 b–22 a correspond respectively to the νοου and the τιμωρος δαιμων of Corp. I.

The τιμωρος δαιμων is here spoken of as a well-known personage. The Jews knew him under various names (Satan &c.). Platonists more commonly spoke of τιμωροι δαιμωνει in the plural; cf. Lydus de mens. 4. 32 (a fragment of the Δογος τηλειος, connected with Ascl. Lat. III. 33 b): τους μην τιμωροι ταν δαιμωνων, εν αυτη τη θηλη παρονται, τιμωρεσθαι το ανθρωποιν κατ' αειαν.

§ 23. ην δευτερα του τυρος προσβαλλων. The 'fire' is metaphorical; it is the fire of evil passion. The same metaphor is employed in Corp. X. 20 (ποιον τυρ τοσαυταν φλογα έχει δοσην ή δειβεσα; The impious soul cries out καιομαι, φληγομαι). The verb πυροσθαι is used in Greek poetry in the sense 'to be inflamed with passion'; and especially 'to burn with love'; but the description of evil passion in Corp. I and Corp. X. 20 as a fire by which the wicked are tortured in this life was probably suggested by accounts of a fiery hell in which sinners are punished after death. The notion of a penal hell-fire existed among the Zoroastrians from early times, and was current among the Jews at the time when Corp. I was written; it occurs, for instance, in the Jewish Sibyllina.
When a man has once fallen into the fundamental sin of 'loving the body', he already deserves punishment; and 'the avenging daemon' punishes him by driving him into acts of crime, and thereby causing him to incur the penalties which follow on such acts. Cf. Corp. XII. i. 5-7, where it is similarly said that the wicked are punished by being forced to commit crimes. But the function of making them commit crimes is there assigned, not to 'the avenging daemon', but to Heimarmene.

οδ παρέται (σκοτομαχών). The words ἀκορέστως σκοτομαχών are manifestly wrong where they stand in the MSS.; and I have disposed of σκοτομαχών by inserting it here. The man is struggling in the dark, and therefore at random, and to no good purpose. He has not the 'light' of vows to direct his efforts.

ἐν ὀρέσεις ἀπλέτους (. . .), τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχων ἀκόρεστον. The reading of the MSS., ἐν ὀρέσεις ἀπλέτους τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχων, could only be translated 'aiming his desire at boundless appetites'; but that is a strange phrase. The object towards which ἐπιθυμία is directed is not ὀρέσεις, but ἥδων. It is possible that the author wrote ἐφ ἥδων ἀπλέτους, and that ὀρέσεις has come from τὰς ὀρέσεις written as an alternative for τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. Cf. Corp. XII. i. 4, where ἐπιθυμία, ὀρέσεις, and ἥδων occur together.

§ 24. ἐν δὲ μοι εἰπὶ (περὶ) τῆς ἀνδρόν τῆς γυναῖκος. So far, the author has been speaking of man's life on earth. He now goes on to describe the ascent of the disembodied soul to the world above.

(⟨πᾶς εἶς ἡν χωρῆνα⟩) These words, which are evidently out of place in § 21, fit in satisfactorily here, and supply a reason for the use of the second person (εἴπεται, παραδίδωσι) in what follows.

Πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀναλύει τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἁλκιοῦ παραδίδωσιν] αὐτῷ τὸ σῶμα εἰς ἀλλοιώσει. This is awkwardly expressed; and it may be suspected that the author wrote something like πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀλλοιώσει ('when the time comes for you to be changed',—a euphemism for 'at your death',—) παραδίδωσι αὐτῷ τὸ σῶμα (τῇ φύσει (i.e. to the force that works in earth and water) εἰς ἀνάλυσιν ('for dissolution').

καὶ τῷ ἢθος τῷ ἡδίκοιο ... παραδίδωσι. If we retain ἢθος, it must be taken to mean the sum of the πάθη. But we are told in § 25 that the man afterwards renders up his evil πάθη or vicious tendencies to the planets from which they were derived; and if he has already parted with his ἢθος before he reaches the heavens, how can he still
have these πάθη in him when he comes to the planets? It is evident then that something is wrong. Now it appears from § 17 that the parts of which a man is composed are (1) the gross body, made of earth and water; (2) the πνεῦμα, made of fire and air; and (3) the ψυχή and νοῦς, made of 'Life and Light'. These several parts ought now to be disposed of in succession. We are first told what becomes of the gross body (τὸ σῶμα). It is 'delivered up' while the man is still on earth, and it is there resolved into the mass of earth and water whence it came. We should expect to be next told what becomes of the πνεῦμα; and as the πνεῦμα is of gaseous substance, and the man apparently does not part with it till after he has quitted earth and water, and has already parted with it when he reaches the planetary spheres (i.e. the region of fire), it seems probable that the author here wrote τὸ πνεῦμα τῷ ἀνερ ψαρίδωσι, or something to that effect. We may suppose that a Christian reader was puzzled by the word πνεῦμα (which in his usage meant, not the material 'vital spirit', but the highest and divinest part of man), and tried to improve the sense by altering the text, and writing 'you deliver up your (vicious) character to the Devil'.

ἀνεφρηγητον. The work of the πνεῦμα as a part of the individual man is ended.

καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰς δαυτῶν πηγὰς ἐπανδρίζονται. The writer regards the bodily senses as parts of the material πνεῦμα which permeates the body. This is the Stoic view. Iambl. De an., Stob. I. 49; 33, vol. i, p. 368 W.: πνεύματα γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ φασιν (οἱ Στοικοὶ) διατείνειν ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα, τὰ μὲν εἰς ὀφθαλμοὺς, τὰ δὲ εἰς ὅτα, τὰ δὲ εἰς ἄλλα αἰσθητήρια. Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 410: according to the Stoics, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐκτὸς μέρη ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκπεφυκότα καὶ ἐκτείνομεν εἰς τὸ σῶμα καθάπερ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ πολύτοιος πλεκτάναι τῶν δὲ ἐκτὰ μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε μὲν εἰσὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια, ὁρασίας διόφθορας ἀκοῆς γενόμενα καὶ ἄφθος. οὖν ἡ μὲν ὀρασία ἐστὶ πνεῦμα διατείνον ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρις ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀκοῆς δὲ κ.τ.λ. (The Stoics held the ψυχή to be a material thing, and called it πνεῦμα τῶν ἔχουν; so that the ψυχή spoken of in that passage corresponds to the πνεῦμα spoken of in Corp. I.) Compare the doctrine of τὸ φανταστικὸν πνεῦμα which is expounded by Synesius in his De insomniis; e.g. 1289 c (Migne): τὸ φανταστικὸν πνεῦμα κοινότατον ἐστὶν αἰσθητήριον, καὶ σῶμα πρώτων ψυχῆς. See note on ἡ αἰσθήσεις σῶμα in Herm. ar. Stob. Exc. III. 21.

μέρη (τοῦ κόσμου) γινόμεναι, καὶ πάλιν συνιστάμεναι εἰς [τὰς] ἑτέρας
The _aionthés_ are parts of the _pneûma_ of the individual man, go back into the mass of cosmic _pneûma_ whence they came, i.e. into the atmosphere. But in course of time, the same 'pneumatic' matter enters into other organisms, and in them, again assumes the function of sense-perception. Cf. Iamb. _De an._, Stob. i. 49. 43, vol. i, p. 384 W.: 'οτι γάρ λύσται ἐκάστη δύναμις ἄλογος (τῆς ψυχῆς) εἰς τὴν ὄλην ζωὴν τοῦ πνεύματος, ἅφ' ἦς ἀπεμερισθη' ἢ καὶ ὃι μᾶλλον μένεις ἀμετάβλητος, ὡσπερ ἥγεται Πορφύριος: ἢ καὶ χωρισθέντα ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας ἢ ἔλη ἄλογος ζωὴ μένει καὶ αὐτῇ διασωζόμενη ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ὡσπερ οἱ παλαιότατοι τῶν ἱερῶν ἀποφαίνονται. The _άλογα_ εὐαίμην, or include, the _aionthés_; and the writer of _Corp._ I apparently holds the first of the three views spoken of by Iamblichus. (As to the third of these views, see _Corp._ X. 16.) Proclus in _Pl._ _Tim._ p. 311 of the Platonists, οὶ μὲν, τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν μόνην ἀθάνατον ἀπολείποντες, φθειροῦσι τὴν τε ἄλογον ζωὴν σύμπασαν καὶ τὸ πνευματικὸν ὄνομα τῆς ψυχῆς, κατὰ τὴν εἰς γένεσιν ῥοπὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ὑπόστασιν διδόσας αὐτοῖς, μόνον τε ἀθάνατον διατηροῦντες . . . τόυτος Ἀττικὸς λέγει καὶ Ἀλβίνος καὶ τοιοῦτος τινάς: οἱ δὲ . . ., ὡσπερ οἱ περὶ Πορφύριον, . . . παρατίθενται μὲν τὴν καλουμένην φθορὰν κατασκευασάντων τοῦ τα ὁχήματος καὶ τῆς ἄλογου ψυχῆς, ἀναστοχειοῦσθαι δὲ αὐτά φασι καὶ ἀναλυόσαθαι των τρόπων εἰς τὰς σφαίρας, ὡς ἄν τὴν σύνθεσιν ὁμοιόμορφη δὴ εἶναι ταύτα ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν σφαιρῶν, καὶ κατοίκοσαν αὐτὰ συλλέγοντες τὴν ψυχήν· δοστε καὶ εἶναι ταύτα καὶ μὴ εἶναι, αὐτὰ δὲ ἐκαστὰ μηκέτι εἶναι, μηδὲ διαμένεις τὴν ἁμότητα αὐτῶν. . . καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἔστεσθαι τοὺς στου οἴκους (Oracula Chaldaica), ἐν τῇ καθοδίᾳ τῆς ψυχῆς λέγουσι συλλέγοντες αὐτό, λαμβάνοντας "αἴθρης μέρος ἥλιοι τε σελήνης τε καὶ ὁσα ἥμερα συνεχοῦνται".

1 I.e. the Platonists Atticus and Albinus (second century A. D.) said that at a man's death his 'irrational part' (the _aionthéseων_ and _haimatików_) perishes completely, and his soul alone continues to exist.

2 Cf. _Corp._ I. 25. The _ónyma_ τῆς ψυχῆς spoken of by Proclus corresponds to the _pneûma_ ('vital spirit') spoken of in _Corp._ I. 17 and 24; the _άλογος_ τοῦ ψυχῆς spoken of by Proclus corresponds both to the _aionthéseως_ spoken of in _Corp._ I. 24 (and there regarded as parts of the _pneûma_), and to the planetary _ψφη_ spoken of in _Corp._ I. 25.

3 I.e. at death the man's _aionthéseων_ ceases to exist as an individual and separate thing; but in another sense it continues to exist, being absorbed into the cosmic mass. This agrees closely with the doctrine of _Corp._ I. 24.

Proclus here ascribes to Porphyry the first of the three views distinguished by Iamblichus in the passage quoted above; Iamblichus, on the other hand, ascribes to Porphyry the second of those three views. Porphyry himself ('Ἀφορμὴ τριῶν τὰ σηματά 29') says ἡλικία (τῆς ψυχῆς) τοῦ οὐρανοῦ σώματος τὸ _pneûma_ σωματική, ὡς ἐν τῶν σφαιρῶν συνελέγεν, and this seems to show that Iamblichus is right in what he says about him. But perhaps Porphyry spoke differently in different writings.
This statement implies that the man gets rid of θυμός and ἐπιθυμία while he is still in the sublunar region. But in the following section we are told that, when he quits that region and enters the heavens, he still has in him certain evil πάθη, which might be collectively described as θυμός and ἐπιθυμία; and one of these πάθη is actually called ἡ ἐπιθυμητική ἀπαιτή. The author can hardly have been guilty of so manifest an inconsistency; and it is most likely that the words καὶ ὁ θυμός . . . χωρεῖ were inserted by some one else, —possibly by the same person who altered πνεῦμα into ἥδος above.

Even when these words have been struck out, a difficulty still remains; for a man who has got rid of his αἰσθήσεις could hardly continue to be liable to the πάθη enumerated in connexion with the planets. But the inconsistency of making the man retain the πάθη after he has got rid of the αἰσθήσεις is less obvious than that of making him retain the πάθη after he has got rid of θυμός and ἐπιθυμία, and the writer may have failed to notice it.

§ 25. τῇ πρώτῃ ξώῃ διδομένη . . . καὶ τῇ ἡδονῇ τὸ ἐνθρευόμενον ψεῦδος. We were told in § 13 a that the first Anthropos, in the course of his descent into the lower world, took into himself the distinctive qualities (φύσεις) of the several planets. All individual men have inherited these qualities from their ancestor the first Anthropos; and we are now told that the disembodied soul, in the course of its ascent to the higher world, renders them back to the planets to which they severally belong, and so gets rid of them. In his list of the planetary influences, the writer has adopted astrological notions which were current in his time. The αἴτησι καὶ μειωτικὴ ἑνέργεια (i.e. the operation of what Aristotle called the θεραπτικὴ ψυχή, or τὸ θεραπτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς μόριον,) comes from the Moon; fraud, from Mercury; lust, from Venus; pride, from the Sun; audacity, from Mars; covetousness, from Jupiter; and deceitfulness, from Saturn. (The distinction between ἡ μηχανὴ τῶν κακῶν διὼν, which is attributed to Mercury, and τὸ ἐνθρευόμενον ψεῦδος, which is attributed to Saturn, perhaps consists in a difference of motive. The ‘Mercurial’ man deceives others with a view to his own gain; the ‘Saturnine’ man deceives others out of malice, and his object is to do them mischief.)

The influence of the moon, as here described, is neither good nor bad,—except in so far as change in itself is bad, as compared with the immutability of the higher world; but the influences of the six other planets are assumed to be morally bad. In regarding the
planets as maleficent powers, the author agrees with some of the Christian Gnostics.

A list of the planetary influences is given in the verses which Stobaeus (Exc. XXIX) ascribes to 'Hermes': δάκρυ μὲν έστι Κρόνος, Ζεύς (δ') ἡ γῆς, λόγος Ἕρμης, θυμός Ἀρης, Μίνης δ' ἀρ' ἤνων, Κυθήρεα δ' ὤρεφις. The writer of those verses agrees with Corp. I in attributing ὤρεφις to Venus, and in calling Mars θραυστός, but differs as to the characteristics of the other planets. Cf. Firmicus Maternus Math. 1. 22: 'si Saturnus facit cautos graves tardos avaros ac tacitos, Iuppiter maturos bonos benignos ac modestos, Mars crudeles perfídos ac feroces, Sol religiosos nobiles ac superbos, Venus luxuriosos venustos et honesto gratiae splendore fulgentes, Mercurius astutos callidos et concitati animi mobilitatibus turbulentos, Luna acutos splendididos elegantés et popularis splendoris gratia praecvalentes.'

As to the notion that the soul receives certain things from the planets in the course of its descent, and renders them back to the planets in the course of its ascent, see Wendland, Hellen.-Röm. Kultur, pp. 165-171, and Dieterich, Mithrasliturgie, p. 180 ff. This notion, (in which the Stoic conception of the structure of the universe, as popularized by Posidonius, is presupposed,) seems to have been adopted by the Mithraists of the Roman Empire, and symbolically represented in their ritual. It was probably from the Mithraists that it passed to certain Gnostics, who substituted names of angels for those of the seven planet-gods (Orig. c. Cels. 6. 22-31); and it may very well have been transmitted from the Mithraists to the author of Corp. I also.

The notion was accepted by some of the later Platonists; cf. Porph. Aphormai 29, quoted above. Arnobius Adv. nat. 2. 16 speaks of certain Platonists who say that 'dum ad corpora labimur et prosperamus humana, ex mundanis circulis sequuntur nos causae quibus
mali simus'. *Ib. 2. 28*, arguing against that doctrine, Arnobius asks how embodied souls can know 'quas ex quibus circulis qualitates, dum in haec loca labuntur, attraxerint'. Macrobius *Sonn. i. 12. 68: 'de zodiaco et lacteo (i.e. from the outermost sphere, the ogoetas of Corp. I.) ad subjectas sphaeras anima delapsa, dum per illas labitur, in singulis singulos motus quos in exercitio est habitura producit, in Saturni (sphaera) ratiocinationem et intelligentiam, in Iovis vim agendi, in Martis animositatem, in Solis sentiendi opinandique naturam, desiderii vero motum in Veneris, pronuntiandi et interpretandi quae sentiat in orbe Mercurii, naturam vero plantandi et augendi corpora ingressu globi lunar is exercet'. Servius *ad Virg. Aen. ii. 51: 'dicunt physici, quum nasci coeperimus, sortimur a sole spiritum, a Luna corpus, a Venere cupiditatem, a Saturno humorem, quae omnia singulis rededere videntur: extincti.' Serv. *ad V. Aen. 6. 714: 'mathematici fingunt quod singulorum numinum potestatibus corpus et anima connexa sint, quia quum descendunt animae, trahunt secun tum torporem Saturni, Martis iracundiam, Veneris libidinem, Mercurii luci cupiditatem, Iovis regni desiderium.' Cf. Porphyry as reported by Proclus *in Pl. Tim. p. 311*, quoted above in note on § 24.

A somewhat less close resemblance to the doctrine of Corp. I. 24 and 25 may be seen in what Basilides says about the death and ascension of Jesus (Hippol. *Ref. haer. 7. 27*): γέγονε δὲ ταύτα, φησίν, ἣν ἀπαρχὴ τῆς φυλοκρηνήσεως γένηται τών συγκεχρημένων ὁ Ἰησοῦς... ἁναγκαῖον ἦν τά συγκεχρημένα φυλοκρηνηθῆναι διά τῆς τοῦ Ἰησοῦ διαρέσεως. ἐκαθὼς σὺν τούτῳ ὅπερ ἦν αὐτῶν σωματικῶν μέρος, ὅ ἦν τῆς ἀμορφίας,1 καὶ ἀπεκατέστη ἐς τὴν ἀμορφίαν ἀνάστησι δὲ τούτῳ ὅπερ ἦν ψυχικῶν αὐτῶν μέρος, ὅπερ ἦν τῆς ἔφδομάδος,2 καὶ ἀπεκατέστη ἐς τὴν ἔφδομάδαν ἀνάστησι[σε] δὲ τούτῳ ὅπερ ἦν τῆς ἀκρωρείας οἰκείοις τοῦ μεγάλου ἄρχοντος,3 καὶ ἔμενε παρὰ τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν μεγάνων 'ἀνήγεγκε' (ἀνηγεγκή) δὲ μέχρις τῶν τούτῳ ὅπερ ἦν τοῦ μεθορίου πνεύματος, καὶ ἔμεινεν ἐν τῷ μεθορίῳ πνεύματι.4 ἀπεκαθάρθη δὲ ἡ νίστης ἡ τράτη 5 δὲ αὐτῶν, . . . καὶ ἀνήλθε πρὸς τὴν

1 I. e. of gross matter.
2 The hebdomas is the region of the seven planetary spheres.
3 'The ἀκρωρεία of the great Archon' is the sphere of the fixed stars, the abode of the Demiurgus.
4 I. e. at the boundary between the material world and the immaterial world, the latter being thought of as filling the space outside the Kosmos.
5 The τράτη νίστη is the divine element which had been intermixed with matter in the lower world. (Is it merely a coincidence that the Anthropos of Corp. I is third son of the supreme God?)
The last sentence implies that in the case of every man a like ‘separation of things of diverse nature’ is destined to take place. Basilides has adopted and applied to Jesus a doctrine which in certain Pagan schools was taught concerning men in general. Compare the doctrine of a Gnostic sect in Irenaeus i. 30. 12: ‘descendisse autem eum (sc. Christum) per sep-
tem caelos, assimilatum (esse) filiis (tois aphrousoi?) eorum dicunt, 
et sensim eorum evacuasse virtutem.’

§ 26 a. γυμνοθείς ἀπὸ τῶν τῆς ἁρμονίας ἐνεργημάτων. The τῆς ἁρμονίας ἐνεργήματα are the planetary τάδη which have just been enumerated. As to γυμνοθείς, cf. Plotinus 1. 6. 7: ἀναβατέων σὺν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄγαθον . . . τεῦχος δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀναβαίνοις πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, καὶ ἐκπαραβείσαι, καὶ ἀποδυνάμενος ἀ καταβαίνοντες ἡμφασισματα· οὐν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀγάμα των ἱερών ὑπὸν ἄνωθεν καθάρσεις τε καὶ ἱμαίων ἁπαθείες τῶν πρῶν, καὶ τὸ γυμνοῦ ἀνίκαν: οἷον ἂν τις ἐρελθὼν (ἀποβαλλόν) τὰν δοσον ἀλλότριον τοῦ θεοῦ, αὐτῷ μόνῳ αὐτῷ μόνον ἦδη κ.τ.λ. I do not know what particular ritual Plotinus had in mind. Did the Mithraists thus strip themselves when they were ascending their κλίμακες ἐπτάπυλας?

γίνεται ἐπί τὴν ὁγδοαδικὴν (ὁγδοαδικὴ MSS.) φύσιν. ‘The substance of the ὁγδοας’ is the eighth and outermost sphere, that of the fixed stars. This is the δημιουργικὴ σφαίρα spoken of in § 13a, i.e. the seat of the Demiurgus-Nous; and it was there that Anthropos was situated before his descent through the region of the planets. It is the sphere to which the ὁγδοή πύλη of the Mithraists corresponded (Orig. c. Cels. 6. 22, quoted above). Cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. 4. 161: εἶτε ἐπὶ σύρμων οὗ τινος ἀμβοῦτοι καὶ ἐκαταβαίνων, εἶτε καὶ ἡ ἀπλανής χώρα ἡ πλησιάζοντα τῷ νοστῷ κόσμῳ ὁγδοῶν λέγοντο. The word ὁγδοάς is frequently used in this sense in the writings of the Christian Gnostics; e.g. Basilides, Hippol. Ref. haer. 7. 27: ἦτοιν ο ἀκόσμων δημητρίμονος εἰς (1) ὁγδοάς (the sphere of the fixed stars), ἦτοιν ἦ κεφαλή τοῦ παντοῦ κόσμου, . . . καὶ εἰς (2) ἐβδομάδα (the region of the seven planets), ἦτοιν ἦ κεφαλή τῆς ἐβδομάδος ὁ δημιουργὸς τῶν

1 The μακαρίᾳ νίκη is that ‘Sonship’ which ὡμοὶ τῷ γενέσεως τοῦ σπέρματος τῆς πρώτης καταβολῆς . . . ἀνήθει καὶ αὐθαυματωθὲν ἄνω, and has ever since remained above, in union with God.

2 Cf. Irenaeus 1. 30. 9: the Ophites ‘sanctam hebdomadam septem stellas quas dicunt planetas esse volat’. Hippolytus, Ref. haer. 7. 26, apparently reports Basilides as saying that there
The Valentinians used the word ὅγας in two different senses. Their 'first ὅγας' was the group of the eight highest Aëons. But they also used ὅγας as Basilides used it, in the sense of 'the eighth sphere', i.e. the sphere of the fixed stars, which is above the planetary hebdomas. E. g. the Valentinian Theodotus, Clem. Alex. fragm. 63:

ὅμων τῶν πνευματικῶν ἀνάκωσις... ἐν ὅγας... παρὰ τῷ μητρὶ (Sophia), ἡ ἐκ χοντα (λέγε ἐκ χοντων) τὰς ψυχὰς τὰ ἰδήματα. ἐμπιστεύεσθαι: αἱ δὲ ἄλλα πισταὶ ψυχαὶ παρὰ τῷ δημογυρῷ. περὶ δὲ τὴν συντέλειαν ἀναχωροῦντα καὶ αὑτὰ εἰς ὅγας... τὸ ἐντόθεν, ἀποθέμενα τὰ πνευματικά (νομ.) τὰς ψυχὰς κ.τ.λ. enter into the pleroma (which is above the material Kosmos), καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ὅψαν ἐρχομα, αἰώνες νοεροὶ γενόμενα. (This passage has much in common with the description of the ascent of the soul in Corp. I.)

Ibid. 80: 'ἐν γενής ἡ μήτηρ, εἰς βάθανον ἀγίησα καὶ εἰς κόσμον ἐν δὲ ἀναγεννησὶ Χριστῷ, εἰς ζωὴν μετατίθεται εἰς ὅγας (i. e. into the 'eighth sphere', which is above the seat of the Valentinian Demiurgus, and beyond the reach of the planetary πάθη).'

are 365 ὅρανοι in the hebdomas. His words are these: ἦλθεν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἑβδομάδα πάντα θεωρότοιο...—κτίσεως γὰρ εἰσὶ (κατ' ἀυτὰ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ κατ' αὐτὸν) (λέγε κατὰ τὸ τῶν διαστήματα, sc. in the planetary region) ἄνειροι καὶ ἄρχαὶ καὶ κυνήματα καὶ δρακόντες... ἴσα καὶ τρακτήτων ἧξωντες πάντες ὁμομοῦ φαίνοντο, καὶ τῶν πέραν ἱερών τῶν εἰς τὸ 'Αβραάμας...—ἀλλ' ἠλθεί, φαίνει, ταῦτα ἀπελευθέρωσεν, ἵνα λογίσατο τὴν τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν (τῆρ) καθ' ἡμᾶς (i. e. the sublunar world) φωτισθῆναι. If this statement is to be accepted, the meaning may perhaps have been, not that there is a series of 365 concentric spheres, but that there are 365 different aspects of the heavens, corresponding to the 365 days of the year. Each of these aspects of the heavens—or in other words, each of the days of the year—is presided over by a different Power (a χρονοκράτωρ, as Egyptian astrologers would have said); and all these 365 Powers together are subject to 'the great Archon' Abrasax, who is lord of the whole region of the planets. Cf. Irenaeus 1, 24, 7: 'τρεcentorum (possibly trecentas!) autem sexaginta quinque caelorum locales positiones distribuunt (In ille Didascalia), similiter ut mathematici: illorum (sc. mathematicorum, 'astrologers') enim theoremeta accipientes, in suum characterem doctrinae transiturunt: esse autem principem illorum 'Αβραάμα (ὅν ἦ δὲ τῶν ἱερών τῶν ἑραίων 'Αβραάμας (Theodore), et propter hoc CCCXXVII numerus habere in se.' The letters of the name 'Ἀβραάμας' or 'Ἀβράας', taken as numbers, make up the number 365 when added together. (It was noted that the letters of the name Melēbas also make up the number 365; Jerome in Amos lib. 1.)

1 Perhaps ἡ κατάληγι [τῶν ἑνκωμιῶν].
2 The πνευματικόν is the highest part of the man; the ψυχή is a lower part, and is regarded as a 'vesture' or 'integument' of the πνευματικόν.
3 I. e. until the final consummation of all things.
4 I. e. in the planetary hebdomas, which is the seat of the Demiurgus in the Valentinian system.
5 Basilides sometimes used ὅγας and ἑβδομάς as personal names, signifying respectively 'the Power that resides in the eighth sphere' and 'the Power that resides in the seven planetary spheres'; e. g. Hippol. Ref. haer. 7, 25: ἦ...
The man has at this stage recovered the powers proper to his true nature, which he had lost through his descent into gross matter.

Those who are 'there' (i.e. in the sphere of the fixed stars) are (1) the star-gods, and (2) other human souls, which have previously mounted to that sphere. The notion that human souls of the highest order, after their release from the body, take up their abode in the sphere of the fixed stars, can be traced back (perhaps through Posidonius) to Heraclides Ponticus. See Cic. Somn. Scip.; and cf. Corp. X. 7 fin.: ἀνή (viz. residence among the astral gods) ψυχῆς ἡ τελιστάτη δόξα. The author of Corp. I has adopted this notion; but he regards an abode in this region, not as the highest to which the soul can attain, but as a stage on the way to something yet higher.

As to the hymns sung by the οὐά/ουις, cf. Valentinus, Hippol. Ref. haer. 6. 31 fin.: ἄνδραμεν ... ὁ Ἰραστός καὶ τὸ Ἀγιόν Πνεῦμα πρὸς τὸν Ναὸν καὶ τὴν Ἀλέθειαν ἄντος τοῦ ὅρου (i.e. into the pleroma with which extracosmic space is filled), ἧν (ὁ παῖς) μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰώνων δοξάζων τῶν Πατέρα. For φωνὴ την ἀνίδα, ταῖς γλώσσαις ... τῶν ἀγγέλων in I Cor. 13. 1. Testament of Job (Reitzenstein Poin. p. 57): the first of Job's three daughters ἀντέθηκε τοῖς ἀγγελικοῖς οἴμον ἐν ἀγγελικῇ φωνῇ, καὶ ἦμον ἀνέμελπε τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὴν ἀγγελικὴν ὑμνολογίαν τὴν δὲ ἀνίδα καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων, ὑπὲρ τὴν ὑγιεινὴν φύσιν οὐσίων, φωνῇ τιμὴν ἔμμουσιν τῶν θεῶν. As to the hymns sung by the ὑμνεῖς, cf. Valentinas, Hippol. Ref. haer. 6. 31 fin.: ἀνδραμεν ... ὁ Χριστός καὶ τὸ Ἀγιόν Πνεῦμα πρὸς τὸν Ναὸν καὶ τὴν Ἀλέθειαν ἄντος τοῦ ὅρου (i.e. into the pleroma with which extracosmic space is filled), ἧν (ὁ παῖς) μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰώνων δοξάζων τῶν Πατέρα. For φωνὴ την ἀνίδα, ταῖς γλώσσαις ... τῶν ἀγγέλων in I Cor. 13. 1. Testament of Job (Reitzenstein Poin. p. 57): the first of Job's three daughters ἀντέθηκε τοῖς ἀγγελικοῖς οἴμον ἐν ἀγγελικῇ φωνῇ, καὶ ἦμον ἀνέμελπε τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὴν ἀγγελικὴν ὑμνολογίαν τὴν δὲ ἀνίδα καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων, ὑπὲρ τὴν ὑγιείαν φύσιν τῆς δεύτερης.
sang hymns in 'the language (διάλεκτος) of the Archontes'; and the third, in 'the language of the Cherubim'.

We were told in § 7 that the 'Light' which stands for God is subdivided into innumerable δύναμεις. That is, the supreme God is pictured as a Being made up of innumerable 'Powers', which fill the boundless space outside the Kosmos. In § 26 a, these 'Powers' are regarded as persons. The Catholic Christians spoke of three divine 'Persons'; the Valentinians, of thirty. The author of Corp. I recognizes innumerable Persons in a somewhat similar sense; and he holds that individual human souls may be added to the number of them (δυνάμεις καὶ αὐτοὶ γενόμενοι ἐν θεῷ γίνονται).

His conception of the δύναμεις of God resembles that of Philo. (See Bousset, Rel. des Judentums, Kap. XVIII; and Zeller, Phil. der Gr. III, Abth. 2 (1903), pp. 407-418.) Philo speaks much of God's δύναμεις. He repeatedly says that the two chief δύναμεις of God are η ποιητική δύναμις (also called η ευφεργία δύναμις and η τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγαθότητα), and η βασιλική δύναμις (also called ἀρχή, ἐξουσία, ἡγεμονία, τὸ κράτος, ἡ ἡγεμονικὴ καὶ διοικητικὴ ἐξουσία, and η κολαστήριος δύναμις). In De fuga et invent. 18. 94 ff., Wendland III, p. 130, he adds three others, the operation of which is limited to God's dealings with erring men, viz. η λεως δύναμις (by which God pardons repentant sinners), η προστατική (by which God gives commands to men), and η ἀπαγορευτική (by which God issues prohibitions); and he there says that these five δύναμεις are subordinate to the θείος λόγος, which is the first and chief δύναμις, and the ἐνεργος τῶν δύναμεων. Cf. De cherubim 9. 27, Cohn I, p. 176: κατὰ τὸν ἐκάκτον ὄντα θεόν δύο τὰς ἀνωτάτους εἶναι καὶ πρῶτας δύναμεις ἀγαθότητα καὶ ἐξουσίαν, . . . τρίτον δὲ συνάγωνα ἀμφότερον εἶναι λόγον, λόγος γὰρ καὶ ἀρχοντα καὶ ἐγαθόν εἶναι τὸν θεόν. In other passages, he says that the two chief δύναμεις of God are η ποιητική and η βασιλική, and does not mention the λόγος in connexion with them. Elsewhere, he says that the δύναμεις of God are unlimited in number;¹ and he identifies them (1) with the Platonic ἰδέαι, (2) with the (σπερματικοί) λόγοι of the Stoics, and (3) with the 'angels' of the Jews and the 'daemons' of the Platonists. At times, a δύναμις of God means to Philo merely a mode or department of God's action. But at other times, he conceives the δύναμεις as persons distinct from God; he speaks of them as God's δορυφόροι,

¹ De conf. ling. 34. 171, Wendland II, p. 262: εἰς ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἀμφίθεν περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχει δύναμεις, ἀρωγοὺς καὶ σωτηρίου τοῦ γενομένου πάσας.
and even calls them ψυχαί (De conf. ling. l.c.). See also Philo
Legat. ad Caïum 1. 6, Cohn VI, p. 156.

Philo's hypostatization of the δυνάμεις is an instance of a mode
of thought which was common among the Jews of his time. There
are traces in the New Testament of a tendency to hypostatize the
dύναμες θεοῦ; e.g. 1 Cor. 1. 24: Χριστὸν θεοῦ δύναμιν καὶ θεοῦ σοφίαν.
Luke 1. 35: δύναμις Ὑφίστον ἐπωρκάζεσι σοι (where δύναμις Ὑφίστον
stands in parallelism with πνεῦμα ἄγιον). Luke 22. 69: ἦσταί ὁ νιὸς
1. 21 (ὑπεράνω πάσης ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ κυριότητος),
die δυνάμεις are persons. Simon Magus called himself ἡ μεγάλη
dύναμις,1 probably meaning thereby that in him the divine νοῦς or
λόγος had 'become flesh'. Simon, as reported by Hippolytus,
spoke also of subordinate δυνάμεις, which he distinguished from 'the
great Power' (ἡ μεγάλη δύναμις, ἡ ἀρεταῖος). The term δύναμις
was similarly used by some of the Christian Gnostics, e.g. by
Satornilus.1

καὶ τότε τάξει ἀνέρχονται πρὸς τὸν πατέρα. The souls 'ascend to
the Father'; i.e. they quit the material Kosmos, and enter the
incorporeal world, which is filled with the presence of God; or, as
some of the Gnostics would have expressed it, they enter the pleroma.
And they enter it in due order or succession (τάξει), as each of them
in turn becomes fit for this supreme exaltation.

[θεωθήμα. If we retain this word, we must take it as equivalent
to ἐν θεῷ γενέσθαι in the sense explained above. But the sentence
reads better without it; and it seems most likely that it has been
added by a later hand.

§ 26 b. καθοδον γίνῃ τοῖς ἄξιοις. The prophet is to preach to
all mankind; but it is only 'the worthy' among his hearers that
will accept him as their guide.

ὁ Πομάνδρης ἡμίγε τοῖς δυνάμεις. The divine Mind, which has
assumed a quasi-corporeal form for the purpose of communicating
with the prophet, returns to the incorporeal world, and resumes its

1 Acts 8. 10: ὁ προσεύχον πάντες... λέγουσι Οὐτὸς ἦστιν ἡ Δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ
καλωμένη Μεγάλη. Irenaeus 1. 23. 2: 'esse se (dixit Simon) sublimissimam
virtutem (i.e. δύναμις), hoc est eum qui sit super omnis Pater.' Hippol. Ref.
haeres. 6. 19: ἐκεῖνον δὲ λέγει τὴν ὑπὲρ πάντα δύναμιν εἶναι.
2 Hippol. Ref. haeres. 7. 28: Satornilus said ἵνα πάτερα ἄρωσον τοῖς υἱῶιν
ὑπάρχων, τῶν ποιήσατα ἄγγελοι, ἀρχαγγέλοι, δυνάμεις, ἐξουσίας. Epiphan.
Haer. 33: Satornilus said τὸν σωτῆρα ἀνετάλθαι ἀπὸ Πατρὸς κατὰ τὴν γνωμὴν τῶν
δυνάμεων.

F 2
functions as the supreme Being in whom all the δυνάμεις are comprehended.

§§ 27-29. [[ἐγὼ δὲ εὐχαριστήσας . . . τὴν ἰδίαν καλίν.]] This passage is out of place. § 30, in which the prophet describes his state of mind on waking at the conclusion of his vision, must have been meant to follow immediately after the account of the vision itself; and his hymn of thanksgiving (§ 31 f.), which follows rightly on § 30, must have preceded § 27, the opening words of which (ἐγὼ δὲ εὐχαριστήσας κ.τ.λ.) refer back to it. When the text is thus rearranged, the order is perfectly satisfactory. The prophet first speaks of his own reception of the revelation (§§ 30-32), and then proceeds to describe how he preached to others the gnosis which had been revealed to him; and he brings his narrative to a fitting close, by making his hearers go to bed at the end of the day thus spent, § 29 fin. (Compare the conclusion of the First Book of the Iliad.) It is possible that the order of the paragraphs was deliberately changed by some one who intended the libellus to be read as a ‘lesson’ at a meeting of worshippers, and considered that it would serve this liturgical purpose better if the hymn (in which the congregation might join) were placed at the end.

§ 30. τὴν εὐεργεσίαν τοῦ Ποιμάνδρου ἀνεγραφάμην εἰς ἐμαυτόν. The more usual construction would be εὐεργέτην τὸν Π. ἀνεγραφάμην, ‘I registered his name on the tablet of my memory as that of a benefactor’. Cf. Pl. Gorg. 506 C : εὐεργέτης παρ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἀναγεράφημε.

πληρωθεὶς δὲ ἴθιλον. These words refer back to § 3, μαθεῖν τῆλον τὰ δικτα . . . καὶ γνῶναι τὸν θεόν.

ἡ τοῦ λόγου ἄφορία (ἐκφορὰ MSS.) γένημα[ν] ἡ άγαθῶν. The phrase ἡ τοῦ λόγου ἐκφορὰ is parallel to the preceding σωφτή; it is therefore evident that ἐκφορά (‘utterance’) is wrong. In his sleep, the prophet uttered no words; he was only dreaming that he spoke. ἄφορία gives the sense required, and suits well with the following γένημα and the preceding ἔγκυμον. The word ἄγαθον can hardly be right, because γένημα[ν] ἄγαθῶν too closely resembles ἔγκυμον τοῦ ἄγαθον. We might get a good antithesis to λόγον (‘speech’) by writing ἄγιον (νομιμάτων), ‘holy thoughts’.

λαβόντι ἀπὸ τοῦ Ποιμάνδρου, τουτέστι τοῦ τῆς αἰθέτιας (νοὸς, τὸν . . .) λόγον.—(λαβόντι ἀπὸ τοῦ νοὸς μου, τουτέστι τοῦ Ποιμάνδρου τοῦ τῆς αἰθέτιας λόγου MSS.) With the correction τοῦ τῆς αἰθέτιας λόγου for τοῦ τῆς αἰθέτιας λόγου, and the omission of μου, the reading of the MSS. would be intelligible, if we take αἰθέτια to mean ‘the
absolute truth', though not if we take it to mean 'the sovereignty'. But it seems more probable that Poimandres was here again called ὁ θεός αὐθεντίας νοῦς, as in § 2.

§§ 26, 27. Δυσος ὁ θεὸς... τὴν πᾶσαν ἱσχύιαν. This hymn occurs in a collection of Christian prayers, Berlin Papyrus 9794. (*Berl. Klass. Texte*, Heft VI, *Altchristliche Texte*. See Reitzenstein and Wendland, 'Zwei angeblich christliche Gebete', *Nachrichten von der k. Gesellschaft der Wissensch., Göttingen, Philol.-hist. Klasse*, 1910, Heft 4, p. 324 ff.) We are told that the Papyrus was written in the third century. There is no doubt that the hymn was composed to form part of *Corp. I*, and was borrowed thence by the Christian compiler of the collection of prayers in the Papyrus; for some of the phrases in it were clearly suggested by passages in *Corp. I* (e.g. ζωὴν καὶ φῶς, and παρέδωκας ἅπα τὴν πᾶσαν ἱσχύιαν). It must have been extracted from the Pagan Poimandres-document by some Christian who considered it suitable for use in his own worship. The Christian who adopted it added a doxology at the end, and probably inserted the words τὸ γὰρ πνεῦμα μου (...) τῷ θεῷ πνεῦματι.

§ 31. Δύσος (ὁ θεὸς, ὁ πατὴρ, ὁ ἐποθείας μοι [ἀπὸ τοῦ νοοῦ] ζωὴν καὶ φῶς). This clause is omitted in codd. *Corp.*; but as the words ὁ ἐποθείας μοι ζωὴν καὶ φῶς were evidently written with reference to what has gone before in *Corpus I*, it is to be presumed that it originally belonged to that document,1 and was taken thence, with the rest of the hymn, by the compiler of *Pap.*

For ἀπὸ τοῦ νοοῦ, Reitzenstein writes ἀπὸ τοῦ Νοοῦ. But this is hardly intelligible. If διὰ were written in place of ἀπὸ, the meaning might be διὰ τοῦ Ποιμάνδρου; and if Poimandres could be regarded as a person distinct from the supreme God, it might very well be said that God has revealed 'Life and Light' to the prophet through the agency of Poimandres. But we have seen reason to think that the writer's view is rather that Poimandres, ὁ θεός αὐθεντίας νοῦς, is identical with the supreme God; and if so, this explanation cannot be accepted. It seems best therefore to assume that ἀπὸ τοῦ νοοῦ has been wrongly inserted here. It may possibly be a misplaced doublet of the words ἀπὸ τοῦ νοοῦ which occur in the text of the MSS. a few lines above.

Δύσος ὁ θεὸς, ὁ πατὴρ τῶν διαν codd. *Corp.*—Δυσος ὁ θεὸς καὶ (αἱ πατηρ τῶν) διὰ [Δύσος et] (ὁ πρὸ) ἄρχην [ὁν] *Pap.* As given in codd. *Corp.*, the first clause of this triplet is too short to match the second and the

1 It ought therefore to have been printed in the text.
third; it is therefore probable that it originally included the phrase of which ἀρχή, preserved in Pap., is a remnant. The Berlin editors of Pap. write ὁ ἀρχή ἄρχης ὄν; but perhaps ὁ πρὸ ἄρχης ὄν is preferable. Cf. § 8 a: τὸ ἄρχεττων ἔδω, τὸ προάρχον τῆς ἄρχης. In the vision described in § 4, the ‘light’ which stands for God is in existence before the first rudiment of the future Kosmos comes into being.

οὐ ἡ βουλή τελεῖται ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων δυνάμεων. ἀπὸ is here, as often in post-classical writings, used in the sense of ὑπὸ with a passive verb. For βουλή, cf. ἐκ βουλῆς θεοῦ in § 8 b. The δυνάμεις are the ‘Powers of God’ which were spoken of in § 7 and § 26 a sq. The epithet ἰδίων can hardly be right; there is no need to emphasize the fact that the δυνάμεις are Powers of God, and not of some one else. It would be possible to write (ἡ)διών; but though the Powers are, no doubt, ‘everlasting’ or ‘eternal’, there would be little point in saying so here. Perhaps the author wrote ἰδικῶν, ‘individual’ or ‘several’. (For this meaning of ἰδικός, see note on Ascl. Lat. I. 2 b fin.) The personified δυνάμεις correspond, in one aspect, to the ‘departmental gods’ of Pagan theologies. Each individual among them has some special function of his own in the administration of the universe; and by discharging their several functions, they collectively fulfil the all-comprehensive βουλή of God.

δὲ γνωσθήματι βούλεται. Cf. Corp. X. 15 a: θελεῖ γνωσθῆσθαι. Corp. VII. 2 a: ἀφοράοιτες τῇ καρδίᾳ εἰς τὸν (οὐτὸς) ὄραθημα θέλοντα. God’s will that men should know him is a part of his universal βουλή.

ὁ λόγος σωτηριάμοιος τὰ ἅντα. λόγος here means God’s ἡμι, and is no more hypostatized than in Ps. 32 (33) 6, τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ κυρίου οἱ ὀφραντι ἐστηρεώθησαν. But it is nevertheless possible that the phrase was suggested by what was said about the hypostatized λόγος of God in § 5 a.

ἀγίος εἰ, ἡ ἅγια ὑμαύρωσεν

ἀγίος εἰ, οὐ πᾶσα φύσις εἰκὼν ἣν.

So Pap.; in codd. Corp. the two clauses are interchanged. The order of Pap. seems preferable. In the first clause, the verb is ἡμαύρωσεν (no doubt a miswriting of ἡμαύρωσεν) in Pap., but ἦμαρφωσεν in codd. Corp. If we accept ἦμαρφωσεν, we must take φύσις to mean here the power which imposes forms on matter. God is not included in the sphere of operation of this power; for God, being incorporeal, has no μορφή. But this conception of μορφή, and of φύσις as the imposer of μορφαῖ, does not occur elsewhere in Corp. I; and ἡμαύρωσεν seems the better reading, as being in accordance with the notion of φῶς and σκότος which is prominent throughout the
document. ‘God is light, and in him is no darkness at all’ (Ep. Joh. 1. 1. 5). Man also, in respect of his true being, is unmixed light; but in his case, the light has been obscured through his marriage with φύσις, that is, through his descent into the world of matter, and incarnation in a material body. God, on the other hand, remains on high, apart from all that is material, and unaffected by the darkening influence of ἀλή.

οὖ πᾶσα φύσις εἰκών ἐφυ. ἥ πᾶσα φύσις is the material universe; and the material universe is an ‘image’ of God. Cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 10: ‘dei, cuius sunt imaginis duae mundus et homo’.

Corf. VIII. 2: ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενόμενος (κα. ὁ κόσμος).

The three clauses of this triplet deal with the relation between God and the Kosmos. The material world has been made by God; but God is not affected by the evil influence of the ἁλή of which it is made; and whatever good there is in it is a copy or reflection of the Good which is in God.

ὁ πᾶσης δυναστείας (δυνάστεως Pap.: δυνάμεως codd. Corp.) λογορητέρος. δυναστείας is probably a conflation of two readings, δυναστείας and δυνάμεως. As δυνάμεως was used a few lines above in a sense not applicable here, δυναστείας is the more likely reading.

δῆκαι λογικός θυσίας ἄγνας. Cf. Corp. XIII. 18: δῆκαι . . . λογικήν θυσίαν. Ἰβ. 21: πέμπω λογικός θυσίας. A λογική θυσία is an act of worship which consists in verbal adoration, as opposed to a material offering. Tertullian On Prayer, 27: ‘most excellent is every custom which . . . helps us to bring to God, as our best victim, a well-enriched prayer; for this is the spiritual victim which has abolished the former sacrifices’. The epithet ἄγνας implies that such worship alone is acceptable to God, and that θυσία in the literal sense (i.e. material offerings, and especially bloody sacrifices) are ‘impure’. See Ascl. Lat. 41 a. But perhaps ἄγνας ought to be bracketed.


τῆς γνώσεως τῆς κατ' ὁδοίαν ἡμῶν codd. Corp.—τῆς γνώσεως τῆς κατὰ ἠφος (ἠφος;?) ἡμῶν αὐτῶν Pap. The reading of codd. Corp. might be understood to mean either the ‘gnosis’ which corresponds to our
true and incorporeal being (i.e. to the νοῦς in us'), or 'such (imperfect) gnosē as (earthly) beings like us are capable of acquiring'. The former explanation perhaps agrees better with the tone of the context. But the phrase τῆς κατ' οὕσιν ἡμῶν, taken in either sense, seems irrelevant here; we should rather have expected the speaker to say 'the gnosē to which I have attained'. The reading of Pap. is meaningless; with the emendation ὑσος ('our exalted station') in place of υφος, the phrase might perhaps be taken as equivalent to τῆς κατ' οὕσιν ἡμῶν in the first of the two senses explained above. But I am inclined to think that both texts are corrupt here. Possibly the true reading may be τῆς κατ' (ἀ τῆν ἔξωσιάν ἡμῶν (the ἔξωσιά which God has given to man).

καὶ ἀνθυμίωσον με, ἵνα [καὶ] τῆς χάριτος ταύτης (πνεύμαν) φωτίσω τοὺς ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ γένους μου. 'This boon' means the revelation which the prophet has received. He prays that supernatural power may be given him, in order that he may be enabled to illuminate others as he himself has been illuminated, and so obey the injunction of Poimandres (§ 26 b: ὁ χ λ ὁ πάντα παραλαβὼν καθοδηγὸς γίνῃ κτλ.).

—τοὺς τοῦ γένους μου means 'my fellow-men'; cf. καθοδήγος ἐγενόμην τοῦ γένους in § 29.

[τὸ γὰρ πνεύμα μου τῷ θείῳ πνεύματι] Pap.: om. codd. Corp. These words are meaningless as they stand in Pap. Reitzenstein inserts συμπνεῖ after μου, and takes the meaning to be 'my spirit is in accord with the divine spirit'. But this can hardly have been written by the author of the hymn. We have found πνεύμα used in this document in two different senses, viz. (1) 'the element air' (§§ 9, 16), and (2) the 'vital spirit' of the individual man (§ 17). But both these uses of the word belong to the same stratum of Greek thought, and are connected with the Stoic system; in both of them alike, the πνεύμα is a material thing of gaseous substance. If we retain the words of Pap., we must say that the author has here used πνεύμα in an entirely different sense, to signify the divine Mind, and the highest and incorporeal part of man. But he elsewhere uses the Platonic term νοῦς to express this conception; and it is difficult to see why he should here use πνεύμα as a substitute for νοῦς. On the other hand, πνεύμα was habitually thus used by the Christians, from Paul onward. Hence it may be inferred that these words were inserted by a Christian, and presumably by the Christian who adopted this Pagan hymn for use in his own worship, and included it in the collection of Christian prayers contained in the Papyrus.
If this clause was added by a Christian, it is possible that the missing verb is \( \sigma\nu\mu\alpha\rhost\upsilon\pi\nu\epsilon\). Cf. \textit{Ep. Rom.} 8. 16: \( \alpha\nu\tau\omicron\sigma\tau \tau\omicron\alpha\nu\sigma\upsilon \pi\nu\epsilon\mu\alpha\iota\nu\eta \nu \pi\nu\epsilon\iota\mu\alpha\iota \iota \tau\omicron\alpha\nu \tau\omicron\sigma\nu\). A Christian reader of the Hermetic prayer might very well be reminded of that text by the words \( \nu\nu\iota\omicron\upsilon\sigma\upsilon \delta\iota \varsigma\sigma\omicron\upsilon \) and \( \pi\upsilon\sigma\tau\iota\omicron\omicron\omega\nu \) \( \kappa\alpha\iota\alpha\upsilon \varsigma \) \( \mu\alpha\rhost\upsilon\pi\nu\epsilon\). Which precede and follow the interpolation.

(...)

The prophet 'believes' this himself, and 'bears witness to it' in his preaching to others. But \( \delta\iota\) is meaningless, and there is no clear connexion of thought with what precedes. It may perhaps have been because he felt the need of something to which \( \delta\iota\) could refer, that the Christian interpolator inserted before it the words \( \tau\omicron\alpha\nu \pi\nu\epsilon\mu\alpha\iota\upsilon\nu \kappa\tau\alpha\lambda\). But I am inclined to suspect that in the earliest form of \textit{Corp. I} the greater part of this hymn or prayer was absent, and that the prophet's \textit{eulogia} originally ran as follows: \( \alpha\gamma\iota\sigma\upsilon \) \( \delta\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\sigma\upsilon \), \( \delta\ \upsilon\omicron\delta\omicron\epsilon\iota\upsilon\sigma\varsigma \) \( \mu\omicron\upsilon \zeta\omicron\nu\eta\nu \) \( \chi\omicron\omega\upsilon\). \[ \] \( \delta\iota \) \( \pi\upsilon\sigma\tau\iota\omicron\omicron\omega\nu \) \( \kappa\alpha\iota\alpha\upsilon \varsigma \) \( \mu\alpha\rhost\upsilon\pi\nu\epsilon\). \( \epsilon\upsilon\lambda\gamma\nu\gamma\rho\omicron\nu\delta\upsilon\zeta \) \( \epsilon\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\sigma\nu\) \( \delta\osigma \) \( \upsilon\upsilon\) \( \kappa\alpha\iota\alpha\upsilon \varsigma \) \( \sigma\nu\alpha\gamma\iota\zeta\epsilon\iota\zeta\upsilon\alpha\nu \) \( \sigma\nu\alpha\gamma\iota\zeta\epsilon\iota\zeta\upsilon\alpha\nu \). 'God has set before me the promise of Life and Light; therefore, I believe and testify that I enter into Life and Light.' We may suppose that some one afterwards expanded this short \textit{eulogia} by inserting the three \( \alpha\gamma\iota\sigma\upsilon\) -triplets, and the petitions which follow them; whence it resulted that \( \delta\iota\) was separated from the clause to which it originally referred. But if so, the addition had already been made when the document came into the hands of the Christian compiler of the collection of prayers in the Papyrus, and must therefore have been made in or before the third century a. D.

\( \delta\osigma \) \( \alpha\upsilon\theta\rho\omicron\iota\sigma\upsilon \) \( \sigma\nu\alpha\gamma\iota\zeta\epsilon\iota\zeta\upsilon\alpha\nu \) \( \sigma\nu\alpha\gamma\iota\zeta\epsilon\iota\zeta\upsilon\alpha\nu \). 'Thy man' is the higher and incorporeal part of the man, i.e. \( \nu\upsilon\omicron\upsilon \) in him, which is derived from the first \textit{Anthropos}, and in virtue of which he is a son of God. But perhaps the author may have written \( \delta\osigma \) \( \upsilon\omicron\upsilon \), which would suit better with the preceding \( \pi\upsilon\tau\omicron\sigma\nu\). The phrase \( \delta\osigma \) \( \alpha\upsilon\theta\rho\omicron\iota\sigma\upsilon \) is borrowed from \textit{Corp. I} in \textit{Corp. XIII. 20} (\( \delta\osigma \) \( \alpha\upsilon\theta\rho\omicron\iota\sigma\upsilon \) \( \tau\alpha\iota\tau\alpha\iota \) \( \beta\omicron\omicron \)); but the text of \textit{Corp. I} may have already been altered when it was read by the writer of \textit{Corp. XIII}.

\( \sigma\nu\alpha\gamma\iota\zeta\epsilon\iota\zeta\upsilon\alpha\nu \) \( \sigma\nu \) must mean 'to be holy as thou art holy', with reference to \( \alpha\gamma\iota\sigma\upsilon \) \( \delta\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\sigma\upsilon \) above. But \( \alpha\gamma\iota\zeta\epsilon\iota\zeta\upsilon\alpha\nu \) usually means 'to make holy', and we should rather have expected \( \sigma\nu\alpha\gamma\iota\zeta\epsilon\iota\zeta\upsilon\alpha\nu \).
to unite himself with God, if he will; and the man who speaks does will to do so (bouleita). Cf. Ev. Joh. 1. 12: δοῦν δὲ ἑλαβον αὐτῶν, ἐδωκεν αὐτῶις ἑξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι.

§ 27. Ὁ λαοί, ἄνδρες γυναικεῖς, κ.τ.λ. Corp. VII is an expansion of this missionary sermon.

Men, in respect of their lower nature, are ‘sons of earth’ (γυναικείς). As long as they remain unilluminated, the earthly nature which they inherit from φώς, the mother of their race, is predominant, and ‘Man, the son of God’, is dormant in them.


§ 28. οἱ συνοδεύοντες τῇ πλανῇ καὶ συγκοινωνήσαντες τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ. ‘Error’ and ‘Ignorance’ are here personified by a figure of speech.

§ 29. ἐπειδή (ἐν) αὐτοῖς τῆς σοφίας λόγους, καὶ ἐτράφης[σαν] (τὸ σπαρέν) ἐκ τοῦ ἀμβροσίου ὑδάτος. The notion of ‘the water of immortality’ occurs in many different regions. We meet with it in Babylonian myths. Cf. the ἔδωρ χῶν spoken of in Ev. Joh. 4. 10-14 and 7. 37 f. ‘The Orphici spoke of ‘the fount of Mnemosyne’, in contrast to ‘the fount of Lethe’. But as the writer of Corp. I has just spoken of sowing seed, he must have gone on to speak, not of water which men drink, but of water with which the seed is watered. If then we retain ἐτράφησαν, we must understand of λόγοι as its subject. But a reader would more naturally take the subject of ἐτράφησαν to be the men to whom ἐν αὐτοῖς refers; and as this cannot be what the author meant, it is more likely that he wrote ἐτράφη τὸ σπαρέν, or something of the sort. The thought partly resembles that of Paul in 1 Cor. 3. 6: ὁ δὲ πνεύματος, Ἀπόλλων ἐπετύγχανεν, ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἦν ἤξεις. The preacher sows the seed of wisdom; but it is God that supplies the water which makes the seed grow.

ὁδεὶς (ὁς MSS.) ἔκλεισα αὐτῶις εὐχαριστεῖν τῷ θεῷ. καὶ ἀναπληρώσαντες τὴν εὐχαριστίαν κ.τ.λ. εὐχαριστία here means a liturgical thanksgiving. This is not far from the sense in which the word was used in the early Christian Church, whence our word ‘Eucharist’. Cf. Justin Apol. 1. 13: τῶν δημοιρίων τούτων τοῦ παντός . . . λόγῳ εἰχής καὶ εὐχαριστίας . . . αἰνοῦντες. Ιβ. 1. 65. 3: ἐπειτα προσσήκεται τῷ προεστώτι τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἄρτος καὶ ποτήριων ὕδατος καὶ κράματος, καὶ οὗτος λαβὼν αὐν καὶ δόξαν τῷ πατρὶ τῶν ἄνω . . . ἀνατέμπει, καὶ εὐχαριστίαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατηξιοθαι τούτων παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἤτι πολὺ ποιεῖται οὐ συντελεσάντος τὸς εἰχῆς καὶ τὴν εὐχαριστίαν πᾶς ὁ παρών λαὸς ἐπευφημεῖ λέγων Ἀμήν.
LIBELLVS II

In the MSS. of the Corpus Hermeticum, the text of Libellus II begins at the words ἡ θεός in § 4 b. The part of the text which precedes these words has been preserved by Stobaeus. It is possible that, in the original document, the passage given by Stobaeus was preceded by some introductory sentences; but there is no reason to think that any considerable part of the dialogue is missing.

In the Corpus, this piece is entitled Ἐρμοῦ πρὸς Τᾶτ λόγος καθολικός. But this cannot have been the title of a dialogue in which the pupil addressed by Hermes is Asclepius; and there can be no doubt that the right explanation is that which is given by Reitzenstein (Poimandres, p. 193). The libellus which originally stood second in the Corpus bore the title Ἐρμοῦ πρὸς Τᾶτ λόγ. καθ. In a MS. from which all our MSS. are derived, this title chanced to come at the bottom of a page, and several following leaves were torn out and lost. In these lost leaves were contained both the whole of the libellus to which the title Ἐρμοῦ πρὸς Τᾶτ λόγ. καθ. belonged, and the title and beginning of the next libellus (our Libellus II), which originally stood third. Thus the title of the lost second libellus came to be immediately followed by the words ἡ θεός κ.τ.λ. of our Libellus II, and was consequently taken to be the title of the libellus beginning with those words.

It appears from the headings of Stobaeus's three extracts from this document that it was known to him, not as one of the pieces of our Corpus, but as one of a collection of 'Discourses of Hermes to Asclepius'.

Corp. II is described in the concluding words as an introduction to a course of philosophy (προγνωστικὰ τις τῆς πάντων φύσεως); hence it may be inferred that its writer intended it to be the first of a progressive series of discourses of Hermes.

Contents of Libellus II.

That which encompasses the Kosmos, and within which the movement of the Kosmos takes place, must be something incorporeal; consequently, it must be either identical with God, or closely connected

1 This passage was restored to its place at the beginning of Corp. II by Patrizzi, who was the first to see that Stobaeus's extract had been taken from this document.

2 Assuming that only one libellus has been lost. But it is of course possible that the missing leaves contained two or more libelli.
with God (§§ 1-4 a). But it is not identical with God; therefore, it must be something closely connected with God (§§ 4 b-6 a). It must also be motionless (§ 6 b).—But is it not void? No, for there is no such thing as void (§§ 10, 11).—

That by which the Kosmos as a whole, and all bodies within the Kosmos, are moved, is something incorporeal (viz. soul) which is within the body moved (§§ 8 b, 9). And this thing also is motionless (§ 6 b).

The incorporeal thing which encompasses the Kosmos is Nous (§ 12 a). But there is something above Nous, viz. the Good, which is the source of Nous and Aletheia (§ 12 b).

What then is God? God is distinct from and above Nous; he is the cause of the existence of Nous and Aletheia, and of all else (§ 13). God is identical with the Good; and no other being than God can properly be called good (§§ 14-16).

(A passage concerning the movement of the heavenly bodies, §§ 6 b-8 a, and a passage in which the duty of procreation is asserted, § 17 a, seem to have been subsequently added.)

The argument starts with certain propositions concerning movement (κίνησις); but the treatment of this topic is merely preliminary to the account of God which is given in §§ 12-16; and it is in these latter sections that the substance of the προγνωσία imparted in this dialogue is to be found. The doctrine set forth may be shortly stated thus; 'God is above and distinct from Nous; he is the source from which Nous issues, and is identical with τὸ ἀγαθόν'.

In the first part of the dialogue (§§ 1-11), the argument is confused by the intermixture of statements concerning τὸ κοινὸν (= τὸ ὀφθ' ὁ οὐ κινεῖται τὸ κυνόμενον) with others concerning τὸ ἐν ὅ ὁ κινεῖται. How far the author is responsible for this confusion, and how far it has been caused by subsequent dislocation of portions of the text, it is difficult to guess; but the Hermetist's meaning would certainly have been more clearly expressed if the two topics (that of τὸ ἐν ὅ and that of τὸ ὀφθ' ὁ) had been kept separate.

The sources of Libellus II.

The doctrine is mainly Platonic. The conception of τὸ ἀσώματον is derived from Plato; and the source of the view that God is ἀνω- σίατος (§ 4 b), and of the statement that νοὺς and ἀλήθεια are 'rays' emitted by τὸ ἀγαθόν (§ 12 b), is to be found in Pl. Rep. 6. 508 e ff. In his identification of God with τὸ ἀγαθόν, and in his account of the
relation between God and Nous, the writer is in agreement with many Platonists of the Roman Empire; and in the latter, he must have drawn from the same Platonic sources as the Christian Gnostics who spoke of Nous as an emanation from the Propator. The doctrine that ψυχή is ἀκίνητος (§ 6 b, τὸ κενὸν ἐστηκέν) is not Platonic, but Aristotelian. The discussion of τὸ κενὸν (§§ 10, 11) presupposes the Stoic doctrine of extracosmic κενὸν, against which it is directed. The use of the word τόπος as a name for the extracosmic Nous is probably of Jewish origin. There is nothing distinctively Egyptian in this dialogue; and there is no trace of Christian influence.

Date.

This libellus must necessarily have been written later than the revival of Platonism which took place in the first century B.C.; but how much later, it is difficult to guess. From the word προγνώσις in § 17 b, it may perhaps be inferred that it was one of the earlier of the series of Hermes to Asclepius dialogues, the latest of which seem to have been written shortly before A.D. 300. (See notes on the dates of Ascl. Lat. III and Corp. IX.) It could hardly be said that any date between A.D. 1 and 250 is impossible; but the affinity of the doctrine of Nous in Corp. II to that of Platonists such as Numenius (A.D. 150-200), and to that of Valentinus and other Christian Gnostics, affords some ground for conjecturing that it was written between A.D. 100 and 250.

I append here, for comparison with Corp. II and with other Hermetica, the fragments of Numenius in which he speaks of 'the first God' and 'the second God'.

Euseb. Pr. ev. 11. 18. 1-24:

§ 1. "τὸν μέλλοντα δὲ συνήσειν θεοῦ πέρι πρῶτου καὶ δευτέρου χρῆ πρώτερον διελέσθαι ἐκαστα ἐν τάξει καὶ ἐν ἐστθημοσύνῃ τινὶ... 3. ὁ θεὸς οὗ μὲν πρῶτος, ἐν οὐσίᾳ δὲ, ἐν ἀπλοῦσι, διὰ τὸ οὐσία συγγενὸς διὰ λόγου μὴ ποτὲ εἶναι διαφέροντος: ὁ θεὸς μέντοι ὁ δευτέρος "καὶ τρίτος" ἡσυχία ἐστὶν εἰς, συμφερόμενος δὲ τῇ ὑλῇ, διάδετο δὲ ὁ σος, ἐνοικόν υἱὸν, σχίζεται δὲ ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς, ἐπιθυμητικόν ἡδος ἡμοῖς ἐκοίμησαι καὶ ἱεροΐς. 4. τῷ οὖν μὴ εἶναι πρῶς τῷ

1 I.e. the second God.
2 In place of καὶ τρίτος (which is meaningless), something like καὶ οὐ πρῶτος μὲν, σε (as below) πρῶς δευτέρος μὲν ὁ, is needed.
3 ἡδος Dindorf: εὔδος Mullach.
νοητῷ,—ὅπρος ἅπτητι,—διὰ τὸ (εἴπε?) τὴν θλήνα βλέπειν, τούτης ἐπιμελοῦμεν ἀπερίοτος ἀνατοῦ γίνεται. 5. καὶ ἄπτεται τοῦ αἰωθητοῦ καὶ περιέκει, ἀνάγκη τε ἐς τις εἰς τὸν ἄδικον ἱδίος, ἀπορεξάμονον εἰς τὴν ἁλήν.

6. καὶ μὲν ἐτέρα φθορά ἐγερμένη:

"καὶ γὰρ ὁ τὸν ἀνθρώπον καὶ τὸν θεὸν τοὺς ἐκείνον καὶ υἱόν τινα τοῦ ὁμοίου τοῦν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς ἔχον τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν." 7. εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μὴ ἄνθρωπον, ἔχοντες ἰδίαν καὶ ἐν γενετρίᾳ τοῦ ἐμοῦ, οὐκ ἔχον τοῦ ἄνθρωπον ἐν τοῖς γονιμοῖς. 8. πρὸ καὶ μέγιστον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῆς ἀλώσεως, διαμολογούμεθα ἢμᾶς αὐτοῖς διάλογον οὐκ ἀμφισβητήσαμεν ἀκούσας, τὸν μὲν πρῶτον θεόν ἀργόν εἶναι ἔργων ἐξουσίων, καὶ βασιλέα, 9. διὰ τούτου καὶ ὁ στάλος ἡμῶν ἐστὶ, κατὰ τοῦ νοῦν πεποιημένον εἰς διέξοδον πάσης τούτων (αὐτοῦ; sc. τοῦ νοοῦ) κοινωνίζεται συντεταγμένος. 10. βλέπουσιν μὲν οὖν καὶ εὐπραγματεύοντες τὸν ἐμοῦ ἐκατον τοῦ θεοῦ, 10. συμβαδεύει τῆν τε καὶ βιώσακες τά τοῦ σώματος, εἰς ἐνδιωκτον 11. τοῦ θεοῦ τοῖς ἄκροβολομοῖς 12. μεταστρέφοντος δὲ εἰς τὴν ἀνατολὴν περιήγησιν τοῦ θεοῦ, 13. ταῦτα μὲν ἀποσβεβέννυον, τὸν δὲ νοοῦ τῆς, βίον ἐπαναφέροντο εὐδολύμονος." 14

3. ἀπορεξάμονος. 1. ἐν οἷς MSS. Dindorf: ἀπορεξάμονος Mullach. Possibly ἀπορέγομεν τῆς ἐλπίδας! (Cf. ἐπισκηφικοῖς ἡμᾶς ἔχοντας above.)


8. The first God is a king or emperor, who sits untroubled in his palace; the second God is a viceroy or subordinate ruler (ἡγεμόν), who goes forth into the world to execute the king's will. Perhaps we ought to read κατὰ βασίλεα, 'in the manner of a king'.

10. Sc. the second God.


12. τοῖς ἀκροβολομοῖς, τοῖς τοῦ φότος = τοῖς ἄντειοι, the radiations of his influence.

Some of the Hermetists would have said τοῖς ἐνυξύασις.

13. A reminiscence of Pl. Politicus 272 ε: τοῦ παλαιοῦ κυβερνήτης, σον παλαιῶν οἰκεῖον ἀφίκομεν, εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ περιήγησιν ἀνέστη. The phrase τὴν ἀνατολὴν περιήγησιν is here equivalent to τὸ ἀνατολὸς νοεῖν.

14. As long as the Demiurgus (i.e. the divine νοεῖν operating in the sensible world) directs his attention to a man, he infuses life into that man's body, and the man continues to live embodied upon earth; but when the Demiurgus averts his
Attention from the man, then the man's body dies (ταύτα μὲν οὖν Νομίμων) but the ὄνος that was in him, — the ὄνος which is his true self, — lives on, and enjoys a life of bliss (being re-united with the divine ὄνος, from which it was parted during the man's life on earth). The divine ὄνος θαυμών ὄνοι; and the disembodied soul, being made one with the divine ὄνοι, shares in that beatific contemplation.

11. ταύτα μὲν οὖν Νομίμων. οὐ δὲ γε παράθεις ἄνωτές τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Δαβίδ προφητείας (Ps. 103 (104) 24 and 27-30) . . .

13. τάλιν δὲ αὖ . . . οὖν Νομίμως ἐπάκουσον ολα περὶ τοῦ δεύτερου ἄττίου θεολογείας.

14. ὡσπερ δὲ τάλιν λόγος ἐστι γεωργὸς πρὸς τὸν ὄνος ἀναιρεθηκισμοῖς, τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου μάλιστα ἡ ἐστίν ὁ πρῶτος θεός πρὸς τὸν δημιουργόν. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ὄν 

15. καὶ ἔξοδο ὅταλιν περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἄττίου τὸ δεύτερον ὑπέστη ὡς ὄνοι.
The words καλ...ἀναμνήσει unduly anticipate the following sentence; the reader has not yet been told that the thing spoken of is ἐπιστήμη. I have therefore transposed this clause to § 16. (It may have been added by a reader, but must in any case have been meant to stand where I have put it.)

I have altered προσώπησα into προσώπησατο, as ὁνατο occurs in the same sentence; but ἀναμνήσατο and προσώπησατο would do equally well.

I have altered τοῦτον τι σχετίζει: τοῦτον τὸ MSS.

The eis seems to show that the book from which this and the adjacent extracts were taken was a dialogue.

I.e. τοῦτον τὸ αἰτίον ἴσιν ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

This refers to Pl. Phileb. 16 c: θεοῖς μεν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ὄνομα...ποιεῖν ἐκ θεῶν ἱδρύῃ διὰ τῶν Προμηθείων ἀμα φαντάζεται τοῖς παιδα.

In this extract nothing is said about the first God and the second God; yet Eusebius says (§ 15 init.) that Numenius was here speaking περὶ τοῦ πάντων ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου τὸ δεύτερον ἐπιστήμη. If Eusebius is right in this, we must suppose that Numenius went on to say that, as a teacher loses nothing when he imparts knowledge to a pupil, and as the gods lost nothing when 'fire' (i.e. the light of wisdom) was conveyed from them to men by Prometheus, so the first God loses nothing of his own being when he puts forth from him the second God.

The distinction might be expressed by saying that the βίος of the first God is αἰῶνος (in the Platonic sense of αἰῶν), and that of the second God is (partly at least) ἐκ χρόνου.

This seems to show that the book from which this and the adjacent extracts were taken was a dialogue.

7 I.e. τοῦτον τὸ αἰτίον ἴσιν ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

8 The eis καὶ οὕτως ἡ ἱδρύῃ τὴν ἐπιστήμην is νοῦς. The νοῦς in you and me is one with the divine νοῦς.

10 In this extract nothing is said about the first God and the second God; yet Eusebius says (§ 15 init.) that Numenius was here speaking περὶ τοῦ πάντων ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου τὸ δεύτερον ἐπιστήμη. If Eusebius is right in this, we must suppose that Numenius went on to say that, as a teacher loses nothing when he imparts knowledge to a pupil, and as the gods lost nothing when 'fire' (i.e. the light of wisdom) was conveyed from them to men by Prometheus, so the first God loses nothing of his own being when he puts forth from him the second God.

11 The distinction might be expressed by saying that the βίος of the first God is αἰῶνος (in the Platonic sense of αἰῶν), and that of the second God is (partly at least) ἐκ χρόνου.

12 Βίοι οὕτως Viger: Βίοι οὕτως MSS. The same tense must have been used in this and the following clause; but it would be possible to write ὅτα in both places, meaning 'it follows that it is so'.—ἀναμνήσει...καὶ νοῦν εἴναι may perhaps be a marginal note.
21. μηθαυκασςες δ' ει τοις ēφην' πολλ' γαρ ετι θαυμαστο- 

terον ακούση. ἀντι γαρ της προσούνης τῇ δευτέρᾳ κινήσεως, τῇ 

προσούνῃ τῷ πρώτῳ στάσιν φημι εἶναι κύρινην σύμφωνον, ἢφ' ἦ 

τῇ τάξει τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἡ μονή ἡ ἄδικος καὶ ἡ σωτηρία ἀναχεῖται εἰς 

tα ὀλία." 

22. ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐκτερ' προστίθηκε τάτα· 

"ἐπειδὴ ἥξει ὁ Πλάτων παρὰ τοῖς ἄνθρωποις τόν μὲν δημιουργὸν 

γνώσκομεν μόνον, τὸν μέντοι πρῶτον νοῦς, ὅστις καλεῖται αὐτὸ 

δ' ἢν, παντατάσσει ἀνγγούμενον παρ' αὐτοῖς, διὰ τοῦτο οὕτως εἶπεν, ὥσπερ ἐν (εἰ) 

τῇ (οὐσίᾳ) λέγει, 23. ὅ στριφωτοί, ὃν τοπάζετε ὑμεῖς νοῦς οὐκ ἐστι 

πρῶτος, ἀλλὰ ἐκτερόν πρὸ τούτου νοῦς πρεσβύτερος καὶ θεοτέρος." 7 

24. καὶ μεθ' ἐπερ' ἐπιλέγει: 

"κυβερνησίς μὲν πον ἐν μέσῳ πελάγει φορούμενος, υπὲρ πλα- 

τάσις ὑψίζονος, τοῖς οὐαί διδύνει τῇ ναιν ἐφεξζόμενος· ὅμως δ' 

αὐτοῦ καὶ νοὺς εἴθυ τοῦ αἰθέρος ἑντυπάται πρὸς τὰ μετάρχα, καὶ ἡ 

δόδος αὐτῷ ἀνώ δ' ὑπ' οὐρανοῦ ἀπεχεῖ, 8 πλεόνει κάτω κατὰ τὴν 

θάλασ- 

σαν. οὖν καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς τῆς ὕλης, τοῦ μιᾶς διακρόσιας μιᾶς 

ἀποσκληρύνει· 9 αὕτην, (τῇ) ἀρμονίαν ἐνυλθημένος, 10 αὐτός μὲν ὑπὲρ 

1 σύμφωνον probably means 'corresponding to his (unique) nature' (and therefore 

differing from all other κύριοι). The first God is κύριος; but his κύριος must not 

be taken to mean inertness or inactivity. The first God works as an efficient cause, 

and produces effects in the ὄντος; and his κύριος is in that sense a κύριος. The 

unvarying order (τάξις) and everlasting duration (μονή) ἡ ἄδικος καὶ 

σωτηρία) of the ὄντος are effects caused by the κύριος of the first God. 

2 Nom. ἡ ἄδικος Mullach, Gifford: μονή ἄδικος Dindorf. 

3 I.e. this extract is taken from Book VI of Numenius Περὶ τάγαθος. 

4 Numenius uses the term ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς as a synonym of ὁ πρῶτος θεός; and 

he uses the terms ὁ δευτέρος νοῦς and ὁ δημιουργὸς as synonyms of ὁ δευτέρος θεός. 

He here says that ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, i.e. the first God, is αὐτὸ δ' ἢν; and in other 

passages he identifies him with τὸ ἄγαθον. He does not say (as Plotinus did 

later on, and as the author of Corp. Herm. II does) that the first God, called τὸ ἄγαθον 

(or τὸ ἑαυτῷ), is ἐπίκεισθαι νοῦ καὶ ὀστία, i.e. distinct from and above νοῦς 

and τὸ ἑαυτῷ δ' ἢν. 

5 αὐτὸ δ' Dindorf: αὐτὸς Mullach. 

6 ὅσπερ ἐν τῷ οὖν λέγει MSS.: ὅσπερ δ' ει τῷ οὖν λέγει Mullach: οὖν 

σεοίδει. 

7 Cf. Oracula Chaldaica (Kroll, p. 14): πώτα γαρ ἐγέλεσον πατήρ (i.e. the 

first νοῦς), καὶ τῷ παρὸν ἐν δεύτερῳ, ὥσπερ δὴ πρῶτον κληρίσετε Ἦν γένος ἁθανόν ('whom 

ye, O mankind, (wrongly) call first'). 

To what passage of Plato is Numenius here referring? Probably Pl. Ερ. 2. 312 ε, 

περὶ τῶν πύρων βασιλεία κ.τ.λ. 

8 Some such verb as διελεύσατο or φαίνεται would make sense. (φ)αίνεται might 

possibly be corrupted into ἀνείπει. 

9 διακρουσάτο MSS.: διακρουσθηκάναι Mullach. Perhaps διακρούσα(α)σθε, 'to evade' 

or 'escape from control'. 

10 ἀνελευθηκάναι MSS.: ἀνελευθηθῆναι Dindorf: ἀνελευθηθῆναι Mullach. 

11 For the notion that the Demiurgus 'bound ὕλη together, lest it should wander 

away', cf. Corp. Herm. VIII. 3, where we are told that God fashioned the sphere 

of heaven out of a part of ὕλη, and enclosed the rest of ὕλη within this sphere, ἡ 

μη ἡ ὕλη, τῇ (τοῦ παρτὸς ὅμιμοι) συντασσάς θελήσας ἀνεστηκάναι, διαλυθῆ ἐκ τῆς 

1804-2
taũτης ἔρωται, οἶνον ὑπὸ νεῶς ἐπὶ θαλάττης τῆς Ὑλῆς, τῆν ἀρμονίαν ἔκ ἑώρει, ταῖς ἱδεαῖς οἰκίζων, βλέπει τε, ἀντὶ τοῦ οἴκων, εἰς τὸν ἀνωθεν, προσαγάμησαι αὐτοῦ τὰ δύματα. λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ μὲν κριτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς θεωρίας, τὸ δὲ ἀρχιτέκτων ἀπὸ τῆς ἐφέσεως.

Euseb. Pr. ev. 11. 22. 1–10:

πάλιν δὲ καὶ ὁ Νομένιος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τάγαθοι, τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος διάνοιαν ἐρμηνεύων, τοῦτον διεξέτας τὸν τρόπον.


But what does Numenius mean by ἀρμονία; If the thought is similar to that in Corp. VIII, it would seem that ἀρμονία (or rather, perhaps, ἡ ἀρμονία) ἔννοιες ἐκ τῶν ἐνότοις must mean 'having bound Ὑλή together by means of the framework or structure of the heavens', the word ἀρμονία being used in the same sense as in Corp. Herm. I. In the phrase τὴν ἀρμονίαν ἔκ ἑώρει below, τὴν ἀρμονίαν appears to mean τὸν κόσμον.

1. taũτης probably means τῆς Ὑλῆς. Perhaps, ὑπὸ taũτης ἔρωται, οἶνον ἐπὶ νεῶς ἐπὶ θαλάττης τῆς Ὑλῆς.

2. The steersman is the Demiurgus, i.e. the second God; the ship which he steers is the Kosmos; the sky at which he gazes, and by which he directs the ship's course, is the first God (that is to say, τοῦ ἄγαθον); and the sea on which the ship is sailing is Ὑλή. In this last point, the simile does not seem to work out rightly; for the Kosmos is made of Ὑλή, but a ship is not made of sea. Numenius probably meant that Ὑλή is like the sea in respect of its ἐκπρίων κύριος, but was unable to make this comparison consistent with the rest of the simile.

3. The Demiurgus 'steers' (i.e. guides or directs the world-process) 'by means of the archetypal forms', which are the thoughts or purposes of the first God, and which the Demiurgus 'sees' in contemplating the first God.

4. The first God 'attracts the eyes' of the Demiurgus.

5. τὸ κρυπτὸν is that in him which discerns or apprehends truth; and this he gets ἀπὸ τῆς θεωρίας, 'from his contemplation (of the first God, that is, of the Good)'.

6. τὸ ἀρμονίων is that in him which impels him to action; and this he gets ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας, 'from his desire (for the first God or the Good)'. The word θεωρία may perhaps convey the meaning required without any supplement; but a genitive (τοῦ ἄνω θεοῦ, or τοῦ ἄγαθος) seems to be needed with τῆς ἀληθείας, and may very likely have been written there, and omitted by error.

7. This extract (taken from Book I of Numen. Περὶ τάγαθοι) appears to be the beginning of a passage in which Numenius dealt with the question how knowledge of the Good is to be got. Later on in the same work (see § 3 below) he demonstrated that the Good is identical with the first God.

8. 60 ἀρμονίων = καταλαβεῖν, to apprehend or get a true notion of a thing.

9. We can get knowledge of a corporeal thing, or learn to understand it, (1) ἐκ ὑμοίων, i.e. by noting its resemblance to things already known to us, and thence inferring that it has qualities like theirs; and (2) ἀπὸ παρακείμενων, i.e. by noting and drawing inferences from its relations to things adjacent to it. But in neither of these ways can we get knowledge of the Good; for there is nothing that is like the Good, and nothing that is adjacent to it. The Good is ὑμοίων, ἀρμονίων; it abides in solitude, far removed from all things perceptible by sense; and only when we have withdrawn ourselves from all things perceptible by sense can we draw near to it.

9 oδῶ οὖν Mullach: oδῶ ἀν Dindorf.
LIRELLVS II 83

Liberus, metakumiai, oxi deodorados mci bolho katetidev (v) [ton
nai].—onte de tina, apelvonta xorriw toon aiosthtan, amelystai to
agathu monv monon, evda mihe tois anbropow mihe te zevon eteron, meide
soma me ga meida amkron, allia tois afatos kai adygntos etegyov erimia
theesthevos, evda tov agathov heth (..) diatrobetai te kai aglaabi,1 avto de
en etepita, en etepiaia, to hremo,1 hremonikov,1 A avon, etopanovemai eti
ti odyia. 2. e de tis, prois tois aioshythois litapron, to agathon (tointov)
epitapamovon snatkazaia, kaieta prothov oinoto to agatho exentycheknai,
tov pantos amartanei. taw yar ont ei radia, theia de prois avto de
mevdvov kai esti kratistovn, twn aioshythton amelystant, neaniesamvnn
pros to mahtumata, tois airotvos thesamanw, ooutos eklesterai mahtima,
ti esti to ouv.11

3. taute men en to prwv.

en de tiv pemwtei12 taute fivov

“ei de esti men vnothi ouvia kai th idia, tautes de eimoloihtai proesvb-
teron kai avtoiv einai d (prwtov)9 nois, avtou ooutos monos etepita en to
agathov.10 kai ypr [ei]11 o men thimougevov theves12 esti genestes arixy,13 to

1 metakumiai Dindorf: metakumiai Mullach. The boat is almost hidden in the
trough of the sea, or is visible only at intervals, when it emerges from the trough.
2 The simile of the fishing-boat seen far out at sea is meant to illustrate the
emph of the Good (there is nothing 'adjacent to it'), and also to suggest that the
Good is barely visible even to the keenest (mental) eye.
3 In that solitude are the haunts and pastimes and festivities of the Good ; but
the Good itself dwells in peace', &c. That can hardly be right. The mention of
diatrobetai and aglaabi of the Good seems incongruous with the context ; and with
what is 'the Good itself' contrasted? It seems probable that there is a lacuna
after this, and that the words diatrobetai te kai aglaabi are part of a clause in which
was described the bliss enjoyed by the man who seeks the Good and finds his way
to it (dumei tiv agathu moni monos, as was said above). On this hypothesis, it is
possible to account for en etepiaia ('goodwill' or 'favour') and avon ('gracious'),
which imply a relation between the Good and man, and would be inexplicable if
nothing were said about man in the context.
4 The simile of the fishing-boat seen far out at sea is meant to illustrate the
emph of the Good (there is nothing 'adjacent to it'), and also to suggest that the
Good is barely visible even to the keenest (mental) eye.
5 In that solitude are the haunts and pastimes and festivities of the Good ; but
the Good itself dwells in peace', &c. That can hardly be right. The mention of
diatrobetai and aglaabi of the Good seems incongruous with the context ; and with
what is 'the Good itself' contrasted? It seems probable that there is a lacuna
after this, and that the words diatrobetai te kai aglaabi are part of a clause in which
was described the bliss enjoyed by the man who seeks the Good and finds his way
to it (dumei tiv agathu moni monos, as was said above). On this hypothesis, it is
possible to account for en etepiaia ('goodwill' or 'favour') and avon ('gracious'),
which imply a relation between the Good and man, and would be inexplicable if
nothing were said about man in the context.
6 The Good is not to be found in the world of sense.
7 Perhaps, [to] hremo, [to] hremunikov, Avon (ou Iapov) ? e传奇mon to
ouvia. (For Iapov, cf. Corp. Herm. I. 4, where God is pictured as phos henov te
kai Iapov.)
8 voutos addid. This and voutos thesama-
miev appear to be alternatives ; either might stand, but hardly both together ; and
the fact that mabhima follows closely makes it preferable to cut out the first.
9 In this point Plotinus differed from Numenius. According to Plotinus, to
agathov is the first God, but is distinct from nois, and elegend nois.
10 Dindorf: Dindorf. Possibly to (logmatov), or to (epotov)? It was
as an aforism pros to onotai that the study of mathematics was valued by the
Platonists.
11 Book V of Numan. Peri tayxov.
12 Stavos addid. Either to Stavos nois, or the equivalent term to Stavos theves,
is needed here.
13 Arie Mullach: Arie Mullach.—genestos means tois tinin geniomvouv ;
ouvia means tinin daktos daktov.
84 CORPUS HERMETICUM

(δε) ἀγαθον οὐσίας ἐστιν ἀρχή. ἀνάλογον δὲ τούτῳ μὲν ὁ δημιουργός θεὸς, διὰ αὐτοῦ μεμητῆσθαι, τῇ δὲ οὐσίᾳ ἡ γένεσις, εἰκὼν αὐτῆς οὐκ ἔμεθα καὶ μέμημα. 4. ἐν γὰρ ὁ δημιουργός ὁ τῆς γενέσεως ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς, ἃ ποιεῖ σαλώμενος, σύμφωνας δὲν τῇ ἑαυτῇ οὐσίᾳ. ὁ γὰρ δεύτερος δυτικὸς διὰ τῶν αὐτοποιεῖ τὴν τε ιδέαιν ξανθῷ καὶ τὸν κόσμον, δημιουργὸς δὲν ἔσται θεωρητικός ἄλλος. 5. συλλογομομάνων ὁ ἡμῶν ὑμάματα τεταράμων πραγμάτων, τέταρτα ἐστὶν τἀυτα: ἡ μὲν πρῶτος θεός, αὐτοδαίγον ὁ δὲ τούτῳ μεμητῆσθαι δημιουργὸς, ἀγαθὸς ἡ δ᾽ οὐσία, μία μὲν ἡ τοῦ πρῶτον, τέταρτα ἡ τοῦ δεύτερου. τῆς μὲν καὶ τοῦ κόσμου, κακώς, κακάς. κακαίς καὶ τοῦ κόσμου. 6. καὶ εν τῷ δεύτερῳ "μετέχει δὲ αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ μὲν όνομα, ἐν δὲ μόνῳ τῷ


LIBELLVS II 85

1 φρονεῖν. ταύτη όρα καὶ τῆς (τοῦ) ἀγαθοῦ συμβάσεως δύναται ἂν, ἄλλως οὔ. καὶ μὲν δὴ τὸ φρονεῖν τοῦτο δεῖν8 συντετύχηκε μόνο τῷ πρῶτῳ. υποστείλεται καὶ ἀγαθοῖς, τῶν τούτου οὐκέτι μόνον μόνῳ προσή, ἀβεβλήσας ἐν εἰς ψυχής ἤτι ἀμφιλογεῖν.8 7. εἰ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς ἐστιν ὁ δεύτερος οὐ πάρ' ἑαυτοῦ, παρά δὲ τοῦ πρῶτου, τῶν οὖν ταῖς, υποστείλεται μετανοεῖται ἐστὶν οὕτως ἀγαθὸς, μή (τῷ)6 ἀγαθῶν (ἐνία), ἄλλως τε καὶ τούχη αὐτοῦ ὥς (τοῖς) ἀγαθῶς8 μεταλείποντες δὲ δεύτερος; 8. οὕτω τοι ὁ Πλάτων ἐκ συνλογισμοῦ τῷ ὑπὲρ βλέπειν ἀπέδωκε τὸ ἀγάθον ὑπὸ ἐστὶν ἐν (…) 9. καὶ πάλιν ἐξῆς φησιν:

9. ταύτη δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντα ἢθη μὲν10 ὁ Πλάτων ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη χωρίσας. ἵνα μὲν γὰρ τὸν κυκλικὸν (λόγον)11 ἐπὶ τοῦ δημουργοῦ ἀγαθῶν ἐγράφατο ἐν Τημαίῳ, εἰπών 'ἀγαθὸς ἢν'.12 εὖ δὲ τῇ Πολίτει18 τὸ ἀγάθον ἀνεν ἀγαθῶν ἑδύον ὡς τοῦ δημομαργοῦ ἑδύον ὡς τὸ ἀγάθον, ἐστι14 ἀπεικονίσει ἕμιν ἀγάθος μετανοεῖται τοῦ πρῶτου [καὶ καίνου].18 10. ἀσκερ

1 φρονεῖν is equivalent to νοεῖν. Things (including men) partake of the first God if and so far as they partake of νοεῖν, or have some νοεῖν in them.

2 Sc. τῷ φρονεῖν. By that alone can things 'associate' or 'be in agreement' (συμβάσει) with the Good.

8 δεῖν (al. ἄδ) MSS.: δεόντως Mullach: δή Dindorf: τε Gifford. But the corruption probably extends beyond this one word. It could hardly be said that τὸ φρονεῖν συντετύχηκε ('occurs together'?) with the first God alone. I have thought of proposing καὶ μὲν δὴ τῷ φρονεῖν τοῦρ (ἡδειν συντετύχηκεν ἡμῖν) μόνη τοῦ πρῶτον. 'It is by this φρονεῖν (i.e. by using our νοεῖν), and by this alone, that it has befallen us to see the first God' (i.e. that we have had the happiness to see him).

4 διαφοραίοται, if sound, must be taken to mean 'receive colour by transference from something'. Perhaps διαφοραίοται, which might mean 'are tinged with colour', would be better.

5 If then that from which the other things take their colour, and by which the other things are rendered good,—if that, and that alone, appertains to the first God, and to him alone, it would be foolish to doubt about this any longer.' That is to say, 'If that is so, the proposition which I have been discussing is indisputably true.' That which is here said to be certainly true must be the statement that the first God is identical with the Good; and a statement to that effect must have been made by Numenius in the passage which preceded this extract.

6 τὸ ἀδιάδιτο. 

7 εἶναι add. Viger.

9 Ought we to read here ὡς (τοῖς) ἀγαθῶν, or ὡς ἀγαθός? With either reading, this last clause (ἄδια ἔν τῆς κ.τ.λ.) seems to add nothing fresh to what has already been said.

10 Perhaps, ὡς ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ θεῷ or something equivalent: 'that the Good is one with the first God'.

12 ἢθη μὲν MSS.: ἢθη Dindorf: ἢθη ἐνὶ μὲν Mullach. Perhaps, ἢθει μὲν ὁ Πλ. ἄλλη (δή) καὶ ἄλλη (ὁ)χώρισαν.

14 Vel addenda vox λόγον, vel certe supplenda' Viger. κυκλικὸς means in circulation, in common use, current or popular.

16 ἀπὸ τῆς Mullach, Gifford: ἀπὸ Dindorf.

18 Sc. θεοῦ or νοῦ. It is possible to call the first God μόνον, meaning that he dwells ἐν μονώτητι or ἐκ δύο; but it is confusing to do so in a sentence in which a second God is spoken of together with him; and for that reason it seems best to bracket τοῖς καὶ καίνων.
1 Sc. τοῦ (neuter), or in other words, τῷ πρώτῳ θεῷ. The meaning is that the second God is to the first God (who is τῷ θεῷ) as the world of τῷ γεγραμμένων is to the world of τῶν ὅταν ὡτα.
2 3. τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ, αὐτοαγαθοῦ δὲ τούτου μορφωμένου, τίταρα ἐστὶν τούτῳ. ἢ μὲν πρῶτος θεὸς, αὐτοαγαθὸς δὲ τοὐτῷ μορφωμένος, ἄγαθος ἢ δ᾽ οὐσία, μᾶ μὲν ἢ τοῦ πρῶτου, ἄτερα δὲ ἢ τοῦ δεύτερου. οὕς μὲν μόρμημα δ᾽ [καλὸς] κόσμος, 10 κεκαλυπτυσσένος μεταφυσίᾳ τοῦ καλοῦ. 
6. καὶ εἰ τῷ ἔκτῳ 11 δὲ ἐπιλέγει: μετέχει δὲ αὐτῶν 12 τὰ μετασχηματικά ἐν ἑλληνικῆ ὁμολογίᾳ, εἰ δὲ μόνῳ τῷ...
fronév.1 ταύτη ἡ ἐρα καὶ τῆς (τοῦ) ἀγαθοῦ συμβαίνει δύναται ἂν, ἄλλως δ’ οὖ. καὶ μὲν δὴ τὸ φρονεῖν τούτῳ δεῖ13 συντετέχθη μόνῳ τῷ πρῶτῳ. υφ’ οὗ οὖν τὰ ἄλλα ἀποχαίρεται2 καὶ ἀγαθοῦται, τῶν τούτο ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ μόνως προσῆ, ἀλλοτρίας ἂν εἰς ψυχής ἐκὶ ἀφωμολογεῖ.8 7. εἴ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς ἄστιν δευτέρου οὐ παρ’ ἑαυτῷ, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ πρῶτου, τῶν οὗν τε, υφ’ οὗ μετονομαζότων οὕτως ἄγαθος, μή (τὸ)6 ἀγαθὸν (ἐκαίνα), ἄλλως τε καὶ τὸ ἄτροφον ὅς (τοῦ) ἀγαθοῦ8 μεταλαχῶν δευτέρους. 8. οὔτω τοῦ τοῦ Πλάτων ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ τὸ δὲ βλέποντι ἀπέδωκε τὸ ἄγαθὸν ὅτι ἴστην ἐν (. . .).9 καὶ πάλιν ἔξης ὑπό.

"ταύτη δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντα 'ἐδή μὲν'10 ὁ Πλάτων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλὰ χαρώνας. ἴδα μὲν γὰρ τὸν κυκλικὸν (λόγον)11 εἰς τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἐγγαίνοντο ἐν Τίμαιῳ, εἰσών 'ἀγαθὸς ἤν'.12 εἰ δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ10 τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶσθεν 'ἀγαθὸν ἴδιον', ὥστε δὴ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἰδίων οὗτοι τὸ ἀγαθόν, δοτις14 πεφανταί ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸν μετονομαζόν τοῖς πρῶτοι (τα καὶ μόνου).10 ὁ ἄστερ

1 φρονέων is equivalent to νοεῖν. Things (including men) partake of the first God if and so far as they partake of νοεῖν, or have some νοεῖν in them.

2 Sc. τῷ φρονεῖν. By that alone can things 'associate' or 'be in agreement' (συμβαίνειν) with the Good.

3 τῇ MSS. : δείκτης Mullach : δ’ Dindorf : τῇ Gifford. But the corruption probably extends beyond this one word. It could hardly be said that τὸ φρονεῖν συντετέχθη ('occurs together?') with the first God alone. I have thought of proposing καὶ μὲν δὲ τῷ φρονεῖν τοῦτῳ (δεῖν συντετέχθην τῷ ἴδιον) μόνῳ τῶν πρῶτων. 4 It is by this φρονεῖν (i.e. by using our νοεῖν), and by this alone, that it has befallen us to see the first God' (i.e. that we have had the happiness to see him).

4 ἀνορθαίνεται, if sound, must be taken to mean 'receive colour by transference from something'. Perhaps ἀνορθαίνεται, which might mean 'are tinged with colour', would be better.

5 If then that from which the other things take their colour, and by which the other things are rendered good,—if that, and that alone, appertains to the first God, and to him alone, it would be foolish to doubt about this any longer. That is to say, 'If that is so, the proposition which I have been discussing is indisputably true.' That which is here said to be certainly true must be the statement that the first God is identical with the Good; and a statement to that effect must have been made by Numenius in the passage which preceded this extract.

6 τὸ ἀποδέδω. ἤ εἰς aad. Viger.

7 Οught we to read here ὅς (τοῦ) ἀγαθοῦ, or ὅς ἄγαθος? With either reading, this last clause (ἀλλὰ τε καὶ ὁμ. κ.τ.λ.) seems to add nothing fresh to what has already been said.

8 Perhaps, ὅτι ἵστην ἐν (τῷ πρῶτῳ θεῷ) or something equivalent: 'that the Good is one with the first God.'

9 ἴδα μὲν MSS. : ἐδέκτης Dindorf : ἴδα ἵστη μὲν Mullach. Perhaps, ἵστη μὲν ὁ Πα., ἀλλὰ (δ’ οὖν καὶ ἀλλὰ (ἐχώρουν.

10 'Vel addenda vox λόγου, vel certe supplenda' Viger. κυκλικὸς means in circulation, in common use, current or popular.

11 Sc. ἀαίνω or νοεῖ. It is possible to call the first God μόνον, meaning that he dwells in μονότητι or ἑρμηνείᾳ; but it is confusing to do so in a sentence in which a second God is spoken of together with him; and for that reason it seems best to bracket τα καὶ μόνου.
Proclus In Tim. 93 a (commenting on Pl. Tim. 28 c, τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τουδέ του παντὸς κ.τ.λ.):

Νομίμως μὲν γάρ, τρεῖς ἀνυμῆςας θεοὺς, πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, ποίημα δὲ τὸν τρίτον. ὁ γάρ κόσμος κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεὸς: ὅταν κατ’ αὐτὸν δημιουργὸς διττός, ὁ τε πρῶτος θεὸς καὶ ὁ δεύτερος, τὸ δὲ δημιουργοῦμενον τὸ τρίτος. ἀμενον γὰρ τούτο λέγειν, ἢ ὃς ἐκείνος φησιν πραγμάτων, πάππου, ἡγοῦν, ἀπόγονον.

Proclus In Tim. 268 a (commenting on Pl. Tim. 39 b, ἂν ἐπερ οὖν νοῦς ἐνοῦσας ἑιδας τῷ ἐστὶ ζῷον, οἷα τὲ ἐνεισὶ καὶ διαὶ, καθορέ, τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαῦτας ἀνευμηθείς δεῖν καὶ τόδε σχεῖν):

Νομίμως δὲ τὸν μὲν πρῶτον (ἐκ νοοῦ) κατὰ τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ ζῷον τάττει, καὶ φησιν ἐν προσχρησίᾳ τοῦ δεύτερου νοῶν τὸν δὲ δεύτερον κατὰ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ τούτου αὐτὸν ἐν προσχρησίᾳ τοῦ τρίτου δημιουργεί τὸν δὲ τρίτον

1 I have added ἀγαθός. . . ἱδας, which must, if not expressed, be understood, to make sense of the argument.
2 ei de scrispsi: scirep MSS.
3 ἀγαθόν hinc transpositum. We must understand θεὸν or νοῦς with τοῦ πρῶτου, as before.
4 δημιουργός addidit.
5 When Numenius spoke of a 'third God' in addition to the first and second, he meant thereby the Kosmos, regarded as a living being, body and soul together,—the ζῷον that is called θεός αὐλοθητός in Pl. Tim. 50c.
6 I. e. Numenius divided the one Demiurgus of Pl. Tim. into two distinct Gods, whom he called 'the first God' and 'the second God'. That agrees with Euseb. 11. 22. 4, where Numenius calls the second God ὁ τῆς γένεσις δημιουργός, and the first God ὁ τῆς οὐσίας δημιουργός; but in the rest of the extracts in Euseb., Numenius uses the word δημιουργός only to denote the second God (= second νοῦς), and adds a first God (= first νοῦς, = τὸ ἀγαθόν), distinct from and above the δημιουργούς.
7 ἀγονος, grandson; ἀγογος, descendant. This must mean that Numenius called the first God 'grandfather' of the Kosmos, and that he called the Kosmos 'grandson' and 'descendant' of the first God. It is implied that he called the second God son of the first God, and the Kosmos son of the second God (as in Pl. Tim. the Kosmos is called son of the Demiurgus).
8 This obscure passage may perhaps be interpreted as follows: 'Numenius takes the first νοῦς (of his own system, who is τὸ ἀγαθόν,) to correspond to (i.e. to be signified by) Plato's τὸ δ ἐστὶ ζῷον (the ideal archetype of the αὐλοθητός οἴκωμος); and he takes the second νοῦς (of his own system, who is the Demiurgus,) to correspond to Plato's νοῦς.' The first νοῦς νοῦς (and does nothing else; ἀντικοί and τάς ἐν λαύτη ἱδας νοοῖς;) the second νοῦς contemplates (καθορέ) the first νοῦς and the ἱδα which 'are in' the first νοῦς (that is to say, the thoughts which the first νοῦς thinks), and δημιουργεῖ after the pattern of those ἱδας. That, it would seem, is what Numenius took Plato's sentence to mean. But I do not know what can be meant by ἐν προσχρησίᾳ τοῦ δεύτερου ('making use of the second νοῦς in addition?') and ἐν προσχρησίᾳ τοῦ τρίτου.
LIBELLVS II: §§ I, 2 87

κατὰ τὸν (al. τὸ) διανοούμενον. — ταῦτα δὲ (says Proclus) ὅτι μὲν ἐχει
tινὰς καθ’ ἑαυτὰ διαφορὰς, πρόδηλων' οὐχ οὐτῶ δὲ διήρηται νῦν ὅτι
τὸν Πλάτωνος ὥστε ἔτερον μὲν εἶναι τὸν νοοῦτα νοῦν, ἔτερον δὲ τὸν
dιανοούμενον.

Corp. II, §§ 1-6 a. Πάν τὸ κινοῦμενον . . . ὅς ἐνέργεια χωρητικὴ. In
1-4 a, the writer shows that ὁ τόπος (i.e. τὸ ἐν ἣ κεῖται ὁ κόσμος) is
(1) μέγας, and (2) ἀσώματος. From the proposition that ὁ τόπος
is ἀσώματος, he proceeds in the following paragraph (4 b-6 a) to draw
the inference that ὁ τόπος ἐστὶν τῷ. Then follows a digression; but
in § 12 a he resumes the argument at the point at which he left it in
§ 6 a, and announces that ὁ τόπος ἐστὶν. That is the proposition for
which §§ 1-6 a are intended to prepare the way.

In § 1, certain general statements are made concerning κίνησις; in
§§ 2-4 a, these statements are applied to the case of the Kosmos.

§ 1. [ἢχυρότερον ἢρα τὸ κινοῦ τοῦ κινομένου.— ἢχυρότερον γάρ.—]
This mention of τὸ κινοῦ is evidently out of place. The preceding
and following sentences are concerned, not with τὸ κινοῦ, but with τὸ
ἐν ἣ κεῖται; and the latter alone is under consideration down to the
end of § 6 a. Moreover, ἢρα is meaningless, as the proposition
cannot be inferred from anything that has preceded it.

The statement may perhaps have been transposed to this place
from some other part of the dialogue. It would be more appropriate
in connexion with §§ 8 b, 9, where τὸ κινοῦ is discussed. It cannot
be fitted into the extant text at that point; but it may possibly be
a remnant of a lost passage which preceded § 8 b.

§ 2. ἑτέροντα γάρ. The Kosmos is wholly filled with bodies;
it contains no void. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 33 a: 'omnia enim mundi
sunt membra plenissima .. corporibus.'

Σῶμα δὲ ὁ κόσμος; — Σῶμα.—Καὶ κινοῦμενον; — Μέλισσα. These words

1 If my interpretation of τάττει κατὰ is right, this clause must mean 'Numenius
takes the third (God of his system, who is the ἀληθινὸς κόσμος) to correspond to τὸ
dιανοούμενον (implied in Plato's word διανοήσῃ), i.e. the thing which is thought
out in detail, planned, or designed by the Demiurgus.

dιανοούμενον must here be passive in meaning; though, in ἔτερον δὲ τὸν διανοού-
μενον below, the word is in the middle voice, and active in meaning. The
ambiguity might be avoided by writing here κατὰ τὸ δημιουργοῦμενον in place of
κατὰ τὸ διανοούμενον.

ραῦτα means, I suppose, τὸ νοῦν and τὸ δημιουργεῖν. There is a difference
between these two functions of the divine νοῦς; but that, says Proclus, is not a
sufficient reason for saying that there are two distinct νοῦς.

1 Numenius said that there are two νοῦς, one of whom νοῦς, and the other
δημιουργεῖ (mod.) and δημιουργεῖ; and he thought that this was what Plato meant.
But Proclus says that Numenius was mistaken in thus interpreting what Plato wrote.
are awkwardly placed; the argument would run more smoothly if they were cut out. Perhaps they ought to stand at the beginning of § 2. The original text may have been something like this: "(Σῶμα δὲ οὗτος ὁ κόσμος; —Σῶμα.—Καὶ κυνόμενον; —Μάλιστα.—) Μέγας δὲ ὁ κόσμος ...; —Οὕτως ἡξίον.—[…] Πηλίκον οὖν δὲ τὸν τόπον εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

§ 3. Πηλίκον ... καὶ ποταμὸν τὴν φώσι; The second of these two questions anticipates Ποταμὸς δὲ φύσεως below. The answer to the first question is Παιμέγεθες τι χρῆμα. The answer to the second is 'Ασώματον.

τῆς φορᾶς τὴν συνέχειαν. The movement of which the writer is chiefly thinking is the circular movement of the outermost sphere of heaven. This sphere must have room to move freely; if it were closely enveloped and pressed upon by some (corporeal) thing outside it, its movement would be checked.

§ 4 a. 'Ασώματος οὖν ὁ τόπος. This proposition is ostensibly inferred from the axiom laid down in § 1, ἐναντίων ἡχειν φύσιν ἀνάγκη τὸ ὑπὲρ κυνομένου τῇ τοῦ κυνομένου. But that axiom, in the sense in which it is used to draw this inference, is manifestly untrue; for we are perpetually seeing instances of a body moving in another body, i.e. in a thing which is not 'of opposite nature' in respect of corporeality. As a logical demonstration then, the argument is invalid. But the Hermetist assumes that all existing bodies are included in the spherical body which he calls the Kosmos (πετάληρωται ὁ κόσμος πάνω ὅσα ἐστὶ σωμάτων); and on that assumption, whatever is outside the Kosmos must be incorporeal, though not for the reason he gives.

§ 4 b. τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον ἡ θείων ἔστιν ἢ ὁ θεός. The conception of τὸ ἀσώματον was first clearly defined by Plato,1 who asserted the existence of an incorporeal world of νοτρά, distinct and separate from the corporeal world of αὐθανατία. To a Platonist, τὸ ἀσώματον means primarily, if not solely, τὸ νοτρών; and τὸ νοτρών is ἡ θείων ἢ ὁ θεός. See Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. VIII. We are there told that there are in man three kinds of ἀσώματα; the first of the three kinds is ἡ αὑτῆς τῆς πρώτης καὶ νοτρῆς οὐσίας, and appears to be identical with νοῦς.

The real existence of things incorporeal, which the Platonists asserted, was denied by the Stoics. Hence Platonists and Stoics, while agreeing that all bodies are included in the Kosmos, differed

1 The word ἀσώματος occurs only five times in Plato's Dialogues (Phaedo 85 E, Soph. 246 b, 247 c, Polit. 286 a, Phileb. 64 b). But the conception which the later Platonists used this word to express is present throughout a large part of his writings, though he more commonly expresses it by means of other terms (ἀδέρματος, δεικτί, νοτρός, &c.).
in their answers to the question 'what is there outside the Kosmos?' The Stoics said that outside the Kosmos there is 'infinite void' (κενὸν ἀέρων). Now according to the genuine Platonic doctrine, terms of spatial extension are inapplicable to the incorporeal, and the νοητά cannot be located in space, either inside the Kosmos or outside it; and men who held this doctrine might have been expected to say, like the Stoics, that there is nothing outside the Kosmos except empty space. But many Platonists found it difficult to maintain their conception of the incorporeal consistently. They were inclined to take the symbolic language of Plato's myths in a literal sense; and they could not refrain from imagining that the incorporeal νοητά (or in other words, ὁ θεός and τὰ θεῖα) are situated in the boundless space outside the Kosmos. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 33 a as emended: 'nec istud enim quod dicitur extra mundum, si tamen est aliquid, inane esse credo, sic adeo plenum (ὅνω γε πλήρες δὲν) intellegibilium rerum, id est divinitati suae similitum.'

But the writer of Corp. II is not content with saying that τὰ θεῖα are situated ἐν τῷ ἔκτω τοῦ κόσμου τόπῳ, or that they fill the extracosmic space with their presence; he asserts that this τόπος ἐστὶ θεῖων τι; and we learn from § 12 a that the θεῖον of which he is thinking, and with which he identifies the extracosmic τόπος, is the divine νοῦς. His meaning is, that τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ κυβεῖται ὁ κόσμος is Nous; or in other words, that the space outside the Kosmos (that space which the Stoics held to be void) is filled with Nous. But he expresses this view in an unusual way. He uses the word τόπος in an altered sense, and employs it to denote, not the extracosmic space itself, but that incorporeal substance with which he holds the extracosmic space to be filled, namely, the divine Nous. (Cf. Corp. V. 10 b as emended: ὅν γὰρ ὁ τόπος τῶν δυτικῶν· οὗ τόπος ἐστὶν ἄλλος οὐδεὶς παρά σέ, πάντα δὲ ἐν σοί.) Thus used, τόπος bears a meaning not far removed from that of ἀιῶν in Corp. XI. i. 2: ὁ σὺν ἀιῶν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ὁ δὲ κόσμος ἐν τῷ ἀιῶνι. . . καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀιῶν ἐστὶς ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν, ὁ δὲ κόσμος κυβεῖται ἐν τῷ ἀιῶνι. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 30 init.: ‘in ipsa vitali aeternitate locus est mundi’; that is to say, aeternitas (ἀιῶν) is τὸ περιέχον, within which the Kosmos is located.¹

This peculiar use of the word τόπος must have been suggested to the Hermetist by its employment as a name of God, or of a god, by...

¹ Iamblichus (Simplic. Categ. 92 a; see Zeller III. ii, p. 764) said that the word τόπος is applicable to things incorporeal as well as to things corporeal, and that the supreme Deity may be called the τόπος in which all things are contained.
some of his contemporaries. There are traces of such a use of the word ‘Place’ among the Persians. Eudemus ap. Damasc. De princiō. (quoted in note on Corp. I. 4): Μάγος δὲ καὶ πᾶν τὸ 'Αρείου γένος . . . οὐ μὲν Τόπον οἶ δὲ Χρόνον καλοῦν τὸ νοητὸν ἄταν καὶ τὸ ῥηματόν, κ.τ.λ. It appears from this that, about 300 B.C., some of the Zoroastrians called the primal Being, from whom both the Good God and the Bad God emanated, by a name which Greeks translated by Τόπος. This primal Being is Zerwan, the Persian god of time, who was worshipped by the Mithraists of the Roman empire under the names Αἰών and Κρόνος; and it is possible that, among his other appellations, that of Τόπος may have been still used by some of his worshippers in Egypt under Roman rule.

But it is of more importance that God was frequently called ‘Place’ by Jews of that period. R. Eisler, Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt, p. 471, n. 3, and 744, gives numerous references to passages in the Talmud, in which the word māqôm (place) is thus used; e. g. ‘The Holy One is the place of the world (i.e. οὗ τόπος εἰς θεόν θεόν τὸ κόσμος); the world is not the place of the Holy One.’ The ancient teachers applied the name māqôm to God, because he produces all, determines all, and bounds all . . . God pervades the world; he is the space which supports it, the extension which upholds it.” And Philo uses the word τόπος in the same way. E. g. De somm. I. 11. 62, Wendland III, p. 218: τρεῖς δὲ εν τούτῳ τόπους, ἀπαξ μὲν χώρα ὑπὸ σώματος πεπληρωμένη, κατὰ δεύτερον δὲ τρόπον ὁ θεός λόγος, δι’ ἐκπληροκέν θλον δὲ δύων δασμάτων δυνάμεις ὁ θεός . . . κατὰ δὲ τρέτον σχηματισμὸν αὐτὸς ὁ θεός καλεῖ τόπος, τῷ περιέχει τὸν τὰ δίκαιον, περιέχεσθαι δὲ πρὸς μηδενὸς ἐπάλλος, καὶ τῷ καταφυγῇ τῶν συμπάντων αὐτὸν ἐναι, καὶ ἐπειδήσερ αὐτός ἔστι χώρα ἑαυτοῦ, κεχωρηκὸν ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐμφαινόμενον μόνον ἑαυτῷ. ἡ γὰρ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐμί τόποις, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς, καὶ ἐκατον τῶν ὄντων ὑμοίως τὸ γὰρ περιεχόμενον διαφέρει τοῦ περιέχοντος τὸ δὲ θείον, ὅπ’ ὀδὸν περιεχόμενον, ἀναγκαῖος ἔστιν αὐτὸ τόπος ἑαυτοῦ.

1 Cumont, Mystères de Mithra, 1902, p. 90: ‘Au sommet de la hiérarchie divine et à l’origine des choses, la théologie mithriaque, héritière de celle des mages zervanistes, plaçait le Temps infini. On l’appelait parfois Αἶων ou Σαεκύλου, Κρόνος ou Saturnus, mais ces désignations étaient conventionnelles et contingentes, car il était regardé comme ineffable, comme sans nom aussi bien que sans sexe et sans passions.’

2 Abelson, The immanence of God in Rab. lit., p. 109, says that statements to this effect are ‘to be found passim in Rabbinic literature’; he quotes Genesis Rabba 68. 9 as an instance.

3 Boussert, Rel. des Judentums, p. 363, says that the use of the word ‘place’ as a name of God is frequent in the Mishna, but that there is scarcely a trace of it in Jewish literature before the first century A. D.
Cf. Philo De Cherubim 14. 49, Cohn I, p. 182: God is ἀσωμάτων ἰδεών ἀσώματος χώρα. De fuga et invent. 14. 75, Wendland III, p. 125: τόπον γὰρ καλεί νῦν (Exod. 21. 13) οὗ χώραν ἐκπεπληρωμένη ὑπὸ σώματος, ἀλλὰ δὲ ὑπονοοῦν αὐτὸν τὸν θεόν, ἐπειδὴ περιέχοιν οὗ περιέχεται, καὶ ὁτι καταφυγῇ τῶν διῶν ἑστί. A similar use of τόπος occurs in the writings of some of the Christian Gnostics, who doubtless adopted it from the Jews. Hippolytus Ref. haeres. 6. 32 says of the Demiurgus of the Valentinians, (i. e. the inferior deity who was the maker of the material Kosmos, and was identified with the God of the Jews,) καλεῖται δὲ καὶ τόπος ¹ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἔβδομάς, καὶ παλαιὸς τῶν ἡμερῶν. Cf. the Valentinian Theodotus in Clem. Alex. Exc. § 34: κατελείφθησαν δὲ αἱ ἀριστεραὶ (δυνάμεις) ἐπὶ τοῦ τόπου (i. e. τοῦ δημιουργοῦ) μορφοθήκην. τῆς μητρὸς οὖν (σκ. τῆς Σοφίας) . . . εἰσελθούσης εἰς τὸ πλήρωμα, τότε ὁ τόπος (i. e. ὁ δημιουργὸς) τὴν ἔξωθιν τῆς μητρὸς καὶ τὴν τάξιν ἀπολήφεται ἡν νῦν ἔχει ἡ μητρ. Ἰβ. § 38: πατριμός ἐκπερίεσαι πυρὸς ὑποκάτω τοῦ θράνου τοῦ τόπου, καὶ μὲ εἰς τὸ κενὸν τοῦ ἔκτυσμόνω . . . καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ τόπος πυρνός ἐστι. (Hippol. 6. 32 says that the Valentinian Demiurgus is πυρεῖς.) . . . καὶ ὁ Ἰδιοῦς παρακληθεῖς συνεκαθήθη τῷ τόπῳ . . . ἐν τῷ τόπῳ ἡμερῶσῃ. The word τόπος is similarly used in one of the Gnostic documents published by C. Schmidt (Koptisch-gnostische Schriften I, p. 344): 'They praise him, saying . . . thou art Father in the Fathers, and thou art God in the Gods, and thou art Lord in the Lords, and thou art Place (τόπος) in the Places (τόποι).' Ἰβ. p. 335: 'This is the first Father of the All . . . This is the αὐτοφύς and αὐτογενής τόπος.' Ἰβ.: '(Out of him?) has arisen the second τόπος, who will be named δημιουργὸς and Father and λόγος and πατρὶ and νοῦς.' Compare also the words addressed to God by Arnobius, Adv. tiat. 1. 31: 'Prima enim tu causa es, locus rerum ac spatio, fundamentum cunctorum quaecumque sunt.'

The writer of Corp. II identifies the τόπος ἐν ὃ περιέχεται δό κόσμος, not with the supreme God himself, but with the divine Nous, which, as he tells us in § 12 b sq., issues from and is subordinate to the supreme God. Thus the meaning which he assigns to the word τόπος resembles the second of the three meanings assigned to it by Philo, viz. that of δ θεός λόγος. There can be little doubt that the Hermetist, in thus using the word, was directly or indirectly influenced by some Jewish authority.

¹ This is the reading of the MS. Duncker and Schneidewin insert μεσόγητος after τόπος; but there is no good reason for doing so.
The adjective *θεός* might be applied, not only to τὰ ἀγέννητα (that is, τὰ ὀντός ὄντα, things eternal and unchanging), but also to γεννητά (that is, things belonging to the world of time and change); e.g. the heavenly bodies might be described as *θεία σώματα*, and the Kosmos itself might be called *θεῖος*. The writer therefore warns us that the term *θεῖον* is here used in its stricter and higher sense, and must be understood as connoting ἀνουσία. That with which the space outside the Kosmos is filled is perhaps not ὁ θεός, but only *θεῖον* τι; but if so, it must at any rate be ἀγέννητον.

ἐὰν μὲν οὖν ἢ θεῖον, ὁσιωδές ἦστιν’ ἐὰν δὲ ἢ (ὁ) θεός, καὶ ἀνουσίατον γίνεται (καὶ ἄνθρωπον)? ἕνεκα does not here mean ‘it becomes (something which it was not before)’; for God cannot change. The meaning is ‘we must infer (from its identity with God) that it is ἀνουσίατον’. That which is *θεῖον* (in the stricter sense explained above) is ὁσιωδές; i.e. it is of the nature of τὸ ὀντός ὄν, as opposed to τὰ γιγαντιούμενα. But ὁ θεός is ἀνουσίατος; that is to say, he is not ὁσιωδὴς, but is exalted above ὁσιωδία. This statement is derived from the passage about the ὄνα ὑπὸ ἀγαθὸν in Pl. Rep. 6. 508 ε ἡ., and especially from the words οὐκ ὁσιωδάς ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐτι ἐπίκεισαι τῆς ὁσιωδίας προσβεία καὶ δυναμεὶ ὑπερέχοντος. The writer of Corp. II identifies τὸ ἀγαθὸν with God (see §§ 14-16); and he here applies to God what Plato said about τὸ ἀγαθὸν. The thought that the supreme God is above ὁσιωδία, or prior to ὁσιωδία, was familiar to the later Platonists; and the adjectives ὑπερνοοικός and προπτοικός were employed by them to express it. But I have not met with the word ἀνουσίαστος in this sense elsewhere. Does it mean ‘not to be deemed ὁσιωδία’? Or ought we to read ἀνουσίων?

Plato l. c. couples ὁσιωδία with γνώσις (or ἐπιστήμη), the mental process by which ὁσιωδία is known, and exalts τὸ ἀγαθὸν above both

---

1 The word ἀνουσίαστος occurs in the heading of a magic charm, *Pap. mag. Par.* l. 2441 (Wünsch, *Aus einem gr. Zaubertypus*, Leitzmann *Kleine Texte* 84, p. 4): ἀγαθῷ, ἀγαθῷ ἀγαθῷ, καὶ ἀνουσίαστος, μονομυπός. That is to say, This charm will draw people to you so that nothing can hold them back; it will draw them to you within a single day, even though they are not worked on by means of an ὁσιωδία. The word ὁσιωδία, as there used, is a technical term of Graeco-Egyptian magic; it means a material thing employed by a sorcerer in the working of his spell, and especially a thing taken from the body of the person who is to be worked on,—for instance, a lock of hair, or a scrap of worn clothing.
alike, saying that it is distinct from both, and is the cause or source of both. 1 If then the Hermetist had that passage or some paraphrase of it in his mind, he would be likely to couple with ἀνωνύμωστον some adjective signifying a corresponding negation of knowledge or thought. And as the following sentences apparently deal with the question whether, or in what sense, God is νοητός, there is a strong probability that the original reading was καὶ ἀνωνύμωστον γίνεται (καὶ ἀνόητοι). (Compare § 13: ὃ ὑπὸ θεὸς ὑπὸ νοῦς ἔστιν, αἰτίος δὲ τοῦ (νοῶν) ἐὰν. By inserting καὶ ἀνόητον, we make a connexion with what follows, and at the same time give a meaning to the otherwise otiose καὶ which stands before ἀνωνύμωστον. God is καὶ ἀνωνύμωστος (or ἀνωνύειος) καὶ ἀνόητος: that is to say, he is above ὀδύσια, and he is also above νόησις. 5 But the statement that God is ἀνόητος is ambiguous. It might mean either that God ὃυ νοεῖ, or that God ὃυ νοεῖται; it might be taken to imply either that he is something other and higher than νοῦς, or that he cannot be apprehended by human thought. Some explanation of its meaning is therefore needed; and the following sentences were probably intended to explain it.

§§ 5-6 a. ἡλέχος ὁ ... ἄνεργεια ... χωρητική. This passage is almost hopelessly corrupt; but the author’s meaning may perhaps be guessed. I assume that he here said that ὃ θεὸς ἐστιν (ἐαυτῷ, ὃ δὲ τότος) ἦμιν, ὃς ἐκτῷ. According to the MSS., the Hermetist says that God ὧπ τῷ νοτῖ οὐ κοιτάσασθαι; which is equivalent to denying that God οὐκ θείον νοεῖ. Aristotle said that God θείον νοεῖ; and that statement was commonly accepted by Platonists. 4 On the other hand, Plotinus says that τὸ ἐν (the Supreme, which is beyond or prior to νοῦς and τὸ δύ) οὐ νοεῖ. 5 If then the author of Corp. II

1 Toff ytyvattTKOfitvotsroiyvv fi% fiwov rd iyivweriefa$attpdvaiinri tov iyAvob vapftvai,&\a itait& flvalT€ fcalrfpfoinxiavinr'ixeivovavpoauvai.
2 Hippol. Ref. harrtis. J. 21 says that Basilides placed at the head of his system an ὃν ὁν θεὰς, οἵον ἀνόητος ἐρτι; which is equivalent to denying that God ἐαυτὸν νοεῖ. Aristotle said that God ἐαυτὸν νοεῖ; 4 and that statement was commonly accepted by Platonists. 4 On the other hand, Plotinus says that τὸ ἐν (the Supreme, which is beyond or prior to νοῦς and τὸ δύ) οὐ νοεῖ. 5 If then the author of Corp. II

4 Cf. Aadammonis responsum 8. 3 (Testim.), where it is said to be taught by ‘Hermes’ (that is, by some Egyptian Platonist) that ‘the first νοῦς’ is νοῦς ἐαυτῶν νοῶν καὶ τὸς νοῦς ἐcles λαυτοῦ ἐκπρόλεος.
5 See Plotinus 5. 6, περὶ τοῦ τὸ ἐπίκεισα τοῦ ἐντος μὴ νοεῖν. 5. 6. 2 : τὸ ἐπίκεισα
meant by ὁ θεός what Plotinus meant by τὸ ἐν, and agreed with Plotinus on this point, it would be possible for him to say that ὁ θεός ὁ θεός ἐστιν νοεῖ, and is not ἐντῷ νοστῷ. But it seems more likely that he agreed with Numenius, who said (Euseb. Pr. ev. i. i. 18. 3 sq.) that the first God (also called by him the first νοστὸς) ἐντῷ συγγίνεται διὰ αὐτόν, and that the second God (also called by him the second νοστὸς) is not πρὸς ἐντῷ, but τὸ ὑπὲρ ἐπιμελούμενος ἀπεριόπτος ἐντῷ γίνεται. This implies that, according to Numenius, the first God ἐντῷ νοεῖ, and the second God, so far at least as he is concerned with the material world, ὁ θεός ἐντῷ νοεῖ. If we assume that the θεός of Corp. II corresponds to the first God or first νοστὸς of Numenius, and that the τόπος of Corp. II corresponds to the second God or second νοστὸς of Numenius, a sense that agrees with that assumption can be got by writing νοστὸς ... ὁ θεός ἐστιν (ἐντῷ ὁ δὲ τόπῳ) ὑμῖν, ὁ θεός ἐντῷ.

If the meaningless ψωτὸς of the MSS. is a miswriting of πρῶτος, ‘primarily’, this word implies that ὁ θεός is not only νοστὸς ἐντῷ, but is also, in some sense, νοστὸς ὑμῖν. A Platonist might say either that God is νοστὸς ὑμῖν or that God is not νοστὸς ὑμῖν. (Men are capable of apprehending God; yet no man can apprehend God adequately.)

If the word νοστὸς is taken merely as opposed to αἰσθητός, and equivalent to ἀσώματος, in that sense at least God is νοστὸς; and the unconnected scrap (ἢ γὰρ ἐγὼ) ἀληθήσεται ὑποπίπτει τὸ θεός may be a part of a statement to that effect. The other phrases in § 5 which I have bracketed, [сколько τοῦ νοουμένου] and [διὰ τοῦτο ὑμῖν νοεῖται], may perhaps be remnants of a marginal note on the paragraph.

§ 6 a. εἰ δὲ νοστὸς τὸ τόπος ὁ νοστὸς ὁ ἐντός ὁ θεός, [ ] ἀλλ' ὁς ἐνέργεια χωρητική, (ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ τόπος). The question whether τὸ τόπος is ὁ θεός, or is θεός τι but not ὁ θεός, which was raised at the beginning of the paragraph, must surely have been answered before the writer quitted the subject. We know from §§ 12 a-13 what his answer would be, viz. that this τόπος is θεός τι, but is not ὁ θεός. I have therefore added here the words ἀλλ' τι ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ τόπος.

ἐνέργεια must be taken to mean ἐνέργεια θεοῦ. (See note on Corp. X. 1 b.) The τόπος-νοστὸς is not God himself, but a certain manifesta-
tion of God's activity. This ἐνέργεια is hypostatized, and is regarded as a 'second God'.

§§ 6 b–8 a. πᾶν δὲ τὸ κινούμενον . . . καὶ ὁπο ἑτάσεως κινεῖται. It seems impossible to make sense of this paragraph; it has probably been ruined by unintelligent interpolation. It begins with the assertion that everything which is moved is moved (1) in something stationary, and (2) by something stationary; and it ends with the same assertion repeated in different words. But the instances which seem intended to illustrate these two propositions, or one or other of the two, have no discoverable connexion with either.

§ 6 b. πᾶν δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ὃδὲ ἐν κινοῦμενῳ κινεῖται, καὶ ὁπο ἑταυτῷ. Taken in their obvious sense, the words ὃδὲ ἐν κινοῦμενῳ κινεῖται are manifestly false; there are plenty of κινούμενα which are contained in other κινοῦμενα. But the writer probably meant that there must be ἁπλός outside the outermost κινούμενον, and intended to suggest the inference that τὸ τῶν κόσμων περιέχων (i.e. the τότος-νοῦς) is motionless. Bodies alone are subject to movement; the divine Nous by which the Kosmos is encompassed is ἀσώματος, and partakes of the eternal stability and changelessness of the supreme God.

καὶ τὸ κινοῦν δὲ ἐστήκεν. We learn from § 8 b sq. that τὸ κινοῦν is ψυχή, or something analogous to ψυχή, and that it resides within the body which it moves. The Kosmos as a whole, or the outermost sphere of the Kosmos, is moved by a world-soul; individual organisms within the Kosmos are moved by their several ψυχα. In what relation the soul (τὸ κινοῦν) residing in the Kosmos stands to the τότος-νοῦς (τὸ ἐν ἀει κινεῖται) which occupies the space outside the Kosmos, we are not informed; but it may perhaps be inferred from § 12 a (or rather, from a conjectural restoration of § 12 a,) that the cosmic soul and the individual souls owe their power of originating movement to the 'light' with which the τότος-νοῦς irradiates them, that is to say, to the life which the divine Nous infuses into them.

We are here told that τὸ κινοῦν (i.e. ψυχή) is itself motionless. This is a point on which the Aristotelians differed from the Platonists. Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 392: Πλάτων δεκώγητον μὲν τὴν ψυχήν . . . Ἀριστοτέλης δεκώγητον τὴν ψυχήν, πᾶσης κινήσεως προηγούμενην. On this question, the writer of Corp. II sides with the Aristotelians, and

1 Here again, we may compare Numenius (Euseb. Pr. su. 11. 18. 10): ἀλάτοντος μὲν οὖν καὶ διεἰσπραγμένου πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐκατον τῷ θεῷ (i.e. the 'second God') συμβαίνεις ζῆν τε καὶ μισθοκενθαί τούτο τὰ σώματα, κ.τ.λ.
against the Platonists, who said that the soul is ‘self-moving’. See Pl. *Phaedr. 245 c d*, and Legg. X. 894 ff.¹

Ποῦς δὲ... ῥὰ ἐνθάδε (κινούμενα) συγκαίνεται τόις κινούμενοις; Ought we to read ῥὰ ἐνθάδε (κινούμενα) συγκαίνεται τόις κινούμενοις (codd. Corp.), or ῥὰ ἐνθάδε (κινούμενα) συγκαίνεται τόις κινούμενοις (codd. Stob.)? In either case, Hermes and Asclepius seem to be here speaking of ῥὸ κινοῦν, and not of ῥὸ ἐν ὑ κινεῖται. And it appears from the words κινεῖται ῥὸ ῥῆ ἀπλάνους σφαῖρας that the sphere of the fixed stars is discussed as an instance of ῥὸ κινοῦν, and not as an instance of ῥὸ ἐν ὑ κινεῖται. Yet that sphere is certainly not ῥὸ κινοῦν in the sense in which this term is explained in §§ 8 b, 9; it is not the incorporeal soul of the planet-spheres. Besides, we have just been told that ῥὸ κινοῦν (as well as ῥὸ ἐν ὑ κινεῖται) is motionless; and the sphere of the fixed stars is not motionless. What then has the instance of the spheres to do with the subject under discussion? I cannot answer that question; and I can only conjecture that the passage about the spheres was inserted by some one who did not understand the meaning of the dialogue.

We can dimly discern through the fog of words that the writer of this passage is seeking to show that, in the movement of the spheres, there is something which stands fast. And he seems to have thought that, by showing this, he would confirm the preceding statement (πᾶν ῥὸ κινούμενον ἐν ἑστῶτι κινεῖται, καὶ ῥὸ κινοῦν δὲ ἐστηθεῖν) or one of the two parts of that statement. But what is it that stands fast? Certainly neither the sphere of the fixed stars, nor any of the planet-spheres. The movement of a planet (or of the sphere to which the planet was supposed to be affixed) could be described in two different ways. The simpler way of describing it was to say that the fixed stars travel daily round the earth, and the sun, for instance, also travels daily round the earth in the same direction, but not quite so fast. The other way of describing it was to say that the sun is carried daily round the earth with the fixed stars, but has also an independent and slower movement of its own in the opposite direction,² and that the visible movement of the sun is a compound of these two different movements. The writer, since he speaks of

¹ The notion that ῥὸ κινοῦν is ὑωχγ occurs in a *Cosmopoiia* (second century A. D.) made use of by a sorcerer in a magic Papyrus edited by Dieterich, *Abraxas*, p. 184: when the Creator ‘laughed’ for the seventh time, ἐγώετο ὑωχγ. ὡ δὲ θεός ὅρη ἑκάτα κινήσεως... τοῦ εἰσόητος τοῦ θεοῦ πάντα ἐοιηθῆ.

² Thus Cleomedes, *De motu corp. cael.* 1. 3. 16, compares the movement of the planets to that of ants creeping on a potter’s wheel in the opposite direction to that in which the wheel is revolving.
must have conceived the movement of the planets in the latter way. But where is the στάσις to be found? The result of the composition of the sun's two different movements is, not that it stands still, but that it moves from East to West a little less swiftly than it would if it had only that movement which belongs to it in common with the fixed stars. Neither the fixed stars nor the planets are stationary. The only things in the material universe which could with any show of reason be said to stand fast are, firstly, the common axis of the revolving spheres, or some point in that axis (e.g. one of the Poles in which it terminates, or the centre of the earth), and secondly, the globular earth, massed round the central point of the whole system. And as the writer does not mention the earth, but does mention the North Pole, round which he says the Bears revolve, we must conclude that the thing to which he ascribes στάσις is the Pole. But if so, his point of view is entirely different from that of the writer of the rest of the dialogue, who ascribes στάσις only to άσωμα, viz. (1) the τόπος-νοῦς (τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον) outside the Kosmos, and (2) ψυχή (τὸ κυών) within the Kosmos.

But there is a further difficulty. The writer seems to assert that the orao-tos of which he speaks is caused by the ἓναντιότης of the two movements, viz. the movement of the ἀπλανήσ σφαῖρα in the one direction, and the movement of the planet-spheres in the other direction (ἡ γὰρ ἓναντιόνα στάσις φορᾶς). But what could be meant by saying that the Pole is kept fixed in its place by the combined effect

---

1 The obliquity of the orbits of the planets is not mentioned in this passage, and seems to be left out of account.

2 In the Mithraic cult, the North Pole seems to have been of great importance. In the Mithrasiturgia edited by Dieterich (pp. 12-14 and 69-78), the North Pole is the abode of the μέγας θεός (sc. Mithras), to whom Helios, the ruler of the planet-region, is subordinated. This 'greatest God' holds in his right hand μόρφων ἄγαν κράτους, ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἅμα καὶ ἀντιστροφώσῃ τὸν οὐρανόν: and he is attended by a group of seven gods, who are called οἱ πολεμάτορες τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ... οἱ ἀναδικαστικαί, ... οἱ στραφέωτες ὑπὸ ἐν κέλευσμα τὸν περιόδου τοῦ πλανήτη ἀνατομὸν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, and who, no doubt, represent the seven stars of one of the two Bears. (There is a corresponding group of seven maidens, who presumably stand for the seven stars of the other Bear.) It might therefore be conjectured that the passing concerning the movements of the stars was inserted in Corp. II by some one who was influenced by Mithraism, and who was thus led to locate the 'static' νοῦς by which the moving universe is governed at the North Pole, instead of in extracosmic space, where the author of Corp. II places it.

Cf. Proclus In Eucl. (Friedlein), p. 90, 1. 11: ἄλλω δὲ ἀπορρητότεροι λόγοι καὶ τῶν δημοφιλῶν ἐφαστάται τῷ κόσμῳ λέγομαι τὰ τόλμων ἑπτάχρομον, καὶ δὲ ὕστατος θεόν τὸν ἐπιστρέφοντα πρὸς θαυμόν. The word ἀπορρητότερο seems to imply that this doctrine was taught in connexion with some mystery-cult, which may perhaps have been that of Mithras.
of these two opposite movements? To this question I can give no answer.

The instance of the man swimming against a current (§ 8 a) appears to be given as an illustration of the principle that the combined effect of two contrary movements is to produce stability or immobility. But if so, the instance is absurdly inappropriate. In the case of the swimmer there is nothing analogous to the Pole; he could only be compared to one of the planets, borne from East to West together with the fixed stars, but at the same time moving from West to East with an independent movement of its own. But this comparison also breaks down. It is assumed that the swimmer is stationary (ἡ ἀντιπυ... στάσις γίνεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ); and if so, the velocity with which he swims must be equal to the velocity of the contrary current. But the velocity of the planet's independent movement is not equal to that of the contrary movement of the fixed stars; and the planet is not stationary.

tὰς γὰρ σφαίρας ἐφης τῶς πλανώμενας κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπλανώης σφαίρας. The connexion of thought would be made clearer if this were followed by something like καίτω συγκεντρώτα τῶς πλανώμενας ἡ ἀπλανή. It is to this latter proposition (implied, if not expressed,) that Hermes replies Ὄνκ ἐστιν αὐτὴ συγκίνησις.

The word ἐφης must be meant to refer to some earlier discourse of Hermes to Asclepius. Yet the doctrine taught in this dialogue is described in the concluding sentence as προγνωσία τις, i.e. as the beginning of a course of instruction.

ἡ δὲ ἐναντίωσις τῆς κινήσεως τὸν ἀντέρεισιν ἐχει ἀντώσαν. τὴν ἀντέρεισιν appears to be used in the sense of τὸ ἀντερέισον, the 'fulcrum', i.e. the common axis of the spheres which revolve in opposite directions.

§ 7. [πέρι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ στρεφόμενας.] This must be cut out; for Hermes would not go on to ask 'what sort of movement' (Κίνησιν ποιάν) if he had just answered that question himself.

κίνησις ἐστιν ὑπὸ στάσεως καταχωμή. Here it seems clear that the στάσις spoken of is that of τὸ περὶ δ' κινοῦμαι αἱ ἀρχαι, i.e. that of the Pole. But where, in this instance, is the ἐναντίωσις κινήσεως, to which στάσις was said to be due? Does the writer regard the movements of the two Bears, circling in the same direction, but on opposite sides of the Pole, as two 'opposite' movements?

1 Galen, De musc. motu 1. 7 f., K. vol. iv, p. 400 (Arnim, Stoic. vet. fr. II, p. 148), employs the instance of the swimmer in a rational way, to illustrate the case of a body held at rest by two equal and opposite pressures or tensions.
kuXucito uirepout<5. It appears from the context that this must be intended to mean 'prevents them from diverging from their circular orbits'; but it is difficult to see how that sense can be got out of the words.

§§ 8 b–9. η oν κινήσις κ.τ.λ. Here we have a discussion of τό κινοῦν, which down to this point has only been mentioned incidentally. But the fresh topic is introduced with strange abruptness; and it is probable that the beginning of the paragraph about τό κινοῦν has been lost.

§ 8 b. ο&chi; υπό τῶν κατεκτός τού σώματος συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι, ἄλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐντὸς εἰς τὸ κατεκτό, ἡτοι ψυχῆς [ἡ πνεύματος] ἡ ἄλλου τινὸς ἄσωμάτου. The Kosmos is not moved by something which pushes it from without, but by its ψυχή, which impels it from within. And the same may be said of every individual man and animal. (The writer is here thinking of spontaneous movement only, and leaves out of account the case of a man or animal pushed, dragged, or carried by another man or animal.) The ψυχή is incorporeal, but at the same time is regarded as residing 'within' the body of the man or animal. The phrase εἰς τὸ κατεκτός, which is bracketed by Wachsmuth, may be allowed to stand. A living organism is moved 'from within outwards', and not 'from without inwards'; that is, the movement is originated by the soul, which is within the body, and passes thence to the bodily organs, and to material things outside the body.

I have bracketed ἡ πνεύματος. If these words are retained, πνεύμα is classed among the ἀσώματα. But the incorporeal πνεύμα spoken of by orthodox and Gnostic Christians (a Semitic equivalent for the Platonic νοῦς) occurs rarely, if at all, in the Hermetica. When the Hermetists speak of πνεύμα, they commonly use the word in the Stoic sense, and mean by it a gaseous substance (σῶμα, not ἀσώματον), which they regard as the corporeal vehicle or envelope of the incorporeal soul. The words ἡ πνεύματος may have been inserted by some one who was in the habit of using πνεύμα as the Christians used it.

But if πνεύμα is excluded, how are we to understand ἡτοι ψυχῆς ἡ ἄλλου τινὸς ἄσωμάτου? What other incorporeal thing besides ψυχή can be included under the head of τό κινοῦν by which living bodies are moved? Possibly φύσις? Or ἐνέργειαι, in the sense in which that term is used in some of the Hermes to Ammon documents?

σῶμα γὰρ ἐμψυχον ο&chi; υπὸ σώματος) κυκλίται) ἄλλ᾽ ὀδὸ τοῦ σύναλον σῶμα. By this restoration, the sense unquestionably required is clearly expressed. It would be possible to interpret in the same sense.
The reading of codd. Corp. (σῶμα γὰρ σῶμα ἐμψύχων οὐ κινεῖ κ.τ.λ.) but no intelligent writer would use a form of words so ambiguous.

§ 9. Ὑπὸ τίνι κινεῖται τὰ κινούμενα, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος, δὴ λοι. The soul 'carries' the body. Hence, when a man carries a burden, his soul has to carry both his body and the burden; and it feels oppressed, because an extra burden is added to its usual load.

§ 10-11. Ἄσκλεπιος here interposes an objection. Does not all movement presuppose a κενόν? If bodies were packed against one another without intervening void, would not movement be impossible? And if so, must not the space outside the Kosmos be void, to render the movement of the Kosmos possible? How then can that space be 'full' of θείου τι, as Hermes asserts?

An argument similar to that on which Asclepius's objection is based was commonly used by those who asserted the existence of void. Cf. Ar. Phys. 4. 6. 213b: (λέγοντων οἱ φύσικοι κενὸν εἶναι) ὅτι κόσμῳ ἡ κατὰ τόπων οὐκ ἐν εἴη (εἰ μὴ εἴη κενὸν) τὸ γὰρ πλῆρὲς ἀδύνατον εἶναι δείξειν τι. But those who argued thus meant that a body cannot move unless there is a void space into which it may move. Asclepius goes further, and suggests that the outer sphere of the Kosmos could not revolve if there were not a void space within which it revolves. We might express his thought by saying that the movement would be stopped by friction. Cf. § 3, ἵνα ... μὴ θλιβόμενον τὸ κινούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς στενότητος ἐπίσχυ τὴν κίνησιν, where Hermes himself seemed to assume the same principle.

The objection might have been better placed at the close of Hermes' explanation of τὸ ἐν ὧ κινεῖται, to which it refers, i.e. immediately after § 6 a; but it is not unreasonable that Asclepius should refrain from mentioning his doubt until both the subjects under discussion (τὸ κινοῦν as well as τὸ ἐν ὧ κινεῖται) have been dealt with.
With this passage on τὸ κενὸν should be compared Ascl. Lat. III. 33 a sq., which closely resembles it. The Stoic doctrine, according to which τὸ ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου is κενὸν ἀπειρον, is presupposed; the writer's object is to declare and justify his rejection of that doctrine. He points out that the apparently void spaces within the Kosmos are not really void, but are filled with some corporeal substance, such as air. Within the Kosmos then, there is no void; and, since bodies certainly move within the Kosmos, Asclepius's notion that there cannot be movement unless the moving body has void space juxtaposed to it is thus shown to be untenable. It is true that this argument does not directly bear on the question whether void space exists outside the Kosmos; but the reasoning by which Asclepius was led to think that there must be void space outside the Kosmos is shown to be invalid.

Since κενὸν can mean nothing else than 'space which is not occupied by something corporeal', the question whether the extracosmic space is κενὸν or is 'filled' with something incorporeal is in reality futile. That which is ἄσωματον in the proper sense of the word is not extended in space, and cannot 'fill' space or be situated in space. But the Hermetist tacitly assumes that the ἄσωματον of which he is speaking, viz. the divine Nous, is σωματικὸν to this extent at least, that it is capable of occupying space; and the word κενὸν appears to him to be inapplicable to the space which is 'filled' with that ἄσωματον. He probably pictured the divine Nous to himself as a thing which pervades extracosmic space in the form of an impalpable vapour, or a diffused light.

§ 10. μὸνον δὲ τὸ μὴ δὲ κενὸν ἐστι. This is a reminiscence of the language of Democritus, who called the empty space between the atoms τὸ ἄμα ὃν, though at the same time he said that it exists no less truly than τὸ ὅν, i.e. the atoms. Ar. Metaph. 1. 4. 985 b 4: Αἰνίκητος δὲ καὶ . . . Δημώκρητος στοιχεῖα μὲν τὸ πλήρες καὶ τὸ κενὸν εἶναι φασί, λέγοντες τὸ μὴ ὅν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅν.

<(τὸ γὰρ ὑπάρχων)> . . . εἰ μὴ μεστὸν τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἤν. The text of the Corpus and that of Stobaeus have been differently corrupted; I have tried to make sense of the passage by combining the indications of both. The argument appears to amount to this; 'τὸ ὑπάρχων cannot be void; but τὸ ὅν is ὑπάρχων; therefore, τὸ ὅν cannot be void.' The writer feels that the term τὸ ὑπάρχων connotes absence of void more evidently than the synonymous term τὸ ὅν. The word ξένον in codd. Corp. is doubtless a corruption of κενὸν.
§ II. oδι διὰ πάντων διήκει τῶν ὄντων, καὶ πάντα διήκον πληροὶ; The writer speaks of air in nearly the same words in which the Stoics spoke of the cosmic πνεῦμα (a mixture of fire and air). Cf Alex. Aphrod., p. 223. 25 Bruns: the Stoics say τὸ πῦὸ ἄμοιθά τε καὶ συν-έχεσθαι πνεῦματος τινος διὰ παντὸς διήκοντος αὐτοῦ. But the Stoics, in accordance with their doctrine of κράσις δὲ ὄλων,¹ held that πνεῦμα is present in every part of sublunar space, even in those parts of it which are occupied by other bodies. The Hermetist does not adopt this view with respect to air; for he proceeds to say that air is excluded from those parts of space which are occupied by other bodies. His meaning therefore must be merely that all interstices between other bodies are filled with air.

οὕτω δὲ οἷκ ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων σωμάτων κεκραμένον συνέστηκε; No portion of any one of the four elements actually presents itself unmixed with the other three. (Cf. Corp. IX. 7: πάντα δὲ ὅποι σύνθετα.) That which we commonly call 'air', for instance, is really a mixture of all four elements, but a mixture in which the element air preponderates. It is not the element air then, but the mixed body commonly called air, that occupies all apparently empty spaces in the Kosmos.

It may be doubted whether the writer would have denied that elemental fire exists unmixed in the heavens; but he is not here thinking of the heavens.

ὑπάρχει τὸν [ἄρος καὶ πνεῦματος]. The meaning of πνεῦμα here must be different from its meaning in [ἡ πνεῦματος], § 8 b; for the thing here spoken of is σῶμα, and the thing spoken of in 8 b is ἀσωμάτος. But καὶ πνεῦματος at least ought certainly to be cut out; for in the argument which this sentence ends, air alone, and not πνεῦμα, is spoken of. I think however that it is best to cut out ἄρος also; for we have to account for the readings ὑπάρχει γὰρ and ὑπάρχει γὰρ καὶ of the MSS.; and this can best be done by assuming that the author wrote ὑπάρξεως γὰρ μεστά ἐστιν, 'for they are full of something which exists', viz. air. (Cf. ei ἡ μεσόν τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἦν in § 10.) When ὑπάρξεως had been corrupted, some one inserted ἄρος καὶ πνεῦματος to make sense. Perhaps the interpolator borrowed these words from the Greek original of Ascl. Lat. III. 33 c: 'spiritu tam en et aere vacuum esse non possit.'

¹ Plut. Comm. not. 37. 1077 e: the Stoics say σῶμα χαρέων διὰ σώματος, καὶ μηδέτερον περείχοντος, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλῆρος εἰς τὸν ἄρος ἐνδομένος. They held that it is possible for the same portion of space to be occupied simultaneously by two or more different bodies. See Arnim, Sto. vet. II, p. 151 ff.
§ 12 a. Τὸν οὖν τόπον . . . τῷ εἴπομεν; It is clear that εἴπομεν (codd. Stob.) and not εἶπομεν (codd. Corp.) is the right reading. Having dealt with τὸ κύκλον, and disposed of the objection about τὸ κέντρον, Hermes resumes the discussion of τὸ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ at the point at which he left it at the end of § 6 a; and he begins by reminding Asclepius of one of the conclusions there arrived at, viz. that the τόπος in question is ἀδώματος.

Τὸ οὖν ἀδώματον (τοῦτο). It seems necessary to insert τοῦτο; for besides the extracosmic νοῦς here spoken of, there is at least one other kind of ἀπαράματον, viz. the intracosmic ψυχή by which the Kosmos and the bodies contained in it are moved (§§ 8 b, 9).

Νόης δλος. Ought we to write νοὺς δλος, ἢ δλον ἀπαντὸν ἐμπεριέχων; Or νοὺς, δλος ἢ δλον ἀπαντὸν ἐμπ. ? The MSS. of Corp. give νοὺς, λόγος, ἢ δλον κ.τ.λ.; but λόγος must be a corruption of δλος.

ἀπαντὸν ἐμπεριέχων. This means that the τόπος-νοὺς by which the Kosmos is encompassed is not itself encompassed by anything else, or that there is nothing else outside it. The Hermetist might have said that this Nous ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐμπεριέχεται but his view appears to be that, though the divine Nous is located in space, the supreme God, whom he distinguishes from it, is not in space. Yet a different view seems to be implied in what is said below about the ixypa8os of το άγαθον.

ελεύθερος σωματικῆς πλάνης.—(ελεύθερος σώματος πάντος, ἀπλανῆς MSS.) It is superfluous to tell us that an ἀδώματον is ελεύθερον σώματος παντός. I have therefore altered ἀπλανῆς into ἀν-άνες, and taken this to be the genitive dependent on ελεύθερος. The unmeaning σωματικῆς καὶ which follows ἀπαθῆς in codd. Corp. may have resulted from a misplacement of σωματικῆς; and παντός may have come from πλάνης by duplication.

χωρητικὸς συμπάντων καὶ σωτήριος τῶν ὄντων. The divine Nous (καὶ τόπος) 'contains all things' (cf. ὃς ἐνέργεια χωρητικῆ in § 6 a). And it 'preserves all things'; i.e. it is (in subordination to the supreme God) the agent by whom the universe and all things in it are maintained in existence. In this respect it corresponds to the second and demiurgic God of Numenius, though the writer of Corp. II does not use the word δημοιοφόρος in describing it.

(ἀφ' οὗ ὂν (?) τὸ) (πῆς ψυχῆς) (φῶς). Some explanation of the relation between the extracosmic νοὺς and the intracosmic ψυχή is wanted; and the words τῆς ψυχῆς, which occur in the MSS. at the end of § 12 b, probably formed part of such an explanation. The writer might be
expected to say that the divine Nous (τὸ ἐν ὦ κινεῖται ὁ κόσμος) is that by which the soul (τὸ κυών, including both the cosmic soul and the souls of individual men) is 'illuminated' or vitalized.

The text of 12 a b is badly damaged, and my attempted restoration of it is open to much doubt; but it seems probable that the description of νοῦς ended at the end of 12 a, and that the thing spoken of in 12 b was τὸ ἁγαθὸν.

§ 12 b. Μετά τοῦ οὗτος, τὸ ἁγαθὸν, ὁ οὗτος ἀκτίνες εἶσιν. Ως τε νοῦς καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια. This passage is manifestly based on the discussion of 'the idea of the Good' in Pl. Rep. 508 e ff., where Plato's Socrates compares the Good to the sun.

In the traditional text, τὸ ἁγαθὸν is called one of the ἀκτίνες of something else. But as the writer holds that τὸ ἁγαθὸν is identical with the supreme God, and is the primary source of all things, he cannot have called it an ἀκτίς emitted by something else. The words τὸ ἁγαθὸν therefore must be out of place. The author's meaning must have been that certain things are ὀστέον ἀκτίνες τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ, i.e. that these things are emitted by τὸ ἁγαθὸν as rays are emitted by the sun.

But what are these 'rays' or radiations of the Good? One of them is ἡ ἀλήθεια. But as ἀκτίνες εἰσι is in the plural, at least one other 'ray' must have been mentioned. Now Plato l.c. speaks of ἀλήθεια as a thing produced or emitted by τὸ ἁγαθὸν; and he repeatedly couples it with another thing, viz. ἐπιστήμη or γνώσις, which, he says, is also produced or emitted by τὸ ἁγαθὸν. The leading thought of that passage would be correctly expressed by saying that ἐπιστήμη (or its synonym γνώσις) and ἀλήθεια are ὀστέον ἀκτίνες τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ. Hence it may be inferred that the other 'ray', which the Hermetist coupled with ἀλήθεια was either ἐπιστήμη, or something closely connected with ἐπιστήμη; and as the topic under discussion in this part of the dialogue is the relation between νοῦς and τὸ ἁγαθὸν (= ὁ θεὸς), there is strong reason to conclude that he wrote ὀστέον ἀκτίνες εἰσιν (ὁ τε νοῦς καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια). That the

1 Pl. Rep. 508 e ff.: ἀκτίνες εἰσὶν ὀστέα καὶ ἀλήθεια (τὴν τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἱδαν) ἀκτίνες εἰσὶν ὀστέα καὶ ἀλήθεια (τὴν τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἱδαν) ἀκτίνες εἰσὶν ὀστέα καὶ ἀλήθεια (τὴν τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἱδαν) ἀκτίνες εἰσὶν ὀστέα καὶ ἀλήθεια (τὴν τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἱδαν) ἀκτίνες εἰσίν ὀστέα καὶ ἀλήθεια (τὴν τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἱδαν) ἀκτίνες εἰσίν ὀστέα καὶ ἀλήθεια (τὴν τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἱδαν). The word ἀλήθεια is here used by Plato in the sense of 'reality' rather than 'truth'; and a few lines further on, the phrase τὸ εἰσὶν τοῦ τῆς τοῦ ἱδαν (τῶν γνωσθήσων) is substituted for it as an equivalent.

Platonists of the second century A.D. were accustomed thus to couple together νόης and ἀλήθεια, as proved by the use made of these terms by the Gnostic Valentinus, who gave the names Νοῦς and Ἀλήθεια to the first pair of Aeons put forth by the supreme God. It may be added that the Hermetist would have no reason for mentioning ἀλήθεια here, unless he spoke of it as the correlate (or in the language of Valentinus, the σύζυγος) of νόης, with which he is more especially concerned. For the series τὸ ἄγαθον, νοῦς, ψυχή, cf. Plotinus 5. 1. 8: αἰτίον μὲν τὸν νοῦν (λέγει ο Πλάτων) δημιουργός γὰρ ὁ νοῦς αὐτῷ· τοῦτον δὲ φησὶ τὴν ψυχήν ποιεῖν ... τοῦ δὲ αἴτιου, νοῦ ὄντος, πατέρα φησὶ τάγαθον, [καὶ] τὸ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ... ὡσπερ Πλάτωνα εἰδέθω ἐκ μὲν τάγαθῳ τὸν νοῦν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ τὴν ψυχήν.

The ἄρχητυτον φῶς of which the Hermetist speaks must, I think, be τὸ ἄγαθον itself. The statement that τὸ ἄγαθον is 'the archetypal light' corresponds to Plato's statement that ἡ ἠθή τοῦ ἄγαθον is the sun of the intelligible world. The phrase implies that there is another φῶς which is an εἰκών of the archetype; and this other and subordinate φῶς may be the 'light' which the extracosmic νοῦς gives forth, and by which the intracosmic ψυχή is irradiated. Cf. Philo De somn. 1. 13. 75, vol. iii, p. 223 Wendland: ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἐστι, ... καὶ οὐ μόνον φῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ παντὸς ἐκέραυν φωτός ἄρχητυτον, μᾶλλον δὲ παντὸς ἄρχητυτον προεβύτερον καὶ ἀνάτερον. Plotinus 5. 1. 6 sq. and 5. 3. 12, quoted in note on Corp. XII i. 1.

§ 13. 'Ο οὐν θεὸς τί ἐστιν;—'Ο μυθότερον (μηδὲ ἐν MSS.) τούτων ἐπάρκει τω, δὲ καὶ θεοτού (τοῦτω) τοῦ εἶναι [ ] αἴτιος, καὶ πᾶσι κ.τ.λ. Of the things to which τούτως refers, ἀλήθεια is certainly one; and if my explanation of the passage is right, the other is νοῦς. (We are told below that δὲ θεὸς τοῦ νοοῦ ἐστιν, αἴτιος δὲ τοῦ νοοῦ εἶναι.) The writer has just said that νοῦς and ἀλήθεια are 'rays' emitted by τὸ ἄγαθον; he now says that the cause of their existence is God, who (as he tells us in § 15 f.) is identical with τὸ ἄγαθον.

The writer apparently holds that the Kosmos is without beginning, and denies creation ex nihilo. God is the supreme cause of all things, inasmuch as he is the source of Nous, by whom the Kosmos is maintained in being (νοῦς is σωτήριος τῶν ...

1 Cf. Irenaeus 2. 12. 2: according to the doctrine of Valentinus, unum et idem est Nus et Aletheia, semper adhaerentes invicem. This part of the Valentinian system must have been derived from Pl. Rep. 1. c.
Corpus Hermeticum, § 12a; but God's agent Nous makes each thing, not out of nothing, but out of something else which existed before it.

That which is not cannot become anything, or turn into anything. This is merely another way of saying that *ek tōn μὴ δυνατον* ou dūnatai γενόται τι. [τοῦ μηδέποτε εἶναι.] These words have, no doubt, come by duplication from the following τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ποτε. Things which now exist cannot at any time pass out of existence; they can only change into something else. Cf. Corp. VIII, "Οτι οδην των δυνατων απολλυται. The words Ti oiv φης cannot have been intended to stand here; I have found a possible place for them above, in § 12 b.

ο δὲ νεως οδ νοις έσται, αιτιος δε του τού ειναι. Cf. Abammonis Resp. 8. I ff., where the Egyptian priest Abammon answers the question τι το πρωτον αιτιον ηγουται ειναι Αιγυπτιοι, ποτερον νοιν ἢ ἐναρ νοιν. The doctrine that the supreme God is ὑπερ νοιν and αιτιος του νοιν ειναι was current among the Platonists of the Roman empire, and was adopted from them by Valentinus and other Gnostics. Ps.-Archytas (first century A.D.), Stob. I. 41. 2, vol. i. p. 280 W.: το δε τουωτον (sc. the principium which imposes form on formless matter) ου νοιν μονον εμαν δει, ἀλλα και νοιν τι κρασσον νοιν δε κρασσον οτιν διπερ δομαξομεν θεον. Irenaeus I. 24. 3: 'Basilides . . . ostendens Nun . . . ab innato natum Patre.'

The mention of πνεύμα may be ascribed to the same interpolator who inserted πνεύμα in § 8 b. If we take ϕως to mean το της ψυχης ϕως, 'the light by which the soul is illuminated', i.e. the secondary and derivative ϕως spoken of in § 12a, the words οδη ϕως, αιτιος δε του ϕως ειναι might be regarded as another way of saying that God (= το δυαθον) is το ἀρχητυπον ϕως. But as the matter under consideration is the relation between God and Nous, it is more likely that the paragraph ended with a statement of that relation, and that the words concerning ϕως were added by another hand.

§ 14. τον θεον δωσι ταυταις τας προσηγοριαις σεβεσθαι δει. What are the 'two appellations'? The writer of § 17 a must have taken them to be το δυαθον and δ πατηρ. 'The Good' has been spoken of already; but the word πατηρ does not occur until § 17 a, and the reader could not be expected to supply it out of his own head in § 14. If the two names meant by the author of § 14 were 'the Good' and 'the Father', some words in which his meaning was explained (e.g. τη του δυαθον
kai τη του πατρός, in apposition to ταύτας ταίς προσηγορίαις,) must have fallen out. But it is more probable that the two names of which he is speaking are those which he has already been employing, viz. ὁ θεός and τὸ ἄγαθον, and that § 17 a, in which the second of the two names is taken to be ὁ πατήρ, was subsequently added by some one else. In § 15, we are told that it is impious to call God by any other name except 'the Good'. This shows that the two names which the author recognized were ὁ θεός and τὸ ἄγαθον; and the writer of § 17 a, in calling God 'the Father', is guilty of the very impiety which is denounced in § 15.

In Corp. X, the phrase ὁ θεός καὶ πατήρ, ὁ καὶ τὸ ἄγαθον, occurs repeatedly as a name of God; but in that document the words καὶ τὸ ἄγαθον have probably been inserted by a later hand.

οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων . . . τις δύναται . . . ἄγαθος εἶναι ἡ μόνος ὁ θεός. Corp. VI is an expansion of this thought. Compare Mark 10. 18, Luke 18. 19: Τί με λέγεις ἄγαθον; οὐδεὶς ἄγαθος εἰ μη εἰς ὁ θεός. Matt. 19. 17: τί με ἐρωτᾷς περὶ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ; εἰς ἑαυτὸν ὁ ἄγαθος. The saying must have been widely current, and there is no reason to suppose that the Hermetist derived it from the Gospels. It might be suggested to a Platonist by the discussion of the odo of Simonides in Pl. Protag. 341 e.

§ 15. τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἐστι τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ τὸ μέγεθος. Here the Good (i.e. God) is described as extended in space. We are told that neither body nor soul is spacious enough to contain it, and that it is coextensive with the whole sum of things corporeal and incorporeal; that is to say, it extends through all space, both cosmic and extracosmic. But perhaps the Hermetist meant these statements to be understood metaphorically, and not literally.

§ 16. τετειμημένοι τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορίᾳ. We honour the subordinate gods by applying to them an appellation which properly belongs to the supreme God alone, i.e. by calling them ἄγαθοι.

The same phrase occurs in the prayer or hymn at the end of Ascl. Lat.: ἀφραστὸν ὄνομα, τετειμημένον τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορίᾳ, . . . καὶ εὐλογούμενον τῇ τοῦ πατρός. But in that passage, the words are used in a different sense, and it is the supreme Deity himself that is there said to be 'honoured by the appellation θεός'. It would seem that the writer of Ascl. Lat. 41 b read the phrase in Corp. II (which is probably the earlier of the two documents), but either misunderstood it, or intentionally employed it in a different way.
[καὶ ἐν γένοις ἄμφοτέρων, ὥς ὅδ' τὰ γένη πάντα.] γένος is a strange word to use with reference to God; and when two things are said to have the same γένος, or belong to the same γένος, it is implied that they are specifically different, rather than that they are identical, which is the point on which the writer is here insisting.


The reading of the MSS. is certainly wrong; for in an independent statement the negative would be οἴδην, not μηδὲν.1 But even in the form into which I have altered it, the sentence is out of place here; for at this stage the writer is asserting, not that God is ἄγαθός, but that God is τὸ ἄγαθόν. If the words ὁ γὰρ . . . μηδὲν λαμβάνων occurred at all in the original text, they probably followed ἢ μόνος ὁ θεὸς ἐν § 14.

[ὁ θεὸς πάντα διδώσω καὶ οἴδην λαμβάνων.] ὁ θεὸς is a duplication of the first three words of the following sentence; and πάντα διδώσω καὶ οἴδην λαμβάνων is an alternative for ἀπαντᾷ ἐστὶ διδώσαι καὶ μηδὲν λαμβάναι.

ὁ θεὸς (τῷ) ἄγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἄγαθόν ὁ θεὸς. Cf. Philo De special. leg. 2. 53 (De septen. 5), Cohn V, p. 99: μόνος γὰρ (ὁ θεὸς) εἰδάμων καὶ μακάρως, παντὸς μὲν ἄμετοχος κακοῦ, πλήρης δὲ ἄγαθών τελείων, μᾶλλον δ', εἰ χρή τάληθες εἰπεῖν, αὐτὸς ὁ δ' τὸ ἄγαθόν,2 δὲ οὐδ'εἰς καὶ γῇ τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἀμβρυγεν ἄγαθα. Proclus on Pl. Tim. 28 says that the Platonist Atticus (a.d. 160–180) identified the Demiurgus with 'the Good' (τὸν δημοιρύγον εἰς παθῶν ἄγει τάγαθα).

The statement that 'God is the Good, and the Good is God' forms a fitting conclusion to the dialogue; and there can be little doubt that in the original text these words were immediately followed by τοσαίτα . . . λελέχω κ.τ.λ. (§ 17 b). The topic of procreation, which is introduced in § 17 a, has no connexion with the preceding argument, though the person who appended that section contrived to produce a superficial appearance of continuity by referring to the mention of two προσηγορίαι of God in § 14.

1 It would be possible to avoid this difficulty without inserting θεός, by writing ὁ γὰρ ἄγαθός ἦστιν ὁ ἀπαντᾷ διδώσαι καὶ μηδὲν λαμβάνων.
2 But in Opif. mund. 2. 8, Cohn I, p. 3, Philo says that God (who is there called τῶν διόν νοῦς) is κρείττων ἢ αὕτῃ τὸ ἄγαθόν καὶ αὕτῳ τὸ καλὸν.
§ 17 a. πατρός γάρ το ποιεῖν. ποιεῖν is here used in the sense ‘to beget’, as in the compound παιδοποιεῖν.

σκοτή ... εὐσεβεστάτη ... ἕστιν ἡ παιδοποιία. The thought that human procreation is an imitation of the creative energy of God, which is implied in this passage, is more fully expressed in Corp. XI ii. 14 a, and in Ascl. Lat. Ill. 20 b sq. The view that the begetting of offspring is incumbent on man as a sacred duty is implied in Ascl. Lat. Ill. 20 b sq., but is more directly asserted in Corp. II. 17 a. The writer must have found in his environment some special reason for insisting on it. In saying that to die childless is ‘a great misfortune’, he is in accord with a sentiment which was strongly rooted among Greeks, Jews, and Egyptians alike; and he finds religious support for it in his doctrine of ‘God the Father’. But in his time, there were many who preferred to remain childless, some from a wish to avoid trouble, expense, and anxiety, and others, (especially Pythagoreans, Platonists, and Christians,) on account of the contemptus mundi, and hatred of the body, to which their beliefs gave support. The first of these two motives finds frequent expression in literature, from the time of Euripides downward; see for instance the passages collected in Stobaeus 4. 22. 28 sqq. Hense, ὅτι οὐκ ἔγαθὼν τὸ γαμεῖν, and id. 4. 24. 16 sqq., ὅτι ἀσύμφορον τὸ ἔχειν τέκνα. Augustus found that the tendency to ‘race-suicide’ was becoming a grave public danger, and enacted laws to check it. The same sort of inducements to prefer a celibate life which were felt in Italy in the time of Augustus were no doubt also felt in Egypt some generations later; and as the writer of Corp. II. 17 a bids his readers μὴ συνησθῆναι, ‘not to rejoice with’ a childless man (as with one who is fortunate), it may be inferred that he is arguing chiefly against those who thought childlessness the more comfortable state. On the other hand, the writer of Ascl. Lat. III was probably thinking rather of Christian ascetics who abstained from procreation on religious grounds.

δίκην οὖσος δίδωσι μετὰ θάνατον τοῖς δαίμοσιν. The notion that the agents by whom sin is punished after death are daemons occurs in Plato’s myths. See Ascl. Lat. III. 28. The writer of Corp. II. 17 a holds that the punishment inflicted by the daemons, in some cases at least, takes the form of a penal reincarnation; on this, cf. Corp. X. 8 a. Plutarch, in his ‘Vision of Thespies’, De sera numinis vindicta 567 ῥ, describes the daemon-torturers reshaping guilty souls to fit them for reincarnation in the bodies to which they are condemned.

σῶμα ... μὴτε ἀνθρώπος μὴτε γυναικὸς φύσιν ἡχον. This means a body
other than human. Those who refuse to discharge the function incumbent on them as ἄνδρες or γυναῖκες will be punished by reincarnation in beast-bodies.

[[ὁπερ ἄντι κατηραμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου.]] What is it that is ‘cursed by the Sun’? According to the reading of the MSS., the thing which is ‘cursed’ is σῶμα οὕτε ἄνδρος οὕτε γυναῖκος φύσιν ἤχον. A deformed or defective human body might be said to be ‘accursed’, but hardly the normal body of a beast. It seems more likely that the clause has been misplaced, and ought to stand after ἕτεκναν τινά ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀπαλλαγήν; it is childlessness that is the accursed thing.

But why does the writer add ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου? Perhaps the Sun-god, being himself the cosmic source of life and growth, might be thought to look with displeasure on those who refuse to co-operate with him by begetting children. The phrase may have been in use as a traditional formula in some solar cult.

LIBELLVS III

The text of Corp. III, as given in the MSS., is so corrupt as to be almost wholly meaningless; and I have altered it with a free hand. It is not likely that the conjecturally emended text which is here printed is precisely what the author wrote; but I think it probable that, in the main at least, it correctly represents his meaning.

There is no necessity to take this little piece to be an extract from a longer treatise; it appears to be a complete whole in itself, and it is rounded off by a recurrence, in the concluding words, to the same thought with which it began. It is the concentrated essence of some unknown Egyptian’s reflections on the universe.

The author of Corp. III had read the first chapter of Genesis. It is impossible to doubt this, when we compare the corresponding passages in detail.

Genesis I (LXX). Corp. III.

1. ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν.

1 'Under the sun’ would rather be ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου. (Cf. Eccl. passim, e.g. 2.18: σύμπαντα μόνιμα μου δὲ γνώ κοινώ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου.) It would be possible to write ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου, and (perhaps assuming a lacuna before ὑπὸ) to take this as meaning ‘during life on earth’, as opposed to μετὰ διάων; but there is no need to reject the phrase ‘cursed by the Sun’. Cf. καταραθήτω ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου, in a passage quoted from Hermes by the alchemist Olympiodorus (Testim., Zosimus Addendum (c)).
LIBELLVS III

2. ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατα-
σκεύαστος,
καὶ σκότος ἐπάνω τῆς ἀβύσσου'
καὶ πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω
τοῦ ἱδατος,
3. καὶ ἐπεν ὁ θεὸς Γεννηθήτω φῶς
καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς.
7. καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ στε-
ρέωμα· καὶ διεκόρυσεν ὁ θεὸς ἀνὰ
μέσον τοῦ ἱδατος ὅ ἦν ὑποκάτω τοῦ
στερεώματος, καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ
ἱδατος τοῦ ἐπάνω τοῦ στερεώματος.
8. καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ στερέωμα
οὐρανον. . . 9. καὶ συνήχθη τὸ
ὕδωρ τὸ ὑποκάτω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εἰς
tὰ συναγωγάς αὐτῶν, καὶ ὁφθη ἡ
έξη. 10. καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ὁ θεὸς τὴν
ἐξῆν γῆν . .
11. καὶ ἐπίθηκεν ὁ θεὸς Βλαστησάτῳ
ἡ γῆ βοτάνην χόρτου, σπείρον
σπέρμα κατὰ γένος καὶ καθ ὀμοι-
τητα, καὶ ξύλον κάρπημον ποιοῦν
καρπῶν, οὐ τὸ σπέρμα αὐτοῦ ἐν
αὐτῷ κατὰ γένος εἰς ὀμοιότητα ἐπὶ
tῆς γῆς καὶ ἐγένετο οὐτῶς. 12.
καὶ ἐζήτησεν ἡ γῆ βοτάνην χόρ-
του . . .
14. καὶ ἐπεν ὁ θεὸς Γεννηθήτωσαν
φωτιῆς ἐν τῷ στερεώματι τοῦ οὐ-
ρανοῦ εἰς φαύνην τῆς γῆς, καὶ ἄρχων
tῆς ἡμέρας καὶ τῆς νυκτός. . . καὶ
ἐστῶσαν εἰς σμηνία . . . 15. καὶ
ἐγένετο οὖντος . . .
20. καὶ ἐσέβη ὁ θεὸς Ἐξαγαγέτω
τὰ ἱδατα ἥρπτηα ψυχῶν ζωσίων καὶ
πετειών. . . καὶ ἐγένετο οὖντος. 21.
καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὰ κηθὰ τὰ με-
γάλα καὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν τῶν ἔρπε-
2 a (differently placed): ἀδιαφο-
ρήστων ἐκ δινὼν ἀπάντων καὶ ἀκατα-
σκευάστων.
1 b. ἦν γὰρ σκότος ἀπειρον ἐν
ἀβύσσοις,
καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ πνεῦμα λεπτὸν νοε-
ρόν, δυνάμει θεία (. . .) τὰ ἐν χαλ.
ἀνειθή δὴ φῶς ἅγιον.
( . . .) στοιχειά καὶ θεοὶ πάντες . . .
2 a. ἀποδιωρίσθη τὰ ἑλαφρά εἰς
ὕψος, καὶ τὰ βαρέα θεμελιώθη ὕφι-
ῦρα ἄμμῳ . . . ἀνακραμασθέντων
πνεύματι ὁχεῖται.
(1 b. καὶ ἐπάγη ὑπ’ ἄμμῳ ἐξ
ὕγρας οὐσίας.)

3 a (differently placed): καὶ
πάσα σπορὰ ἐνστορος. καὶ (ἐγέ-
νετο) χῶρτος καὶ ἄνθους παντός
χλοῆς τὸ σπέρμα τῆς παλιγγενεσίας
ἐν ἑαυτοῖς.
(1 b. ἑκαταιδιαρούει τάφυσες ἐν-
στόροις.)

3 a (differently placed): καὶ
πάσα σπορὰ ἐνστορος. καὶ (ἐγέ-
νετο) χῶρτος καὶ ἄνθους παντός
χλοῆς τὸ σπέρμα τῆς παλιγγενεσίας
ἐν ἑαυτοῖς.
(1 b. ἑκαταιδιαρούει τάφυσες ἐν-
στόροις.)

2 b. καὶ ὁφθη ὁ οὐρανὸς ἐν κύ-
κλοις ἐπτά, καὶ θεοὶ [ταῖς] ἐν ἀστρον
ἰδέαις ὑπανωμένοι σὺν τοῖς αὐτῶν
σημείοις ἂπασι. καὶ δυνηρόθη σὺν
τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ θεοῖς.

3 a. ἅνηκε δὲ ἐκαστὸς θεὸς διὰ
tῆς ἰδίας δυνάμεως τὸ προσταχθὲν
αὐτῷ· καὶ ἐγένετο . . . ἐνυδρα καὶ
πτηνα.
It is evident then that the writer of Corp. III knew the Mosaic account of the creation. But he also knew the Stoic cosmology; and in this document, he has tried to harmonize the one with the other, and so to 'reconcile Genesis with science'.

We have fragments of another cosmogony, which appears to have been likewise derived in part from Genesis and in part from Stoic science, but was said by its author to be based on writings of Thoth, whom the Greeks called Hermes Trismegistus,—namely, the cosmogony of Sanchuniathon, as reported by Philo Byblius;' and it seems worthwhile to compare this with Corp. III. Philo Byblius is quoted as follows by Eusebius, Pr. ev. i. 10. 1 (33 b) sqq.

"Την τῶν ὀλων ἀρχὴν ὑποτίθεται (ὁ Σαγχυνιαθῶν) ἀέρα ζωφόδη καὶ πνευματόδη, ἡ πνοὴν ἄρος ζωφόδους, καὶ χάος θόληρον ἐρεβώδες."  

1 Date of Philo Byblius, c. A. D. 64-140 (Christ Gesch. Gr. Litt.). He may have written this book about A. D. 100-120.
2 The text here given is based on that of Gifford's edition, 1903.
3 ἀέρα καὶ πνευματόδη are two alternative translations of a Semitic term corresponding to the 'spirit of God' in Genesis i. 2, and the ψεῦμα καὶ ἁπλῶν νοοῦ in Corp. III. In what follows, this same thing is called simply τοῦ ἐρεβώδες. The epithet ζωφόδης corresponds to the 'darkness upon the face of the deep' in Genesis.
4 The χάος θόληρον ἐρεβώδες, which is coupled with the ψεῦμα, and is the other
of the two primordial things, corresponds to tekhôm ('the deep') and the waters' in Genesis, and to ὠθωσος, ὁδός, and τὸ ἐν χάοις in Corp. III.

I have inserted here the words μῶτ...σῆμα, which are evidently misplaced where they occur below in the text of Eusebius. They must have been meant to apply to the 'turbid chaos' or formless watery mass; and it is to be presumed that μῶτ is a Semitic word, of which Philo Bybius, as before, gives two alternative explanations, viz. Aus ('mud'), and ῥησις ἀποκατοικίας ('a fermenting watery mixture'). A word meaning 'the waters' (Heb. mayim) would serve the purpose. I find it stated that the Semitic word for water occurs in the form mös in Aramaic; and it is possible that ὠθωσ was a miswriting for μῶτ. Cf. Assyrian möš, pl. möš. (The Egyptian for water is msw, Coptic mswt; but the immediate source of Philo Bybl. must have been Semitic, and not Egyptian.)

In Damascius's account of the Babylonian cosmogony, De princip. (Kopp) p. 12, p. 384 (Gunkel, Schöpfung und Chaos, p. 17), there is a Being named Môwâz, son of 'Aštûûl and Tavâšû (i.e. Apsû and Tidmût,—'Aštûû and Tehôm); and mútmû ('die tosende Wasserstille', Delitzsch,) is sometimes used in Babylonian documents as the name of the messenger of Apsû (Langdon, The Babylonian Epic of Creation, 1913, p. 73). But Mr. Langdon (ib.) also says that 'Mûmmû is an ordinary word for 'form', which was personified as creative reason, and inherent in the first principle, water'. Is there any connexion between this Mûmmû—Môwâz and the Μῦτα of Philo Bybl.?

It has occurred to me that μῶτ might possibly be tekhôm written backwards. A Greek might conceivably make this mistake in transcribing a Semitic word written from right to left; but this is hardly probable.

The origin of the word μῶτ is doubtful, but we are not left in doubt as to its meaning in this passage; for the writer himself tells us that it may here be taken to mean Flaën. For our present purpose then, μῶτ means 'mud'.

Viz. the πτεύμα and the χαός θάλασσαν (also called μῶτ).

The reading is āřaûṣt to πτεύμα τῶν ἱδίων ἄρχων. But that is nonsense. The πτεύμα is itself one of the two ἄρχαι, and has no ἄρχα of its own' of which it might become enamoured. The writer must have meant that there were two ἰδίων ἄρχαι (i.e. two things without beginning), viz. the πτεύμα and the watery mass, and that at a certain time the former became enamoured of the latter, and the two (which had hitherto been separate) consequently came to be intermingled. This is his interpretation of the phrase in the Hebrew Genesis, 'the spirit of God was brooding upon the face of the waters'. His πτεύμα corresponds to 'the spirit of God'; his μῶτ corresponds to 'the waters'; and the Hebrew word which our translators render by 'was brooding' is taken by him to mean ἁραῦχα.

In Eusebius, the reading is ἁραῦχα τὸ πτεύμα τῶν ἱδίων ἄρχων. Both that is nonsense. The πτεύμα is itself one of the two ἄρχαι, and has no ἄρχα of its own' of which it might become enamoured. The writer must have meant that there were two ἰδίων ἄρχαι (i.e. two things without beginning), viz. the πνεύμα and the χαός θάλασσαν (also called μῶτ).

Viz. the πτεύμα and the χαός θάλασσαν (also called μῶτ).

For a long time, the two primal things (the πτεύμα and the μῶτ) continued to be unformed or unordered. This clause corresponds to 'the earth (i.e. all that existed in the beginning) was waste and void (lohs wa tabah)' in Genesis, and to ἄρχαι τὸν ἐν χάοις καὶ ἀκαταστασθέντων in Corp. III. The epithet ἀκαταστασθέντων occurs in Corp. III. I b, and in the original text of that passage, was probably applied to ἄρχαι, i.e. the formless watery mass.

In Eusebius, the reading is ἁραῦχα τὸ πτεύμα τῶν ἱδίων ἄρχων. But that is nonsense. The πτεύμα is itself one of the two ἄρχαι, and has no ἄρχα of its own' of which it might become enamoured. The writer must have meant that there were two ἰδίων ἄρχαι (i.e. two things without beginning), viz. the πνεύμα and the χαός θάλασσαν (also called μῶτ).

Viz. the πτεύμα and the χαός θάλασσαν (also called μῶτ).

For a long time, the two primal things (the πτεύμα and the μῶτ) continued to be unformed or unordered. This clause corresponds to 'the earth (i.e. all that existed in the beginning) was waste and void (lohs wa tabah)' in Genesis, and to ἄρχαι τὸν ἐν χάοις καὶ ἀκαταστασθέντων in Corp. III. The epithet ἀκαταστασθέντων occurs in Corp. III. I b, and in the original text of that passage, was probably applied to ἄρχαι, i.e. the formless watery mass.
A doublet of ψάραν...μυστήριον above.

It is clear that the words ἢ δὲ τίνα...ὀφαράν κατάτασσα has been wrongly inserted here. It would be absurd to talk about ψάρα at a stage when the production of ψάρα cannot yet have taken place, and when even the cosmic sphere has not yet been shaped. (Its shaping is first spoken of in the following sentence.) It is to be presumed that these misplaced fragments have come from the paragraph which followed the κοσμογονία of Sanchuniathon, and which Eusebius calls his ψαλμία. I suppose the strange phrase ψάρα οarkers αἰσθάνομαι (which, in the terminology of the Greek schools, would be self-contradictory,) is a translation of some Semitic equivalent of the term διάλογον (ψάρα, and means the beasts; and the 'animals which possess intelligence and contemplate heaven' must be the human race. Cf. ἢ δὲ τίνα...μυστήριον in Corp. III. 3 b, where 'the contemplation of heaven' is mentioned as one of the functions of man, or one of the purposes for which he has been made. It is a thought which very commonly occurs in Hellenistic writings, that men, in contrast to the beasts, have been so constructed as to stand erect, in order that they may look up to heaven. See note on Corp. XII ii. 20 a.

The clause about men can hardly have been intended to follow immediately after the clause about beasts; for if it were, ἢ δὲ would refer to the beasts, and it would be implied that the writer held men to be descended from beasts, which is not likely. More probably, we have here two separate fragments, and ἢ δὲ (if rightly read) refers to something which has been lost.

ἡφασμάτων is Semitic. The words of which it is a transliteration are those which in Hebrew would take the form τοπαθής, 'one who watches', and ἡφασμάδιν, 'heaven'. Philo Byblius is therefore right in saying that it means φασμάτων κατάτασσα. He has here retained a phrase of the Semitic original, and added his translation of
It is evident from this and other indications that Philo Byblius is telling the truth when he says that his work is a translation of a Semitic text. He did not then invent the so-called ‘writings of Sanchuniathon’ out of his own head, as has sometimes been supposed; he had them before him, written in Phoenician, or some cognate language, and translated them out of that language into Greek. But the Semitic original which he translated must have been of recent date. As the cosmogonia with which it began was constructed, like that of Corp. III, by blending data supplied by Genesis with conceptions derived from Stoic physics, it cannot have been written before the third century B.C.; and it is most likely that it was written either after the Christian era, or not long before it.

The world-egg occurs in Egyptian and Orphic cosmogonies, but not, as far as I know, in Babylonian documents.

A passage describing the separation of the four elements, and corresponding to Corp. III. 3 a, must have occurred here; but it has been lost. Something of the sort is presupposed in what follows (ουδεις δε θεωρηκηκα τον Κόσμον).

A zoogonia must mean an account of the origin of beasts and men, such as is given in Corp. III. 3 a sq. Eusebius here says that he is going to give the zoogonia of Sanchuniathon; and at the end of the paragraph which these words introduce, he says that he has given it (τοιαύτη αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡ ζωγονία). Yet he does nothing of the sort. It is true that the disconnected fragment with which this paragraph ends (καὶ λειψθη... ἄριστο καὶ θήλη) may very well have occurred in a zoogonia. But in the rest of the paragraph, not a word is said about the origin of beasts and men. It deals with an entirely different topic; it is an explanation of the origin of thunderstorms. The subject of thunderstorms is apparently introduced for the purpose of explaining how men (τὰ νεφώδες ζώα), assumed to be already living on the earth, came to imagine a thunder-god, and to worship this imaginary being. The zoogonia then has disappeared, all except three detached scraps, two of which (viz. ἢν δὲ τιμά ζώα οἱ θανάτου αἰσθήσεως καὶ ζών... ὁρανός κατάστατα) have got into wrong places; and a theory of thunderstorms has been substituted for it. This explanation of thunderstorms probably occurred later on in the Sanchuniathon-document, and has been transposed to this place through some blunder. It is based on the Stoic physics; and the writer’s object is to show that the phenomena of thunderstorms, which men mistakenly attribute to the action of a personal god, result from the operation of physical laws. The passage shows the same atheistic tendency as the other extracts from ‘Sanchuniathon’, in which it is asserted that the gods of the traditional mythologies are not gods, but men who lived a long time ago.

Something ‘was moulded into an egg-like (i.e. spherical) form’. The subject of ἐναλάτθης has been lost. It must have been τὸ μῦτρος; and I have accordingly transposed μῦτρος to this place from the following sentence, where it interrupts the sense. The mass of unformed matter, under the influence of the pneuma by which it was now permeated, was moulded into the shape of a spherical Kosmos.

The world-egg occurs in Egyptian and Orphic cosmogonies, but not, as far as I know, in Babylonian documents.
...they thought there must be a God who thunders, and they began to worship him."

Cf. Philo Bybl. in Euseb. ib. 9. 24: ο Ταυτος, προΦανειον, τα εν ζωτη και σι ο Ανω, μενευε τας χρησιμοτητας τα τοβος, ειδε δι των θεων γεγονοντων προτοι έμη[[των των κατασκευας]] των θεων των ανεμων, και θεον και ανθρωπους ευθυγραμμιστηκαν. "Similarly Critias, in his account of the origin of religion (Diels Vorsokr, p. 621), mentions, inter alia, ταυτος ασημενια μοναδια θεων, και ταυτος, μενευε τας χρησιμοτητας τα τοβος, ειδε δι των θεων γεγονοντων προτοι έμη[[των των κατασκευας]] των θεων των ανεμων, και θεον και ανθρωπους ευθυγραμμιστηκαν. (This sentence, as given in the MSS., is intolerably clumsy and confused; I have made the meaning clear by transposing Ταυτος and και ανω... των λογου.)

'Taautos' is the Egyptian Thoth; and in the text above, Philo Byblius says that Sanchuniathon constructed his cosmogonia out of material which he found in the writings of Thoth, and supplemented by his own reflections. Philo Byblius must have read a statement to that effect in the Sanchuniathon-document. This might be thought to indicate that the author of that document had access to some of the Greek Hermetics; and in that case, Corp. III itself might possibly have been known to him. But it is more likely that his statement that he had read and made use of writings of Thoth was a mere figment. He certainly had no scruple about inventing authorities; for in another passage (Porphyry. ap. Euseb. ib. 9. 21), when he was speaking about his sources for early Hebrew history, he mentioned, as one of the most important of them, certain memoirs written by 'Ierubbaal (Jerubbaal), priest of the god 'Iew (Jahwe). He must have got the name Jerubbab (which is the other name of Gideon, the Hebrew 'Judge'), out of the...
If we compare the *cosmogonia* of 'Sanchuniathon' with *Corp. III*, we find that in their theology the two writers are at opposite poles. The author of *Corp. III* makes it his object to assert the supremacy of God over φώς. The author of the Sanchuniathon-document, on the other hand, is content with φώς, and sees no need of a God. As Eusebius expresses it, ἀντίκρυς ἀθεότητα εἰσάγει: 'his doctrine is sheer atheism'. He recognizes no deity at all;—except indeed that he so far personifies his two physical ἀρχαί, the μῦτ and the πνεῦμα, i.e. the primal 'mud' and the primal 'gas', as to say that one of them fell in love with the other; and even that, perhaps, is not much more than a figure of speech.

But in other respects, there are close resemblances between the two documents. Both writers agree in saying that (leaving God out of account) the two things which existed in the beginning, and out of which the universe has been evolved, were 'mud' and 'gas'; and the two cosmogonies seem to have been arranged in the same order, and constructed on similar lines, though this is less apparent, owing to the loss of parts of the Sanchuniathon-document. Both writers were acquainted with the Stoic physics; and both of them had read the first chapter of *Genesis*. The author of *Corp. III* had read that chapter in the Greek translation of the LXX, and the other writer probably in the Hebrew text. There is no reason to suppose that either of them borrowed from the other; but both these cosmogonies were constructed out of the same or similar materials.

*Corp. III* shows hardly a trace of Platonism; and its writer definitely rejects the Platonic doctrine of the survival of the individual soul. It contains nothing distinctively Egyptian; and there is not

---

Footnotes:

1 Compare the statement that the two light elements, fire and air, are 'male', and the two heavy elements, earth and water, are 'female' (Hippol. *Ref. haer.* 4. 43, quoted in note on *Corp. I.* 17).

2 See note on πᾶσαν ἄναρπαοτή ψυχήν in § 3 b.
the slightest sign of Christian influence. The document may be shortly described as Judaeo-Stoic.

I can find no clear indication of date in Corp. III. It might conceivably have been written at any time after the translation of Genesis into Greek, and the rise of Stoicism, in the third century B.C., and before the date of the latest of our Hermetic writings, which is probably not far from A.D. 300. If we could be sure that the heading in which it is ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus was written by the author of the document, that might be a reason for presuming that it was not very far separated in time from the other Hermetica, most of which were written almost certainly after the Christian era, and probably not before the second century at the earliest. But there is nothing in the document itself to connect it with Hermes; and it is quite possible that it was written in complete independence of the Hermetic tradition, and that the superscription which attributes it to Hermes was added at some later time, when it had passed into the hands of a Hermetist. It differs markedly in character and style from most of the other Hermetica. It shows traces of a connexion with Corp. I, which contains a similar cosmogonia, and presents similar evidence of acquaintance with the early chapters of Genesis. But Corp. I also differs widely from the bulk of the Hermetica; and in all the rest of the Hermetic literature, signs of Jewish influence are few and faint.1

But though it is conceivable that Corp. III may have been written in the third or second century B.C., so early a date is hardly probable. It seems reasonable to consider that attempts to amalgamate the Mosaic account of the creation with the Stoic cosmology are not likely to have been made until both had been long and widely known; and the prominence given to astral influences in the system of Corp. III connects it with the later rather than the earlier Stoicism. The resemblance between this document and the cosmogonia of Sanchuniathon makes it likely that both belong to the same period; and I am inclined to conjecture that both of them were written in the first century A.D.

Title. (δι) πρωτος απαντων (δεια παντων MSS.) δ θεως. The δεια of God, i.e. his 'glory', was frequently spoken of by Jews (see Bousset, Rel. des Judentums, pp. 362 and 398); but I can find no

1 The peculiar use of δ τοων in Corp. II is probably of Jewish origin; and some of the Hermetic fragments quoted by Cyril show knowledge of the first chapter of Genesis.
meaning in the statement that God is the δόξα of things. God might be called ἀρχή πάντων, or πυγή πάντων, or μία πάντων; but it is difficult to see how any of these words could be corrupted into δόξα. It seems more probable that the author wrote πρώτος ἀπάντων. (Cf. Corp. VIII. 2 initi.: πρώτος γὰρ πάντων . . . ὁ δημιουργὸς τῶν ἐλων θεός.) The word πρώτος may have been written in the abbreviated form αος (see Corp. I. 6). If we assume that the second word was ἀπάντων, that gives an α to follow; and the letters ΑΟΣΑ might easily be read as ΔΟΞΑ.

The MSS. give the words ἰδοὺ πάντων ὁ θεὸς . . . καὶ φύσις θεία as the beginning of the discourse. But it is more likely that these words were written as a heading, with ἐντι before them, and that the discourse itself began with the sentence which follows (ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀντων ὁ θεὸς κ.π.λ.). This accounts for the repetition of ὁ θεὸς, which would otherwise be purposeless.

καὶ (ἄ) φύσις θεία. The writer both begins and ends by asserting that 'nature is divine', that is to say, that the force by which all cosmic processes are carried on issues from God, and is directed by God's sovereign will. He must therefore have had in mind some persons who denied that doctrine. His position is that of the Stoics, who employed the word φύσις, among other terms, to describe God's working in the universe. The contrary view was held in its extreme form by the Epicureans. But the Aristotelians also were inclined to minimize the action of the Divine in the sublunar world, and to speak of φύσις as a power distinct from God and working independently of him; and some people, for that reason, denounced them as little better than Epicureans. The Aristotelian Strato (who was called ὁ φυσικός) went so far as to renounce the idea of God as a being separate and distinct from the world as a whole, and content himself with φύσις, which he regarded as 'a necessary force operating without consciousness and reflection' (Zeller, Aristotle, Eng. tr. II, p. 455). And the position of the sceptical Academics was similar. E.g. in Cic. Nat. deor. 3. 27, the Academic speaker says 'At enim (quaeritur) unde animum arripuerimus, si nullus fuerit

1 E.g. the Platonist Atticus (c. A.D. 170), in Euseb. Pr. ev. 15. 5. 7: 'ὅ μὲν Πλάτων εἰς θεόν καὶ ἐκ θεοῦ πάντα ἀναπτεί' but Aristotle, like Epicurus, denies that the world is governed by God. "τί σοι;" φήσαι τις ἐν γόν "ἐν ταύτῃ τἀτταις Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ Ἐπίκουρον," τὰν μὲν σω, διε γὰρ τὸ πρὸκειμένον . . . καὶ τὸν γὰρ τὸν ἀμφότερον ἀπὸ τὸν θεόν ἀμαλές εἰς τοὺς ανθρώπους . . . . Epicurus banishes the gods to a place outside the Kosmos; but Aristotle, ὑπ' αὐτήν τὴν δῆν τῶν θεῶν τὰ ανθρώπινα πράγματα υποθέλει, ελαῖν ἀτμήλητα καὶ ἀφρόντιστα, φθεῖ τιν καὶ οὐ θεοῦ λογισμῷ διωκόμενα.
in mundo. . . . Naturae ista sunt, . . . omnia cipientis et agitantis motibus et mutationibus suis. . . . Ila vero 'cohaeret et permanent' (cohaerent et permanent edd.) naturae viribus, non deorum'. Ib. 2. 81, the Stoic speaker contrasts the two views: 'alii naturam esse censent vim quandam sine ratione cientem motus in corporibus necessarios; aliui autem (sc. the Stoics) vim participem rationis atque ordinis, (i.e. 'divine'); . . . cuius sollertiam . . . nemo opificex consequi possit imitando.' Lactant. Div. inst. 2. 8. 23 (criticizing the Academic speaker in Cic. Nat. deor.): 'melius igitur Seneca . . ., qui vidit nihil alium esse naturam quam deum. . . . Cum igitur ortum rerum tribuis naturae ac detrahis deo, (you are in error).'

I a. ἀρχή τῶν ὄντων ὁ θεός, καὶ νοῦ, καὶ φύσεως, καὶ ὁλης (καὶ νοῦς και φύσεως και ὁλης MSS.). φύσις is the force which works on ἡλη; and the external world consists of ἡλη and φύσις in combination. νοῦς, I suppose, is here the human mind, in contrast to the external world; cf. 'quaeritur unde animum arripuerimus' in Cic. Nat. deor., quoted above.

If I have restored the words rightly, the writer says that God is the source (or maker) of ἡλη. Cf. Abammonis Resp. (Testim.) 8. 3: ἡλην δι' ἀρχήν ὁ θεός, κ.π.λα. The statement that God is ἀρχή ἡλης contradicts the Platonic doctrine that ἡλη is without beginning, and exists independently of God; but it agrees with the doctrine taught (in later times at least) by the Jews, and adopted from them by the Christians, that God made the world ex nihilo, and not out of pre-existent ἡλη. Origen, De princip. 2. 9. 1, says that God τοσοῦτον ἡλην κατεκεύασεν, δυνατόν ἥδεν το θεός κατακατακεύασεν. Lactantius, Div. inst. 1. 5. 9 and 2. 8. 8ff., says that God first made materia (ἡλη), and then made all things out of it. The question whether ἡλη is or is not ἀγέννητος and σύγχρονος τῷ θεῷ (coeval with God) is discussed at some length in Methodius Περὶ τοῦ αἰτεξονίου.

σοφίας(ε) els δείξειν (ποιήσας πάντα). Cf. Corp. XIV. 3: the Maker of the universe is μόνος ὄντως σοφός πάντα. The word σοφία was used by Jews especially, but sometimes by Stoics also, in connexion with God's making of the world.

For the thought, cf. Methodius Περὶ τοῦ αἰτεξονίου 22. 3 (see prefatory note on Ascl. Lat. II): φημι τοιγαροῦν πολλὰς ὑποθέσεις ὑπάρχειν τῷ θεῷ καθ' ἀς δημοουργεῖν αὐτόν ἐδων πρῶτον μὲν (τὴν) τῆς τέχνης ἐπιστήμην, ἢν ἀργεῖν μεν [μέν] οὐκ ἔχον . . . ἀπέπερ γὰρ εἰ τις ἐπιστήμην ἔχων ἢ μοναζίς ἢ αὐτό πάλιν ἰατρικής ἢ τεκτονικής, εἰς ὅσον τοῦ
It is difficult to see what could be meant by 'ivipyteu coupled with 'svo-isand avdymo-and placed between them. It is true that the word 'ivipyteu is sometimes used in the sense of at theo 'ivipyteu, 'God's workings' (see Corp. X. r b and 22 b); but there would be no reason here for inserting 'ivipyteu in that sense. It seems more likely that 'ivipyte has been shifted, and that what the author said is that 'svo-is is theo 'ivipyteu. Cf. Corp. XI. 1. 5 init. eite 'angyka, eite pronoan, eite 'svo-is, eite allo ti ogetai ... tis, touto ystew i theo 'ivipyteu. See also Ascl. Lat. III. 39 (Lydus).

The word 'angyka is here a synonym for itpuni; and in the view of the writer of Corp. III, 'necessity' or 'destiny' is brought to bear on things below by the movements of the heavenly bodies. (See § 4.) tlois, coupled with anvewosi, must mean teleni, i.e. extinction. tlois and anvewosi together (the 'extinction' and 'renewal' of sublunar things) are wrought by 'svo-is, the action of which is determined by the movements of the heavenly bodies; and these movements are themselves determined by God's will. 'svo-is is therefore thei.

The author evidently had in mind the similar words in Gen. 1 (sktoa xapov tou odivoson LXX). It would be easy to bring the text into still closer agreement with Genesis by writing e ino odivosw in place of in odivosw.

The writer has taken over from Genesis the pneuma theo' which 'moved upon the face of the waters' (enofw'te odivov tou odivos LXX); but he identifies it with the pneuma of the Stoics, i.e. the gaseous substance (a mixture of air and fire) which pervades and animates the Kosmos. This substance is lepton ('rare'), as compared with the denser mass of ta en xai; and it is xepov, i.e. living, conscious, and intelligent.
A participle agreeing with πνεῦμα, and governing τὰ ἐν χάει, has been lost. The Stoic word δικόν (‘pervading’ or ‘permeating’) may be conjectured; but the LXX would rather suggest ἐπιφερόμενον τοῖς ἐν χάει.

(διαπερίστων δὲ ἐκτὸς ἀπάστων καὶ ἀκατασκευάστων.) These words are out of place in the MSS.; they must have preceded the description of the demiurgia, which begins with the emission of light (ἀνέβη δὴ φῶς ἄγιον). The word ἀκατασκευάστων shows that the writer’s source was the LXX, and not the Hebrew Genesis. In the LXX, the corresponding words are ἥ δὲ γῆ ἥν ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκευαστός; and it is very unlikely that two persons would independently hit on ἀκατασκευάστως as a translation of the Hebrew bohu.

[[καὶ ἐκάθεν ὅπ’ ἄμμῳ ὡς ὄγρας ὅδικαι]]. The author cannot have said that the light ‘was solidified out of watery substance’; light is not a solid body. These words doubtless belong to the following passage about the elements (§ 2 a), and describe the formation of the solid earth by separation out of the hitherto undifferentiated mud or slime.

(καὶ ἐγένετο τὰ) στοιχεῖα [καὶ θεοὶ πάντες]. The results which followed on the emission of light are first shortly summed up in these words, and then more fully described in § 2 a. The θεοὶ recognized by the author of Corp. III are the heavenly bodies (§§ 2 b, 3 b, and 4), and the cosmic elements (§ 3 a init.). But to couple θεοὶ in the sense of cosmic elements with στοιχεῖα would be to say the same thing twice over; and a mention of the heavenly bodies at this stage would be premature. It seems best therefore to assume that καὶ θεοὶ πάντες has been added by a later hand.

§ 2 a. ἀπεχωρίσθη (αποδιωρίσθη MSS.) τὰ ἐλαφρὰ εἰς ὅφος κ.τ.λ. This passage corresponds to the dividing of ‘the waters under the firmament’ from ‘the waters above the firmament’ in Genesis. In the Stoic physics, which the writer of Corp. III had adopted, there were no ‘waters above the firmament’; he therefore took the ‘waters’ here spoken of in Genesis to stand for matter in general. He substituted the lighter elements (τὰ ἄνωφερη, fire and air,) for ‘the waters above the firmament’, and the heavier elements (τὰ κατωφερη, water and earth,) for ‘the waters under the firmament’, and proceeded to describe the separation of the four elements, in accordance with Stoic doctrine. The text is badly damaged, but his meaning seems to have been as follows. In the beginning, there were two distinct things, viz. ὅμως ἄπερυον and πνεῦμα λεπτὸν. The
former was not exactly water, but the substance out of which earth and water were subsequently differentiated; and similarly, the ρνεύμα was not air or fire, but the substance out of which fire and air were subsequently differentiated. We might call the one 'mud', and the other 'gas'. The 'gas' was living and intelligent (νοσός); the 'mud' was presumably inert and lifeless. When light appeared, the separation of the elements took place. The 'gas' (τὰ ἀλάφρα) rose, and was differentiated into two distinct elements, fire and air; and the fire rose above the air. (This seems to be the meaning of ἀνακρεμασθάντος (τοῦ πυρὸς τῶ) ρνεύματι δχεύσαν.) The 'mud' (τὰ βαρέα) sank, and was differentiated into two distinct elements, water and earth; and the earth settled down, partly in the form of sand at the bottom of the sea, and partly in the form of dry land. (Compare what is said about the separation of the elements in Corp. I. 5 b.)


As the participle preceding τὰ ἐν χάτι has been lost, we are left in doubt how the writer conceived the original relation between these two substances. He may have said that the 'gas' was above (ἐνέφατο ἐναύς ΛΧΧ), and the 'mud' below. But the words διαχωρίζοντα τὰ ἀλάφρα εἰς ὄδως are more easily explained if we assume him to have said that the 'gas' permeated the 'mud' (διόσκ.). In the latter case, we must suppose that the two substances were distinct in character, but were contained in the same space.

'Sand' is mentioned in connexion with God's creative action in Jer. 5. 22: τῶν τάξαντα ἄμμον δρων τῇ βαλάσσῃ, . . . καὶ ἡχοῦσιν τὰ κύματα αὐτῆς καὶ χοί ὑπερβησιν αὐτὸ. But the ἄμμος of Corp. III seems to be the 'foundation' on which the water rests, i.e. the sandy sea-bottom, and not the sandy shore.

Perhaps ἔξαπτως.

'The probable meaning is, that the last remains of the original fire begin a motion in the opposite direction' (Zeller). Perhaps: τὸ δὲ πτῶς ἐξυγρανθέν, τοῦ ἐς ἄκητον τοῦ πυρὸς ἀντιτυπήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ μέσου (λειψάνου), (i.e. 'when the last of the fire, which has remained in the midst of it, reacts upon it,' τρέπεσθαι πάλιν εἰς τοῦτον τίνα ὑφιστά-μηνς ἄρα ἀναθυμάται λεπτονυμένον δὲ τοῦ ἄρεος ἀλήθη περιεχέται κ.τ.λ.'
134 CORPVS HERMETICVM

κύκλω. Chrysipp. in Plut. iul. : διάλογον μήν γὰρ ἐν ὧν ὁ κόσμος πυρώθη, ἐνθὸς καὶ ψυχῇ ἐστὶν ἀντίκα καὶ ἠγεμονικῶν1 ὅτε δὲ, μεταβαλών εἰς τὸ υγρὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναπολειψάντων ψυχήν,2 τρότον τινα εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν μετέβαλει, ὥστε συνεστάναι ἐκ τοιῶν, ἄλλον τινὰ ἐγχε λόγον. Diog. Laert. 7. 135–137: ἐν τῇ ἐξ ἑαυτὸν καὶ νοον καὶ εἰμαρμένην καὶ Δία, πολλαῖς τε ἐπίφασιν ἀνομασίαις3 προσομολόγεσθαι. κατ’ ἄρχας μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὐτὸν ὡστά,4 τρέπει τὴν πάσαν οὐσίαν δὲ ἀδέρος εἰς ὑδάρ.5 καὶ διαστή 

135 ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα6 περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοίνυν, σπερματικὸν λόγον ὑπάρχον τοῦ κόσμου, τούτῳ ὑπολείπεσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ,7 εἰργόν αὐτῷ ποιοῦσα τὴν ἔλεον πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐξής γένεσιν. εἶτα ἀπογενέναι πρῶτον τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ, ὕδας, ἀέρα, γῆν. ... ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ, δὴ ἀιθάρα καλεῖται, ἐν τῷ πρώτῃ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαίραν γεννᾶσθαι, εἰτα τὴν τῶν πλανιμάνων μεθ’ ἐν τοῦ ἀρα’ εἰτα τὸ ὑδάρι ὑποστήμην δὲ πάντως τῆς γῆς, μέσην ἀπάντων ὄντων. Ιb. 142: γίνοντας δὲ τὸν κόσμον, οὐκ ἐκ πυρός ἢ οὐσία τραπῇ δ’ ἀδέρος εἰς ὑγρότητα, εἶτα τὸ πυρομέρις αὐτῷ συνιάζων ἀποτελεσθῇ γῆ, δὲ τὸ λεπτομέρις ἀμαρώθη,8 καὶ τοῦτ’ εἶτ’ πλέον λεπτομένθ’ πῦρ ἀπογεννηθή. Clem. Alex. Strom. 5. 14. 105: λέγει9 ὅτι πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ διοικούντος λόγον καὶ θεού τὰ σύμπαντα δὲ ἀδέρος εἰς υγρόν, τὸ δὲ10 σπέρμα τῆς διακοσμήσεως ... ἔτ’ ἐκ τοῦτον αὐθεὶς γίνεται γῆ καὶ σφαίρας καὶ τὰ ἐμπεριεχόμενα. Dio Chrysost.11 36. 55, 452 M.:12 (at the completion of the ἐστίγωρισ), λειψθεὶς δὴ μόνος ὁ νόος (i.e. the νοερὸν πῦρ, which is God, ... σοδεῖς ἐν αὐτῷ πυκνοὶ λει- 

8 Perhaps rather τὸ πνεῦμα, the ‘vital spirit’ of the individual in its most rudimentary form. Cf. καθάπερ ἐν γονῇ πνεῦμα in Dio Chrysost., quoted below.
9 I.e. at this stage there exist (1) a watery mass, and (2) God, in the form of νοερὸν πνεῦμα, permuting the mass.
10 Perhaps ἐγὼ πνεῦμα τό.
11 Dio calls the doctrine which he is here expounding ‘Zoroastrian’; but it is mainly, if not wholly, Stoic.
12 The text here given is based on that of Dindorf, 1857.
13 ι. e. desired to return to the state of things before the ἐστίγωρισ.
According to the Stoic doctrine then, the first stage of the diacosmesis consists in the transmutation of the greater part of the universal fire ('through air') into water; and when this first process has been completed, the universe is a mass of water, having latent within it, and diffused throughout it, living and intelligent fire or pneuma. Then follows a second and distinct stage, in which the latent pneuma works on the watery substance through which it is diffused, and differentiates it into the four cosmic elements.

The writer of Corp. III ignores the Stoic doctrine of a periodically recurrent ephorosis and diacosmesis, and speaks only of a genesis of the Kosmos which took place once for all. He also ignores the first stage of the diacosmesis as described by the Stoics, i.e. the transmutation of the universal fire (all but a hidden remnant) into water. But the state of things which he assumes to have existed 'in the beginning'

1 I.e. the demiurgia or diacosmesis began with a flash of light. No such flash of light occurs in the Stoic cosmogonia; this detail then may have been borrowed by Dio from some oriental source. It is possible even that it may have been transmitted to him from Genesis, in which the creation begins with 'Let there be light'.

2 Not such lightning as we see in storms.
3 'Fiery air' is νευμα.
4 Something like ε κατον ουκ ενεγος is wanted here.
5 'Hera' means air. This allegorical interpretation of the marriage of Zeus and Hera was borrowed by Dio from Chrysippus; see Arnim Sto. vet. fr. II, p. 314.
6 The words ευ...πνημον break the connexion here, and look like a misplaced explanation of των θασαν του πνευμα του νου.
7 I have inserted here the words τοτε δη...εις τροπου, which it seems necessary to remove from the place where they stand in the traditional text. It is only when God (the πατος νουρων) has fashioned for himself a body composed of gross matter (ατυχεσι την οδων), that he can be compared to a σπον consisting of ψυχη and ομα. For this comparison, cf. Chrysippus, quoted above.
is identical with that which, according to the Stoics, followed on the transmutation of fire into water; and from that point onward, his cosmogony agrees with theirs.

If the founders of Stoicism had invented their system de novo, they would have had no motive for interposing a watery chaos between the primal fire and the differentiated elements of the present world; and the more obvious course would have been to say that air, water, and earth were formed from fire by successive condensations. But the conception of a waste of waters out of which the ordered universe has been developed was a piece of earlier tradition which they retained; and there can be little doubt that this tradition was of Babylonian origin. The notion must have arisen in a country where the land was yearly seen emerging from the floods at the end of the rainy season (Gunkel, Schöpfung und Chaos, p. 15); and Babylonia is such a country. Long before the time of Zeno the first Stoic, there were ways of communication by which Babylonian notions might be transmitted to Greek thinkers; and the theory of Thales, who held water to be the ἀπὸ όλου ἀλλοτρίου of all things, may perhaps have been derived from that region. But Zeno's successors, if not Zeno himself, may also have read the writings of Berosus, by which the Babylonian cosmology was more directly and more fully made known to the Greeks. Berosus said that 'in the beginning all was darkness and water'; and after giving a summary of the Babylonian creation-myth, he explained its meaning thus: 'this tale is an allegorical description of natural occurrences. The All was once fluid; ... but the god Bel ... divided the darkness in the midst, and so separated earth and heaven from one another, and therewith established the order of the universe.' (Gunkel, Schöpfung und Chaos, pp. 17–19.) The account of the beginning of things which is given in the first chapter of Genesis was no doubt ultimately derived, in part at least, from the same Babylonian sources; but the two parted streams of tradition had been flowing in separate channels for many centuries, when they were brought together again by the writer of Corp. III.

§ 2 b. διηρωθή (ἡ πυρίνη οὐσία) σῶν τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ θεοῖς. αὐτῇ refers to the lost subject of διηρωθή, and shows that it must have been feminine. I have inserted ἡ πυρίνη οὐσία; but it would be equally possible to write ἡ πυρίνη φύσις.

1 This is what Chrysippus did say, when he was speaking, not of the first formation of the world, but of that transmutation of the elements which is perpetually going on in the world in which we live. (Arius Didymus, Diels Doxgr. p. 438.)
kai theoi . . . stn tois autwv smeiois apaioi. These theoi are the stars. The writer has taken over the word smeia from the LXX (istonan eis smeia, 'let them be for signs'); but he uses it in a different sense. It here means 'constellations'.

cαι περιειλιχθη το αιθεριον κυκλιω δρομηματι.—(και περιειληγη (so A) το περικυκλιον αερι κυκλιω δρομηματι MSS.) I have cut out peri-
kukliov, which I take to be a doublet of 'aeris' kukliw.

πνευματι θειω σχοιμενον. Cf. πνευματι σχευονται above. The revolving fiery heaven 'rides on' or 'is vehicled upon' the air, which is situated immediately below it. The writer here applies to the air, as an element distinct from fire, the same word, πνευμα, which he previously applied to the undifferentiated 'gas'. (For πνευμα in the sense of air, cf. Corp. I. 9.) The air is called theion, as the 'gas' was called νεφελων before. It is itself a god, as are the other three elements; and it is God's instrument, by means of which the life he gives is conveyed into all terrestrial creatures.

§ 3 a. άνηκε δε έκαστος θεος . . . το προσταχθεν αυτων κ.τ.λ. The 'gods' here spoken of are the several elements. At God's bidding, the earth produced quadrupeds and reptiles; the water, fishes; the air, birds; and the earth again, plants. (As to the fire, we have already been told that the heavenly bodies were formed from it.)

In this paragraph, the writer follows Genesis closely. But he was dissatisfied with the strange order of events in Genesis, according to which the plants were created before the heavenly bodies; he therefore shifted the production of plants, and coupled it with the production of animals.

[kai pása sporad ένσπορος]. I take this phrase to be a misplace-
ment of something connected with το σπέρμα της παλιγγενεσιας εν καυτωις in the following line. The words are corrupt; but ένσπορος must have been intended to convey the same meaning as the phrase in Genesis, ου το σπέρμα αυτων εν αυτω, 'whose seed is in itself'. In Genesis, it is the plants alone that are said to 'have seed in them after their kinds'; but perhaps the writer of Corp. III meant the phrase to apply to animals and plants together.

§ 3 b. (... ) τε γενεσεις των άνθρωπων. An account of the making of man, the event in which the whole process of creation culminated, must necessarily have occurred here; but it has been lost. In the words γενεσεις των άνθρωπων κ.τ.λ., the writer is speaking of the prop-
gation of the human race, and assumes that at least a first pair of human beings is already in existence.
This appears to be a doublet of εἰς κατοπτρεῖαν ... εἰς τε σημεία ἀγαθῶν below. Compare the following phrases:

εἰς ἔργων θείων γυνῶν εἰς κατοπτρεῖαν ... ἔργων θείων καὶ φύσεως ἑνεργοῦσαν μαρτυρίαν καὶ φύσεως ἑνεργείας καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπίγνωσιν εἰς τε σημεία ἀγαθῶν

The two passages cannot have been intended to stand together in the same paragraph; one of them must have been written as an alternative or substitute for the other. The first of the two contains the significant words καὶ (εἰς) πάνων τῶν ὑπ’ οὐρανοῦ δεσποτείαν, which correspond to the passage in Genesis, ἀρχέτασαν ... πάσης τῆς γῆς κ.τ.λ. It seems probable that this phrase originally stood in the second passage also, and followed εἰς κατοπτρεῖαν οὐρανοῦ there. When κατοπτρεῖα οὐρανοῦ and πάνων τῶν ὑπ’ οὐρανοῦ δεσποτεία are brought together, the combination resembles the description of man’s twofold function in Ascl. Lat. I. 8: ‘et mirari atque adorare caelestia, et [in]colere atque gubernare terrena.’

καὶ πληθός ἄνθρωπων]. These words are meaningless here. Perhaps (εἰς) πληθός ἄνθρωπων may have been written as an explanation of ἐν πλήθει below.

εἰς τὸ αὐξάνεσθαι ἐν αὐξήσει καὶ πληθύνεσθαι ἐν πλήθει. This is evidently derived from αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ πληθύνεσθε in Gen. 1. 22 and 28. 1 But how are we to account for the addition of ἐν αὐξήσει and ἐν πλήθει? This construction is a Hebraism; but the Hebrew idiom which it represents is not employed in the phrase ‘increase and multiply’ in Gen. 1. On the other hand, the very same form of words occurs in Corp. I. 18, where we are told that God said to men and beasts αὐξάνεσθαι ἐν αὐξήσει καὶ πληθύνεσθε ἐν πλήθει. This looks as if the writer of one of these two documents had borrowed from the other. But it is possible to account for the facts without assuming that either the writer of Corp. I or the writer of Corp. III had read what the other wrote, if we suppose that both of them alike got the phrase, not indeed from Genesis directly, but from some document based on a Semitic paraphrase of Genesis, in which the verbs ‘increase’ and ‘multiply’ were thus emphasized.


2 This Hebrew idiom is differently rendered in Gen. 16. 10 (to Hagar) and Gen. 22. 17 (to Abraham): πληθύνων πληθύνω τὸ σφήμα σου.
A verb is needed; and as the writer is here speaking, not of the first creation of man, but of the births which take place in successive generations, the present is the right tense. I have therefore written ἐνσαρκοῖ. In incarnating human souls, God uses the revolutions of the stars as his instrument; that is, human births are determined by astral influences. (See Ascl. Lat. III. 35.) The verb ἐνσαρκοῖ may perhaps have been adopted from some Platonist, as it would more naturally be employed by a person who believed in the pre-existence of the soul; but it does not necessarily imply this belief. Man is ἰμβριχος, i.e. he consists of a body with a soul inside it; and the soul may be said to be ‘put into the body’, though its individual existence begins at the moment of birth. It is clear from what follows that the writer did not himself admit the existence of disembodied souls.

The strange word ἵραπαοτίπης (sowing of portents?) is unquestionably due to corruption. It seems clear that some participle must have stood here; and παρασκευάσας suits the context well. By writing ἐνσαρκοὶ for ἐν σαρκὶ, and παρασκευάσας for περαστορίας, the chaos of words in this section can be reduced to grammatical order. This is probably a misplaced doublet of ἐλά δρομῆματος θεῶν ἐγκυκλίων.

The words ἐργαν θεῶν, which occur above in the doublet of this passage, were probably written here as an alternative for θείας δυνάμεως. The balance of the phrases is improved by inserting μαρτυρίαν, which occurs in the doublet. Compare with this clause the description of ‘the purpose for which man was made’ in Corp. IV. 2 as emended: ὁ ποιήσας γὰρ τῶν ἐργῶν τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ ἀνθρωπος καὶ ἑκτὸ έγένετο, τὸ τῶν κόσμων θαυμάσας, καὶ γνωρίσας τον ποιήσαντα.

The words τυπα καὶ τίπα θεία μεγάλων, which occur above in the doublet above. θυγατέρα means either ‘to mark or note a thing’, or ‘to infer a thing from indications’. μοῖρα (‘a division’) may mean ‘a class’, regarded as divided or distinguished from another class; and the sense required may be got either by cutting out...
As the author of *Corp. III* had certainly read the first chapter of *Genesis*, it is probable that he had read the second and third chapters also; and this phrase may have been suggested to him by 'the tree of the knowledge of good and evil' in *Gen. 2*. But if so, he must have deliberately rejected the teaching of that passage in one respect. The God of *Gen. 2* f. seeks to debar man from 'the knowledge of good and evil'. The God of the Platonists and Stoics is devoid of φθόνος, and intends man to acquire that knowledge; and in this matter, the writer of *Corp. III* sides with the Platonists and Stoics.

πᾶσαν [ἀγαθόν] διδασκουμέναν εὑρεῖν. ἄγαθόν is awkward; and as the word has occurred twice just before, it is most likely that it has been repeated here by error. The thought expressed by πᾶσαν διδασκουμέναν εὑρεῖν resembles that of Soph. *Ant.* 332 ff. (τολλὰ τὰ δεινά, κοι delt διδέα τοῦ διοίκητον πέλει κ.τ.λ.).

§ 4. βιώσαι τε καὶ ἀφανισθῆναι (σοφισθῆναι MSS.) πρὸς μοῖραν δρομήματος ἡγεῖται κυκλών θεῶν. μοῖρα here means the 'lot' or 'destiny' assigned to each man by the revolutions of the starry heavens. Not only the man's birth, but the course and end of his life also, are determined by the movements of the stars. The writer does not add that men, by observing the stars, can discover beforehand what is destined for them. If this were added, the view expressed would amount to a belief in astrology.

Each individual man, at the termination of his life on earth, 'disappears' (ἀφανίζεται), and 'undergoes dissolution' (ἀναλύεται εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα ?). Not only is there no mention of a survival of the individual soul after the dissolution of the body, but the contrary is clearly implied. Nothing of a man continues to exist after his death, except his 'name' (i.e. the memory of him in the minds of living men); and even that, in most cases, fades away in a little while.

μεγάλα ἀπομνημονεύματα τεχνουργημάτων ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς καταλύωσε. Perhaps the writer was thinking of the old kings who built the pyramids. But ἀπομνημονεύματα τεχνουργημάτων might be taken to include the works of the poet and the statesman as well as those of the builder; for ποιητική and πολιτική also are τέχναι. Cf. Hor. *Od.* 3. 30: 'exegi monumentum aere perennius: ... non omnis moriar.'

πᾶσαν γένεσιν ἐμψύχου σαρκὸς καὶ καρποῦ σπορᾶς (διαβέβηται φθόνοι). Men, beasts, and plants alike (must perish). The end of the sentence
is lost; but its meaning can be inferred with certainty from the context. Perhaps the author's thought might be better expressed by writing (ὅσπερ) καὶ καρπὸν σποράς. 'All flesh is grass.' οἶδι περ φύλλων γενε, τοῦ δὲ καὶ ανθρών.

If we retain these words, we must take them in connexion with ἀπομημονεύματα τεχνουργημάτων, and the thought suggested would be this: 'not only do men perish, but their works perish also; and though the names of great men may be preserved through long ages by the memorials they have left behind them, yet even the greatest will be forgotten in the end.' But the phrase is awkwardly interposed, and hardly suits the context; it cannot be said of the works of human art that they are 'renewed by the operation of the stars', in the sense in which this is said of human and animal births and vegetable growths.

ἀνανεωθήσεται [ἀνάγκη], καὶ ἄνανεωσεν θεῶν [καὶ φῶτεως] (γὰ)κυκλών ἑναρθρίων (κύκλου ἑναρθρίου MSS.) δρομήματι. The reading is very uncertain; but this, or something like it, must have been the meaning. ἄνανεωσεν may have come by duplication from ἄνανεωθήσεται; and ἄναγκη καὶ φῶτει may have been inserted as an explanatory note on θεῶν . . . δρομήματι. Sense might be made in another way, by shifting φῶτεως, and writing ἄνανεωθήσεται ἄναγκη φῶτεως, καὶ θεῶν ἑγκυκλίων ἑναρθρίων δρομήματι.

That which decays and passes away is 'renewed', but only by substitution. The individual perishes, but the race is immortal. The dead do not live again, but others are born to succeed them. And this unceasing renewal of life on earth is caused by the unvarying movements of the heavenly bodies, through the operation of which fresh births are continually taking place. The force by which the renewal is effected may be called φῶς; but φῶς is dependent on the movements of the stars, and therefore on the sovereign power of God, by whom the stars themselves were made and set in motion.

It is to be noted that, in the first part of the text, the lacunae which we have found it necessary to assume occur at nearly equal intervals. This suggests a suspicion that in the writing from which our MSS. are derived the lacunae came at the ends of the lines. In the appended transcript of the conjecturally restored text, the Greek is divided into lines in accordance with this hypothesis.¹ The

¹ One or more lines, in which the making of man was described, have probably been lost between l. 13 and l. 14.
numbers of the letters in the first eight lines, not counting the lacunae at the ends, are 59, 67, 67, 65, 67, 70, 26, 64; and adding the letters of my conjectural supplements, we get the numbers 64, 78, 76, 69, 79, 80, 38, 76. In the first line, which contains the title, the letters may have been more widely spaced; and this might account for their smaller number (59 without the supplement, 64 with it). At the end of the fourth line, the missing word may have been longer; if, for instance, we wrote ρεφερόμενον τοῖς in place of ὅμων τά, we should have a line of 75 letters instead of 69. We must suppose that a large part of the seventh line has been lost in some other way; but seven of the eight lacunae might be accounted for by assuming that the Greek was written in lines of 75–80 letters, and that a piece at one side of the column was torn off. Lines of this length are exceptional; but even longer lines occur in some of the Oxyrhynchus papyri; and a document of this kind, which may have been scribbled down by some sort of Pagan hermit in a hut at the edge of the desert, would not necessarily be written according to the rules commonly observed in libraries and bookshops.

The probability that the Greek was written in lines of 75–80 letters is somewhat increased by the positions of the lacunae in the last section. In the restoration of that part of the document especially, there is much uncertainty; but in the conjectural text of § 4 we find lacunae again occurring at nearly equal intervals; and these intervals are of about the same length as before. If we place the lacunae at the beginning of the lines, the last four lines yield the numbers $x + 63, 9 + 70 (=79), 15 + 70 (=85), 10 + 66 (=76)$; and these numbers look as if they were in some way connected with those of the first eight lines. Assuming that the Greek was divided into lines as here shown, and that it was written on the face of a detached piece of papyrus, the two groups of lacunae may have been caused by the destruction of two opposite corners of the leaf. But if we suppose that it was written partly

1 In this transcript, all the words are written out in full; but it must be remembered that in the archetype the lines may have been somewhat shortened by the use of abbreviations.

2 The total number of letters (85) in 1. 22 is rather too large; but the excess is due to the fact that my conjectural supplement (σιάσσεις φθόρα) extends to 15 letters, whereas the supplements of the line before and the line after contain respectively 9 and 10 letters only. If we wrote, for instance, πάνα γένεσις ... (πτώνες φθόρα), or πάνα γένεσις ... (σιάσσεις φθόρα) (12 letters), 1. 22 would be reduced to 82 letters; if we wrote πάνα γένεσις ... (φθήρνται) (10 letters), the total would be 80.
1. Ἐρμοῦ τοῦ τρισμεγίστου λόγος ἱερός. (Ὁτι) πρῶτος ἀπάντων ὁ θεός, καὶ θεών (τὸ πᾶν),
2. καὶ ή φύσις θεία. Ἀρχή τῶν ὄντων ο θεός, καὶ νοῦ καὶ φύσεως καὶ ὕλης, σοφίας εἰς δειξι
3. σκίτων ἃν ἀρχη καὶ του θεοῦ ἐνέργεια ή φύσις, κατ’ ἀνάγκην καὶ τέλος καὶ ἀνανέων
4. ἢν γὰρ σκότος ἐν αἰθώσῃ, καὶ ὃν ἄπειρον, καὶ πνεύμα λεπτῶν νοσον, δυνάμει θεία
5. δε ἢν τὰ ἐν χαί. ἀδιαφόρων δὲ ὄντων ἀπάντων καὶ ἀκατασκεφάλων, ἀνείδη δὴ φῶς ἄγιον
6. στοιχεία. τῶν γὰρ ὅλων δυοσθενῶν, ἀπεριωρίζη τὰ ἑλαφρά εἰς ύψος, ἀνακρεμασθέντος
7. πνεύματι οὐκέτια, καὶ τὰ βαρέα (κατηνέχθη).
8. οὐκ ἡμελέω πρός ἡγαίον οὐσία, καὶ ἐπάγη ἡ ἑγαίον ἡ ὑγιασιον οὐσία. καὶ διηρθώθη (ἡ πυράνθη οὐσία).
9. σωτός ὁ ἄνθεος· καὶ ὑφήθη ὁ οὐρανὸς ἐν κύκλοις ἐπτά, καὶ θεοὶ ἐν ἄστροις ἑπτά ὑπάρχονται σὺν
10. τοῖς αὐτῶν σημαίας ἀπαί. καὶ περιελάθη τὸ ἀδέρραν κυκλώματα πνεύματι θείον ἄχυρον
11. ἀνάκα Θεοῦ διὰ τῆς ἱερᾶς δύναμες προστασίαν αὐτῶν καὶ ἐγένοσθαι τῆς λεβάδας καὶ ἐξελάθη καὶ ἐναρκτα, καὶ χόρτος καὶ ἄνθοις παντὸς χλόης, κατὰ διακήρυξιν ὕπαιθρον καὶ ἀνακρεμασθέν τοῦ πυρός τοῦ. (τὸ πῦρ τοῦ)
12. τὸ στέρμα τῆς παλιγγενεσίας ἐν ἑαυτοῖς στερμαγονοῦντα. (..)
13. γενέσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐκλείπουσι τε
14. αὐξάνουσι διὰ αὐξαίεσθαι καὶ πληθύνουσι τε πληθυνθεῖ καὶ πάσων ἐναρκτοι ψυχὴν διὰ δρομήματος
15. θεῶν ἐγκυκλίων, παρασκεφάλωσι καὶ κατοπτεῖαν ὁμοιούν, καὶ πάντων τῶν ὑπ’ ὁμοιοὶς διακατείχαιν
16. καὶ εἰς γνώσιν θείας δύναμις, καὶ φύσεως ἐνεργείας μαρτυρίαν, ἐς τε σημείωσιν ἄγαθων, οὐρας
17. διαγνώσθηκαν ἄγαθων καὶ φαύλων καὶ πάσαν διαδυσυνάρτιον εὑρεῖ. ὑπάρχει τοι αὐτοίς βιούσι τε καὶ
18. ἀφανυθήθην πρὸς μοίραν δρομήματος ἐγκυκλίων θεῶν καὶ ἀναλυθήναι εἰς (τὰ στοιχεία καὶ οἱ
19. μοίραι)
20. ἔστωσι, μεγάλα ἀπομημονεύματα τεχνουργημάτων ἐτί τῆς γῆς καταλαμβάνει
t
21. (τῶν δὲ πολλῶν)
22. (ἀποδείκται φθορά?) τὰ καὶ ἐλλεττούμενα ἀνακωθήσηται θεῶν ἐγκυκλίων ἐναρκτώματος 
23. (ἐξερχόμενο)

on the face of the leaf and partly on the back, and that the writing on the back began at l. 20, both groups of lacunae may have been caused by the destruction of one corner.
134 CORPVS HERMETICVM

LIBELLVS IV

Contents

(God is incorporeal;) and that which is incorporeal is impercep-
tible by sense. God is prior to all corporeal things, and has made
them all. § 1 b.

Having made the Kosmos, God sent man down to earth. And
man was made for this purpose, that he might admire the Kosmos,
and learn to know its Maker. § 2.

God has ordained that those men only shall have mind who seek
it by their own free choice. The men without mind give heed
only to corporeal things, and ignore all that is higher. But those
who have sought and received the gift of mind rise above earthly
things, and see the Good; and thenceforward they scorn all that is
corporeal, and press on towards God. §§ 3–6 a.

If you would receive the gift of mind, you must begin by hating
the body. You are free to choose either things corporeal and
mortal, or things incorporeal and divine; but you cannot have the
one without rejecting the other. Those who choose the incorporeal
win glory by their choice; those who choose the corporeal exist to
no good purpose, and are a mere encumbrance in God's world.
God is blameless; if we suffer evil, it is because we ourselves have
chosen the evil. §§ 6 b–8 a.

We have to rise above all that is corporeal, and make our way
up to the Good. And to do this, we must put forth all our strength.
It is not easy; for the things that attract us here below are visible,
and the Good is invisible. §§ 8 b, 9.

. . . (A lacuna of unknown length.) . . .

God is the source whence all things have their being. He is to
things as the arithmetical unit is to the numbers derived from it;
that is to say, he contains all things, and is contained by none;
he generates all things, and is generated by none; he is perfect,
and all things else are imperfect. §§ 10, 11 a.

If you meditate on God, you will find yourself led upward; for
when a man has once caught sight of things divine, they draw him
to them. § 11 b.

Sources. The doctrine of Corp. IV is wholly Platonic. The
contrast between 'things corporeal' and 'things incorporeal' which
LIBELLVS IV: § 1a

runs through the document is the Platonic contrast between αἰσθήτα and νοητά; and the exhortation to 'hate the body' is in accordance with a side of Plato's teaching which is prominent in the Phaedo. The Platonic doctrine that human souls existed in a higher world before their incarnation is taken for granted (§ 2, κατέκευμη; § 9, επὶ τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ δραχαὶ δανακάμπτεω); and the doctrine that some souls return to that higher world after death is alluded to in § 4 (πιστεύουσα διὶ ἀνελεύσῃ); though the state of disembodied souls is not directly dealt with. The comparison of God to the μοράς was doubtless suggested by a theory of numbers which was adopted by Plato's immediate successors, and must have been known to all Platonists. The term τὸ ἄγαθον is employed in its Platonic sense, § 8 b. Reminiscences of the Timaeus occur in the account of the demiurgia, §§ 1 b, 2. The influence of particular passages in Plato's dialogues is to be recognized in the assertion of man's freedom of choice, §§ 6 b, 8 a (Pl. Rep. 1o. 617 e); in the mention of φθόνος, § 3 (Pl. Phaedrus 247 a ?); and probably in the mention of the loadstone, § 11 b (Pl. Ion 533 d).

The allegory of the crater may possibly have been suggested by Christian invitations to baptism; but this is a doubtful point. The words οὗ χερσὶν ἄλλα λόγῳ in § 1a may have been inserted by a Christian.

Date. On the hypothesis of Christian influence in § 4, a late date must be assumed; for such familiarity with a Christian rite as this implies would hardly have been possible for a Pagan writer before the latter part of the third century. Setting that hypothesis aside, I can find no indication of date in Corp. IV except its general resemblance to other Hermetica, from which we may infer that it was probably written in the second or third century A.D.

Title. The title δ Κρατήρ refers to the allegory in § 4. We have no means of knowing whether this title was given to the dialogue by its author, or subsequently inserted by some one else. The second title, ἡ μοράς, which is applicable only to §§ 10, 11 a, was probably added later.

§ 1a. ἔπειδῇ τὸν πάυτα κ.τ.λ. The text of §§ 1 a, 1 b is in confusion. The beginning of the dialogue is missing; there is no apodosis to the clause which stands first in the MSS. (ἔπειδῇ . . . ἄλλα λόγῳ); and there is no satisfactory connexion of thought between the sentence ὡστε οὖτως ὕπολαμβανε . . . τὰ ὄντα and the following
sentence, τὸν γὰρ ἐστὶν τὸ σῶμα ἐκεῖνον κ.τ.λ. I have tried to express what I suppose to have been the writer’s meaning by rearranging the sentences. It may be presumed that the passage ὅστε οὖν ὑπολάμβανε... τὰ δεῦτα stood at or near the end of a paragraph which dealt with the making of the Kosmos; and the words ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πάντων κόσμων ἐποίησεν ὁ δημιουργός supply a suitable transition from this to the following paragraph, § 2, which deals with the ‘sending down’ or embodiment of man.

[ὁ χεραίν ἄλλα λόγῳ]. These words would evidently be out of place at the beginning of § 2; if therefore we are right in transposing ἐπεὶ... ὁ δημιουργός to that position, it follows that ὁ χεραίν ἄλλα λόγῳ must have been added after the clause had been shifted from its original place.

The λόγος here spoken of is the creative fiat of the Demiurgus. It is not hypostatized or personified. The notion that God made the world ‘by his word’ or ‘by the breath of his mouth’ was familiar to the Jews; cf. Psalm 33. 6. It appears to have been familiar to the Egyptians also, from a time long before the beginnings of Hebrew literature. Moret, Rituel en Égypte, 1902, p. 155: ‘l’idée de la force créatrice du verbe existe déjà nettement dès les textes des pyramides’1 The thought expressed by the words ὁ χεραίν ἄλλα λόγῳ might therefore have been derived from sources either Jewish or Egyptian. But if these words were added later, it is most likely that they were inserted by a Christian.

§ 1 b. τὰ(α)ὖν τὸ γὰρ ἐστὶν τὸ (ἄ)σωμα(τοῦ) [[ἐκεῖνο]]. If we retain τὸ σῶμα ἐκεῖνον, the reading of the MSS., we must say that the writer, by a bold paradox, ascribes a ‘body’ to God, though at the same time he denies that God’s ‘body’ has any of the qualities of other bodies. But the statement that God has a body is not only unparalleled in Hermetic literature,2 but is also irreconcilable with what is said elsewhere in this document. (See especially § 6 b: δύο γὰρ ὄντων τῶν ὄντων, σῶματος καὶ ἀσωμάτου, ἐν οἷς τὸ θυτόν καὶ τὸ θεῖον.) There can therefore be little doubt that the text is corrupt. It would be possible to write ἔθος in place of σῶμα; compare the ἔθος

1 See also Moret, Mystères égyptiens, 1913, ch. 2, ‘Le mystère du verbe créateur’. But Moret hardly distinguishes with sufficient clearness between the doctrine that God made or makes things by his creative fiat (which may be ascribed to the Egyptians without hesitation), and the doctrine of a Logos regarded as a person distinct from the supreme God. (See note on Corp. I. 6.) The latter doctrine also may perhaps have existed in Egypt before the Hellenistic period; but the evidence for its existence seems to be far less conclusive.

2 See Corp. XIV. 7: τοῦτο ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ὑστέρ [σῶμα], ἡ πολιτεία.
LIBELLVS III: §§ 1 a–2

& oματος of God which is spoken of in Corp. XI. ii. 16 b. But it seems most likely that the writer, having asserted that God is οματος in the lost passage which preceded this sentence, here went on to explain what sort of thing το οματος is. I have accordingly written το οματος. The word ικεινου may have come from ικεινος misplaced.

ουτε γαρ τω των ουτων (ηκεινου), ουτε δυστυ, ουτε άηρ, ουτε πνεύμα. God was identified with fire by Heraclitus; with water, by Thales; with air, by Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia; and with fire or pneuma (i.e. heated air) by the Stoics. That which is common to all these theories is the notion that God is corporeal; and this is the notion against which the Hermetist is contending.

δε αυτοι προώντωσ (δε του παρόντος MSS.). Cf. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. XXI. 1: ιντι τοινυ το προον έπ(ικεινα) πάντων των ουτων κ.τ.λ. In Iren. 1. 1. 1, the term προών is applied to the supreme God of the Valentinians (the Bythos or Propator). In the writings of Plotinus and his successors, το προον would mean το έν, το ενεκιναι ουσίας (και νοο); but the writer of Corp. IV means merely that the existence of God is prior to the existence of the corporeal universe.

δασος γαρ ου, ‘μονω λαυτη τουτο αναθειναι1 Stob.—δασος ου. ‘μονω γαρ τουτο αναθεικες1 Corp. As the phrase δασος ου is here used in connexion with the demiurgia, it was probably suggested by Pl. Tim. 29 E: δασος ου, . . . το θεος αναθει λαυτη . . . βουληθεις γαρ ο θεος αναθαι μεν παντα, φλαιρων δε μηδεν ειναι κατα δυναμιν, ουτο δε παν δον ουν ουν ορατων . . . εις ταξιν . . . ἡγαγεν εκ της αταξιας. And if the writer was thinking of that passage, he may perhaps have written something like δασος γαρ ου, ‘βουληθει τα παντα) δασο αναθαι ειναι. The words μονοι λαυτη τουτο (μονοι γαρ τουτο codd. Corp.) might be a corruption of μονοι αυτος (‘inasmuch as he, and he alone, was good’); or they might possibly have come by duplication from μονος τη δε αυτος in the preceding sentence.

§ 2. ἥθλησε και την γην κομησαι. If my rearrangement of the passage is right, την γην is contrasted with των παντα κοσμων. Having made the Kosmos, God bethought him that something more was needed to complete the order and beauty of the earthly part of it, and supplied what was lacking by peopling the earth with men. The thought is somewhat similar to that of Pl. Tim. 41 b, where the Demiurgus, having made the gods, says that mortal creatures
have not yet been made; τούτων δὲ μὴ γενομένων, οὐρανὸς (i. e. the universe) ἀτελῆς ἦται· τὰ γὰρ ἄπαντα ἐν αὐτῷ γένη ζῴων οὐκ ἔζη, δει δὲ, εἰ μελέτη τέλεους ικανῶς ἐλνα. Cf. Kore Kosm., Exc. XXIII. 9: after the first creation, ἢ (τῶν ὕποκειμένων) φύσις ἐπιγίγνεται στείρα, until the gods represented to the supreme God ὅτι δέν ἐστὶ συγκοσμηθῆναι (καὶ) ταῦτα· whereupon the supreme God proceeded to make souls. Perhaps the word κοσμήσαι implies that it is a part of man’s function to tend and beautify the earth; if so, we may compare Ascl. Lat. I. 10: ‘curam propriam diligentia suae (suscipiens homo) efficit ut sit ipse et mundus uterque ornamento sibi.’ Ἡβ. 8: ‘sine quibus (sc. the work of the human arts and crafts) mundum deus noluit esse perfectum.’

κόσμον δὲ θείου σωμάτως κατέγεφυρε τὸν ἄθρωπον, (εἰκόνα) ζῷον ἀθάνατον ζῷον θητών. There is here a play on the two meanings of the word κόσμος (‘universe’ and ‘ornament’), as in ‘ut sit ipse et mundus ornamento sibi’ (Ascl. Lat.). The θείον σῶμα is ἢ γῆ; the ζῷον ἀθάνατον is the Kosmos, of which man (the microcosm)¹ is an image. But the combination of the two phrases is somewhat awkward; and it may be suspected that εἰκόνα ζῷον ἀθανάτον ζῷον θητῶν has been added by a later hand.

The word κατέγεφυρε shows that the writer holds the Platonic doctrine that human souls existed ἀνω before they were embodied on earth. In the Timaeus, we are told in mythical language that the souls were made by the Demiurgus, and that when made, they were first placed in the stars, and afterwards sent down to earth. But the writer of Corp. IV, as he says nothing about the ‘making’ of souls, may have held that individual human souls are without beginning. It is true that he repeatedly says that man γέγονε (‘has been made’) for a certain purpose; but when he uses this expression, he is speaking of man as an earthly organism composed of body and soul, and not of the unembodied soul.

[[καὶ ὁ μὲν κόσμος . . . τὸν νοῦν.]] This must have been written to introduce the topic of the distribution of νοῦς, and must therefore have stood at the beginning of § 3.

θείης γὰρ [[ἐγένετο]] τῶν ζῴων τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ ἄνθρωπος. Cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 8, where it is said that when God had made the Kosmos, ‘esse voluit alium qui illum quem ex se secerat intuéri potuisset’, and

¹ The saying that man is a μικρός κόσμος was attributed to Democritus (Diels Fr. Vorsokr. p. 398). In Arist. Phys. 253 b 36, a ζῷον of any kind is said to be a μικρός κόσμος.
therefore he made man. Corp. III 3 b, as emended: παρασκευάσας (τὸν ἀνθρώπον) εἰς κατοπτείναι οὐρανοῦ, ... καὶ εἰς γνώσιν θείας δυνάμεως, καὶ φύσεως ἐνεργείας παρατείναν. Iamblichus, Protrept. 9, says that Pythagoras, when he was asked what is the purpose οὐ χάριν ἡ φύσις ἡμᾶς ἐγέννησε καὶ ὁ θεός, answered, "τὸ θεάσασθαι τὸν οὐρανόν" καὶ ἐπικυρίως ἐφάσκεν εἰναι τῆς φύσεως, καὶ τούτου ἑνεκα παρεληθεύει τὸν βίον.

Something to which γὰρ refers, and which connected this sentence with what precedes, must have been lost.

καὶ (ἐπὶ τούτῳ ⟨⟨ἐγέννητο⟩⟩, τὸ τῶν κόσμου) θαυμάσαι, καὶ γνωρίζαι τὸν ποιήσαντα.—(καὶ θαύμασε καὶ ἐγνώρισε τὸν ποιήσαντα MSS.) As we are afterwards told that many men do not 'come to know the Maker', the indicatives θαύμασε and ἐγνώρισε, which imply that man in general does so, can hardly be right. In the following sections, the writer speaks of 'the purpose for which man was made' as a thing known to the reader; hence it may be inferred that he somewhere said what that purpose is. And if so, there can be little doubt that he said it at the end of the paragraph about the 'sending down' of man, and in some such words as I have written.

§ 3. τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸν νοῦν. It may be doubted whether λόγος ought here to be translated 'speech' or 'reason'. But in the parallel passage Corp. XII i. 12 (δύο ταύτα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ θεός . . . ἐχαρίσατο . . . τὸν τε νοῦν καὶ τὸν λόγον κ.τ.λ.), the word clearly means 'speech'.

tὸν δὲ νοῦν οὐκέτι (πάσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμέρισε). The νοῦς of this dialogue is the higher sort of νοῦς, which only a few men possess; and the lower sort of νοῦς, which goes along with speech, and is possessed by all mankind, is not expressly mentioned. Cf. Corp. I. 21 fin.: οἷς πάντες γὰρ ἀνθρώπων νοῦν ἔχουσιν; Ascl. Lat. I. 7 a: 'non omnes . . . intellegentiam veram adepti sunt.'

ὁ γὰρ φθόνος οὐκ ὀφρανόθη (ἐκείν MSS.) ἐρχεται. It would be possible to write ἀνωθέν; but ἀνθέν, the reading of the MSS., may very likely have arisen out of ὀφρανόθη (i.e. ὀφρανόθῆν abbreviated).

φθὸνος does not 'start from' heaven or 'begin with' heaven; i.e. οἷς πάνω ἐγγίνεται ἀπὸ τῶν οὐρανίων ἀρχόμενος; it is not present in all beings from God downward. Cf. Pl. Phaedrus 247 Α: ἐπεται δὲ (τοῖς θεοῖς) ὁ δὲι θέλων τε καὶ δυνάμενος φθόνος γὰρ ἔχω θείου χῶρον ὑσταται. Pl. Tim. 29 E: τούτου δὲ (sc. φθόνον) ἐκτὸς ὄν (ὁ θεός) κ.τ.λ.
"Nous, or the gnosis of which nous is the organ, is a thing to be striven for. The Hermetists speak of gnosis sometimes as a gift bestowed by God's grace, and at other times, as a thing to be sought by human effort. This writer takes the latter view, and insists on man's freedom to choose either the higher life or the lower.

§ 4. κρατήρα μεγάν . . . κατέπεψε κ.τ.λ. This passage was known to the alchemist Zosimus; see Zosim. ii. 8 (Testim.), βαπτισθεων τη κρατηρα.

Whence did the writer of Corp. IV get his notion of 'a great basin filled with νοῦς', in which men's 'hearts' are invited to dip themselves? The figure must have been suggested to him by some sacramental rite with which he was acquainted; but it seems clear that he himself attached no value and ascribed no efficacy to the sacramental rite of which he was thinking, and that he uses it merely as a figure to illustrate his doctrine of νοῦς. To what cult did the rite which he had in mind belong? It is not impossible that his allegory was suggested by the Christian sacrament of baptism, and that the κρατήρ corresponds to the Christian font. The use of the words βαπτίζειν and πιστεύειν, and the mention of a κύρυμα by which all are invited to undergo the rite, agree well with this hypothesis; and the language of § 4 might have been used by a Christian almost without alteration, except that he would have spoken of πνειμα instead of νοῦς. But on the other hand, it seems improbable that a Pagan, writing before the end of the third century, would have been so familiar with the Christian rite of baptism as to base an allegory on it. Did a similar practice of sacramental dipping exist in any Pagan cult which is likely to have been known to the writer of Corp. IV? Purifications by sprinkling, washing, or bathing were no doubt in constant use in the indigenous cults of Egypt, and in almost all the other religions of the time. But the rite presupposed in Corp. IV. 4 is not a mere ceremonial purification, but an operation of sacramental efficacy, by which the personality of the votary

---

1 On the Jewish rites of purification by washing or dipping, see Schürer, Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes, 4th ed., II, p. 564 f., and III, pp. 181-185. Proselytes, at their admission to the Jewish community, were cleansed from the pollutions of their Pagan life by a ceremonial ablution. This is spoken of in the exhortation addressed to Pagans in the Jewish Orcu. Sibyl. 4. 163 ff. (written probably towards the end of the first century A.D.): ἀ μέλειαν μετάθεσε Βρυστὴν τάξιν . . . ἐν ποταμῷ λύσασθε δύον δέμας δεδώσας, ἵνα ἑξήνωμεν ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων πάρον ἐργαν ἱερόν συνεκτίμην αὐτοῖς. But this Jewish 'baptism' of proselytes (if it is to be called by that name) hardly amounted to a sacrament.
is profoundly transformed; and if a non-Christian 'baptism' in that sense was anywhere in existence, it is most likely to have existed in Syria, or at any rate, to have been of Syrian origin.¹

We have further to consider from what source the writer of Corp. IV can have got the term κρατήρ, which he uses to denote the tank or basin in which the votaries are dipped. In Pl. Tim. 41 D, the vessel in which the Demiurgus 'mixed' or 'blended' the substances of which he made the world-soul and the individual souls is called a κρατήρ. Cf. Lucian Bis accusatus 34. 834 (a jesting reference to the Timaeus): ἵκαια σμικρολογούμενος, εἰ ἄθανατος ἡ ψυχή, καὶ πόσας κοτίλας ὁ θεός, ὃποτε τῶν κόσμων κατεσκευάζετο, τῆς ἀμυγοῦ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντας οὐδεὶς ἕνεχεν ἐς τὸν κρατήρα ἐν φ' τὰ πάντα ἐκείναντο.² But the κρατήρ of Corp. IV, which is a receptacle containing a liquid in which people dip themselves, cannot have been derived from the 'mixing-bowl' or 'crucible' spoken of in the Timaeus.

There seem to have been two Orphic poems called Κρατήρ. Servius ad Aen. 6. 667 (Abel Orphica fr. 159): 'ad (Musaeum Orpheus) primum carmen scripsit quod appellatur Crater.' Joannes Diaconus ad Hes. Theog. 617 (Abel ib. fr. 164): ἄκουε γὰρ τοῦ Ὀρφέως ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ Κρατήρι τάδε σοι λέγοντος: 'Εστιν δὴ πάντων ἄρχη Ζεύς, θνὸν γὰρ ἑκὼδε κ.τ.λ. Joannes Diaconus ad Hes. Theog. 950 (Abel ib. fr. 160): μαρτυρεὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ Κρατήρι,(i. e. in the shorter of the two poems which bore that title) τὸ Ὀρφεῖς, τάδε λέγων Ἐρμῆς ὅ ἐμμηνώ δὸν πάντων κ.τ.λ. The poem from which these extracts were taken seems to have contained a catalogue of gods, with explanations of their names and functions in the Stoic manner. We are not told the meaning of the title Κρατήρ which was given

¹ See notes on Corp. XIII, and Appendix on Rebirth.

² There seems to have been two Orphic poems called Κρατήρ. Servius ad Aen. 6. 667 (Abel Orphica fr. 159): 'ad (Musaeum Orpheus) primum carmen scripsit quod appellatur Crater.' Joannes Diaconus ad Hes. Theog. 617 (Abel ib. fr. 164): ἄκουε γὰρ τοῦ Ὀρφέως ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ Κρατήρι τάδε σοι λέγοντος: 'Εστιν δὴ πάντων ἄρχη Ζεύς, θνὸν γὰρ ἑκὼδε κ.τ.λ. Joannes Diaconus ad Hes. Theog. 950 (Abel ib. fr. 160): μαρτυρεὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ Κρατήρι,(i. e. in the shorter of the two poems which bore that title) τὸ Ὀρφεῖς, τάδε λέγων Ἐρμῆς ὅ ἐμμηνώ δὸν πάντων κ.τ.λ. The poem from which these extracts were taken seems to have contained a catalogue of gods, with explanations of their names and functions in the Stoic manner. We are not told the meaning of the title Κρατήρ which was given

³ See notes on Corp. XIII, and Appendix on Rebirth.

It is no doubt possible that in some of the many Egyptian temple-cults a sacramental rite of dipping in a basin or tank was practised. (There seems to be an allusion to some such rite in the Egyptian Book of the Dead, 'Chapter of the going forth by day', Erman's transl. 459 f., quoted by Dieterich Mithraïsit. p. 195.

ἀμαρτία is driven away, and the sin which was upon me is cast down. I have washed myself in those two great ponds which are in Hermopolis, in which the offering of men is purified for that great god who dwells there. I go on the way where I wash my head in the lake of the righteous.¹ But the writer of Corp. IV speaks of an invitation to all who will to receive this baptism; and that is hardly in accordance with the spirit of the Egyptian religion. In the cults of Egypt, the privilege of sacramental initiation appears to have been almost entirely restricted to the priestess.

⁴ Arnobius 2. 25 says that the anima (humana) was spoken of by certain Platonists as affluens ex crateribus vivis. This phrase was probably suggested by the passage in the Timaeus.
to it; but Joannes Diaconus, in the same connexion, quotes from
'Orpheus' the line Ζεύς δὲ τὰ πάντων ἦστι 'Θεός' (πατήρ) πάντων τε
κρατήρις (A el fr. 161); and it seems probable that this fragment
also belongs to 'the smaller Crater', and that the poem was so named
because it said that Zeus 'mixed all things in a bowl' when he
made the Kosmos. (Cf. τὸν κρατήρα τὴν φανατόν κρατάννυτο in
Lucian.) If so, the κρατήρ of Corp. IV can have nothing to do with
'the smaller Crater' of Orpheus.

We are also told that in some Orphic poem 'the crater of Diony-
sus' was spoken of. Proclus in Tim. 316 a (Abel Orph. p. 216):
καὶ Ὁρφεὺς ὃδε μὲν καὶ τὸν τοῦ Διονύσου κρατήρα, πολλοὶς δὲ καὶ
ἄλλοις (κρατήρας) ἦδρει περὶ τὴν ἥλιακὴν τράπεζαν. Macrobius
Somn. Scip. i. 12. 8 identifies the constellation called the Crater
with 'the crater of Dionysus', and says that unembodied souls
drink from it, and being thereby intoxicated, are drawn down to
earth and embodied there. To Macrobius then, 'the crater of
Dionysus' meant the vessel which contains the drink of Lethe; and
the term 'may possibly have had the same meaning in the Orphic
passage to which Proclus refers. But it is evident that the Hermetist's
notion of a bath or font filled with Mind cannot be in any way
connected with Macrobius's notion of a drinking-vessel filled with
the wine of Lethe.

It might with somewhat more show of reason be conjectured that
the legend that Empedocles leapt into the crater of Etna arose
through perversion of a saying that he plunged into the κρατήρ of
divine fire (i.e. of νοῦς), and so became a god. Diog. Laert. 8. 69:
'Ἱππόβοιτος δὲ φύσιν ἕξαναστάντα (τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα) ὠδεύειν ὡς ἐπὶ
τὴν Αἰτνὴ, ἐστὶ παραγενόμενον ἐπὶ τοῦ κρατῆρα τοῦ πυρὸς ἐναλύουσιν
καὶ ὅφαινθηναι, βουλὸμενον τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ φύσιν βεβαιῶσαι ὧτι
γεγόνος θεός. (I do not know the date of Hippobotus; but the
story was commonly known in the time of Horace, Ars poet. 464.)
On this hypothesis, the Hermetist's allegory might possibly have
been suggested by a conception which originated among the Orphici
or Pythagoreans of Sicily and South Italy. But there is no evidence
that the word κρατήρ was thus employed by any Pagan school or
sect; and perhaps the passage about 'the basin filled with mind'
can be most satisfactorily accounted for by assuming that the author
of Corp. IV, though himself a Pagan, had heard or read a Christian
invitation to baptism, and adapted a few sentences of it to his own
purpose.
IV: § 4

The word ‘soul’ here was not thus used by Plato, nor by philosophic writers in general after Plato’s time. On the other hand, it is habitually thus used in the Septuagint and the New Testament. Its employment here might therefore be considered to tell in favour of the hypothesis that the source of this passage was Christian. But the word ‘heart’ was used in the sense of ‘soul’ or ‘mind’ by Egyptians also.

It may be suspected that the truereading is to

KaTtirifufiiToy avOpwirovin § 2), and that riv KpaTrjpahas been added by error. In the traditional text, tov Karairiavra tov KpaTrjpa refers to KpaTrjpa . . . katέπεμψε at the beginning of § 4; but I am inclined to think that we ought to read some such word as katέστησε there in place of Katort/m/. The ‘sending down’ of a ‘great tank’ from heaven is a process that it is not very easy to picture; and Katέστησε would agree better with the preceding verb ἰδρύσατο.

tέλειοι ἄγρινοτο ἀνθρώποι, τῶν νοῶν δεξάμενοι. A man without νοῦς is ἄτελῆς; it is only when he has received νοῦς that he becomes a complete or fully-developed man. The word τέλειοι sometimes carried with it religious associations connected with τελετή and τέλος in the sense of ‘initiation’. But in this sentence, the common and popular meaning of τέλειοι gives a satisfactory sense, and there is no need to look for any other.

1 Its use in the speech of Alcibiades, Pl. Sympos. 218 a (τὴν καρδίαν γὰρ ἢ ψυχῆν ἢ τι δει αἰτῶ δορώματι πληγῖτο τε καὶ δηχθεῖς ὧδε τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων) is an isolated instance.

2 Reitzenstein (Heilen, Mysterienrel. p. 165) says that the Hermetist associated the word τέλειος with τελετή, and meant to imply by it that the men of whom he speaks are ‘consecrated’ (geweiht’) by a sacramental rite. But I see no reason to think that any such meaning was intended here.

Reitzenstein ib. says ‘eim κρατήριον wird bei der Reinigung oder Taufe in den griechischen Mysterien immer verwendet’; but he does not give any authority for
§§ 4, 5. Ὅσοι δὲ ἦμαρτον τῷ κράτῳ ματός... γεγονέναι πιστεύοντες. There is evidently something wrong in the long string of participles which this passage contains; but it is doubtful how the text ought to be corrected. The words τὸν νῦν μὴ προσεληφθότες correspond to τὸν νῦν δὲκάμενοι above; it therefore seems probable, on the ground of symmetry, that the sentence ended at προσεληφθότες. If so, we have to provide a subject and a verb for the sentence which follows. I have provided a subject by inserting καὶ ὅστι μέν, which seems needed to match Ὅσοι δὲ... μετέσχον, ὅστι below; and a verb, by altering ἐξοντες into συνέχεονται.

§ 5. [αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις τοῖς ταῖς τῶν ἀλώγων ἢ λέγων παραπλήσιαι.] The two sorts of men are sufficiently distinguished by the fact that the one sort possesses νοῦς and the other does not; why should it be said that their αἰσθήσεις also differ? And if the aἰσθήσεις of the ἄνω ἄνθρωπος are like those of the beasts, in what respect do the aἰσθήσεις of the ἄνων ἄνθρωπος differ from those of the beasts? We might rather have supposed that, in respect of their αἰσθήσεις, all men are alike. Besides, there is some awkwardness in saying that the αἰσθήσεις of the ἄνων ἄνθρωπος is like the ἄλογα ξύλα, when we have just been told that he possesses λόγος. It seems best therefore to bracket these words.

ὃργῇ καὶ ἀκρασίας συνέχονται.—(καὶ ἐν θυμῷ καὶ ἐν ὀργῇ τὴν κρᾶσιν ἔχοντες MSS.) There is no meaning in τὴν κρᾶσιν ἔχοντες; and ἀκρασία is a probable correction. It may be considered a substitute for ἀπιθυμία; and some such word is needed to suit the following phrase ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων ἡδοναῖς καὶ ὀρέξεσι, which has nothing to do with θυμὸς or ὀργή. The words καὶ ἐν θυμῷ are probably a variant for καὶ ἐν ὀργῇ. In Corp. XIII. 7 b, ἀκρασία stands third, and ὀργῇ tenth, in a list of twelve evil passions.

θαυμάζοντες τὰ ὅθεν θάνα MSS.) The reading of the MSS. seems to have resulted from a mixture of θαυμάζοντες τὰ ὅθεν θάνα and ὅθεν θαυμάζοντες τὰ θάνα θάνα. § 6 α. αὐτῇ... ἢ τοῦ νοῦ ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, ἐπιστήμης τῶν θεῶν εὐπορία καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ κατανόησις.—(αὐτῇ... ἢ τοῦ νοῦ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τῶν θεῶν εὐπορία, καὶ ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ κατανόησις MSS.) There is no such word as εὐπορία; and the correction ἐπιστήμης... εὐπορία is confirmed by τὸν νοῦν ἔχον καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης μεταφράσῃ below. The phrase this statement. At Eleusis, the preliminary purification of the mystae by bathing took place, not in a καρπή, but in the sea, as is shown by the ἄλαος μόσται. I know of no Greek mysteries in which bathing or dipping was the central or most significant part of the sacramental action, as it is in the Hermetist's allegory.
§ 4-6. 

§ 4. ἐπιστήμη τῶν θείων καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ κατανόησις is equivalent to γνώσις; and γνώσεως εἰσορία might very well be said to be the ἐνέργεια of νοῦς. Some such word as ἐνέργεια is wanted here; and there is a superfluous ἐνέργεια at the beginning of § 7, which may possibly have been transposed from § 6 a.

§ 6 b. ἐὰςάνω τοῦ κρατήρος βπτισθῆναι βοῦλομαι. A mention of the κρατήρ is out of place at the end of § 6 a, as Hermes is there describing the results produced by the possession of νοῦς, and has ceased to talk about the 'basin'. On the other hand, τοῦ κρατήρος is wanted to supplement βπτισθῆναι in the words spoken by Tat. A genitive might be used with βπτισθῆναι, as with λούσθαι. Cf. ἐβπτισταυτῷ τοῦ νοῦς in § 4.

ἀν γε πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα μισήσῃ, . . . σεαυτὸν φιλήσαι οὐ δύνασαι. Φίλησαι δὲ σεαυτόν, νοῦν ἔξεις. Tat’s words, ‘I wish to be dipped in the basin’, mean ‘I wish to get νοῦς’; and Hermes replies: ‘If you wish to get νοῦς, the way to do so is to hate your body, and love yourself’. τὸ σῶμα means the separate and narrowly limited self of the man who is sunk in matter; and σεαυτόν means ‘your true self’, i.e. the larger and higher self of the man who has risen above the limitations of the material world. Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 21 a: ἀρκεῖ δὲ κατακλείσῃ σου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι κ.τ.λ. On the two meanings of φιλαυτος, see Ar. Eth. Nic. 9. 8. The man whom the Hermetist describes as ‘loving himself’ corresponds to Aristotle’s σπουδαῖος, who is ready, if need be, to die for others, and by that very fact, shows himself to be φιλαυτος in the sense that he seeks τὸ καλὸν for himself. The Hermetist, however, was probably not thinking of the man who shows his φιλαυτία by unselfish action, but rather of the man who develops that which is best and highest in himself by religious meditation, and in that way seeks and finds his true good.

Πῶς ταύτα λέγεις; ταύτα means especially the paradoxical statement ‘if you do not first hate your body, you cannot love yourself’.

ἡ αἰρέσις θατέρου καταλείπεται. The writer insists on man’s freedom of choice. Cf. Pl. Rep. 10. 617 e: οὐχ ὡμάς δαίμων λήξεται, ἄλλ’ ὡμες δαίμων αἰρήσεθε. . . . ἄρηθ ἡ ἄδιστοτον ἔγν ἔρμών καὶ δημάλων πλέον καὶ ἔλατον αὐτῆς ἔκαστος ἔξει. αὐτὰ δλαμένων θεός ἀναίτιος. That passage was frequently referred to by later writers as a locus classicus on the subject of free will; and

1 See e.g. Porphyry ἐν τοῦ ἐφ’ ἠμῶν, Stob. 1. 8. 39, vol. ii, p. 163 W.
the author of Corp. IV no doubt had it in mind. Cf. ὥ μὲν θεὸς ἀναίτιος in § 8 a.

οὐ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ὅλων τε καταλαβεῖν.—(οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἀμφότερα ἐν οἷς τε ἡ ἐξαιρέσεις καταλείπεται MSS.) You are free to choose either the one or the other (sc. either τὰ θνητά, the illusory goods of the corporeal world, or τὰ θεῖα, the real goods of the incorporeal world), but you cannot have both. This must have been the writer's meaning, though it may be doubted in what words he expressed it. The phrase ἡ ἐξαιρέσεις καταλείπεται is a doublet of ἡ αἰρέσις θατέρου καταλείπεται above, and has taken the place of the original ending of the sentence.

τὸ δὲ έτέρον ἐλαττωθὲν τὴν τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐφανέρωσεν ἐνεργείαν. When the body 'gets the worst of it', and the man ceases to be influenced by the bodily πάθη, then τὸ θεῖον works, and the effects of its working become manifest in him; and the reverse takes place when the body gets the upper hand.

§ 7. ((οὐ μόνον)) τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν ἀποσώζουσα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐσέβειαν ἐπιδεικνύσα. (Ἀποδείκνυσα . . . ἐπιδεικνύσα MSS.) It would be a strange anticlimax to say that something 'not only changes a man into a god, but also shows that he is pious'. We need two phrases which can stand in contrast with τὸν μὲν ἀνθρωπὸν ἀπώλεσαι, . . . εἰς (δὲ) τὸν θεὸν ἐπιλημμέλησεν' and the opposite of ἀπολέσαι is σώσαι. It may therefore be presumed that the author wrote ἀποσώζουσα. The choice of the better not only 'brings the man off safe' (from the evils which beset him who 'loves the body'), but also entitles him to claim the merit of piety. If it merely saved him from misery, the αἰρέσις τοῦ κρατῆτος might be called σύμφορος, but hardly καλὴ; but since it also shows him to be εὐσέβης, it is καλλιττη.

οὐδὲν δὲ (ἤττον) εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐπιλημμέλησεν [ἡ τοῦτο μόνον]. What is wanted here, to match the words τὴν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐσέβειαν ἐπιδεικνύσα above, is a statement to the effect that the choice of the worse shows the man to be δυσσεβῆς. The meaning required may be obtained by writing οὐδὲν δὲ ἤττον; and we may suppose that, after ἤττον had dropped out, some one tried to restore sense by adding ἥ τοῦτο μόνον. (οὐδὲν ἥ occurs repeatedly in the Hermetica in the sense of οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἥ.)

οὐδ' ὁ μόνον ποιμενοῦσιν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. If a man fails to recognize 'for what purpose he has been made' (ἐτι τί γέγονεν, § 4), and does not discharge the function which his Maker has assigned to him,
he is offending against God. The life of such a man serves no good purpose; it is nothing but an unmeaning show; and his presence in the world is a mere hindrance to those who seek to live as God meant them to live.

The writer speaks of πομπαί with evident dislike. What sort of 'processions' was he thinking of? The πομπαί most frequently seen in the streets of Alexandria and other Egyptian towns must have been religious processions, more or less resembling the πομπή of Isis at Corinth which is described by Apuleius. The Hermetists in general may have taken little interest in the ceremonial of the established cults; but we should hardly have expected one of them to speak of such things with positive contempt. The writer of Ascl. Lat. III would certainly not have spoken in this tone about a piece of religious ritual, and would not have said that it has no efficacy (οὐδὲν ἐνεργήσας δύναται); but it is possible that the writer of Corp. IV was more averse to the usages of the popular religion. At any rate, it is not the religious significance of the πομπή that he is here concerned with; he is thinking of it merely as a train of people passing through the streets; and his point is that the persons who take part in the procession are led passively along (παραγόμενοι), and are not only doing no useful work themselves, but hindering other people from going about their business. To one who wanted only to be left in peace to live the contemplative life, the tumult of a city festival, culminating at the time when the procession was on its way, may well have been a mere annoyance.

The word πομπή is similarly used by the alchemist Zosimus (i. 4 Testim.; Reitzenstein Poim. p. 102): τοὺς τουοίτους δὲ ἄνθρωπους ὁ Ἑρμής ἐν τῷ περὶ φύσιν ἔκλαι ἄνοιας, τῆς εἰμαρμένης μόνον ὁντας πομπάς, κ.τ.λ. Corp. IV was certainly known to Zosimus, since he speaks elsewhere of 'dipping oneself in the Crater'; but it is not clear whether he is here referring to it, or to some other Hermetic document. In Corp. IV, Hermes does not indeed use the word ἄνοια, but he says that men of this sort are devoid of νοῦς, and also speaks of τὰ ἀσώματα. But on the other hand he says nothing about εἰμαρμένη; and if Zosimus is referring to Corp. IV, he must himself have introduced the conception of εἰμαρμένη (i.e. the power by which τὰ σωματικὰ are governed) in giving his interpretation of its contents. Zosimus gives to the document of which

1 μόνον codd.: μόνων Reitz.
2 I. e. led passively along by Heimarmene.
he speaks the title Περὶ φύσεων (possibly Περὶ (τῶν δύο) φύσεων?). This might be taken to mean either 'concerning the two kinds of things' (viz. σώματα and ἀσώματα), or 'concerning the two kinds of men' (viz. ἔννοιας and ἄνοιξ); and understood in either of these senses, it would be a possible title for Corp. IV.1

Reitzenstein Poim. p. 102 says that the simile of the πομπή 'is taken from Greek philosophy'; but I do not know to what philosophic writings he refers. The comparison of a πομπή is used in a different way by Epictetus, Diss. 4. 1. 104: οὐχὶ ἔκεινός (sc. ὁ θεὸς) σε ἐλείγαγεν; οὐχὶ ὡς θητὸν; οὐχὶ ὡς μετὰ ἄλλον σαρκιδίου ζήσοντα ἐπὶ γῆς, καὶ θειόμενον τὴν διοίκησιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ συμποτεύοντα αὐτῷ καὶ συνορφάσσοντα πρὸς ἄλλον; οὐθένα όμων, ὡς δέδοται σει θειόμενος τὴν πομπήν καὶ τὴν πανῆγυριν, εἰτα, ὅταν ο' ἐξῆλθη, πορευόμεθα προσκινήσας καὶ εὐχαριστήσας ὑπὲρ διὸν ἡγοῦναι καὶ ἔδει; In that passage, the πομπή is a show exhibited to us for our entertainment.—Marcus Aurelius 7. 3 describes human life as πομπῆς κενοστοιεία. This is a somewhat closer parallel; but the word πομπή must have had different associations for a Roman emperor.

§ 8 a. ὅ μὲν θεὸς ἀναίτιος, ἡμεῖς δὲ αἰτίοι τῶν κακῶν, ταῦτα προκρίνοντες τῶν ἁγαθῶν. The germ of this thought is as old as Homer. In Od. 1. 32 sqq., Zeus says οἶνον δὴ νῦ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιώνται. ἐξ ἡμῶν γὰρ φασὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ ποτὲ ἁπαθαλίγησθαν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἀλλ' ἠκούσαν. But there can be little doubt that the source from which the Hermetist got it was Pl. Rep. 10. 617 E. Compare also Pl. Tim. 42 D, where the Demiurgus explains to the new-made souls the laws under which they are to live; διάθεσμοθέτησας δὲ πάντα αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, ὡς τῆς ἐπείτα εἰς κακίας ἐκάστων ἀναίτιος, ἐσπερείς κ.τ.λ. Rep. 2. 379 C: τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀλλ' ἀττα δὲ ζητεῖν τὰ αἰτία, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν θεῶν.

§ 8 b. (...) ὅρης ... πόσα ἡμᾶς δεὶ σώματα ... διεξελθεῖν. The thought expressed in this passage may be connected with that of the preceding paragraph in this way: 'in order to draw near to God, who is incorporeal, we must reject all that is corporeal; we must therefore rise above the corporeal Kosmos.' But in the traditional text, the connexion is not apparent; it seems necessary therefore to assume a lacuna before ὅρης.

When he says that 'we must pass through many bodies in succession', the writer does not mean that we must be many times

1 In IV. 6 b (δύο γὰρ ὄντων τῶν ὄντων, σώματος καὶ ἀσώματον), one might very well read οἷς ὃν τῶν φύσεων in place of ὄντων τῶν ὄντων.
incarnated. He is speaking of men who are still living on earth, not of the destiny of the soul after death; and his meaning is that we must ascend in thought to the heavens, and beyond them, to reach 'the incorporeal', which here, as often, is spoken of as if it were situated in extracosmic space. Cf. § 5: πάντα ἑπεραλάβοντες τῷ ἐαυτῶν νοὶ... εἰ τε ἐστιν ὑπὲρ ὀδρανόν. The many 'bodies' which the mind must successively traverse in its upward course are, first, the atmosphere, (or perhaps a lower and a higher stratum of the atmosphere, as in the system of Posidonius), and then, the several subdivisions of the region of fire, namely, the seven planet-spheres, and the sphere of the fixed stars. Compare Corp. XI. ii. 19, where the ascent of the ψυχή (i.e. the mind or thought) is similarly described.

καὶ πόσος χρόνος δὲμόνων [ ] καὶ δρόμους ἀστήρων. This is another way of describing the same ascent through successive strata of matter. The daemons are the inhabitants of the atmosphere; the planets and fixed stars are the inhabitants of the region of fire.

(. . . ἀνέβασαν γὰρ τῷ ἁγάθῳ, καὶ ἄναρτον. The region of τῷ ἄναρτον, which is above the highest heaven, and extends beyond it without limit, is filled with the Good. (Cf. § 5, τοσοῦτον ἐνυφώσαντες εἶδον τῷ ἁγάθῳ.) When you have once entered that region, you will never come to the end of it, or reach its further boundary; you may continue your ascent for ever, and there will still be more of the Good above you.

Here again, the connexion of the thought with what precedes can be guessed without difficulty; but the writer must have expressed it, and some words or sentences must therefore have been lost before ἀνέβασαν.

καὶ ἀπέλευ, αὐτῷ ἔδω καὶ ἄναρχον, ἡμὺν ἔδω δικαίαν ἀρχὴν ἐξειν τὴν γνώσιν. The Good is correlative to God, if not identical with God (see Corp. II, Corp. VI, and Corp. X); and 'for itself', or in itself, it is without end and without beginning, even as God is. 'For us' also (ἡμὺν, as opposed to ἐαυτῷ or ἄναρχον), it is without end; that is to say, the man who has once attained to it will continue to enjoy the possession of it for ever. But 'for us' it is not without beginning. The unilluminated man is not aware of its existence. It is only when a man gets gnosis that the eternally existent Good presents itself to his consciousness; and from his point of view, the existence of the Good appears to begin at the moment when he first becomes conscious of it.

τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ ἄρχαία άνακάμπτειν. The σωματικά (Plato's αἰσθήτα), to which we have grown accustomed since our incarnation; the παλαιὰ καὶ ἄρχαία are τὰ ἀσώματα (Plato's νοητα), i.e. the things of the higher world in which we lived before we were 'sent down' to earth.

τὰ δὲ ἄφαντα ὑποστηθὲντες. The fact that these things are ἄφαντα makes it difficult to believe in their existence. The words ἄφαντα and ἄφαντος are here employed as in Corp. V.

ὶς ἄφερέτερα δὲ ἢστι τὰ κακά. The κακά are the corporeal things which seem to us to be goods, but are really evils. Cf. Corp. VI. 2 b–4 a and 6.

τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ... πᾶσιν ἀνόμοιον. This passage is meaningless in the MSS.; I have put a meaning into it by transposing ἀδύνατον ... φαντάσαι, and inserting δῆ. If the words τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἄφαντα τῶν φανερῶν are sound, they must be explained in accordance with the statement ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀσώματον σώματι φαντάσαι, and τὰ φανερὰ must here be taken to mean our bodily organs of sense, which are themselves perceptible by sense. We cannot see the Good with our bodily eyes; for the Good is incorporeal, and that which is incorporeal cannot be seen by that which is corporeal.

διὰ τούτο, (ὁτεί) ἀστήρ μὲν ἦστιν ὁμοίων, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ἀνόμοιον. Cf. § 1 b, as emended: τοοῦτο γὰρ ἦστι τὸ ἀσώματον, οὐχ ... ὀρατῶν, ... οὗτος ἄλλος τῶν ὁμοίων.1 It is to be presumed that in § 9, as well as in § 1 b, the subject is τὸ ἀσώματον. When the writer speaks of ὁμοίων and ἀνόμοιον, he is thinking of the saying that 'like is known by like'. (Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 20 b: τὸ γὰρ ὁμοίων τῶ ὁμοίων νοητόν. Ar. De an. 1. 2, 404 b 17: γινώσκεσθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὁμοίου. Philolaus, in Sext. Emp. Math. 7. 92: ὅτῳ τοῦ ὁμοίου τὸ ὁμοίων καταλαμβάνεσθαι πέρικεν.) That which is ἀσώματον is 'unlike' σώμα, and therefore cannot be apprehended by the σωματικά αἰσθήσεις; but it can be apprehended by the νοῦς in man, which is itself ἀσώματος; for all that is ἀσώματον is ἀστήρ ὁμοίων, or in other words, all ἀσώματα are ἀλλήλοις ὁμοία.

[ἀστήρ διαφορὰ ... πρὸς τὸ ὁμοίον.] I can make nothing of this; and it seems best to assume that it is a marginal note.

1 A similar phrase occurs in a sentence attributed to Philolaus in Philo De opif. mundi 33. 100, Cohn I, p. 34: ἦστι γὰρ ἡγεμόν καὶ ἄρχον ἀδύνατον θεὸν εἰς εἰς, δὲ οὐ, μόνιμος, ἀδύνατος, ἀστήρ ὁμοίων, ἄλλος τῶν ἄλλων.
§ 10. (...) [ἡ γὰρ μονάς ... καὶ μίξα] κ.τ.λ. The breach of continuity at the beginning of § 10 can be accounted for only by supposing that a connecting passage has been lost.¹

The text of § 10 is in confusion; and the best way of restoring order seems to be to assume that the writer first said that a certain thing is the ἀρχή of all things, and then illustrated his meaning by the comparison of the arithmetical unit, which is the ἀρχή of all numbers. If so, the words ἡ γὰρ μονάς are out of place at the beginning of the paragraph. Moreover, the pointlessness of the repetition οὖσα ἀρχή καὶ μίξα ... ὡς ἂν μίξα καὶ ἀρχή shows that there is something wrong in the first sentence. I have therefore removed the words ἡ γὰρ μονάς, πάντων οὖσα μίξα καὶ ἀρχή, and inserted them below, where they fit in well. But what is the lost subject for which ἡ μονάς has been substituted? What is it that is here said to be the ἀρχή of all things? It might be τὸ ἀγαθόν, or τὸ θεόν, or ὁ θεός. But in § 11 b, we read αὐτὴ σοι ... ὑπογεγράπται τοῦ θεοῦ ἑκόνων' and if these words were meant to refer to §§ 10, 11 a, it would seem that the lost subject of § 10 init. must be ὁ θεὸς. Compare Hermippus (Kroll and Viereck) 1. 18. 135: ἡ δὲ μονάς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἀρχή καὶ μίξα τις ὑπόκειται, ἐν δὲ τοῖς νοητοῖς ὁ θεός, ἀφ' ὧν καθάπερ ἐκ πηγῆς ἔργην τὰ ὑπάρχοντα.

ἐξ οὖσαν ἄλλ' ἢ [ἐξ] αὐτῆς. It is difficult to see any definite meaning in the statement that a thing 'has arisen out of itself', or 'has been generated by itself'; but to the Hermetists, and other writers of their time, the phrase appeared to express an important truth. The epithet αὐτογενής, 'generated by himself', was frequently applied to God, and seems to have been regarded as equivalent to ἀγαθόν, 'without beginning'. See Ascl. Lat. II. 14 b: 'ex se nata sunt'. αὐτογενὴς occurs in the same sense in Pseudo-Philolaus (Diels Vorsokr. p. 249): ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῆς τῶν κοσμικῶν αἰωνίας δια-μονῆς κρατιστούσιν καὶ αὐτογενὴ (τ' unerschaffene' Diels) συνοχήν.

μονάδι οὖν (ἐσκευὴ ὁ θεὸς).—(μονάς οὖν ἀρχή (ο ἢ ἀρχή)), codd. Corp.: μονάς οὖσα οὖν ἀρχή codd. Stob.) If my reconstruction of the passage is correct, this is the first mention of the monad; and we must suppose that the writer here wrote something to the effect that 'God (ἡ ἁρχή) is like the monad'.

The use of the μονάς as an ἑκόνων of the 'uncaused cause' of all things was, no doubt, suggested to the writer by the arithmetical

¹ Or else, that 10–11 b is a fragment of another document, and has been appended to Corp. IV by error.
speculations of Pythagoreans and Pythagorizing Platonists. But the Hermetist, if I have interpreted him rightly, uses the arithmetical unit merely as an 'image' or illustration, by means of which the learner may be helped to comprehend the nature of the $\alpha \rho \chi \eta \pi \alpha \tau \tau \omicron \upsilon$; he does not identify it with the $\alpha \rho \chi \eta \pi \alpha \tau \tau \omicron \upsilon$ itself. He does not say, as some Platonists did, that the $\mu \omicron \nu \alpha \varsigma$ is God, or that God is the $\mu \omicron \nu \alpha \varsigma$, but only that the relation of God to things is analogous to the relation of the unit to numbers.

Plato spoke much of $\tau \omicron \varsigma$ in contrast to $\tau \alpha \pi \omicron \lambda \alpha \varsigma$; but he did not, in his written dialogues at least, use the word $\mu \omicron \nu \alpha \varsigma$ with any special significance. But Plato's pupils and successors, Speusippus and Xenocrates, adopted from Pythagorean sources a sort of arithmetical theology; and we are told that Xenocrates said that the $\mu \omicron \nu \alpha \varsigma$ is the supreme God. Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 304: Ενενκράτησ... τὴν $\mu \omicron \nu \alpha \varsigma$ καὶ τὴν δύα ὲθέας, τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄρρενα, πατρὸς ἔχουσαν τάξεων, ἐν οἴκῳ βασιλεύσαν, ἤτηνα προφανεῖ καὶ Ἰνή καὶ περίττον καὶ νοῆς, ὅτις ἦσσιν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός. τὴν ὥς ὅς Βήλειαν, μητρὸς θεῶν δύκην, τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ οἴκου λήξεως ἤγουμένην, ὑτὶς ἦσσιν αὐτῷ ψυχή τοῦ παντός. From the time of Xenocrates onward, there are frequent instances of this deification of the number one. 'Pythagoras!'; in Aetius (Doxogr. p. 281): τὴν $\mu \omicron \nu \alpha \varsigma$ καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον δύαδα (τίθησιν) ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαῖς' στεάθηκε δὲ αὐτῷ τῶν ἀρχῶν ὡς μὲν (sc. ἡ $\mu \omicron \nu \alpha \varsigma$) ἐπὶ τὸ πουκετοῦ αἰτίᾳ καὶ εἰδικῶν, ὅπερ ἦσσι νοῆς, ὁ θεὸς, ὁ δὲ (sc. ἡ ἀόριστος δύας) ἐπὶ τὸ παθητικὸν τε καὶ ὑλικόν, ὅπερ ἦσσιν ὁ ὀρατὸς κόσμος... νοῦς μὲν οὖν ἡ $\mu \omicron \nu \alpha \varsigma$ ἦσσιν κ.τ.λ. Aetius, Doxogr. p. 302: Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν $\mu \omicron \nu \alpha \varsigma$ τὴν θεόν καὶ τάγαθον, ὅτις ἦσσι τοῦ ἐνός φύσις, αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς, καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον δύαδα καὶ τὸ κακόν, ἐπεὶ ἦσσι τὸ ὄλικον πλήθος. (This passage is evidently corrupt; perhaps the original text was something like this: Π. ἀρχάς τὴν $\mu \omicron \nu \alpha \varsigma$, ὅτις ἦσσιν ὁ νοῦς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ θεός καὶ τάγαθον, καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον δύαδα, ἐπεὶ ἦσσι τὸ ὄλικον πλήθος καὶ τὸ κακόν.) Hippol. Ref. haer. i. 2 (Diels Doxogr. p. 555): Pythagoras $\mu \omicron \nu \alpha \varsigma$ μὲν εἶναι ἀπεφήνασα τὸν θεόν. Compare the 'Egyptian' (i.e. Pythagorean) doctrine in Hippol. ib. 4. 43: ἐφασαν τὸν θεόν εἶναι $\mu \omicron \nu \alpha \varsigma$ ἀδιάιρετον καὶ αὐτὴν λαυτὴν γεννώσαν, καὶ ἐκ αὐτῆς τὰ πάντα κατακατεκυάσαν. αὐτῇ γὰρ, φησίν, ἀγέννητος οἶσα, τοὺς ἐξ ἀρίθμους γεννᾶς ὀδον ἐφ' ἐαυτὴν ἡ $\mu \omicron \nu \alpha \varsigma$ ἐπιπροστεθεῖσα γεννᾶ τὴν δύαδα, καὶ ὁμοίας ἐπιπροστεθεῖσα γεννᾶ τὴν $\mu \omicron \nu \alpha \varsigma$.

1 It appears from Aristotle's reports of Plato's 'unwritten' teaching that Plato himself, in his old age, went some way in this direction; and the metaphysics of his earlier successors contained 'a large admixture of arithmetical mysticism' (Zeller, Plato, Eng. tr. p. 566).
LIBELVS IV: § 10

153

tueilka kai tetraida mechi tis dekados. Synesius, Hymn. 1. 52 (Migne 66.
1589 A): o min, autostutuc 1 arxh.1 tamias pathe te (i)ayn,2 di-
chus,3 ousdake,11 ous doreon karan,11 diu,2 kidei gaion,11 theos
empus thetaite, iinotitein ena agi en monades monas te proti,
keitostis kekratist 11 enofasai11 kai tekousa11 uproosios locheias.3

1 Perhaps aukoteta evryusvaxia.
2 Perhaps akrotetas gennsia.
3 Perhaps aukoteta gennsia.
4 Tit. 2. 53: ou mat, v 1. 80 evs mat.
5 The meaning of this (if it can be said to have a meaning) appears to be that
the supreme God is a monas monades, or monades, from which issues a monas which
is also a trados (i.e. the Christian Trinity). Cf. Synes. Hymn. 3. 210: ouai se,
trados monas el, trados evn, trados el, monas evn.
6 Perhaps arxh monas.
7 Perhaps arxh monas.

1 Perhaps autogennetos.
2 Oytov Migne.
3 Oytov Migne.
4 Perhaps autogennetos gennioasa.
5 Cf. ib. 2. 63: ou mat, v 1. 80 evs mat.
6 The meaning of this (if it can be said to have a meaning) appears to be that
the supreme God is a monas monades, or monades, from which issues a monas which
is also a trados (i.e. the Christian Trinity). Cf. Synes. Hymn. 3. 210: ouai se,
trados monas el, trados evn, trados el, monas evn.
7 Perhaps arxh monas.
which they thought they had discovered in the relations of numbers, they identified ‘the Monad’ with God, the πάντων γεννητής. But from this confusion of thought the writer of Corp. IV seems to have kept himself free.

§ II a. [καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰτητῶν ... τὴν μονάδα χωρῆσαι.] This passage is omitted by Stobaeus; and it is probably a note inserted in the Corpus-text by some reader. The words τὸ μὲν αἰτητῶν αἰτεῖται ἀπὸ τῆς μονάδος mean that the numbers are produced from the unit by successive additions. This is merely another way of saying that the unit πάντα ἄρμον γεννᾷ. But when we are told that the numbers ‘increase from’ the unit, it might be thought to follow that, since they are all greater than the unit, any one of them would be more fit than the unit to serve as a symbol of God; and the writer’s object seems to have been to guard against this inference. ‘It is true’, he says, ‘that the number three, for instance, is greater than the unit; yet it is inferior to the unit; and its inferiority is shown in this, that it is incapable of containing the unit, whereas the unit and does contain the number three.’ The verb χωρεῖν here is equivalent to ἐμπερίεχειν above.

§ II b. αὕτη σοι ... ὑπογγέγραπται τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκῶν. Applying the analogy of the numerical unit to God, we may infer from what has been said about the unit (1) that God πάντα ἐμπερίεχει; and ὑπ’ οὐδὲνος ἐμπερίεχεται; (2) that God πάντα γεννᾷ; and ὑπ’ οὐδὲνος γεννᾶται; and (3) that God is τέλειος, ἀδιάφροτος, ἀναίδης, καὶ ἀμείωτος, whereas τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ γεννώμενα ἀτελῆ, διακρατᾶ, αἰτητὰ καὶ μεστά.

τοῖς τῆς καρδίας ὄφθαλμοι. καρδία, as here used, corresponds to the νοῦς of Corp. V. 2, τοῦ τοῦ νοῦ ὄφθαλμοι.

αὕτη σε ἢ [εἰκῶν] (θέα) ὁδηγήσει. If we read ἢ εἰκῶν, it must be taken to mean ἢ μονάς, to which the preceding words (αὕτη σοι ... ὑπογγέγραπται τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκῶν) refer; and Hermes must be understood to say that the arithmetical unit, or the comparison of God to the arithmetical unit, ‘will guide you on your upward way’. But that is hardly satisfactory. A better sense may be got by writing θέα here, and taking it to refer to θέα above.

ἐξεί γὰρ τι ἰδιον ἢ θέαν; τοὺς φθάσαντας θέασασθαί κατέχει, καὶ ἀνέλκει καθάπερ φατέν ἡ Μαγγείς λίθος τῶν σιθηρον. The subject of ἐξεί, κατέχει, and ἀνέλκει, which is the same as the object of θέασασθαι, can hardly have been ἢ θέα. Something like τὸ θεῖον would serve the purpose.

κατέχεσθαι means ‘to be possessed’ by a deity. Compare Pl. Ion
LIBELLVS IV: §§ 10–11 b

533 D: ἐστὶ δὲ τούτῳ τέχνη μὲν ὁπὸ δυνάμει, . . . θεία δὲ δύναμις, ἢ σε καὶ, ὠστερ ἐν τῷ λίθῳ ἦν Εἰρακίδης μὲν Μαγνήτων ὄνομασεν . . . πάντες γὰρ οἱ . . . ποιηταὶ . . . ένθεοι ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι κ.τ.λ. Ας τὸ κατέχεσθαι καὶ ἡ Μαγνήτης λίθος ἀρχαῖοι λέγοντον τὸν θεόν ὑπήκοον. . . 
As to the δύναμις and the Μαγνήτης λίθος are spoken of together both in the Ion and in Corp. IV, it is probable that the thought was suggested to the Hermetist by the passage in the Ion. For the comparison of the magnet, cf. Porphy. De abst. 4. 20: προσπεφυκὼς τῷ θεῷ μᾶλλον ἡ σίδηρος τῷ μάγνητι.

LIBELLVS V

Contents

God is unseen, and ever-existent. He brings all things into being; but he himself is not brought into being. Coming into being means appearing as a thing perceived by sense, and God causes all things thus to appear; but he himself does not thus appear; he is unseen, or hidden. § 1 b.

Yet, inasmuch as he causes all things to appear, he can be seen in all things; but he can be seen by thought alone, and not with the bodily eyes. Seeing the Kosmos with your eyes, you can apprehend by thought Him of whom the Kosmos is an image. § 2.

The heavenly bodies observe order in their movements; and air, sea, and earth are likewise ordered. Now where there is order, there must be one who has established the order; there must therefore be a Maker and Master of all these. (It is true that there are some things which are out of order; but these things also are subject to the Master, and will be brought to order by him.) §§ 3–4.

If you could see all parts of the Kosmos at one view, you would see everywhere the hidden God manifested through his works. § 5.

You can also see him in all mortal organisms. For instance, the structure of the human body shows evident marks of design; there must therefore be a Craftsman who made it. §§ 6–8.

All things then have been made or generated by the one God. He could not exist if he were not always and everywhere producing things. He is all things that now are, and all things that are to be hereafter. § 9.
God, though hidden, is yet manifest; for he is all things. § 10a.

How can I worship Thee? Thou art everywhere; all things are Thine; Thou art in all times alike; Thou art the author of all. I cannot do or say anything by my own power; for I am not other than Thou. There is nothing that Thou art not. §§ 10b, 11.

Thou art Mind, and Father, and God, and Good. § 11fin.

Sources. The distinction between τὸ ἀφανὲς and τὸ φανερὸν corresponds to the Platonic distinction between τὸ νοητὸν and τὸ αἰσθητὸν. But the terms ἀφανὲς and φανερὸν are not thus used by Plato; the writer must therefore have got them from some other source; and his use of these terms may possibly be due to Egyptian influence.

In the description of the human body (§ 6), the influence of the Timaeus may perhaps be recognized in the list of the internal organs, and especially in the words ἀγγειόσας and σημαγγύσας.

In the argument that the structure of the human body shows design, the writer handles in a cursory and superficial way a topic on which the Stoics were accustomed to dilate; see e.g. Cic. Nat. deor. 2. 134–146 (probably from Posidonius). The remark that the Demiurgus has concealed the unseemly parts of the body may be traced back to Panaetius.

The term φαντασία (§ 1b) has been adopted either from the Aristotelians or from the Stoics, but probably from the latter.

When the writer of Corp. V says that God is the 'maker' and 'father' of all things, he is using the language of the Timaeus. But he also says that God 'is' all things. The latter statement, which is hardly consistent with the former, must have been derived from a different source. It might perhaps be accounted for as a development of Stoic theology; but it may also have been suggested by the diction of hymns used in the worship of the Egyptian gods. The phrases καὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα (§ 9), and τὸ γενόμενον, τὸ μὴ γενόμενον (§ 11), as here employed, may perhaps be of Egyptian origin. In the concluding hymn, the worshipper's denial that he is other than God (ὡς ἄλλος ὦ;) is in accordance with the distinctive character of Egyptian religion.

A sign of Jewish influence may perhaps be seen in the statement that God is the τὸρος of all things (§ 10b); and possibly also in the use of ὁ κύριος as a name of God (§ 2).

The document shows no trace of Christian influence.
Date. There is little evidence of date in Corp. V, except the intermixture of Stoic conceptions with Platonism, which shows that this document, like the Hermetica in general, cannot be earlier than the first century B.C. It appears from the introductory words that it was one of the διεξοδοκείοντα λόγου addressed to Tat; and these were presumably later than the γενομένου λόγου. It may therefore be reasonably conjectured that Corp. V was written in the third century A.D.

Title. διαφανής ( . . . δ) θεὸς φανερώτατος ἦστι. In § 1 b, the writer asserts that God is διαφανής; in the rest of the document, he asserts that God is φανερώτατος. On the assumption that the heading referred to the contents of § 2 sqq. only, sense might be restored by striking out διαφανής. If it referred to § 1 b also, the meaning required might be got by writing διαφανής (δ) θεὸς (καί) φανερώτατος ἦστι, or διαφανής (καίτερ) θεὸς (ὅν οἵ τε νόμισαν δοκοῦτον) διαφανής (διαφανής (καί) φανερώτατος ἦστι, or ὁ δὲ (πῇ μὲν) διαφανής (δ) θεὸς, (πῇ δὲ) φανερώτατος ἦστι.

§ 1 a. καὶ τάνδε σοι τὸν λόγον, ὦ Τάτ, διεξελέφησον. The verb διεξέρχεσθαι corresponds to the substantive διεξοδος; it is therefore probable that this document was one of the series known as τοῦ πρὸς Τάτ διεξοδοκείοντα λόγου, and that at least one other λόγος preceded it in that series.

διαφανὴς μὴ ἀμφότερος ἐστὶ τοῦ κρείττονος θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος. The pupil is to be ‘initiated’; that is, the gnosis which this discourse is to reveal to him is spoken of as a μυστήριον. But it is a ‘mystery’ only in a metaphorical sense. Sacramental ritual, which was the essence of the Greek mystery-cults, is wholly absent; and the gnosis is imparted to the pupil by oral instruction only. The term ἀμφότερος may be taken as implying, firstly, that the gnosis has hitherto been known only to a few (and possibly, that those to whom it is known ought to reveal it only to the few who are worthy to receive the revelation); and secondly, that he to whom it is revealed is thereby brought into communion with the deity concerned,—that is, in this case, with the supreme God. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III 19 a, ‘tibi ... divina nudo mysteria’; and see note on Corp. I. 16.

τοῦ κρείττονος θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος, if that is the right reading, must be the genitive of ὁ κρείττων θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος, ‘He who is mightier than

1 The phrase is obscure; the author’s meaning might be more clearly expressed by writing τοῦ κρείττονος πάντων ἄνθρωπων here, and ὁ κρείττων ἄνθρωπος κρείττων in § 10 a.
the name θεός', i.e. too great to be rightly called θεός. See § 10 a
and 9 init.; and compare Ascl. Lat. III. 20 a. The word θεός is
applied to many subordinate beings; it is inadequate to describe
the supreme and all-inclusive Being. The writer subsequently uses
the name θεός (§ 7 fin., § 11 fin.), as well as others (ὁ κύριος, ὁ πατήρ,
&c.); but he holds that the supreme Being is, strictly speaking,
either παντόνιος or οὐκ ἄνευν (§ 10 a). Cf. Exc. VI. 19: ὁ θεός,
μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ μετάφ. τί ἐν 'τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ ὄνομα'.

τὸ δοκοῦν τοὺς πολλοὶς ἄφαντες. The ἄφαντες of which this writer
speaks is the ἀδάμαστον or δειδέο (i.e. νοητόν) of Plato. God is ἄφαντος;
that is, he is not directly apprehensible by the senses. But the
word ἄφαντος is not employed in this connexion by Plato; and it is
possible that the author of Corp. V was influenced in his choice
of the term by language used in the Egyptian cults. 'According
to the received explanation in the time of the New Kingdom, the
name of the God Amen signifies "The Hidden One"' (Wiedemann,
Rel. of the Ancient Egyptians, Eng. tr. p. 108). Brugsch, Rel. und
Myth. p. 97, quotes from Egyptian documents: 'God is hidden, and
his form is known to no man.' 'No one has searched out his
likeness.' 'He is hidden to gods and men.' 'He is a secret for
his creatures.'

In the system attributed by Hippolytus to Simon Magus, the
terms κρυπτόν and φανερόν were used as ἄφαντας and φανεράς in
Corp. V. Hippol. Ref. haer. 6. 9: ἢστι δὲ τούτο (ἐκ τοῦ κρυπτοῦ
καὶ τὸ φανερῶν) ἐπερ... Πλάτων νοητὸν καὶ αἰσθητὸν (καλεῖ)...
καθόλου δὲ [ὁσιν] εἰσείν, πάντων τῶν ὄντων, αἰσθητῶν τε καὶ νοητῶν,
ἐν (ὁ Σίμων) κρυφῖσιν καὶ φανερῶν προσαγορεύεται, κ.τ.λ.
§ 1 b. τῶν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον γεννητον... τὸ δὲ ἄφαντας δεῖ ἢστι.
To this writer, τὸ φανέρα καὶ τὸ γεννηθαί are equivalents. The
things of the sensible world have no substantive existence; they are
merely φαινόμενα. And they 'appear' only for a time; it is the
'hidden' or 'unseen' alone that 'exists everlastingly'.* The thought
is derived from Plato, though the terms used to express it are not
those which Plato commonly employed. As here stated, the
doctrine resembles Berkeley's idealism. In the world of sense, esse
is percipi. There are no really existent 'external objects'; there
is nothing but perceptions (φαντασίαι), and God, who causes the

1 Cf. ἔργας, Corp. V. 11.
2 Cf. Paul, 2 Cor. 4. 18; μη σκοτούσιν ἡμῶν τὰ βλεπόμενα, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὴ βλεπό-
μενα τὰ γὰρ βλεπόμενα πρώκαιρα, τὰ δὲ μὴ βλεπόμενα αἰώνα.
perceptions. Cf. Herm. ap. Stob. *Exc. II A. 18: τὸ ψευδός (i.e. the sensible world) φημὶ τῆς ἀληθείας (i.e. τοῦ θεοῦ) ἐνέργημα εἶναι.

οὔτε ἀφαίης ὅν. Ηερε vehemently speaking no longer of τὸ ἀφαίης in the neuter, but of ὅ ἀφαίης (θεος) in the masculine. Some words in which the transition from τὸ ἀφαίης to ὅ ἀφαίης was made have probably been lost.

οὐκ ἀφαίης γενόμενος ἐν φαντασίᾳ. φαντασία is a technical term of the Aristotelian and Stoic theory of cognition. It signifies the mental image which results from the action of an object on the bodily sense-organs, or the process by which this mental image is produced. Aetius (Diels *Doxogr. p. 401) gives Chrysippus's definition of φαντασία as follows: φαντασία ... ἔστι πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γεγομένου, ἐνεκινήσειν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός· οἷον ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὄψεως θεωρώμεν τὸ λευκόν, ἦστι πάθος τὸ ἐγγενεσιτόν διὰ τῆς ὀράσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ (κατὰ) τότε τὸ πάθος εἰσέπν ἔχομεν ὅτι ἐπούκειται λευκὸν καὶ δύσι ἡμᾶς. ... ἡ φαντασία δείκνυσιν ἑαυτῇ καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός αὐτήν.

Chrysippus took for granted the reality of τὸ πεποιηκός, i.e. the

---

1 Sir William Jones, writing with reference to the Indian doctrine of Maya, says: 'The inextricable difficulties attending the vulgar notion of material substances ... induced many of the wisest among the ancients, and some of the most enlightened among the moderns, to believe that the whole creation was rather an energy than a work, by which the Infinite Being, who is present at all times and in all places, exhibits to the minds of His creatures a set of perceptions, like a wonderful picture or piece of music, always varied, yet always uniform; so that all bodies and their qualities exist, indeed, to every wise and useful purpose, but exist only as far as they are perceived.' (Hargrave Jennings, *The Rosicrucians*, p. 147.)

There was frequent communication by sea between Roman Egypt and India; and it is not impossible that some Indian notions may have been transmitted to Egyptian Greeks. Numenius, in Book I of his *Περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπου*, mentioned the Brahmins (together with the Jews, the Zoroastrians, and the Egyptians) as one of the peoples whose religious rites and philosophic doctrines he would have to adduce and compare with the teachings of Plato and Pythagoras. (The passage is given as follows in Euseb. *Pr. ev. 9. 7: ἰσθήσεσθαι τὸ ἐν τῇ ἐν ἐνθυμοῦσθαι, προσφέρομεν αὐτῶν ὅσα ταῖς τελείαις καὶ τὰ διὰγώρα, τὰ τῆς ἱδρύων συντελομένας Πλάτων ομολογούμενον*, ὅπως Βραχμᾶνες καὶ Ιουδαῖοι καὶ Μάγοι καὶ Αληγίται Βελεότα. Neither ἱδρύων nor συντελομένα makes sense. I am inclined to conjecture that Numenius wrote ταὶ τῆς ἱδρύς (Βιβλίων οἱ γράμφα) δηλοῦν Πλάτων ομολογοῦμεν, ὅπως Βραχμᾶνες ... καίτερο— showing that all the sacred books which the Brahmins &c. composed agree with Plato, or something to that effect. He had read some of the sacred books of the Jews, and doubtless knew—or thought he knew—something about those of the Zoroastrians and the Egyptians; and he may have had some information about Indian writings also.) Moreover, both the fictitious visit of Apollonius Tyaneus to India described in Philostr. *Vita Apollon.*, and the historical fact that Plotinus made an attempt to visit India, show that in the third century A.D. Greek thinkers had some inkling of the significance of Indian philosophy. But the doctrine of Corp. V can be sufficiently accounted for as a development of Platonism, without assuming Indian influence.

2 Plato, *Soph. 264 A*, defines a φαντασία as a ὁδός which πάρστι τῷ μή καθ' αὑτὴν, ἄλλα δὲ ἀισθήσεως, i.e. an opinion which is formed in the mind as the result of an impression on the senses; but he does not habitually use the word.
external object; but the writer of Corp. V here ignores τὸ πεπουηκός, and speaks only of τὸ πάντα φαντασίων (i.e. τὸ τὰς φαντασίας ποιῶν, or τὸ τὰ πράγματα γεννών ἐν φαντασίᾳ,) namely, God.

ἡ γὰρ φαντασία μόνον τῶν γεννητῶν ἐστιν. τὰ γεννητά are presented to us in φαντασία; indeed, it is only in our φαντασία that they exist; 'for γένεσις is nothing but φαντασία'. But ὁ ἀγέννητος θεὸς is not presented to us in φαντασία; he is therefore ἄφαντος.

§ 2. τὰ δὲ πάντα φαντασίων, διὰ πάντων φαίνεται. In the preceding paragraph, the writer has shown that God is ἄφαντος; he now proceeds to show that God is φανερός. Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 22 a: τὸς αὐτοῦ φανερώτερος;

We commonly suppose that our φαντασίαι are caused by external objects, and we say that we see those objects. But in reality, our φαντασίαι are caused by God; it is really God then that we see.1

τῷ κυρίῳ καὶ πατρί, [καὶ] τῷ μόνῳ καὶ [οὐχ] ἐνὶ ἀγαθῷ [ἀλλ' ἀφ' οὐ ἐίς]. The words οὐχ ἐνὶ ἀλλ' ἀφ' οὐ ἐίς are inconsistent with the rest of the libellus. Everywhere else, this writer speaks only of the one God as Demiurgus, and does not recognize a distinct and subordinate Being called ὁ οὐ. It might be conjectured that the words which I have bracketed were written by some Platonist who distinguished a first and a second supracosmic God (corresponding to the ἡ and the νοῦς of Plotinus); but if so, we should have expected him to give the name ὁ οὐ to the first God, not to the second. Possibly ἀλλ' ἀφ' οὐ may be a corruption of ἀγαθός, and οὐχ and ὁ οὐ may have been subsequently added to make sense. For τῷ μόνῳ καὶ ἐνὶ ἀγαθῷ, cf. Corp. II. 14: οὗτε γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ... τις δύναται ... ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, ἡ μόνος ὁ θεός. But ὁ οὐ καὶ μόνος might be used (without ἀγαθός) as a name of the supreme God.

ἀκτινὰ σοι καὶ μίαν ἀκτοῦ. Cf. Corp. XVI. 16: ὁ γὰρ ὁπὸ ἐν τῷ λογικῷ ἀκτίς ἐπιλάμπει κ.τ.λ. The divine νοῦς is the light by which the 'gnostic' is illuminated; and it is by that light alone that a man can 'see' God.

(εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν σοι ... πῶς ... φανησταὶ;) This sentence is clearly out of place at the end of the section, where it stands in the MSS. Here, it suits the context perfectly. The words τὸ ἐν σοι,
which are obscure when taken by themselves, are satisfactorily explained by the preceding νόσης . . . ἀφανῆς οὖσα; and διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν (‘with your bodily eyes’) prepares the way for the contrasted phrase, τοῖς τού νοῦ ὀφθαλμοῖς, which follows. It may therefore be considered certain that the sentence was intended to stand where I have placed it. For the thought that ἦν ἦμων νόσης is ἀφανῆς, and is in that respect comparable to God, cf. Corp. XI. ii fin.: ὁ νοῦς (the human mind) ὄραται ἐν τῷ νοεῖ, ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῷ ποιεῖ.

τὸν εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ: i.e. the sensible Kosmos. Cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 10: ‘dei, cuius sunt imaginis duae mundus et homo.’ You can see τὰ οὐράνια; you can both see and grasp with your hands τὰ θνητά, e.g. a human body.

§§ 3–5. εἰ δὲ θελέεις αὐτὸν ἰδεῖν . . . φανόμενον δι’ ἄν πολέμι. Compare Corp. XI. ii. 6 b–11, where it is shown by a similar argument that there must be a ‘Maker’ of the Kosmos. In both passages alike, the τάξεις τοῦ παντός is insisted on; but the word ζωή, which is the keynote of Corp. XI. ii, is not employed in Corp. V. Cf. Methodius Περὶ τοῦ αὐτέχουσιν (Bonwetsch) 2. 3 ff. (a ‘Valentinian’ speaks): I observed that the sea is under control, οὔκ ὑπερβαίνονσα τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον, ὡς ἐποίησεν θεῖον τι πρόσταγμα περιβεβημένη. . . . ἄλλα μοι καὶ περί τοῦ ἦλιον ζητεῖν ἔδοκει, . . . ὅτι μηδὲ αὐτὸς παρέχεται τὸν οἰκεῖον δρόμον, ἄλλα καὶ αὐτός, ὡς ἐνεστὶ εἰπεῖν, ἐντολὴ τινα φυλάττει κρείττονος. καὶ . . . ἔωρων . . . σελήνην . . . , ὅτι τε καὶ αὐτῇ τηρεῖ τὸν κόκλον τῶν ἡμερῶν. καὶ μοι ἔδοκε τὸ ἐνεκεῖθεν ὡς θεῖα τις ὑπάρχῃ οἰκονόμος καὶ δύναμις κρείττονος (ἄλ. κρείττονος) ἡ συνέχουσα τὰ δίλα, ἢν καὶ θεῶν δικαίως ἂν εἴπομεν.

§ 3. [τάξεις γὰρ πᾶσα]. This may possibly be a misplaced doublet of πᾶσα γὰρ τάξεις in § 4.

ὁ ἥλιος . . . τῶν πάντων εἰκοσιον οἱ ὀφθανίοι θεοί ὥσαι άλειβελε. Cf. Corp. XVI, and Corp. XI. ii. 7 as emended: τοῦ ἦλιον, . . . τοῦ . . . πάντως τάξεως ἀρχαντος, καὶ ἤγεμόνοις τῶν ἐπτὰ κόσμων.

ἔκαστος τούτων τῶν ἄστέρων ἰπεριφρίσται ἀριθμῷ καί τόπῳ). The words περιφρίσταται . . . τόπῳ are evidently out of place where they stand in the MSS.; and something of the sort is needed here to complete the sentence. By ἀριθμῷ must be meant the ‘measure’ or ‘extent’ of the planet’s orbit. Thus περιφρίσταται ἀριθμῷ καὶ τόπῳ corresponds to τὸν τῆρον καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ δρόμου ἰπεριφέρεται below.

§ 4. (ἡ) ἄρκτος, (ἡ) . . . τῶν πάντων κόσμων συμπεριφέρεται. The two Bears, as depicted on a celestial globe or planisphere, looked
like two animals walking in the same direction round the Pole (see e.g. Boll, Sphaera, Tafel I); and this, no doubt, suggested the notion that they worked like mill-horses, and made the whole sphere of the fixed stars revolve, or that one of them did so. Cf. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. VI. 13: (τὴς ἀρχῆς ἑνήργεια ἐστι καθάπερ ἄξονας, . . . περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ στρεφομένης, ἑνεργοῦσθε δὲ τὴν τοῦ ζωοφόρου κύκλου τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ). The Mithraic Apathanatismoi (Dieterich Mithra- liturgie') p. 14: ἀρχή ἑνὶ κυβερνήῳ καὶ ἀντιστρέφουσα τὸν ἄρξαν. (. . .) τίς ὁ τούτῳ κεκτημένος τὸ ὀργανόν; According to the traditional text, the writer passes abruptly from the highest heaven to sea and earth. But it is more probable that he mentioned all the four elements in succession, and that after discussing the heavens (i.e. the region of fire) he spoke of the air before dealing with the water and the earth. If so, the ὀργανόν is air, regarded as the 'instrument' by means of which life is conveyed into terrestrial organisms and maintained in them. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 19 b fin.: 'aer vero organum est vel machina omnium, per quam omnia fiunt.' The function here assigned to air corresponds to that which the Stoics assigned to πνεῦμα, i.e. warmed air. (ib. 17 a: 'spiritu . . . qui quasi organum vel machina summi dei voluntati subiectus est.') A similar function seems to be assigned to φῶς, or illuminated air, in Corp. XI. ii. 7. In Corp. X. 18, the ὀργανόν is fire.

Here the writer touches on the problem of evil. The evil in the world (τὸ ἀκμηρὸν or τὸ ἄτακτον) is ἕλη which the Demiurgus has not yet brought to order; it is a survival of the primitive chaos. But sooner or later, order will be imposed on it; that is, the evil will be changed to good. The Hermetist seems to be thinking chiefly of physical evil; he holds that 'plagues and earthquakes break not Heaven's design', but only show that Heaven's design is still in process of execution, and has not yet been completely carried out. But the solution which he suggests might be applied to moral evil ('a Borgia or a Catiline') also.

§ 5. ἀδέφος τὸ ἀνεμένον. ἀνεμένον means 'free to roam at large'. The wind 'bloweth where it listeth'.

§ 6. εἶ (δὲ) θνησίς καὶ διὰ τῶν θητῶν κ.τ.λ. After speaking of τὰ ἄθαντα, i.e. the heavenly bodies and the elements, the writer passes on to τὰ θνητά. The Maker's skill may be seen in the bodies of all animals,—men and beasts on land, and fishes in the sea. As an instance, the Hermetist takes the human body, and speaks of its
construction in detail. Some words introducing this special instance have probably been lost. The topic may have been suggested by the description of the making of the human body in Pl. *Tim.* 69 ff.; but the writer does not, like Plato, discuss the *functions* of the bodily organs; he contents himself with speaking of their shape.

This is probably the passage to which Lactantius refers in *Div. inst.* 2. 10. 14 (Testim.).

τὴν καλὴν ταύτην καὶ θείαν [τοῦ ἀνθρώπου] εἰκόνα. If we retain τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, the meaning must be, not ‘this image of man’, but ‘this image, namely, man’. But the phrase is awkwardly ambiguous; and it seems best to cut out τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, which may have come from a repetition of τοῦ ἀνθρώπου above.

The human body is a living statue; cf. § 8 *init.*, ἀνθρώπα μὲν ἡ εἰκόνα.1 The epithet θείαν may perhaps have been intended to suggest the thought that man is an image of God; but that thought is not here fully expressed.

οὐκ ἔχειν ἀκτίνας καὶ δεσμεύσεις. The word δεσμεύσεις shows that the writer means by οὐκ ἔχειν the ‘sinews’ or ‘tendons’, and not the ‘nerves’. In Plato (*Tim.* 74 b, d) and Aristotle, νεῦρα means ‘sinews’. Erasistratus, about 258 B.C., ‘won the highest fame by his discovery of the function and nature of the nerves’ (Puschmann, *Gesch. der Medizin*, p. 296). After his time, νεῦρα came to be used by medical writers in the sense of ‘nerves’; but the word continued to be used also in the earlier sense of ‘sinews’.


[([τῆς ὧν σφήνη ἐκτίνας;]) It is not likely that the author placed an organ of such subordinate importance as the spleen first among all the internal organs. In Pl. *Tim.* 72 c, the spleen is mentioned as an appendage of the liver, and we are told that it serves as a sponge or napkin to cleanse the mirror-like surface of the liver and keep it bright. I have accordingly placed the mention of the spleen next after that of the liver.


1 Lactantius *l.c.* contrasts God’s work, the making of a living man, with that of Prometheus, who, he says, merely made lifeless statues.
It has been proposed to substitute some other word for *νεῦρα*. Flussa conjectured *πλευρά*; but it would be strange to interpose 'the ribs' or 'sides' between 'the heart' and 'the liver'. The writer mentions in succession all the chief internal organs,—heart, liver, spleen, lungs, and *κοιλία* (which may be taken to mean stomach and bowels together). In Pl. *Tim*. 70 a ff., the same organs are spoken of, in the order (1) heart, (2) lungs, (3) liver, (4) spleen, (5) abdomen and bowels. As there is no other organ which is likely to have been mentioned here, it is to be presumed that the words *τὰ νεῦρα συνθεῖς*, as well as those which precede, have to do with the heart; and I have therefore inserted *αὐτῇ*. As to the connexion of the *νεῦρα* with the heart, cf. Aristot. *Hist. an*. 3. 5, 515 a 27: ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ (τῶν νεῦρων) ἐστὶν ἐκ τῆς καρδίας· καὶ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ ἡ καρδία ἔχει νεῦρα κτλ. *Aet. Part. an*. 3. 4, 666 b 13: ἔχει δὲ καὶ νεῦρων πλήθος ἡ καρδία, καὶ τούτῳ εὐλόγους ἀνά ταύτης γὰρ αἱ κυψήλεις. *περαίνονται δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔλκειν καὶ ἀνένεαν τε ὑποαίθες ὑπηρεσίας καὶ ἱσχύος. The *νεῦρα* were regarded as the 'strings' by which the limbs are moved (cf. *ἀγάλματα νεῦροστασα*, 'puppets moved by strings'); and it was thought that the heart is the organ which pulls the strings, and that the *νεῦρα* must therefore be connected with the heart. Cic. *Nat. deor*. 2. 55. 139 (probably from Posidonius): 'huc adde nervos, a quibus artus continentur, . . . qui sicut venae et arteriae a corde tractae et profectae (tracti et profecti edd.) in corpus omne ducuntur.' J. B. Mayor ad loc. says that *nervos* here 'includes no doubt both tendons and nerves properly so called'.


§ 7. ποία μήτηρ, ποῖος πατήρ, εἰ μη ὁ ἀφανὴς θεὸς; To the Greeks, the notion of a Mother of all that lives (Mother Earth, ἡ μεγάλη μήτηρ, known under many different names,—Gaia, Rhea, Cybele, &c.,) was as familiar as the notion of a Father of all. In Roman Egypt, the name by which the Mother was best known was Isis.
But perhaps the writer was not thinking of gods and goddesses, but rather of the human parents of the child. The growing embryo is fashioned with consummate skill, and the work of thus fashioning it is certainly not done either by the mother or by the father; it must therefore be done by some one else; and who can that be, if not 'the unseen God'? Cf. Psalm 139. 13-16.

§ 9. τούτο αὐτῷ τὸ ἐργὸν ἵστι, (τὸ) πατέρα εἶναι. Cf. Corp. XI. i. 5, as emended: τί δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐργον ἢ τὸ ποιεῖν; XI. ii. 13 b–14 a: τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐργον ἐν δν, ίνα πάντα γίνηται, κ.τ.λ.

τούτου ἡτίν (ἡ) ὀσίᾳ τὸ κυνέω (κύνεω MSS.) πάντα καὶ ποιεῖν. The verb κύνεω or κυνεῖν is used of the mother only, not of the father. The writer of Ascl. Lat. III, who asserts that God is ἀρσενόθηλος, might have said that θεὸς both γενετερ καὶ κύνει; but in Corp. V, there is (apart from ποία μήτηρ, ποῖος πατήρ above, which need not be thus understood,) no hint of that doctrine, except in this one word κυνεῖν; and the bisexuality of God can hardly have been tacitly assumed here. There can therefore be little doubt that κυνεῖν is corrupt; and κυνεῖν is an obvious emendation. Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 17 c: τούτο γὰρ ὡσπερ (οὐδεί;) ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ, (τὸ) κυνεῖν τὰ πάντα καὶ ξυστοποιεῖν. Corp. IX. 9: τοῦτο ἡτίν ἡ αἰσθήσεις καὶ νόησεις τοῦ θεοῦ, τὰ τὰ πάντα ἐπι κυνεῖν.


τὰ μὲν γὰρ δὺνα ἐφαινόμενα, τὰ δὲ μὴ δύνα ἐξεῖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. τὰ μὴ δύνα are the things which are to be hereafter. They have not yet come into being; but they exist already in God's thought or purpose, and so God may be said to 'contain them in himself'. Ascl. Lat. I. 2 a: 'omnia unum esse et unum omnia, utpote quae in creatore fuerint omnia, antequam creasset omnia.' Compare the 'Unknown Gnostic document' in C. Schmidt, Koptisch-Gnostische Schriften I, p. 358: 'Thou art the δημοιοργός of those things which have not yet manifested themselves; for these Thou alone knowest, we know them not.'

The phrase 'that which is and that which is not' occurs frequently in Egyptian documents (Erman, Aeg. Grammatik, p. 192).


1 It is not clear what is meant by δημοιοργός here; we might rather have expected 'Thou art the τόπος or', &c.
document,’ C. Schmidt, Kopt.-Gnost. Schriften I, p. 366: ‘He has no name, and all names belong to Him.’

§ 10 b. τίς οὖν σε ἐνοχήσαι κ.τ.λ. The libellus ends with a hymn addressed to the supreme God. Compare the hymns in Corp. I, Corp. XIII, and Ascl. Lat. fin.

οὐ γὰρ ὁ τόπος τῶν ὄντων: οὐ τόπος ὄστιν ἄλλος οὐδεὶς παρά σε.—(οὐ γὰρ τόπος οὐ τόπος ὄστιν περι σε, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ΜΣ.)
The words οὐ γὰρ τόπος are meaningless. It is possible that τόπος has come by duplication from the following τόπος; but it seems more likely that the Hermetist wrote οὐ γὰρ ὁ τόπος, ‘thou art the place in which all things are contained’. Compare the τόπος (= νοῦς) of Corp. II, and the Jewish parallels there quoted. Thus corrected, the sentence follows suitably on the question ποῦ βλέπων εὐλογήσω σε; It is impossible to choose out any one place, and say that God is there rather than elsewhere; for God is himself the all-containing ‘place’. The words οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων are irrelevant; if they are not wholly spurious, they must be corrupt. The passage cannot be restored with certainty; but the writer’s meaning was probably not far from that which is expressed by my rewriting of the words.

The Egyptians considered it important that the worshipper should face in a particular direction during prayer. Cf. Ascl. Lat. 41 a, ‘orare ... in austrum respicientes’ &c.

(. . .) πάντα ἀπὸ σοῦ πάντα δίδως, καὶ οὐδὲν λαμβάνεις. This has nothing to do with the question ‘in which direction am I to look?’ It must therefore be presumed that it followed on another question which has fallen out of the text; and that question probably was, ‘What can I offer to thee?’ (Cf. Ascl. Lat. 41 a, where Hermes rejects the proposal to burn incense.) The writer’s object is to show that, in the worship of the supreme God, all rites employed in the cults of subordinate deities are inadequate; and among those rites, the most important were θυσίαι and ἔμνου. A satisfactory meaning might therefore be obtained by inserting τίνα δὲ σοὶ πέμψω θυσίαν; Cf. Corp. XIII. 21: σοὶ . . . πέμψω λογικάς θυσίας. As to πάντα δίδως καὶ οὐδὲν λαμβάνεις. Cf. Corp. II. 16: οὸν θεὸς πάντα δίδωσι καὶ οὐδὲν λαμβάνει.

§ 11. πάντα δὲ σε ὄμησον; Cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. 7. 35: οὔτε ὄμησον τῶν οὔτε ἐξαιρέτων ιερῶν, οὔτε μὴν ἔσται τίνας καὶ ἡμέρας.

1 Ménard quotes an Indian parallel from the Baghavat-Gīta: ‘Tu es ... le lieu du monde.’
The things which God 'has not made' are, I suppose, the things which have not yet come into being, but which are destined to come into being hereafter. Cf. τα ἄντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα in § 9, and τὸ γενόμενον ... τὸ μὴ γενόμενον below.

The things which God 'has hidden' are τὰ ἀφάνη, i.e. τὰ νοητά.

If we retain it, the implied answer must be 'there is no reason why I should adore thee'. The preceding clauses signify that any adoration limited to particular places and times is inadequate; but this phrase would mean that all adoration is useless, and the Hermetist would not say that. A better sense may be got by writing διὰ τίνος, 'wherewith shall I sing hymns to thee?' The obvious answer to that question would be διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, or διὰ τοῦ λόγου. But the Hermetist reflects that man has no power of his own to speak or act (σῦ εἰ δὲ ἂν λέγω). When a man is said to 'sing praise to God', it seems to be implied that he has a power of utterance in himself, as a being distinct from God; but I have no such power, and when I praise God, it is God that speaks in me or through me. Cf. Corp. XIII. 18-20: ἡ φωνὴ καὶ ἡ φωνή, ἀφ ἐμῶν (not from me) χωρεῖ ἡ εἰλογία. ... ὁ σὸς λόγος δὲ ἐμὸν ὑμνεῖ σε. ... ὁ σὸς ἀνθρώπως ταῦτα βοᾷ διὰ ... τῶν κτισμάτων σου.

ὤς ἐμαυτοῦ δὲν; ὡς ἐξων τι ἱδιον; Cf. Philo Leg. alleg. 3. 70. 195, Cohn I, p. 156: μόνῳ ἄρμότητι θεῷ λέγειν "τὸ ἐμὸν", αὐτῷ γὰρ ὄντως κτήματα μόνου τὰ πάντα.

ὤς ἄλλος δὲν; σὺ γὰρ εἰ δῦ [ἑ]ν δ. This is the typical utterance of mysticism; 'I am Thou, and Thou art I.' In the Greek mystery-cults, the worshipper sought some kind and degree of union with the particular deity to whom his worship was addressed; but among the Greeks, the abolition of the boundary-walls of separate personality was seldom spoken of in such emphatic and uncompromising terms.

In Egypt, on the other hand, the Pyramid-texts of the VIth Dynasty...
(2500 B.C. or earlier) are full of phrases which show that by that time the primitive worshipper's sense of identification with the object of his worship (or at least his assurance that he would, after death, be identified with his god) had already been stereotyped in traditional formulas of unknown antiquity; and the same sort of language persists in Egyptian documents of all periods, down to the time when the magicians of the Roman age borrowed the phrase συ εγώ και εγώ συ\(^2\) from reputable cults to use it for their own sordid purposes. The tone of this hymn is not Greek, but Egyptian.


\[\text{νοῦς μὲν (ει), νοούμενος, πατὴρ δε, δημιουργῶν. God is Mind, in that he designs things, and Father, in that he produces or 'manifests' the things which he has designed. We might rather have expected πατὴρ δε, γεννῶν; but δημιουργῶν, 'to create', is interchangeable with γεννῶν.}\]

\[\text{[Μην μὲν... νοῦ δὲ θεὸς]. This passage is evidently out of place here. See Corp. XII. i. 14 a, where the same statement occurs in a more suitable context.}\]

There is some reason to suspect that the preceding sentence also (νοῦς μὲν ει... πάντα ποιῶν) has been added by a later hand. It is not closely connected in thought with what comes before it; and it is something of an anticlimax, after the sweeping statement 'Thou art all things', to add that God makes things. Perhaps the hymn originally ended thus: \(\text{συ γάρ πάντα ει: [..] συ ει πάν το γενόμενον, συ το μη γενόμενον, (και άλλο οίδην ἐστιν δ μη συ ει.)}\)

\[\text{1 Cf. ἐνωσις πρὸς τοὺς θεὸς in Adammonis responsium (Testim.) passim.}\]

\[\text{E.g. Pap. mag. Leid. W. 17. 44 sq.: καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐνότητος τῶν ἓκοτον νοῦν καὶ τὰς ἑκάς φρίναις εἰς τῶν ἀναπτύχθηκε ἀκόμα καὶ τῇ ἐπωμ. συ τῷ γάρ εἰ ἐγώ, καὶ ἐγώ σὺ. \textsf{Pap. mag. Lond.} 122. 37: συ γάρ εἰγώ, καὶ ἐγώ σὺ 'thy name is mine, and mine is thine', etc. Cf. Ophite \textit{Evangelium Evae} (Keitsenstien Poim. p. 241), quoted in note on Corp. XI. ii. 21 b: 'I heard a voice as of thunder, which spoke to me and said ἐγώ σὺ καὶ σὺ ἐγώ,' \textit{k.t.l.} In that passage, the words are addressed by the god to his worshipper; more often, they are addressed by the worshipper to his god.}

Corp. VI is a discourse on τὸ ἀγαθὸν and τὸ καλὸν. The point on which the writer insists is that nothing good or beautiful is to be found in the world in which we live. This document is distinguished from most of the other Hermetica by its intensely pessimistic tone. The Kosmos is described in it as ‘one mass of evil’. Men may indeed attain to gnosis; i.e. they may come to know God, and, in knowing God, to know the Beautiful and the Good; but even for the man who has got gnosis, beauty and goodness are unattainable as long as he is in the body; and of the life after death, the writer does not speak.

The doctrine is Platonic; and there is no trace of anything distinctively Egyptian, Jewish, or Christian. The conceptions of τὸ ἀγαθὸν and τὸ καλὸν are derived from Plato, and that of τὸ καλὸν more especially from the Symposium and the Phaedrus. But in his sweeping condemnation of the Kosmos and all things in it, the writer goes beyond Plato, and agrees rather with some of the Neo-Pythagoreans and some of the Christian Gnostics. The document contains no clear indication of date; but as this sort of contemptus mundi was more prevalent in the second and third centuries A.D. than in earlier times, the tone of Corp. VI affords some reason for thinking that it ought to be assigned to that period. Two or three verbal agreements with Numenius point towards the same conclusion, as far as any significance can be ascribed to them.

What is the relation between Corp. VI and Corp. II? The doctrine of Corp. VI. 1-4 a concerning τὸ ἀγαθὸν resembles that of Corp. II. 14-16; but it is not quite the same. In Corp. II, ‘the Good’ is completely identified with God; in Corp. VI, ‘the Good’ (or ‘Goodness’) is described as a ‘part’ of God, a property of God, and a thing inseparably connected with him, but is not absolutely identified with God, except in two phrases which are hardly consistent with their context, and have probably been added by a later hand. Moreover, there is no trace in Corp. VI of the doctrine of a supra-

1 Compare and contrast Pl. Legg. 10. 906 α.: συγγεωρήκαμεν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐκαίν μὲν τὸν οὐρανὸν (i.e. the Kosmos) κολλών μετὰ ἀγαθῶν, ἐκαίν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκαίνων, πλεῖναν δὲ τῶν μόντ (ἀγαθῶν). In the Timaeus, Plato τὸν κόσμον ἐστείλει καὶ θεὸν λέγω, ἐκαίν ἐστείλει (Plotinus 4. 8. 1).

2 The doctrine that ‘the Kosmos is evil’ is that against which Plotinus especially protests in his controversy with the Gnostics (Enn. 2. 9, Πρὸς τοῦτο καθὼ τὸν δημιουργὸν τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὸν κόσμον καθὼς εἶναι λαγόντας).
cosmic Nous distinct from and subordinate to the supreme God, which is taught in Corp. II. For these reasons, it is improbable that Corp. VI was written by the same person as Corp. II; but its author may perhaps have known Corp. II, and may possibly have intended Corp. VI to be read as a sequel to it. (In both II and VI, the pupil is Asclepius.)

The author of Corp. X probably had Corp. VI before him; and he seems to have made it his aim to supplement the teaching of Corp. VI, and to correct its pessimistic tendency.

Contents

A. §§ 1–4 a: περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

The Good is changeless, free from wants, and exempt from perturbations (or evil passions). But these attributes belong to God alone; therefore the Good (or Goodness) is in God alone. (§§ 1, 2 a.)

The Good is not in the Kosmos, nor in anything contained in it. The Kosmos is good in this one respect, that it is productive, but in no other respect. It is subject to perturbation; and where there is perturbation, the Good cannot be. (§§ 2 b, 3 a.) The Kosmos is one mass of evil. (§ 4 a.)

The Good is not in man; for man’s material body subjects him to evil passions and delusions. And the worst of all the evils that beset him is the error of thinking evils to be goods. (§§ 3 b, 4 a.)
The words *ἐν οἴδει* . . . *εἷς δὲ οὖσας* are an interruption. There can be little doubt that the author began by describing *τὸ ἀγαθόν*, and then, in § 1 b, proceeded to say that it belongs to God alone. *ἐν οἴδει ἔστιν εἷς μὴ ἐν μονή τῷ θεῷ* is merely a repetition of the words of the heading, ἢ *εἷς μονῇ τῷ θεῷ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἔστιν.* The words *μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸς ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς* are perhaps a subsequent addition. Cf. [ἡ αὐτὸς ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν] in § 3 b *init.* The statement that 'the Good is God himself', or 'God himself is the Good', hardly agrees with the rest of the document. The writer says that the Good is in God; but except in these two clauses, it is nowhere said or implied that *τὸ ἀγαθόν* is *identical with* God; and the language used in other parts of the discourse would be difficult to reconcile with that proposition. See especially § 4 b, where we are told that *τὸ καλὸν* and *τὸ ἀγαθὸν* are 'parts of God', and that God is in love with them. Both *μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸς ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς* in § 1 a, and *ἡ αὐτὸς ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν* in § 3 b, may have been inserted by some one who had been reading *Corp. II,* the conclusion of which is *ὁ οὖν θεὸς (τὸ) ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν ὁ θεὸς.*

The meaningless [ἀεὶ] may have resulted either from a duplication of *εἷς,* or from a misplacement of *δὲ.*

*τὸ ἀγαθὸν . . . οὖσιαν εἶναι (οτ νοεῖν;) δὲι πάσης κυνήσεως καὶ γενέσεως ἔρημον.* οὖσια here means ὅν τι, 'a thing'. It is similarly used in § 2 a, where *ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ οὐσίᾳ, 'in a thing such as that', is parallel to *ἐν οἴδει τῶν ἄλλων, 'in no other thing'. οὖσια is often used by Platonists in the sense of 'eternal and changeless existence' as opposed to γένεσις (whence οὐσιόδοθης, as employed in *Corp. I. 15 &c.); but it cannot bear that meaning here; for if it did, the following words πάσης κυνήσεως καὶ γενέσεως ἔρημον would be superfluous.

[ἐν οἴδει ἔστιν]. This may have come from ἐν οἴδει ἔστιν above.


ἀνεβηκαί καὶ (παθῶν) ἀπειρητον (οτ ἀπειρατον). ἀπειρητον, the reading of the MSS., cannot be right. ἀπειρητός (= ἀπειρος, 'endless') occurs in Homer and Hesiod, but seldom in later literature; and the state-
ment that τὸ ἀγαθὸν is ‘endless’ would here be irrelevant. The writer is arguing thus: ‘τὸ ἀγαθὸν has certain properties; these properties are to be found in God, and in God alone; therefore τὸ ἀγαθὸν is in God alone.’ Now in describing the properties of God, the point on which he dwells is that God is not subject to certain πάθη, viz. ἐπιθυμία, λύπη, ἔρως, ὁργή, ξύλος; and this would not be to the purpose, unless he had previously said that τὸ ἀγαθὸν is free from such πάθη. The passage about God might be summarized by saying that God is ἀνενεχθεὶς καὶ παθὼν ἀπείρατος; the writer must therefore have previously said that τὸ ἀγαθὸν is ἀνενεχθεὶς καὶ παθὼν ἀπείρατος, or something to that effect. Cf. § 2 a: ἔταν δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, οὐδὲ ἐν πάθοις.

πᾶν γὰρ τὸ χορηγοὺς ἀγαθὸν [ἐταῖς] λέγεται (λέγω MSS.). The meaning might be more clearly expressed by writing τὸ (ὅτων) χορηγοὺς, ‘everything which supplies anything at all’, and thus emphasizing the opposition to πάντα καὶ ἀεὶ χορηγοὺς below. And [ἐταῖς] might then be accounted for as having come from ὀτιών misplaced.

The statement ‘I call all things good which furnish a supply of anything’ is hardly consistent with the author’s assertion that the Κόσμος is πληρωμα τῆς κακίας, which implies that he would call nothing in the world good; it is therefore most likely that he wrote, not λέγω, but λέγεται; ‘the word ἀγαθὸν is commonly thus used.’

§ 1 b. [λύπη γὰρ κακίας μέρος]. Cf. Corp. XIII. 7 b, where λύπη takes a place among the vices or evil passions, side by side with ἀκρασία, ἐπιθυμία, ἀδικία, &c., and χαρά, its opposite, is ranked with ἐγκράτεια, καρπερία, δικαιοσύνη &c. The statement λύπη κακίας μέρος is unobjectionable in itself; but as it is not wanted here, and disturbs the symmetry of the passage, it is most likely a marginal note inserted in the text by error.

οὕτε κρείττον αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν οὖδέν, ὧφ' οδ ἀδικηθεὶς πολεμήσει (ὁφ' οδ πολεμηθήσεται MSS.). The reading of the MSS. (‘by which he will have war made on him’) does not make sense; for a war might be begun by one who was not ‘the stronger’. Nor would sense be restored by writing ὧφ' οδ (κατα)πολεμηθήσεται, ‘by which he will be vanquished’; for defeat is not a πάθος in the same sense as ἐπιθυμία, ὁργή, &c. Now the words τὸ ἀδικηθήσηκαί διὰ τούτο are evidently out of place in the MSS., where they separate σύζυγοι from ἐπιθυμήσεται; and it seems probable that they have arisen out of something originally connected with οὕτε κρείττον . . . οὖδέν. I have therefore
inserted Ἀδησθαίας here, and altered πολεμηθήσεται into πολεμήσει to make sense in combination with it. It is true that τὸ πολέμαιν is not, strictly speaking, a πάθος; but it may be regarded as implying τὸ ἐρθαίειν, and ἐρθαὶ is a πάθος. The writer may have had in mind the θεομαχία of Greek mythology, which had long been a scandal to pious thinkers.

οὔτε σύζυγον (perhaps σύζυγός) ἄστιν ἅλτῃ, [ ] οὗ ἀρασθήσεται. Compare the system of Valentinus, in which each pair of Aeons consists of a male and a female σύζυγος, i.e. a husband and a wife. On the question whether the supreme God (called Proarche, Propator, and Bythos) had a σύζυγος, the Valentinians differed among themselves. Irenaeus ι. ι. ι. 15: some of the Valentinians (τῶν Βυθῶν) ἁγνον λέγοντο, μήτε ἀρρενα, μήτε θῆλεαν . . . ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρρενῳθῆλῃν αὐτῶν λέγοντον καίναι, ἐρμαφροδίτῳν φύσιν αὐτῷ περιέποντες. Σειγὴν δὲ πάλιν ἄλλοι συνεκτόντον ἅλτῃ προσοπόπουσιν, ἵνα γένηται πρώτη σύζυγια. Hippol. Ref. haer. 6. 29: οἱ μὲν γὰρ (of the Valentinians) . . . ἀθλητὴν καὶ ἁγνόν καὶ μόνον τῶν Πατέρα (i.e. the Propator) νομίζοντον εἶναι' οἱ δὲ, ἅδυνατον νομίζοντες [δύνασθαι] εἰ ἄρρενον μόνον γένεσαν δόλο τῶν γεγενημένων γενέσθαι τινός, καὶ τῷ πατρὶ τῶν ἁγνῶν, ἵνα γένηται πατήρ, Σειγὴν εἰς ἀνάγκης συναρμοδοῦντι [τὴν] σύζυγον. In the version of the Valentinian doctrine which is given in Iren. ι. ι. 1, the consort of the Propator is named Ἕρώη, Χάρις, and Σειγή. Ἰδ. ι. 12. 1: the Valentinian Ptolemaeus assigned to the Bythos two σύζυγος, named Ἕρώη and Θηλῆμα (πρῶτον γὰρ ἐννοίθη προβαλέν, φυσίν, ἐκα ἠθελησε). In the Pistis Sophia (C. Schmidt, pp. 2, 14, 24, 138,) χωριστόσυζυγος, 'without consorts', is used as an epithet of a certain class of divine Persons. The writer of Corp. VI may perhaps have heard of the Valentinian doctrine of σύζυγία, and must certainly have met with analogous doctrines. ¹

In § 4 b, we are told that God ἐρα τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. But as τὸ καλὸν and τὸ ἀγαθὸν are there called 'parts of God', the statement that God 'is in love with them' does not imply that he has a σύζυγος, i.e. a consort other than himself, but rather corresponds to the doctrine that God is ἀρσενάθηλις; and the ἐρας there spoken of is not regarded as a πάθος.

οὔτε ἄκρην, ὦ ὀργυμοθήσεται. The will of God finds complete and instant fulfilment. Cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 8: 'placitum enim dei necessitas

¹ Arnobius Adv. not. 3. 8 speaks of the attribution of sex to God as a Pagan error rejected by Christians; 'non enim deus mas est, sed nomen eius generis masculini est.'
But if God is good, he must will only what is good; and if nothing is disobedient to God's will, it would seem to follow that all things must be good. How then can this view be reconciled with the assertion that the Kosmos is πλήρωμα τῆς κακίας (§ 4 a), and that the highest good to which man can attain is only a smaller share of evil (§ 3 b)? Does the good God will that the Kosmos shall be full of evil, and that men shall be wicked? 1 With this difficulty the writer of Corp. VI makes no attempt to deal. Other men of his time tried to reconcile the existence of evil with the goodness of God by asserting that there is something which is 'disobedient' to him, viz. either an intractable ὀλη (see Ascl. Lat. II), or an evil God or Daemon. The notion of an evil God at enmity with the good God was adopted 2 by some of the Christian heretics, e.g. in part by Marcion, and more fully by Mani; (see Bousset, Hauptproblemen der Gnosis, pp. 91-119;) and a modified form of the same doctrine presents itself in the Satan of the Jews, and in the Christian conception of the Devil, who was commonly held to be 'disobedient to God', and to have power to thwart God's will to some extent in the present world, though destined to be overcome at some future time. Moreover, Jews and Christians were agreed that men can disobey God, and that most men are disobedient to him. On the question whether God is angry with those who disobey him, opinions differed; Lactantius, for instance, (De ira dei) asserts it; Arnobius (Adv. nat. 1. 17 and 23) denies it, adhering to the Platonic view that God is ἀπαθής. The writer of Ascl. Lat. III holds that not only the supreme God, but the astral gods also, are ἀπαθεῖς, and that the 'terrestrial gods' alone are subject to anger; see Ascl. Lat. III. 40 a, where it is said that the higher Powers 'ne ira commoverent nec flectur sit gratia'.

§ 2 a. δοπερ γάρ 1 ὅδεν τῶν (κακῶν) κ.π.λ. If we retain γάρ, it must be taken as referring back to μόνοι in § 1 b init. (μόνοι τῷ θεῷ). But a more obvious connexion would be got if δε were written in place of γάρ.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις. A similar phrase occurs in Numenius Περὶ τῶναθῶν (Euseb. Pr. ev. 11. 22. 1, quoted in prefatory

1 Arnobius Adv. nat. 2. 54: 'si cuncta (dei) voluntate conficiuntur, nec citra eius nutum quicquam potest in rebus vel provenire vel cadere, necessario sequitur ut mala etiam cuncta voluntate eius intellegantur enasci.'

2 In the main, from the Zoroastrians. But suggestions of this doctrine may have been found also in Plato's mention of a κακὴ ψυχή (Legg. 10. 896-898), and in the Egyptian conception of Set-Typhon (Plut. Is. et Os.).
note on Corp. II): μηδὲ σῶμα μεγά μηδὲ συμκρόν, ἀλλὰ τις . . . ἀρημία

θεοπίσος. The phrase πάσης κινήσεως καὶ γενέσεως ἔρημον in Corp. VI. 1 a corresponds to Numenius’s word ἀρημία.

ἀόης τῆς γενέσεως παθητῆς οὐσίας. This probably means that all processes of birth and growth result from some sort of ἄρμή (emotional impulse), and therefore imply the presence of πάθος (emotional disturbance). The agent at work in all such processes (the Aristotelian φύσις) is seeking to attain to some end or ‘good’. If the end were realized, the process would cease. As long as the process goes on, the end is still unrealized, i.e. the good is not yet present; and as the cosmic process never ceases, it follows that the good is never present in the Kosmos. If then feeling of any kind is ascribed to the agent in the cosmic process, it must be the feeling of unsatisfied desire; (‘the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together’;) and such a feeling is a πάθος.1 On the other hand, the good, which remains ever unattained in the γένεσις of the Kosmos, is eternally realized in the στάσις of God. God is ἀνενδής, and has no unsatisfied desire; if he can be said to ‘desire’ the good, (ἀρ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, § 4 b,) his desire is eternally fulfilled; for the good which he desires is eternally present in him. Cf. Methodius Contra Porphyrium, Bonwetsch, p. 347: εἰτε γὰρ τὸ ἁγάθον θέλει (ὁ θεὸς), αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ ἁγάθῳ ἐν θαντῷ μένει: εἰτε τὸ καλὸν ὑπάρχει ἱραστῶν αὐτῷ, αὐτὸς δὲν τὸ μόνον καλὸν εἰς ἑαυτὸν βλέπει.

§ 2 a fin., 2 b init. ἀδύνατον ἐν γενέσαι . . . οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Didymus, De Trinitate 2. 3 (Testim.), quotes this passage; and in the same paragraph he uses some other phrases borrowed from Corp. VI (κατὰ σύγκρισιν δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ ἁγάθον . . . τίτακται: τὸ γὰρ μὴ λιῶν κακὸν . . . ἁγάθον ἐνθάδε προσείρηται from VI. 3 b, and ὅπως νῦξ, οὕτω ἄμερα from VI. 2 a).

§ 2 b. ματωσία πάνω ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ δλη (dia?) δεδομένη. By πάνω we must understand πάνω τῶν νοστῶν εἰδῶν. The νοστά εἰδη or παραδείγματα are not present in material things; but material things ‘partake of’ them. The Kosmos may in this sense ‘partake of’ τὸ ἁγάθον; i.e. ‘copies’ (εἰκόνες or εἰδωλα) of the Good may appear in it, though the Good itself never enters into it.

τούτων τῶν τρόπον ἁγαθῶς δὲ κόσμος. Here the writer makes a reluctant concession to the opinion of the majority of the Hermetists, who held that the Kosmos is in some sense good. Cf. Corp. IX. 4 b:

1 Cf. Numenius (Euseb. Pr. ev. 11. 18. 3): ἐνισθυμητικὸν ἤθος ἰχώση (τῆς δλῆς), καὶ μεσοθή.
God is the supreme Maker of all things; but the Kosmos (the 'second God') is the proximate maker of individual organisms. Thus the procreative energy of the Kosmos is a 'copy' of the creative energy of God; and as the absolute goodness of God is manifested in his creative energy, so the secondary and derivative goodness of the Kosmos is manifested in the operation of the cosmic forces by which living organisms are brought into being.

§ 3 a. \([\text{to} \delta \text{ to AvdrÒþ} \ldots \text{dthd} \text{tò ågadón}]\). The mention of man is out of place here; it interrupts the discussion of the Kosmos, which is continued in what is said in the rest of § 3 a. It is most likely that the writer first disposed of the question whether the Kosmos is good, and then proceeded, in § 3 b, to discuss the question whether man is good. I have therefore transposed the words about man to § 3 b.

\([\text{to} \delta \text{ dthd} \ldots \text{dla}x\text{st}o}\). If we read these words in the order in which they are given in the MSS., it is not clear what is meant by dthd. A more satisfactory sense can be got by interchanging the two clauses, and making dthd refer to kai dì pàvthtòs kai plethùn nòinttès.

[kakovpìmon yàp oûçtì ågadòv mèneti: mì mènav δè, kàkòv ùvinti.] The words kakouìmenon yàp (to ågadòn) oûçtì ågadòv mèneti were probably written as an alternative for kakouìta yàp dthd to ågadòn; and mì mènav δè kàkòv ùvinti is an addition which adds nothing.

§ 3 b. \([\text{to} \delta \text{ to Avdròþ} \kappaαtā σύγκρισιν του kàkou του ågadòv àlìkata (kαtα σύγκρισιν του ågadòv του kàkou tētaka MSS.) το yàp mì liàn kàkòv ùvadè [to] ågadòv] \) (pòsoeìntta). When ën \èδ Åvdròþpì is placed here, it stands in contrast with ën mòns të ðéfì, and the ðè serves to express this contrast.

The writer's meaning is that the word 'good', when applied to a man, signifies only that he is not so bad as he might be, or as other men are. This may be a reminiscence of Pl. Protag. 339 a ff., where Socrates comments on the ode of Simonides, \(\text{àndp} \text{ågadòv mèn àlātheōs} \text{genvēthai} \text{xaleptōn} \ldots \text{ðeòs ën mòns tōù} \text{ëkòt} \text{gēròs} . . . . . ëmòù} \text{ëzarkei ës ën mì kàkòv ët mìδ} \text{ågàv àtálamno.} \)
It is difficult to make sense of τέτακται; yet it is the word used by Didymus in his borrowing from this passage. If the original reading was λέλεκται, this must have been altered into τέτακται before Didymus wrote, i.e. before A.D. 380-398.

ος γὰρ χαρέι (sc. τὸ ἀγαθῶν, acc.) σώμα ὄλικων (nom.). Cf. Corp. II. 14 fin.: σῶμα γὰρ ἢστι καὶ ψυχή τότεν ὁμίκ ἔξοντα χαρῆσαι δυνάμενον τὸ ἀγαθὸν.

εἰσαγων τούτων ... [ἐρ.]πεπίστευται ἐνθάδε [τὸ] μέγιστον εἶναι ἀγαθόν. The writer cannot have meant to say that πάνιν καὶ ἀληθοῦς ἄλλοι are believed by men to be great goods. Few men think that pain and grief are goods. The meaning must be that the things which the πάθη impel men to seek (e.g. the satisfaction of vicious or morbid desires) are believed by men to be good, whereas they are really evil; but this meaning is not clearly expressed. The same thought recurs in § 6: τὸ κακὸν πιστεύσαντα ἀγαθῶν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

τὸ μᾶλλον ἁπτηροβλητον κακὸν. These words would more naturally be applied to one particular evil; it is strange to say that each of a number of evils is 'an evil not to be surpassed'. Perhaps the phrase has been inserted by a later hand.

[ἡ γαστρομαργία] [ἡ] τῶν κακῶν πάντων χαρηγός ἢ πλάνη (αὐτή) [ ] ἢστι. There is no occasion to speak of gluttony here. ἡ γαστρομαργία must have been inserted by some ascetic transcriber who misunderstood the text, and thought it necessary to supply a subject for ἁπτηροβλητον κακὸν, or for τῶν κακῶν πάντων χαρηγός.

§ 4 a. τῷ εἰς τοὺς μοι βαλόντι ... ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἔστιν αὕτο ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ εἶναι. The Hermetist thanks God that he has learnt that nothing in this world is good. He is thus secured against 'the greatest evil of all', viz. the error of believing this or that evil thing to be good.

ὁ γὰρ κόσμος πλήρωμα ἢστι τῆς κακίας, ὁ δὲ θεὸς τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ. The meaning of πλήρωμα is well illustrated by Philo De praem. et poen. 11. 65, Cohn V, p. 350: γενομένη δὲ πλήρωμα ἀρετῶν ἢ τῇ ἡ ψυχῇ ... , οὐδὲν ἐν ἑαυτῇ καταλιποῦσα κενὸν εἰς πάροδον ἄλλων. The Kosmos is completely filled with evil, so that no room is left in it for any good to enter; and God is completely filled with good, so that no room is left in him for any evil to enter.

[ἡ τὸ ἁγαθὸν τοῦ θεοῦ]. The original writer would hardly have said that the Good 'is wholly filled with God', or 'is one mass of God'. These words may be attributed to the same interpolator who inserted [μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ἁγαθὸν αὐτὸς ἢστιν δ ἱθοῦ] in § 1, and
§ 4 b. The writer now proceeds to deal with τὸ καλὸν, and to explain its relation to τὸ ἄγαθον and to God. τὸ καλὸν is the object of the Platonic ἐρώς; and in this part of Corp. VI, the influence of Pl. Sympos. and Phaedrus may be recognized. The beginning of the paragraph must have been lost; for the γάρ implies some preceding mention of τὸ καλὸν. And the first lines of what follows the lacuna (αἰ γάρ ἔχοιαί . . . οὐσίαι ἐκείνοι) are hopelessly corrupt.

καὶ καθαρωτέραι καὶ εἰλικρινέσταται (ἀλ.-τεραι). The author must have written either two superlatives or two comparatives. The same two adjectives occur in connexion with τὸ καλὸν in Pl. Sympos. 211 D: τί δήτα, ἐφί, οἰκίμεθα, εἶ τῷ γένουτο αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἱδεῖν εἰλικρνές, καθαρὸν, ἀμύκτον, κ.τ.λ. The Hermetist presumably had that passage in mind; and perhaps he here said something about the relation between τὰ καλά καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν.

Ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ, εἰ γε οὐσίαν ἔχει, τὸ καλὸν ἐστὶ [τὸ δὲ καλὸν] καὶ (τὸ) ἄγαθον. It would be possible to say τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ ἄγαθον, 'the Beautiful is also good'; but as the writer repeatedly couples τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἄγαθον together in the following sentences, it is most likely that here also he wrote τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἄγαθον.

He asserts, with some hesitation, that τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἄγαθον are the οὐσία of God. But he does not say that they are absolutely identical with God; his meaning seems to be rather that beauty and goodness are the most essential attributes of God. A few lines below, he calls τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἄγαθον 'parts' of God.

As to εἰ γε οὐσίαν ἔχει, cf. Corp. XII. i init.: εἰ γε τις ἐστιν οὐσία θεοῦ. This reservation was doubtless suggested by the Platonic doctrine that God is ἐπίκενω τῆς οὐσίας. See Corp. II. 4 b.

(ὡς δὲ τούτων (οὐ τῶν δὲ τούτων φωτὶ ὃ) οὖθεν ἐστὶ καταλαμμέσθαι (καταλαβέσθαι MSS.) τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. It would be possible to make sense by writing (τούτων δὲ) οὖθεν ἐστι καταλαβέσθαι (in the sense of καταλαβέων) τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, 'it is impossible to find aught of them in the world'; but it is more likely that the author wrote καταλαμμέσθαι. Plato described τὸ ἄγαθον as the sun of the intelligible world; and in Pl. Rep. 6. 508 D, οὐ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν is parallel to οὐ δὲ ήλιος καταλάμπει. (Cf. τὸ ἄρχεττον φῶς in Corp. II. 12 b.) κάλλος is associated with light, and described as 'shining', in Pl. Phaedrus 250 D: περὶ δὲ κάλλους, δισπερ ἔπομεν,
§§ 4a-6

179

met' ekeínon te élampten ón, deúró te élthontes katelhýfamen autó diá tías énargaróstastis aiosthíseos tôn ëméstovn (sc. tás ëfyes) stúlbvnon énargéstata.

tá dé µé (óðhalaµ) ὑποτίπτοντα (álhthi ?), máliosta dé Í tóu kalóu kai tó ãgávou (ídea ?). álhthi ('real') is a suitable word to stand in contrast to éidola and σκαγραφίας; cf. Herm. ap. Stob. Exe. II A, peri álhthías. The missing word after ãgávou is very likely Ídea; but it might also be õvía or φύσις.

((ðókolhpori)) érassmöstata. Both these adjectives occur in Pl. Phædrus 250 c, D: (τῆν τελετὴν) ἦν ὀργαλζομεν (in our antenatal bliss) ðókolhpori món aútov õntes kai ápatheis kakóv ñsa ëmás ên õstérph xrhoûn ùpemenev, ðókolhla dé kai ãplá kai átremi kai õðdaimova fásmeta mouímenoi te kai ēstoteóntes ën aτgý katharí, katharoi õntes. . . . tûn dé kállos mónoun taìtín ësthe múbran, õstî ekfánóstaton ënain kai ðrarasóstata. The word ðókolhporos (integer) may be rendered 'unblemished'. In Phaedr. l. c. ðókolhporos is coupled with ápatheis kakóv; in Tím. 44 c, ðókolhporos is coupled with ãgýn, and means 'whole' as opposed to 'sick'. From the context in the Phaedrus, it may perhaps be inferred that the word was in some way associated with the Eleusinian mysteries.

§ 5. to kalóu kai Í tó ãgávou, [to õpērλαμπρον] to õpērλαμπτεμενον' õpto tóu òeou. to õpērλαμπρον (al. õpērλαμπτον) has probably come by duplication from to õpērλαμπτεμενον. But what can be meant by to õpērλαμπτεμενον õpto tóu òeou? These words would naturally mean 'which is outshone by God'; but that would not suit the context. Possibly the original reading may have been something like to õpērλαμπτεμενον õpto tóu òeou (φώς), 'the light which God sheds round about him'.

ëkêinò Ò õgávou ãmûminton. Possibly we ought to read Òlλλλλlýpeton in place of Òlλλλλmýpeton. Cf. Corp. X. 5 as emended: to kállos tóu ãgávou, Ñêkêinò to ãfharptov, to ãlýpeton (ãlýpeton MSS.).


kalóu kai ãgávou toímè document. Êëgêinò ãrëvò stûlûs. The writer is thinking of the common use of the term kállos kagàdês or kalokágàdês in speaking of a man whom one likes and respects.

µhê ñpar théasámenon el Í tôtov ãgávov. This description is not applicable to the writer himself, and those who, like him, have 'trodden the path of piety'; for such men know that the Good exists, and do not mistake the evils of human life on earth for
goods. What is here said about 'a man' applies therefore to most men, but not to all men. But even the pious cannot be truly called καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ; for though they are free from the worst errors of their fellows, and know the evils to be evils, they still 'have need of' the evils, and 'cannot live without them'. The writer may perhaps have hoped that the Good, though it is unattainable on earth, will be attainable to the pious after their release from the prison of the body; but in this document, he makes no mention of any such prospect.

τὸ κακὸν πιστεύοντα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Cf. Herm. ap. Stob. XI. 2. (19) and (21): ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὸς, ὁ ἀνθρώπος κακὸς. . . . οἱ θεοὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ αἴροιται' (οἱ ἀνθρώποι τὰ κακὰ αἴροιται) ὡς ἀγαθὰ. This was already a current saying in the time of Sophocles. Ἀντίγ. 631: σοφίᾳ γὰρ ἐκ του κλεινὸν ἔτος πέφαναι, τὸ κακὸν δοκεῖν ποτ' ἔσθελον τῷ ἔμμεν, ὅταν φρένας θεὸς ἀγιὲ πρὸς ἄταν. But the Hermetist does not, like the wise man quoted by Sophocles, make God the author of the delusion. In § 3 b, he implies that such ἀπάτη καὶ δῶσαι ἀνόητοι result from the incarnation of the soul in a σῶμα ὄλικον; but he does not explain how the soul has come to be incarnated.

ἀγωνιζόμενον τινὰ μὴ μόνον ἔξπι (τὸ κακὸν), ἄλλα καὶ ἐπιεῖ. What are the evil things which men mistake for goods, and strive to keep and to increase? They cannot be the πάθη themselves; they must be the things towards which our carnal desires are directed, that is, the material means of life (e.g. food, or the money needed to buy it). These are the things which we 'cannot shun or hate', and 'without which we cannot live'. Cf. Philo Leg. alleg. 3. 50. 147, Cohn I, p. 145: ὁ τῆς θεοῦ σοφὸς ὄλον μὲν τὸν θύμον ἵσται παρατησάναι καὶ ἀποκόψαι, ὁ χήνας κατεξανασάτι, τὴν δὲ κοιλὸν ἑκτείνει ἄδυναν τοὺς γὰρ ἀναγκαῖοι στίγμα καὶ ποτοὺς ἡ φύσις μιᾶς ἤθελεν καὶ τὸν ἀληθεϊστατον καὶ καταφρονητικῶν αὐτῶν τῶν ἀναγκαλῶν, καὶ ἀπτιμὰ αὐτῶν μελετῶντα. Porphyry, De abst. 3. 27, says that, man's end being τὸ ὁμοιόνοις θεῷ, one would come nearer to realizing that deal if one could abstain, not only from the flesh of animals, but from vegetables also; εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀλλ' ἐνεπάθεν γε τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἐλάτωμα, . . . τι τὸ θεῖον ἀκήρωτον καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀβλαβεῖς σῶζειν μὲ δυνάμειαν' ὁ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἡμῶν ἄπροσδεῖσ. αὐτίδ' ἐν ἡ γένεσι, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ πενίᾳ ἡμῶς γεννῶναι.1

1 Cf. Eucken, Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, Eng. tr., p. 163: 'From the altitudes occupied by the spiritual life, submission to the impulses and the goods of sense seems to be something mean and base; and yet without these man cannot possibly
LIBELLVS VII

This piece should be read in connexion with Corp. I, of which it may be considered an appendage. It is an expansion of the abridged sermon given in Corp. I. 27, 28; and the attitude of the preacher is identical in the two documents. He does not, like the teacher depicted in most of the Hermetica, merely instruct a few select pupils in privacy; he is a man who feels that he has a mission to convert his fellow men in general, and to lead them to the gnosis in which he himself has found salvation. This missionary spirit is peculiar to Corp. I and Corp. VII, and places them in a different class from the rest of the Hermetic documents. Both of them are ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus in the headings prefixed to them in the MSS.; but there is nothing in the contents of either to confirm this ascription; and it is probable that in the case of both alike, the author himself never thought of putting his words into the mouth of a prehistoric prophet, but meant them to be read as spoken by himself in his own person.

The view that the body is the enemy, which is the one definite lesson taught in Corp. VII, is the same that is taught through the myth of the Archanthropos in Corp. I. Almost every thought in Corp. VII has its parallel in the longer document; and there is nothing in the one which is out of keeping with the contents of the other. There is therefore strong reason to think that both were written by the same man. Compare the following:—

Corp. VII. Corp. I.
1 a. μεθίσοντες, τῶν τῆς ἀγνωσίας ἀκρατον ἐκπόντες. . . . στίγμε νη-
ψαντες. 2 a. ὅποι οὖν οἷς ἐς μεθίν, ἄλλα πάντες νηφοσιν.
1 b. Ἕφορμίζεσθαι τούς τῆς σω-
τηρίας λιμέσι.
2 a. ζητήσατε χειραγωγῶν τῶν ἵππησοντα υμᾶς ἐπί τάς τῆς γνώ-
σεως θύρας. 26 b. ὅπως τῷ γένου τῆς ἀνθρωπο-
τητος . . . σωθῇ. 29. διάσκοιν πῶς . . . σωθήσονται.

2 b. ζητήσατε χειραγωγῶν τῶν ἵππησοντα υμᾶς ἐπὶ τάς τῆς γνώ-
σεως θύρας.

preserve his life. . . . There is something in our life which we cannot dispense with, yet which, from the spiritual point of view, it is an imperative duty to shake off.'
I have given reasons for assigning Corp. I to the period A.D. 100–200; Corp. VII may therefore be dated between the same limits.

§ I a. Ποι ἑρεσθε; Men are possessed and carried away by an evil power, which the preacher compares to that which takes possession of the drunkard. (Cf. Hor. Od. 3. 25. 1: 'Quo me, Bacche, rapis tui plenum?') He afterwards compares this same power to the current which sweeps a boat along. The contrary of ἑρεσθε μεθύσκετε is expressed by στήτε νήπιαντες below; 'make a firm stand (against the force which has hitherto swept you away); rid yourselves of this drunkenness.'

μεθύσκετε. As Mr. Mead points out, the same metaphor is
employed in one of the Logia Jesu (Klostermann, Apocrypha II, p. 16): έστην ἐν μάσῃ τοῦ κόσμου... καὶ ἐφον πάντας μεθύστης, καὶ οὐδένα ἐφον δύσφωτα (i.e. ἴσωρον;?) ἐν αὐτοῖς. καὶ πονεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ μον ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ τῶν αὐθροπῶν, ὅτι τυφλοὶ εἰσίν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτῶν καὶ οὐ βλέπουναν. The latter part of this Logion resembles Corp. VII. 1 a, ἀναβλάψατε τοῖς τῆς καρδίας ὄφθαλμοις, and 2 a fin., ἀφωτίστε τῇ καρδίᾳ κ.τ.λ. In both documents alike, blindness is associated with drunkenness.

The state of the soul when affected by the body is compared to drunkenness in Pl. Phaedo 79 c (the soul πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ νηριγια ὁστερ μεθύνονα); and the metaphor occurs in the writings of the later Platonists, e. g. Porphyr. De abst. 4. 20 fin.: men hate τοὺς ὑπομυνόσκοντας καὶ τῆς μέθης ἀνανήψαι παρακαλοῦντας.

τὸν τῆς ἀγνωσίας ἀκρατον [λόγον] ἐκπιάτες. Agnosia (which includes estrangement from God as well as ignorance of God) comprises all that is evil in human life, as its opposite, gnosis, comprises all that is good. Cf. Corp. X. 8 b: κακία δὲ ψυχῆς ἀγνωσία... τούναυτον δὲ ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς γνώσεως. Corp. XI. ii. 21 b, as emended: ἡ γὰρ τελεία κακία τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν θεόν.

It would be possible to speak of the λόγος of γνώσεως (‘the teaching by which gnosis is conveyed’); but it is hardly possible to speak of the λόγος of ἀγνωσία; for ἀγνωσία is not associated with any particular doctrine, and might rather be called ἀλογία. No substantive is needed with ἀκρατον (sc. οἶνον); but some reader may have thought that a substantive was wanted, and inserted an unsuitable one.

ἀλλ' ἦδη αὐτῶν καὶ ἐμείτε. Is ἐμείτε indicative or imperative? Probably indicative. If the writer had meant to say ‘tornit forth the strong drink of ἀγνωσία’, i.e. ‘rid yourselves of it’, he would rather have written ἀλλ' ἦδη αὐτῶν ἐξεμέσατε (ἐξεμέν, not ἐμείν; and aorist, as in στῆ σε, which follows,—not present). If the verb is indicative, it may be taken to signify the outpouring of foul words and deeds in which the ‘drunkenness’ of those who have not gnosis is manifested. They have reached the last and ugliest extreme of drunkenness; that is what is meant by ἦδη καί.


There is a very close resemblance between the words of Corp. VII. 1 a and those used by Eusebius (Adversus Hieroclem, printed in Kayser's edition of Philostratus, vol. i, p. 411, § 47) with reference to the fatalistic doctrine which he finds in Philostratus's Life of
§ 1 b. ή γάρ τῆς ἀγνωσίας κακία ἐπικλούει πᾶσαν τὴν γην. ή τῆς ἀγνωσίας κακία might mean either ‘this evil thing, agnosia’, or ‘the evil which results from agnosia’.

The figure or parable which runs through this paragraph is not that of a voyage on the open sea, but that of a journey on the Nile. The river is in high flood (ἐπικλούει πᾶσαν τὴν γην); the current is swift, and makes it difficult for the boat to gain the sheltered landing-place (λιμήν) at which the traveller is aiming. But the steersman takes advantage of an eddy or counter-current (ἀνάρροια), and brings the boat safely in. The traveller lands, and finds a guide, who leads him through the town ‘to the door’ of the temple which we must suppose to be the goal of his pilgrimage.

καὶ συσσύρει (συμφθείρει MSS.) τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατακεκλεισμένην ψυχήν. The soul of the godless man is ‘penned up’ in the narrow cell of the body. Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 21 a: ἐὰν δὲ κατακλείσῃ σοῦ τὴν ψυχήν ἐν τῷ σώματι, . . . τί σοι καὶ τῷ θεῷ;

The word κατακεκλεισμένη brings in a metaphor inconsistent with the figure of the river-journey; but that is unobjectionable, because in this phrase the writer is not developing the figure itself, but explaining its application. The fate of ‘the soul that is shut up in the body’;—that is, the godless soul,—is like that of the traveller who fails to fetch up at the landing-place, and is swept along down stream, away from the sanctuary towards which his journey was, or should have been, directed. But it is difficult to defend the verb συμφθείρει (‘corrupts’), which is placed between and closely connected with two phrases referring to the river (ἐπικλούει πᾶσαν τὴν γην and μὴ ἔσσα ενορμίζεσθαι κ.τ.λ.), and yet presents an entirely different picture. We are told that agnosia, like the swollen river, ‘floods the land, corrupts the (godless) soul, and does not suffer it to reach the haven’. This can hardly be right. Besides, there is no apparent reason for using the compound συμφθείρει instead of φθείρει. A satisfactory sense may be got by substituting συσσύρει, ‘sweeps along with it’.

§ 2 a. Ζητήσατε χειραγωγόν, τὸν δεδηγησθοντα ὃμᾶς κ.τ.λ. He who seeks gnōsis needs some one who has already attained to it to lead him on his way. The preacher probably means it to be understood that he himself is such a guide, and is ready to give his services to all who will accept them.

eπὶ τὰς τῆς γνώσεως θύρας. For the moment, Gnōsis is personified. The preacher represents her as the deity whose temple the traveller in his parable is seeking; and he proceeds to depict her sanctuary, describing it as a place filled with unmixed light, and speaking of the votaries who are gathered there. His use of the plural (πάντες νόημως κ.τ.λ.) may perhaps be taken to show that he has in mind a community of gnōsτικοί,—comparable to a Jewish synagogue or a Christian ecclesia,—of which the convert will become a member.

τὸ λαμπρὸν φῶς, τὸ καθαρὸν σκότους. This phrase shows that in the writer's circle φῶς was a recognized name for God, or for the presence and power of God. (Cf. Corp. I passim.) The word is used as in the Fourth Gospel. Cf. Ep. Joh. 1. 1. 5: ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἐστιν, καὶ σκοτία οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ δήμος.

ἀφορώντες τῇ καρδίᾳ εἰς τὸν (οὖν) ὀραθήναι θύλατα. Cf. Corp. I. 31: (ὁ θεὸς) γνωσθήναι βουλεταί. Corp. X. 15 a: (ὁ θεὸς) θέλει γνωρίζεσθαι. It is necessary to insert οὖν (sc. τῇ καρδίᾳ), on account of the following words, οὗ γὰρ ἐστιν . . . ὑπατός ὄφθαλμοι, ἀλλὰ νῦν καὶ καρδία. If the preacher had merely said that God ὄραθηναι βουλεταί, there would be no meaning in the γάρ.

οὗ γὰρ ἐστιν ἀκουστός, οὐδὲ λεκτός. Cf. Corp. X. 9: ὁ γὰρ θεὸς . . . οὔτε λέγεται οὔτε ἀκούεται. The teaching of the 'guide' is, no doubt, needed; yet gnōsis cannot be conveyed from one man to another by verbal instruction; it must spring up spontaneously in the heart of him who seeks God. See Corp. IX σίν.

§ 2 b. πρῶτον δὲ δεῖ σε περιρρήσασθαι ἐν φορεῖς χιτώνα. The χιτών is the body; and the preacher denounces it in the most emphatic language. Cf. Corp. IV. 6 b: ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα μορφῆς κ.τ.λ. This hatred of the body was shared in various degrees by the later Platonists and Pythagoreans in general, and by many of the Catholic Christians, and was carried to extreme lengths by some of the Christian Gnostics, and especially by the Manicheans. Compare Paul, Gal. 5. 17: ἢ γὰρ καρδιὰ ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, λάβετε οὖν τὸν νοτάμον ῥοθήρη, πάντα καταπιεσάς τὰ τῆς κακείας καὶ σώσασθαι καὶ σωθήσασθαι τοῖς ἀκούοντας διὰ θορύβου.

1 A Hermetist would have said κατὰ τοῦ νοῦ.
Rom. 7. 5—8. 8: ὅτα γὰρ ἦμεν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ, τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἀμαρτίων
. . . ἐνηργείτο ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ καρποφόρησθι τῷ θανάτῳ.
. . . ὁ νόμος πνευματικὸς ἐστιν; εἰγὼ δὲ σάρκινος εἰμι, πεπραμένος ὑπὸ
tὴν ἀμαρτίαν. . . οὐδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἔκει. . . ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου ἔγαθον.
. . . τὸς με ὀφείλεται ἐκ τοῦ σῶματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου; . . . τὸ γὰρ
φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς θάνατος. . . οἱ δὲ ἐν σαρκὶ ὄντες θεῷ ἄφεται,
οὐ δύνανται. Philo calls the body ἁμαρτωλόν (De migr. Abr. 2. 9, Wendland II, p. 270); a ἔφοτή (Quis rer. div. her. 14. 68, Wendl. III, p. 16). Cf. Philo De migr. Abr. 3. 16, Wendl. II, p. 271: εἰς δὲ οἱ μέχρι τῆς τελευτῆς . . . ὀστέρ ἀρνακὴ ἡ σοφὸς . . . (τῷ σώματι) ἐπιμένον. Leg. alleg. 3. 22. 69, Cohn I, p. 127: τὸν γὰρ δερμάτων ὁγκὸν ἡμῶν, τὸ σῶμα, . . . ποιήμα τι καὶ ἐπιβολοῦν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ νεκρὸν καὶ τεθνηκὸς αἰεί; μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι νοσίζῃ ἵκαστον ἡμῶν ποιεῖν ἃ νεκροφορεῖν. Leg. alleg. 1. 33. 108, Cohn I, p. 89: ὡς νῦν μὲν, ὅτε ζωμεῖ, τεθνηκώς τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὡς ἐν σώματι τῷ σώματι ἐντευτυβεβεβενείς, εἰ δὲ ἀποθάνοικε, τῆς ψυχῆς ζώσης τὸν ἰδιὸν βίον, καὶ ἀπελλαμμῆνας κακοῦ καὶ νεκροῦ συνδέσμον τοῦ σώματος. This sort of language is derived in part from Pl. Phaedo 64 ff., and other passages in Plato; but some of the later Platonists went far beyond Plato in their hatred of the body.

(Πον skoteiνων περίβολον). The numerous metaphors by which the body is here described are mutually inconsistent; but their inconsistency becomes less obtrusive, and the transitions easier, if we shift τὸν σκοτεινὸν περίβολον, and place it next after χειτώνα. The body is first compared to a garment—χειτῶν, περίβολος, ψφασμα, (ατίργυμα;?); it is then called a δεισμός, i.e. a thing by which the soul is bound; (a garment might act as a δεισμός; the mention of φθορά in combination with δεισμός suggests the three terms which follow, viz. 'death', 'corpse', and 'tomb'; and finally, the pernicious thing is personified as a 'robber' and an 'enemy'.

τὸ τῆς ἄγνωσίας ψφασμα, τὸ τῆς κακίας 'ατίργυμα.1 How are the genitives to be understood? ἄγνωσίας ψφασμα would most naturally signify 'a web made of or consisting of ignorance'. But the writer's meaning must have been that the woven structure of the body produces or results in ignorance. The soul which is wrapped in it forgets its antenatal gnosis, and is sunk in lethe.

1 Compare τὸν δὲ θέρεσα μισοῦτα καὶ δὲν καθημεῖς σοι φθανοῦτα in Corp. VII as emended.
2 A Hermetist would have spoken of ἡ γνωσις in place of δο νόμος.
3 A Hermetist would have said θεων γνωσιν.
It is a strange mixture of metaphors to say that a piece of woven stuff (σφαιρα) is a 'prop' of wickedness or evil; and there can be little doubt that στήριγμα is a misreading. Possibly the author may have written τὸν . . . στήμονα, 'the warp of evil', carrying on the notion expressed by σφαιρα.

(⟨⟨(τὸν ἔχθρον)⟩⟩ τὸν δὲν ἔφεσαι μισοῦντα καὶ δὲν ἐπιθυμεῖς σοι φθενοῦσα. —(τὸν δὲν φιλεῖ μισοῦντα, καὶ δὲν μισεῖ φθονοῦσα MSS.) The reading of the MSS. can only be translated 'who hates the things by means of which he loves, and grudges the things by means of which he hates' (or, 'and grudges by means of the things which he hates').) But there is no meaning in that. Emended as above, the passage makes good sense. Your enemy the body 'hates the things which you seek after (i.e. τὰ αἰστῶματα καὶ θέα, —in Paul's language, τὰ πνευματικά), and grudges you the things which you desire.'

A substantive is needed here, to match the words with which the preceding phrases end. If there is no expressed substantive, we are forced to understand ληστήν; and that does not make good sense. A man who robs you is not one who 'hates the things which you seek after'; he is rather one who loves them overall. ἔχθρον is just the word that is wanted; and as an epithet of χτήνα in the following sentence, it is clearly out of place. I have therefore transposed it.

§ 3. ἄγχων σε κάτω πρὸς αὐτόν. Cf. Corp. Χ. 24 a: (ψυχήν) τῷ σώματι προσπηρτήμενον καὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἄγχομαιν κάτω. Ascl. Lat. I. 12 a: 'animam obtorto, ut aiunt, detinet collo.'

τὸ ἐκεῖ μένον (ἐγκείμενον MSS.) ἄγαθόν. If we retain ἐγκείμενον, we must take the words to mean 'the Good which is situated in Reality', or 'situated in the beauty of Reality'. But that is hardly satisfactory. ἐκεῖ μένον, 'abiding in the other and higher world', is better.

τὰ [δοκοῦντα καὶ μὴ] νομιζόμενα αἰσθητήρια ἀναίσθητα ποιῶν. (καὶ μὴ Α: ἐμοὶ Q: μοι καὶ Τυρν.) Both μὴ and μοι are unmeaning; and to say δοκοῦντα καὶ νομιζόμενα would be to say the same thing twice over. Perhaps the readings of the MSS. may have arisen out of δοκοῦντα καὶ μὴ (ὅτα), written as an alternative for νομιζόμενα.

Those who live in subjection to the body cannot see or hear aright; and the eyes and ears of such people do not deserve the name 'organs of sense', which is commonly applied to them. 'O foolish people, and without understanding, which have eyes, and see
not; which have ears, and hear not’ (Jerem. 5. 21). The preacher here includes under the term αἰωθήνια that ‘seeing with the heart’ which in § 2 a he distinguished from ‘seeing with the eyes’; and his meaning is that those who see with the bodily eyes alone, and not ‘with the heart’, ought to be called blind (ἀναίωθητοι), because they cannot ‘see the things they ought to see’ (ἐ βλέπειν δὲ, i.e. τὰ ἀσώματα καὶ θεία). It is the eyes and ears of the heart, and not the bodily organs, that are ‘stuffed up’.

The piece ends abruptly at the words ἸΑενοςας, and there is no fitting conclusion. It is probable therefore that only the beginning of the preacher’s discourse is given in Corp. VII, and the rest of it has been lost.

LIBELLVS VIII

Contents

...Nothing dies. The Kosmos is a living and immortal being; and no part of such a being can die. § 1 b.

The Kosmos is the second God. It has been made, and is maintained in being, by the first God. The first God is eternal (i.e. without beginning, as well as without end). The Kosmos is not without beginning, but it is immortal; for it has been made immortal by its Maker, who is eternal. § 2.

God made the Kosmos out of formless or unordered matter, which existed beside him from all eternity. Out of that part of matter which was wholly subject to his will, he fashioned the sphere of heaven; and within this sphere he enclosed the rest of matter. On the matter enclosed within the sphere he imposed manifold forms, so that the cavity (i.e. the sublunar world) was filled with living creatures; and he made the whole structure immortal, so that matter might never revert to its primal disorder. Yet a vestige of that disorder remains in the sublunar world, and manifests itself in the growth and decay of terrestrial organisms. The order of the heavenly bodies is perfect; their movement is cyclic or recurrent, (and accordingly, they are individually immortal.) Terrestrial organisms suffer dissolution; but by this dissolution they are reabsorbed into the cosmic elements, which are immortal. Thus, though the consciousness of each terrestrial being ceases, life never perishes. §§ 3, 4.
Man is made in the image of the Kosmos, and feels himself a part of it; but he differs from all other terrestrial creatures, in that God has given him mind. Hence he not only perceives the corporeal Kosmos, but also apprehends the incorporeal God. And from the relation of man to God and to the Kosmos, it follows that man is immortal.

The Kosmos is made by God; and man is made by the Kosmos. Thus God is the supreme author of all. § 5.

Sources. 'Nothing perishes; there is no death.' That is the thesis maintained in Corp. VIII; and it is likewise maintained in Corp. XII. ii. 15 b–18. Both the writer of VIII and the writer of XII. ii doubtless had in mind the often-quoted lines of Euripides Chrysippus, fr. 336 Nauck: ¹ χωρεὶ δ' ὀπίσω | τὰ μὲν ἐκ γαῖας φύσιν eis γαῖαν, | τὰ δ' ἄρ' αἰδέριον βλαστώντα γονῆς | eis οὐρανὸν πάλιν ἦθε τάλιον | θυσίσκει δ' οὐδὲν τῶν γεγομένων, | διακρινόμενον δ' ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλον υἱόν | μορφήν εἶπεν ἀπέδειξεν.⁴

For the rest, the doctrine of Corp. VIII is mainly Platonic, but partly Stoic. In his conception of the supracosmic and incorporeal God, the writer is a Platonist; and in his account of the relation between God and the Kosmos (§ 2), and his description of the demiurgia (§ 3), he is dependent on the Timaeus. His conception of ἄλλος υἱόν is derived from Plato. But his division of υἱόν into two separate portions, one of which is 'subject to God's will', and the other is not, does not come directly from the Timaeus, but shows

¹ That passage of Euripides, or part of it, is quoted in Philo (†) De incorrup. mundi three times, cc. 2, 6, 37; and by Philo, Leg. alleg. 1. 3. 7, Cohn I, p. 65; Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 430; Heraclitus Alleg. Hom. 22; Marcus Aurelius 7. 50; Clem. Alex. Strom. 6. 24. It is translated into Latin by Lucretius, 2. 991 ff., and by Vitruvius, 8 praef. § 1.

² Euripides got the thought from Anaxagoras, fr. 17 Diels: τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀνάλυειν οὐκ ὁρθὸς ἡμῖν παρὰ τοῦ Ὀλύμπου ὁδῷ φεύγων | τὸν χρόνον λείψαντα ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τάξιν | ἄλλ' ἄρ' ἄλλων κριτικῶν συμμετείχον τοὺς καὶ διακρίνοντα. καὶ ἄλλος δὲ ὁδὸς καλοίν τὸ τε γιγνεῖν συμμετείχον καὶ τὸ ἀνάλυειν διακρίνοντα. Compare also Epicharmus Gnom., fr. 9 Diels: συνεκρηθέν καὶ διεκρηθέν κατάστησαι οὐκ ἡ δέ αἰσθηθείν τάξιν, | γάρ μὲν εἰς γάν, πνεύμα δ' ἄρα (perhaps πνεύμα ἀνόω, τί τώρα χάλευτον; οὐδὲς θύ.)

But it was the verses of Euripides that fixed themselves in men's memory.

For a modern expression of the same thought, cf. Maeterlinck, Our Eternity, Eng. tr. 1913, ch. 2: 'Total annihilation is impossible. We are the prisoners of an infinity without outlet, wherein nothing perishes, wherein everything is dispersed, but nothing lost. . . . We can no more conceive death than we can conceive nothingness. . . . We give the name of death to anything that has a life a little different from ours. . . . "There is no room for death!" . . . All that dies falls into life.'

³ ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλον Clem. Alex. (†), Nauck, Diels; ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλον Bernays.

⁴ Variants, μορφήν εἶπεν and μορφήν ἀπέδειξεν.
connexion with a later form of the Platonic doctrine of \( \Delta \lambda \eta \). The comparison of the Kosmos to a cave may have been adopted from Numenius or some other Platonist of the same period. The description of the Kosmos as ‘the second God’ was doubtless suggested by the *Timaeus* (see *Tim.* 92 c). But the ‘second God’ of the Platonists is the supreme God of the Stoics; and in his account of the Kosmos, and of man’s relation to it, the writer has been influenced by Stoic authorities. The use of the word *συμπάθεια* (§ 5) is an indication of this. The words *ἀποκατάστασις* (§ 4), *ποιόν* and *ποιότης* (§ 3), probably came from Stoic sources. The writer of *Corp.* VIII apparently does not accept the Platonic doctrine that the individual man continues to exist as a separate person after the dissolution of the body. In this respect, he has rejected one of the most important tenets of Platonism, and his position more nearly resembles that of the Stoic Epictetus.

**Date.** The combination of Platonism and Stoicism which *Corp.* VIII presents cannot be earlier than the first century B.C. The date of this document must therefore lie somewhere between 100 B.C. and A.D. 300, if we take the latter date as the *terminus ad quem* of the *Hermetica* in general. Narrower limits cannot be fixed with absolute certainty; but the probabilities are strongly in favour of the latter half of this period. The nearest parallels to § 3 *init.* (καί ὅσον ἦν τῆς Ἰλης κ.τ.λ.) occur in the writings of Hermogenes and Methodius (A.D. 200–300); and the comparison of the Kosmos to a cave points towards the time of Numenius, Cronius, and Porphyry (A.D. 150–300), by whom the same comparison was employed. It is therefore most likely that *Corp.* VIII was written at some time between A.D. 150 and 300.

§ 1 a. *περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὡς ἔτει, νῦν λεκτὸν.* This implies that something has preceded. If the *libellus* began with these words, its writer must have intended it to follow another ‘discourse of Hermes to Tat’.

Hermes says that he is about to speak ‘about the soul’, and explain ῥόπῳ ζωή ἄθανατος ἤ ψυχή; but in the discourse which follows, there is not a word about ψυχή. The document might be described as *περὶ ἄθανασίας*; but no part of it can be described as *περὶ ψυχῆς*. However, there is undoubtedly a lacuna after καὶ διαλύσεως at the end of § 1 a; and it is possible that a passage of considerable length has disappeared there, and that these intro-
ductory words had more to do with the lost beginning of the discourse of Hermes than with the part of it which has been preserved.

In the preceding clause, the manner in which the νόημα and διάλογος of (earthly) bodies are carried on might be named either φός or εἰμι προς τὸν θάνατον. The νόημα and διάλογος of bodies are spoken of in § 4; but the document, in the form in which we have it, contains no explanation of the nature of the νόημα by which these processes are effected,—unless indeed what is said in § 3 about God's imposition of ποιήμα on ἄτακτος ὀνή can be considered such an explanation.

§ 1 b. (...) υπάρχουσιν ἔν τῷ κόσμῳ. A passage in which 'the things in the Kosmos' were mentioned must therefore have been lost before these words.

There is no such thing as death. Cf. Corp. XII. ii. 18: οὐδέν δὲ φανερῶν ἡ ἀπολλυμένων 

A similar thought occurs in Apollonius' Ep. 55, a consolatio addressed by Ap. to his brother, whose wife had died: μηδὲ ἐκεῖ θάνατος τι λέγεται ('because men speak of a thing which they call death'), κρεῖσσον αὐτοῦ τῷ ζῷῳ ἡ ὁμολόγῳ, χαῖρον δὲ τῷ πατρί τοῖς νοοῖς ἑξώναι. But in Ep. 55 (which may also be genuine, for all that I know), there is no philosophic elaboration of this thought; the bulk of the letter consists of advice to the widower (who was presumably not a philosopher) to marry again without delay.
I. e. 'the change from the state of elemental matter (οὐσία in the Stoic sense) to the state of an organism'. The meaning would be better expressed by writing τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ οὐσίας τραπέν εἰς φύσιν ἔδοξε γένεσις, τὸ δὲ ἐκ φύσεως εἰς οὐσίαν κατὰ ταυτὰ βάθατος, οὕτε γεγομένου κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὼν οὕτε φθειρομένου ποτὲ, μὸνον δὲ ἐμφασικώς ὑπός (for a time) ἀόρατον δὲ ὅστερον, τοῦ μὲν δὲ παχύτητα τῆς ὑλῆς, τοῦ δὲ διὰ λεπτότητα τῆς οὐσίας, οὕτως μὲν αἰτεί τῆς αὕτης, κυκαίρει δὲ διαφερομένης καὶ στάσει. τὸτο γὰρ τοῦ τὸ ἰδίον ἀνάγκη τῆς μεταβολῆς, οὐκ ἔχοντες γεγομένης πολέν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ὅλου μεταβάλλοντος εἰς τὸ τέρα, τῶν μερῶν δὲ εἰς τὸ ὅλον τρεπομένων (...).

2 ένότητι τοῦ ποντός. ἐὰν δὲ ἐφίσεται τις τι τότε ἢτι τοὺς μὲν ὅρατον ποτὲ δὲ ἀόρατον ἢ (ἐν;) τοῖς αὐτοῖς γεγομένων ἢ ἄλλοις, φαίνει τις δὲν ὅπως ἐκάκουστον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε γενών, δηλ. πληρωθέν μὲν (ὑλής;) ἑφάνη διὰ τὴν τῆς παχύτητας ἀντίπτωσιν, ἀόρατον δὲ ἐστιν, εἰ κενωθείη, διὰ τὴν τῆς λεπτότητας, τῆς ὑλῆς βία. περικυκλοφορίας ἐκκενωθέντος τι τοῦ περιέχοντος αὐτὴν αἰωνίου μέτρου γεγονήτω δ' οὐδαμός.

3 The writer must have meant, and may have written, τοῦ περιέχοντος αὐτὴν μέτρου, αἰωνίου ὑπός, γεγονήτω δ' οὐδαμός.

4 Conybeare translates 'shed abroad', which seems to suit the context. The word περικυκλοφορίας could hardly bear that meaning; but one might read περικυκλοφορίας, and 'the measure could hardly bear that meaning; but one might read περικυκλοφορίας, and be translated thus: 'If some one asks what is this thing that becomes visible at times, and invisible at other times, whether in the same individuals or in different individuals, we may answer that each kind of being upon earth has a measure, which, when filled with gross matter, becomes visible by reason of the solidity of its density, but if emptied of gross matter, is invisible by reason of its rarity, the gross matter having been shed abroad by violence and poured out from the measure which contained it. The measure is eternal, and is neither generated nor subject to destruction.'

5 The 'thing which is now visible and now invisible' is, if I understand the passage rightly, a sort of living gas (the πυρ νοσου or πνεύμα of the Stoics), which permeates the universe, and vivifies all individual organisms. It is thought of as corporeal, but subtle, and is contrasted with ζῦν (gross matter). It is invisible in itself; but when a portion of it, marked off by a definite boundary, is 'filled' with ζῦν, the thing thus composed (i.e. the living organism) is visible and tangible.

6 But what is the meaning of μέτρον? The word seems to be here used to denote the limiting surface of any one of these portions of πνεύμα (if 'the thing which is visible at times' may be called πνεύμα). At the death of the organism, this limiting surface is, so to speak, shattered by a violent shock (Βία), and the ζῦν with which it was 'filled' escapes, and is dispersed. The portion of πνεύμα which was delimited by this μέτρον, and in which the life of the organism consisted, then becomes invisible (and is presumably reabsorbed into the universal πνεύμα).

I have failed to find any parallel to this use of the word μέτρον; but it may possibly have been suggested by the saying of Heraclitus, fr. 30 Diels, ἢ δὲ καὶ ἐστι καὶ ἐστιν πῦρ ἀείζον (μέτρον τοῦ πυρ τοῦ τῶν Στοίκων, ἀιώνιον μέτρα καὶ αὐσωβεν

7 νόμουν μέτρα). Be that as it may, the notion which Apollonius here expresses by μέτρον seems to be similar to that elsewhere expressed by the Pythagorean term τετραγόνος. Of the philosophic tenets of Apollonius little is known; but a Stoicizing Neo-Pythagorean, such as we may suppose him to have been, might perhaps take
LIBELLVS VIII : § 1 b 193

τί δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς πλάνης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀνέλεγκτον; ¹ οἶνοι ταίς γὰρ τινες, δὲ πεπνύθασιν, αὐτοὶ τοῦτο πεπουργέσαν, μὴ εἰδότες ὡς ὁ γεννηθεὶς διὰ γονέων γεγένηται, οὐχ ὑπὸ γονέων; ² καθάπερ τὸ διὰ γῆς φυών οὐκ ἐκ γῆς φύεται, πάθος τε οἴδεθ τῶν φαινομένων περὶ ἐκαστοῦ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ ἐν ἐκάστου. ³ τούτῳ δὲ (εἰς τὸ ἔν) τί ἄλλο τις εἰπών ἢ τὴν πρώτην οἰσιάν ὑδρῶς ἄν ὁμοίασεν; ἢ δὲ μόνη πούει τε καὶ πάσχει, πάντα γνωμένη πάντα διὰ πάντων, θεος ἄδιδος, ⁴ ὁμαίασι καὶ προσώπων ἀφαιρομενὴ τὸ ἱδίον ἄδικον-μένη τε. ⁵

καὶ τούτο μὲν θλαττόν. τὸ δὲ (μείζον) κλαίεται τις, ὅταν θεὸς ἐν ἁνθρώπων γένεσθαι τόποις μεταβάει καὶ οὐχι φύσεως. ⁶ ὡς δὲ ἔχει τὸ

the ánwpwv of which Pythagoreans spoke to mean the universal ψεύμα, and τὸ πέρα to mean the μετρὸν by which the ψεύμα of an individual organism is marked off from the universal ψεύμα.

But the writer goes on to say that the μετρὸν is αλώνιον. What does he mean by this? It seems to be an attempt to combine with the Stoic cosmology the Platonic or Aristotelian conception of οἶδος. The μετρὸν of a horse, so far as it is regarded merely as belonging to this or that individual horse, is shattered at death; but regarded as a type or general form (εἴδεως), it is present in all horses; and the race of horses is everlasting. (The race or kind is referred to in the words ἑδατον τῶν ἑνώδει γενών.) The words ἐν (ἐν οὐκ αὐτοῖς γνωμένων ἢ (ἐν ἕ) ἄλοις are puzzling. The ψεύμα (and with it, the μετρὸν by which the ψεύμα is delimited) may be said to become visible and invisible by turns ἐν ἄλοις (καὶ ἄλοις), i.e. in a succession of different individuals; but how can it be said to do so ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς? Does τοῖς αὐτοῖς refer to the heavenly bodies, which, though the life in them persists unchanged, are alternately visible and invisible to us in the succession of day and night, and of the seasons of the year?

Why is it that this error (viz. the notion that men "die", or that there is such a thing as "death") has so long remained unrefuted?²

Valerius thinks 'I have begotten a son' (and consequently mourns when he loses his son). But that is a mistake; the begetting of his son, like all else that takes place, is an act of God (God immanent in the universe, and identical with φῶς)—or in other words, an operation of the all-permeating ποιητικῆς ὁμορρούμεν ἢ; and Valerius (who is himself merely a temporarily marked off portion of God) is in this, as in all else that he does (or rather, thinks that he does), a passive instrument of God, who does all.

Nothing that takes place in the visible world is a thing that befalls an individual; every incident in the life of an individual (ἐκαστὸν) is rather a thing that befalls the One (παρὶ πάντα) ἐν τῷ; this must, I think, have been the meaning of the clause; but περὶ τῶν ἑκαστῶν is obscure, and perhaps corrupt.

Valerius thinks 'the death of my son is a disaster that has befallen me'. But he is wrong; it is an event that has to do, not with him as an individual, but with the One who is all.—This is Stoic pantheism pushed to its extreme.

God (who is ποιητικῆς ὁμορρούμεν) is both the maker of the Kosmos and the πρώτη οἰσία (i.e. the primary elemental substance) of which it is made. The other elements (air, water, earth) have come into being by transmutation out of fire (and, according to the Stoics, will be wholly retransmuted into fire at the ἐκπροσία, when God will again be 'all in all'; but we have no evidence that Apollonius accepted the Stoic doctrine of ἐκπροσία).

This alone is agent and patient, ... (and this,) in so far as it takes as the names and persons of individuals, forfeits its peculiar character to its prejudice (Conybeare). Or perhaps, and when men impose on it the names and persons of individuals (as Valerius does when he talks about "me" and "my son"), they deprive it of its proper character, and do it wrong.

To weep when this takes place is μείζον, i.e. 'a still greater error than that of
aληθές, οὐ πενθητόν σοι θάνατον, ἄλλα τιμήτων καὶ σεβαστέον. . . .

νῦν δὲ ξέις καὶ νῦν τὸν τεθνηκότα, φήσει τις τῶν νοῦν ἔχωντων. τὸ γὰρ
όν οὐκ ἀπόλλυται, διὰ τούτο οὐν, ὅτι ἐσται διὰ πάντος. ¹ η καὶ τὸ μὴ δὲν
γίνεται: πῶς δὲν γένοιτο [μὴ ἀπολλυμένον τοῦ ὄστος]. ²

Macrobius Somn. 2. 12. 12: 'Quod autem ait (Cicero) “mundum
quadam parte mortalem”, ad communem opinionem respicit, qua
mori aliqua intra mundum videntur, ut animal examinantum, vel ignis
extinctus, vel siccatus humor; haec enim omnino interisse creduntur.
Sed constat secundum verae rationis adsertionem, quam et ipse
(Cicero) non nescit, nec Vergilius ignorat dicendo “nec morti esse
locum” (Georg. 4. 226), constat, inquam, nihil intra vivum mundum
perire, sed eorum quae interire videntur solam mutari speciem, et
illud in originem suam atque in ipsa elementa remeare, quod tale
quale fuit esse desierit.'

[Archivo esto του πρώτου γράμματος λεγόμενος θάνατος ἀντὶ τοῦ
ἀθάνατος.] That is, when men say θάνατος, they mean, or ought to

which I have been speaking'. The man who has died 'has become θεὸς, by
a change of place, but not of nature'. This does not mean that he has become a
god,—i.e. a divine individual, one among a number, with a separate personality of
his own. He was (or at least, he seemed to be, and thought he was) an individual
person while he lived on earth, but he is such no longer; he has been reabsorbed
into the All which is God. He has undergone 'a change of place, but not of
nature', in the same sense that this might be said of a bucket-full of water which
has been poured into the sea. His φύσις (his mode or kind of being) is unchanged;
i.e. he still is what he was before. He was πνεῦμα upon earth; (i.e. the man, qua
living, was πνεῦμα ; the Ὑγ with which his μέτρον of πνεῦμα was 'filled'
to constitute an organism was not he;) and he is πνεῦμα still. But during his life on
earth he was a distinct portion of πνεῦμα, marked off and divided from the rest;
now, that portion of πνεῦμα, which was he, is blended with the whole mass of
πνεῦμα in which the life of the universe resides.

That is what the writer must have meant, if he adhered to the doctrine laid
down in the preceding part of the letter. But from this point onward, he speaks
ambiguous, and uses phrases which, to a reader who had not fully grasped the
meaning of his doctrine, might seem to imply a survival of the man as a distinct
and individual person; e.g. διὰ τῶν ἱερων τοῦ γίνεται, and νῦν ξέις καὶ τῶν
tῶν τεθνηκότα.

¹ 'That which is, is for this very reason, that it will be for ever.' This, I
suppose, means 'Only that which is everlasting can rightly be said to exist'. If it
could, at any time in the past, be truly said of your son that 'he is', then it follows
that he can never cease to be. He must therefore be in existence now. (But he
does not now exist as a separate person; he has been absorbed into God, or has
become one with God.)

² The thing to be proved is that τὸ δὲν οὐκ ἀπόλλυται; and that being so, the
words μὴ ἀπολλυμένον τοῦ ὄστος appear to make the argument run in a circle. If
we cut out these words, the rest may be translated thus: 'Otherwise,' (i.e. if it
were true that τὸ δὲν perishes,) 'it would follow that τὸ μὴ δὲν comes into being;
but how could τὸ μὴ δὲν come into being?' (i.e. 'but that is impossible'). τὸ μὴ
δὲν γίνεται, 'the non-existent comes to be'; is merely another way of saying τὸ δὲν
ἀπόλλυται, 'the existent ceases to be'; but the writer seems to have thought that
the impossibility was more manifest when the statement was put in the form τὸ μὴ
δὲν γίνεται.
mean, ἀθάνατος, but have omitted the first letter. The writer should rather have said 'they mean ἀθανασία'; but he invents a substantive ἀθάνατος equivalent in sense to ἀθανασία, in order to give plausibility to his suggestion that βάνατος is a corruption of a word meaning 'deathlessness'.

The grammar of this clause is faulty. The grammatical defect might be removed by writing λέγεται in place of λεγόμενος; but it seems best to assume that ἀθάνατος has been inserted by a later hand.

ἀθάνατον ἐστι τοῦ ἀθανάτου ζωοῦ μέρος τι ἀποθανεῖν. Cf. Corp. XII ii. 15 b, 16. Ascl. Lat. III. 29 c: 'si enim animal mundus vivensque semper (αἰείζωος) et fuit et est et erit, nihil in mundo mortale est.'

[μάλιστα δὲ (ἀθάνατος) ὁ ἀνθρωπός, τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον.] According to the traditional text, μάλιστα δὲ would mean μάλιστα δὲ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ κόσμου. But that is nonsense. The writer's meaning must have been that man has been inserted by a later hand.

dΣτάθροντι μὲν τοῦ Δαρκίτου μὲν τοῦ δικτείου. Cf. Corp. XII. ii. 19: πάντων δὲ μάλλον (ἀθάνατος) ὁ ἀνθρωπός. But the mention of man interrupts the sequence of thought here, and unduly anticipates § 5, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὁ ἀνθρωπός κ.τ.λ. It is best therefore to bracket the words as an interpolation.

§ 2. θεύτερος δὲ ὁ καὶ εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ . . . ἀθάνατος γέγονε. This passage, as given in the MSS., is unintelligible; but the writer's meaning was probably not far from that which is expressed by the Greek as I have rewritten it. God is ἄδιος. (The word ἄδιος here means 'without temporal beginning or end'; it does not mean 'eternal' (αἰώνιος) in the Platonic sense, i.e. 'out of time'.) The Kosmos is not ἄδιος, but is αἰείζωος or ἀθάνατος, these two words being used as synonyms. The Kosmos has had a beginning; it has been made by God (ἐν αὐτοῦ γενόμενος). But having once been made, it is continually maintained in being, or unceasingly remade, by its Maker (ἐν αὐτῷ συνεχόμενος καὶ τρεφόμενος,—ἀεὶ γίνεται). And it will be thus maintained in existence as a living being through all future time; that is to say, God has made or makes it immortal. The contents of the paragraph are summed up in the concluding words, ὁ δὲ κόσμος ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἄδιόν ὄντος ἀθάνατος γέγονε. This doctrine is evidently based on the Timaeus. See Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. XI. 2. (5), and Corp. XVIII. 14 a.

ὁ καὶ εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ . . . γενόμενος. See Ascl. Lat. I. 10: 'dei, cuius sunt imagines duo mundus et homo.'

εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐγένετο, ψε' διατο. God may be called αὐτογέννητος;
but that is only another way of saying that he is ἀγέννητος. See Ascl. Lat. II. 14 b.

§ 3. ὅσον ἦν τῆς ὀλης ὄποκειμένον τῷ οὐσίῳ (θελήματι). These words imply that, of the total amount of ὀλη, a part only was ‘subject to God’s will’, and the rest was not. This is a modification of the doctrine taught in the Timaeus, which is rather that all matter is partly, but not wholly, subject to God’s will. Cf. Hermogenes ap. Hippol. Ref. haer. 8. 17 (quoted in prefatory note on Ascl. Lat. II): God ἔχορισε (τήν ὀλην) κατὰ μέρος, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς λαβὼν ἡμέρωσε, τὸ δὲ εἶσαεν ἀτάκτως φέρασθαι. The ‘Valentinian’ in Methodius’s dialogue Περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίων c. 3 (quoted id.) as emended: God ἀπὸ τῶν χειρίστων (τῆς ὀλης) τὰ κάλλυστα διακρινὼν, οὐτως ἐθημούργησεν ὅσα γοῦν ἥμοζαν θεω δημιουργεύν τὰ δ’ ὅσα αὐτῆς . . . τριγυδὴ ἐγωγχανεν, ταῦτα ὡς εἶχεν κατέληπεν.

The ἀτάξια of which the speaker in Methodius’ dialogue is thinking is wickedness, or moral evil. His view is that this ἀτάξια exists in men alone, and that it has arisen out of that portion of ὀλη which God rejected as too bad to be brought to order by him, and which, we must suppose, has somehow entered into the composition of men,¹ though not into that of anything else in the universe. But the ἀτάξια of which the writer of Corp. VIII is thinking is not (or at least, not solely or mainly) moral evil; it is rather αὐτής and μείωσις (§ 3 fn.), i.e. the growth and decay, or composition and dissolution, of individual organisms,² as opposed to the permanent and unchanging existence of the heavenly bodies; and this kind of ἀτάξια presents itself, not in men alone, but throughout the sublunar world.

ὁσαν καὶ αὐτῆς ἀδανάτον, καὶ ἕξουσιν ἁθινὸν τὴν ὀλητη. This is an anacoluthon. If the reading is right, the author has written ὅσαν &c. in agreement with ὀλη, which does not occur in the text, but might have stood above in place of ὅσον τῆς ὀλης. He ought rather to have written ὁσικῆς τῆς ὀλης καὶ αὐτῆς ἀδανάτον, καὶ ἕξουσις κ.τ.λ. Matter is not merely ἀδανάτος, as is the Kosmos, which has had a beginning; ‘the materiality of matter’ (i.e. matter as such, or unformed matter) is also ἁθινος, as God is; that is to say, it has had no beginning, but has existed side by side with God from all eternity. Cf. Ascl. Lat. II.

¹ Compare the statement in Pēsis Sophia (C. Schmidt, p. 160, l. 28 &c.) that men are ‘the dregs of ὀλη’.
² Cf. Plut. Is. et Os., quoted in prefatory note on Ascl. Lat. II.
God fashioned ‘so much of ἁλή as was (wholly) subject to his will’ into a hollow sphere; that is to say, out of this portion of ἁλή he made the heavens, that part of the universe in which there is perfect order. Moreover, he enclosed within this sphere the ἁλή which was not wholly subject to his will, and imposed a partial and imperfect order on this more refractory ἁλή; that is, he brought into being the mutable organisms of the sublunar world. And he did this by ‘sowing’ or ‘planting’ the qualities of the various kinds of ζῶα in the space within the sphere; that is, by imposing these qualities on the ἁλή with which that space was filled.

This writer uses the Stoic term ποιά, and not the Platonic term ἱδεῖν or ἕδη, to denote the thing by the addition of which ἁλή is changed into ζῶα, that is, into organized and living σώματα. The word ἱδεῖν is unmeaning here, and must have been written by error.

The description of the sublunar world as a cave in which the refractory ἁλή is imprisoned, and in which the ζῶα composed of it (including man) are enclosed, must have been borrowed from writers by whom the point of the comparison was more fully explained. Cf. Porphyry De antronympharum § 5 sq. (Nauck): ἀντρα μὲν δῆ... οἱ παλαιοὶ καὶ σπήλαια τῷ κόσμῳ καθιέροντο... σύμβολον μὲν τῆς ἁλῆς εἶ δῆ (συνάστηκεν) ὁ κόσμος τὴν γῆν παραδίδοντες,... τὸν δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἁλῆς γυμνὸν κόσμον διὰ τῶν ἀντρων παρατάντες... τὸ ἔνδρον... τῶν ἀντρών... καὶ σκοτεινόν... ἐδέσων αἰς σύμβολον τῶν προσόντων τῷ κόσμῳ διὰ τὴν ἁλῆν... οὕτω καὶ Πέρσαι τὴν εἰς κάτω κάθοδον τῶν ψυχῶν καὶ πάλιν ξέδον μοναχογονίτες τελοῦσιν τὸν μύστηρν, ἐποιομάσαντες σπήλαιον (τὸν) τόπον... εἰκὼν φέροντος [αὐτῷ] τοῦ σπηλαίου τοῦ κόσμου, διό τε Μίθρας ἐθεομιμούργησε, τὸν δὲ ἐντὸς κατὰ συμμέτρους ἀποστάσεις σύμβολα φερόντων τῶν κοσμικῶν στοιχείων καὶ κλιμάτων.¹ Ἡθ. § 8: οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ μετὰ τούτους Πλάτων (Ῥη. 7) ἀντραν καὶ σπήλαιον τὸν κόσμον ἀπεφήναντο... ὅτι μὲν οὖν σύμβολον κόσμον τὰ ἀντρα καὶ τῶν ἐγκοσμίων δυνάμεων ἐπίθετο οἱ θεολόγοι, διὰ τούτου διδήλωσεν. Porphyry in the De antr. νυμβρ. repeatedly refers to Cronius and Numenius, who had written on the same subject; e.g. § 21: ‘Numenius and his friend Cronius

¹ Perhaps we ought to cat out καὶ κλιμάτων, which yields no satisfactory sense, and read τῶν δὲ ἤντος ⟨⟨κλιμάκων⟩⟩ κατὰ συμμέτρους ἀποστάσεις σύμβολα φερόντων τῶν κοσμικῶν στοιχείων. The word στοιχεῖα may be taken to mean or include the planets. On the κλίμακας ἐπιτάπιλος of the Mithraic cult, see note on Corp. I. 25.
say that the cave presents an image and symbol of the Kosmos.‘
Thus it appears that the comparison of the Kosmos to a cave was
traditional among the Platonists of the second and third centuries
A.D., and that this symbolism may have been suggested to them
in part by the rites practised by the Mithraists in their subterranean
sanctuaries, as well as by reminiscences of the allegory of the cave
in Pl. Rep. 7. 515 sq.

πάντι ην οὐδήσεις θεοῦ δυνάμειν οὐδ’ αὐτοῦ (ὕ)πον. If this
reading is right, τὸ μετ’ αὐτοῦ ἄποιον must be taken to mean the
unformed matter ‘which existed side by side with God’.

Τῇ δὲ ἄλωσια περιέβαλε (περιβάλον MSS.) τὸ πάν σῶμα. God
conferred immortality on the universe which he had made. But the
immortality of the Kosmos resides more especially in the enclosing
sphere of heaven; and the word περιέβαλε seems intended to
suggest the meaning ‘God wrapped the Kosmos round with the
immortal heavens’.

Τῆς τούτου σωστάσεως θελήσασα ἀποστήμαι. The σωστάσεις is the
‘putting together’ or systematic arrangement of matter, by which
the Kosmos is constituted. It is nearly equivalent to τάξις; and
so ἄταξία is contrasted with it. τούτου might perhaps be omitted
with advantage; but if we retain it, we must take it to mean τοῦ
παντὸς σώματος, i.e. τοῦ κόσμου.

If the matter of which the Kosmos is composed were not ‘wrapped
in immortality’ (i.e. enclosed by the immortal heavens), it might
break away, and all might go back to chaos. Cf. Numenius ap.
Euseb. Pr. ev. 11. 18. 24 (τὴν ἑλέν ἦν . . . ἐνδησάμενος κ.τ.λ.),
quoted in prefatory note on Corp. II (p. 81).

ἐξει δὲ καὶ ἐνδέαθε ἄτακτόν τι περι τὰ μικρὰ ζωά εἰλοῦμεν.—(ἐξει
δὲ καὶ ἐνδέαθε τὴν περι τὰ ἀλλὰ μικρὰ ποιὰ εἰλοῦμεν MSS.) Some-
thing like ἄτακτόν τι is needed to lead up to αὐτὴ ἡ ἄταξία in the
following sentence. τὰ μικρὰ ποιὰ is meaningless; and there can be
little doubt that the author wrote τὰ μικρὰ ζωὰ (or σώματα). ‘The
small ζωὰ’ are the individual organisms on earth (which are called
τὰ ἐπίγεια ζῶα below), as opposed to that great ζωὸν the Kosmos,
and perhaps to the heavenly bodies also. ἀλλὰ is probably an
alternative reading for μικρὰ.

τὸ τῆς αὐξήσεως καὶ τὸ τῆς μειώσεως (sc. ἄτακτων) [ὅν θάνατον οἱ
ἀνθρώποι καλοῦσιν]. The μεταβολή to which all sublunar things are
subject takes the form of increase and decrease, or growth and decay.

1 Mr. G. R. S. Mead alters ποιά into ζῶα here.
Each living organism is continually taking into itself portions of the elements, and casting off other portions of them. But in the earlier stages of its existence it takes in more than it casts off, and so 'increases'; in the later stages it casts off more than it takes in, and so 'decreases'. Sooner or later, the advancing process of 'decrease' or 'decay' terminates in complete dissolution, 'which men call death'. But the relation between decrease and death is not explained in the text. It is not the decrease itself, or 'the disorderliness of the decrease', that men call death, but the dissolution in which the decrease terminates; and dissolution is not expressly mentioned. There is therefore reason to think that the words ἐν θάνατον οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦν have been added by another hand.

The process of growth and decay to which sublunar organisms are subject is contrasted with the unvarying movement of the heavenly bodies, and is considered to be caused by the partial survival, in the lower part of the Kosmos, of the ἀταξία of unformed or chaotic matter.

§ 4. ὡς ἀποκατάστασις τῶν ἐπιγείων σωμάτων (διαλυτήσις γίνεται τῆς) συστάσεως· τῇ δὲ διαλύει ταύτῃ (ἡ δὲ διάλυσις αὐτῇ MSS.) ἀποκατάσταται εἰς τὰ διάλυτα σώματα. The 'indissoluble bodies' are the cosmic elements, which are immortal. When an organism is broken up, the earth, water, air, and fire of which it was composed are reabsorbed into the mass of cosmic earth, water, air, and fire (cf. Corp. XII. ii. 18); and this 'return to the former condition' is here described by the term ἀποκατάστασις, which, in its stricter sense, was applicable only to the heavenly bodies, and meant the return of any one of them (or of all of them simultaneously) to the same position which it (or they) had occupied before. In Corp. XI. i. 2, the ἀποκατάστασις of terrestrial bodies is called ἀνταποκατάστασις.

καὶ οὕτω στάθησις γίνεται τῆς αἰσθήσεως, οὐκ ἀπόλεια (Џωίς) [τῶν σωμάτων]. Cf. Corp. XII. ii. 18, as emended: οὗ γὰρ ἡ γένεσις ἦστι ζωῆς ἀρχή, ἀλλ' αἰσθήσεως: οὐδὲ ἡ μεταβολὴ θάνατος, ἀλλὰ λήθη.

§ 5. τὸ δὲ τρίτον [τὸν ζῷον] ὁ ἄνθρωπος. If we retain ζῷον, these words imply that the Kosmos is τὸ δεύτερον ζῷον, and that God is τὸ πρῶτον ζῷον. But ζῷον usually means an animated body, i.e. a being composed of body and soul in combination; and in that sense, it is applicable to the Kosmos, but not to the supreme God, who is incorporeal. The Hermetists never, I think, call God a ζῷον. It
seems best therefore to bracket ζωήν, which may have come from ζωής in the preceding sentence.

πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον θεὸν συμπάθειαν ἔχων. This use of the term συμπάθεια is of Stoic origin. Alex. Aphr. De mixt. 142: ἦνωθαὶ μὲν ὑποτίθεται Χρόσιππος τὴν σύμπαθαν οὐχίαν, πνεύματός τινος διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διήκοντος, ὡς οὐ συνάγεται τε καὶ συμμένει καὶ συμπάθες ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὸ πάν. Cic. Nat. deor. 3. 28: ‘estque in (natura) iste quasi consensus, quam συμπάθειαν Graeci vocant.’ (Compare Nat. deor. 2. 19. ‘By such language the Stoics meant to express . . . the organic unity of the world as an animate body, and the correlation and mutual interdependence of all its parts,’ J. B. Mayor ad loc.) Cic. Div. 2. 34: ‘ex conjunctione naturae, et quasi concentu atque consensus, quam συμπάθειαν Graeci appellant.’ Ibid. 2. 142: ‘continuatio conjunctio naturae, quam, ut dixi, vocant συμπάθειαν.’

The Kosmos is one whole, all parts of which are συμπάθεια, i.e. are interconnected and mutually affected; man therefore, inasmuch as he is a part of the Kosmos, is συμπαθής with all other parts of it, and with the Kosmos as a whole. The Hermetist accepts this Stoic doctrine (cf. ο ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ below); but being, in the fundamentals of his theology, a Platonist, and not a Stoic, he goes on to say that man is something more
than a part of the Kosmos, and that, in virtue of his νοῦς, he is capable of entering into relation with the supracosmic God.

أشياء الأوماتو [καὶ νοῦ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ]. God is ὁ ἄγαθος νοῦς. As ἄγαθος, he is distinguished from the human νοῦς, which might be called οὐ κακὸς, but could hardly be called ἄγαθος without undue presumption (cf. Corp. VI, and Corp. XII. ii fin.). Being νοῦς, God can be apprehended by the human νοῦς. But the words καὶ νοῦ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ are awkwardly appended, and impair the symmetry of the sentence; and for this reason it seems probable that they have been added by another hand.

νόησις τί θεός, τί κόσμος, τί ξύλον ἄθανατον, τί ξύλον διάλυτον. It is implied that reflection on these questions (that is, on the answers to them which Hermes has given in this discourse) will make it evident that man 'does not perish'. The ξύλον ἄθανατα are the Kosmos itself, the heavenly bodies, and the cosmic elements (which are called τὰ ἄθανατα σώματα in § 4); the ξύλον διάλυτα are the sublunar organisms. Man, as a terrestrial organism, must be reckoned among the διάλυτα ξύλα; and as such, he does not perish, but is resolved into the imperishable elements.¹ It seems to be in this sense alone that the writer holds man to be immortal; for he does not speak of any other sort of human immortality. He says nothing of a survival of the individual ψυχή;² and he appears to hold that in the case of man, as in that of other animals, the individual consciousness ceases at the dissolution of the body (στέρησις γίνεται τῆς ἀιωθότεως, § 4). If anything retains separate existence, it must be the νοῦς alone; but this writer gives no indication of a belief that the νοῦς of a particular man continues after death to exist as a separate person. We must conclude then that he rejected the Platonic doctrine of individual immortality.

ἄρχη δὲ καὶ περιοχὴ καὶ σύστασις πάντων ὁ θεός. In other words, γεννᾶται καὶ περιέχεται καὶ συνίσταται πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ.

¹ Cf. Shelley, Adonais 42: 'He is made one with Nature; there is heard his voice in all her music', &c.
² There is nothing in the extant text to correspond to the words of the introductory sentence, τρύπῃ μίν νοῦ ἄθανατος ἡ ψυχή. If the writer had been asked what becomes of a man's ψυχή after the dissolution of the body, he might perhaps have answered that it is reabsorbed into the world-soul.
A. Man's sense and thought. §§ 1 b–5 a.

In men, sense and thought are inseparably united. In beasts, instinct takes the place of thought. § 1 b.

Thought is the function of mind. Thought and speech are interconnected. § 1 c.

There cannot, in man, be thought without sense, nor sense without thought. (This holds good even in dreams.) § 2.

When a man's mind is impregnated by a daemon, it brings forth bad thoughts; when it is impregnated by God, it brings forth good thoughts. And to have good thoughts is to be religious, i.e. to know (and be devoted to) God. §§ 3, 4 a.

Those who know God are at variance with the many, and are persecuted by them. But the religious man will cling to his knowledge of God in spite of persecution; and for him, all things are good. § 4 b.

All men possess thought; but the religious alone get good from it. All things are good to begin with, being made by God; but in the cosmic process, good turns to evil. The qualities of things are determined by the influence of the heavenly bodies; and by that influence some things are made bad, and others good. § 5.

B. The sense and thought of the Kosmos. §§ 6–8.

The sense and thought of the Kosmos are occupied in making and unmaking living organisms, and thereby accomplishing God's will. The Kosmos has received seed from God, and its function is to develop from this seed a perpetual succession of living beings. § 6.

The bodies of these beings are composed of the cosmic elements; their various qualities are imposed on them by the operation of the heavenly bodies; and their life is breathed into them from the life-breath of the Kosmos. §§ 7, 8.

C. God's sense and thought. § 9.

The sense and thought of all living beings are derived from the Kosmos; and the sense and thought of the Kosmos are derived from God. God's sense and thought are occupied in giving move-
ment (i.e. life) to all things. All things owe their being to God. Nothing can ever cease to be; for all things are in God; or rather, God is all things.

D. Teaching and belief. § 10.

The teacher's words may serve to set the pupil on the right track; but only by his own thought can the pupil attain to assurance of the truth.

The opening words of Corp. IX imply that it was written as a sequel to the Λόγος τέλειος, i.e. the Greek original of the Latin Asclepius. (See notes on Ascl. Lat. init.) The writer of Corp. IX then had that document before him; and it is possible that he was the same person who joined together the Greek Ascl. I, Ascl. II, and Ascl. III, and gave the title Λόγος τέλειος to the composite treatise. At any rate, there seems to be good reason for ascribing to the writer of Corp. IX the insertion, in Ascl. I, 8, of the clause περὶ γὰρ τούτου, πάσης αὐτῶς (ὁ κόσμος) αἰσθάνεται (ἡ μῆ, εἰσαίθις ἁθήσεται), which points forward to Corp. IX. 6, καὶ γὰρ ὁ κόσμος . . . αἰσθησιν ἴδιαν καὶ νόησιν ἔχει κ.τ.λ.

The topic of 'sense and thought' is dealt with under three heads, viz. A. man's sense and thought: B. the sense and thought of the Kosmos: C. God's sense and thought. It is possible that this arrangement was suggested to the writer by Ascl. Lat. III. 32 b, where ὁ ἀνθρώπως νοῦς, ὁ κοσμικός νοῦς, and ὁ θείος νοῦς are distinguished. But if so, he must have understood those three terms in a different sense from that intended by the author of Ascl. Lat. III. The 'cosmic' and 'divine' νοῦς of Ascl. Lat. III. 32 b, as well as the 'human' νοῦς there spoken of, are (if my explanation of that passage is right) primarily kinds or grades of νοῦς as it exists in men (ὁ ἀνθρώπως κοσμικός νοεῖ, ὁ ἀνθρ. θείως νοεῖ), and thus have little in common with the 'sense and thought of the Kosmos' and the 'sense and thought of God' discussed in Corp. IX, where the meaning is that ὁ κόσμος (and ὁ θεός) αἰσθάνεται καὶ νοεῖ. Moreover, the writer of Corp. IX differs from the writer of Ascl. Lat. III in speaking of 'thought' chiefly as connected with and issuing in action. The νόησις which he discusses is for the most part the function of the νοῦς πράκτικός, and not that of the νοῦς θεωρητικός; it is the operation of the will rather than of the intellect.

Sources. The writer's conception of the supracosmic God, and of the relation between God and the Kosmos, is Platonic. But in asserting
the inseparability of νόησις and αἰσθήσις, he is opposed to the teaching of the Platonists; and this part of his doctrine is probably derived from some Stoic authority. His conception of the cosmic πνεύμα is Stoic.

**Date.** The prophecy in *Ascl. Lat.* III was probably written about A.D. 270, under the stress of the troubles caused by the Palmyrene invasion of Egypt. *Corp.* IX then, being a sequel to *Ascl. Lat.*, was most likely written shortly after that date, i.e. about A.D. 280–300.

The only definite indication of date in the document itself is that which is given in § 4 b, where the writer says that οἱ ἐν γνώσει δυνατείς (i.e. the adherents of his religion) are mocked at, hated, and despised, and that, if not actually put to death, they are at least in danger of being put to death by their enemies (τάχα που καὶ φονευόμενοι). At what time, and under what circumstances, could this be said of an obscure group of Egyptian Platonists? It is true that descriptions of the philosopher despised and jeered at by the many occur repeatedly in Plato and elsewhere in Greek literature (e.g. *Pl. Gorgias* 521 d ff.; *Theaet.* 174 a ff.; *Phaedrus* 249 D); and the instance of Socrates would suffice to prove that a man might even be put to death on account of his devotion to philosophy. But the writer of *Corp.* IX would have had no reason to introduce the topic here, if it had not been suggested to him by present circumstances. There can be little doubt that he and his companions felt themselves to be exposed to such treatment as he describes; and the words ὅ θεος ἐβίβαζεν πάντα ὑποστήσει κ.τ.λ. show that they anticipated serious ill usage. The attitude which he ascribes to the enemies of 'the gnosis' closely resembles that which is ascribed to the enemies of religion in the Prophecy of Hermes, *Ascl. Lat.* III. 25 (compare μεμνήναι δοκοῦν with *religiosus pro insano habebitur*, and γέλωντα ἀφιλοκάνονοι with *anima et omnia circa eam... risui*); and it is to be presumed that in *Corp.* IX, as well as in *Ascl. Lat.* III, the enemies in question are the Christians. At the time at which we have found reason to think that *Corp.* IX was written (A.D. 280–300), the Palmyrene occupation of Egypt, which had given occasion for the prophecy in *Ascl. Lat.* III, was a thing of the past; but the aggressive energy of the Christians, which had forced the writer of that prophecy to recognize that Paganism was already doomed, must have been increasing year by year during the interval; and perhaps something of the temper which showed itself in the murder
of Hypatia by a Christian mob in A.D. 415 was already visible among them. The Hermetists, as well as other Egyptians who adhered to the old religion, must have known themselves to be despised and hated by their Christian neighbours; and they must have seen that the Christians, if their present rate of progress was maintained, would soon get the upper hand. It was to be expected that, when this took place, the mass of the remaining Pagans would conform to the requirements of the new doctrine without serious resistance; but the few who were in earnest about their religion, and were resolved to cling to it at all costs, may well have felt that, under Christian domination, their lives would be in danger.

Of Egyptian history during the last quarter of the third century, not much is known to us. The most striking event of the time is the rebellion which broke out in Egypt about A.D. 295, and was suppressed by Diocletian in 297. What part the Christians of Egypt took in that struggle, we are not informed. But it is not likely that they were passive and indifferent spectators; and it may reasonably be conjectured that they sided against the imperial government, and that their conduct on that occasion contributed to convince Diocletian that the existence of Christianity was a grave danger to the empire, and thus to bring about the systematic attempt to suppress it which began in A.D. 302. The reconquest of Egypt by Diocletian probably gave a temporary check to the growing power of the Christians in that country; but it is not unlikely that in the confusion caused by the revolt, if not before it, their hatred of their Pagan countrymen may here and there have manifested itself in acts of open violence.

Title. The contents of the discourse are correctly described by the words peri rohseos kai aisthoseos. The words which follow (oti en monw... oidaioi) have been transferred to this place by error from the heading of Corp. VI.

§ I b. oti h mwn (aisthoseis) ulikh estin, h de (rhopos) odoswthim. The

1 Compare Julian's accusation against the Christians, written in A.D. 362 (Jul. c. Christianos, Neumann, p. 199): 'grhoit he Iousaion tois thymois kal tois nekrivn, daphonntes lera kal thymosi, kal akooftate aixi himaw monon tois tois patrinov dýmyntas, alla kal twn hle hlmaw peklakmimwv aiermoxwv tois mh toin aitov tropon himaw toin nekrivn thporoynas.

2 Schiller, Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit II, pp. 138 ff.; Mommsen, Provs. of Röm. empire, Eng. tr. II, p. 251. Mommsen says that the revolt lasted three or four years.

3 Schiller (II, p. 140) says that prophecies extracted from the holy Scriptures were probably employed [by Christians] to stir up fanaticism in the interest of the rebellion.
words ἐλλικός and ὀοισιώδης are contrasted in Ascl. Lat. I. 7 b. In that passage, the human νοῦς is called pars hominis ὀοισιώδης, which means that it consists of ὀοσία in the Platonic sense, i.e. of incorporeal and eternal substance; and the body (including the ψυχή αἰσθητική?) is called ἐλλικόν, which means that it is composed of material elements. The terms here used by the writer of Corp. IX were probably suggested to him by Ascl. Lat. I. 7 b; but he applies the words ὀοισιώδης and ἐλλικός somewhat differently. νόσος is not a pars hominis, but the function of a pars hominis; and when he says people think νόσος to be ὀοισιώδης, he must mean that they hold, not that νόσος consists of ὀοσία, but either that the ‘part of man’ which operates in νόσος consists of ὀοσία, or that the object of νόσος is ὀοσία. Similarly, when he says that they think αἰσθήσει to be ἐλλική, he must mean that they hold, not that αἰσθήσει is composed of material elements, but either that the organs of sense consist of matter, or that the objects of sense-perception are material things.

ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσιν ἀμφότερα ἡμῶναι. Cf. § 2: οἵτινε ὄροι καὶ χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως δυνατῶν νόσοι, οἵτινε αἰσθήσεα καὶ χωρὶς νοσοῖς. In man, αἰσθήσεις and νοσοὶ are inseparable; in every process of his conscious life, both are present together.

In saying this, the writer deliberately rejects the doctrine commonly taught by the Platonists, who held that in the higher activities of the human mind νοσοὶ alone is present, and αἰσθήσεις is absent. The Platonic view of νοσοὶ and νοστά is maintained in the Λόγος τελεῖος (see especially Ascl. Lat. III. 17 b-19 c and 34 b-36); and the writer of Corp. IX must have intended to correct in this respect the teaching of that document.

But whence did he derive the doctrine of αἰσθήσεις and νοσοὶ which he seeks to substitute for that taught by the Platonists? The pre-Socratics used the word νοσὶ and its synonyms and derivatives to signify sense-perception as well as thought.1 The first writer who made a clear and sharp distinction between αἰσθήσεις and νοσοὶ was Plato;2 and Plato’s distinction was maintained by Aristotle, with

1 Arist. De an. 3. 3, 427 a 31: οἴ τε ἁρχαὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταῦτα ἐναν φαιν., . . . τάκτε γὰρ οὕτω τοὺς σωματικὸς ὀπαστρ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐνολομάδανοι. For them, the conception of τὸ ὀοισιώδης did not exist, and everything was ἐλλικὸς.

2 Windelband, Gesch. der alten Philosophie, p. 117: according to Plato, ‘two worlds are to be distinguished (Pl. Tim. 27 D and 51 ff.). One of these two worlds consists of that which is and never becomes; the other consists of that which becomes and never is. The one is the object of αἰσθήσεις; the other is the object of νοσοὶ.’ That which ‘becomes and never is’ is corporeal; that which ‘is and never becomes’ is incorporeal.
some modifications. Aristotle held that νόησις can take place in man only when the νοῦς has been called into action by preceding αἴσθησις; and he would have admitted that, in this sense, ἀνθρώπος οὗ δύναται νοσεῖ χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως; but he would not have said that ἀνθρώπος οὗ δύναται αἰσθήσασα νοσεῖ χωρὶς νοσεῖς. The view of the Peripatetic Strato, 290–270 B.C., was more like that expressed in Corp. IX. Strato denied the existence of the incorporeal νοσεῖ recognized by Plato and, in a somewhat different sense, by Aristotle; he held the objects of νόησις to be corporeal, and identical with those of αἴσθησις; and accordingly, he regarded αἴσθησις and νόησις as inseparable.2 Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was a contemporary of Strato; and the Stoics, as they agreed with Strato in holding that only the material is real, agreed with him also in rejecting the Platonic and Aristotelian separation of αἴσθησις and νόησις. Sext. Emp. Math. 7. 307: ναὶ φασιν (οἵ δογματικοὶ, i.e. the Stoics), ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἐστι διάνοια καὶ αἴσθησις, οὗ κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἄλλο μὲν διάνοια, κατ’ ἄλλο δὲ αἴσθησις: καὶ ἐὰν τρόπον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσων κοιλὸν τε καὶ περίκυκτον λέγεται, οὗ κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ . . . οὕτως ἡ αὕτη δύναμις κατ’ ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶ νοῦς, κατ’ ἄλλο δὲ αἴσθησις. ‘The Stoics’ in Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 400: τὸ γὰρ φάντασμα ἑπεδίον λογικὴ προσπήπτει ψυχῆς τὸν ἐννόημα καλεῖται, ἐλπισφερό τούτομον παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ. ‘The Stoics’ in Diog. Laert. 7. 51: τῶν φαντασίων αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν λογικαί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογα: λογικαῖ μὲν, αἱ τῶν λογικῶν ζώων ἄλογα δὲ, αἱ τῶν ἄλογων. αἱ μὲν οὖν λογικαὶ νοσεῖς εἰσίν: αἱ δὲ ἄλογα οὐ τετήχασιν ἀνάμνησις. (This implies that all human φαντασίαι are νοσεῖς; and assuming that every act of αἴσθησις results in a corresponding φαντασία, it would follow that ‘in man there is no αἴσθησις without νόησις’).3

1 Ar. De an. 3, 8, 432 a 7: οὕτω μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηδὲν οὐδὲν ἀν μάθων οὔδε ἔννοια ἦν τα βουθή, ἀνάγνω ἄμα φάντασμα τι βουθεῖν. ‘Nihil est in intellectu quin fuerit in sensu.’

2 Windelband, Gesch. der alten Phil. p. 179: Strato ‘identified God with the world, and on the other side, thought with sense. . . . He regarded the soul as an indivisible ἴδιανοικον, which has the senses for its organs, so that the activity of the senses never takes place without thought, and on the other hand all thought is limited to a content given by sense-perception.’ No thought without sense; Strato in Simplicius Phys. 225 a (Zeller Arist. II, p. 468): διὰ γὰρ μὴ πρότερον λόγως (ἡ ψυχή), ταύτα οὔ δύναται νοεῖν. No sense without thought; Plat. Sollert. animal. 3. 6: Στράτανος γε τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγου οὕτω ἀνθετεκόντων ὅσον οὐδὲ αἰσθάνονται τοσοῦτον ἀνεῖν τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλάκις ἐνυπερουμένως τῇ ὁδεί καὶ λόγοι προσπεποιηθέντες τῇ ἑαυτῇ διαλαμβανομένῳ ἑαυτῷ καὶ διαφέρει οὖσι πρὸς τίτος τῶν νοεῖν ἑχοντας· εἰτ’ αὕτη ἑπαγγέλθη καὶ μεταθεῖ καὶ θέσει τῶν προερχομένων ἐκαστὸν ἀναληγμένον. ἦ καὶ λέγεται “νοεῖς ὅρῳ καὶ νοεῖς ἄλογος, τάλα καρδία καὶ τυφλά” (Epicharmus), ὅτι τῷ περὶ τὰ ὀμάτα ταῦτα πάντως ἄγαν, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸ φυσικόν, αἴσθησις οὐκ ὀκούστων.

3 Cf. Philo Leg. alleg. 2. 18. 71, Cohn I, p. 104: οὕτω γὰρ ὁ νοῦς διὰ αἰσθάνεται ἑδύνατο καταλαβεῖν ζῶον ἢ φυτὸν ἢ λίθον ἢ ζύλον ἢ συνόλοι σώμα, οὕτω ἡ αἴσθησις
A Hermetist of the third century A.D. is not likely to have been directly influenced by Strato; and there can be little doubt that the writer of Corp. IX, in his doctrine of αισθησις and νόησις, has adopted a view suggested to him by some Stoic authority.

ἐν γάρ τοῖς ἄλλοις (perhaps ἄλαγοις) ζῴοις ἢ αἰσθησις τῇ φύσει ἦμωται. The lower animals differ from man in this respect, that they are devoid of νοῖς, i.e. incapable of νόησις. But in place of νόησις, they have φύσις. Cf. Corp. XII. i. i: ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλαγοις ζῷοις (ἀντὶ νού;) ἡ φύσις ἐστίν. See also Herm. Exc. IV B.

The actions of men result from αἰσθησις supplemented by νόησις; the actions of beasts result from αἰσθησις supplemented by φύσις. The word φύσις may here be translated 'instinct'. It means an impulse implanted in the animal by a force which operates throughout the universe, and which, in the view of the Hermetists, issues from the will of God. When a man acts, he is consciously aiming at a good (real or apparent) to be realized by his action; and his conception of the good towards which he directs his action is called νόησις (ἄγαθοι). But a beast acts without conscious aim; it has no conception of a good to be realized by its action; and if its action is directed towards an end, the conception of that end or good must reside, not in the beast itself, but in the mind of God, who governs the forces by which the beast's action is determined. It is not the animal itself, but φύσις operating in the animal (or rather, God working through φύσις), that in this case aims at a good.

§ 1 c. νοῆσεως δὲ ὁ νοῦς διαφέρει...χωρίς λόγου. This is a digression. The writer here speaks of (1) the relation between νοῆσις and νοῖς, and (2) the relation between νοῆσις and λόγος. In § 2, he returns to the topic with which he began, viz. the relation between νόησις and αἰσθησις.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ θειότης ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ γίνεται, ἢ δὲ νόησις ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ. What is the meaning of θειότης here? ὁ νοῦς is the mind, i.e. the 'part of man' which thinks; and νόησις is that which 'is done by the mind' (ὑπὸ τοῦ νοοῦ γίνεται), or 'the action of the mind', i.e. the process of thinking. And since we are told that the relation between νόησις and νοῖς corresponds to that between θειότης and θεός, it follows that θειότης must mean 'what is done by God', or 'God's action'. The writer was probably thinking especially of God's

εἰκα τοῦ νοοῦ περικυσάμενο τὸ αἰσθάνεται. ἦπερδη τοῖνυν ἀμφα ταῦτα συνελθείν ἢ τι πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν ὑποκειμένων κ.τ.λ. The Stoics held that there is nothing which is not σῶμα; and to one who took that view, Philo's statement would mean that (in man) there can neither be νόησις without αἰσθησις, nor αἰσθησις without νόησις.
action in or on the human soul; and in that respect, it might be said that as νὸσσις is that which takes place in him who is ἐννοοῦσ, so θεώτης is that which takes place in him who is ἐνθεός. If this is the writer's meaning, θεώτης may be translated 'divine inspiration'; and the employment of the word in this sense may have been suggested by the common use of θεῶς to describe a man who is inspired. θεώτης is similarly used in Clem. Homil. 2. 27: Simon Magus τὰ μαγεία γινόμενα θεώτητι πουῖν ἔλεγεν. In that passage, θεώτητι means 'by the operation of God', as μαγεία means 'by the operation of demons'. Cf. περὶ θεώτητος διαλεγόμενος in Corp. XIII. 1.

§ 1. ή δὲ νόσσις . . ., ἀδελφή οὖσα τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ὁργανα (ταῦτα) ἀλλήλων. λόγος here means 'speech'. See § io, where λόγος is contrasted with νῶς. Speech is an ὀργανον of thought; i.e. speech is the instrument by means of which thought is expressed. But what is meant by saying that thought is an ὀργανον of speech? Probably the meaning is that the speaker's words can influence the hearer only by acting through the hearer's thought; they are effective only so far as the hearer understands them. (That is the point which is insisted on in § 10.) But in order to obtain this meaning, we ought to read, in place of οὔτε γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἐκφωνεῖται χωρὶς νοσσεος, something like οὔτε γὰρ ὁ λόγος καταλαμβάνεται χ. ν. Perhaps ἐκφωνεῖται originally stood in the following clause (where the MSS. give οὔτε ἡ νόσσις φαίνεται), and was thence transferred by error to this place, where it was substituted for the original verb.

§ 2. εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον συνεπιστρέφουσιν ἀλλήλαις. See § 9, where we are told that the sense and thought of all ζώα (including man) are derived from the sense and thought of the Kosmos, and that they pass into the individual ζώον from the atmosphere in the process of breathing.

[Συνατὶν δὲ νόσσον (καίτιοι λέγονται ἄνθρωποι ἐνίστε (?) ὡς ἀισθήσεως νοεῖται, καθάπερ οἱ διὰ τῶν ἑνείρων ψυχαλάμμενοι δράματα ὕμοι δὲ δοκεῖ (μάλλον εὐσεβεῖς εἰναι (?) τὸ γεγονέναι ἀμφότερος τὰς ένεργείας ἐν τῇ τῶν ἑνείρων ὑπερ ξυμνημοσύνη γὰρ σηματάς άεί η νόσσος τῇ (?) αισθήσει. I suppose the meaning of this mutilated passage to have been that some people say that νόσσος takes place without αἰσθήσεις in dreams,1 but that the writer denies this, and maintains that νόσσος

1 Compare the theory of sleep and dreams which is given in Lactant. De opin. dei 18. 4: 'Requiescere nullo pacto possumus, nisí mens visionum imaginibus occupata teneatur. . . . Avocatur ergo (mens) simulacris, donec membra sopore irrigata vegetentur: corpus enim vigilante sensu, licet iacent immobile, tamen non est quietum, quia flagrat in eo sensus . . . Sed postquam mens ad contemplandas
and αἰσθησις are inseparable, not only in waking life, but in dreams also. I take [δυνατόν δὲ νόησιν] to be a doublet of the preceding words δυνατόν νόησιν. It is to be inferred from the phrase ἵμοι δὲ δοκεῖ that something like ‘it is said by some’ has preceded. The two εὐρέγειαι spoken of must be αἰσθησις and νόησις.

...and (ἡ αἰσθησις) (διήρτηται γε MSS.) εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν. From the following words, καὶ όταν ἀμφότερα τὰ μέρη τῆς αἰσθησισς k.τ.λ., it may be inferred that the missing subject of διήρτηται ἦν ἡ αἰσθησις. The ‘two parts’ of αἰσθησις are probably the two processes which Aristotle and the Stoics distinguished under the names αἰσθησις and φαντασία. According to Aristotle, the external object, acting through the bodily organ of sense, stamps an image of itself¹ on the ψυχὴ αἰσθητικῇ; and the perception of this internal image (which persists after the external object has ceased to be present) is called φαντασία. He says that ἡ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἰσθησις τῆς αἰσθησις (Rhet. 1. 11, 1370 a 28), and that ἡ φαντάσματα ὁπέρ αἰσθήματα ἐστιν, πλὴν ἄνευ ύλῆς (De an. 3. 8, 432 a 9). The Stoics adopted Aristotle’s theory of αἰσθησις and φαντασία with little alteration. Cf. ‘the Stoics’ in Diog. Laert. 7. 46: τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἰδίοματος [οἰκείως] μετεπεργεμένου απὸ τῶν τύπων (τῶν) ἐν τῇ κηρῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ δακτυλίου γυαλώμων. Αἱ φαντασίαι may be ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, i. e. it may be an impression stamped on the soul by a really existing external object; in that case, it is called καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ (i. e. a φαντασία which gets hold of something real), and its evidence is true. On the other hand, it may be ὅτι ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, i. e. it may have originated in the soul itself; in that case, there is no external object to correspond to it, and the man who accepts it as evidence of reality is mistaken. (See Arnim, Stoic. vet. fragm. II, pp. 21 ff.) A dream is a series of φαντασίαι of the latter kind.

The Hermetist’s doctrine of ‘the two parts of αἰσθησις’ is probably derived from the Stoic doctrine of αἰσθησις and φαντασία. The ‘part of αἰσθησις’ which he assigns to the body is the operation of the bodily sense-organs, and corresponds to the Stoic αἰσθησις; the imagines ab intentione traducta est, tunc demum corpus omne resolvitur in quietem.... Sibi avocamenta invenit (mens), ne saluberrimam quiclibet corporis interrupat.... Dormiendae ergo causa tributa est un deo ratio somniandii.¹ This implies that in sleep sense (αἰσθησις, i. e. the activity of the bodily sense-organs) is suspended, and the mens (νοῦς) alone is active, being occupied in the contemplation of simulacra or imagines (φαντάσματα).

¹ The simile of seal and wax, by which Aristotle (De mem. 1. 350 a) illustrates the process, had already been employed by Plato in the Theateletus, 191 c sqq.
LIBELLVS IX: §§ 2–3

'part of αἰσθήσεως' which he assigns to the soul corresponds to the Stoic φαντασία.

ءًاءν ἄμφότερα τὰ μέρη τῆς αἰσθήσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνήσῃ. 'When the psychic αἰσθήσεως agrees with the bodily αἰσθήσεως (?)'. This perhaps may mean 'when the φαντασία is an exact reproduction of an image impressed on the bodily sense-organs by an external object'; that is, in Stoic terms, 'when the φαντασία is ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος'. But the meaning of the paragraph as a whole is uncertain; and that being so, there can be no certainty about the meaning of this or that clause of it.

§ 3. ὃ γὰρ νοῦς κύις πάντα τὰ νόηματα. In the words κύις and ἐστιν, the writer illustrates his meaning by a metaphor taken from human procreation. The man's νοῦς is the mother of his νοήματα; but the father of every good νόημα is God, and the father of every bad νόημα is some daemon. That is to say, man's νοῦς does not produce νόηματα by its own unaided operation; each of his designs or purposes is suggested to him from without, either by God or by a daemon.

As instances of κακὰ νοήματα, the writer mentions φόνοι, μυστερία, and the like; as instances of ἄγαθὰ νοήματα, he gives ἀρέτη and σωφροσύνη. It is evident from this that the νοῦς here spoken of is νοῦς πρακτικός; the νόησις is the process of deciding on a certain end to be aimed at by action, and is assumed to carry with it a corresponding act of will; and the νόημα is the purpose thus formed, or the course of action thus decided on.

For the notion that good νόηματα are 'begotten' by God, cf. Philo De Cherubim 13. 43, Cohn I, p. 180: ἀνὴρ μὲν γυναῖκι . . . τὰς ἐπὶ γενέσαι παιδῶν ὀμιλίας . . . συνέχεται ποιησόμενος' ἀρεταῖς δὲ τοιλλά καὶ τέλεια τικτούσαις θέμας οὐκ ἔσων ἀνδρός ἐπιλαχεῖν θυντοῦ μὴ δεξάμενα δὲ παρὰ τινος ἔτερου γονίν, εὖ ἐαυτῶν μόνον οὔθετο πνεύματι. τὸς οὖν ὅ σπείρων ἐν αὐταῖς τὰ καλὰ πλὴν ὁ τῶν ὄντων πατὴρ, ὁ ἀγάπης θεὸς καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα γεννῶν; The ἀρεταί are here hypostatized, and are spoken of as if they were persons distinct and separate from the virtuous man; but Philo's meaning appears to be that good thoughts and actions (the offspring of the ἀρεταῖ) are not originated by the man himself, but are implanted in him or bestowed on him by God. Philo expresses the same thought without metaphor in Leg. alleg. 3. 46. 136, Cohn I, p. 143: δεὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς τόνον μὴ ἐαυτῇ προσάγειν τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ' ἀφελεῖν ἀφ' ἐαυτῆς καὶ θεῶ ἀνενεγκεῖν, ὁμολογοῦσαν ὅτι οὖν ἡ Ἰσχίως αὐτῆς οὐδὲ ἡ δύναμις περιποίησε τὸ καλόν, ἀλλὰ ὅ καὶ
The following ιστις must be taken to refer, not to δαιμονος here, but to the preceding τινος των δαιμόνων. But that being so, the interposed words μηθενός . . . δαιμονος awkwardly interrupt the sentence, and obscure the construction. It seems best therefore to assume that they have been inserted by a later hand.

ο κόσμος here means the sublunar world alone. It cannot include the heavens; for no Hermetist would have said that the heavens are full of maleficient daemons. The writer of the clause presumably held the view expressed in Corp. XVI and elsewhere, that all physical processes in the sublunar world are carried on by the agency of personal beings called daemons. He considered that all bad thoughts and actions result from the influence on us of the matter of which our bodies and their environment consist; but he attributed the influence of matter to the action of personal beings residing in it.

If a man is 'illuminated' by God, he is secured against the action of the daemons; if not, they beget bad νοήματα in him. Cf. Corp. XVI. 16: ουδεὶς γὰρ οὐδὲν δύναται οὔτε δαιμόνων οὔτε θεῶν πρὸς μίαν ἀκτίνα τοῦ θεοῦ. Hermes in Lactant. Div. inst. 2. 15. 16 (Anl. Lat. III. 29 b): εὐσεβοῦς γὰρ ἀνθρώπου οὔτε δαιμόνων κακὸς οὔτε εἰμαρμένη κρατεῖ.

In the word πεφωτισμένη, the writer employs a different and inconsistent metaphor. To say that God 'pours light into' a man is another way of saying that God begets good νοηματα in the man's νος.

Each individual daemon begets his own special kind of sin. Cf. Valentinus ap. Clem. Alex. Strom. 2. 20. 114: πολλὰ γὰρ ἐνοικοῦντα (τῇ καρδίᾳ) πνεύματα (= δαιμόνος) οὐκ ἐξομηλανεν ἐκατον δὲ αὐτῶν τὰ ἱδία ἐκτελεῖ ἔργα, πολλαχῶς ἐνθριόντων ἐπιθυμίαις οὗ προσηκοῦνται. Origen, Hom. XV in Iesum Natæ: 'per singulos homines sunt spiritus aliqui, diversa in ipsis peccatorum genera molientes. Verbi causa, est aliquis fornicationis spiritus, est irae spiritus alius, est avaritiae spiritus, alius vero superbiae. Et si invenias esse aliquem hominem qui his omnibus malis aut etiam pluribus agitatur, omnes hos vel etiam plures in se habere inimicos putandus est spiritus.'
The enumeration of evil ought to end with évσσβεία, in which all wickednesses are summed up, as the enumeration of ágathá νόημαta ends with εὐσσβεία. There is therefore reason to think that the words áγχώνας . . . δαίμονες ἔργα have been subsequently added. The phrase κατὰ κρησμῶν καταφοράς recalls the words ἀρμυσαν ἡ ἀγέλη κατὰ κρησμόν in the story of the Gadarene swine (Mark 5.13, Matth. 8.32, Luke 8.33); and possibly the interpolator may have been a Christian, and may have been thinking of the δαίμονες ἔργων which is described in that story.

§ 4 a. εὐσσβεία δὲ ἐστὶ θεοῦ γνώσει. Cf. Lactant. Div. inst. 2. 15. 8: "quid sit autem εὐσσβεία, ostendit (Hermes) alio loco his verbis: ἡ γὰρ εὐσσβεία γνώσει ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ." The words quoted by Lactantius are not quite identical with those of Corp. IX; and they may perhaps have occurred in some other Hermetic document known to him.

§ 4 b. τὴν γὰρ κακίαν εὐθαδε δεῖν οἰκεῖν εἰπον, ἐν (εἰπομέν MSS.) τῷ ἐαυτῆς χωρίς ὀυκον. The word εἰπον implies that this statement occurred in some earlier Hermetic document known to the writer. But the remoter source of it is Pl. Theaet. 176 a: ὥστε ἀπολίσατα τὰ κακὰ δυνάτων . . . ὡσεναντίον γὰρ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκης, ὥστε ἐν θεοῦ αὐτὰ ἱδρύσαται τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τῶν τόπων περισταλεῖ εἰς ἀνάγκης.

οὐχ ὁ κόσμος, ὡς ἔνοι ποτε ἐρροῦσθαι βλασφημοῦντες. The writer implies that some of his contemporaries assert that evil extends through the whole Kosmos; but he holds that the heavens are free from evil, and that it exists on earth alone. Among the blasphemers who spoke evil of that 'second God', the Kosmos, were the Christians; and perhaps it is of the Christians chiefly, if not solely, that the Hermetist is here thinking. Compare Ascl. Lat. III. 25: when the Christians prevail, 'non admirandus videbitur mundus nec adorandus' &c. But the writer of Corp. VI was guilty of similar blasphemy; see VI. 4 a, ὁ γὰρ κόσμος πληρωμὰ ἔστι τῆς κακίας.

The word κόσμος here includes the heavens; whereas in § 3, in the clause μὴ δὲν ἡμέροι τοῦ κόσμου κενὸν ὄντος δαίμονος, it means the
sublunar world alone (the γη of § 4 b), and it is implied that the κόσμος (in that sense) is the abode of κακία. The verbal contradiction between the two statements confirms the suspicion that the clause in § 3 has been inserted by another hand.

§ 4. μενότι θεοσέβης πάντα ὑποστήσει αντισχέμενος (ἀνθέμενος MSS.) τῆς γνώσεως. He who has gnosis will endure pain and death, if need be, rather than abandon his religion.

πάντα ἀναφέρει εἰς τῆν γνώσιν. Does this mean that he 'makes his sufferings contribute to the increase of his gnosis', i.e. that they bring him nearer to God? Or, that he 'finds an explanation of them in his gnosis', in the light of which he sees that they are blessings in disguise?


§ 5. οὐ πᾶς δὲ ἀνθρώπος . . . ἀπολαύει τῆς νοήσεως. All men νοεῖσι, i.e. all men possess νοεῖ and use it; but some men do not use it rightly, and therefore get no good from their possession of it. This was implied in § 3, to which the words ὃς προέσπει refer. In the Hermetica, νοεῖ is sometimes used (as here) in a wider sense, to signify a faculty which all men possess, and by the possession of which they are distinguished from beasts; and sometimes in a narrower sense, to signify a higher faculty, which is bestowed by God on a few among men, but is not possessed by the many. In the latter sense, it is the faculty by which men 'know God', and is thus correlative to γνώσις, 'knowledge of God'.

[ἔλλ' ὁ μὲν ὀλικός, δ' δὲ ὀσιώδης.] The men who use their νοεῖσι wrongly are ἐλικοῖ; that is, they are dominated by material things, or in other words, by the daemons who reside in material things and operate by means of them. These men live in subjection to the πάθη bred by the material body, and their desires are directed to material objects. They are those who 'love the body', as some of the Hermetists say. On the other hand, those who use their νοεῖσι rightly are ὀσιώδεις; that is, they are freed from the domination of the body and its material surroundings; it is the incorporeal and eternal part of them that has the upper hand, and their hearts are set on things incorporeal and eternal. Thus applied, the terms
LIBELLVS IX: §§ 4 b–5

1Aikos and oicriu'is correspond to χοικός and πνευματικός as used by some of the Christian Gnostics.

But the words ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἠλικός ὁ δὲ ὀδυσσώδης appear to be wrongly placed here. Their connexion with the preceding clause is obscure; and the sequence of thought becomes clearer if we cut them out, and read οὖ πᾶς δὲ . . . ἀπολαμβάνει τῆς νοῆσεως: [ ] ὁ μὲν γὰρ . . ., οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ μετὰ κακίας [ἠλικός] (νοεῖ), . . . οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ [οὐσιωδῶς] (εἰς νοεῖν). ἠλικός (ὅ ἐὰν ἠλικῶ;) and οὐσιωδῶς may perhaps have been added by the same person who inserted ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἠλικός ὁ δὲ ὀδυσσώδης. The text is corrupt, and cannot be restored with certainty; but the writer's meaning must have been that some men's thinking produces bad results, and other men's thinking produces good results. The mention of 'evil' and 'good' in this sentence leads on to an attempt to account for the existence of evil.

ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σωζόμενοι. These men are saved by God from subjection to ἀληθία and the daemons who operate in it.

πάντα ποιεῖ [μὲν] ἐντὸς ὁμοία. All things are made by God, and therefore all things, when first made, are 'like God', i.e. are good.

τὰ ὃ, ἀγαθὰ γενόμενα, ἐν τῇ χρήσει τῆς ἐνεργείας ἀφορά. The sense required to suit the context is 'all things are good when first made, but some things afterwards become bad'. (Some things, not all, become bad; for the writer goes on to say that the κοσμικὴ φορά, while it makes some things bad, makes other things good). But it is doubtful how this sense is to be got out of the words. Perhaps ἐν τῇ χρήσει τῆς ἐνεργείας might be taken to mean 'when the operation of the (cosmic) forces is brought to bear on them'; but the phrase is obscure, and very likely corrupt. In place of ἀφορά, we might write ἐκβαίνει διάφορα, 'turn out various in quality' (i.e. some of them bad and others good). But it is also possible that ἀφορά has come by duplication from φορά, and that the original predicate is wholly lost.

For the thought, cf. Corp. XIV. 7: 'evil has not been made by God, but breaks out, like a sort of rust, on the things which God has made.'

ἡ γὰρ κοσμικὴ φορὰ, τρέπουσα (τρίβουσα MSS.) τὰς γενέσεις, ποιάς ποιεῖ. (Possibly ποικίλας ποιεῖ· cf. ποικληγείn in § 6, and τῆν ποικιλαν τῶν γενέσεων in § 7.) 'The movement of the Kosmos' must here mean the movement of the heavenly bodies. The aspect of the
stars changes from moment to moment; and the character (whether
good or bad) of every living creature is determined by the aspect of
the stars at the moment of its birth. (Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 35.) This
statement, if its logical implications were accepted, would involve
absolute fatalism; it would throw all responsibility for evil on the
heavenly bodies,¹ and therefore ultimately on God. If God has
made the stars and determined their movements, and the stars, by
their movements, determine that some men shall be bad, God is the
author of moral evil. But the writer did not draw this inference.

§ 6. καὶ γὰρ ὁ κόσμος . . . αἰσθητός ἰδίαν καὶ νόησιν ἔχει. The
terms αἰσθητοὶς and νόησις must be taken here in the same sense in
which they were employed before with reference to man. αἰσθητοὶς
seems to be the perception that a certain state of things exists, and
νόησις, a deliberate decision to take certain action in view of that
state of things. Thus the statement that the Kosmos possesses
αἰσθητοὶς and νόησις means that the Kosmos is a conscious and
rational agent.

οὐκ ὁμοίαν τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ, οὐδὲ (οὔτως) πουκήθην. Man's νοήματα are
ποικίλα; that is to say, they are sometimes good, but oftener bad;
and when bad, they are bad in manifold ways (ἰσθλοί μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς,
παντοδαιμός δὲ κακοῖ). But the νοήματα of the Kosmos are invariably
good, and therefore ἀπλά. And it may be inferred that they are
invariably begotten by God. (Yet if the νοήματα of the Kosmos
are invariably good, how is it that the κοσμικὴ φορὰ gives rise to evil
as well as good?)

ἡ γὰρ αἰσθητὸς καὶ νόησις τοῦ κόσμου μία ἀστι, τὸ (τῷ MSS.)
pάντα ποιεῖν, καὶ εἰς λαυτοῦν (λαυτυν MSS.) ἀποτομεῖν. The correction
τὸ for τῷ is confirmed by the parallel in § 9, τοῦτο ἐστιν ἢ ἀ. καὶ τοῦ
θεοῦ, τὸ τὰ πάντα ἀλή κινεῖν. The Kosmos acts consciously and
deliberately; and its action consists solely in making and unmaking
things; i.e. all physical processes are directed to this end. By
'things' we must understand living organisms. When an organism
is 'unmade', it is broken up into its component elements; and as
these elements are parts of the Kosmos, the Kosmos is said to
'unmake things into itself'.

ἀργανον (ἀντα) τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ βουλήσεως. It seems necessary to insert
ἀντα, in agreement with κόσμον, the understood subject of πουεῖν and

¹ We were told in § 4 b that it is 'blasphemy' to say that there is evil in the
heavens. But if a thing produces evil, how can it be denied that in that respect it
is itself evil?"
The word ὄντως in the following clause yields no satisfactory sense; it is probable therefore that ὄντα was transferred to that place by error, and was subsequently altered into ὄντως. The word ὄργανον is wrongly repeated in ὄργανον ὠπιθέκτα.

The Kosmos, in carrying on the physical processes by which living organisms are made and unmade, is executing the will of God, and therefore, though a conscious agent, may at the same time be called an ‘instrument’ by means of which God works. The same phrase occurs in Ascl. Lat. III. 25 (‘mundus,... machina voluntatis dei’), whence the writer of Corp. IX presumably borrowed it.

ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ λαβὸν τὰ στερματα. The Kosmos has received the ‘seeds’ of all things from God, retains these ‘seeds’ in itself, and produces from them a perpetual succession of living organisms. In using the word στερματα, the writer may have had in mind the στερματικὸι λόγοι of the Stoics. For its employment in this passage, cf. Basilides (or one of his followers) ap. Hippol. Ref. haer. 7. 21:

Her... 

1 oü̂... ἀναίσθησιν seclusi. ‘οὐ νοητόν, οὐκ αἰσθητόν susp. Iacobiou... but this would be a duplication of τῶν δι’ αἰσθητῶν κ.τ.λ. below.

2 As to ἀνοίητον, ἀναισθήσεων, see note on Corp. IX. 9 below.

3 I.e. ‘I use the word to indicate my meaning, but it is not to be understood literally.’

4 καὶ ἄνοητον καὶ ἀναισθήσεως secludendum

5 Perhaps, τὸν [[ ]] κατὰ διαίρεσιν γεγενημένον ὄστερον καὶ (κατὰ πλάτος) διεστίατο.

6 πάντα Duncker and Schen.: πᾶσας MS.

7 Perhaps γεγενημένα, or γεγενημένοι.

8 Perhaps (ἀπαντὴ (1) συγκεκυμένα.

9 ὄντα Duncker and Schen.: ὄν MS.

10 Either καταβαλόμενος καὶ or καταστήσας ought, I think, to be struck out.
CORPVS HERMETICVM

The Kosmos has received from God the 'seeds' of things only, and not the things themselves; it produces the things ἐνεργῶς by its own action. That is to say, the things exist only δυνάμει (potentially) in the 'seeds', but are made to exist ἐνεργῶς (actually) by the action of the Kosmos. With the other reading, ἐνεργῶς, the meaning would be that the Kosmos brings the individual organisms into concrete and visible existence by its own action.

This clause, where it stands in the MSS., is an awkward and pointless repetition of ὤν ἤστως δὲ μὴ ζωογονεῖ. I have therefore transposed it to this place, where something of the sort seems needed to lead on to καὶ διαλύον πάντα ἀνανεοῖ. The word φερόμενος implies that it is the κοσμικὴ φορά, i.e. the movement of the heavenly bodies, that produces life in each individual organism at its birth.

As a farmer 'renews' his crop (i.e. brings a fresh crop into being in place of that which has been reaped) by sowing seed, so the Kosmos renews the life of all organisms by making them produce offspring. Cf. Corp. III. 4 as emended: τὰ δὲ ἐλαττούμενα ἀνανεωθήσεται θεῶν ἐγκυκλίων ἐναρμότημα. The word φερόμενος is out of place here, since it has no application to the γεωργία. It has doubtless come by duplication from φερόμενος δὲ πάντα ζωοποιεῖ.

For the simile of the γεωργία, cf. Numenius ap. Euseb. Pr. ev. 11. 18. 14, quoted in prefatory note on Corp. II.

Compare also Pap. Mag. Berlin Parthey I. 26, where the term ἀγαθὴ γεωργία is addressed to the Egyptian god Khnum (the Agathos
Daimon), who, as lord of the Nile, and fertilizer of Egypt, had come to be regarded as the giver of all life on earth.

§ 7. τὰ δὲ σώματα ἄλλα ὀνήματα. The writer distinguishes the material body of the organism from the life (or soul) generated in it or infused into it. His conception of ζωή resembles that of anima in Ascl. Lat. I. 2 b, where the anima is distinguished from the mundus (όλη) of which the body is composed.

ἐν διαφορᾷ. It would be possible to write ἐνδιάφορα, 'having differences in or among them'. There seems to have been an adjective ἐνδιάφορος with this meaning; cf. Corp. XII. i. 6, πῶς ἐνδιάφορος ἄστιν (ὁ νοῦς). See also Corp. V. 7.

[τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄστιν ἐκ γῆς, τὰ δὲ ἐκ Ῥηματος, τὰ δὲ ἐκ ἀέρος, τὰ δὲ ἐκ πυρός.] This appears to mean that the bodies of one kind of ζῶα are made wholly and solely of earth, those of another kind wholly and solely of water, and so on. But that is contradicted by the following statement, πάντα δὲ ἄστι σύνθετα, which implies that every organized body is composed of different elements in combination. It is most likely therefore that τὰ μὲν . . . ἐκ πυρός is a note inserted by some reader.

The interpolator probably assumed that the bodies of men and terrestrial animals are made of earth, and those of fishes, of water. The only ζῶα that could be said to have bodies made of fire are the celestial gods (sun, moon, and stars); and that being so, the ζῶα that have bodies made of air are most likely the daemons.

πάντα δὲ ἄστι σύνθετα, καὶ τὰ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὰ δὲ ἀπλούστερα: μᾶλλον μὲν τὰ βαρύτερα, ἦπτων δὲ τὰ κοφότερα. ἀπλούστερα is equivalent to ἥπτων σύνθετα, and (if the text is sound) is accordingly resumed by ἥπτων in the phrase which follows. But what kinds of ζῶα have bodies that are ἥπτων σύνθετα and consequently κοφότερα? If the writer were speaking of men alone, one might suppose that he was thinking of the doctrine of Posidonius concerning life after death. Pos. seems to have said that men living on earth are composed of all four elements, and when a man dies, he becomes first a 'hero', composed of water, air, and fire, and dwelling in the lower atmosphere; then a 'daemon', composed of air and fire, and dwelling in the upper atmosphere; and (in some few cases) finally a god, composed of fire alone, and dwelling in heaven. But that interpretation of the sentence would not suit the context; for the author of Corp. IX is speaking of the ζῶα produced by the Kosmos, and it is clear that he includes among these ζῶα beasts as well as men, and that he
is thinking of them only as born on earth and living upon earth. There is reason therefore to suspect that not only the preceding sentence, but this passage also (πάντα δὲ ... κονφότερα) is an interpolation. Perhaps the best way out of the difficulty would be to cut out all that is here said about τὰ σώματα, and to assume that the original text ran thus: (ὁ κόσμος) ὁμοῦ τόπος ἐστὶ καὶ δημιουργὸς ζωῆς. [τὰ δὲ σώματα ... ἢπτον δὲ τὰ κονφότερα.] τὸ δὲ τάχος αὐτοῦ τῆς φορᾶς κ.τ.λ.

tὸ δὲ τάχος αὐτοῦ τῆς φορᾶς τὴν ποικιλίαν τῶν [ποιῶν] γενέσεων ἐφαρμόζεται. This is explained by Ascl. Lat. III. 35. The qualities imposed on individuals at their birth are ποικιλα; that is to say, no two individuals are born alike; and this is accounted for by the fact that, owing to the rapid movement of the heavens, no two individuals are born under the same aspect of the stars. ποιῶν (qualities) may be an alternative reading for γενέσεων. It would be possible to write either τὴν ποικιλίαν τῶν γενέσεων (cf. τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τῆς γενέσεως below), or τ. π. τῶν ποιῶν, but hardly τ. π. τῶν ποιῶν γενέσεων.

ποίη γάρ, οὖσα πυκνοτάτη, προτείνει τὰ ποιὰ τοῖς σώμασιν. This ποίη is the Stoic πνεῦμα, i.e. the life-breath of the living Kosmos. (Cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 6 b, 'spiritus, quo plena omnia, permixtus cunctis cuncta vivificat'; and Ascl. Lat. III. 17 a.) The writer identifies it with the atmosphere, and holds it to be the instrument by which the influences of the heavenly bodies are brought to bear on all organisms on earth. All ζωὰ live by breathing, i.e. by taking into themselves a portion of the cosmic ποίη. (Cf. εἰσπνεύοντα ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος below.)

The ποίη is πυκνοτάτη; that is to say, it operates without intermission, and so maintains a constant succession of changing qualities. It 'extends the qualities forward' (προτείνει τὰ ποιὰ); this seems to mean that it supplies a continuous series of them.

μετὰ ἄνω πληρωματος τῆς ζωῆς. The ποίη not only imposes on all bodies their sensible qualities (τὰ ποιὰ), but also conveys life into them. And since all bodies in the Kosmos (inorganic bodies as well as organisms) possess life in some degree, their lives, regarded collectively, constitute ἕπειτα πληρωμα τῆς ζωῆς; that is to say, the universe is, through the operation of the ποίη, wholly filled with one continuous mass of life. Cf. Corp. XII. ii. 15 b: ὁ δὲ σώματος κόσμος οὕτως ... πληρωμά ἐστι τῆς ζωῆς.

§ 8. [πατήρ μὲν ... τοῦ κόσμου.] Placed in the midst of the discussion of the Kosmos, this passage is an interruption. It may
perhaps have been a note appended to the words ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ λαβὼν ἵχνη in § 9, where the writer is passing on from the Kosmos to God. As to ὁ μὲν κόσμος νῦς τοῦ θεοῦ κ.τ.λ., cf. Corp. X. 14 b: καὶ γίνεται ὁ μὲν κόσμος τοῦ θεοῦ νῦς, ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπος τοῦ κόσμου (νῦς, καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ) διασερ ζηγονος.

Numenius called the first God ‘grandfather’ of the Kosmos; see Numen. ap. Procl. In Tim. 93 A, quoted in prefatory note on Corp. II. ὁ αὐτὸς οὗν κόσμος ἀναγκαίως καὶ οἰκείως καλοῖτο. ἀναγκαίως, which is meaningless in this context, has probably come from ἀνάγκης above. The meaning must have been that the word κόσμος has two senses, viz. ‘order’ and ‘universe’, and that one of these is its ‘proper’ or primary sense, and the other is a transferred or secondary sense. Perhaps the original reading may have been ἀναλόγως, which, when contrasted with οἰκείως, would mean ‘metaphorically’. Cf. Ar. Rhet. 3. 10. 7: τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν... εἰδοκιμοῦσι μάλιστα αἱ καὶ ἀναλογίαι.

For the omission of ἄν, cf. ὑποσταῖη in Corp. XI. ii. 16 b. (In IX. 10, the MSS. give δόξειν without ἄν, but the text is corrupt.) Whether ἄν was omitted from the first, or has been dropped out by a copyist, we have no means of knowing.

ὁ αὐτὸς... καλοῖτο ends the paragraph feebly, and is an anticlimax after the more impressive sentence which precedes it; I am therefore inclined to suspect that it is a note inserted by a later hand.

§ 9. πάντων οὖν τῶν ζωῆς ἡ αἰσθήσις καὶ νόησις έξωθεν ἐπεισέρχεται, εἰσπνεοῦσα ἀπὸ (ὡς MSS.) τοῦ περιέχοντος. According to § 1 b, ‘sense and thought’ exist (on earth) in men alone, and in the lower animals their place is taken by ‘sense and instinct’. But here, the phrase αἰσθήσις καὶ νόησις is used in a wider sense, and means ‘conscious life’ in general, so that it becomes almost equivalent to ζωῆς. We have just been told that ‘life’ is conveyed into all bodies by the cosmic πνεῦμα; and the same thing is expressed in other words by the statement that ‘sense and thought’ are breathed into them from the atmosphere. In adopting the Stoic doctrine of the cosmic πνεῦμα, the writer has not ceased to feel that πνεῦμα primarily means ‘breath’; and his description of the process of vivification is based on the view that men and beasts draw into themselves, by the act of breathing, portions of the conscious life of the Kosmos, with which the atmosphere is filled. In this respect, he is still in touch with the theories of Heraclitus and Diogenes of Apollonia, out of which the Stoic doctrine of πνεῦμα was developed.
The writer assumes that the Kosmos has had a beginning. This was denied by the Aristotelians, and by some of the Platonists.

The writer refers to his own time by putting a prediction into the mouth of the prehistoric Hermes. His meaning is that some of his contemporaries deny that God *isaqthénetai kai nóstos.* Who are the persons referred to? They can hardly be orthodox Christians; but some of the Christian Gnostics might be included among them. Cf. Basilides, quoted above, in note on § 6: the ‘non-existent’ God *ánqthos, ánqathwos,* . . . *kósmoν ἱθέλησεν ποιήσαι.* But that is merely an extreme statement of a doctrine which was taught by some of the Pagan Platonists also; (see note on *Corp.* II. 5;) and the writer of *Corp.* IX, when he spoke of certain men who blasphemously say that God is *ánqthos kai ánqthos,* may have been thinking either of Pagan Platonists or of Platonizing Christians.

It is their anxiety to exalt God to the utmost, and to separate him by the widest possible interval from the material world and the evil in it, that leads them into this error; and thus they may be said to ‘blaspheme through excess of reverence’.

*Corp.* XI. ii. 17 c: *tovτo yap ouvto (ovτi?) tου τοῦ θεοῦ, (το) κινεῖ τά πάντα καὶ ζωοποιεῖν.* God is the *primum movens*; it is his activity that takes effect in all subordinate activities. He infuses life and energy into the Kosmos, and thereby causes the Kosmos to infuse life and energy into all things contained in it. And his *aíσθησις* and *νόησις* consist in doing this; that is to say, he does it consciously and deliberately, and is wholly occupied in doing it.

The writer probably adopted the view expressed in *Ascl. Lat.* I. 4, that plants, though they have *ζωή,* and even a kind of *aíσθησις,* have no *ψυχή.* They are living and perhaps sentient bodies, but bodies without ‘soul’ or ‘psychic substance’. Thus *tα διὰ σωμάτων ἑνεργοῦτα* may be taken to mean plants, as opposed to *tα διὰ ψυχικῆς οὐσίας κινοῦτα,* which means *ζωοψυχα,* i.e. beasts and men. *Ψυχή* is ‘self-moving’ or ‘self-moved’ (Pl. *Phaedrus* 245 e, *Laws* 896 a); and the self-moving *ψυχή* of a man or animal originates movement in the body in which it resides, and thereby moves inanimate bodies.
also (Corp. II. 8 b, 9). ἦμψιχα are therefore κινοῦντα; but since this very power of self-movement is bestowed by God, the spontaneous movements of ἦμψιχα, as well as the mechanical movements of ἀνψιχα, are caused by God.

τὰ δὲ διὰ πνεύματος ἵπποςκοιλία, τὰ δὲ τὰ κεκμηκτότα ὑποδεχόμενα. This is obscure; but a comparison of Ascl. Lat. I. 2 b and 6 b (which the writer had before him in the Δόγος τέλεως) suggests that it is to be explained as follows. The two kinds of things here spoken of are the ἀνωφερήν and κατωφερήν of Ascl. Lat. I. 2 b, that is, the pair of light elements, fire and air, and the pair of heavy elements, earth and water. The ἀνωφερήν are ἵπποςκοιλία (σύνποιηκα, Ascl. Lat. I); that is to say, portions of fire and air enter into the bodies of men and animals, (these bodies being composed mainly of τὰ κατωφερήν, earth and water,) and convey life into them. And the fire and air do this διὰ πνεύματος, that is, by combining with one another to form a gaseous substance called πνεῦμα, which men and animals draw into their bodies by breathing. The κατωφερήν ‘receive into themselves dead organisms’; that is to say, when an animal ‘expires’, the invisible πνεῦμα by which it has hitherto been vivified passes away into the atmosphere, but the visible and tangible body is resolved into the gross elements of which it was composed, and is thus ‘received back’ into the mass of earth and water. If this is the meaning, the first and second of the four kinds of things distinguished are organic bodies (animals and vegetables), and the third and fourth are inorganic bodies (the lighter and heavier elements).

Perhaps it might also be possible to take the passage in another way; τὰ διὰ πνεύματος ἵπποςκοιλία might be taken to mean the heavenly bodies, which produce life in individual organisms by means of the cosmic πνεῦμα by which their influence is conveyed to earthly things; and τὰ τὰ κεκμηκτότα ὑποδεχόμενα might be taken to mean the four elements, into which the organism (including the portion of πνεῦμα which has been infused into it, as well as the visible and tangible body) is decomposed at death.

[kai eikótwos]. This phrase is evidently out of place; for it ought to be followed by an explanation introduced by γάρ, and there is no such explanation here. It may be a misplaced doublet of kai eikótwos in § 8.

[[μᾶλλον δὲ λέγω δι τι οὐκ αὕτως αὕτα ἔχει, ἀλλά ... αὕτως ἀπαντᾷ ἐστιν.]] There can be little doubt that this was written as a correction of τὰ γὰρ ὄντα ὁ θεὸς ἔχει below. If we transpose it accordingly,
the statement αὐτὸς ἀπαντᾷ ἐστιν falls into its right place, as the climax with which the paragraph ends.

[οὐκ ἔχων ἄνευ προσλαμβάνων, ἔχω δὲ ἐπιδιδοὺς.] These words, in which God is spoken of as distinct from 'things', cannot have been meant to follow αὐτός ἀπαντᾷ ἐστιν, in which he is identified with them. Perhaps οὐκ . . . ἐπιδιδοὺς was intended to stand after τὰ γὰρ ὄντα ὁ θεὸς ἔχει below; but if placed there, it would interrupt the sequence of thought; and it seems most likely that it is a note inserted by a reader.

καὶ οὐκ ἔσται ποτὲ χρόνος ὅτε ἀπολειψθησεταί τι τῶν ὄντων. See Corp. VIII, where it is maintained that οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀπόλλυται.

οὐκ . . . ἀπολειψθησεταί τι τῶν ὄντων [ ]. τὰ γὰρ ὄντα ὁ θεὸς ἔχει. Nothing that is can cease to be, because all things are contained¹ by God, or included in God. (Cf. ἐν τῷ θεῷ ἔστι above, and οὔτε αὐτὸν οὐδὲν ἐκτός, which follows.) If things are 'in God', they partake of God's eternity, and cannot perish.

καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸν οὐδὲν ἐκτός οὔτε αὐτὸς οὐδενός. The first of these two statements, 'there is nothing which is not in God', is a repetition of τὰ ὄντα ὁ θεὸς ἔχει in different words. But the second, 'there is nothing in which God is not', brings in a fresh thought which is hardly to the point; and it may be suspected that the author wrote merely καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ ἐκτός, and that this was amplified by a transcriber.

§ 10. ὅπω τοῦ λόγου μέχρι τινάς δηνηγθείς. The teacher's words may guide the pupil's thought in the right direction; but they can do no more than that. Unless the pupil thinks for himself, he cannot grasp the truth which the teacher's words express; (cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 3 b, and Ascl. Lat. III. 19 a;) and it is only when his own thought has confirmed what another man tells him, that he arrives at an assured conviction. Cf. Plotinus 6. 9. 4: διὸ οὐδὲ ῥητῶν οὐδὲ γραπτῶν (τὸ ἐν) ἀλλὰ λέγομεν καὶ γράφομεν, πέμποντες εἰς αὐτὸ, καὶ ἀνεγείρουντες ἐκ τῶν λόγων (by our teaching) ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν, ὀσπερ ὀδὸν δεικνύοντες τῷ τι θεάσασθαι βουλομένῳ. μέχρι μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὀδοῦ καὶ τῆς πορείας ἡ διδαξις, ἢ δὲ θεὰ αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἦθη τοῦ ἱδεῖν βεβουλημένου. I.e. a man may be led by his teacher to a standpoint from which it is possible to see 'the One' (or God); but he cannot see it unless he looks with his own eyes.

¹ It might be possible to translate έχει 'holds in his keeping'. But it suits the context better if we take it to mean 'contains within himself'.
The νόησις spoken of in this section is the operation of νοῦς θεωρητικός; whereas in the rest of the document the νόησις in question is mainly, if not solely, the operation of νοῦς πρακτικός.

ο δὲ νοῦς . . . φθάνει μέχρι (φθάνειν ἐχει MSS.) τῆς ἀληθείας. The repetition of the phrase φθάνει μέχρι τῆς ἀληθείας is clumsy; and perhaps it would be better to cut it out here, and write ὁ δὲ νοῦς . . . Ἰδιγγθείσι, ά καὶ περινόησας κ.τ.λ.

τόιγαρον νοησαί μὲν πιστὰ τὰ προειρημένα, μὴ νοησαί δὲ ἀπιστα.— (τοῖς οὖν τὰ προειρημένα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ νοησαί μὲν πιστά, μὴ νοησαί δὲ ἀπιστα MSS.) In the traditional text, the position of μὲν is impossible. Ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ may perhaps be a remnant of a note to the effect that it is only by God’s help that a man can think rightly.

LIBELLVS X

Contents

A. §§ 1 b–4 a. The relation between God and the Good.

The action of God’s will is one with the action of the Good. That action differs from the action of the cosmic forces, in that it has to do with things not subject to change. § 1 b.

God wills the existence of all things; and things exist only by his will. The Good appertains to God alone, and not to the Kosmos; for God alone is the author of life. The Kosmos may indeed be said to produce life, but only in a secondary sense; for the Kosmos is subject to God’s will. §§ 2–4 a.


Can man attain to the vision of the Good? Yes; but not until after death. While a man is still in the body, he can catch only faint and intermittent glimpses of the Good. But when released from the body, he may behold the Good in its full splendour; and if he does, he will thereby be changed from a man into a god.

C. §§ 6–19 a. How do souls become bad, and how do they become good?

All individual souls come into being by separation from the world-soul. The individual soul is incarnated on earth, first in an
animal body of the lowest grade, and then in animal bodies of higher and higher grade, until it enters a human body. At that stage, it may begin to be divine; and if it does, that will be its last earthly incarnation; on its release from the human body, it will be changed into a daemon, and subsequently into an astral god. But if the soul, when it has entered a human body, continues to be bad, it is reincarnated in the bodies of beasts. §§ 7-8 a.

The badness of a soul consists of lack of gnosis (i.e. knowledge of God, or of the Good). A soul which has not gnosis is ruled by the body, and is tossed about by the bodily passions. But the soul which has got gnosis is good. Gnosis is not to be got by talk; nor is it to be got by sense-perception. The senses operate by means of the body; but gnosis has nothing to do with the body; its organ is the mind, and mind is incorporeal. §§ 8 b-10 a.

Is the Kosmos good or bad? The Kosmos is immortal, and therefore is not bad; but it is material, and therefore is not good. It is everlasting; but its existence is a perpetual becoming; and becoming is movement. The Kosmos then is in ceaseless movement; and its movement is effected by something which is itself incorporeal and motionless (i.e. by soul). The soul of the Kosmos is incorporated in its body in the following way. The Kosmos resembles a human head; and its outermost sphere corresponds to the cerebral membrane of the human head, that membrane which is the seat of conscious life. Life or soul then pervades the whole Kosmos, but is present in the highest degree in the outermost sphere. The stars and planets, being closely connected with the outermost sphere, have in them more soul than body, and are consequently immortal; sublunar things, being remote from the outermost sphere, have in them more body than soul, and are consequently mortal. §§ 10 b, 11.

Man, qua mortal, is not merely 'not-good', but positively bad. Like the Kosmos, he consists of a body with a soul in it; his soul has for its vehicle the vital spirit; and the vital spirit, which is intermingled with the blood, moves the body. When death takes place, the soul quits the body; the vital spirit also then quits the body, and the blood coagulates in the veins. §§ 12, 13.

The Kosmos is son of God; man is son of the Kosmos, and grandson of God. God wills that man should know him; and it is by knowledge of God (gnosis) that a soul becomes good. §§ 14 b, 15 a.
The human soul is originally good, but necessarily becomes bad when incarnated. The soul of a young child is still good; for it is hardly yet separated from the world-soul. But as the body grows, it draws the soul down into its own gross substance, and makes it forget the Good; and thus the soul becomes bad. § 15 b.

When death takes place, not only does the soul separate from the vital spirit, but the mind also separates from the soul. The mind takes to itself a body of fire, and ranges through all space; and the soul, abandoned by the mind, suffers punishment according to its deserts. If a soul is pious, (i.e. if in this life it has attained to gnosis,) it becomes mind and nothing else; and in that case, it changes into a daemon when it quits the body. But the impious soul, after death, remains mere soul (as opposed to mind); it seeks another body into which it may enter, and thus suffers self-inflicted punishment. §§ 16–19 a.

D. §§ 22 b–25. The relations between men and beings of other grades.

The Kosmos¹ is subject to God; man is subject to the Kosmos; and the lower animals are subject to man. God works on the Kosmos by the direct action of his will; the Kosmos works on man by its physical forces; and man works on what is subject to him by his arts and crafts. Thus all things are dependent on God, and are administered by mind, which is in both gods and men, and joins gods and men together. Not indeed all men; for some men have no mind in them; and such men are like the beasts. But the man whose soul is filled with mind (or in other words, the man who has got gnosis) is comparable, not to the beasts, but to the gods in heaven; indeed, we may even say that he is greater than a god in heaven. The Kosmos is an agent through whom God works; but not the Kosmos only; man also is God's agent. But it is God that governs all.

(A passage in which the reincarnation of human souls in bestial bodies is denied (§§ 19 b–22 a), and a short passage in which to this is spoken of (§ 14 a), have been added at a later date.)

The connexions of Libellus X with other Hermetica. Among the

¹ 'The Kosmos' seems here to mean the astral gods regarded collectively. The Kosmos is a God composed of numerous individual gods, who are his 'members'. Compare the relation between the Demiurgus and his several ὀνομάσι εἰς τὰ ἁπλά (identified with the several temple-gods), as described in Abammonis resp. 10. 6 (Testim.).

Q 2
extant *Hermetica*, that with which Corp. X is most closely connected is Corp. VI. Compare the following:—

**Corp. VI.**

1 b. (τὸ ἀγαθὸν) οὐδὲν ἄλλῳ πρόσετιν εἰ μὴ μόνῳ τῷ θεῷ.

1 a. τὸ ἀγαθὸν . . . εἰ οὐδὲν ἐστιν εἰ μὴ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ θεῷ.

2 a. ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ζῶῳ τῷ πάντων μείζον (sc. τῷ κόσμῳ).

2 b. ὅπερ δὲ μετονομά πάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ὕλῃ (διὰ)δεδομένη, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἄγαθου. τὸν τὸν τρόπον ἄγαθος ὁ κόσμος, καθὰ καὶ αὐτὸς πάντα ποιεῖ, ὄν ἐν τῷ μέρει τοῦ ποιεῖν ἄγαθος εἶναι ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσιν οὐκ ἄγαθος· καὶ γὰρ παθητὸς ἐστιν.

5. ἐκεῖνο γὰρ τὸ κάλλος ἀσύγκριτον, καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀμίμητον (fortasse ἀλάλητον).

**Corp. X.**

2. τοῦτω (δὲ πρόσετι) τὸ ἀγαθὸν, (τουτοῦτο δὲ) ὁ μηδεν(ι) πρόσετιν τῶν ἄλλων.

3. (τὸ ἀγαθὸν) οὐ δυνατὸν ἐγγενέσθαι ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἐν μόνῃ ἑκάστῃ.

12. ὁ μὲν κόσμος πρῶτον (τῶν ἄλλων ζωῆς).

2. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κόσμος [ ] τῶν κατὰ μετονομάν (ἀγαθῶν) καὶ αὐτὸς πατήρ.

3. τὸ γὰρ ἄγαθὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν.

10 b. οὐκε[στὶ] δὲ ἄγαθος (ὁ κόσμος) ὑλικὸς γὰρ, καὶ [εὐπα-θητὸς.

5. τὸ κάλλος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐκεῖνο[ν] τὸ ἀφθαρτον, τὸ ἄληθεν (lege ἀλάλητον).

These verbal similarities make it very probable that the writer of one of the two documents had the other before him; and Corp. X, being the longer and more elaborate of the two, is presumably the later. But a still stronger proof may be seen in the relation of the argument of Corp. X as a whole to that of Corp. VI. The writer of Corp. VI asserts with emphasis that man is wholly bad, and there is no good in him; and if he admits for a moment that there is a way which leads to τὸ καλὸν, viz. the way of 'piety combined with gnosis' (VI. 5 fin.), he seems to forget this admission in the bitter denunciation of man with which he concludes. Now Corp. X appears to have been written with the express purpose of giving a different answer to the question whether there is any good in man. The author of Corp. X accepts in part the statements of Corp. VI concerning the relations of God, Kosmos, and Man respectively to the Good; but he counteracts the gloomy inferences which the writer of Corp. VI drew from those statements, by directing attention to the life beyond the grave (of which not a word was said in
Corp. VI), and pointing out that man is free to hope that after death he will enjoy the beatific vision, and attain to the ‘crowning glory’ of a life among the celestial gods. As regards the present life, he admits that the soul is necessarily made bad by its incarnation; but he gives a different aspect to the matter, by insisting on the point (just hinted at in Corp. VI) that through gnosia the soul which has thus been made bad may become good again; and he concludes with a glorification of ‘the man who is a man indeed’, which seems deliberately intended to contrast with the gloomy picture drawn in the concluding paragraph of Corp. VI. I think then that we may reasonably assume that the author of Corp. X had Corp. VI before him, and wrote with the object of supplying a corrective to the pessimism of that document.

Some verbal resemblances to Corp. II also are to be noted in Corp. X. Compare the following:—

Corp. II. Corp. X.

4 a sq. σώματι δι' ἑναντίαφύσις τὸ αὐσώματον . . . τὸ δὲ αὐσώματον ἢ θεῖον ἐστιν (sc. νοῦς), ἢ ὁ θεός.
8 a. πάσα αὖν κίνησις . . . υπὸ στάσεως κινεῖται.
16 (as emended): μῶν γὰρ ἢ φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ . . . ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἁγαθὸς ἐστιν, ὡς ἀπαντᾷ διὸν καὶ μηδὲν λαμβάνων.

In the case of the statement about the φύσις of God (II. 16 = X. 1 b), if there was direct borrowing on either side, it must have been the writer of Corp. X who borrowed; for he goes on to object to this use of the word φύσις. It seems probable therefore that the writer of Corp. X had before him Corp. II as well as Corp. VI. But if so, he merely took a few phrases from it; he makes no attempt to deal with its argument as a whole, and he does not refer to the doctrine of the τόπος-νοῦς, which is peculiar to Corp. II. The phrase ὁ θεὸς καί πατὴρ, used as a name of God in Corp. X, may possibly have been suggested by Corp. II. 17 a; if so, that section must have been already appended to Corp. II at the time when Corp. X was written. The words καί τὸ ἁγαθόν, which occur repeatedly after ὁ θεὸς καί πατὴρ in the tradi-
tional text of Corp. X, but were probably inserted by a later hand, may have been suggested to the interpolator by Corp. II. 16, ὁ θεὸς τὸ ἄγαθὸν, καὶ τὸ ἄγαθὸν ὁ θεὸς.

The passage Corp. X. 22 b–25 has much in common with Ascl. Lat. I; but there is no proof that the author of either of these two documents made use of the other; and it is quite as likely that both were influenced by some common authority.

Sources. The doctrine of Corp. X is Platonic, with an ingredient of Stoicism. The influence of particular passages in Plato's dialogues may be recognized in § 19 a fin., γήμον σῶμα ζητοῦσα εἰς ὁ εἰσέλθη (Pl. Phaedo 81 b ff.);—in the comparison of the Kosmos to a human head, § 11 (Pl. Tim. 44 d ff.);—and in the identification of the νοεῖς with the ἄγαθὸς δαιμόν, § 23 (Pl. Tim. 90 a). The doctrine of §§ 16–18, that the νοεῖς, when it quits the earthly body, clothes itself in a body of fire, is characteristic of a certain sect of Platonists mentioned by Iamblichus, and may perhaps have been derived by them from Heraclides Ponticus. The statement in § 7 fin., that an abode in the material heavens is the highest to which the soul can attain, may be attributed to the same sect of Platonists; but it is also possible that it was suggested by Posidonius.

Stoic influence is to be seen in the doctrine taught in § 7, and implied in § 15 b, that all individual souls are ἀνὸς μᾶς ψυχῆς τῆς τοῦ πνεύμον ἐστιν ἀπονεγεμέναι, which the writer tells us that he found in the Hermetic Γενικοῦ λόγου;—in the glorification of man in § 25, including the saying of Heraclitus (ἀδιάνυστον βνητοὶ κ.τ.λ.) as there interpreted;—and in the use of the terms ποιήσεις and ποιητήρεις, ποιά and ποια, in §§ 3 and 10 b (derived from Aristotle, but probably through Stoic intermediaries).

The physiological doctrine of § 11 concerning the function of the meninx was originated by Erasistratus. In his view of the function of the arteries (§ 13), the writer follows Herophilus. His conception of the ζωτικοῦ πνεύμα may have been derived from the same medical sources as the rest of his physiology.

The doctrine of the composition of opposites (§ 10 a) may be traced back to Heraclitus. The doctrine, mentioned in § 13, that 'the soul is the blood', was commonly ascribed to Empedocles. A quotation from Theognis occurs in § 24 a.

The contents of Corp. X are wholly derived from Greek sources. The document contains nothing Egyptian, except the names of the
euhemerized gods Hermes, Tat, Asklepios, Uranos, and Kronos; and nothing Jewish, with the possible exception of the use of the word δόξα in § 7 fin. There is not the slightest trace of Christian influence.

**Date.** The blending of Stoic notions with Platonism in Corp. X makes it certain that this document cannot have been written before 100 B.C.; but beyond this, there is little to indicate any particular period, except so far as inferences can be drawn from the relations of Corp. X to other Hermetica. At the time when Corp. X was written, 'the Γενικοί λόγοι addressed to Tat' were already known as a collection of documents distinguished by that title from other Hermetic dialogues; Corp. X must therefore be later than the Γενικοί λόγοι, which were probably the earliest of the Greek Hermetica. But we know from Corp. X. 7 (ἀπὸ μιᾶς ψυχῆς κ.τ.λ.) that some of the Γενικοί λόγοι themselves contained an infusion of Stoic doctrine, and therefore cannot have been written before the first century B.C.; whence it follows that Corp. X can hardly have been written before the Christian era. It is most likely, however, that it is much later. Its author seems to have known Corp. VI, and probably Corp. II also. I have conjecturally assigned Corp. VI to the second or third century A.D., and Corp. II to the second century; Corp. X may therefore be provisionally placed in the second or third century A.D., and perhaps rather in the third century than the second.

The inserted passage 19 b–22 a was probably written at some date not far from A.D. 300; and the short passage about τὸ ἱερό (§ 14 a) may be put with it.

**Title.** The title Κλεῖς may have been given to Corp. X by its author, or may have been applied to it at some later time. A key is the instrument by which a door is unlocked; and in this connexion, the door must be either that of a treasure-house, or that of a sanctuary. If the former, the title must be meant to imply that this document is a thing which gives access to the treasury in which gnosis is laid up. Cf. Luke II. 52: ἦρατε τὴν κλεῖδα τῆς γνώσεως κ.τ.λ. But more probably, the meaning is that this document gives access to a sanctuary, in which holy secrets are revealed to those who are permitted to enter. Compare the use of κλείσων as applied to a priest or priestess. As an instance of the association of the word with mystery-cults, cf. Soph. O. C. 1051: ἐν καὶ χρυσείᾳ κληὶ ἐπὶ γλῶσσα βέβακε προσώπων Ἐυμολπίδαν 'on whose lips the
ministrant Eumolpidae have laid the precious seal of silence' (Jebb). In that passage, however, κλείς means a thing used to close a door; as the title of Corp. X, it signifies a thing by means of which a door may be opened. The word occurs as the title of a 'Book of Moses' in which secrets of magic are revealed; Dieterich Abraxas, pp. 171-175: έν τῷ Κλείδι τῷ Μωισέους κ.τ.λ. Melito bishop of Sardis (who died before A.D. 195) wrote a book entitled ἡ Κλείς (Euseb. Hist. eccl. 4. 26. 2).

§ 1 a. Τὸν χθὲς λόγον . . . ἐπιτομῇ. The writer of § 1 a must have intended Corp. X to be read next after a discourse addressed to Asclepius, which he describes as 'the discourse delivered yesterday'. But did these introductory words form part of the original document, or were they inserted by the compiler of the Corpus? In the latter case, they must have been intended to refer to the document which immediately precedes Corp. X in the Corpus, i.e. to Corp. IX, which is addressed to Asclepius. There is no connexion between the contents of Corp. X and those of Corp. IX, and the juxtaposition of these two documents in the Corpus must be due to mere accident or caprice; but the compiler of the Corpus may have inserted these words with the object of linking them together; and if so, the phrase τὸν χθὲς λόγον in Corp. X init. may have been suggested to him by Corp. IX init., where the Τῆλεως λόγος (i.e. Ascl. Lat.) is referred to as a discourse 'delivered yesterday'.

On the other hand, we have seen reason to think that Corp. X was written with the object of supplementing and correcting the teaching of Corp. VI, which is addressed to Asclepius; and if the introductory words of Corp. X formed part of the original text, the preceding discourse to which they refer may perhaps be Corp. VI.

The writer of § 1 a assumes that both Asclepius and Tat are present, though in the rest of the dialogue Tat alone is addressed by Hermes. Compare Ascl. Lat. init., where Tat and Ammon are present as well as Asclepius.

τὸν ζυμοννικὸν λόγον. The statement that Corp. X is 'an abridgement of the Γενικοῦ λόγου' is hardly to be taken in the strict and literal sense of the words; but in § 7 the writer refers to the authority of the Γενικοῦ λόγου; and it may be presumed that he was more or less influenced by the same authority in other parts of his treatise also. Compare Corp. XIV. 1.

§ 1 b. οὐ μὲν οὖν θεῶς καὶ πατήρ, καὶ τὸ ἄγαθον, οὐ Τάτ, τὴν αὐτὴν ἐχει φῶς, μᾶλλον δὲ [καὶ] ἐφρυγκεῖν. There can be little doubt that the
writer is here thinking of Corp. II. 16, μία γὰρ ἡ φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ (τῇ) τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (τῇ ἀγαθῶν MSS.). But he rejects the word φύσις, as inapplicable to God, and substitutes ἐνέργεια. For the distinction between φύσις and ἐνέργεια, cf. § 22b: τὸ μὲν θεοῦ καθάπερ ἀκτίνες αἱ ἐνέργειαι, τὸ δὲ κόσμου αἱ φύσεις.

God is here called ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ. In Corp. II, πατὴρ, as a name of God, occurs only in § 17 a, which was probably added to the dialogue by a later hand. But in Corp. X, καὶ πατὴρ must have occurred in the original text, in § 2 at least, if not in other places; for it is presupposed there in the statement that the Kosmos is καὶ αὐτὸς πατὴρ.

tὰ θεῖα [τε], ἐνέργεια [διν] αὐτὸς βοηθεῖαι εἶναι. The restoration of the sentence is doubtful; but a satisfactory meaning can be obtained by the corrections which I have proposed. If a man is such as God wills or means him to be, he is exalted above τὰ μεταβλητὰ καὶ κυματά, and belongs to the world of eternal and changeless existence; he is οἰνωπὸς, and in that sense θεῖος. In § 24 b we are told that ὁ ὅστος ἄνθρωπος ('he who is a man indeed') ἔστιν ὁ αὐτὸς θεῖος.

ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ (περὶ) ἐνέργειαν (ἐνέργειαν MSS.) [!] διδάσκαμεν. In Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. III, ἐνέργειαι are discussed at some length. In that document, the term is used to denote the cosmic forces put in action by the heavenly bodies. But in Corp. X, the word is applied only to the direct operation of God's will, as opposed to the operation of the cosmic forces. As τὸ ἄγαθον is the τέλος towards which God's will is directed, the operation of God's will may be described either as ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ θεοῦ or ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; and so it may be said that 'God and the Good have the same ἐνέργεια'. God is the efficient cause of all; τὸ ἀγαθὸν is the final cause of all.

ἐνέργεια means 'a force in action', and especially 'a divine force acting on earthly things'. (Cf. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. XI. 2. (40): αἱ ἐνέργειαι οὐκ ἄλοι πνευματικῆς, ἀλλὰ κατωφερεῖς.) Perhaps it was first applied in this sense to the influences of the star-gods, and thence transferred by Platonists to the action of the supracosmic God upon the Kosmos and the things contained in it. As to the use of the word in the New Testament, see note on ἐνεργεῖν and its cognates in Armitage Robinson, St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians, p. 241 f.

§ 2. ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ τὸ θλεῖν πάντα εἶναι. Cf. Corp. XI ii. 13 b: νοῆσεις τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἔργον ἐν ὦν, ἵνα πάντα γένηται τὰ γινόμενα κ.τ.λ.
Corpus Hermeticum IX. 9: τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἡ αἰσθητικαὶ καὶ νόησις τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ τὰ πάντα ἀεὶ κινεῖν.

The o ὁσιά of God is spoken of in Corpus. VI. 4 b: ἡ ὁσιά τοῦ θεοῦ, εἰ γε ὁσιάν ἔχει, τὸ καλὸν ἔστι. Cf. Corpus. XII i. 1.

τὸ γὰρ ἐστὶν δὲ θεὸς καὶ πατήρ καὶ τὸ ἄγαθον ἦν τὸ τῶν πάντων ἐναί οὐκέτι ἄνωτε; Cf. Ascle. Lat. I. 2 a: 'dixi omnia unum esse et unum omnia, utpote quae in creature fuerint omnia ante quam creasset omnia.' The παράδειγμα of the Kosmos, and of all things that come into being within it in course of time,—the 'builder's plan', as Philo calls it,—exists eternally in the mind of God. Before these things have come into being, God's will has already determined that they shall be; and so they may be said to exist already in God, for whom there is no future, but all is one eternal present.

The writer of Corpus. VI says that τὸ ἄγαθον 'is in' God, or 'belongs to' God; the writer of Corpus. II says that τὸ ἄγαθον ἐστι God. The writer of Corpus. X, who probably had both Corpus. VI and Corpus. II before him, certainly adopted the first of these two forms of expression; but owing to the uncertainties of the text, we can hardly make sure whether he employed the second also or not. If we read ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατήρ, (ὁ;) καὶ τὸ ἄγαθον, these words imply that God is the Good. But on the other hand, if we are right in reading δὲ μὴν πρόσεται τῶν ἀλλῶν below, the writer there employs the language of Corpus. VI. 1 b, (τὸ ἄγαθον) οὐδὲν ἀλλίως πρόσεταν εἰ μὴ μόνη τῷ θεῷ. Again, in Corpus. X. 3, we are told that (τὸ ἄγαθον) οὐ δυνάτων ἐγγενέσθαι ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἡ μόνῃ (τῷ θεῷ); and this agrees with Corpus. VI init., τὸ ἄγαθον ἐν οὐδενὶ ἄνωτε εἰ μὴ ἐν μονῇ τῷ θεῷ, but differs from Corpus. II. Moreover, the writer of Corpus. X speaks of the 'will' of God, and thereby implies the existence of τὸ ἄγαθον as the object towards which God's will is directed, and as a thing distinct from him who wills (cf. Corpus. VI. 4 b, ὁ θεὸς τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἄγαθον ἐφεξή;); and this is hardly consistent with the statement that God is τὸ ἄγαθον. There is therefore reason to think that the words καὶ τὸ ἄγαθον, in which God and the Good are absolutely identified, have been inserted by a later hand, both here and elsewhere in Corpus. X. The insertion of these words may have been suggested by a misunderstanding of the sentence ὁ θεὸς . . . καὶ τὸ ἄγαθον (originally τῷ ἄγαθῳ;) τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει φύσιν in § 1 b.

διαρρήξει αὐτὴ τῶν ὄστων. αὐτὴ εἶναι τῷ θεῷ θέλησις. All things owe their existence to God's will; it is only as willed by God that they exist.
The Good 'belongs to' or 'is present to' God, and God alone; that is to say, the Good which God wills is realized in his own eternal being, but is never realized in the world of time, where, in place of the eternal oüëia or στάσις of God, there is only γένεσις or κίνησις, i.e. a process directed towards the Good, but a process without end and without advance.

Cf. Corp. VI. 2 b, διπέρ δὲ μετουσία κ.τ.λ. Ascl. Lat. III. 27 a: 'sicut enim deus . . . dispensator . . . est bonorum, id est sensus, animae, et vitae, sic et mundus tributor est et praestitor omnium quae mortalibus videntur bona.' The 'seeming goods' of Ascl. Lat. III. (i.e. the material things or processes by means of which life is maintained) correspond to τὰ κατὰ μετουσίαν ἀγαθὰ of Corp. X (of which the στορά καὶ τροφῇ mentioned below are instances); and the 'true goods' of Ascl. Lat. III. (among which vita is included) correspond to τὸ ἀγαθὸν (coupled with τὸ ζῷν) in this sentence of Corp. X.

[καὶ δὲ ἡμίος]. This must be one of the 'solar interpolations'. Cf. [διὰ τοῦ ἡμίου], § 3; and see note on Ascl. Lat. III. 19 b, 'solis oüstáρχης lumen est'.

ὁκέτι δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τοῖς ἐξωσ ἑως αἰτίως ἐστιν' ὀδαὶ (γὰρ) τοῦ ζῴν. τὸ ἀγαθὸν cannot here mean 'the Good' which was dealt with above (i.e. the αἰτίως ἀγαθὸν, which 'belongs to none save God'); for 'the good' here spoken of is, or includes, τὸ ζῷν, which exists in all living creatures. The writer apparently regards life as a true good, and distinguishes it, as such, from 'the things which are good merely by participation' (τὰ κατὰ μετουσίαν ἀγαθὰ), but at the same time distinguishes it also from the absolute Good, which does not enter into the Kosmos.

εἰ δὲ [ ], πάντως μέντοι ἀναγκάζομενος. The Kosmos may in a sense be said to produce life in the creatures contained in it; for births are effected by the operation of the cosmic forces, and, according to the view which prevails among the Hermetists, more especially by the influence of the heavenly bodies. But life is a gift of God, and the Kosmos is merely God's agent in its bestowal. It is not clear, however, why the Kosmos is not held to be equally subject to God's compelling will in the production of τὰ κατὰ μετουσίαν ἀγαθὰ (e.g. the στορά καὶ τροφῇ mentioned in § 3 init.). Perhaps the author might have said that ψῦχα is immortal, and, as such, is not affected by the operation of the cosmic forces, but is
more directly connected with God himself; and that it is only the temporary incarnation of the immortal ψυχή (or of a separated portion of the cosmic ψυχή) in this or that particular body that can be ascribed to the relatively independent action of the Kosmos.

§ 3. (παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ) τὴν [δρέξιν] (χορηγίαν) λαβὼν τοῦ ἄγαθον. It might be said that the Kosmos, in its work of generating and maintaining living organisms, is impelled by a desire for the Good; i.e. that the Kosmos, in the production of each individual creature, is seeking to produce something which shall partake of the Good, or in other words, something which shall be an εἰκὼν of the divine παράδειγμα. That statement would correspond to Aristotle's assertion that φύσις, in all its operations, 'aims at the good'; with the difference, however, that the Hermetist's Kosmos, unlike Aristotle's φύσις, is a conscious agent. But as there is nothing in the context to suggest a mention of this 'desire' of the Kosmos, it seems more likely that the author wrote, not δρέξιν, but some such word as χορηγίαν.

The word λαβὼν must have been accompanied by some phrase indicating the source from which the Kosmos gets its supply of 'good', or life-producing energy; and that source can only be God. I have therefore inserted παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ.

τὸ γὰρ ἄγαθον ἔστι τὸ ποιητικὸν. The Good is 'the creative principle', in the sense that it is the τίλος or οὗ ἐνεκα of all ποιήσεως. But the Hermetist's thought seems to have been influenced by the fact that the word ἄγαθος, in addition to the sense 'desirable', may also bear the sense 'beneficent' or 'bountiful', and may in the latter sense be applied to the agent by whom things are made. In the following sentence (τῷ μηδὲν μὲν λαμβάνοντι κ.τ.λ.) it is clear that the writer regarded τὸ ἄγαθον as connoting 'beneficence' or 'generosity'. Cf. Pl. Tim. 29 E : ἄγαθος ἐν (ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ ταιρίας συνάξας), ἄγαθος δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίζεται φθόνος. . . . βουλήθεις γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἄγαθα μὲν πάντα, φλαύρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κ.τ.λ. Here Plato plays on the two senses of the word ἄγαθος. The Maker is 'bountiful' or 'beneficent'; the things which he makes are 'desirable', and are copies of τὸ ἄγαθον, the supreme object of all desire. Those Platonists who completely identified God with τὸ ἄγαθον, (among whom the writer of Corp. X is probably not to be reckoned,) meant in part that God is the supreme object of desire, but in part also that God is the source of infinite bounties. Cf. Corp. VI. 1 a as emended: πᾶν γὰρ τὸ (ὅτιοῦ;?) χορηγοῦν ἄγαθον λέγεται. Ιβ. 2 b : οἷς ἐν τῷ μέρει τοῦ ποιῶν ἄγαθος εἶναι.
The word ἀριθμός was applied to the action of the Demiurgus in Pl. Tim., and was habitually thus used by Platonists; but the writer of Corp. X gives reasons for rejecting it. His first reason is that the action of a ποιήσεως is intermittent. When the ‘maker’ has once finished making a thing, he has, as maker, nothing more to do with it; he begins to act again only when he proceeds to make another thing. It is therefore better to say, not that God is the ‘maker’ of all things, but that God ‘wills the existence of’ all things; for this phrase implies that God’s will is operative, not merely in bringing each thing into existence once for all, but in maintaining each thing in existence as long as it continues to exist. His second reason is that a ‘maker’ makes only ‘quantities’ and ‘qualities’ (but not ‘substances’); that is to say, he deals with some already existing material, and merely adds to it or takes from it, or in some way alters it, but does not bring it into being. The writer holds that ‘substances’, as well as ‘quantities’ and ‘qualities’, owe their existence to God’s will. This does not necessarily imply that God has at some past time created the universe out of nothing; (see Corp. II. 13, where it is denied that anything can come into existence out of nothing;) for it is possible to hold that the world has existed without beginning, but that it is God’s eternal will that has maintained it in its everlasting existence. And this was probably the view held by the writer of Corp. X; for in § 10 b he speaks of the Kosmos as ὁ θεός ὁ θεός.

This may be a conflation of two alternative readings, viz. i. i. μέν ποιεῖ, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχει. This makes something large which was small before, or makes something hard which was soft before, but does not, strictly speaking, ‘make’ the thing itself, i.e. the ὑπερείμενον, or the οὐσία in the Stoic sense. According to Aristotle (Cat. 5, 3 b 32, and 6, 5 b 11.), the term ἐναρτία is not applicable to quantities; there is no contrary to ‘three feet long’. He admits that ‘many’ and ‘few’, or ‘large’ and ‘small’, may be called ἐναρτία; but he says that these terms belong to the category of πρὸς τι, and not to that of ποσῶν. The Stoics did not recognize ποσῶν as a distinct category.

§ 4 α. καὶ γὰρ ταύτα (τούτῳ MSS.) θέλει εἶναι, καὶ (καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον) ἦστι
καὶ ἀδήμων (ἀδήμων MSS.). God wills things to be, and the things consequently exist. But they do not exist absolutely; for they are dependent on God. The only thing (besides God) that 'exists in the highest degree' (μάλιστα ἢστα) is the Good, which is correlative to God, and is the final cause of the existence of all else (τὰ ἀλλὰ πάντα διὰ τοῦτο ἢστα).

§ 4 b. (...) Ἰδιον γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ γνωρίζειν (θελεῖν;) τῇ αἰσθήσει (τῷ δυναμένῳ ἰδεῖν). Down to this point, the writer has been speaking of the relation between God and the Good. He now proceeds to speak of the relation between man and the Good; and in doing so, he begins by discussing the question whether, and under what conditions, it is possible for man to attain to the intuition of the Good, and to the union with God which is implied in that intuition (§§ 4 b–6). But the transition is abrupt, and it is probable that a connecting passage has been lost at the beginning of § 4 b. The words τὸ δυναμένῳ ἰδεῖν are pointless where they stand in the MSS. Transposed to this place, they make good sense, and serve to lead on to the discussion of the θεῖα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

'Ευλόγωσε ἡμᾶς ... τῆς ... καλλίστης θεᾶς. This passage (§§ 4 b–6) is discussed by Reitzenstein, Die hellen. Mysterienrel., pp. 115 ff.

In his joy at the new thought which has been awakened in him by his father's words, Tat imagines for a moment that he already 'sees the Good'. But Hermes undeceives him. In reality, he has caught but a faint glimpse of the beatific vision; and indeed, no more than a faint glimpse of it is possible for men, until they are released from the body by death.

ὁλὸς δὲῖν ἐπεξετάσθη (ἐπεξετάσθη MSS.) μου ὁ τοῦ νοῦ ἐφθαλμὸς ὑπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης 'θαλα'. If we retain ἐπεξετάσθη, we must translate 'my mental eye was almost stricken with awe'. But why 'almost'? The writer must have meant to make Tat say 'my mental eye was dazzled, and almost blinded'; and this might be expressed by ἐπεξετάσθη. (Cf. Philo, De opif. mundi i. 6: τὰ ... ὑπερβάλλοντα κάλλη, καὶ ταῖς μαμαρναγάς τῶν ἐννυχανόντων ψυχὰς ἐπεκαλύπτοντα.) Hermes proceeds to explain that the vision of the Good never produces the harmful effect which Tat thought it had 'almost' produced in his own case. It is true that the man who has once seen the Good 'can see nothing else thereafter' (§ 6 init.); but that does not mean that his mental eye is blinded; it is only the things of earth that he can no longer see. In Pl. Rep. VII init., it is said that those who
come forth from the cave are at first dazzled by the light of day, i.e. by the splendour of the Good. Cf. Philo, De opif. mundi 23. 71, Cohn I, p. 24: πρὸς τὴν ἄκραν ἀφίδια παραστροφθείσας τῶν νυκτῶν, ἐπ᾽ αὐτόν ἑναι δοκεῖ τὸν µέγαν βασιλεία γιλχυμένου δ᾽ ἰδεῖν, ἀθρόον φωτὸς ἄκρατοι καὶ ἀμετέχεις αὐγά χειμάρρου τρόπον ἐκχείζονται, ὡς ταῖς μαρμαραγγαίς τὸ τῆς διανοίας ἐμµα σκοτωδιῶν. It is not likely that the author ended two successive clauses with the same word θέας. The second θέας has probably been substituted by error for some other word, e.g. μαρμαραγγαίς.

πάσης ἰδανασίας ἀνάπλεως. ἰδανασία here, as often in the Hermetica, means the state of the ἰδάνατος, i.e. of the gods. In so far as a man sees the Good, he is a god; and a god is secured against all harm.

§ 5. οἱ δυνάµενοι πλέον τι ἀρύσασθαι τῆς θέας κατακοµµιζοµαι πολλάκις θῇ (ἐν MSS.) ὑπὸ τοῦ σώµατος. Even those who are able to 'draw somewhat larger draughts' of the vision than others, are often made torpid by the body; their mental eyes are at such times closed, as in sleep, and their glimpses of the Good are therefore necessarily intermittent. 'Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting;' and even those who have been awakened from the sleep or lethum of bodily life must many a time fall asleep again, as long as they are in the body. For the metaphor of sleep, cf. Philo, De somnn. 1. 26. 165, Wendland III, p. 240: ψυχαὶ δ᾽ ὡς τεῖων ἕρωτῶν ἐγείσοσθε, καθάπερ ἐκ βαθίων ὑπὸν διαναστάσας, καὶ τὴν ἀχλίνη ἀποσκεδάσασας, πρὸς τὴν περίβλεπτον θέαν ἐπείχθη. The same metaphor is employed in the words addressed to the recently deceased Plotinus in an oracle quoted by Porphyry, Vita Plotini 22, 1. 23 ff.:1 'Even in your earthly life, πολλάκις σεἰσ νώοι βολάς ... | ὁδοπόρονς αὖ κύκλα καὶ ἀμβροσόν ὁλῶν ἀεων | ἰδάνατοι, θαμεῖν ψεῦδος ἀκτίνα προφαίνε | δοσοὺς δέρκεσθαι ἀπὸ σκοτεινός λυγάρις: οὐδὲ σε παμπάλιην βλεφάρων ἔχε νηδύμος ὑπὸς, | ἀλλ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἀπὸ βλεφάρων σκεδάσας κηλίδα βαρείαν, | ἀχλίνος ἐν δίνου θρούσιοι σφουγγοι, ὑδρακός δοσοὺς | πολλὰ τε καὶ χάριστα, τὰ κεν σέσν αὐτήν ἄμετρον | ἀνθρώπων, δοσοὺ σοφίης αὐτίκος ἐποίετεν. | νῦν δὲ, ὅτε δὴ σκῆρος μὲν ὑλόσα, σῆμα δὲ ἄλειψα | ψυχής δαμονίης, you live a blessed life as a daemon.' Plotinus was one of those who are able πλέον τι ἀρύσασθαι τῆς θέας.

(ἀπολυθέντες δὲ τοῦ σώµατος) εἰς τὴν καλλίστην ὑφίν (ἐντευχοῖν), ὅπερ (ἐπερ οἵ δοσόρ MSS.) ὀδρανίς καὶ Κρώνος, οἱ ἡμετέροι πρόγονοι, ἐντευ-

---

1 Porphyry says that these verses were the response given by Apollo to the question put to him by Amelius, 'Where has the soul of Plotinus gone?' Perhaps Amelius not only asked the question, but composed the answer also.
It is clearly necessary to insert ἀπολυθέντες δὲ τοῦ σώματος, or something to that effect. It is only when death has freed a man from the encumbrance of the body, that the vision will burst upon his sight in its unclouded splendour. Urans and Kronos once lived as men on earth; (cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 37, where the gods Thoth-Hermes and Imhotep-Asclepius are similarly spoken of;) but they have died, and become gods; and as gods they have attained to the vision of the Good. The human teacher Hermes and his son (and all devout Hermetists also) may hope that after death they will be as Urans and Kronos now are.

Urans and Kronos are here said to be ancestors of the teacher Hermes. According to Ascl. Lat. III. 37, the teacher Hermes was a grandson of the god Thoth-Hermes; and the writer of Corp. X may have held the same view. In the Greek theogonies, the list of gods was usually headed by Urans and his son Kronos; Zeus was a son of Kronos, and the Greek Hermes a son of Zeus. But the Hermetist probably intended Urans and Kronos for Greek renderings of the names of two Egyptian gods. The earth-god Seb or Qeb was commonly identified with the Greek Kronos; and if Kronos here means Seb, Urans ought to mean Shu (Σως or Σωσις), the father of Seb. In the Heliopolitan theogony, Shu and his consort Tafnut were generated by the Propator Tum, and stood as the first σώματα in the Ennead; and Seb and his consort Nut were the offspring of Shu and Tafnut. Seb and Nut were called Kronos and Rhea by the Greeks; (see Plut. Is. et Os. 12;) it would therefore be natural to identify their parents, Shu and Tafnut, with the Greek Urans and Gaia. Shu was the god of the atmosphere, and was called 'uplifter of heaven' and 'lord of heaven'; so that Urans might very well be regarded as his Greek equivalent.

Thoth (Hermes) had no generally recognized place in the genealogy of the Egyptian gods. He was sometimes described as ungenerated, or self-generated (Brugsch, p. 445); he was sometimes said to be son of Ra (ib.), and sometimes son of Ptah (Wiedemann, Rel. anc. Eg., p. 226). But we are also told (Brugsch, p. 188) that he was sometimes substituted for the maleficent Set in the list of the five children of Seb and Nut. Perhaps the writer of Corp. X may have adopted this variation of the Heliopolitan genealogy, and regarded

1 Plutarch also says (Is. et Os. 44) Ἰσρα ἢ Ὀσ. Κρόνος δὲ Ἀνουβίς εἶναι. But the Κρόνος of Corp. X cannot be Anubis.
2 'Sein Reich ist die Luftregion, der Wolkenhimmel' (Brugsch, Rel. und Myth. der alten Aeg. p. 431).
the god Thoth-Hermes as son of Seb (Kronos), and grandson of Shu (Uranos). See Lactantius, *Div. inst.* i. 11. 16 (*Testim.*).

The words θεάσασθαι τὸ κάλλος τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ, ἐκεῖνο[ν] τὸ ἄφθαρτον, τὸ ἀλάλητον (ἀλητὸν MSS.) *Corpus* VI. 5. The words ἐκεῖνο[ν] τὸ ἄφθαρτον (κάλλος) serve to contrast 'the beauty of the Good' with the perishable beauty of things on earth. The epithet ἀλητὸν is hardly appropriate; and there can be little doubt that the original reading was ἀλάλητον, which leads on to the words ἦταν μηδὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἑξῆς εἰπὼν, and βαθεία σωφρ., in what follows.

ἡ γὰρ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ βαθεία (καὶ θεία MSS.) σωφρ. ἐστι. Cf. § 9: ὁ μὴ πολλὰ λαλῶν. *Corpus* I. 31: ἀνεκλάλητε, ἀρρητε, σωφρ. φωνούμενε. *Corpus* XIII. 2 as emended: σοφία ἡ μήτρα, ἐν στιγῇ (κοινοῦσα). Compare also the name Σιγή applied by some of the Valentinians to the consort of the Propator. The Pythagorean injunction of στιγῇ was probably in the Hermetist's mind.

§ 6. οὕτω γὰρ ἀλλο τι δύνασθαι . . . θεάσασθαι τὸ τοῦτο θεασάμενος, . . . οὗτος τὸ σώμα τοῦ σώμα κινήσαι. If the Hermetist had written ὁ τοῦτο νοῦν, . . . ὁ τοῦτο θεασάμενος, we might have understood him to be speaking of a temporary ecstasy or trance, from which the man will awake to resume the occupations of everyday life. But the aorist participles νοῆσας, θεασάμενος, make this interpretation impossible. We are told that he who has once seen the Good in its full beauty can never thereafter see earthly things, or hear of earthly things, or move his body. But to say this of a man is equivalent to saying that he is either dead or dying. It is clear therefore that, in the writer's view, the θεία of which he speaks is incompatible with the continuance of earthly life. We may hope to see the beatific vision, but not until the moment of our release from the body. If a living man attains to it, his earthly life is then and there at an end; the vision 'draws his soul up out of the body,' and transforms him into pure ὀδορία, or in other words, changes him from a man into a god. The writer seems to have regarded the cessation of earthly consciousness in a dying saint as the counterpart of his absorption in the dawning splendour of τὸ κάλλος τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ. Thus understood, the sentence is in agreement with the words ἀδύνατον . . . ψυχὴν ἀποθεωθῆναι ἐν σώματι ἀνθρώπου (μάντωσα) below. Cf. *Excelsus* VI. 18: ἀδύνατον τὸν ἐν σώματι τοῦτον (καὶ τὸν θεὸν θεασάμεθα) εὐτυχήσαι.

ταῦτα γὰρ τῶν σωματικῶν αἰσθήσεων τε καὶ κινήσεων ἐπιλαβόμενος (ἀλβάμενος MSS.) ἀστρειτε. The writer of the *Hermippus* (see notes on *Corpus* XVI) has borrowed from this passage. *Hermippus* (Kroll
and Viereck) 2. 20. 186 f.: ποίονς ἐν ἔρωτας Ἰσχοὶ τοῦ ὕποντον κάλλος κατοπτεύεσθαι δεδυνημένος, ἀφθαρτον, ἀκρατον . . .; οὕτως τὴν θείαν σωτηρίαν ἀποτήρησται, λέγει περὶ αὐτοῦ ὁχ οὖς τὸ ὄν, πασῶν τὸν σωματικὸν αἰσθήτων τε καὶ κατόν τε ἐπιλαθόμενος ἀπερμήσεις.

Τὴν δὴν ψυχὴν ἀναλαμβάνει (ἀναλάμβανε MSS.) καὶ ἀναλαμβάνει διὰ τοῦ σώματος. 'The whole soul' is contrasted with the νοῦς, which is here regarded as a part of the soul. The relation between νοῦς and ψυχή is differently conceived in §§ 16 ff. The preposition διὰ must be taken in the sense of the Homeric διέκ; the beauty of the Good draws the soul forth from the body, as from a sheath. Cf. Corp. XIII. 3: ἐμαντόν (διέξελληθα) εἰς ἀθάνατον σῶμα. Ἡθ. 12: τὸ σκῆνος τοῦτο . . ἐς διεξελλήθαμεν. Both in Corp. XIII and in Corp. X. 6, the process described is an ἀποθέωσις; but the writer of Corp. XIII speaks of this ἀποθέωσις as taking place in a man who continues to live on earth, whereas the writer of Corp. X holds that it can take place only at or after death.

ἐις οὕσι τε μεταβάλλει. 'Ins Göttliche und Uebersinnliche' Reitzenstein. Cf. Corp. XIII. 14, where the word ὀνειώθης is used in a similar connexion. The same thought is expressed in another way in Corp. X. 19 a, where it is said that after death the pious soul δῆν νοῦς γίνεται.

ἀθάνατον . . . ψυχὴν ἀποθεωθῆναι εἰς σῶματι ἀνθρώπου (μένουσαν ἀλλὰ χρῆ μεταβληθῆναι αὐτῆν, καὶ οὕτω δὴ) θεοσαμένη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (τοῦ) κάλλος [τῷ] ἀποθεωθῆναι. [τῷ] may have arisen out of (τὸ) misplaced. My restoration of the text differs from that of Reitzenstein (Hellen. myst., p. 116); but he is right in saying that it is to be inferred from what follows that some form of the verb μεταβάλλει occurred here. As to μεταβάλλει and μεταβολή, cf. Pl. Legg. X. 904 c: μεταβάλλει μὲν τοῖνυν πάνθ' ὡσα μέτοχα ἐστὶν ψυχῆς, ἐν ἑαυτῷ κεκτημένα τῆς τῆς μεταβολῆς αὕτην μεταβολὴν δὲ σέρεται κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἐμφαμάνης τάξιν καὶ νόμον. The word μεταβολή ('a change from one state to another') is sometimes used as a euphemism for death. Cf. Philostr. Vita Apollon. 8. 31: τοῦ δὲ Ἀπολλωνίων ἐξ ἀνθρώπων μὲν ἑδη οὕτως, θαναμαρμένου δ' ἐπὶ τῇ μεταβολῇ. Porphyry ap. Stob. r. 49. 59, vol. i, p. 445 W.: ἐκατέραν γὰρ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς μεταβολῆς, τῆς μὲν εἰς σῶμα γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ ἀπὸ σώματος θάνατον προσαγορευομένην.

§ 7. ἀπὸ μιᾶς ψυχῆς τῆς τοῦ παντὸς πᾶσαι αἴ ψυχαί εἰςιν αὕται (κἀὶ περὶ ἀποκεφαλημέναι). Cf. § 15 b, where the soul of a child is described as ἐν σχεδον ἄνθρωπη τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῆς. Ascl. Lat. I. 3 a:

1 Cf. Ascl. Lat. 41 b: ἐν πλάσμασιν ἧμας ὄντας ἀπεθάνων.
'mundus unus, anima una.' See also Corp. IX. 9 init. The writer says that this doctrine was taught in the Τενυκοι λόγοι. The conception of a world-soul occurs in the Τίμαιος, and must have been familiar to all Platonists; but the doctrine that individual souls are derived from the world-soul, and have been 'parted off' from it, is not Plato's, and the Hermetists by whom the Τενυκοι λόγοι were written must have got it from Stoic sources.

τούτων τοίνυν τῶν ψυχῶν πολλαὶ αἰ μεταβολαί. The individual souls, having been brought into existence by separation from the world-soul, pass through a series of transformations, in the course of which they may successively occupy all stations in the scale of life, from that of a reptile to that of a god. The writer seems to imply that their career begins by incarnation in animal bodies of the lowest order, viz. that of ἐρπετα. (Cf. § 8 a: τὴν ὀδὸν ἐπουστρέφει τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐρπετα.) If this is his view, he differs from Pl. Τίμ. 90 ε ff., where we are told that, 'according to the probable account', the individual souls were first embodied as men (ἄνθρωποι), and that those of them who lived amiss in their first life on earth were afterwards reincarnated in the form of women, birds, quadrupeds, many-footed animals, reptiles, or fishes, according to the kind and degree of their decline from their original state.

τῶν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ εὐπυχέστερον, τῶν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναπτύσσον. This is directly contradicted in § 22 a: εἰς μὲν οὖν τὸ κρείττον ψυχή μεταβαίνει, εἰς δὲ τὸ ἐλαττὸν ἀδύνατον.

αἱ δὲ ἀνθρώπειαι, ἀρχὴν ἄθανασίας ἑγείρονται. The soul which, in its successive transformations ἐπὶ τὸ εὐπυχέστερον, has risen to the condition of a man, may at that stage acquire something of ἄθανασία, i.e. of divinity. Such a soul is already a daemon or a god potentially (cf. § 19 a: ψυχὴ ἀνθρωπινή, οὐ πάσα μὲν, ἢ δὲ ἐυσεβής, δαιμονία τίς ἐστι καὶ θεια); it may therefore, at its next transformation, actually become a daemon, and afterwards a god. The divine element (τὸ ἄθανατον) in the human soul is νοῦς, by the possession of which man is distinguished from the lower animals.

In holding that the human soul must pass through an intermediate stage as a daemon before it becomes a god, the writer agrees with Posidonius; but he does not recognize the stage of 'hero' which Posidonius interposed between 'man' and 'daemon'. In § 6 above, the daemon-stage is not mentioned, and apotheosis is spoken of as if it might follow immediately on death. In the oracle quoted by Porphyry, Vita Plotini 22 (see p. 239), Apollo says that Plotinus,
now that he has departed from the body, is no longer a man, but a
daemon (δαίμων, ἄνερ τοῦ πάροιθεν κ.τ.λ.), and the 'daemonic' life into
which he has entered is described.

εἰς οὖσα εἰς τῶν τῶν θεῶν χωρὸν χωροῦσι (χωρεύουσι MSS.). They
take their place among the star-gods. For the phrase δ τῶν θεῶν
χωρός, cf. Corp. XII. i. 12: ἀδηγηθέστει . . . εἰς τὴν τῶν θεῶν καὶ
μακάρων χωρόν. Kaibel, Epigr. Gr. ex lapid. cons. 288 (Cyprus,
'recentiores aetatis'): ΗΤΙΣ . . . (αl. HBΗΣΕΝ: legendum ἕρπασεν?)
ά(θ)ανά(των με) χωρός.

[χωρὶς δὲ δύο θεῶν, δ μὲν τῶν πλανωμένων, δ δὲ τῶν ἀπλανῶν]. This is
an inserted note. The following αὕτη means τὸ εἰς τῶν τῶν θεῶν χωρὸν
χωρεῖν, and the interposed mention of two distinct χωρὶς (that of the
planets and that of the fixed stars) is irrelevant.

Q gives ἀφανῶν in place of ἀπλανῶν. This seems to indicate an
alternative reading, δ μὲν τῶν φανερῶν (= αἰσθητῶν), δ δὲ τῶν ἀφανῶν
(= νοετῶν).

αὕτη ψυχῆς ἡ τελειοτάτη δόξα. A place among the star-gods is the
highest to which the soul can attain. This again agrees with the
system of Posidonius. In this paragraph, there is no suggestion of
the Platonic notion that the soul may rise above the material heavens
into the supracosmic and incorporeal world (as is said, for instance,
in Corp. I).

The use of the word δόξα in this connexion may possibly be a
sign of Jewish influence. Cf. Paul, 1 Cor. 15. 40: ἐτέρα μὲν ἡ τῶν
ἐπουρανίων δόξα, ἐτέρα δὲ τῶν ἐπιγείων . . . ἀστὴρ γὰρ ἀστέρος διαφέρει
ἐν δόξῃ.

§ 8 a. οὗτοι γενέται ἀθανασίας [οὗτος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μεταλαμβάνει]. A
soul of this sort does not, in its human life on earth, acquire ἄρχην
ἀθανασίας; for it has no νοεῖ in it (§ 24 a), and is no better than that
of a beast.

It is superfluous to tell us that a soul which remains bad does not
'take part of the Good'.

παλίσσυρος (codd. Corp.), 'dragged back', or 'swept back as by
an adverse current', seems better than παλίσσυρος (codd. Stob.).

(καὶ η ἴκακοδαίμων . . . δουλεύει σώμασιν ἄλλοκτος καὶ μοχθηρός.)
These words are out of place in the MSS., where they form part of
the description of κακία ψυχῆς. 'Servitude to uncouth and noxious
bodies', i.e. incarnation in the bodies of beasts, is not κακία, but is
the penalty of κακία; the mention of it ought therefore to precede
the words αὕτη καταδίκη ψυχῆς κακίσι. Cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 12 a: 'secus
enim inpieque qui vixerint, . . . constituitur in corpora alia, indigna animo sancto, [et] foeda migratio.

ἀνυόθωσα ἡ αὐτὴν. The soul forgets, or fails to recognize, its kinship with the divine; hence the νοῦς in it (if νοῦς has entered into it at all) becomes dormant or departs, and only the lower and merely animal part of the man is active. A soul thus degraded is fit only to animate the body of a beast, and is accordingly incorporated in a bestial body at its next incarnation. The Platonic locus classicus on τὸ γνώναι ἡ αὐτὸν is Alcib. I, in which compare especially 133 c: τῷ θείῳ ἄρα τοῦ ἥκων αὐτής (‘this part of the soul’, viz. the νοῦς) καὶ τις εἰς τὸ τοῦτο βλέπει, καὶ πᾶν τὸ θείον γνοῦν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸν ἄν γνοίη μάλιστα. Cf. ἡ ἁναγνωρίσα αὐτὸν in Corp. I. 18-21.

§ 8 b. μηδὲν γνῶσα τῶν ὄντων, μηδὲ τὴν τούτων φύσιν, μηδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν. By τὰ ὄντα are here meant τὰ ὄντως ὄντα, i.e. τὰ νοητά οὐ τὰ θεῖα. The soul which does not recognize the existence of things incorporeal and eternal is wholly subject to the influences of the body. μηδὲ τὴν τούτων φύσιν seems a pointless repetition of μηδὲν . . . τῶν ὄντων (unless indeed we take τούτων to mean τῶν γιγνομένων, as opposed to τῶν ὄντων); and the sentence would be improved by cutting out μηδὲ τὴν . . . τὸ ἀγαθὸν.

ἐντινάσσεται ταῖς τοῖς σωματικοῖς τάθεσι . . . αὕτη κακία ψυχῆς. Cf. Plotinus I. 2. 3: ἐπειδὴ κακὴ μὲν ὄντων ἡ ψυχὴ συμπεφυγμένη τῷ σώματι καὶ ὑμοπαθής γυνομένη αὕτη καὶ πάντα συνδοξάζοντα, εἰς ἀν ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἀρετὴν ἔχουσα, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο αὑτοῦ, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐνεργοί· ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ φρονεῖν μήτε ὑμοπαθῆς εἰς ὅπερ ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν· μήτε φοβοῦσθαι ἀφωταμένη τοῦ σώματος· ὅπερ ἐστίν ἀνδραξεθαι· ᾧ γοῦτο δὲ λόγος καὶ νοεῖς, τὰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοτέλεοι· δικαίωσθαι δὲ ἀν ἐν τοῦτο. τὴν δὲ τοιαύτην διάθεσιν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ ἦν νοεῖ τε καὶ ἀπαθῆς οὕτως ἴστιν, εἰ τις ὑμοίοιο λόγον πρὸς θείον, οὐκ ἄν ἀμαρτάνοι. (This last sentence corresponds to καὶ ἵδον θείος in Corp. X. 9 ini.)

ὁσπερ φορτίον βαστάζεισα τὸ σῶμα. In Corp. II. 9 we are told that in all men and animals alike the soul φέρει (i.e. κινεῖ) τὸ σῶμα. But here, the meaning is different. The vicious soul is weighed down by the body, as by an oppressive burden; the virtuous soul is not thus weighed down. Cf. ὅσπερ φύρτων τῶν βαστάζει in § 13.

The conception of the body as a thing by which the soul is weighed down does not agree well with the conception of it as a thing by which the soul is governed (οὐκ ἄρχουσα ἀλλ' ἀρχομένη); and for this reason it might perhaps be better to bracket ὅσπερ φορτίον . . . καὶ.
The writer's meaning must have been that the wordy disputations of the schools are not a help to the attainment of gnosis, but rather a hindrance. This meaning might have been more clearly expressed by writing οὐχ ὁ πολλὰ λέγων, οὐδὲ ὁ πολλὰ ἀκούων. Cf. Porphyry, Ad Marcellam 20: θεοῦ γὰρ γνώσις ποιεῖ βραχύν λόγον (λέγε βραχυλόγον). Stobaeus, vol. v Hense, præf., p. vii: βραχύλογον μάλιστα ἦθεος γνώσις ποιεῖ. Sexti Sent. 430 Elter: ἀνθρωπὸν θεοῦ γνώσις βραχυλόγον ποιεῖ.

σκιαμαχεῖ. 'He fights without any real opponent matched against him;' he is like a boxer going through the motions for practice, who strikes at an imaginary adversary, and beats the empty air. That is to say, the philosophizing of such men is not directed to any serious purpose; it is a vain repetition of empty formulas. Cf. Pl. Apol. 18 D: ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνψ ὠσπερ σκιαμαχεῖ ... καὶ ἔλεγχεις μηδενὸς παραμονένου. Philo, De plantatione 42. 175, Π. p. 169 Wendland: οὐδεὶς καὶ αὐτὸν ἀγωνιζόμενον ἀναγράφεται νικῶν, ἐς δὲ ἀγωνιζότοι Wendland: rather, εἰ δὲ ὁ πολλὰ παρέχεται σκήμα i.e. the man is represented in a fighting attitude, but with no opponent facing him. Numenius ap. Euseb. Pr. ev. 14. 6. 13: Zeno would not dispute directly with his living opponent Arcesilaus, πρὸς δὲ τὸν οὐκέτι ἐν ἔσχεν διὰ τὰ Πλατωνᾶ ἐσκιαμάχει, ... ὡς οὐτὶ ἀν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀνυφόμενον κ.τ.λ. Lucian, Piscator 35 (of philosophers who do not practise what they preach): οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπου ποτὲ ὀψεῖται πάντα ταῦτα ἀποτύπωμα, περιείλεται ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπὶ, μάθην πρὸς αὐτῶν ἐν τail διατριβᾶσι σκιαμαχοῦμαι.

This passage has no meaning as it stands in the MSS. I have found possible places for τοῦτον ... οὕτων and διὰ τὸ ... χωρὶς αὐτοῦ; but I propose these transpositions with diffidence. The words αὐτοθέτοι εἰσὶ may be a remnant of a sentence containing some mention of αὐτοθέτοι which led on to the statement that gnosis is something very different from it (γνώσις δὲ

1 The same comparison is employed by Paul, 1 Cor. 9. 26: οὐτωσ πατεῖται ὁς οὐκ ἀλλὰ δέρων (= σκιαμαχεῖ): ἀλλὰ ἴπτατε μον τὸ σῶμα. The body is no σκιά; it is a real and solid opponent. And τὸ σῶμα is the enemy with whom the Hermetists also were engaged in combat.

In Liddell and Scott, σκιαμαχεῖ is said to mean 'to fight in the shade'; but that is a mistake.
Having said that ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς is γνῶσις, the writer proceeds to explain what γνῶσις is, by contrasting it with αἰσθήσις.

§ 10 a. [ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη . . . γὰρ ἐπιστήμη]. The mention of ἐπιστήμη is irrelevant; and these words have probably passed into the text from a marginal note.

ἀργάτι χρωμάτι αὐτῷ τῷ νότι. The νότι is the ‘organ’ of gnosis, in the same sense that the eye is the organ of sight.

ὁ δὲ νότι τῷ σώματι (ἐναντίος). According to the reading of the MSS., the meaning would be that the νότι uses the body as its organ. But that cannot be right; for the body is not the organ of the mind in the same sense that the mind (or mental eye) is the organ of gnosis. By inserting ἐναντίος, we get a statement which suits well with what precedes, and leads on naturally to what follows. Man consists of two opposites in combination; and this is an instance of a law which applies to all things alike.

τὰ τε νοητὰ καὶ τὰ ὅλικα. The human soul ‘admits into itself both incorporeal and things material’; or in other words, it performs the two contrasted operations of νοησις and αἰσθήσις. This, or something like it, must have been the writer’s meaning; and this meaning can be obtained by writing εἰς σῶμα (εἰδούσα ψυχή).

§ 10 b. Τὸς ὁμιλοῦντας γὰρ καὶ ἐναντίότητος δεῖ τὰ πάντα συνεστάναι. This must be more or less remotely derived from Heraclitus. Ar. Eth. Nic. 9. 2, 1155 b 4: Ἡράκλειτος τὸ ἀντίστοιο συμφέρον, καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφέρόντων καλλότητην ἀρμονίαν, καὶ πάντα κατ’ ἐρα γίνεσθαι. Pseudo-Ar. De mundo 5, 396 b 7: ἦτο τῇ ἐναντίον ἡ φύσις γλίστεται, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀποτελεῖ τὸ σύμφωνον, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων . . . ταῦτα δὲ τούτῳ ἢν καὶ τῷ παρὰ τῷ σκοτεινῷ λεγόμενον Ἡρακλείτως συνάψιες ὅλα καὶ οὖσα ὅλα, συμφερομένων διαφερομένων, συναφῶν διάδοχον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἔν καὶ εἰς ἐνός πάντα. Heracl. fr. 51 Diels: οὗ ἐνυώσαν ὅκως (τὸ ἐν οὗ τὸ πάν) διαφέρομεν ἑωτῷ ὄμολογεῖς παλάντροπος ἀρμονία δικωστέρ τόξον καὶ λύρης. The Hermetist says in this section that man is composed of νοητά καὶ ὅλικα, just as he says in § 11 that τὸ πᾶν (the universe) ἐκ τῶν ὅλικων καὶ νοητῶν συνεστήκεν; and he regards τὰ νοητά (i.e. ἀσώματα) ὡς ἐναντία τὰ τὰ ὅλικα (i.e. σωματικά). Cf. Corp. II. 4 a: σώματι δὲ ἐναντία φύσις τὸ ἀσώματον . . . ἀσώματος οὖν ὁ τόπος. (The τόπος there spoken of is identified with νότι.)
question has been given in the words κακία ψυχής ἀγνωσία (§ 8 b); ἄρετὴ ψυχής γνώσις (§ 9); ὁ γνώσις ἀγαθός (ib.). Man is good if he has gnosis, and bad if he has not gnosis. And this answer was probably more fully explained in the lost passage at the end of § 10 a. E.g. it may have been there said that the human soul is good in so far as it detaches itself from the material body, and identifies itself with νοῦς (the ‘organ’ of gnosis), which is ‘contrary to the body’. In § 10 b, the writer passes on from man to the Kosmos, and considers the question whether the Kosmos is good.

Οὖ κακός ὁ κόσμος, οὐκέτι δὲ ἀγαθός.—(ὁ καλὸς κόσμος, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἀγαθός MSS.) Cf. § 12: ὁ μὲν γὰρ κόσμος οὐκ ἀγαθός, ὁς κυνητός, οὐ κακός δέ, ὃς ἀδίαντος. See Corp. VI. 2 b.

καὶ αὐτοθέσις καὶ αὐτός [ποτὲ μὲν γενόμενος] ἄει [δὲ] δὲν, δὲν δὲν ἐν γενέσει. The meaning might be made more unmistakable by transposing καὶ αὐτός, and writing ἄει (μὲν ὁ; ἄει καὶ αὐτός, δὲν δὲν ἐν γενέσει. The Kosmos καὶ αὐτός (i.e. as well as God) is ever-existent; but it is not ever-existent in the same sense that God is; for its everlasting existence takes the form of perpetual γένεσις.

The word αὐτοθέσις does not occur elsewhere; and it is difficult to assign any meaning to it. καὶ αὐτός has probably come by duplication from the following καὶ αὐτός. The words ποτὲ μὲν γενόμενος and δὲ were most likely inserted by some one who held the view that the Kosmos has had a beginning. The author himself, on the other hand, seems to have held that the Kosmos has always been in existence.

γενόμενος δὲι (τῇ) γένεσει (γένεσις οὐ -αίν MSS.) τῶν ποιῶν καὶ τῶν ποιῶν. Cf. ποιότητας καὶ ποιότητας ποιεῖ (ὁ ποιῶν) in § 3 as emended. The οὐσία (substance) of the κόσμος is everlasting; but (in the sublunar world at least) every part of this substance is continually having fresh qualities imposed on it, and every individual thing that is made of it is continually increasing or decreasing.

§ II. ἡ δὲ νοητὴ στάσις κυρίει τὴν ὑλικὴν κίνησιν τῶν τρόπων τούτων. Cf. Corp. II. 8 a: πάσα ὁνὶ κύρισις . . . ὑπὸ στάσεως κυρίτω. All changes of quality and quantity that take place in the Kosmos are modes of material movement (ὕλικη κίνησις); and τὸ κυνων must be something which is itself immaterial and motionless (νοητὴ στάσις). The writer assumes that τὸ κυνων is ψυχή (see Corp. II), and proceeds to explain how the cosmic ψυχή (i.e. the immaterial thing by which all material things are moved) is incorporated in the structure of the Kosmos.
The notion that the spherical Kosmos is like a human head was doubtless suggested by Pl. Tim. 44 d ff., where the making of the human body by the 'created gods' is described: τὰς μὲν δὴ θείας περιούδους (i.e. the movements of νοῦς) ..., τὸ τοῦ παντὸς σχῆμα ἀπομιμησάμενον περιφερέσ ὄν, εἰς σφαιροειδὲς σώμα ἐνέδρασαν, τούτῳ δὲ νῦν κεφαλῆς ἐπονομάζομεν, τὰ θεοτότατα τε ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἥμιν πάντων διαστοίτων κ.τ.λ. In the Timaeus the human head is said to resemble the spherical Kosmos; in Corp. X the spherical Kosmos is said to resemble a human head. Cf. Synesius, Cath. iii comm. 8, Migne tom. 66, col. 1181 B: τι δὲ αὐτῷ σφαιρὰς γένοιτο ... θεοπεπεισάρεσθεν; ... τὸ τρίτος θεὸς, ἢ τὸν κόσμον ψυχήν ἢν ἢν πατήρ μὲν αὐτῆς, τοῦ δὲ σωματικοῦ κόσμου δημιουργοῦ, ἐπεισήγαγε τῷ κόσμῳ, τέλον αὐτὸν ... ἀνεργασάμενος, ἀπόδοτος δὶς τοῦτο καὶ σχῆμα σχημάτων τὸ περιστότατον (i.e. a spherical shape). ... ητε σφαιρῆς σφαιρὰς ὑπάρχουσα τοῦ τὸν δόλον κόσμον ψυχοῦ, αὐτῷ δὲ αὐτής ἢν καὶ μᾶλλον ψυχῆς ἢν καὶ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῆς, διακόμισαν καὶ κόσμων εἰς ψυχήν, δὲ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γέγονεν αὐτῶν αὐτῶν. οὕτως ἐδέσε ἡ φύσις σφαιρῶν μερικῶν. ἄνω μὲν ὄν ἀστέρες, κάτω δὲ κεφαλῆς διεπέλαυσαν, ὡς εἰς ἐκείνους ψυχῶν, εἰς κόσμῳ κόσμων μικρῶς ἐδει γὰρ, οἷμαι, εἰς τὸν κόσμον ὄψιν ἐκ ὄψιν συγκείμενον.

[κεφαλῆς δὲ οὐδὲν ὑπεράνω ὠλικῶν, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ ποδῶν οὐδὲν νοητῶν ὑποκάτω, πάν ὃς ὁ λείκων]. I can make no sense of this. The words must be taken to refer to man, and not to the Kosmos; for the Kosmos is a head without trunk or limbs, and has no feet. But what can be meant by saying that in a man 'there is nothing material above the head, and nothing immaterial below the feet'? The words κεφαλῆς οὐδὲν ὑπεράνω ὠλικῶν might possibly be taken to mean that the head is the highest part of man's material frame, and therefore the part best suited to be the abode of ψυχή; but the mention of the feet and what lies below them seems utterly irrelevant.

[Ῥοῦς δὲ κεφαλῆς αὐτῆς σφαιρικῆς κινουμένη, τοῦτο ἐστὶ κεφαλικῶς]. This also is meaningless. It is absurd to say that a head is νοῦς; for a head is a material thing, and νοῦς is immaterial. Perhaps Ῥοῦς... αὐτῆς is a corruption of ἐν νοῦς δὲ ἡ κεφαλῆς αὐτῆς, 'this head (viz. the Kosmos) has νοῦς in it'. That statement would be intelligible in itself, and would agree with the doctrine of the Timaeus, according to which man's νοῦς is situated in his head; but it would not be to the point here; for in this paragraph the writer is speaking about the
embodiment of ψυχή, and not that of νοῦς. The words κεφαλή... σφαιρικός κυκουμένη, τούτο ἐστὶ κεφαλικός, suggest the grotesque notion of a man's head spinning round like a top. If a thing moves σφαιρικά (i.e. like a sphere revolving on its axis), then it does not move κεφαλικά (i.e. as a human head moves). The Kosmos (or, to speak more exactly, the celestial part of the Kosmos) 'moves spherically'; and it might be said in a metaphorical sense that νοῦς 'moves spherically'; but it is nonsense to say that the human head 'moves spherically'. The Kosmos resembles the human head in its spherical shape, but differs from the human head in its movement; and a writer who is seeking to show that these two things resemble one another ought to avoid mentioning their movement.

The υἱός is the meninx or πia mater, i.e. the membrane in which the brain is enclosed. 1 Ar. Hist. animal. 1. 16, 494 b 29: υἱόν δὲ (τὸν ἐγκέφαλον) δύο περίεχοντο, δὲ μὲν περὶ τὸ δατόν (the dura mater) ἐκχύρωσαν, δὲ δὲ περὶ ἀυτὸν τὸν ἐγκέφαλον (the πia mater) ἔτην εἰκεῖνον. 1b. 495 a 8: ἵνα δ' υἱόν δερματικοῦ ἡ μὴνιξ ὁ περίεχον τὸν ἐγκέφαλον.

The writer of Corp. X holds this membrane to be the seat or organ of conscious life and thought in the human body. Here, as in § 13, he shows some acquaintance with the physiological theories of his time.

The Platonists in general, adhering to the teaching of the Timaeus, held the seat of νοῦς or τὸ λογιστικόν to be the brain. 2 Chrysippus and most of the Stoics placed the ἄγγελονοι in the heart. The Aristotelian Strato, about 280 B.C., said that the seat of the ἄγγελονοι is τὸ μεσοσφέρον (the space between the eyebrows), or rather, the part of the brain which lies behind that region. 3 The view adopted by the writer of Corp. X is that of the physician Erasistratus 4 (about 300–250 B.C.). Aetius, Diels, Doxogr., p. 391:

---

1 Suidas (Bernhardy): Μήνιξ ὁ υἱός τὸν ἐγκέφαλον σχίζειν. . . . διὰ αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκέφαλον ἀρχίμεναι διὰ τῶν νεῦρων ἀχρὰ τῶν αἰσθητήριων προτάσατο. . . . διὸ τῶν ἀνέκτηκεν τοῦ ἄδη ἐν τῷ κολληματὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς, συμφώνησεν δὲ τῷ μὴνιξ καὶ τῷ υἱόις. οὕτως οὖν δὲ ἀδήν, ἀγέμενος εἰς τὸν ἐξεθαν ἀέρος τῶν ψόφους, . . . διὰ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῆς μὴνιξι λαμβάνει τοὺς ψόφους.

2 Alcmaeon of Croton, about 500 B.C., 'was the first to recognize the brain as the central organ of intellectual activity' (Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, Eng. tr. 1901, vol. i, p. 148).

3 Aetius (Diels Doxogr. p. 391) says that Strato placed the ἄγγελιον ἐν τῷ μεσοσφέρῳ (in superciliarium mediale), Tertull. De an. 15). Pollux, Onomast. 2. 326, says that he placed it κατὰ τὸ μεσοσφέρον. The latter phrase, no doubt, gives Strato's meaning more exactly.

4 The doctrines of Erasistratus continued to be maintained by a succession of followers for several centuries. A medical school of Erasistrateoi at Smyrna stood
The almost equally celebrated physician Herophilus (about 300 B.C.) placed the ἁγμονικον in the ventricles of the brain (ἐν τῇ ἐγκεφαλίου κοιλίᾳ, ὀπίς ὅστι καὶ βάσις, Aetius id.); and there can be no doubt that Erasistratus was the first to place it in the meninx.¹

The Hermetist compares the Kosmos to a human head. The 'cerebral membrane' of the Kosmos is the outermost sphere;² and 'the things which are united to this cosmic meninx are the fixed stars and the planets. They, like the Kosmos itself and all living things within it, are composed of soul (νοησία) and body (ἄληκτον); but being in or near the outermost sphere, in which the soul or life of the Kosmos is concentrated, they have in them 'more soul than body'; whence it results that they are ἄθανατα (and consequently 'not bad'). On the other hand, all living organisms in the sublunar region have in them 'more body than soul'; whence it results that they are θανάτῳ (and consequently 'bad').

Compare Plotinus 4. 3. 17 on the descent and embodiment of souls: ὅτι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ εἰς τὴν ὀρανοῦ ἱερὰν αἱ ψυχαὶ τὸ πρῶτον χῶραν, λογισάμενον ἄν τις ἐκ τῶν τουτών. ἐὰν γὰρ ὀρανὸς ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τόπῳ ἁμαίνων, εἰ ἐν προσεχής τῶν νοητῶν τοὺς ἑσάκει ἐκεῖθεν τοῖνυν (ὅποι ἐκ τῶν νοητῶν) ψυχοῦντα ταύτα (ὅποι τὰ ὀρανά) πρῶτα [καὶ μετα-

³ The school of Erasistratus was still flourishing at Rome in the second century A.D. (Puschmann, Gesch. der Medizin, p. 300).¹

¹ There must be some error here; perhaps there is a lacuna before ἐν ἑπερανίδα λέγει. According to Liddell and Scott, ἕπερανίδα means 'the membrane of the cerebellum', not that of the brain. (But does it not rather mean the cerebellum itself?) Puschmann, op. cit., p. 300, says 'Das Seelencentrum, ἁγμονικόν, verleget (Erasistratos) in die Meninx und in das kleine, für sich umhautete Hirn, ἕπερανίδα'; but the text of Aetius does not yield that meaning.

² According to Rufus Ephesius, Erasistratus divided the nerves into those of sensation and those of motion; the former he considered to be hollow, and to arise from the membranes of the brain' (W. A. Greenhill, in Smith's Dict. Biogr. II. 43 b). He held that these hollow nerves serve to convey pneuma. 'He recognized the purpose of the larger number of cerebral convolutions in man, as compared with the stag and the hare' (Puschmann, p. 300). His theory of the function of the meninx was founded on his own anatomical investigations.

³ Cf. the teaching of the Naassenes, as reported by Hippolytus, Ref. haer. 5. 9: Ἔδη (Eden) δὲ ἐναύλων ὡς καὶ τὸν ἁγμονικόν ἔγκεφαλος, οἷον δεδεμένον καὶ κατασφυγμένον ἐν τοῖς περικυκλώσις χίτους, ὡσπερ ὀρανοῦ παράδεισον δὲ ἐναυλών τῶν μέχρι μέχρι τῆς ἁγμονικοῦ ἀσθράντος (i.e. the human head).

⁴ Perhaps: τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς δοτάτον (ὁς ψυχοῦται), ὁς ψυχής ἴττον περικυκλώσις μετα-

LIBELLUS X: § ii 251
I have reconstructed this sentence by mere guesswork, out of the two misplaced scraps \( \psi \chi \delta \) \( \sigma \omega \mu \alpha \tau \omega \) \( \pi \epsilon \omicron \nu \omicron \) \( \zeta \omicron \omicron \nu \). But something to this effect seems wanted to lead on to what follows. If we assume that the words are rightly restored, the writer, having explained the relation between \( \psi \chi \delta \) and \( \sigma \omega \mu \alpha \tau \omega \) in the case of the Kosmos, ends the paragraph by saying that the Kosmos is an \( \nu \epsilon \mu \rho \upsilon \chi \nu \) \( \sigma \omega \mu \alpha \) ("a body with soul in it"), that is, a \( \zeta \omicron \omicron \nu \); and he then goes on to say that it is the first of all \( \zeta \omicron \omicron \nu \), and that man is the second.

§ 12. \( \delta \) \( \Delta \sigma \nu \rho \varphi \omicron \tau \omega \) \( \sigma \omega \tau \epsilon \omicron \nu \) \( \zeta \omicron \omicron \nu \). Having disposed of the Kosmos, the Hermetist returns to the discussion of man. The treatment of man in §§ 12, 13 is parallel in arrangement to the treatment of the Kosmos in §§ 10 b, 11. The writer first gives his decision on the question whether man is good or bad, and then explains how the human soul is incorporated in the human body.

\( \delta \) \( \Delta \sigma \nu \rho \varphi \omicron \tau \omega \) \( \zeta \omicron \omicron \nu \) \( \delta \) \( \mu \delta \omicron \nu \) \( \delta \) \( \Delta \sigma \nu \rho \varphi \omicron \tau \omega \) \( \mu \omicron \nu \). Man is not, as the Kosmos is, merely not-good; he is positively bad. The reading of the MSS. would rather mean 'man is not, as the Kosmos is, almost good'; and that cannot be the sense intended.

The statement that man is \( \kappa \alpha \kappa \sigma \) is verbally inconsistent with § 24 b, \( \delta \) \( \gamma \alpha \rho \) \( \Delta \sigma \nu \rho \varphi \omicron \tau \omega \) \( \zeta \omicron \omicron \nu \) \( \delta \) \( \theta \epsilon \omicron \nu \) \( \kappa \tau \theta \omicron \lambda \). These apparently conflicting statements are probably derived from different sources; the language used in § 12 may have been suggested by Corp. VI, and that in § 24 b, by some document similar in tone to Ascl. Lat. I. 6 a, "magnum miraculum est homo" &c. But there is no real contradiction. In § 12 we are told that man \( \omega \) \( \theta \upsilon \nu \tau \omicron \nu \) (i.e. in respect of his body, and the \( \theta \upsilon \nu \tau \omicron \nu \) \( \epsilon \omicron \theta \omicron \omicron \nu \) \( \psi \chi \gamma \zeta \) which is inseparably connected with the body,) is \( \kappa \alpha \kappa \sigma \). In § 24 b we are told that \( \delta \) \( \delta \omicron \tau \omicron \nu \) \( \Delta \sigma \nu \rho \varphi \omicron \tau \omega \) (i.e. man as identified with \( \nu \omicron \omicron \nu \), or with the higher and immortal part of the soul,) stands on a par with the astral gods, or perhaps above them. And \( \delta \) \( \gamma \nu \omicron \omicron \nu \) (§ 9), 'the man who has got gnosis', is \( \delta \) \( \delta \omicron \tau \omicron \nu \) \( \Delta \sigma \nu \rho \varphi \omicron \tau \omega \).

§ 13. \( \psi \chi \delta \) \( \Delta \sigma \nu \rho \varphi \omicron \tau \omega \) \( \delta \) \( \chi \epsilon \iota \tau \alpha \) \( \tau \omicron \omicron \nu \) \( \tau \omicron \omicron \nu \) \( \kappa \tau \theta \omicron \lambda \). The connexion of § 13 with § 12 may be explained thus. Man is bad in so far as he is a \( \theta \upsilon \nu \tau \omicron \nu \) \( \zeta \omicron \omicron \nu \); and he is a \( \theta \upsilon \nu \tau \omicron \nu \) \( \zeta \omicron \omicron \nu \) in so far as his soul is enclosed in a material body. Hence arises the question how soul and body are connected during earthly life.

The writer here says that the \( \pi \nu \epsilon \omicron \nu \)ma is the 'vehicle' (\( \delta \chi \gamma \mu \alpha \)) of the \( \psi \chi \gamma \), and the \( \psi \chi \delta \) is the 'vehicle' of the \( \nu \omicron \omicron \nu \). In § 16, he describes
the same relation by a different metaphor, speaking of the \textit{pneuma} as the ‘garment’ or ‘envelope’ (\textit{δυνάμα}, περιβολή) of the \textit{ψυχή}. Both these metaphors are employed together in Iambi. \textit{Peri ψυχής}, Stob. i. 49. 43, vol. i, p. 385 W.: οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰδοὺς αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχήν αὑτῷ τῷ σώματι τῷ ὄργανῳ συνοικίζοντο, ὥστεροι οἱ πλείστοι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν: οἱ δὲ μεταξύ τῆς τοῦ ἀσωμάτου ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ \textsuperscript{1} ἀγγελιώδους\textsuperscript{3} (\textit{λεγε γεωδών}) (σώματος τίθενται\textsuperscript{4}) αἰθέρια (τινά?) καὶ αὐράνια καὶ πνευματικὰ περιβλήματα, (ἀν ἂν) περιμετέχοντα τὴν νοερὰν ζωήν προβεβληθοῦσαι μὲν αὐτῆς φρονίας ἐνεκεν, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ αὐτῇ καθαπέρ ὁχήματα, [συμμέτρος δ’ αὐ] καὶ πρὸς τὸ στερεῖν σώμα συμβιβάζειν ((αὐτὴν)) μέσος τις [κοινώς] συνάδεσμος [αὐτὴν] συνάπτοντα. The word \textit{δχήμα} is used in a similar connexion in Pl. \textit{Tim.} 69 c: the created gods, when they fashioned man, \textit{παραλαβόντες ἀρχὴν ψυχής ἄθανατον, τὸ μετὰ τούτο θυητὸν σώμα αὐτῇ περιετόρρευσαν, χτήμα τε πάν τὸ σώμα ἔδοσαν. In that passage, the σώμα in which the immortal soul is enclosed is the human head (περιετόρρευσαν implies a circular shape), and the \textit{δχήμα} is the trunk and limbs, which were added as means of locomotion (\textit{Tim.} 44 ε); but Plato’s phrase may have suggested to later writers the metaphor by which they described either the whole body, or the corporeal \textit{πνεύμα}, as \textit{δχήμα ψυχής}.

This section is copied in the \textit{Hermippus}, i. 13. 96-99: λόγος μὲν \textit{δχήμα} νοῦ, τοῦ δὲ λόγου ψυχή, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο δὲ δήκον διὰ φλεξῆν καὶ ἀρτηριῶν καὶ αἴματος καὶ τῷ ζῷων καὶ πρὸς τὰς οὐκείας ἐνεργείας καθιστήσειν. . . . ὅστεροι τοὺς ἐκείνα ἐν τῇ συντάξει δὲ ἄλλοις χωρεῖ καὶ τὸ ζῷων ἔμπνει, οὕτω καὶ τῇ διάλειψιν ἀδής πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἐπαναχωρεῖ καὶ συντελλεῖται.\textsuperscript{4} αἷμα μὲν εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα, πνεῦμα δὲ εἰς ψυχήν, ψυχή δ’ αὖ εἰς λόγον, καὶ οὗς λόγος εἰς νοῦν, καὶ οὗτος αὖ εἰς τὸ συνγενεῖς. The writer of the \textit{Hermippus} had before him the same corrupt text which presents itself in our MSS. of the \textit{Corpus}.

\textit{ὁ νοῦς} [ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, \textit{ὁ λόγος}] ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. λόγος is spoken of as a human faculty inferior to νοῦς in \textit{Corp.} IV. 3: τὸν μὲν λόγον . . . πάσι τοῖς ἀνθρώπωσι ἐμέρους, τὸν δὲ νοῦν οὐκέτι. See also \textit{Corp. XII.} i. 12 sq. But in \textit{Corp.} X, λόγος is nowhere interposed between νοῦς and ψυχή, except in this one sentence; and in § 16, νοῦς is spoken of as contained in ψυχή without any intermediate ‘envelope’. It is clear therefore that the mention of λόγος here must be an interpolation.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} τοῦ\textsuperscript{P}: της\textsuperscript{F}.
\item \textsuperscript{2} \textsuperscript{4} \textsuperscript{Wachsmuth.}
\item \textsuperscript{3} \textsuperscript{4} \textsuperscript{Wachsmuth.}
\item \textsuperscript{4} \textsuperscript{4} \textsuperscript{Wachsmuth.}
\end{itemize}
Plotinus, 2. 9. 1, says that it is an error to interpose λόγος ('discursive reason'), as a separate entity, between νοῦς and ψυχή. The words ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ λόγος must have been inserted in Corp. X by some one whose doctrine of λόγος resembled that which Plotinus rejects.

For the series νοῦς, ψυχή, πνεῦμα, cf. Corp. XI. i. 4 b: ὁ μὲν θεὸς ἐν τῷ νῷ, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἢ δὲ ψυχή ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ. (πνεῦμα is ὑλή qualified in a certain way.) Corp. XII. i. 14 a (= V. 11 βι.). τῆς μὲν ὕλης τὸ λεπτομερέστατον ἀρπός, ἀρπός δὲ ψυχή, ψυχής δὲ νοῦς, νοῦ δὲ θεὸς. (ἀρπός there takes the place of πνεῦμα.) The writer of Corp. X holds νοῦς and ψυχή to be ἄσωματα; yet at the same time he pictures each of them to himself as a material thing enclosed in another material thing of denser substance.

But why should νοῦς be spoken of at all in § 13? At this stage, the writer's business is to explain the relation between ψυχή and σῶμα in man, as he has just explained the relation between ψυχή and σῶμα in the Kosmos; and this mention of νοῦς unduly anticipates the contents of § 16 f., where he passes on to a discussion of the relation between νοῦς and ψυχή. Moreover, the words are awkwardly put together; a man composing freely would hardly write ψυχή . . . ὄψεται τὸν τρόπον τούτον, ὁ νοῦς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. I am therefore inclined to suspect that τὸν τρόπον τούτον, ὁ νοῦς . . . ἢ δὲ ψυχή is a later addition, and that the original text ran thus: ψυχή δὲ ἀνθρώπου ὄψεται [ ] ἐν τῷ πνεύματι, τὸ δὲ πνεύμα, διήκον κ.τ.λ., καὶ τὸ σῶμα. (Perhaps the puzzling words νοῦς δὲ κεφαλὴ αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ. in § 11 may have been inserted by the same interpolator.)

ἡ δὲ ψυχή ἐν τῷ πνεύματι, τὸ (δὲ) πνεύμα, διήκον κ.τ.λ. Turn. gives ἡ ψυχή ἐν τῷ πνεύματι· τὸ πνεύμα ἐν τῷ σώματι· τὸ πνεύμα διήκει κ.τ.λ. But the words τὸ πνεύμα ἐν τῷ σώματι are not wanted; for the relation between the πνεύμα and the σῶμα is sufficiently described by the following sentence, τὸ πνεύμα, διήκον . . . (μετὰ τοῦ) αἵματος, καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ . . . βαστάζει. Moreover there would be a

1 Plot. 2. 9. 1 (Volkmann): ἦστι γὰρ ὡς: ἦστι νοῦς ἡ ὄσοντας ἐναγωγὴ κείμενος ὑστόσον· ἠκούσα τῇ πρὸς αὐτόν καὶ πρὶν αὐτῷ ψυχή ἤδη ἐργόν. . . καὶ λόγος ἐν αὐτῶν (οὗ τοῦ νοῦ) εἶναι ψυχήν, ψυχήν νοσίν νοσίων, σώμα ἄλλῃ τοῦτο μεταχείριζον καὶ πνεῦμα φάσιν. (Perhaps ὡς ἄλλῃ τῆς μεταχείρίας καὶ ψυχῆς. 'Lόγος is not a thing distinct from νοῦς and ψυχή, and intermediate between them.') . . . τῶν δὲ λόγων διεξαγαγάν τὸν τοῦ νοῦ τοῦ λόγου (i.e. when a man says that the absolute or universal λόγος is derived from the absolute or universal νοῦς), ἔστα [ἀκόλουθος] γίνεται ἐν ψυχῇ (λόγῳ) ἄλλων ἀν' αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα μεταχεθῇ καὶ νοῦς ἃ ὄσος (οὗ τοῦ λόγος), ἀναστρέψῃ τὴν ψυχήν τοῦ νοῦ, εἰ μη ἔταξ τοῦ νοῦ κομίζεται, ἀλλὰ ἕτοι ἄλλως τοῦ μεταχείρισθε, τῶν λόγων καὶ ἐκδολων λόγων, ἀλλ' οὗ λόγον ἔξει, καὶ ἄλλως ὡς εἰςθέτει νοῦς ὡς ἄλλως νοηθεί.
verbal contradiction in saying that τὸ πνεῦμα διέχειται ἐν τῷ σώματι
(= βαστάζεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος), and at the same time, that τὸ πνεῦμα
(nom.) βαστάζει τὸ σώμα (acc.)

The pneuma spoken of in Corp. X is the 'vital spirit' (ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα) of the individual organism. It is a gaseous substance, which serves as the corporeal 'vehicle' or 'integument' of the incorporeal soul. Pneuma in this sense occupied a prominent place in the theories of the medical writers, from Erasistratus onward (i.e. from about 300 B.C.), if not earlier (Puschmann, Gesch. Med., p. 299 ff.). The cosmic pneuma of the Stoics, which is the 'vital spirit' of the universe (the Kosmos being conceived by them as a ζωον organized on the same plan as an individual man or animal), is not mentioned in Corp. X.

τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα, διήκον διὰ τῶν [φλεβῶν καὶ] ὁρτηρίων [καὶ] (μετὰ τοῦ) αἷματος. If we retain the words φλεβῶν καὶ, we must understand the writer to say that the veins and arteries alike convey both blood and pneuma. It is not quite impossible that he held that view;¹ but it seems more probable that φλεβῶν καὶ was inserted by a later hand, perhaps in consequence of the corruption of κατὰ τὰς φλέβας into καὶ τὰς φλέβας below. As to the function of the arteries, opinions differed among the medical writers. Praxagoras of Cos (about 340–320 B.C.) said that the veins contain blood alone, and the arteries contain air alone; and his view was adopted by the Stoics (Puschmann, p. 276). Herophilus held that the arteries convey both blood and pneuma (Galén iv. 731; Puschmann, p. 288); Erasistratus held that the veins convey the blood by which the tissues are nourished, and the arteries serve as canals for the ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα alone (Puschmann, p. 300).² If my restoration of the sentence is right, the writer of Corp. X agrees with Herophilus and differs from Erasistratus on this question.

¹ For the opinion that the φλέβες contain air as well as blood, cf. Aetius (Diels Doxogr. p. 436): Διογένης (Ἀπολλονιατές) ἐλ ἔδω τὸ αἷμα διαχέομενον πληρώσει (ὑπὸ) µὲν τὰς φλέβας, τῶν δὲ ἐν αὐτῶι περιχόμενον ἄρα φως (ὑπὸ) ἐλ τὰ ἁρτήρια καὶ τὴν ὑποσεμίλειν γαστέρα, ὅπως γίνεσθαι... τῶν δὲ ἀρτηρίων ἐκ τῶν φλεβῶν ἐληλυθέν, δώδεκα συνυγχάλων.

² Cf. Simon Magnus, as reported by Hippolytus, Ref. haer. 6. 14: ἐκτέρωσεν γὰρ τὸν ὄρμφολος δὺ τὰν ἀρτηρία πωλεταμέναι, ὅχετον πνεῦματος καὶ δύο φλέβες, ὅχετον αἷματος... αἱ ἀρτηρίαι, οἱ δὲ φλέβες ὅγετον εἶναι πνεῦματος... πρὸς τὴν µεγάλην συνάστωσιν ἀρτηρίας, τὴν κατὰ µέχριν καλοποιησάντης δαρτήν καὶ ὅπως διὰ τῶν παραθόρων ἐκ τὴς καρδίας ἱδονάν τὸ πνεῦμα κινήσει ἐγραζήται τῶν ἐμπρών.
Corp. II. 8 b, 9); but the writer of Corp. X holds that the ψυχή acts on the gross matter of the body, not immediately, but through the interposed pneuma. The function of the pneuma, as he conceives it, corresponds to that of the nervous system in modern physiology.

As to ὁσπέρ φόρτον τινὰ βαστάζει, see ὁσπέρ φορτίον βαστάζουσα τὸ σῶμα in § 8 b.


As to τὸ τάρα τῆς ἐνεργείας συναφείς, see ἀνθρώπως τὸ καρδιά ἐστὶν τῆς ἀναβαθμίας, τὰ δὲ ἀναβαθμίας ἐκ τῆς ἀναβαθμίας ἀνάγχεται .

If this is the case, the view of Empedocles was an anticipation of the Platonic theory of the soul; cf. the θνητόν εἶδος ψυχῆς in Pl. Tim., and the 'two souls' of the Hermetists as reported in Adammonis resp. 8. 6 (Testim.).

The opinion that the soul is the blood was maintained by Critias, shortly before 400 b. c. (Aristot. De an. 1. 2, 405 b 5); and it seems to have been asserted, but probably in a modified sense, by the Stoic Diogenes Babylonius, about 160 b. c. Galen, Dogm. Hipp. et Plat. 2, 8, 110, quotes Diog. Bab. as saying that τὸ κύον τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν τὰς κατὰ προαίρεσιν κυνήσεις ψυχής τῆς ἐστὶν ἀναβαθμίας, πάσα δὲ ἀναβαθμίας ἐκ τῆς ὀρθής ἀνάγχεται . but he adds that Diogenes, ἀκοῦσθαι εἰπολαθεῖσαι τῶν οἰκείων δογμάτων, αἷμα φασιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, ὁς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Κρεπίαν ὑπέλαβον. εἰ δὲ γε ἔστιν Κλεάνθει καὶ Ἀριστοτελείᾳ καὶ Χρυσίστῳ καὶ Ζήνωνι, τρέφεσθαι μὲν ἐκ αἵματος φήσασθι τὴν ψυχήν,
The Hebrews held that 'the life is the blood', and gave this as a reason for the law which forbade them to eat flesh in which the blood is retained. Gen. 9. 4: κρέας εἰς αἷμα τοῦ ψυχῆς οὐ φάγοντες. Cf. Philo De special, leg. 4. 10. 119–123, Cohn V, p. 236 f.: κελεύει μάντιν μήτε θυρσμαίοιν μήτε θυμάλωτον προσίεσθαι. . . . ένοι δὲ . . . ἀδύνα παρασκευάζουσιν, ἄγχοντες καὶ αἵματι τρέφοντες, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἃν ἐκθύθειν καὶ ἄφεν τὴν ηλικίαν ἔτα, ἀυτοῖς, μὴ προσφέροντες τῷ σώματι, τὸ αἷμα: σαρκῶν γὰρ αὐτὸ μόνον ἀπολαμβάνειν αὐτάρκειας ἦν, μηδὲν δέ ἐμφατο-μόνους τῶν συγγενέων πρὸς ψυχήν ἐξώτων. ὦθεν ἐν ἑτέρως τίθησι νόμον περὶ αἷματος, μήθε αἷμα μήτε στέαρ προσφέρεσθαι τῷ μέν αἷμα δὲ ἦν εἴον αἰτίαν, ὅτι οὐσία ψυχῆς ἔστιν, ὅχλῳ τῆς φύσεως καὶ λογικῇ, ἄλλῳ τῆς αἰσθητικῇ, καθ' ἣν ἤμιν τε καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις κοινῷ τὸ ζῆν συμβιβασκαίν' ἐκεῖνης γὰρ οὐσία πνεύμα θεόν (Gen. 2. 7). Philo must have met with the doctrine that the blood is οὐσία ψυχῆς in Pagan writings, as well as in the Books of Moses. In the time of the Roman empire, Jewish influence may perhaps have helped to revive this primitive belief among the Pagan Greeks.

σφαλλόμενοι τῆς φύσεως (τὴν φύσιν MSS.). It would be possible to say σφαλλόμενοι τὴν γνώμην, but not σφαλλόμενοι τὴν φύσιν. If we read τῆς φύσεως, the phrase may be taken as equivalent to σφαλλόμενοι τοῦ περὶ τῆς φύσεως ἀλήθειας.

πρῶτον δὲι (ἐξελθείν) τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ τότε, (τοῦ πνεύματος ἀνα-χωρήσαντος εἰς) τῷ περίεξον, τὸ αἷμα παγίναι κατὰ (καὶ MSS.) τῶν φλέβων, καὶ τῶν ἁρτηριῶν κενωθείσας [τὸ ξένον καταλαμβάνειν. The argument appears to be that the soul cannot be identical with the blood, because at death the soul departs, while the blood remains in the corpse. But the details are obscure. We are told that at death the arteries (or, according to the MSS., the veins and arteries) 'are emptied'. It was said above that during life the [veins and arteries] contain both blood and pneuma. What then becomes of the blood and pneuma at death? The blood 'is coagulated'. It certainly remains in the body (except in the case of death by bleeding); and as the writer says that the arteries are left empty after death, his view must be that at the time of death that part of the blood which was previously contained in the arteries passes
from them into the veins, so that all the blood in the body is collected in the veins, and is there coagulated. This meaning may be obtained by writing τὸ αἷμα παγηναί κατὰ τὰς φλέβας, καὶ τὰς ἀρτηρίας κ.τ.λ. in place of τὸ αἷμα παγηναί, καὶ τὰς φλέβας καὶ τὰς ἀρτηρίας κ.τ.λ.

But what becomes of the pneuma when it quits the arteries? According to the text of the MSS., it passes as τὸν ψυχήν; but that is absurd. The ψυχή might be said to be in the πνεῦμα, which is its ἐνυμα; but the πνεῦμα cannot be said to be in the ψυχή, either during life or after death. We must therefore conclude that the Hermetist either omitted to say where the pneuma goes, or wrote something like εἰς τὸ περιέχων. With the alterations which I have proposed, the passage yields a satisfactory sense. The ψυχή quits the body; and the vital pneuma, which is the vehicle or envelope of the ψυχή, quits the body with it. Thereupon the blood, no longer conveyed along the arteries by the pneuma, coagulates in the veins; and the arteries are left empty of blood as well as of pneuma. This physical change, which follows and results from the departure of the ψυχή, is ‘the death of the body’.

A theory similar in part, but not identical with that of the Hermetist, is mentioned in Iambi. Περὶ ψυχῆς, Stob. i. 49. 43, vol. i, p. 383 W.: ἄρα γε (γίγνεται ὁ θάνατος) πνευμὸ τῶν ἀρτηριῶν, ἀποκλειμένων τοῦ δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐκτὸς πνεῦμα; Cf. Exc. XXIII (Kore Kosmu) 67.

§ 14 a. ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ ἄρχης . . . οὖ κινεῖται. This passage has no connexion with the context, and interrupts the train of thought. It may have been written at the top or bottom of a page by some reader, and inserted into the text by a copyist's error.

The writer of these words introduces the Neoplatonic conception of τὸ ἕν, of which there is no mention in the rest of the document. ‘The One’ of which he speaks is something which is prior to the ἄρχη. But what is this ἄρχη? The writer can hardly have omitted to give it a name; and he most likely named it νοῦς. It is possible that he wrote ἐκ μιᾶς ἄρχης (τοῦ νοῦ), and that the superfluous words καὶ μόνον have arisen out of τοῦ νοοῦ misplaced. On τὸ ἕν, as distinguished from νοῦς, and placed above it, see Plotinus passim.

ἡ μὲν ἄρχη κινεῖται. If the ἄρχη is νοῦς, this statement can hardly

1 Cf. Actius (Diels Doxogr. p. 435): Πῶς ἐνυμος γίνεται καὶ θάνατος. Ἀλκμαῖοις ἀναχωρήσει τοῦ αἷμας εἰς τὰ αἱμόρρους φλέβας δῦνον γίνεσθαι φησίν, τὴν δὲ εξερήσων διάχων (οὐκ ὁ αἷμας: πάντως δυνατά οὐκ ἐξερήσων (οὐκ εἰς τὰς φλέβας) θάνατον. But where did Alcmaeon suppose the blood to be during waking life, when it has not ‘withdrawn into the veins’?
be reconciled with § 11 init., § 12 novit et statius kate twn ylkon kinein.
But it agrees with Plotinus 6. 7. 13: nous te kuioumenon kinein kata mev
osas tis kai kata ta tauta kai mona de. . . epie panta ouw kinein tis de,
mallos de koumabia. . . eiv 8 eptikev (d nous), ouk noei. . .
ei de touto, oud 8 estin.

to de 8. . . eptikev. This is not quite in agreement with
Plotinus, who says (6. 9. 3) that to de 8; is ou kuioumenon oudo 8 eftos,
but is prod kyntheseis, pro stades.
§ 14 b. tria toinu tauta, d theos [ ], kal d kosmos, kal d antherpns.
Cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 10: 'deus primus est, secundus est mundus, homo
est tertius.' Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. XI. 2. (6): prooton d theos, deuterone
d kosmos, tritoun d antherpns.
tiv men kosmos d theos eixe, tiv de antherpou d kosmos.
eixe probably means 'contains' (epiperikexiv).
In other words, the Kosmos is 'in
God', or God is the topos of the Kosmos. Cf. Corp. IX. 9: t 8 yap
anta 8 theos eixe.
ginetai 8 men kosmos tou theou 8ios, 8 de antherpou tou kosmu (8ios,
kal tou theou) eisper 8gmonos (8gmonos MSS.). Cf. Corp. IX. 8: panthe
men ouw d theos tou kosmu, 8 de kosmos tivn en 8f kosm. The word
8gmonos ('grandson') is preferable to 8gmonos ('offspring' or 'de-
scendant').
§ 15a. ouk apo (ou yap MSS.) gnowei tiv antherpou d theos. God
does not ignore his grandson man; he recognizes the relationship.
Cf. Paul, I. Cor. 13. 12: tote de epignosomai kath k epignovthein.
kal Thele gnavirezovai. Cf. Corp. I. 31: 8gno d theos, 8 gnavirezovai
boiktein. At this point the writer of Corp. X recurs to the thought,
already suggested in §§ 4 b-6, that man on earth, though sunk in
matter, is yet not wholly estranged from God (or from 'the Good',
which is correlative to God), and that through gnosis he may rid
himself of the evil which adheres to him in consequence of his
incarnation, and may thus become good (tovt 8 etw 8 gnavi ginein 8
psi).

aith eiv tiv "Olympton anabasis. In the Greek poets, from the
Odyssey downward, Olympus means heaven; and the word was
employed by some of the Pythagoreans in the sense of the highest
or outermost sphere of heaven. Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 337:
tiv men ouw anwstov meros tiv perichontos . . . Olympton kalei (8
Phiados)'; tiv de upo tiv tiv Olympon foran, ev d touz penthe planhtas
mev 8iav kai skelptis tetrachma, kosmon' tiv d upo touz upostellon
This statement, if it stood alone, might be taken to imply that it is possible for a man to 'ascend to Olympus', i.e. to become a god, while he is still in the body. But that is expressly denied in §§ 5 and 6; and it appears from § 7 that the teleostátois dóxa is beyond man's reach as long as he lives on earth, and that the soul must be released from its earthly prison, and must afterwards pass through an intermediate stage as a daemon, before it becomes a god. We must therefore take the writer's meaning in § 15 a to be that those who, while still in the body, have attained to such gnosis as is possible for them on earth, will, after death, eventually ascend to heaven, and become astral gods.

§ 15 b. (. . .) kal ouStWt (oiWti?) dyaW) (fieVei), kokhyper koiyvTai. A connecting passage must have been lost before these words. The sense required might be expressed by writing (φύτευε μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὴ ἡ ψυχή ἐνσωματωθά ἢ μαλώνεται,) καὶ οὐκέτι ἀγαθὴ (μένει). In this life, the human soul is bad, and can become good only by acquiring gnosis; for though it was good in its antenatal state, it has necessarily been made bad by its incarnation. Cf. Philo, Quis rer. div. heres 55. 272, Wendland III, p. 62: ἀνάγκη γὰρ θητὸν ὄντα τῷ τῶν παθῶν ἔθελεςθηναι καὶ τὰς οἰκείους τῷ γενομένῳ κήρας ἀναδέξασθαι, βούλημα δὲ θεοῦ τὰ σύμφωνα κακὰ τοῦ γένους ἤμων ἐπικοινωνέων ὡστε καὶ ἡμέων ἐν ἀρχῇ τὰ οἰκεία πνεύμαθα, ὡμῶν γενομένων δεσποτῶν δούλω, καὶ ὁ θεὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐργάσεται ἀυτῷ, ἀφέσων καὶ ελευθερίαν ταῖς ἱκέσεσιν αὐτοῦ ψυχαῖς προκηρύσας.


The thought expressed in this passage closely resembles that of

1 Similarly, the writer of Corp. X says that it is 'the will of God' that men should get gnosis, and thereby be 'made good'.
Wordsworth's *Ode on intimations of immortality*. It contrasts with the Christian doctrine of 'original sin'; but there is no reason to suppose that the writer knew of that doctrine and was consciously opposing it.

It is here assumed that the soul of the child comes directly from the world-soul from which it was originally parted off ought to be more clearly visible in a human child. On this subject, the writer of *Corp. X* seems to have set down side by side statements derived from different sources, without asking himself how they were to be reconciled.

Iamblichus (Περὶ ψυχῆς, Stob. i. 49. 40, vol. i, p. 380 W) distinguishes the case of a soul which comes to its embodiment fresh from enjoyment of the beatific vision in the world above, from that of one which has been corrupted in a preceding incarnation: ἂν ἐν τῷ πνεύμα τῷ μωτικῇ ἐκείνῳ ἐκεῖνος ἔκκειται ὑπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἁπάξοντος τῆς. This assumption is hardly consistent with the doctrine of successive incarnations which is taught in § 7, and from which it would seem to follow that the child's soul must have been (or at any rate may have been) previously incorporated in a series of bestial bodies, and that traces of the connexion of the individual soul with the soul-soul from which it was originally parted off ought to be more clearly visible in a human child. On this subject, the writer of *Corp. X* seems to have set down side by side statements derived from different sources, without asking himself how they were to be reconciled.


2 Abelison, *The immanence of God in Rabbinical literature*, p. 281: 'The Rabbins emphasize unceasingly the spotless purity of the new-born babe. “The good inclination”, say they, “is thirteen years older than the evil inclination” (because the latter only begins to assert itself at the age of thirteen).'

3 The σῶμα is the junction of the soul with the body.

4 'Recently initiated'; i.e. fresh from the antenatal ἱποτελία of the νομίμον κάλλος. This is a reference to Pl. *Phae. 250 c*: ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ νοστεληθέν, ὁ διεφθαρμένως, οὖν ἐξελέγη κατέχει θεῖαν πρὸς αὑτόν τὸ κάλλος... ὡς ἀρτετεληθείς, ἐκ τῶν τούτων νομίμων κ.τ.λ.

5 Pl. *Phae. 248 c*: ἡτίς ἐν ψυχῇ θεῖα εὑρισκόμεθα γενομένη κατάθεται τῷ κόσμῳ κάλλος... ὡς ἀρτετελεῖται.

6 Pl. *Phae. 250 c*: ὡς ἀρτετελεῖταί μὲν αὐτῷ ὑπερεῖ καὶ ἄπαθεὶς κατάκεισθαι... ὡς ἀρτετελεῖταί... πάτραται καὶ ἀποτελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐνσωματωμένοις.
of Iamblichus, who ἐκήρατο ἐμφύσῳται πρῶτος εἰς τὰ σώματα; but those who have been polluted in previous incarnations, and who μετὰ παθῶν συνέχονται πρῶτος τοῖς σώμασι,¹ are ignored in Corp. X. 15 b. 

ἀδύνατον (εὐαντήν MSS.) διάλυσιν ἀδύνατε μηδέπω ἐπισυνεχέσθην. The διάλυσις of the individual soul must mean its separation from the world-soul. The soul of the young child does not accept, or admit to itself, its separation; i.e. it feels itself to be still a part of the world-soul from which it has only just been separated. The opposite of this is expressed by διαλύσασα ἐναντίων below.

§ 16. εἰς τὰ σώμα, ... ἐναι τῷ εὐαντήν MSS.) τοῦ πνεύματος χωρίζεται, καὶ δ ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς. The Platonists held that the home or natural place of the soul (τὰ ἐναντίων) is above; and the Stoics said that all souls, when they quit the body, rise into the atmosphere.

A few lines below, we are told that Hermes has said that ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς χωρίζεται καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ πνεύματος. A statement to that effect must therefore have occurred somewhere; and it is precisely what is needed here to complete the sentence.

The separation of the ψυχῆ from the πνεῦμα in which it is enveloped is pictured in Plutarch's 'Vision of Thespiesius', De sero numinis vindicta 22, 564 a. Thespiesius sees fiery bubbles rising through the air; the bubbles break, and little figures in human shape come forth from them. These human figures are newly disembodied souls; and the bubble must be intended to represent the πνεῦμα in which the soul is enclosed.

¹ I.e. who have πῶδη already adhering to them when their life on earth (in the present incarnation) begins.
The vows, when it quits the earthy body, does not remain bodiless, but assumes another sort of body, which consists of fire. This corresponds to what is described in § 7 by the words "διὸ γὰρ γίνεται ψυχή ἐν σώματι ὡσοι, τῇ τε μετέπειτα-  ματουμένη καὶ τῇ ἐκ σώματος ἀφεῖν ἡ πυρινὸν ἐὰς γίγνον γενομένη, ἂν δὲ μετεπόθετον σὺν λέγοντι εἶναι, ὅτι ἐδολὼν τὸ ἄφ' οὗ ἡ ἑκάστροις ἡ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἄσωματος ἐὰς ὡσίων ἱκμα, ἡ δὲ καὶ πρώτῃ ἐν ἡ ψυχή κοινωνίᾳ σώματος. Plot. 4. 3. 15: ἵσι δὲ (ἄλ ψυχαί) ἐκκαθάσασθαι τοῦ νοοῦ ἐὰς ὡφανοῦν μὲν πρῶτον, καὶ σώμα ἐκαῖ προσαλαβόμεναι, δ' ἀυτοῦ ἴδιον ἱποτοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ γεωδότερα σώματα. Iambl. Πείρη ψυχής, Stob. 1. 49. 39, vol. i, p. 378 W: (ἐπὶ τινές τῶν Πλατωνίκων), τιθεμένη τὴν ψυχήν ἀὖ ἐὰς ἐν σώματι, ὡσπερ ἡ Ἐρατοσθένους καὶ Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ καὶ ἄλλων, ἀπὸ σωμάτων αὐτήν λειτουργεῖ ἐὰς τὰ ὀστρεώδη 1 πάλιν εἰσοικεῖε σώματα διατρίβεις μὲν γὰρ αὐτήν ἐὰς μοίραν τινα 1 (λέγε ἐὰς ἐν μορία τινι) τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καθήκειν γε µὴν εἰς τὸ στερεόν σώμα ἄλλοτε ἄλλων τοῦ παντὸς τόπων. καὶ τοῦτος (οὗ τοῦ τόπου) Ἡρακλείδιν τὸν Ποιντικὸν ἀφορίζει περὶ τὸν γαλάζιον, ἄλλων δὲ καθ' ὅλας τοῦ ὡφανοῦ τὰς σφαίρας, ἄφ' ὀν δὴ δεύρῳ κατείναι τὰς ψυχὰς τοὺς δὲ περὶ σελήνην ἤ ἐν τῷ ὑπὸ σελήνην ἁρέ λέγει αὐτὰς κατοικεῖν, καὶ ἄφ' αὐτῶν κατὰ χωρεῖν εἰς τὴν περίγειον γένεσιν τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ σωμάτων αὐτὶ στερεῶν πλέον εἰς ἑκεῖνα (στερεὰ?) σύμματα διαχυρίζεσθαι.

It appears from this passage that Iamblichus knew of certain Platonists who held that the soul, when not incorporated in an earthy body, is at all times incorporated in a material body of finer substance. They may perhaps have derived this doctrine from

1 Ι. έ. γώμα or στερεά. This use of the word ὀστρεώδης must have been suggested by Pl. Παθ. 250 c: καθαρὸν διότι καὶ ἁμαρτιάς τοῦτον, τὸν σώμα περιφέροντες ὀγούμοντο, ὀστέρων τρόπον δεδεσμευμένον.
2 This opinion was adopted by Origen, De princip. 2. 2: 'Querendum primo videtur, si possibile est penitus incorporeas remanere rationables naturas, cum ad summum sanctitatis ac beatitudinis venerint,—quod mihi quidem difficillimum et
Heraclides Ponticus. We are told that Heraclides φωτειδή τὴν ψυχὴν ὄρισαρο (Aetius, Diels Doxogr., p. 388), or said that the soul is lumen (Tertull. De an. 9; Macrob. Somn. i. 14); and that he considered the soul to be an οἰδανόν σώμα (Philoponus De an.). If these statements are correct, it follows that Heraclides must have rejected the Platonic doctrine that the soul is incorporeal. But if he had done so, how could he have come to be reckoned a Platonist? It seems more probable that he considered the soul itself to be incorporeal, but held that, when released from its earthly body, it is incorporated in a body of another sort; that the τελειωτάτη δύνα of a soul is to be incorporated in a body consisting of light, or luminous fire; and that the ζων formed by the combination of the incorporeal soul with this luminous body is of like nature with a star, and shines as a point of light in the Milky Way. If Heraclides held some such view as this, Posidonius's theory of disembodied souls may be regarded as a modified version of that of Heraclides, adapted to the principles of the Stoic physics. The Platonist Heraclides may be presumed to have said that the soul, before and after its embodiment in gross matter upon earth, has for its σώμα either an aerial body (i.e. the body of a daemon), or an aetherial body (i.e. the body of an astral god), and is situated in the atmosphere in the one case, and in the highest heaven in the other case;¹ the Stoic Posidonius said that the soul, before and after its embodiment on earth, is either a mass of air and fire mingled with watery vapour and situated in the lower atmosphere (i.e. a 'hero'), or a mass of air and fire situated in the upper atmosphere (i.e. a 'daemon'), or a mass of pure fire situated in the fiery heaven (i.e. an astral god). The Platonists whom Iamblichus describes as holding that the soul 'is always in a body' may have been influenced by Posidonius; but being Platonists and not Stoics, and therefore holding that the soul

¹ Cf. the classification of ζων in the Platonic Epinomis, the writer of which must have been contemporary with Heraclides.
is incorporeal, they necessarily rejected Posidonius's way of putting it, and reverted to that of Heraclides. The writer of Corp. X appears to have belonged to this sect of Platonists, or at least to have been influenced by them.

The Hermetist's conception of the σώμα πορισμόν of the liberated νοῦς is to some extent similar to Paul's conception of the σώμα πνευμάτων or ἔτοιμων in 1 Cor. 15. 35-50.

κατάληψιν τὴν ψυχὴν κρίσει καὶ τῇ κατ’ ἐξίαν δίκην. Here we have a notion of which the writer has hitherto given no hint. At death, the man splits into two distinct persons,¹ called respectively the νοῦς and the ψυχή. The νοῦς assumes a fiery body, becomes a daemon, and is employed in God's service as a ministering spirit (§ 19 a); but the ψυχή after the νοῦς has quitted it, continues to exist with a separate personality of its own,² and is subjected to punishment, which presumably takes the form of reincarnation in an animal body (§§ 7, 8 a). The man of whom this is said must be the ordinary man, neither very good nor very wicked; for in the case of the ἐσοβζής, the ψυχή is wholly absorbed into the νοῦς (διὰ νοῦς γίνεται), and ceases to exist as a separate entity; and on the other hand, the wicked man has no νοῦς in him (§ 24 a), so that after death nothing is left of him except a ψυχή subject to punishment.

A somewhat similar view of the relation between the νοῦς and the ψυχή is expressed in Plutarch's 'Tale of the stranger from the western continent' (Fac. in orbe lunae 28, 943 ff.). We are there told that man is composed, not of two parts only (σῶμα and ψυχή), but of three distinct parts, viz. σῶμα, ψυχή, and νοῦς. When death takes place on earth, the σῶμα is cast off; and after a term of purgation in the atmosphere, the disembodied man, consisting of νοῦς and ψυχή still linked together, passes to the moon, and resides there. In the moon takes place a 'second death', by which the

¹ For a modern presentation of the same notion, see Edward Carpenter, The drama of life and death, p. 264: 'We have once or twice in the foregoing chapters alluded to the possibility of the self dividing into two personalities, or even more. We have supposed, for instance, that at death the psychic organism may possibly split up—some more terrestrial portion remaining operant and active on the earth-plane, and some other portion removing to a subtler and more ethereal region.'

² Cf. Iamb. De an., Stob. 1. 49. 43, vol. 1, p. 384 W. According to one of the views there mentioned, χρυσοθέου ἀνα τὴν διανοιάν ὡς ἄνω καὶ αὐτὴ διανοιάθεται ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ἀνεπερ οἱ παλαιότατοι τῶν ἐρώτων ἀποφαίνονται. The διάνοια of Iamb. corresponds to the νοῦς of Corp. X. 16, and the ἄλγος ὥς of Iamb., to the ψυχή of Corp. X. 16. But who are the 'most ancient priests' who taught this doctrine? That term might be used by Iamblichus to denote either Orpheus, or Egyptian priests; and among the latter he might possibly include Hermes Trismegistus.
νοὸς is separated from the ψυχή. The νοὸς then ascends to the sun, whence it originally came; the ψυχή is left on the moon, and retains for a time a dreamlike life of its own, but sooner or later fades away, and is resolved into the substance of the moon.

Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ἢ πάτερ, (ὅτι) ὁ νοὸς τῆς ψυχῆς χωρίζεται [καὶ ἡ ψυχή τοῦ πνεύματος]. The relation between the ψυχή and the πνεῦμα has been sufficiently described already, and Tat has no reason to ask for any further explanation about that. But he may well be surprised and puzzled by what Hermes has just said about the separation of the νοὸς from the ψυχή. It is therefore most likely that his question originally ended at χωρίζεται, and that the words καὶ ἡ ψυχή τοῦ πνεύματος were subsequently added. The person who added these words must have read something like ἡ ψυχή τοῦ πνεύματος χωρίζεται in the second sentence of § 16.

This seems to be a clumsy attempt to account for Tat's question; and it was probably inserted after the point of that question had been obscured by the addition of καὶ . . . πνεύματος. The words πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις . . . σοῦ εἰσόντος κ.τ.λ. imply that Tat finds it difficult to reconcile the two statements of Hermes (viz. 'the νοὸς is separated from the ψυχή' &c. and 'the ψυχή is a garment of the νοὸς' &c.) with one another. That is, the interpolation makes it appear that Tat thought it impossible for a thing to be separated from its ἔνδυμα. But no one could think that; every one knows that it is possible to take one's coat off.

The phrase καθαρὸς γενόμενος τῶν ἔνδυμάτων occurred a few lines above; but Hermes has not expressly said that the ψυχή is an ἔνδυμα of the νοὸς, or that the πνεῦμα is an ἔνδυμα of the ψυχή.

§ 17. Συννοεῖν δεῖ . . . τὸν ἰκοσοντα τῷ λέγοντι [καὶ συμπνεῖν]. Cf. Corp. IX fin.—συμπνεῖν (or συμπνεεῖν) is probably a variant for συννοεῖν. The meaning seems to be this: 'If you have understood what I have told you about the relation between ψυχή and πνεῦμα, you ought to be able to anticipate the conclusion at which I have been aiming, namely, that the relation between νοὸς and ψυχή is analogous to that between ψυχή and πνεῦμα, and consequently, that νοὸς is united with ψυχή only so long as both are contained in an earthy body.'

ἡ σύνθεσις [τῶν ἔνδυμάτων] τοῦτον ἐν σώματι γηνυώ γίνεται. The σύνθεσις of which Hermes is speaking is that of νοὸς and ψυχή; and νοὸς is not an ἔνδυμα. It is therefore necessary to bracket τῶν ἔνδυμάτων.
§ 17. The word νοστίον, here equivalent to ἀσώματον, and the writer is hardly conscious of its etymological connexion with νοῦς. θείων may be an alternative reading for νοστίων.

§ 18. νοῦς δὲ, δέχόμενος ὅν πάντων τῶν [θείων] νοστίατόν. νοῦς cannot be called a νόημα; but it may be called a νοστίον. ψυχῆ also is a νοστίον; but νοῦς is δέχομενος ψυχῆς. The word νοστίον is here equivalent to ἀσώματον, and the writer is hardly conscious of its etymological connexion with νοῦς. θείων may be an alternative reading for νοστίων.

§§ 16-18

άνέχεσθαι συγχρωτιζόμενον αὐτῇ παθητόν σώμα. συγχρωτιζόμεθα is derived from χρώσ, and means 'to be in contact with another person, skin against skin'; hence, 'to be in defiling contact'. Cf. Corp. XII. i. 10 as emended: καὶ δὲ νοῦς ἀρα παθητός ἢστι, συγχρωτιζόμενος τοῖς πάθεσι. Diog. Laert. 7. 1. 2: Zeno was told by an oracle that he would live the best life εἰ συγχρωτιζόμενο τοῖς νεκροῖς. He took this to mean that he must study the writings of dead authors. The use of συγχρωτίζω, however, might be made to agree more exactly with its use elsewhere by writing ἀνέχεσθαι συγχρωτιζόμενην παθητῷ σώματι, 'to endure being defiled by contact with'.

§ 18. νοῦς δὲ, δέχόμενος ὅν πάντων τῶν [θείων] νοστίατόν. νοῦς cannot be called a νόημα; but it may be called a νοστίον. ψυχῆ also is a νοστίον; but νοῦς is δέχόμενος ψυχῆς. The word νοστίον is here equivalent to ἀσώματον, and the writer is hardly conscious of its etymological connexion with νοῦς. θείων may be an alternative reading for νοστίων.

§§ 16-18
space', (i.e. the 'daemons'), are employed in subordination to the
divine nois by which the whole is governed, and that the cosmic
processes are carried on, in part at least, through their agency.

ο δὲ τοῦ ἀθρόῳνο (nois) τῶν ἐπιγείων μόνον (δημοσιογύς). The writer
probably had in mind the primary meaning of δημοσιογύς, 'a skilled
workman'. The sort of δημοσιογύς to which the human nois is
limited is the tendance of things upon earth (the θεραπεία τῶν
ἐπιγείων spoken of in Ascl. Lat. I) by means of the arts and crafts.
In the human arts and crafts, as well as in the divine administration
of the universe, fire is an indispensable ὑραμον. The δημοσιογύς of
the human nois cannot mean the operation of the vital force by which
our bodies are fashioned; for that process is not carried on by the
human nois, i.e. by man as a conscious and rational agent, but by
the same power which operates in all natural processes throughout
the universe.

§ 19 a. τῶν τῆς ἐκστασιας ἀγάλμα αἰγοσαμώνη. This clause refers to
man's life in the body; the words μετὰ τὸ ἀπαλλαγὴν τοῦ σώματος,
which precede it in the MSS., ought therefore to be placed after it.

καὶ μηδένα ἀθρόῳτον ἀδίκηται. Cf. § 21, πάντας ἀθρόῳτον...ἐν
ποιῶσα. This is one of the few mentions of social obligation, or of
man's 'duty towards his neighbour', which occur in the Hermetica.
See Ascl. Lat. I. 8: 'commodationes alternae.'

ἡ δὲ ἀσεβὴς ψυχῆ μόνε ἐπὶ τῆς θείας οἰκίας. The impious soul is
ψυχι in the more restricted sense of the word, i.e. ψυχὴ as distinct
from and opposed to nois. The ordinary human soul (ψυχὴ in the
wider sense), during its life on earth, is a combination of nois with
παθητῶν τι; and this παθητῶν is called ἡ ψυχὴ in the narrower sense.
The pious soul (ψυχὴ in the wider sense), when it quits the body,
throws off whatever it has hitherto retained of τὸ παθητῶν, so that
only ὁ nois remains; in other words, the ψυχὴ in the narrower sense,
as a thing distinct from nois, ceases to exist. But the impious soul
(ψυχи in the wider sense), when disembodied, is abandoned by the
nois, (if indeed there was any nois in it during its life in the body),
and thenceforth consists of τὸ παθητῶν (= ψυχῇ in the narrower
sense) alone. Consequently, it seeks to enter another earthy body,
in which it may find satisfaction for its gross desires. The wicked
soul is punished, both by the misery of unsatisfied desire in its
disembodied state, and by reincarnation; but the punishment is
self-inflicted. This description of the destiny of the ασεβῆς ψυχῆ is
based on Pl. Phaedo 81 b ff. With ὃ ἵνα τῆς κολαζομένη, com-
§§ 18.19b-22a. Διαρκείνων δέ... εἰς δέ τὰ ἀλάτταν ἄδυναν. In § 19b it is denied that a human soul can enter the body of a beast. This denial is in direct contradiction to §§ 7, 8a: it is therefore certain that § 19b cannot have been written by the author of § 7f. The same argument applies to § 20fin. and § 22a fin., where the denial is repeated. The only doubt is whether we ought to assign to a different writer those sentences only in which the doctrine taught in § 7 is denied, or the whole passage in which these sentences are contained. But on further examination it appears that the whole passage 19b-22a is written from a different point of view from the rest of Corp. X. The writer of § 20 no doubt intended that section for an explanation of the phrase ὑφ' εἰκόνα κολαζόμενη in § 19a; but he has misunderstood the words on which he comments. The punishment spoken of in § 19a is that which the disembodied soul inflicts upon itself; but the self-punishment described in § 20 takes place while the soul is still in the body. Also, the maleficent νοῦς which suddenly makes its appearance in § 21 is ignored in the rest of the libellus, and what is there said about νοῦς cannot be reconciled with what is said about νοῦς in other parts of Corp. X. We must therefore conclude that the whole passage 19b-22a has been inserted by a later hand.

§ 19b. οὐδὲ ἄθικος ἄστιν εἰς ἀλόγου ζῷου σώμα ψυχὴν αὐθροπινήν καταπεσάν. The doctrine that human souls migrate into the bodies of beasts was adopted by Plato from the Pythagoreans.¹ Aristotle

¹ The Orphici agreed with the Pythagoreans in holding that the human soul is incarnated in a series of bodies in succession; but it may be doubted whether the Orphici, in earlier times at least, spoke of its reincarnation in bodies other than human. The only evidence for this that I have met with is an Orphic fragment quoted by Proclus *In rem. publ.* p. 339 Kroll (Abel *Orphica* fr. 223): ὥσπερ δ' τι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μεταβαίνει ὡς τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτῳ οἰκοδομεῖ Ὄρφειον ἀναδιδόμεν, ὡς ἡ ποιήσεως ὡς τῆς ἀνθρωποείης κατὰ σώμα ἔργον | ἀνθρώπων ὡς ὄντας μετέρχεται ἄλλων ἄλλοις | ἄλλοις ὑπ' ἔντοχος,... ἄλλοις δὲ πρόβατον, τότε δὲ ἡρμής κ.τ.λ. But the date of these verses is unknown; they may have been written in a period when the original distinction between the Orphic doctrine of reincarnation and that of the Pythagoreans had been obliterated. In a second passage quoted from *Orpheus* by Proclus ib. (Abel 222 = 225), reincarnation in human bodies alone is spoken of; and in a third (Abel 224), the lot of the disembodied souls of beasts is expressly distinguished from that of the disembodied souls of men; for the Orphic poet there says that the soul of a beast, when it quits the body, hovers in the air εἰκόνα αὐτὴν | ἄλλο φυτακῇ μήτερ γνώσθειν... but human souls, when they quit the body, are led down by Hermes γαῖς εἰς κενθρώπαν πελάριον. The fact that the destination of all disembodied human souls
pointed out a serious difficulty in the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine of metensomatosis; De an. 1. 3, 407 b : οἷς δὲ μόνον ἐπιχειροῦντι λέγων τούτο τι ἡ ψυχή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δεξιόμενον σώματος ὑδέθη ἐτὶ προσδιορίζοντι, ὅσπερ ἐνδεχόμενον κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς μύθους τὴν τυχοῦσαν ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ τυχοῦν ἐνδόεσθαι σώματι κ.τ.λ. Ιδ. 2. 2, 413 b. The Platonists agreed with Aristotle that man is distinguished from the beasts by the possession of νοῦς; and according to the Τίμαιος, the νοῦς is the only part of the soul which is immortal.1 If then the body of a beast is not receptive of νοῦς, how can it be animated by a human soul?

But in spite of this objection, the Platonists in general, down to the latter part of the third century A. D., adhered to the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration into bestial bodies, which they found set forth in Plato's dialogues;2 and this view was still maintained by Plotinus, who asserted that the human soul may descend so low as to take to itself not only the body of a beast, but even (as Empedocles had said) that of a vegetable. Plot. 3. 4. 2 : the human soul is at once λογική, αἰσθητική, and φυσική. ἡ ἐξελθοῦσα δὲ τοῦ σώματος, δὲ τι περ ἐπελεώνας, τούτῳ γίνεται... δόσιν μὲν οὖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐτήρησαν, πάλιν ἄνθρωποι δοὺς δὲ αἰσθῆσαι μόνον ἔξομαι, ἡμῖν ἐι μὲν αἰσθῆσαι μετὰ θυμοῦ, τὰ ἁγία, δοὺς δὲ μετά ἐπιθυμίας... τὰ ἀκόλουθα τῶν ψυχῶν καὶ γαστρόμαργα. εἰ δὲ μηδὲ αἰσθῆσαι μετὰ τούτων, ἀλλὰ νοεῖ ἀναστῆσαι μετὰ αὐτῶν, καὶ φυτῶν: μόνον γὰρ τούτο (ἐν αὐτῶι) ἡ μάλιστα ἐνήργει, τὸ φυτικὸν, is in these verses placed beneath the earth indicates an early date; and it is possible that this may be the very passage to which Aristotle refers in De an. 1. 5, 410 b 27: τούτῳ δὲ πέπενθε καὶ ὡς τοίς Ὀρφικοῖς ἔτησι καλομῶνυς λόγοις ἡμεῖς γαρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ διόν εἰσίναι ἀπαντήσεως, φερομένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνίμων. οὐχ οὖν ταῦτα τοῖς φυτοῖς τούτῳ συμβαίνειν, ὡδὲ τῶν ψυχῶν έναίσθε, ἐπεὶ μὴ πάντα ἀναστείλουσιν. There is no reason to assume that the Orphic abstinence from flesh-eating (ἄφυκος βοῦς, Eur. Hesper. 957) was founded on a belief that the bodies of beasts are animated by human souls. The Pythagoreans, who did hold that belief, alleged it as one reason among others for their traditional practice of abstinence from flesh-food; but the prohibition itself, in the case of Orphici and Pythagoreans alike, is analogous to the taboos or 'laws of holiness' by which in many primitive religions the worshippers are required to abstain from certain kinds of food. The Hebrews and other Semites abstained from pork, but did not suppose that the souls of their deceased fathers inhabited the bodies of pigs.

1 In this respect the teaching of the Τίμαιος approximates to that of Aristotle. Cf. Ar. De an. 2. 2 : περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς διάκρισιν ὑμῶν εἶπον τὸν φανερὸν, ἀλλά ἐμοὶ ψυχήν γένος ἔτερον εἶπαν καὶ τούτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθὼς τὸ δίκαιον τῷ φθορτοῦ. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μορία τῆς ψυχῆς φανερῶν... διτού ἔστι χωρίς τα.

2 The writer of the Τίμαιος Λοκρὶ de anima mundī (before A. D. 300) must be excepted. In the last paragraph of the Τίμαιος Λοκρ. (Mullach Fr. Ph. Gr. ΙΙ, p. 46) it is clearly implied (though not expressly said) that the doctrine of penal reincarnation in the bodies of beasts is untrue, but may be useful as a 'medicinal lie'.
successorsof Plotinus were more strongly impressed by the objections
to this view. As to Porphyry, the evidence is conflicting. In a
passage preserved in Stob. i. 49. 60, vol. i, p. 445 W., Porphyry, like
his teacher Plotinus, accepts the statements of Plato on this matter
in their literal sense. Pythagoras and Plato, he says, teach that
the soul μεταβολήν ἵσχε καὶ μετακόσμησις εἰς ἄτερα σωμάτων ἐδέχη.
. . . Hence πολλῆς μὲν εὐνοείς αἱ ψυχαὶ δεόνται, πολλῆς δὲ σωφρο-
σινής, ὅτως μὴ . . . κακοδαίμονα καὶ θηριώδη βίων ἀμείψωσιν. ἡ γὰρ . . .
tῶν ἐν “Αἰδον τρίδος ἐνταῦθα ποι τέκτακται, περὶ τὰ τῆς
ψυχῆς σχῆμαμεν μέρη, τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμοειδὲς καὶ ἐπιθυμητικὸν,
ὅν ἐκατὸν ἀρχὴν ἐν ἄντον καὶ βοηθή ἐπὶ τῶν οἰκείων βίων ἐνδίωσα,
καὶ ὑκτεί ταύτα μύθος οὐδὲ ποίησις, ἀλλὰ ἀλήθεια καὶ φυσικὸς λόγος.1
ὅν μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ μεταβολῆ καὶ γενέτει τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐξανθοῦν
ἐπικρατεῖ καὶ δυναστεύει, τούτοις εἰς νυφή [καὶ] 2 σῶματα . . . φησι
(Plato) γενέται τῇ μεταβολῆν· ὅταν δὲ . . . ἐξηγερωμένον ἔχουσα
παντάπασιν ἡ ψυχή τὸ θυμοειδὲς εἰς δεύτερα γένεσιν ἀφίκεται, . . .
ἀρρυθνι εἰσὶ τὰς λύκου φύσεις ἡ λειτουρ.3
1 It may be inferred from these words that some Platonists known to Porphyry
thought that what Plato had written about transmigration into the bodies of beasts
was merely 'myth' or 'poetry'.
2 In De abst. 1. 19, Porphyry represents an advocate of flesh-eating as arguing
'if the soul of the beast I kill for food is immortal, I am doing it a kindness by
expelling it from its present lodging; it will make its way back into a human body
all the sooner'. But Porphyry does not there give his own opinion.
3 Nemesius De nat. hom. 2: κατὰ μὲν οὖν πῶς ἐν Πλάτωνος ἐδέχετο τῆς
μετανωμάτωσις δογματίζοντας: διαφέρειται δὲ περὶ τὰ εἷδη τῶν
ψυχῶν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν εἴδος τὸ λογικὸν εἶναι λόγος, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ εἰς φύσιν καὶ εἰς τὰ
tῶν ἀλόγων σώματα μεταβαίνειν . . . ἄλλοι δὲ οὖν ἐν εἴδος ψυχῶν, ἄλλα διό, λογικῶν
tε καὶ ἐλεγχοῦν τινὲς δὲ πολλά, τοσοῦτον δαί τῶν ψυχῶν τὰ εἴδη. 
μάλιστα δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος περὶ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο διαφέροντας εἰλήφθησαν εἰς τοὺς ψυχῶν τὰ μὲν θυμικὰ
cαι ἐργίμασι καὶ ἑρμηνείας ψυχῆς λύκων καὶ λεόντων σώματα μεταφράζονται, τὰς
dὲ περὶ τῆς ἀκολούθους τοιαύτης ὑπόθεσις ὅταν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀναλαμβάνειν σώματα, οἱ
μὲν κυρίως ήκονοσ τῶν λύκων καὶ τῶν λέοντας τοὺς δέοντές, οἱ δὲ τροποίκις αὐτὸν
eἰφορίζοντες διέγειραν, τὰ δὲ δὲ τῶν λέοντων παρεμφασίσαν. Κρόνος μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ
Περὶ παλιγγενεσίας· οὖν δὲ καὶ τῇ μετανωμάτωσι· λογικὰ πάντα εἰσὶν ἔβολεται
ἀρμολογία δὲ καὶ Θεόδωρος ὁ Πλατωνικός (a disciple of Porphyry) ἐν τῷ Ὠτι ἡ ψυχή
πάντα τὰ εἴδη ἐπικρατεῖ καὶ Πορφύριος ὁ μάτιος. Ἐλαμβάνοι δὲ, τὴν ἐναυτὰς τοὺς ἀρρύθνους
καὶ εἰς εἴδος ψυχῆς εἰδός εἶναι λέγει, ἕγγον εἴδη διάφορα γέγραψαν γονὸν
αὐτῷ μοιραίασιν ξύρρησιν ὅτι ὅ ων ἀν' ἄνθρωποι εἰς ζώον ἐβλέπουν, οὔτε ἀδ' ζωον
tῶν ἀλόγων εἰς ἄνθρωπον αἱ μετανωμάτωσις γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδ' ζώον εἰς ζώον, καὶ
ἀδ' ἄνθρωπον εἰς ἄνθρωπον.
into the bodies of beasts; but he names him among those who held that all souls, including those of beasts, are (at least potentially) λογικαί; and from this it may be inferred that Porphyry saw no force in the objection which prevented others from admitting that a human soul may animate the body of a brute. But Augustine gives evidence on the other side; Civ. dei 10. 30: "Platonem animas hominum post mortem revolvi usque ad corpora bestiarum scripsisse certissimum est. Hanc sententiam Porphyrii doctor tenuit [et] Plotinus; Porphyrio tamen iure displicuit." Ib. 12. 26: "Porphyrius ... cum suo Platone aliisque Platoniscis sentit eos, qui immoderate inhonestequale xierint, propter luendas poenas ad corpora reduire mortalia, Plato quidem etiam ad bestiarum, Porphyrius, tantum modo ad hominum." Ib. 13. 19: "Porphyrium ... ab animis humanis removisse corpora bestiarum." And Aeneas of Gaza (quoted below) speaks of Porphyry as Augustine does. It seems therefore that Porphyry must have expressed different opinions on the question in different writings. Iamblichus then is (with the exception of the writer of Tim. Locr.) the earliest Platonist of whom it can be said with certainty that he rejected the Pythagorean form of the doctrine of transmigration, and maintained ότι οὐκ ἀπ' ἄνθρωπων εἰς ἄλογα ζώα αἱ ἐνσωματόσωσις γίνονται (Nemesius above). Aeneas of Gaza 'in Theophrasto p. 16 ed. Barth' (Mullach F. P. G. II, p. xi): ἐπεγενόμανοι δὲ Πορφύρωι καὶ Ιάμπλυγος, καὶ τὸν πρὸ αὐτῶν σοφία περιφρονοῦσε, καὶ ἐρυθρώντες τὸν Πλάτωνος ὄνος καὶ λύκον καὶ ἱετίνως, καὶ κατανοήσαντες ὡς ἄλλη μὲν λογικής ψυχῆς ἢ ουδεία, ἄλλη δὲ ἄλογου, καὶ ὅτι οὐ μετανῦσται, ἄλλ' ὀσανύσως ξοουνοῖς αἱ οὐσίαι ολαι τὸ πρῶτον προθῆκον οὐ γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ λογικῶν συμβεβηκός, ὡς μεταχειρών, ἄλλ' οὐδεὶς διαφορὰ βεβαιών ἐφεμενήν καὶ ὅλως ἀδελφῶν τὸν λόγον εἰς ἄλογαν μετατίθεναι, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον φήσουσιν φαρμάξειν τῇ λογῳ τῆν φύσιν ταῦτα διέ ποτε διαλογισμένου, ὑπερηφάνησαν τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων, μεταβαλόντες όμι, εἰς ὄνον φασίν (ὄνον φύσιν Wytenbach), ἄλλ' ὀνόματι ἄνθρωπων. 2 Thus according to Aeneas, the view which we

1 As to the view that all souls are λογικαί, cf. Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 432: 'Ποθαγόρας, Πλάτων, λογικὰς μὲν εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἄλογων ζῴων καλομένων τὰς ψυχὰς, οὐ μὲν λογικὰς ἑνεργοῦσας, παρὰ τὸν δυσκρατιαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὸ φαινικόν, ὠσπερ εἰς τῶν πιθήκων καὶ τῶν κυνῶν νοοῦν μὲν γὰρ οὕτω, οὗ διὰκοινὸν άδ. Porphyry De abst. 5. 1. asserts the truth of the 'Pythagorean' doctrine that every ψυχή (including the souls of beasts), δὲ μῆτερια αὐτήθης καὶ μῆμις, εἰς λογική, and he says it follows from this that we have duties towards the beasts.

2 The sense required is ψεφερηθηκασαν(τε) τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων, μεταβαλλόμεν τὴν ψυχὴν λέγοντες οὔκ εἰς ὄνον φώςιν, ἄλλ' (εἰς) ἄνωθεν ἄθρωπων.
find expressed in Corp. X. 19 b–22 a was first put forward by Platonists not long before A. d. 300. It was adopted by many Platonists of later times, e.g. by Hierocles, Olympiodorus, and Chalcidius. Sallustius tried to find a via media; he says (De diis et mundo 20) ai de metempsychoses ei mun eiis loyikai genontos, auto toito psychai gynontai toni symbatov ei de eis loga, exwvthev evkontai, tov kal hemi elenchotes themas daivones. Oi gar oin protes logikai alognos psychi genontos. Proclus agreed in part with the view of the earlier Platonists down to Plotinus, that human souls are sometimes reincarnated in beast-bodies, but stated that view in a modified form; Procl. in Tim. 329 D: δι εληθησα λογος ελεκρανεσθαι μεν εις θηρα φορη την ανθρωπινην ψυχην, ἐξοντα δε την οικειαν ζωηη, και ει την την ελεκριεων (human) ψυχην ολον εποχουμενην, και τη προς αυτην (sc. την του θηρου ζωην) συμπαθεια δεδεμενην. See also Procl. in Phaedrum, and in Remp. II. 309, 28–312, 5; 315, 18; 324, 11 f.; 325, 11 599.; 333, 2–341, 8.

The opinion which Aeneas of Gaza thought to have originated with Porphyry and Iamblichus can hardly have been so complete a novelty in their time as he represents it. An obvious objection to the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration had long before been pointed out by Aristotle; and a Platonist of any period might be driven to admit that the difficulty was insuperable. Lucretius (3. 748 ff.), after speaking of metensomatosis in the Pythagorean sense, proceeds to say ‘Sin animas hominum dicent in corpora semper ire humana, tamen quaeram’ &c. He must therefore have known of some one who held that human souls are reincarnated, but only

1 Hierocl. In aeruim carmen 23, Mullach F. P. G. I. 469 b: δ θηριων μεταμφασαισαι σωμα κυδιωκας κα ζων αλογος γενοσθαι δια καιας, κα και φωτον δι αργαν αθοσθαι, . . . προς τα κατα (την του ανθρωπου σωσιαν) συνωθη, πευκομενοι κα και νους το αμεταλθθων του κατ σωσιαν υπαρχοντο ειδους την ανθρωπινην ψυχην. Δαι γαρ μενονα άνθρωποι, τη της αρετης κα καιας ανε μερος ντησει θηρων λεγεται και θεος γνισηας φοιη δι ουθετερον, άλλα σχετε της προς ιεστερον ομιεοσθαι.

2 Mullach II, p. xi.

3 Chalcid. In Tim. 194 f., Mullach II, p. 223 a: ‘Porro (anima) si deterior facta sit deteriusque vivet, propter aliam corporis amplificationem vitae destinatur infelicior, quoadusque ad feras naturae perveniat immantatem. Empedocles tamen, Pythagoram secutus, ait eas non naturam modo agrestem et feram sortiri, sed etiam formas varias (i. e. that human souls are actually reincarnated in bestial bodies). . . . Sed Plato non putat rationabile animam vultum atque os ratione carentis animalias induere, sed ad vitium velique accedente corpore, incorporatione[n] auctis animae vitis esserari ex instituto vitae priores, et iracundum quidem hominem eundemque fortem provehi usque ad feritatem leonis, sermone vero et eundem rapacem ad proximum luporum similiumdinem pervenire, ceterorum item. Sed . . . anima quondam hominis nequaquam transit ad bestias iuxta Platonem.’

4 I. e. the beasts into which human souls have entered retain the sort of life that is proper to them as beasts.
in human bodies. But there is no reason to think that those who held this view in or before the time of Lucretius were Platonists. The Platonizing Stoic Posidonius certainly held that the human soul exists before its incarnation, and probably held also that the same soul is or may be repeatedly incarnated; but as far as I know, there is no trace of evidence that he thought a human soul might be reincarnated in a body other than human. It is probable therefore that the teacher of whom Lucretius was thinking was Posidonius.

The opinion that a human soul ‘is not permitted to sink into the body of a beast’ may have been held by a Platonist here and there before the time of Porphyry; but it was not until about the end of the third century A.D. that it was definitely adopted by the leaders of Platonic thought, and became, so to speak, the orthodox doctrine of the Platonic school. It is therefore probable that the passage X. 19 b–22 a, in which this doctrine is maintained, was written either after A.D. 300, or at any rate, not long before that date.

§ 20. τοιον ποσυ τοσαυτην φιλογα ἐχει δοσην ἡ ἀσθενεια... "καιομαι, φιλόγομαι". Cf. Origen De princip. 2. 10. 4: 'hoc videtur indicari, quod unusquisque peccatorum flamman sibi ipse propria ignis accendat, et non in aliquem ignem qui antea iam fuerit accensus ab alio... demergatur. Cuibus ignis materia atque esca nostra sunt

1 Origen, De princip. lib. 1 fin. (Lommatzsch), discussed the question whether it is possible for a human soul to be reincarnated in the body of a beast, but apparently did not make it clear to which side his own opinion inclined. His words are quoted thus (Justinianus Imp. ad calcem episl. ad Menam Patriarch. Constant.): ἡ ψυχὴ ἀνορέσουσα τοῦ καλοῦ, καὶ τῇ κακίᾳ προσπλαναμένη, καὶ ἐν πλεον ἐν ταύτῃ γνωρίμη, εὶ μὴ ἐνιστροφόν, ἐν δὲ τῇ αὐτοῖς ἀποκτηνωθεί, καὶ ἐν τῇ κοινλα ἀναφορῳστά. This is followed by three or four lines which are hopelessly corrupt, but contain the words αἰρέται... τὸν ἱναυον, τὸ ὀυτὸν εἰνα, βιον (which seem to imply that, according to the view there stated,—though not necessarily according to the view of Origen himself,—a human soul may come to inhabit the body of a fish), and ὁνοδε ὕλου διαγου. Hieronymus Ep. ad Avitum p. 764: 'Ad extremum (primi libri) sermone latissimo disputavit (Origenes) angelum, sive animam, aut certe daemonem, quos unius asserit esse naturae sed diversarum voluntatum, pro magnitudine negligentiae et stultitiae lumentum possi fieri; et pro dolore poenarum et ignis ardore magis eligere ut brutum animal sit, et in aquis habitet et fluctibus; ac corpus assumere huius vel illius pecoris; ut nobis non solum quadrupedum, sed et piscium corpora sint timenda. Et ad extremum, ne teneretur Pythagoricis dogmati reus, qui asserit metempsychosin, post tam nefandam dispositionem, qua lectoris animum vulneravit, "haec inquit "iuxta nostram sententiam non sint dogmata, sed quiesita tantum atque proecta, ne penitus videretur...". Rufinus, in his Latin version of Origen's De principiis, has struck out this 'nefanda disputatio', and substituted for it the following inoffensive statement: 'Illa nos nequequam recipienda censemus, quae et a quibusdam superfluo vel requiri vel adstrui solent, id est, quod animae in tantum sui decessum veniant, ut, naturae rationabilis ac dignitatis oblitae, etiam in ordinem irrationabile animantium, vel bestiarum vel pecudum, devolvantur.'
peccata... Anima cum multitudinem malorum operum et abundantiam in se congregaverit peccatorum, competenti tempore omnibus illa malorum congregatio effervescit ad supplicium, atque inflammatur ad poenas; cum mens ipsa... omnia in memoriam recipiens... historiam quandam scelerum suorum ante oculos suos videbit exposi- tam; tunc et ipsa conscientia propriis stimulis agitatur atque com- pungitur... Ex quo intelligitur quod circa ipsam animae substantiam tormenta quaedam exipsis peccatorum noxias affectibus generantur.' Origen is there speaking of penal suffering after death; but he adds, with reference to the present life, 'Et ne satis tibi huius rei intellectus difficilis appareat, considerari possibile est ex his passionum vitii quae animabus accidere solent, id est, cum vel flammis amoris exuritur anima, vel zeli, vel livoris ignibus maceratur, aut cum ira agitatur, vel cum insaniae vel tristitiae immensitate consumitur, quomodo horum malorum nimietates aliquanti intolerabiliter ferentes, mortem subire quam huiusmodi cruciatus perpeti tolerabilius habuere.'

The early Buddhists also were accustomed to speak of the (torturing) 'fire' of passion. Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, pp. 175-177, quotes from Buddhist documents 'My sense with passion burns, my mind's afame', and 'There is no fire like unto passion's greed'; and the word nirvana is said to have primarily meant the 'quenching' of this fire.

Hora dormis dona cana passoxi k.t.l.; This is an appeal to observation; the punishment here spoken of must therefore be that which the wicked soul inflicts upon itself in the present life.

[oûte blêpov oûte akówv]. Cf. oûte blêpov hê psuxhê oûte akóoie in § 24 a. But the cry of the tortured soul cannot have been meant to end with these comparatively feeble words. They would perhaps be less objectionable if placed after oûk ðida; but the passage would gain in force if the words ti eînw, ti povûsto oûk ðida (which correspond to oûte ti eîpeîn oû' edrai ðûnatai in § 24 a) were also cut out.

ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ δοκοῦσι. It appears from this that, in the society known to the writer, even 'the many' were Platonists, so far at least as to accept the doctrine of metensomatosis. But it is possible that oûς has been wrongly inserted.

§ 21. ο γὰρ νοῦς, [ivon daîmôns genêtai, purînou tukheîn sômatos têtaîtaî proû tâs tòu theû úptēsías,] [kai] elôdoî . . . aiêliêtaî outhîn k.t.l. The words òtan . . . úptēsías are manifestly out of place here. We were told in § 18 that a noûs must put off its fiery
integument in order to enter a human body. The contradiction of that statement in § 21 might be accounted for on the ground that the two passages were written by different persons; but there is another difficulty, which cannot be thus got over. The νοῦς spoken of in § 21 is a bad νοῦς (cf. δὲ εὐχεσθαι καλοῦ τοῦ νοῦ τυχεῖν in § 22 a); it is one which drives a man to sin; therefore it could not be described as employed in 'the service of God' (τὰς τοῦ θεοῦ ὑπηρεσίας). There can be little doubt that the words which I have bracketed belong to the description of the disembodied ἐστιθῆς ψυχῆ in § 19 a.

As to the bad νοῦς here spoken of, cf. Corp. IX. 3. In that passage, it is said that κακὰ νοῦματα are begotten in the human νοῦς by maleficent daemons; in Corp. X. 21, the κακὰ νοῦματα are attributed to a bad νοῦς which has entered into the soul from without, and is itself regarded as a maleficent daemon.

ἀκιδεται αἰθὴν . . . τρέπεται ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ. I am by no means confident that my restoration of this corrupt passage is right; but the general meaning seems fairly clear. We must be guided by the analogy of the following sentence concerning the ἐστιθῆς ψυχῆ. We are told that a νοῦς of one kind enters the pious soul and guides it to all that is good; the writer must therefore have said that a νοῦς of another kind enters the impious soul and impels it to all that is evil. The μάστιγες τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων must be taken to mean the miseries which sin brings with it in the present life, and which have been described in § 20 (ὅσα κακὰ πᾶσχει ψυχῆ ἡ ἀσεβῆς κ.τ.λ.). In the view of this writer, sin is its own punishment, and there is no need for any doctrine of penal reincarnation.

τρέπεται (γὰρ) ἐπὶ (blasphēmias, καὶ) φῶνου καὶ ὑβρεῖς καὶ [ ] βίας πονίλες δὲ ἐν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικοῦνται. It is necessary to place blasphēmias before φῶνους κ.τ.λ.; cf. (τὸν θεόν) εὐφημοῦσα . . . (καὶ) πάντας ἀνθρώπους . . . εὖ ποιοῦσα below. Perhaps some phrase corresponding to δὲ ἐν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικοῦνται has fallen out after blasphēmias; one might write, for instance, ἐπὶ blasphēmias (δὲ ἐν 

§ 23 a. δὲ εὐχεσθαι καλοῦ τοῦ νοῦ τυχεῖν. The νοῦς dealt with in this passage is regarded as a personal being, distinguishable from the soul into which it enters; it is a δαίμων, as in § 23. But according
to the writer of §§ 19 b–22 a, this guiding genius may be either good or bad. If it is good, it is a guardian angel by whom the man is led; if it is bad, it is a devil by whom he is possessed.

§ 22 b. κοινωνία δὲ εἶστι ψυχῶν κ.τ.λ. From this point to the end of the document, the Hermetist speaks of man's station in the universe, and his relations to beings of other grades; and the thoughts expressed have much in common with those of Ascl. Lat. I, De homine. On the κοινωνία between human souls and beings of other grades, cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 5 f.

αἱ τῶν θεῶν (ψυχῶν). The word ψυχή is here used in its wider sense; i.e. it includes νοῦς. If a pious human soul becomes unmixed νοῦς (§ 19 a), it follows a fortiori that the soul of a god must be νοῦς and nothing else.

ἀνθρώπων δὲ τῶν ἀληθῶν (ἐπιμελευόνταί). Compare the doctrine of Ascl. Lat. I, that one of man's two functions is ἡ τῶν ἐπιγείων θεραπεία, and that in discharging this function he co-operates with the Creator in the administration of the universe.1 The words would apply in their most obvious sense to a man who is occupied in keeping cattle. The relation between gods and men is analogous to that between men and domestic animals; 'we are the sheep of His pasture' (Ps. 100. 3).

τοῦ δὲ κόσμου (καθάπερ ἀκτίνες) αἱ φύσεις. The influences 'radiated' by the Kosmos (or more especially by the heavenly bodies) are αἱ φύσεις, that is to say, the forces by which individual organisms are brought into being and maintained in being. These forces operate διὰ τῶν στοιχείων; i.e. it is through the action of the heavenly bodies on the elements contained in the sublunar region that the organisms are built up. In this process, the demiurgic activity of God (αἱ ἐνέργειαι) is the first cause; but God acts upon man (who is here regarded as an earthly organism) not directly, but through the medium of the Kosmos, and by means of its φυσικη ἀκτίνες. The same view might be expressed in more personal terms by saying that the astral gods (who are 'members' of that 'second God', the Kosmos,) are the intermediaries through whom the action of God's will is brought to bear on men. As we were told above, the Kosmos is the 'son' of God, and man is his 'grandson'.

1 Cf. J. Abelson, The immanence of God in Rabbinical literature, p. 114: 'A favourite Rabbinic expression is that of man, under certain circumstances, being "a co-worker with God in the work of creation"... When man adds his quota of usefulness, he ipso facto becomes a co-worker with God. The sum of Divine blessedness is (thereby) increased.'
Here we have the familiar antithesis between φύσις and τεχνή, between 'works of nature' and 'works of art'. It is by means of the arts and crafts that man fulfils his function of 'tending earthly things', and thereby supplements the operation of the cosmic forces. Cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 8: 'quae pars terrena mundi artium (τεχνῶν) disciplinarumque (ἐπιστημῶν) cognitione atque usu servatur, sine quibus mundum deus noluit esse perfectum.' In the interpolated passage Ascl. Lat. I. 5, the works of nature are described as 'things made by gods and daemons', in contrast to 'things made by men'; that is, the φύσις or φύσικαλ ακτίνες spoken of in Corp. X. 22 b are there personified as gods and daemons.

[οἱ δὲ ἀνθρωποὶ διὰ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν.] If we retain these words, we get the statement that οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ do something ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν by means of the arts and crafts. But there is no sense in that; and it seems clear that the clause must have been inserted by some one who failed to understand the passage.

§ 23. ἐκ τῆς ἐνὸς (τοῦ θεοῦ) φύσις. Here the writer inadvertently uses the word φύσις with reference to God, though in § 1 b he objected to such use of it.

καὶ διοικούμενων (διηκουσα or διοικουσα MSS.) ἐν ἑνὸς τοῦ νοῦ. The several ἀκτίνες spoken of above are all of them operations or manifestations of νοῦς. In the ένέργειαι of God, the divine νοῦς is at work; in the cosmic φύσις, the νοῦς of the Kosmos; in the arts and crafts, the human νοῦς. And in all its different manifestations, νοῦς is one. This implies that the νοῦς of the Kosmos and the νοῖς of individual men are ἀπόρροιαι of the divine νοῦς, and are consubstantial with it. Cf. Corp. XII. i init.

οὐσῶς ἐστὶν ὁ ἄγαθος δαίμων. The word δαίμων here means ὁ ἰδιός ἐκάστου δαίμων. A man's δαίμων is the power by which happiness or unhappiness is assigned to him,—that power being conceived as a person who attends on the man and watches over him.

This use of the word δαίμων must be distinguished from that in which it means one of a class of beings intermediate between gods and men (as in Pl. Symp. 202 e), and located in the atmosphere. What is the relation between the two uses? It is difficult to understand how a word meaning 'a man's good or ill fortune' could have come to mean 'one of a class of superhuman beings who hover in the air', or vice versa; and it may be suspected

1 We are told, however, that the French word fée, 'a fairy', is derived from the
that the two main senses of the word are of different and independent origin. But the meaning of \( \delta \) \( \iota \iota \iota \sigma \) \( \iota \kappa \alpha \sigma \tau \omicron \nu \) was doubtless modified by the influence of the other use of the word. The \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \nu \) in the one sense was assumed to be a \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \nu \) in the other sense also; that is, the power by which a man's fortune is determined was regarded as a personal being who belongs to the class of \( \alpha \' \omicron \omicron \alpha \) \( \zeta \omicron \alpha \), and has been told off to watch over that particular man; and so the \( \delta \) \( \iota \iota \iota \sigma \) \( \nu \nu \) \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \nu \) came to be pictured in imagination as a sort of 'familiar spirit' or 'guardian angel'.

The \( \delta \) \( \iota \iota \iota \sigma \) \( \iota \kappa \alpha \sigma \tau \omicron \nu \) is spoken of by Plato in \textit{Rep.} 10. 620 D: \( \tau \eta \nu \ \Delta \lambda \chi \varepsilon \sigma \omicron \nu \) \( \iota \kappa \alpha \sigma \tau \omicron \nu \), \( \delta \) \( \iota \iota \iota \nu \) \( \tau \omicron \omega \nu \) \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \nu \) \( \tau \omicron \omega \nu \) \( \iota \alpha \nu \varepsilon \beta \iota \varepsilon \nu \) \( \tau \omicron \omega \nu \). (In that passage, 'to choose one's \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \nu \)' means to choose the life which one is to live in one's next embodiment.)

Latin \textit{fata} (= \textit{Parca}), which means 'the being who presides over our \textit{fatum}' (Brachet); and it is possible that a corresponding change of meaning may have taken place in the case of the word \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \nu \).

1 \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \nu \) in the sense of 'a man's fortune' (\( \delta \) \( \iota \iota \iota \sigma \) \( \iota \kappa \alpha \sigma \tau \omicron \nu \)) may perhaps be connected with \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \nu \), \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \nu \), 'to divide' or 'distribute'; cf. \( \mu \alpha \iota \nu \alpha \). The word may have originally meant 'a distributor'; and a man's \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \nu \) may thence have come to mean the power which assigns to him his share of good things or of bad things. On the other hand, it might be conjectured that \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \nu \) in the sense of a \( \zeta \omicron \nu \) \( \alpha \omicron \nu \) \( \rho \omicron \nu \) is possibly connected with \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \nu \), \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \nu \), \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \nu \) (cf. \textit{theodosia}); i.e. that it may have originally meant 'a feaster', and may thence have come to be applied to the invisible guest (or host) at the sacrificial meal or funeral banquet,—the superhuman being with whom the worshippers enter into communion by partaking of the holy food. On this hypothesis, we may see a trace of the primary meaning of the word in the belief, still prevalent in Christian times, that the 'daemons' feed on the blood or reek of sacrifices.
humanae, mortalis in unum | quodque caput, vultu mutabilis, albus
an ater'. (Horace's description of the genius is based, in part at
least, on the Greek conception of the ἑῶς ἐκάστου δαίμων.) If a
man lives a happy life, his δαίμων is ἄγαθος; if he lives an unhappy
life, his δαίμων is κακός. Hence the adjectives ἄγαθος and
κακός δαίμων. Sometimes a man's ἄγαθος δαίμων (the author of his
happiness) and his κακός δαίμων (the author of his unhappiness)
were spoken of as two distinct persons. Plut. De tranq. an. 15,
474 B : οὖ γάρ, ὃς Μένανδρος φησιν, "ἀπαντή δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρα-
στατῇ | ἐδόε γενομάθη μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου | ἄγαθος:" ἄλλα μᾶλλον,
ὡς Ἐρμεδωκλῆς, διετάν τινες ἐκάστου ἢμῶν παραλαμβάνοντι καὶ κατά-
χονται μοῦρα καὶ δαίμονες.²

The δαίμων of an individual man might be thought of either
as determining his external circumstances, or as influencing his
character and directing his actions. Where the former notion
prevails, the word means a man's 'fortune' or 'luck'.³ Thus the
στονδῆ τοῦ ἄγαθος δαίμων at a meal (Ar. Eq. 106) perhaps meant
little more than 'here's luck'. And in a similar sense people
sometimes spoke of ὁ ἄγαθος δαίμων τῆς οἰκίας, i.e. 'the luck of the
house' personified.⁴ On the other hand, moralists expressed their
conviction that the sources of happiness and unhappiness are within
us by saying that a man's character is his δαίμων. Heraclitus, fr. 119
Diels : ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων. Cf. the verse attributed to Epicharmus,

---

¹ It does not appear that the word δαίμων was thus used by Empedocles; in the
verses which Plutarch here quotes from him, that word does not occur, and there
is only a list of good and evil influences personified under various other names,
e.g. Δῆμος and Ἁμοίωσις, Καλλιστός and Μοίχης.
² Compare the Jewish and Christian conception of a man's 'good angel' and
'bad angel'. Hermas, Mand. 6. 2 : δόο εἰσὶν ἄγγελοι μετὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, εἰς τῆς
δικαιοσύνης καὶ εἰς τῆς πονηρίας κ.τ.λ.
³ The building in which men who intended to descend into the cave of Trophonius
were housed during the preparatory rites was called δαίμονος ἄγαθος καὶ τύχης
ἄγαθης λεβῶν (Paus. 9. 39. 4), probably with reference to the good fortune which it
was hoped that the oracle would announce to them. In a system of astrology
described by Bouché-Leclercq L'astrol. grecque p. 280, the phrase ἄγαθος δαίμων
was employed as a technical term. In the diagram which B.-L. gives to illustrate
that system, one of the twelve divisions of the zodiacal circle is inscribed 'ἄγαθος
dαίμων, bonus genus'; while another, diametrically opposite to it, is inscribed
'ἄγαθη τύχη, bona fortunea'. Here ἄγαθος δαίμων differs little in meaning from 'good
fortune'. A planet situated in the division marked ἄγαθος δαίμων was described as
ἀγαθοδαιμονικόν (ib. p. 513).
⁴ Diog. Laert. 6. 74 : Xeniades, having bought Diogenes the Cynic as a slave,
said ἄγαθος δαίμων εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν μου εἰσελθήσει, meaning that all went well with
his household when Diogenes had the management of it. Timoleon dedicated his
house in Syracuse ἄγαθος δαίμων (Plut. De se éro laud. 11. 542 E); this is under-
stood by Plutarch as meaning that Timoleon did not take credit to himself for his
achievements, but attributed his success τὸ μὲν εἰς τὴν τύχην, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸν θεόν,
fr. 17 Diels: ὁ τρόπος ἀνθρώπου ἐνδείκνυ τοὺς ἀνθρόπους, οἷς δὲ καὶ κακῶς. And Platonists, holding that man's welfare consists in the supremacy of νοῦς over the irrational impulses, expressed this by saying that a man's νοῦς is his δαίμων, or his ἰγαθὸς δαίμων. But at the same time, this form of expression may also have been suggested in part by the Orphic and Pythagorean belief that the human soul (or τῶν ἡμῶν θείων, the higher of the two parts of the soul,) is a δαίμων in the other sense, i.e. an immortal being, temporarily incarnated in a human body. The identification of ὁ ἐκάστον νοῦς with ὁ ἐκάστον δαίμων occurs in Pl. Tim. 90 a : τὸ δὲ περὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου παρ᾽ ἡμῖν νοεῖν εἴδους (i.e. τοῦ νοῦ) διανοεῖται δεὶ τῇς, ὅς ἄρα αὐτὸ δαίμων θεῦς ἐκάστῳ δίδωκεν, τούτῳ δὴ φαίμεν οἷς καὶ ἦν ἐκάστῳ ἀκρα τῷ σώματι κ.τ.λ. Ἡ 90 c : αὕτη δὲ διὶ δεὶ θεραπεύοντα τὸ θεῖον, ἔχοντα τα αὐτὸν εἰς κοινοσημεῖον τὸν δαίμονα ἐξοικονομὴν εἰς αὐτῷ, διαφέροντος εὐδαιμονίας. Cf. Plutarch's 'Vision of Timarchus', De gen. Socr. 591 D f.: ἡky ψυχὴ πᾶσα νοῦ mέτεσθαι ... ἀλλ' αἰ μὲν ὅλαι κατέθενσά εἰς σώμα, ... αἱ δὲ τῆς μὲν ἀνεκράθησαν, τῆς δ᾽ Ὀιπον ἐξω τὸ καθαρότατον. ... τὸ μὲν σῶμα ὑποβρύχιον ἐν τῷ σώματι φερόμενον ψυχὴ λέγεται τὸ δὲ φθορᾶς λειψάνοι τοί πολλοὶ νοῦν καλούσατε ἐντὸς αὐτός νομίζοντον αὐτὸν ... οἱ δ᾽ ὅρθος υπονοοῦσας, ὡς ἀκτὸς ὡθεῖ διαίμονα πρασαγορεύον- σων. In the symbolism of the Vision of Timarchus, the νοος or δαίμων is described as floating in a higher world, but connected by a cord with the ψυχή embodied on earth below. Dio Chrysost. 4, vol. i, p. 77 Dindorf: Diogenes says to Alexander, οὗ πρῶτον ἐκεί βασιλεῖα, πρὶν ἂν λάβῃ τὸν σαυτόν δαίμονα, καὶ θεραπεύοντος ὡς δεὶ ἀποδείξῃ ... βασιλικόν. ... οὐκ εἰσὶν ἥξωσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ κακοὶ καὶ ἰγαθοὶ δαίμονες, οἳ τὰς συμφορὰς καὶ τὰς εὐτυχίας φέροντες αὐτοῖς, ὁ δὲ ὅσοι ἐκάστων νοοῦς, οὕτως ἐστὶ δαίμων τοῦ ἐξοικονομ άνθρός, ἰγαθὸς μὲν ὁ τοῦ φρονίμου καὶ ἰγαθοῦ δαίμων, πονηρὸς δὲ ὁ τοῦ πονηροῦ. Marc. Aurel. 5. 27: συζή δὲ θεοῖς ὁ συνεχῶς δικάνοις αὐτῶς τὴν ἐαυτῷ ψυχήν ... ποιούσαν ... οὐσα βούλεται ὁ δαίμων διὰ ἐκάστῳ προστατήν καὶ ἕγεμον ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόστασα ἐαυτοῦ. οὕτως δέ ἐστιν ὁ ἐκάστου νοοῦς καὶ λόγος.

The statement that ὁ (ἐκάστου) νοος is in this sense ὁ (ἐκάστου) ἰγαθὸς δαίμων must have been familiar to all Platonists. But among the Hermetists, the term ὁ ἰγαθὸς δαίμων carried with it also a second and quite different set of associations. It was employed by the Greeks of Egypt in Ptolemaic and Roman times as a name of an Egyptian god, probably the god Khnum or Kmeph. The Egyptian god called Ἰγαθὸς Δαίμων is spoken of in Corp. XII. i and elsewhere
as the teacher from whom Hermes learnt his wisdom. But in other Hermetica the teacher of Hermes is called Νοῦς. (See Corp. XI; and compare Corp. I. 2, ἑγὼ εἰμὶ ὁ Ποιμάντρυς, ὁ τῆς αὐθεντίας νοῦς.) The words ὁ νοῦς ἐστίν ὁ ἀγαθὸς δαίμων might therefore be taken as conveying, in addition to their more obvious meaning, a suggestion that the Egyptian god called Agathos Daimon is a personification of the divine νοῦς.

Πῶς τούτο πάλιν λέγεις; 'This' (τοῦτο) is the statement that some souls are devoid of νοῦς, which is implied in the preceding words of Hermes, η τούτου κεφή. As to the view that some men have νοῦς and others not, see Corp. I. 21 fin., Corp. IX. 5 init., and Ascl. Lat. I. 7 a.

I take these words to have been added to the text after §§ 19 b-22 a had been inserted. The writer of the original document spoke of νοῦς as a thing bestowed on the elect alone. According to his view, there is no other kind of νοῦς to be contrasted with the ἀγαθὸς νοῦς; the wicked are not men who have a κακὸς νοῦς, but men who have no νοῦς at all. But the writer of 19 b-22 a (see especially § 21) spoke of νοῦς as a thing which enters into all men, and which may be either good or bad. Hence, when 19 b-22 a had been inserted, it appeared desirable to point out that, in what follows, the ἀγαθὸς νοῦς alone is in question. The words τοῦ ὑπηρετικοῦ περὶ οὗ ἐμπροσθεν εἰρήκαμεν κ.τ.λ. refer to § 21 in the corrupted form in which it appears in our MSS., viz. ὁ γάρ νοῦς ὅταν δαίμων γένηται, πυράνθο ταυτίως σώματος τέτακται πρὸς τὰς τοῦ θεοῦ ὑπηρεσίας, καὶ εἰσοῦν εἰς τὴν ἀκριβὴ φυχῆν αἰκίζεται αὐτὴν κ.τ.λ. That passage then must have been already corrupted when the words τὸν ἀγαθὸν ... ὑπὸ τῆς δίκης were inserted in § 23 by a still later hand.

§ 24 a. πολλάκις γὰρ ἔξεσται αὐτὸς νοῦς . . . ἀλλ' οὗτε νωθρῆς ψυχῆς αἰκίζεται κ.τ.λ. In the first of these two sentences, the writer speaks of temporary withdrawals of νοῦς; in the second, he speaks of its permanent abandonment of the 'torpid soul'.

οὕτε τι εἴπειν οὐτ' ἐξαι δίνοται. This phrase is quoted from Theognis 177, but is used with an altered application. In Theognis, the subject is ἀὴρ πενήθει δεδυμένος. The Hermetist, if he remembered the context of his quotation, may have intended to imply that it is the man who is in want of νοῦς that is truly τένης.

The clause ψυχῆς γὰρ . . . ἐξαι δίνοται is out of place in the MSS. It most likely followed ἀλόγῳ ζωῷ εἴσεκε, and was meant to confirm that statement. (An ἀλόγον ζωὸν is a creature which 'cannot
§ 23. ‘But it is not indispensable there; and it may perhaps have been added later.

§ 24. ‘If the heavenly gods were directed against the Christian belief that God the Son ‘came down to earth’? I think not. The ‘heavenly gods’ of whom the writer speaks are the sun, moon, and stars; and he takes it to be an undisputed truth that they will never quit the stations which God has assigned to them. Yet there were Pagans who said that gods had come down from heaven to earth; Horace, for instance, spoke thus of Augustus (‘serus in caelum redeas’, Od. 1. 2. 45).’
The interest of the earlier Stoics was almost entirely limited to man's present life; and to them, the saying would mean that man (or at least the ideally wise and good man) is the equal of the gods, save that his life is shorter. Cic. Nat. deor. 2. 61. 153 (Stoic): 'virtutes, e quibus vita beata existit' par et similis deorum, nulla alia re nisi immortalitate, quae nihil ad bene vivendum pertinet, cedens caelestibus.' Chrysippus, in Plut. Comm. not. 33. 1076: άρετή δ' οὖν υπερέχει τὸν Δία τοῦ Διόνυσος. . . . άρετή δὲ μὴ υπολείπομένου ἀνθρώπου οὐδὲν ἀποδεῖ εἰδαμονία, ἀλλ' ἐπίσης εἶναι μακάρων τῷ Δίῳ τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν ἄτυχ. Plut. Sto. rep. 13. 1038: τοῖς ἄγαθοις πᾶσι

1 Perhaps he was speaking of the living elements (fire, water, earth), regarded as ὄς, and therefore masculine. If so, he may have meant that each of these elements is 'mortal', in the sense that portions of it are ceaselessly changing into another element; but that at the same time each of them is 'immortal', either in the sense that the thing into which it changes is still a living thing, or else, in the sense that the whole mass of water, for instance, is maintained in perpetual existence by the ceaseless change of other elements into water, which goes on simultaneously with the change of water into other elements. Cf. Heraclitus fr. 50 Diels: (τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀσθενοῦς, γεννητὸν ἀγίνητον, ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπον). The universe is mortal in each several part, but immortal as a whole.


3 Is there not a lacuna after existit? The subject to which par et similis deorum is predicate ought to be homo.
The Platonists, unlike the Stoics, regarded man's life on earth as a mere episode in the everlasting existence of the soul; and consequently, when a Platonist adopted the saying of Heraclitus, he would have reason to indicate that he was speaking of man upon earth, and not merely expressing the thought, familiar to his school, that a disembodied soul may become a god. Hence the insertion of the word ἐνίγμος in Corp. X. 25.

Plato called the philosopher 'divine', but did not go so far as to say that a man upon earth can be a god, or the equal of a god. Pl. Rep. 6. 500 d: the philosopher θεὸς εἶς τὸ δικαίωμα ἀνθρώπῳ γίνεται. Pl. Soph. 216 b (Theodorus log.): καὶ μοι δοκεῖ θεὸς μὲν ἄνηρ (sc. the Eleatic stranger) οἰδαμὸν εἶναι, 1 θεὸς μὴν πάντας γὰρ ἐγὼ τοὺς φιλοσόφους τοιούτους προσαγορεύει. (Socr.) Καὶ καλῶς γε. 2 The instances of a glorification of man such as we find in Corp. X. 24 b, 25 are mostly Stoic; and there can be little doubt that the contents of this paragraph, including the saying of Heraclitus, were transmitted to the Hermetist from some Stoics source.

υπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἄνδρος (θεοῦ) τὰ πάντα. In the text of the MSS., God is here called either ὁ εἷς or τὸ εὖ ('the One') instead of ὁ θεὸς. But the writer is not likely to have introduced without explanation, 1 Perhaps Plato was here thinking of Empedocles, who spoke of himself as θεὸς ἄμβροτος, obiēti θυτῆς, fr. 112 Diels. 2 Cf. Plotinus 4. 7. 10: οὗτος δὲ τὸ θεοτέρα φῶς συγγενής ἡ φύσις καὶ τῇ ἀλήθει, ... ηδὲ τῶν ἔστι διεκλείωσαι, ... λάβωμεν δὲ φύσιν μὴ τὴν ἐν σώματι ἐντομὴς ἄλγουσα καὶ θυμῶς προσλαμβάνουσα, ... ἀλλὰ τὴν ταύτα ἀνυψώμενην. ... καθημερίνη δὲ αὐτῇ ἄνυψαρκε τὰ διόνυσα, φόροισι καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετή, οὐκετὶ ὤντα, οἷον τοιοῦτον ἡ φύσις ὅτιν ὁ παντῆς ἀλήθει, όσον ὁ τοῖς φάσιν (λυτῶ) ἱερών, οἷον φαίη τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἀλλοῦ παντὸς ἐναί, φώροις τῷ καὶ ἁγιώτατος θείαν ὤντω, οἷον ἐν ἀγαθόνως φιλότιμω καὶ θυγατέρᾳ πρόγνωσι, ἄλλῳ ἀνύψῃ τῶν τοιούτων ἔσεί, εἰς θείας μετὰ αὐτῇ δὲ συγγενής καὶ τὸ ὄμοσίων. θεὶ καὶ ὡς τοιοῦτος ἤμως, ἕλικον οὐκ παραλλάττο τῶν ὑπὸ τήν φύσιν αὐτῇ, μόνον τούτο, διδόν ὑπὸν ἐν σώματι, θυμωνίσας. This amounts to saying that a good man on earth is almost, but not quite, a god.
in the last line of his treatise, a name of God which he has not hitherto employed. He has been speaking of the triad δ θεός, δ κόσμος, δ ἀνθρώπος (see § 14 b); and he doubtless here wrote either τοῦ ἐνὸς θεοῦ, or ἐνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, in contrast to τῶν δύο, κόσμου καὶ ἀνθρώπου. All things are governed by God; but God governs them through his two subordinate agents, viz. the Kosmos (which works by means of its φυσικαὶ ἀρχὲς), and man (who works by means of his arts and crafts). It is possible that ἐνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ was intentionally altered into τοῦ ἐνὸς by the person who inserted § 14 a, in which τὸ ἐν is spoken of.

LIBELLVS XI. i

It is evident that the beginning of Corp. XI has been in some way tampered with. Firstly, a discourse cannot start with a sentence introduced by οὖν. Secondly, the words ὅς δὲ μοι ἐπιγλῶσσα κ.τ.λ. (§ 1 b), which must be assigned to the pupil, are not rightly connected with § 1 a, in which the teacher is speaking. δὲ is impossible in this context; and if the teacher bids the pupil remember his instruction (§ 1 a), that injunction ought to follow, and not to precede, the speech in which the pupil asks the teacher to instruct him (§ 1 b). The words ἄκουε ὅ τέκνον κ.τ.λ. (§ 1 b fin.), follow rightly on the pupil's request;¹ but κατάσχεσ... λεγομένων (§ 1 a) is clearly out of place.

The text of the MSS. may be accounted for by the following hypothesis.² Some collection of Hermetica contained two distinct discourses of Nous to Hermes, which I call XI. i and XI. ii. The marks of division between the two (including the title of the second) accidentally disappeared, and the two discourses came to be read as one. The introductory sentences of XI. ii now stood in the middle of the composite document. A redactor, noticing that they were unsuitable for that position, cut out these sentences, and inserted at the beginning of the whole document (where it now stands in the MSS., as § 1 b), so much of the original introduction of XI. ii as it seemed to him possible or desirable to retain. But he wrongly took the concluding sentence of XI. i (κατάσχεσ οὖν...
tōν λεγομένων, § 1 a) to be connected with the introductory sentences of XI. ii, and transposed it along with them.

At the beginning of XI. ii, something which preceded and led on to ὥς δὲ μοι κ.τ.λ. (§ 1 b) has disappeared; and at the end of XI. i, it is possible that τὰ γνώμενα ὑπ’ αὐτῷ in § 6 a was followed by some sentences which are now lost. But each of the two documents appears to be nearly, if not quite, complete. They differ markedly in style, and exemplify two strongly contrasted methods of teaching. In XI. i, the thought is petrified in rigid formulas; in XI. ii, the thought is fresh and living. In XI. i, the teacher recites a sort of creed (§ 2), which would be utterly meaningless to a beginner; the explanations which he adds (§§ 3–6 a) are intelligible in themselves, but do not throw much light on the obscurity of § 2; and he expects his pupil to learn the words by rote (μέμησα τὸν λεγομένων). In XI. ii, on the other hand, the teacher takes nothing for granted, and presupposes no previous knowledge in the pupil. He does his utmost to make his meaning clear, and to carry the learner with him at every step. He appeals repeatedly to the pupil’s personal experience (§ 12 a, σοῦ τοσαῦτα ποιοῦντος: § 14 a, ἰδε τί σοι ἔγγιναι: § 19 init., τοῦτο νόησον ἀπὸ σειστοῦ); and he ends by telling him to think things out for himself.

It must not be inferred from the straightforward simplicity of XI. ii, and the dogmatic elaboration of XI. i, that the former is necessarily of earlier date than the latter. The writer of XI. ii, though he thinks fit to conceal his learning rather than to obtrude it, is at home among the conceptions of Platonism and Stoicism; and the apparent naiveté of his tone may be due to a reaction against that sort of ματαιολογία of which the author of Corp. XIV speaks with contempt, and of which XI. i. 2 is a specimen.

The two documents, while differing greatly in style and tone, present close resemblances in doctrine. In both alike, God is regarded as the author of life, and his creative function is described as that of putting life into matter; in both alike, it is asserted with emphasis that God ‘is always at his work’ of generating life in the universe; and in both, the two modes of life, διανασία in heaven and μεταβολή on earth, are similarly contrasted. It is therefore probable that the author of the later of the two documents had the earlier before him; and it is most likely that XI. i was the earlier. If so, we may suppose that the writer of XI. ii was dissatisfied with the cut-and-dried formulas of XI. i. 2, and wrote a second ‘discourse
of Nous to Hermes', with the object of putting fresh meaning into so much of the doctrine of the earlier document as he held to be of value. He rejected the hypostatized αἰών of XI. i; but he accepted the conception of God as the author of all life, and made his exposition of it serve to lead up to that exhortation to 'expand yourself' (§§ 20 b, 21 a) which is the most significant part of his own treatise.

Contents of Libellus XI. i

§ 2. The relations between God, the Aeon (or Eternity), the Kosmos, Time, and Birth (or Coming-into-being), are set forth in tabular form.

§§ 3, 4 a. The universe is the work of God; and the power by which God works is the Aeon. The universe is ever being made by the Aeon, and therefore will never cease to be. The Aeon makes things by putting life into matter. But life is put into matter in one way in heaven, and in another way on earth. In heaven, the same beings are made to live for ever; on earth, a succession of mortal creatures is produced.

§ 4 b. The universe is filled with soul. The body of the Kosmos is animated by a soul; the heavenly bodies are animated by souls which persist in them without change; each earthly organism is animated by a soul which stays in it only for a time.

§§ 5, 6 a. That which holds the universe together (and maintains life throughout it) is the Aeon; and the Aeon is God at work. God then is the sole author of life. His work is to make things live; and he is present in all things, and is always and everywhere at work.

Corp. XI. i deals only with God and the universe. Man is not expressly spoken of, but is implicitly included among the perishable organisms of earth; and there is no mention of human immortality. Possibly the writer may have held that man has before him the prospect of rising from the condition of an earthly and mortal ζωή to that of a heavenly and immortal ζωή; but in this document he gives no hint of any such belief.

Sources. The doctrine of XI. i is founded on Platonism, but includes some things not derived from Plato. The conception of the supracosmic God is Platonic. The use of the word αἰών to express the notion of 'eternity' as distinguished from 'time' comes from the Timaeus. The description of the Kosmos as a great ζωή
in which all ζωή, both mortal and immortal, are included,—the statement that the Kosmos is both pervaded and encompassed by 'soul',—and the assertion that 'the Kosmos makes time',—may also be traced back to the Timaeus. The use of the phrase κόσμει γὰρ ἡλιον to describe the demiurgic process is Platonic; and the Platonic term τὸ ἀναθήμα occurs in § 2.

But in saying that God is the author of 'life', and that God, or God's ἐνεργεία, is present in all things in the form of 'life' (or 'soul'), the writer hardly speaks as a Platonist. Something not unlike this may perhaps be implied in the mythical description of the making of the cosmic ψυχή and the individual ψυχαί which is given in the Timaeus; but the language used on this subject by the writer of XI. i has little resemblance to that of Plato. The Platonists said that the Demiurgus κόσμει γὰρ ἡλιον by imposing 'forms' on matter, not by putting 'life' into matter; and the substitution of 'life' for 'form' must be due to some influence independent of Platonism.

The writer's conception of 'God at work' as entering into all things, and manifesting himself in the form of life throughout the universe, is not very different from the Stoic notion of πνεῦμα διάκονος ἐκ οὐκ ἀλοι τοῦ κόσμου (if we leave out of account the fact that the Stoics regarded this πνεῦμα as a material substance); but the terms employed by the Hermetist to express that conception are not those used by the Stoics.

Parallels to the language of Corp. XI. i concerning 'life' are to be found in documents of the old religion of Egypt. The word ἄνkh or ὄνkh, the Egyptian equivalent of ζωὴ, was much used in the Egyptian cults. Take, for instance, the following phrases, which occur in a hymn of King Ikhnaton to the Sun-god, about 1370 B.C. (Breasted, Hist. of Egypt, p. 371, and Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt, p. 324): 'O living Aton, Beginning of life (ἄρχῃ ζωῆς)!' . . . Thou art he who giveth life to the son in the body of his mother, . . . who giveth breath to animate every one that he maketh. . . . By thee man liveth.' In the carvings of

1 Cf. Orig. c. Celts. 6. 7 : τὸν Χριστιὰνον φανερωτάτον δι' θεοῦ πνεῦμα ἐστὶν ἐν πάντων διδομένος καὶ πάντων καταληπτώς ἐν λοιμῷ περιγένε.

Some resemblance to XI. i. 4 b—d a may be seen in the words of Paul's speech at Athens, Acts 17. 24 ff.: ὁ θεὸς ὁ παθήσας τῶν κόσμων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ . . . αὐτὸς διδόει πάσιν ζωὴν καὶ πνεῦμα καὶ τὰ πάντα . . . ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζωὴν καὶ κυρίωσθαι καὶ εἰρηκ. The writer of Acts represents Paul as here using language which would be familiar to a Pagan audience; and the doctrine expressed in these words is that of Stoicism, slightly modified by a tinge of Jewish thought.

289
Ikhnaton’s reign, the sun-disk is seen sending forth rays which terminate in hands holding the emblem of life, and in this way ‘God at work’ is visibly depicted as ‘putting life into’ the bodies of the king and queen. It is true that Ikhnaton was a heretic, in the sense that he sought to overthrow the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Theban priesthood, and to suppress the established cults of Amon and other local gods; but the thoughts which he expressed in his hymns to the Sun were in accordance with the spirit of Egyptian religion, and similar phrases were used by worshippers of the traditional deities. Brugsch, Rel. und Myth., p. 287, quotes an inscription of the time of Augustus: ‘Hor-Samta, the lord of Tentyra, the god Anch (i.e. Life), lord of life, who causes the living (men) to live, in whose hand is life, and by whose look we live.’ Brugsch, ib., says that the most frequently recurring epithet of the god Tum of Heroopolis (Pithom) is Anch or Anhí (‘life’ or ‘the living one’). Thus it is possible that, when the Hermetist describes the function of the creative Power as that of putting life into matter, his Platonism was modified by Egyptian influence. But the conception of God as the author or giver of life occurs in the Old Testament also, and is too widespread to be traced back to any one source.1

Another sign of Egyptian influence may perhaps be seen in the writer’s peculiar treatment of the Platonic αἰών. He has hypostatized ‘the Aeon’, and interposed it between God and the Kosmos. Its function in his system is analogous to that of Philo’s λόγος, and the ‘Second God’ of Numenius; and though Philo’s doctrine of the λόγος can be adequately accounted for as the result of a blending of Greek and Jewish thought, it is possible that certain Egyptian speculations also contributed to it. Moreover, the Hermetist’s personification of αἰών was probably suggested in part by the employment of the term in Roman Egypt as a title or epithet of a god. (See note on Ascl. Lat. III. 26 b–32 a.) The use of the word

1 In the use of the word ἰω in Paul’s Epistles and the Fourth Gospel, phrases resembling some of those used in the old cults of Egypt have been turned to a new purpose. (See Rom. 8. 10; 2 Cor. 4. 11 and 5. 4; Col. 3. 3; Eph. 4. 18; Acts 3. 15; Ev. Joh. 1. 4; 5. 26; 6. 33; 8. 13; 11. 25; 14. 6; Ep. Joh. 1. 1. 1 ff. and 5. 11.) The Egyptians spoke of their Sun-god as the author of earthly life; Christians spoke of God or Christ as the author of spiritual and eternal life. The ἰω of the Egyptian priests is the life which enters into men by carnal birth; the ἰω of the Fourth Gospel is the life which enters into men by ‘the second birth’. The writer of Corp. XI. 1 speaks of two different forms of life, which he distinguishes by the words ἰω and μεθαθή ; if he had gone on to say, as other Hermetists do, that ἰω is attainable by men, this ἰω might have been compared with the ἰω (αἰώνος) of Paul and Ev. Joh.
alóvns by some of the Christian Gnostics to signify hypostatized δύναμες of God is to be connected with this Graeco-Egyptian habit of calling a god alóv, rather than with the Platonic use of alóv in the sense of 'eternity'.

Marks of Stoic influence are to be seen in the words ποιήσις (καὶ ποιήμας) and ἔποκατάστασις; and the terms ἀνάγκη, πρόνοια, and φῶς, mentioned in § 5 as possible substitutes for ὁ alóv or ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἰδέα, are characteristic of Stoicism.

The use of the phrase δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ to describe the hypostatized alóv may perhaps have been derived from a Jewish source. The document contains no trace of Christian influence.

Date. The occurrence of Stoic terms in a document mainly Platonic excludes the possibility of any date earlier than the first century B.C. This argument applies to nearly all the other Hermetica also; but the fact that Hermes here appears as a pupil, and not as a teacher, seems to indicate that Corp. XI. i belongs to a comparatively late stage of the Hermetic literature. It may be presumed that the earlier Hermetists regarded Hermes as the founder of their religion, and that it was not until a considerable number of dialogues in which he took the part of teacher had been written, that the question whence he himself had derived his gnosis was asked and answered. It seems probable that the first answer given to this question was that Hermes had been instructed by the Agathos Daimon (i.e. the god Khnum), and that the substitution of Νοῦς for Ἀγαθὸς Δαίμων as the name of his teacher did not take place till a yet later stage in the development of the Hermetic tradition. We may conclude then that Corp. XI. i was probably written in the second or third century A.D., and that the balance of probability is in favour of the third century rather than the second.

Title. The title of Corp. XI, as given in the MSS., is Νοῦς (al. Νοῦς) πρὸς Ἐρμῆν. There is no reason to doubt that this was the heading of XI. i from the first; and XI. ii may very well have borne the same heading. In XI. ii, the teacher is not expressly named; but Hermes uses the word δεσπότης (§ 1 b), which would not be employed in addressing a mere man; and the phrase δι᾽ έμοῦ (§ 6 b) seems to imply that the teacher's name is Νοῦς.

Cyril,1 quoting part of XI. ii. 22, says that the discourse from

1 C. Iulianum 2. 52, Migne 76. 580: ἃ γεγραφῇ ποτε καὶ ἡ τρισκέπτος Ἐρμής πρὸς τὸν άντωνον τοῦν ἰδομένεται γάρ ἄδι τὸ βιβλίον.
which he took the words was addressed by Hermes ‘to his own mind’. In supposing Hermes to be the teacher and Nous the pupil, Cyril has blundered; but his statement shows that in his copy of Corp. XI the word νοῦς occurred in the title.

In some of the Hermetica, the Egyptian god Agathos Daimon was represented as the teacher from whom Hermes learnt the gnosis; and some of the Hermetists held the Agathos Daimon to be the divine νοῦς (see Abammonis Resp. 8. 3). In Corp. I, the divine νοῦς manifests itself in the form of a person named Poimandres, and in that form gives instruction to an unnamed prophet. In XI. i, and probably in XI. ii also, the personal name (Agathos Daimon or Poimandres) is dropped, and the divine instructor is called simply Νοῦς. The writers of XI. i and XI. ii can hardly have intended their readers to suppose that the divine νοῦς had in fact manifested itself in personal form to the founder of their religion; it is more likely that, in putting their teaching into this form, they merely meant to suggest that the human prophet Hermes derived his wisdom from the divine νοῦς which had entered into him.

§ 3. aθίας (τόν) αἰῶνα ποιεῖ. In XI. i, αἰῶν means ‘eternity’ in the Platonic sense; but the writer has hypostatized eternity. He interposes it, as a divine person, between God and the Kosmos, and assigns to it a function partly analogous to that of the αἰνός ὁ κόσμος, the παράδειγμα of the αἰνός ὁ κόσμος in the Timaeus, but more closely corresponding to that of the extracosmic νοῦς (also called ὁ τόπος) in Corp. II, and to that of the divine λόγος of Philo, and the ‘Second God’ of Numenius. I have found no precisely similar use of the word αἰῶν elsewhere; but a partial analogy may be seen in Philo, Quod Deus sit immutabilis 6. 31, Wendland II, p. 63 (quoted in note on Ascl. Lat. III. 26 b ff.). Philo there says that the νοῦς κόσμος is God’s elder son; that the αἰνός κόσμος is God’s younger son; that χρόνος is son of the αἰνός κόσμος, and therefore grandson of God; and that αἰῶν, which is the δραχτύνον and παράδειγμα of χρόνος, is the mode of life (ὁ βίος) of God. In that passage, Philo does not indeed personify αἰῶν; but he personifies χρόνος in the same way that the writer of Corp. XI. ii personifies both χρόνος and its archetype αἰῶν. The practice of using αἰῶν as a name or title of an individual god must

1 The god Κρόνος or Χρόνος (Zerwan) of the Mithraic religion was also called Αἰῶν; and in Roman Egypt the god Khnum was sometimes called αἰῶν. Possibly those who applied the term to Khnum may have borrowed it from the Mithraists.
have been known to the writer of XI. i, and no doubt made it easier for him to speak of aiōn (‘eternity’ or ‘eternal life’) as a personal being, distinct from the supreme God.

ο κόσμος δε τὸν χρόνον (ποιεῖ). In the Timaeus, time is spoken of as constituted by the movement of the heavenly bodies, and therefore as coming into being together with the material Kosmos.

Τίμ. 37 Ε: ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μήνας καὶ ἐνυαντοὺς, οὐκ οἷς πρὶν οὐρανόν γενότα, τότε ἡμείς ξυποταμένης . . . μηχανάται· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα μέρι χρόνου. Ἱb. 38 b: χρόνου δὲ ὁμ ην ὁ οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν. (‘If there is to be succession, there must be things to succeed each other’, Archer-Hind ad loc.) See also Aristotle, Phys. 8. 1, 251 b 9 ff. The Greeks commonly conceived time in a less abstract way than we do; they could hardly think of it except in connexion with something which is going through a process; and the process with which they usually connected it was the movement of the heavenly bodies. Hence the writer of XI. i says that the Kosmos (by its movement) ‘makes’ time; and Philo expresses the same thought by saying that the Kosmos is the ‘father’ of time (πατηρ δὲ χρόνου κόσμος).

ο χρόνος δὲ τὴν γένεσαν (ποιεῖ). In literature of all periods, time is often spoken of as producing things or causing events by its action, when the meaning is merely that the things come into being or the events take place in the course of time. The writer here adopts this way of speaking, in order to maintain the symmetry of his scheme; but his meaning is more exactly expressed by the subsequent phrase, ἡ γένεσα γίνεται ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ.

τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ [ὁστερ] οὐδία ἐστὶ τὸ ἄγαθον. Cf. Corp. VI. 4 b as emended: ἡ οὐδία τοῦ θεοῦ, εἰ γε οὐδίαν ἔχει, τὸ καλὸν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἄγαθον. See also Corp. XII. i init. The word ὅστερ has been inserted in recognition of the doctrine that God is ἰπερουσίος or ἱπέκεια τῆς οὐσίας. (See notes on Corp. II. 4 b and 13.) If ὅστερ applied to this clause alone, there would be no objection to it. But if we retain it here, we must understand ὅστερ οὐδία in the following clauses also; and there would be no point in saying that ‘sameness is, as it were, the essence of the Aeon’, and so on. It seems clear therefore that ὅστερ must have been inserted by a later hand.

τῆς δὲ γενέσεως (οὐσία) ἡ ζωή [καὶ ο θάνατος]. This is vaguely expressed. The meaning implied seems to be that ‘in birth life begins’, or ‘through birth ζωντα come into being’; but the writer
of this document attaches more importance to the neat grouping of words than to exactness of statement.

The words καὶ δὲ βάναυας must be cut out. In the first place, they violate the law of verbal symmetry which the writer has imposed upon himself; and in the second place, they are inconsistent with the context. It would be possible in some connexions to use γένεσις as a term covering all processes in time, and therefore including φθορά; but the writer of XI. i, wherever he uses the words γένεσις and γίνεσθαι, is thinking of the process by which things are made, or come into being, and not of that by which they are destroyed, or cease to be. Cf. οὐδὲ ἀπολείται τι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ a few lines below.

ἐνέργειαι δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ νοῦς καὶ ψυχῆ. For the word ἐνέργεια, see Corp. X. 1 b. Its proper meaning is ‘a force in action’; but here, the things described as ἐνέργειαι seem to be rather the results produced by the action of God, the Aeon, &c., than the forces which God, the Aeon, &c., put in action.

νοῦς and ψυχῆ are the results produced by God’s action. They are a higher and a lower grade of ζωή; and ζωή comes from God. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 27 a: ‘deus . . . dispensator . . . est bonorum, id est senectus (νοῦ), animae (ψυχῆ), et vitae (ζωῆ).’

The word διαμονή is here contrasted with ἄθανασία, and must therefore be taken to mean ‘duration for a finite time’. ἄθανασία refers to things celestial, and διαμονή to things terrestrial. In heaven, it results from the action of αἰῶν that the star-gods live for ever. On earth, it results from the action of αἰῶν that this or that man (as an earthly organism) lives on for seventy years. Perhaps the writer may have had in mind the fact that in common usage αἰῶν bears the two distinct senses ‘endless time’ and ‘a man’s lifetime’.

The Hermetist doubtless wrote the words in the order ἄθανασία καὶ διαμονή, as in § 4 a. Heaven ought to come before earth, as it does in the corresponding phrase of the next clause, ἀποκατάστασις καὶ ἀνταποκατάστασις.

tοῦ δὲ κόσμου (ἐνέργειαι) ἀποκατάστασις καὶ ἀνταποκατάστασις. As to ἀποκατάστασις, see Corp. VIII. 4, Ascl. Lat. I. 13, and Ascl. Lat. III. 26 a. I have not met with the word ἀνταποκατάστασις elsewhere; but there can be no doubt that the writer meant by it
the *quasi-apocatastasis* of terrestrial organisms (*Corp.* VIII. 4). The movement of the heavenly bodies is cyclic; each of them, after a fixed interval of time, will again be in the same position which it occupies at this moment; and after a longer interval (the ‘Great Year’), all of them will simultaneously be in the same positions as before, relatively to one another and to the universe as a whole. This periodical return to the old position, or recurrence of an identical state of things, is what is meant by *apokatastasis*; and it is characteristic of heaven as opposed to earth. The course of life on earth is not cyclic;¹ an old man does not ‘return to his former position’ and become young again. But the father lives again in his son; and though the individuals die, and return no more, the life of the race is perpetually renewed. It is this ‘renewal of things by substitution’ that is here called *anteapokatastasis*.

τοῦ δὲ χρόνου (ἐνέργειαι) αἰθήσεως καὶ μείωσις. Cf. *Corp.* XIII. 5: τὸ γὰρ θυγατρὸν ἐδόσ (i.e. τὸ σώμα) καθ ἡμέραν ἀλλάσσεται χρόνῳ γὰρ τρέπεται εἰς αἰθήσει καὶ μείωσιν.

τῆς δὲ γενέσεως (ἐνέργειαι) ποιότης (καὶ ποσότης). Since each of the four other things has two ἐνέργειαι, γένεσις also must have had two ἐνέργειαι assigned to it; and if the writer wanted a word to pair with ποιότης, the first to present itself would be ποσότης. Cf. *Corp.* X. 3 as emended: (ὁ ποσῶν) ποιότητας καὶ ποσότητας ποιεῖ. But assuming that he wrote καὶ ποσότης, how is the production of ποσότητας, which is the work of γένεσις, to be distinguished from αἰθήσεως καὶ μείωσις, the work of χρόνος? Perhaps it might be said that γένεσις determines the weight of a baby at birth, and χρόνος is responsible for the child’s gains and losses of weight during life. But the writer probably did not ask himself this question; it was enough for him that the words by which he described the ἐνέργειαι of γένεσις had no obvious resemblance to those by which he described the ἐνέργειαι of χρόνος.

ος οὖν αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ θεῷ κ.τ.λ. The five entities are here imagined in the form of five concentric spheres,—or rather, perhaps, four concentric spheres contained within a boundless space, which is God. Even χρόνος and γένεσις may be thus pictured, if we take χρόνος to stand for the heavenly bodies which constitute time by

¹ The Stoic doctrine that after each *ecpyrosis* the course of things on earth also will repeat itself (e.g. that the same lecturer—or a precisely similar lecturer—will again address the same or precisely similar pupils in the same words) is ignored by the writer of XI. 1.
their movement,\(^1\) and γένεσις for sublunar things. But at the same time, we are not debarred from taking the words ἡ γένεσις ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ in the more obvious sense ‘the births of things take place in the course of time’ (cf. ἡ δὲ γένεσις γίνεται ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ below). The statement ὁ κόσμος ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι is repeated below in the words τοῦ κόσμου ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐμπεριεχομένου.

ὁ μὲν αἰῶν ἐπηκεῖ ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν. \(Accl. \text{Lat. }\) III. 26 b–32 a would serve as a commentary on these words. \(\text{περὶ} \) does not mean ‘around’ in a local sense; for if thus taken, it would conflict with ὁ αἰῶν ἐν τῷ θεῷ. It is rather comparable to \(\text{πρὸς} \) in \textit{Ev. Joh.} 1. 1, ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν.

ὁ δὲ κόσμος κυνεῖται ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι. In this clause, ‘the Aeon’ corresponds exactly to the extracosmic νοῦς spoken of in \textit{Corp.} II, and there called ὁ τόπος (ἐν ᾧ κυνεῖται ὁ κόσμος).

§ 3. ὁ κόσμος, γενόμενος οὐποτε, καὶ ἀεὶ γινόμενος. We might rather have expected γενόμενοι μὲν οὐποτε, γινόμενοι δὲ ἀεὶ. The Kosmos has no beginning. Cf. \textit{Corp.} X. 10 b as emended: (ὁ κόσμος) ἀεὶ ὠν, ὁν ἐν γενέσει, καὶ γινόμενοι ἀεὶ.


\[\text{ἡ δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ } [\text{οὐσία}] \text{ τί[ς] ἐστί; τὸ ἄγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν}.\]

This is a misplaced doublet of τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ οὐσία ἐστὶ τὸ ἄγαθὸν in § 2.

§ 4 a. ἰδανασίαν καὶ διαμορφὴ ἐνθείς τῇ Ὀη. The demiurgic power puts life into matter throughout the Kosmos, but does so in two different ways; it produces immortal ζωὴ in the heavens, and ζωὴ of finite duration on earth.

The Platonists were accustomed to describe the function of the Demiurgus as that of impressing \textit{forms} on matter. But to impose forms on matter is to make living organisms; and this writer conceives the demiurgic work of God (executed through his minister the Aeon) as that of putting \textit{life} into lifeless matter.

\[\text{ἡ γὰρ ἐκεῖνης γένεσις} \ldots \text{μεταβλητῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν (μεταβλητοὶ καὶ φθαρτοὶ MSS.)}. \] No sense can be made of this except by

sweeping alteration of the text. It seems clear, firstly, that the sentence containing the words εν μὲν οὐρανῷ ... ἐν δὲ γῆ must have been intended to explain the distinction implied in ἄθανατόν καὶ διαμονήν, and consequently must have immediately followed ἄθανατόν καὶ διαμονήν ἐνθεὶς τῇ γῇ; secondly, that the words ἦρθηται ἐκ τοῦ αἰῶνος καθάπερ καὶ ὁ αἰῶν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, which in the MSS. separate that explanation from the phrase explained by it, ought to stand immediately before καὶ τοῦ μὲν αἰῶνος κ.τ.λ.; and thirdly, that the subject of ἦρθηται must have been ὁ κόσμος.

I take [ἡ γὰρ ἐκεῖνης γένεσις] to be a doublet of the following ἡ γὰρ γένεσις. (ἐκεῖνης may perhaps have come from the preceding clause, where it would be possible to write ἐνθεὶς ἐκεῖνη in place of ἐνθεὶς τῇ γῇ.)

The MSS. give ἡ γὰρ γένεσις καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐν γῇ εἰσιν, διὰ τῆς δικαιοκρίτης, ἐν μὲν οὐρανῷ ἀμετάβλητοι καὶ ἀφαρτοί, ἐν δὲ γῇ μεταβλητοὶ καὶ φαρτοί. This cannot be right; there is no sense in saying that χρόνος is ἀφαρτος in heaven and χρόνος on earth. Moreover, it is difficult to think of any possible subject to which the masculine adjectives ἀμετάβλητοι &c. could be made to apply. (οἱ θεοὶ might be called ἀμετάβλητοι καὶ ἀφαρτοί; but the only beings that could be called μεταβλητοὶ καὶ φαρτοὶ are οἱ θεοὶ, and there is no occasion here for speaking of men apart from other ἔγενσι ζωὰ.) It can hardly be doubted therefore that the termination -τοι is a misreading. I have expressed what I suppose to have been the author's meaning, by writing ἡ γὰρ γένεσις [ἐν δικαιοκρίτῃ, ἐν μὲν οὐρανῷ ἀμετάβλητον κ.τ.λ. This is equivalent to γίνεται ἐν μὲν οὐρανῷ ἀμετάβλητη κ.τ.λ. The οὐράνια ζωὰ, like the Kosmos as a whole, ὄποτε ἐγένετο, but δεὶ γίνεται.

καὶ τοῦ μὲν αἰῶνος [ἡ ψυχὴ ὁ θεός, τοῦ δὲ κόσμου ὁ αἰῶν. [τῆς δὲ γῆς ὁ οὐρανός.] ἡ ψυχὴ is certainly wrong. God, working through the Aeon, puts ψυχὴ into things; but neither God nor the Aeon is ψυχὴ. A satisfactory sense might be got by substituting ἀρχὴ or πηγὴ for ἡ ψυχὴ.

If we retained τῆς δὲ γῆς ὁ οὐρανός, it would be necessary to make the series continuous by inserting another clause before it, and writing

καὶ τοῦ μὲν αἰῶνος (ἅρχὴ?) ὁ θεός,
τοῦ δὲ κόσμου ὁ αἰῶν,
(τοῦ δὲ οὐρανοῦ ὁ κόσμος)
τῆς δὲ γῆς ὁ οὐρανός.
But it could hardly be said that earth is dependent on heaven, and heaven on the Kosmos, in the same sense that the Kosmos is dependent on the Aeon, and the Aeon on God; and it seems more likely that τῆς δὲ γῆς ὁ σώματος is an interpolation, suggested by the preceding words ἐν μὲν σωματικὸ... ἐν δὲ γῆ.

§ 4 b. [καὶ ὁ μὲν θεὸς ἐν τῷ νῷ, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐν τῷ ψυχῇ, ἐν δὲ ψυχῇ ἐν τῇ ὑλῇ.] [πάντα δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τοῦ αἰῶνος.] This is evidently out of place. When it is removed, the sentence τὸ δὲ πάν τοῦτο σῶμα κ.τ.λ. follows naturally on what has been said about the Kosmos in § 4 a. The words καὶ ὁ μὲν θεὸς... ἐν τῇ ὑλῇ are a superfluous repetition of τὸ δὲ πάν τοῦτο σῶμα ψυχῆς πληρές ἑστιν... καὶ ὁ νοῦς τοῦ θεοῦ. The clause πάντα δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τοῦ αἰῶνος cannot have been meant to follow οἱ μὲν θεοί... ἐν τῇ ὑλῇ; for in this position, πάντα ταῦτα can only mean θεοῦ, νοοῦ, ψυχῆς, and ὑλῆ; and it would be impossible to say that God is ‘by means of’ something other than himself. If πάντα δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τοῦ αἰῶνος occurred at all in the original text, it may possibly have stood at the end of § 6 a. Placed there, it would form a fitting conclusion to the discourse, and would serve to lay stress on the novel conception of αἰῶν which the writer has been expounding.

καὶ (ὁ νοῦς) τοῦ θεοῦ. νοῦς is here regarded as something which resides within ψυχῇ. (Cf. Corp. X. 16 f., where it is said that νοοῦ, when embodied, has ψυχῇ for its integument.) But the writer adds that God in like manner resides within νοοῦ. Hence it may be inferred that God is present throughout the universe; and that is expressly asserted below (ὁ γὰρ ποιών ἐν πᾶσιν ἑστιν, § 6 a). It is not quite clear how this is to be reconciled with the preceding sections, in which God is set apart from the Kosmos, and separated from it by the interposed αἰῶν. Perhaps the writer drew his doctrine of αἰῶν ( §§ 2–4 a) from one source, and his doctrine of ψυχῇ and νοοῦ (§ 4 b) from another, and did not completely succeed in harmonizing them.

καὶ (ψυχῇ δὲ) ἀντός μὲν αὐτῷ (sc. τὸ πάν τοῦτο σῶμα) πληροῖ, ἐκτὸς δὲ περιλαμβάνει. A feminine subject is required by the following participles ἡσυχοϊμοῦσα &c.; and there can be little doubt that the missing subject is ψυχῇ. Cf. Pl. Tim. 34 b: ψυχὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ σώματος, the body of the Kosmos) θεὶς διὰ παντός τε ἑτεροῦ καὶ ἔτερου τοῦ σώμα αὐτῆ περικάλυπτε ταῦτη. The writer divides ‘soul’ into two parts. One part of it is the world-soul, i.e. the soul which animates the Kosmos as a whole (ξωσποιεῖ τοῦτο τὸ
μέγα καὶ τέλειον ἥπον); and this part is located 'without' (ἐκτός), i.e. in the outermost sphere. The other part is distributed among the individual organisms within the Kosmos (ξωσοια πάντα τὰ ζώα), and is the sum of their several souls. Cf. Corp. X. ii on the embodiment of the cosmic ψυχή.


§ 5. συνέχει δὲ τούτῳ (τὸ πᾶν) ὁ αἰών. Cf. Philo De fuga et invent. 20. 112, Wendland III, p. 133: ὁ τε γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος (i.e. τοῦ θεοῦ) λόγος, δεσμὸς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπάντων, . . . καὶ συνεχεῖ τὰ (τοῦ κόσμου) μέρη πάντα καὶ σφόγγι, καλῶν αὐτὰ διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαρράθεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. It is through the action of the αἰῶν (as through that of the λόγος in Philo) that 'all things are one'.

ὁ αἰών, . . . τοῦτο ἑστὶν [πᾶν] ὁ θεὸς ἐνεργῶν. In the earlier sections, the Aeon was spoken of as an entity distinct from God. But here, we are told that the Aeon is a certain aspect of God's being; it is God at work upon the world. God and the Aeon are two Persons, yet the two are one.

ἐστὶ δὲ ἄνάγκη, ἐστὶ πρόνοια, ἐστὶ φύσις, [καὶ] εἶτε τὶ ἄλλο οἶδαι ἢ οἰηθήσεται τις. ἄνάγκη, πρόνοια, and φύσις are mentioned as terms which some people may prefer to employ in place of αἰῶν to express the conception of 'God at work'. These three terms were thus used by the Stoics. Philodemus (Diels Doxogr., p. 545): Chrysippus Δία φηκότιν εἰναι τὸν ἀπαντ(α διοικοῖ)τα λόγον . . . καὶ (πρόνοιαν ὁμοίεσθαι τὸν Δία, καὶ τὴν κοινὴν πάντων φύσιν, καὶ εἰμαρμ(ε)νην, καὶ ἀνά(γ)κην.

But the words ἐστὶ ἄναγκην . . . οἰηθήσεται τις are awkwardly interposed; and it is possible that they were inserted later, and that the original text was συνέχει δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πᾶν ὁ αἰών, [ ] τοῦτο ἑστιν, ὁ θεὸς ἐνεργῶν.

ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ὑεοῦ δυνάμει (δύναμις MSS.) [οδοσ] ἀνυπέρβλητος. It might be possible to call God's ἐνέργεια a δύναμις, just as ὁ αἰών was called δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ in § 3 init.; but δυνάμει suits the context better.
... The meaningless άνομος may perhaps have been substituted for some word (e.g. άνωτάτος) which was written as an alternative for μόνος καὶ ἐνί.  
(τίς ἄλλος ἄλλος) [ἐπί] ἦς, καὶ ἀθανασίας καὶ μεταβολῆς ποιήσες (ποιότητος MSS.)  Cf. Corp. XII. ii. 22: ὑπὸ τίνος οὖν ζωοποιεῖται τὰ πάντα ζωά; ὑπὸ τίνος ἀθανασίας τὰ ἀθάνατα; ὑπὸ τίνος μεταβάλλεται τὰ μεταβλητά; God is the maker of ἀθανασία in heaven, and the maker of μεταβολή, i.e. of the perpetual renewal of life by fresh births, on earth. To the question 'Who else is the maker of ἀθανασία and μεταβολή?' a reader of §§ 2-4 a might be inclined to answer, 'the Aeon'.  Cf. § 2: τοῦ άλοντος (ἐνεργείας) ἀθανασία καὶ διαμονή. § 4 a: τὸ αἰῶν... ἀθανασίαν καὶ διαμονὴν ἐνθείς τῇ ὕλῃ. But the distinction between ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ αἰῶν, which was insisted on before, is minimized in § 5. The writer at one time regards the Aeon as an intermediary agent ὁ θεὸς ἐνεργείη, and at another time, as ὁ θεὸς ἐνεργεύ.  
τί δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄλλο (ἐργον ἦ) τὸ ποιεῖν; (τί δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄλλο τι ποιήσειν MSS.). The reading which I propose is very doubtful; but the author must have written something to this effect; and it may be inferred from the following ἐργός and ἐργία that the word ἐργον occurred in this sentence.  
οῦ γὰρ ἐργὸς ὁ θεὸς.  Cf. Philo Leg. alleg. i. 3. 5, Cohn I, p. 62 (commenting on Gen. 2. 2, 'God finished his work which he had made, and he rested on the seventh day'): παύσασε γὰρ οὐδὲν ποιών ὁ θεὸς, ἄλλ' ὁσπερ ἱδίον τὸ καίειν πυρός καὶ χίονα τὸ ψύχειν, στῶν καὶ σεοῦ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πολὺ γε μᾶλλον, ὄνω καὶ τῶν ἄλλως ἀπασών ἐργῷ τοῦ δράν ἄστυν. 1 Origen De princip. 3. 5. 2: 'Solent nobis obiicere, dicentes: Si coepit mundus ex tempore, quid ante faciebat Deus quam mundus inciperet? Otiosam enim et immobilem dicere naturam Dei, impium est simul et absurdum, vel putare quod bonitas aliquando bene non fecerit, et omnipotentia aliquando non egerit potentatum.' (Origen's answer is, that this world has had a beginning and will have an end, but that God made other worlds before it, and will make others after it.)  
ἀπαντᾷ γὰρ πληρῆ τοῦ θεοῦ. All things are filled with ψυχή. But ψυχή is filled with νοῦς, and νοῦς is filled with God (§ 4 b); therefore, it may be said that all things are filled with God. In other words,  
1 Compare Ev. Joh. 5. 17: ὁ πατήρ μου δείκτε ἐργάζεται, γεγένε σώματοι (said in answer to a charge of sabbath-breaking).
there is life everywhere, and all life is a manifestation of God's presence and working.

These words imply that God, as the source or root of life, is in things; whereas in the rest of the paragraph God is spoken of rather as an external agent, who 'makes' living things, or 'puts life into' things. These two conceptions are combined together in the phrase ὃ γὰρ ποιῶν ἐν πάσιν ἐστιν, § 6 a.

οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐστὶν ἄργια οὐδαμοῦ. Cf. Pseudo-Galen Hist. philos. 24 (Diels Doxogr., p. 613): τοῖς δὲ σώμασι συνδείσθαι (τὰς ψυχὰς) νομίζουσιν οἱ μὲν ἀντοφθαλμὲς ἥκούσας ἐγκρατεῖς οὕτως ὡστε ταῖταις πασχῶσας,11 τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢδονῶν τῶν διὰ τῶν σωμάτων αὐτῶν προσγειομένων.12 οἱ δὲ, κατὰ θεὸν ἐγγίνεσθαι τοῖς σώμασι, ἑβουλόμενοι13 μηδὲν τῶν στοιχείων ἄργόν μηδὲ γὰρ ἔμοιραν ἐναί διὰ τέλους. The second of these two doctrines resembles that of Corp. XI. i. God's work is to put soul or life into matter. Soul is τὸ κενὸν; and matter without soul in it would be ἄργον. But God is always and everywhere at work; there is therefore no matter without soul in it, i.e. no matter which is not alive and active.

[οὐδὲ ἐν τῷν ἀλλῳ]. This is meaningless. There is nothing else beside God, the Kosmos, and the things in the Kosmos (except the hypostatized αὐτῶν of §§ 2–4 a, which cannot here be meant).

ἄργια γὰρ ὅνομα κενὸν ἐστι. ἄργια is a word to which nothing in actual existence corresponds. For this phrase, compare Corp. VIII. 1 b as emended: ὅνομα ἐστιν ἡ θανάτου προστηροία κενὸν ἄργον.

§ 6 a. πάντα δὲ δεὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ δεὶ καὶ καθ' ἐκαστὸν τῶν (καθ' ἐκαστοῦ τῶν) ὑστῆν MSS.). The writer must have meant 'always and everywhere'. ὑστῆν might be combined with χρόνον, but hardly with τῶν. Perhaps the reading of the MSS. has resulted from a conflation of καθ' ἐκαστοῦ τῶν and καθ' ἐκαστὴν (χρόνον) ὑστῆν.

LIBELLVS XI. ii

Contents

The Kosmos is an organized whole, each part of which discharges its special function. The Sun is the (proximate) source of life; for the fire which the Sun emits is transmuted into light, (and this light

---

1 Perhaps: οἷς ἂν ἐκόψας, αὐτοφθάλμῃ διορμαί τοῦτο πασχωάσας.
2 This opinion is based on Pl. Phaedo.
3 Al. Βουλόμενον: legendum Βουλόμενον, in agreement with θεόν.
4 Legendum ζωῆς.
conveys life into all organic bodies.) The Moon fashions matter into a succession of organic bodies here below. The Earth supplies material nutriment to these bodies. And all things in the Kosmos, both the immortals in heaven (i.e. the heavenly bodies) and the mortal creatures on earth, are filled with 'soul' or life. §§ 6 b-8 a.

Since all things in the Kosmos are living bodies, there must be some one who puts 'soul' or life into them; that is to say, there must be a Maker. § 8 b.

And since all things are wrought together into one ordered whole, there cannot be more than one Maker. The theory that the immortals in heaven owe their life to one Maker, and the mortal creatures on earth to another, must be rejected. §§ 9, 10.

The one Maker of all is God. God is one; and the one life which runs through all things is the work of the one God. §§ 11, (14 b).

Why should not the one God be the author of two different modes of life,—immortal life in heaven, and mortal life on earth,—seeing that you yourself are active in different ways? § 12 a.

God's work then is to make living things. God could not exist without doing good; and to do good is to make things live. Human procreation is a type of God's life-generating energy. And God is ever at his work; if he were to cease from it for a moment, all things would perish. §§ 12 b-14 a.

(But he never ceases, and therefore life never ceases.) What men call 'death' should rather be called 'change'. When a living creature 'dies', the life that was in it departs out of our sight, but does not perish. And inasmuch as life is ever shifting and changing in the bodies of which the Kosmos is composed, the Kosmos itself is ever changing, and may be said to 'assume all forms'. §§ 15 b, 16 a.

Does God likewise change, and 'assume all forms'? No. God has one form, and one alone; but it is an incorporeal form. §§ 16 b, 17 a.

God contains all things. All things 'are in God', but not in the same sense in which bodies are contained in a larger body; for God is incorporeal. The incorporeal (i.e. mind) is capable of containing everything. Is it not so in the case of your own mind? You can place yourself in thought at any point in the universe, and even beyond its outermost limits; that is, your mind is capable of containing anything; potentially, it contains everything. And God
(being mind, not body,) contains things in the same sense that your mind contains things. But God contains all things in his thought, not merely potentially, or severally and successively, but actually, and all at once. All things are thoughts which God thinks. §§ 17 b–20 a.

If you would know God, you must be as God is. You must get quit of everything corporeal, and expand yourself to the magnitude of all existence; you must rise above all limitations of time, and become eternal. You must include all things in yourself, or identify yourself with all things. Do this, and you will know God. But if you shut yourself up in the body, and cower within the narrow cell of your separate being, a poor feeble wretch, self-centred and self-seeking, then you have nothing in common with God, and cannot know him. §§ 20 b, 21 a.

Not to know God is the height of evil; to know God is the good, and to seek to know him is to be on the way to the good. Seek him, and he will come to meet you at all times and places. God is not invisible; for he is in all things, and you may see him everywhere at work. §§ 21 b, 22 a.

The most significant passage in this document, and that which contains the essence of the writer's religion, is §§ 20 b, 21 a. The Hermetist there states, in the special form in which he has realized it in his own experience, the principle that 'he who would find himself must lose himself'. But how does he conceive the larger whole in which a man may 'lose' his falsely narrowed self, and 'find' his true self? For this writer, the one alternative to 'shutting oneself up' in one's separate personality is to 'expand oneself to the measureless magnitude' of the universe, and the God who fills the universe with life. Most people are more ready to agree with

1 Cf. Inge, Personal idealism and mysticism, p. 102: 'How does a man “lose his soul” so as to gain it? ... To be willing to lose our φυσική must mean to forget ourselves entirely, to cease to revolve round our own selfish interests, to pass out freely into the great life of the world, constructing our universe on a ... cosmocentric basis, not a self-centred one. To do this is to lose and then to find ourselves.' Caird, quoted by James, Varieties of religious experience, p. 451: 'As a thinking being, it is possible for me to suppress and quell in my consciousness every movement of self-assertion, every notion and opinion that is merely mine, every desire that belongs to me as this particular self, and to become the pure medium of a thought that is universal,—in one word, to live no more my own life, but let my consciousness be possessed and suffused by the Infinite and Eternal life of spirit. And yet it is just in this renunciation of self that I truly gain myself, or realize the highest possibilities of my own nature. For whilst in one sense we give up self to live the universal and absolute life of reason, yet that to which we thus surrender ourselves is in reality our truer self.'
those who find the alternative to selfish isolation in identifying oneself in feeling and interest with one’s fellow men, or with some of them. The human whole in which a man ‘loses himself, and losing, finds himself’, may assume many different forms. For some Greeks, it took the form of the city-state, as in the ideal Sparta and Athens of the fifth century B.C., and in Plato’s Republic; by Stoics, it was recognized in the human race at large. The larger whole with which the individual identifies himself,—the ‘body’ of which he feels himself to be a ‘member’,—may, in the case of one man, be restricted to his own household; for another, it may be some larger human group, or several different groups in turn; and for one here and there, it may include every human being with whom the chances of life bring him into connexion. But the recognition of a human whole, larger or smaller, into which the separate self may expand, does not conflict with the recognition of a cosmic or supracosmic All; often the two are combined, and men’s sense of union with the one is intensified by their sense of union with the other. Citizens of Sparta and Athens expressed and heightened their civic patriotism by their worship of the gods who watched over the city; in Plato’s Republic, it is because the ‘guardian’ is a votary of the Good on which all existence hangs, that in his social life he has no private use for the word ‘mine’; and the Cosmopolis of the Stoics is a world-wide brotherhood of men united by the common fatherhood of the God who pervades the universe. Among the many different religions included under the vague term ‘Christianity’, all possible modes and forms of ‘self-expansion’ might be exemplified. In the language of Paul and the Fourth Gospel, ‘Christ’ means at once the Head or common Life of the body of believers, and the Power ‘by whom all things were made’; and he who, using the name of Christ in this sense, says ‘I live, and yet no longer I, but Christ lives in me’, identifies himself at once with his human brothers and with the life of the whole universe. The writer of XI. ii, when he bids a man break out of his narrow cell

1 Gal. 2. 20: μὴ γὰρ ἐκπέμψα λόγον, μὴ γὰρ ἐν θεῷ Χριστῶς. The ‘old man’ of whom Paul speaks,—the man who has died in the Christian,—corresponds to the man whom the Hermetist describes as ‘shutting up his soul in his body’; the ‘new man’ who is born in the Christian corresponds to the man whom the Hermetist describes as having risen above the limitations of time and space. In Corp. XIII, the change from the one state to the other is described by the simile of a ‘second birth’, just as it is in the Fourth Gospel. The old narrow self ceases to exist, and a new and larger self comes into being in its place. The change may be called either ‘self-surrender’ or ‘self-realization’; it is at once the surrender of a smaller self, and the realization of a larger self.
in space and time, and 'become eternal', is at one with what may be called the 'cosmic' side of the religion of Paul and the Fourth Gospel, as distinguished from its 'human' side; but he has nothing to say about the brotherhood of men, or the 'love of one's neighbour'. For him, as for most of the Hermetists, human society hardly exists, and the only human relation recognized is that between teacher and pupil. The individual man stands solitary, face to face with the universe at large; and if he would escape from his isolation, it is in the life which fills the universe, and the God whom he sees behind that universal life, that he must 'lose himself to find himself'.

Sources. The theoretic doctrine of XI. ii closely resembles that of XI. i, apart from the conception of ἀλών which is peculiar to XI. i; and the mode of regarding God and the universe which is common to both documents seems to have resulted from a fusion of Platonic and Stoic theories, modified by some other influence. In § 1 b, there is a verbal reminiscence of a sentence of Pl. Tim. The application of the term κόσμος to the planets may be taken as a sign that the teachers by whom the Platonic tradition was transmitted to the writer had adopted some distinctively Pythagorean notions. In the discussion of the μορφή of God (§ 16 b), and the assertion that God is ἀσώματος, the author maintains the Platonic position against that of the Stoics. The conception of 'one soul' or 'one life' pervading the universe is more akin to Stoicism than to Platonism; but in the form in which it is here presented, it appears to have been derived in part from some other source, which may possibly have been Egyptian. The physical theory of fire and light (with the words ἡ φῶλα τῶν ἐναντίων) in § 7, and the phrases τὰς ἀντιθέσεις τῶν ποιητῶν and πράγματα, ποιήσεις, ποιήσεις in § 20 b, are marks of Stoic influence. The theory of two Makers, which is discussed and rejected in § 9, must be one which was held by some of the writer's contemporaries; theories more or less resembling it are to be found in the writings of some of the Christian Gnostics, but it is not clear against whom the Hermetist is here contending.

In the passage on 'self-expansion' (§§ 20 b, 21 a), the author is presumably describing a state of mind which was known to him by his own experience, and which perhaps reached its greatest intensity in occasional ecstasies, but also took the form of an abiding or frequently recurring consciousness in everyday life (§ 21 b, 'every-
where God will come to meet you’ &c.). In this, the most original part of his teaching, his attitude differs from that of the earlier Platonists and Stoics, and more nearly approximates to that of Plotinus. If a discourse of Ammonius Saccas, the Egyptian teacher of Plotinus, had been preserved in writing, we might perhaps have found in it a close resemblance to this document. The sort of religion in which the limits of the man’s individual personality melt away, and he becomes one with the object of his worship, (‘I am Thou, and Thou art I’;) is restricted to no one race or country; but it seems to have been specially prevalent in Egypt, from the earliest ages down to Roman times; and the writer of XI. ii, when he speaks in this tone, shows that, beneath his Hellenic culture, he is still a true Egyptian.

I find no trace of Jewish or Christian influence in this document.

Date. What I have said about the date of XI. i applies to XI. ii also. If we are right in assuming that its author had XI. i before him, XI. ii must be placed a little later; and its affinity to the teaching of Plotinus points to the same direction. I would therefore assign it conjecturally to the third century after Christ.

§ 1 b. ós δε μοι ἐπιλθεν εἰπεῖν ὅπερ σκηνῶν. Hermes feels that it needs some courage to speak frankly to his divine visitant. It is to be presumed that Nous has asked him on what subject he wishes to be instructed; and he answers that he wishes to be told the truth περὶ τοῦ παντός καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ. Cf. Corp. I init., where Poimandres (i.e. the divine νοῦς) asks Τί βούλει... μαθεῖν καὶ γνῶναι; and the prophet answers Μαθεῖν θέλω τὰ ὄντα... καὶ γνῶναι τὸν θεόν.

πολλὰ πολλῶν καὶ τάῦτα διάφορα περὶ τοῦ παντός καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ εἰπόντων. This is an echo of Pl. Tim. 29 c: πολλὰ πολλῶν εἰπόντων περὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντός γενέσεως.

§ 6 b. δέ ἔρισεν: i.e. διὰ τοῦ νοῦ. Cf. § 13 b: ἂν μοι σκευτῶν ἐπίθεσι. It is not enough to look at the world with our bodily eyes; we must also reflect on what we see.

[τὸ τε κάλλος αὐτοῦ ἄκριβῶς κατανόησον.] This clause breaks the grammatical construction. σῶμα ought to be in apposition to κόσμου; but in the text of the MSS., it can only be taken as standing in apposition to κάλλος; and so taken, it does not make sense. It would be possible to avoid this difficulty by transposing the clause τὸ τε... κατανόησον, and placing it after ἄκριβῶς καὶ νόον; but even
in that position it would still be superfluous, and would rather weaken the force of the passage. It seems most likely, therefore, that it has been added by a later hand.

§ 7. τοὺς ὑποκειμένους ἔτη κόσμους. These 'seven worlds' are the planets. In the astronomical system ascribed to the Pythagorean Philolaus (Aetius, Diels Doxogr. p. 337), the word κόσμος did not signify the universe as a whole (τὸ πᾶν), but was used to denote the region occupied by the seven planets, in contradistinction both to the outermost sphere (called Ὁλυμπός) above that region, and to the sublunar atmosphere (called ὄραμα) below it. Heraclides Ponticus and some of the Pythagoreans (perhaps by a modification of the usage of Philolaus) called each of the planets a κόσμος. Aetius, Diels ib. p. 43: 'Ἡρακλείδης καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, ἐκατον τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον ὑπάρχειν, γὰρ περιέχοντα καὶ ἀέρα, ἐν τῷ ἀπειρῷ ἀείᾳ. ταῦτα δὲ τὰ δόγματα εἰ τοῖς Ὄρφικοις φέρεσθαι κοσμοποιοῦσι γὰρ ἐκατον τῶν ἀστέρων. Some Pythagoreans said that the moon is a world like ours, and is inhabited; Plutarch (Fac. lunae) speaks of this theory, and makes the moon an abode of disembodied human souls. Anaxagoras also is reported to have said that the moon is inhabited (Diog. Laert. 1. 8). Cf. the Orphic fragment 81 Abel (Proclus, In Tim. 3. 154 a): μέσατο δ' ἄλλην γαῖαν ἀπειρότον, ἣν τε σελήνην ἅθανατοι κληκόσουσιν, ... ἵ πόλλ' οὐρέ' ἤχοι, πόλλ' ἄστεα, πολλά μέλαβρα. Perhaps there were Pythagoreans who held that not only the moon, but all the planets are inhabited worlds, and consequently called them κόσμοι. At any rate, this use of the word κόσμος seems to be a mark of either Pythagorean or Orphic influence.

The planets 'fill endless time with their movements'; i.e. their movements endure through endless time. The writer of XI. ii uses αἰώνιο differently from the writer of XI. i ; he does not hypostatize 'the Aeon'; and he does not here use the word in the Platonic sense of 'eternity' as distinguished from endless time. In § 20 b, however, αἰώνιον γενοῦ means 'free yourself from the limitations of existence in time'.

πῦρ δὲ οὖσαμοι (...). It would be impossible for a Hermetist to say that there is no region of fire in any part of the Kosmos; and the contrary is expressly asserted in § 19 (τὸ τοῦ ἥλιου πῦρ). The meaning must therefore have been that there is no (cosmic or

1 Perhaps [πῦρ] ἰχνώτα. Each of the planets is an earth surrounded by an atmosphere of its own; but all of them are situated 'in the boundless aether'.

X 2
unmixed) fire in the sublunar world, or in the terrestrial atmosphere; and some phrase expressing that limitation must have fallen out of the text.

The meaning must have been that the fiery heat emitted by the sun, which would be destructive to all earthly things if it reached them unaltered, is transmuted into mild and beneficent light in the course of its passage downward through the atmosphere. The fire there meets with 'unlike' and 'opposite' elements, viz. air and watery vapour, and enters into combination with them; and the substance produced by the combination of fire with air and water takes the form of light. This theory is based on the Stoic physics. On the Stoic doctrine as to the illumination of the atmosphere, see Arnim, Stoic. vet. fragm. II, p. 142 f. The phrase ἡ φιλία τῶν ἐναντίων is doubtless a Stoic reminiscence of certain well-known sayings of Heraclitus. For the notion that the celestial fire would burn up all earthly things if they were not protected from it, cf. Corp. X. 18, γῇ γὰρ πῦρ οὐ βαστάζει κ.τ.λ.

The Sun is the generator of every good thing; he is the ruler by whom order is maintained throughout the universe; and he is the governor to whom the other planets are subject. Of course the writer held that the Sun himself is subject to the supreme God; his view must have been similar to that expressed by Plutarch, Quaest. Plat. 8 fin.: (ὁ ἤλιος) τῶν μεγίστων καὶ κυριωτάτων τῷ ἡγεμόνι καὶ πρώτῳ θεῷ γίνεται συνεργός. In Corp. XI. ii, as in Corp. XVI, and in Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. XXI. 2, the Sun holds the position of 'second God', which in some of the
other *Hermetica* is assigned to the Kosmos; but in this paragraph, the time for speaking of the 'first God' has not yet come.

What are we to understand by παντός ἀγαθοῦ? Since we are told below that the function of the Moon is τὸ τὴν κατω ἄλην μεταβάλλων (i.e. to build up terrestrial matter into a succession of organic bodies), it may be presumed that the corresponding function of the Sun is to put ψυχῇ into the bodies fashioned by the moon, and thereby produce ζύγη.1 'Life' is closely associated with 'light'; and the writer's view was probably that the Sun (operating as the highest agent or minister of the supreme God) conveys ωφή or ψυχή into material bodies by means of the πύρ which he emits, and which, by the time it reaches the earth, has been transmuted into φῶς. Now all that is good in the Kosmos may be comprehended under the term 'life' (cf. *Asc. Lat.* III. 27 a); it is therefore possible to take the statement that the Sun is παντός ἀγαθοῦ γαννήτωρ as meaning that the Sun is the generator of life, or the dispenser of ψυχή. But if this is what the writer meant, we should have expected him to express it more clearly and directly; and it may be suspected that παντός ἀγαθοῦ has been substituted for some other term (e.g. πώσης ζωῆς), perhaps by the same person who substituted θεοῦ for ἡλίου.

σελήνην (γ)δε, ἵκειν πρόδρομον πάντων. Πρόδρομος usually means one who goes in advance of others travelling in the same direction. The moon might be called πρόδρομος in this sense, because her eastward movement (i.e. her movement relatively to the fixed stars) is swifter than that of any of the other planets.

ὅρανον τῆς φύσεως. Φύσις means either the process of birth and growth, or the power which operates in that process. Taking the word in the former sense, we may translate 'The Moon is the instrument by which birth and growth are wrought' (by a higher deity, viz. either the Sun, or the Supreme God,—though the latter has not yet been mentioned). But if we take φύσις to mean the force which operates, we must understand that force to be here personified, and translate 'The Moon is the instrument by means of which Nature works'.

τὴν κατω ἄλην μεταβάλλουσαν. The Moon works up terrestrial matter into organic bodies, and replaces them by others as they successively suffer dissolution. Cf. *Firmicus Maternus* *Math.* 4. 1:

1 A different, but partly analogous, view of the respective functions of Sun, Moon, and Earth, occurs in Plut. *Ras. lunae* 28. 3: τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἢ γῆ, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἢ σελήνη, τὸν δὲ νόην δ ἡλίου πάρεσεν ἐλ τὴν γένεσιν (of man).
'omnis enim substantia humani corporis ad istius pertinet numinis (sc. lunae) potestatem. Nam . . . compositi corporis formam pro qualitate cursus sui luna sustentat. . . . Quare scire debemus quod corpus hominis luna susceperit, et quod lunae sit potestatibus deputatum; nam et crescentis lunae augmenta in corporibus nostris et deficientis [luminis] damna sentimus. . . . Sic omnis substantia terrenae corporis istius numinis providentia gubernatur. In posteriores enim caeli regionibus collocata, et terrae imperium ex vicinitate sortita, omnia corpora, quae inspiratione divinae mentis animantur, cursus sui multiplici varietate sustentans, et per signa omnia festina celeritate discurrens, et omnibus stellis asiduis se conjunctionibus socians, ex contrariis mixturis et ex disparibus elementis integra compositi operis substantia mutuata, omnia animantium corpora et concepta procreat et generata dissolvit.'

In Asc. Lat. I. 3 c, a similar function is assigned to Sun and Moon together: '(omnium corporum) augmenta detrimentaque sol et luna sortiti sunt.'

υποστάθημην τοῦ καλοῦ κόσμου. Cf. 'the Stoics' in Diog. Laert. 7. 137: αναστάτο μὲν οὖν ἐλθαί τὸ τῆρ, ἐν δὲ ἀλήθεα καλεῖται, ἐν τούτῳ πρώτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαίραν γεννᾶται, ἐστα τὴν τῶν πλανώμενων μεθ᾽ ἦν τὸν ἀέρα. ἐστα τὸ ὕδωρ. υποστάθημην δὲ. πάντων τὴν γῆν, μέσην ἀπάνων ὄσων.

Plutarch, Fac. lunae 25. 28, 940 F, says that the earth, seen from the moon, would appear to be οἷον υποστάθημα καὶ ἱλιὰ τοῦ παντός, 'a muddy sediment at the bottom of the universe'. But perhaps the Hermetist took the word, as applied to the earth, to mean 'foundation' rather than 'sediment'; cf. Diod. 3. 44. 3, παλαιῶν οἰκίων λιβίνας υποστάθμας, 'stone foundations'.

τροφῶν καὶ τιθήμην τῶν ἐπιγείων. The Earth is nurse, not mother. The Sun gives life to terrestrial organisms; the Moon fashions their material structure; the Earth supplies them with material nutriment. Pl. Tim. 40 b: γῆν δὲ, τροφῶν μὲν ἡμετέραν κ.τ.λ. But in Tim. 88 d, the phrase is differently applied; it is the ὑποδοχή (i. e. ἵλη) that is there called τροφὸς καὶ τιθήμην τοῦ παντός.

μέσην δὲ ἀμφοτέρων [ . . . ] τὴν σελήνην περιπορευομένην. The lunar sphere is the boundary between the abode of τὰ ἀθάνατα ζωὰ above and that of τὰ θνητὰ ζωὰ below.

§ 8 a. πάντα δὲ πλήρη ψυχής, καὶ πάντα κυνοφαινα. ψυχή is τὸ κυνὸν; see Corp. II.

[kαι μήτε τὰ δεξιὰ . . . μήτε τὰ κάτω ἄνω.] This is irrelevant, and

1 Cf. leśini φρόδρομον πάντων in Corp. XI. ii. 7.
interrupts the argument, which should run thus: 'all things, whether mortal or immortal, are alive (πάντα δι' πάλην ψυχῆς . . . περὶ τὴν γέν.; and there must be some one who generates life in them (καὶ ὅτι πάντα ταῦτα γεννητά κ.τ.λ.).' Also, these interposed phrases are obscure and awkwardly constructed. The negative μήτε (not οὔτε) shows that they are meant to be dependent on διασαρί; and κυνούμενα must be supplied; but the sense intended is clumsily expressed. It might be possible to defend μήτε τὰ ἄνω κἀτω μήτε τὰ κἀτω ἄνω, taking it to mean 'the immortal ζωά in heaven do not descend to earth, and the mortal ζωά on earth do not ascend to heaven'; though, if the writer had wished to say this, it would have been better, instead of putting it here, to write (οὔτε) μήτε τὰ ἄνω κἀτω (χωρείν) μήτε τὰ κἀτω ἄνω after μέσην . . . τὴν σελήνην περιστρεφομένην above. But what can be meant by 'those on the right do not move to the left, nor those on the left to the right'? This cannot be said of the θνητά ζωά, which move irregularly in all directions; it must be meant to apply only to the ἀθάνατα, i.e. the heavenly bodies; but there is nothing in the text to limit it to them. And even if we assume that the heavenly bodies alone are here spoken of, the statement is still inaccurate. 'Right' and 'left' may be taken to mean 'North' and 'South'; but the sun, for instance, moves northward and southward in the course of the year, as well as westward in his daily round. I conclude then that καὶ μήτε . . . κἀτω ἄνω is an interpolation.

§ 8 b. πάντα ταῦτα γεννητά. Having described the universe, the teacher goes on to show that there must be a maker of it, and that there cannot be more than one maker. γεννητά is here equivalent to ποιήτα, and therefore implies a ποιησία. The verbs γεννάω and ποιώ are often interchanged; in Pl. Tim., the Demiurgus is called παρήρ (‘generator’) as well as ποιητής (‘maker’) of the universe; and τεκτονεῖν or τεκτονεώτεθαί means τέκνα γεννάω. The sense would be the same if we wrote γεννήθα; for γέννασθαι is often used as the passive of ποιώ. Pl. Phileb. 27 a: τὸ γε ποιούμενον καὶ τὸ γεγονόμενον οἴδαι πλὴν ὅνωματι . . . διαφέρων εἰρήσθαιοι. The Hermetists probably made no distinction of meaning between γεννήτος and γεννητός.

When the writer of XI. ii calls God the ποιητής of the universe,
he is not thinking of a divine act of creation in the past, such as is described in the first chapter of Genesis, or in the mythical narrative of the Timaeus. His God is not one who made the world in six days and 'rested on the seventh day'; he holds (as does also the writer of XI. i. 4 b–6 a) that God 'is ever at his work' (§ 14 a), and that if he were to desist from it for a moment, all things would perish. And this ceaseless work of God consists, not in creating things out of nothing, but in 'bringing ὑλή and ψῡχή together', that is to say, in putting life into lifeless matter, and maintaining that life from moment to moment. His work is τὸ κινεῖν τὰ πάντα καὶ κοινοῦσαι (§ 17 c). Ὑλή not animated by ψῡχή does not exist in actuality; and the only 'things' which this writer recognizes are ζωῆται. To say that God is the ποιήσις of all things is therefore merely another way of saying that God is the author of all life.

§ 9. μάς δὲ κατὰ πάντως τάξεως τεταμένης (ταχύτητος τεταγμένης MSS.), ἄδικον δὲ ἡ πλείον τοιοῦτος εἶναι. Cf. Psellus De daemonum operatione, Migne P. G. 122, 828 b (Testim.).

εἰ ἄρετος ἢν δὲ ποιήσις τῶν μεταβλητῶν [ζῶν] καὶ θνητῶν. Against whom is this argument directed? The writer evidently knew of some persons who taught that τὰ ἀμεταβλητὰ καὶ ἄδικα ἄναπαθεῖα have been made by one Demiurgus, and τὰ μεταβλητὰ καὶ θνητὰ have been made (or are ceaselessly being made) by another. That theory may have been first suggested by Pl. Tim. 41 c, where the Demiurgus says to the gods whom he has made, δὲ ἐμοὶ δὲ τῶν (sc. τὰ θνητὰ γένη) γενόμενα καὶ Βίων μετασχόντα θεοίς ἵσασθαι ἄν: ὥν οὖν θνητὰ ... ἡ ... τρέπεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ζῴων δημιουργίαν, μεμούμενον τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν γένεσιν. 1 'I myself', he adds, 'will generate and hand over to you the immortal part of them;' τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς, ἄδικα ἄναπαθεῖα προσφεύγωντες, ἀπεργάζοντες ζῶσε οἷς καὶ γεννάτε, τροφήν τε διδόντες αὐξάνετε, καὶ φύσιν τὰ πάλιν δέχεσθε. 2 (Cf. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. V. 2, where the maker of men,

1 'Imitating my power that was put forth in the generation of you' (Archer-Hind). This meaning would be more clearly expressed if τὴν were added before περὶ. 2 Cf. Philo Opif. mundi 24. 73, Coh. I, p. 24 (commenting on the plural verb in ποιήσαμεν ἀνθρώπου, Gen. 1. 26): τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀρέτης οὐτε κακίας μετέχει, ὡσπερ φυτὰ καὶ ἔδαρα ἑώρα ... τὰ δὲ αὖ μόνης κυκλοφορίας ἀρέτης, ἀμώτως τάσις ὡσπερ κακίας, ὡσπερ οἷς ἀστέρες ... τὰ δὲ τῆς μετείχεν ἐπὶ φύσιν, ὡσπερ ἀνθρώπους, δὲ ἐπιδέχεσθαι γάναντια, ... ἀρέτην καὶ κακίαν. τῷ δὲ πάντων πατρὶ θεῷ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα (the heavenly bodies) δι' ἀκτοῦ μόνον τοῖς οὐκετίσατον ἢν, ... τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώπου (the plants and beasts) οὐχ ἄλλοτροι ... τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν μὲν οὐκείον τῆς ὀμοίωσις ... διὰ τοῦτο ἐνι μόνης τῆς ἀνθρώπου γενεσίας φύσιν ὅτι εἶτεν δὲ θέος 'ποιήσαμεν', ὡσπερ ἐμφαίνει συμπαράλληλην ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἀναγεννησίαν, ὡν ταῖς μὲν ἀνεπιθύμητοι βουλαίς τε
and presumably of θητά in general, is a single subordinate Demiur-
gus. See also Exc. XXI fin.) But the ‘gods’ (i.e. the cosmic
forces) to whom the making of mortal ζωή is assigned in the Timaeus
have themselves been made by the supreme God, and work under
his orders, so that, on the principle that ‘qui facit per alium facit
per se’, there is after all but one Maker; whereas what is said in
Corp. XI. ii seems to imply that those against whom the writer is
contending taught that τὰ θητά are made by some one who works
independently of the maker of τὰ ἀθάνατα.¹

Doctrines more or less resembling this were taught by some of
Ref. haer. 7. 24: the ‘great Archon’ (not the supreme God) made
τὰ αἰθέρα (i.e. the heavens and the heavenly bodies); and thereafter,
pάλιν ἀπὸ τῆς πανσερπίας ἄλλος ἄρχων ἀνέβη, . . . παλύ ὑποδείστερος
tοῦ πρῶτου ἄρχοντος . . . καὶ πάντων τῶν ὑποκειμένων (sc. of all
sublunar things) ὁδώς (sc. the ἄλλος ἄρχων) ἦστι διοικητὴς καὶ
dημιουργός. The Hermetist is not likely to have been directly
concerned with the teachings of Christian Gnostics; but he may
have been thinking of some Pagan theory by which Basilides and
other Christian Gnostics were influenced. The view discussed
and rejected in Corp. XI. ii has something in common with the
Zoroastrian and Manichaean doctrine of two hostile Powers, the
authors respectively of good and evil; for change and death might
be regarded as forms of evil, though the writer of XI. ii does not
so regard them.

ἐπεθύμησεν ἃν καὶ ἀθάνατος ποιήσαι, ἄσπερ καὶ ὁ τῶν ἀθανάτων
(ποιητῆς) θετοῦς. If the reading is right, we must understand
ἀθανάτους (θεοῦ) and θετοῦς (ἄνθρωπος); though we should rather
have expected ἀθάνατα and θητα. The masculines ἀμετάβλητοι
καὶ ἀφθαρτοὶ, μεταβλητοὶ καὶ φθαρτοὶ, occur (in the MSS.) in a similar
context in XI. i 4 a.

μιᾶς οὐσίας τῆς ὀλης καὶ μιᾶς τῆς ψυχῆς, παρὰ τίνι [δὲ] αὐτῶν ἡ
χορηγία [τῆς ποιήσεως]; The χορηγία must mean the supply of the
μιᾷ πράξειν ἄνθρωπον κατορθοῦντος ἑπιγράφηται θεὸς ἀ πάντων ἄγιοι, ταῖς τῶν
ἀναστασις ἐποίησις τῶν ἦλθαι τὴν ἑκάστην οὕτως πεποιηθήναι τῶν ἐθνῶν. Philo must have had Pl. Tim. 41 in mind when he wrote this passage.

Arnobius (3. 36) says ¹ Christ has told us that our souls were generated, not
by the supreme God, but by another genitor, many grades below him, yet of his court,
and of lofty birth. Did Arnobius get this from some Gnostic Gospel?

¹ This would mean that φῶς (in the sense of the force which works birth and
growth in the sublunar world) is not subject to the direction or control of the God
who governs the heavens. On the question whether φῶς is subject to God, see
Corp. III.
materials (viz. ἐλη and ψυχή) needed for ποίησις. (We might either cut out τῆς ποίησις, or take it to be a corruption of something like εἰς τὴν ποίησιν.) In the view of the writer, ποίησις is the making of ζωντα; and ζωντα are made by joining together ἐλη and ψυχή. This work can only be done if there is in existence a stock of ἐλη and a stock of ψυχή for the ποίησις to draw on. Assuming that there are two ποίησις, which of the two has the stock of ἐλη and ψυχή at his disposal?

With μᾶς ὁστος τῆς ἐλης καὶ μᾶς τῆς ψυχῆς, compare Ascl. Lat. I. 3 a: mundus (ἐλη) unus, anima (ψυχή) una. The writer's notion of μᾶς ψυχή may have been suggested by the Stoic conception of living fire or πνεῦμα pervading the universe. See Corp. X. 7: ἀπὸ μᾶς ψυχῆς τῆς τοῦ παντὸς κ.ἄ.λ.

The view that ψυχή as well as ἐλη existed before the making of the Kosmos occurs in Plut. Quaest. Plat. 4. 1003: ἦ μὲν γὰρ ἄνων ψυχή καὶ τὸ ἀμορφὸν σῶμα συνύπαρχον ἄλλης αἰεί, καὶ οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν γένεσιν ἤσχεν σῶσ' ἄρχην ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ψυχή νοὺς μετέλαβε καὶ ἀρμονίας, καὶ γενομένη διὰ συμφωνίας ζημίας, μεταβολῆς αἰτία γένον τῇ ἐλη, ... οὕτω τὸ σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου γένεσιν ἤσχεν ὑπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. And the same doctrine is more fully expounded in Plut. De an. procr. in Timaeo 5-7, 1013 f ff. Plutarch there says that, before the demiurgia, there existed, not mere empty space, but ἐλη ἀτάκτως κινομένη, that is to say, ἐλη animated by ἀτάκτως ψυχή. The Demiurgus did not create either σῶμα or ψυχή out of nothing; both already existed, but existed in a chaotic condition. But the Demiurgus brought the ἀτάκτως ψυχή to order by putting νοῦς into it; the ἄνων ψυχή which was thus brought into existence changed the disorderly movement of ἐλη into an orderly movement; and so the Kosmos came into being. The disorder of Chaos was not however completely abolished; in the world as we know it, ἀτάκτως ψυχή is still at work side by side with ἄνων ψυχή; and the evil in the world is wrought by the ἀτάκτως ψυχή. (In Plut. Is. et Os., this ἀτάκτως ψυχή is mythically symbolized by Typhon.) In this theory of Plutarch we may see a partial analogy to the Hermetist's notion of a pre-existing stock of ψυχή. But there is an important difference; the writer of XI. ii speaks of ἐλη and ψυχή as existing apart from one another until

1 In the Timaeus, two different and inconsistent accounts of what existed before the demiurgia stand side by side. In Tim. 52 a, the ὑπόθεσις is identified with χώμα, i.e. empty space; but in other passages, we are told that the Demiurgus found already in existence something ἀτάκτως κινομένων. Plutarch adopts and amplifies the second of these two notions.
the 'Maker' joins them together, whereas Plutarch's view is that the chaotic ψυχή was already embodied in the chaotic ζωή. In this respect then, the pre-existing ψυχή of XI. ii corresponds to the νοσ which Plutarch's Demiurgus introduced into the pre-existing chaos, rather than to Plutarch's ἀτακτος ψυχή.

§ 10. τὰ δὲ μὴ ζωτα ζωή [πάλιν] καθ' ἑαυτήν ἐστι. There are no 'things without life' in actual existence. (Cf. § 14 b, πάντα ζωά ἐστι.) The Maker never desists from his work of maintaining, or renewing from moment to moment, the union of ψυχή with ζωή; and ζωή by itself never presents itself in our experience. It is possible, however, to form an abstract conception of τὰ μὴ ζωτα, and to talk about them, as one might talk about τὸ μὴ ὅν; and at this stage of his argument, the teacher falls into the common practice of speaking of the activity of the Maker as if it were occasional and intermittent, or had taken place once for all.

καὶ ψυχὴ ὁμιός καθ' ἑαυτήν, τῷ πονητῇ παρακειμένη, τῆς ζωῆς οὐσία (αιτία MSS.). The meaning must be that ψυχή is the substance of which life is made, and that, before the Maker does his work of making ζωτα, this substance exists apart from ζωή. The word αἰτία could hardly be used to signify 'the substance of which a thing is made'; and the Hermetist probably wrote οὐσία, which was commonly used in that sense by the Stoics. The construction of this sentence is not clear; what verb is to be supplied with καὶ ψυχή κ.τ.λ.? Perhaps there is some slight error in the text.

Where and how does ψυχή exist 'by itself'? It does not follow, because 'ζωή by itself' is a mere abstraction, that the same must be said of 'ψυχή by itself' also; and perhaps the writer held that there is a universal unembodied ψυχή, which exists in close connexion with God (τῷ θεῷ παρακειμένη), and of which the several ψυχαὶ of individual organisms are separated portions. (Cf. Corp. X. 7.) A Platonist of the usual type might have said that 'ψυχή by itself' exists ἐν τῷ νοστῷ; and the writer of XI. ii might accordingly have said that it exists ἐν τῷ ἀσωματώ (that is, in God's mind), since τὸ ἀσώματος is his equivalent for Plato's νοστόν; but it is assumed that the pupil is not yet acquainted with the conception of τὸ ἀσώματος. (See § 17 a.)

Πῶς οὖν... (τῆς... τῶν ἀθανάτων.) My rewriting of this corrupt passage probably gives the author's meaning, or something not far from it, though his exact words can hardly be recovered.

§ II. καὶ γὰρ μία ψυχῆ, καὶ μία ζωή, καὶ μία ζωή. The order of
the three substantives is hardly satisfactory. It would seem better either to omit καὶ μία ἡμῖν, or to write μία ψυχὴ καὶ μία ὑλή, καὶ μία ἡμῖν. 'soul is one and matter is one, and life (resulting from the union of soul with matter throughout the universe) is one.'

τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὁμολόγησας ἐνα εἶναι. Neither the teacher nor the pupil has expressly said this before; but it may perhaps be held to be implied in the description of the ordered universe in § 7, to which the pupil gave tacit assent.

καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἕνα, καὶ τὴν σελήνην μίαν. It might be objected that, if the Sun is one and the Moon is one, Sun and Moon are two; and that the recognition of Sun and Moon as distinct deities, if it has any bearing on the question at all, tells in favour of pluralism rather than monism. But if the text is sound, the writer's meaning must have been that each of these deities discharges a certain function for the whole universe, and not for a part of it alone, and therefore a fortiori the higher function of putting life into matter throughout the universe must be assigned to a single Being. Yet a difficulty remains; for it would seem from § 7 that the operation of the Moon is limited to the sublunar region; and if so, how can the instance of the Moon be used to prove that all ζωα, celestial and terrestrial alike, are made by one God? There is certainly some confusion of thought; but that is hardly a sufficient reason for concluding that the words καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ... μίαν are an interpolation.

καὶ [θειότητα] τῆν γῆν μίαν. θειότητα is meaningless; and as γῆ was spoken of in connexion with θεος and σελήνη in § 7, it is to be presumed that τῆν γῆν is the right reading.

εἰ πολλοί (ἐν πολλῷ MSS.), γελοιότατον. There are many θεοὶ; but there is only one Being to whom the name ὁ θεός applies. γελοιότατον has been duplicated by error; it is rightly placed here, and wrongly above.

§ 14 b. (ἐὰν ἄρα ... γίνεται πάντα.) This passage has no connexion with the topic discussed in the latter part of § 14 a, viz. the ceaselessness of God's life-giving work. On the other hand, it fits in well at the place where I have put it. At the beginning of § 11, the writer sets out to prove that all things are made by one God; and that is precisely the conclusion arrived at in § 14 b. But the conclusion is reached by two stages; it is shown, firstly, that God is one (ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ ὁ θεός), and secondly (καὶ πάλιν), that all things are made by this one God (ἔπο τοῦ θεοῦ ἄρα γίνεται πάντα).
In εἰς ἄρα καὶ ὁ θεός, the καὶ may be taken as referring back to κόσμον, ἥλιον, σελήνην, and γῆν.

καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφαντῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ. Both here and in § 12 a init. (καὶ ἀθανασίαν καὶ μεταβολὴν ποιεῖν), the writer is still contending against the theory that τὰ ἀθάνατα are made by one Demiurgus, and τὰ θητὰ by another.

§ 13 a. [Ἐν τῷ καὶ ψυχῆν] καὶ ἀθανασίαν καὶ μεταβολὴν ποιεῖν. ἀθανασίαν καὶ μεταβολὴν stand for ἀθάνατα καὶ μεταβλητά (i.e. θνητά). The writer's doctrine is not that God makes ψυχῆν, but that God puts pre-existing ψυχῆν into pre-existing ζωή, and thereby makes ζωντα. The words καὶ ψυχῆν must therefore be struck out. We might either strike out ψυχῆ also, or write ψωμ (αιτίω δεν). Compare XI. i. 5 as emended: τίς ἄλλος αἰτίως ζωής, καὶ ἀθανασίας καὶ μεταβολῆς ποιητῆς;

σοὶ τοσαῦτα ποιοῦστοι. God 'makes' different things, viz. immortal and mortal ζωή; the same man 'does' different things, e.g. he both speaks and hears. But ποιεῖν may signify either 'to make' or 'to do'; and by the use of the same verb with reference to both God and man, the analogy between God's actions and man's actions is made to appear closer than it really is. The effect of the Greek can be more nearly reproduced in French than in English; 'Quoi d’étonnant que Dieu fasse... l’immortalité (et) le changement, quand toi-même tu fais tant d’actions différentes?’ (Ménard.)

καὶ γὰρ βλέπεις... καὶ πνεῖς. The human functions mentioned in this list are oddly selected and arranged. Why should 'speaking' be put among the bodily senses? And why should 'thinking' be inserted between 'walking' and 'breathing'? There can be little doubt that the list was originally shorter; but it is difficult to guess which of the verbs were included in its earliest form. Perhaps πνεῖς may have come by duplication from θνητῆς, and the corresponding words καὶ ἄλλος οὐ νοῦν may have been subsequently added below. Possibly the author wrote only καὶ γὰρ λαλεῖς καὶ διάκονος, καὶ περιπατεῖς καὶ ἀναπνεῖς. Since the pupil is taking part in a dialogue, he may be said to be actually 'speaking and hearing'; and locomotion and respiration might be mentioned as functions which belong to him in common with all terrestrial animals.

§ 12 b. ἐν τούτων καταργηθῆς, οδέκτη ζῷον εἰ. A man does not cease to be a ζῷον if he is deprived of sight or hearing; we must therefore understand τούτων to mean 'all these functions together'. It might be held that some kind of αἰωνιός, some kind of spon-
taneous κῖνσις (such as τὸ περικατεῖν), and ἀναστορία, are indispensable for the existence of a ζωή.

ἀν ἐκεῖνων καταργηθῆ, δὲ θεὸς . . . ὁ θεὸς . . . ὁ θεὸς . . . θεὸς. ἐκεῖνων means τοῦ τα ᾠδῶντα καὶ τα θυγατία ποιεῖν. Cf. XI. i. 5: οὗ γὰρ ἀργὸς ὁ θεὸς κ.τ.λ. Corp. XVI. 19: οὔκ ἀν ποτὲ παύσατο (ποιῶν ὁ θεός), ἕκει καὶ αὐτῶς ἀπαυστὸς.

§ 13 b. τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι τὸ ἄγαθόν. [τοῦτο ἔστιν ὁ θεός.] The words τοῦτο ἔστιν ὁ θεός were probably added by some one who wished to insist on the identification of the Good with God. Cf. καὶ τὸ ἄγαθόν, repeatedly inserted after ὁ θεός καὶ πατήρ in Corp. X.

§ 17 c. ((ἀγαπᾶρ γὰρ . . . καὶ ᾧ ὀμοιεῖν.) This passage, misplaced in the MSS., deals with the subject discussed in §§ 13 and 14; and the term τὸ ἄγαθόν connects it especially with § 13 b in. It seems clear therefore that it must have originally stood here. There is some obscurity in the transition from the first sentence of 17 b (ἀγαπᾶρ γὰρ . . . τὸ ἄγαθόν) to the second (τοῦτο γὰρ . . . ᾧ ὀμοιεῖν); and the meaning becomes clearer if we insert between them the words ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ἢ φιλανθρ., ἡ ζωή, which make confusion where they stand in the MSS. God's work is to produce that which is good; and that means, to make things live.

§ 14 a. Τὸ τοῦ ὁλοκλήρου ὁλοκλήρου γεννήσαι. God is 'the Father' of the universe and all things in it; and human procreation is a type or image of God's creative energy. The human father generates life in a single child; God generates life in all things. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 20 b., and Corp. II. 17 a.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἥκει συνεργόν. Cf. Corp. VI. 1 b: οὔτε συμψυχών ἔστιν αὐτῷ, [ ] οὐ διασπορήσεται.

αὐτός ἐν τοῖς ποιεῖ. If the text is sound, the writer here says that God not only makes ζωή (or ζωτα), but is himself the ζωή (or the ζωτα) which he makes. Cf. Corp. XVI. 19: πάντα οὖν ποιῶν λαυτὸν πουί. It is of course possible to say that 'God is life'; but it seems strange to combine in one clause the two verbally inconsistent propositions 'God makes life' and 'God is life'. (There is the
same sort of difficulty in § 14 b, in the words ἄνθ (sc. ὑψή) ἄττικ θεός, followed by ύπν τοῦ θεοῦ ἄρα γίνεται πάντα. Possibly the author may have written ἄνθος ἦν εἰς ζοι; cf. XI. i. 6 a, ὁ γὰρ ποιῶν ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστι.

εἰ γὰρ χωρισθεὶς ἄτομοι, πάντα μὲν συμπεπεισθαί, πάντα δὲ τεθνησθαί ἀνάγκη. Cf. Augustine, quoted by Inge, Personal idealism and mysticism, p. 79: 'If God were to cease speaking the Word even for a moment, heaven and earth would vanish.'

εἰ δὲ πάντα ὕψα (legendum ἕβαντε ἀτο? [μία δὲ καὶ ἡ ὑψή;]) (...). The sentence here breaks off, and three unconnected fragments follow. The words μία δὲ καὶ ἡ ὑψή are probably a misplaced doublet of μία δὲ κατὰ πάντων ὑψή in § 14 b.

§ 14 c. [ἡ ὑψή δὲ ἐστὶν ἐννοι [νοῦ] (σώματος) καὶ ψυχῆς. θάνατος δὴ σόκτε ἀπόλεια τῶν συναχθέντων, διάλυσις δὲ τῆς ἐνύσωσις ἐστι.] In place of νοῦ, we must read either σώματος or Ἵλης. If we read σώματος, the definition of θάνατος agrees with Pl. Phaedo 67 D: τοῦτο γε θάνατος ὄνομαζεται, λόγος καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος.

But this definition of the terms ὑψή and θάνατος is inconsistent with what precedes and follows. ὑψή is spoken of elsewhere in this Libellus as if it were a substantive thing; but ἐννοι σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς is merely a συμβεβηκός of things. We have been told in § 14 b that μία κατὰ πάντων ὑψή ύπν τοῦ θεοῦ γίνεται; but what could be meant by saying that there is μία κατὰ πάντων ἐννοι σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς? And in § 15 b, we are told that at the dissolution of the body ἡ ὑψή εἰς τὸ ἀφανὲς χαρέi (i.e. disappears from our view, but continues to exist); but how could this be said of the ἐννοι σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς? Moreover, in § 14 c θάνατος is spoken of as something that really occurs; but the words τὴν μεταβολὴν θανάτον φασίν εἶναι in § 15 b imply that there is in reality no such thing as θάνατος. And to this it may be added that the meaning of διάλυσις in § 14 c differs from that of διαλύσθησι in § 15 b. The διάλυσις spoken of in § 14 c is the separation of soul and body from one another; the διάλυσις spoken of in § 15 b is the 'dissolution' or 'decomposition' of the body, i.e. the separation and dispersion of the material elements of which the body is composed. Hence it may be inferred that § 14 c was not written by the author of the Libellus, but is a note appended by some one else.

§ 15 a. [τοῖνυ εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ αἰῶν, ... τοῦ δὲ ἡλίου δ ἀνθρωπός.] This passage has nothing to do with the subject discussed in XI. ii. It was evidently written in imitation of the sentences in XI. i. 2;
but it would not be in place there, as it substitutes a different series, viz. θεός, αιών, κόσμος, ἥλιος, ἀνθρώπος, for the series dealt with in all the formulae of XI. i. 2, viz. θεός, αιών, κόσμος, χρόνος, γένεσις.


τοῦ δὲ αἰῶνος (εἰκών) ὁ κόσμος. Cf. Pl. Tim. 92 c: ὁδε ὁ κόσμος, . . . εἰκὼν τοῦ ποιητοῦ (ἀλ. νοητοῦ) θεὸς αἰσθητός. Ascl. Lat. I. 10: '(deus) cuius sunt imaginis duae mundus et homo.' Corp. VIII. 2: πρῶτος . . . ὁ δημιουργὸς τῶν ἰδίων θεός· δεύτερος δὲ ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἑν' αὐτὸν γενόμενον (i.e. the Kosmos).1 The writer of § 15 a had some such statement as that in mind, and modified it by interposing the αἰῶν of XI. i between God and the Kosmos. Perhaps he identified 'the Aeon' with the νοητὸς κόσμος, of which the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος is an image or copy.

tοῦ δὲ κόσμου (εἰκών) ὁ ἥλιος, τοῦ δὲ ἥλιου ὁ ἀνθρώπος. The Sun, being the greatest of individual ζώα, might be called an εἰκών of the Kosmos, which is the all-inclusive ζώον; and worshippers of the Sun-god, whether Mithraists or adherents of the old solar cults of Egypt and Syria, would readily accept the statement that man is made in the image of Helios, who was depicted in human form in their temples. It was a commonplace to say that man is a microcosm, i.e. εἰκών τοῦ κόσμου; and the writer of § 15 a interposed the Sun between the Kosmos and man, just as he interposed 'the Aeon' between God and the Kosmos.

§ 15 b. . . . Some connecting words have been lost; but the lacuna is probably not large. The words πάντα ὁ τεθνηκόσμος ἀνάγκη in § 14 a suggested the thought of death; and the writer here proceeds to explain that there is really no such thing as death (cf. Corp. VIII init.), and that what men call death ought rather to be called μεταβολή. The lost beginning of § 15 b may perhaps have been to this effect: (ἀποθνῄσκει μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν, μεταβάλλεται τὰ τὰ ἐπίγεια πάντα;) τὴν δὲ μεταβολὴν κ.τ.λ.

τὴν δὲ ζωήν εἰς τὸ ἀφανὲς χωρεῖν. ζωή is imperishable; but at the dissolution of an individual organism, the ζωή which was in it

1 Compare Plut. Quaest. Plat. 8. 4. 6, 1007 δ (Duebner): εἰλάνες δὲ εἰλαν ἀμφώ (τ. τ. ὁ κόσμος καὶ ὁ χρόνος) τοῦ θεοῦ, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὁ κόσμος, τῆς δ' ἀδιάθητος ὁ χρόνος ἐν κυβερνής, "καθάπερ ἐν γενεσία θεὸς ὁ κόσμος". The passage might be emended thus: εἰλάνες δὲ εἰλαν ἀμφώ τοῦ θεοῦ, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὁ κόσμος (ἐν γενεσίαις), τῆς δ' ἀδιάθητος ὁ χρόνος ἐν κυβερνής. The words καθάπερ [ἐν γενεσίαις] (ἀλθετῶ) θεὸς ὁ κόσμος (cf. Pl. Tim. 92 c quoted above) are probably an appended note.
(or the ψυχή in which its ζωή resided) 'passes away out of our sight'. Where does it go? The writer does not here tell us; but we must suppose his view to have been either that the portion of life which has quitted the individual goes back into the undivided stock of life or soul which is 'laid up in God's keeping' (ψυχή... καθ' εαυτήν, τῷ ποιητῷ παρακείμενη, § 10), or else, that it passes immediately into other organisms which are just coming into existence. When we are observing the cessation of life in this or that particular ζωή, we do not notice the beginnings of fresh life which are simultaneously taking place elsewhere; and so that portion of the universal life may be said to 'pass away out of our sight'. If the author were speaking as a Platonist, he ought rather to have said that the disembodied ψυχή, with its inherent ζωή, retains its individual personality, and continues to exist as a distinct and separate being; but his conception of ψυχή and ζωή resembles that of the Stoics rather than that of Plato.

ταύτα ἔστι τὰ τοῦ κόσμου πάθη, 'διέσχεις τε καὶ κρύφεις' καὶ ἡ μὲν διέσχεις στροφή, ἢ δὲ κρύφεις ἀνανέωσις.1 The meaning which the context seems to require is that 'the things which befall the Kosmos' are not deaths, but renewals of life, which vanishes in one place only to reappear in another; and the ἀνανέωσις spoken of must be this perpetual renewal of life. But I can make nothing of the words given by the MSS.1

§ 16 a. παντόμορφος δὲ ἐστιν (sc. ὁ κόσμος). In Ascl. Lat. III. 19 b, παντόμορφος is a name or epithet of the Zodiac, regarded as the deity who assigns to all individuals born on earth their several forms. But in Corp. XI. ii, the word is used without any suggestion of astral influences; and the meaning is that the Kosmos, in its various parts, assumes (successively) all possible forms, or passes through all possible changes. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 36: 'et mundus speciem mutat' &c. Plut. Is. et Os. 53: ἡ γὰρ Ἰσίς ἔστι μὲν τὸ τῆς φύσεως θῆλη καὶ δεκτικὸν ἀπάτης γενέσεως... ἤτο δὲ τῶν πολλῶν μυριώνυμοι κέκληται, διὰ τὸ πάσας ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τρεπομένη μορφᾶς δέχεσθαι καὶ ἴδεις.

ὁ δὲ μορφᾶς ἐγκείμενας ἔχων ἐν εαυτῷ, [[&]] αὐτὸς ([[&]]) μεταβάλλων. The writer seems to be guarding against a possible misinterpretation of the word παντόμορφος. It might be supposed that the Kosmos

1 A sense consistent with what precedes could be got by writing ταύτα ἔστιν τὰ τοῦ κόσμου πάθη, διαλύεσθαι τε καὶ κρύφεις (i.e. διαλύεσθαι σωμάτων καὶ κρύφεις ζωής). καὶ τῇ μὲν διαλύει (ἐπταί συ)στροφή (= σύντασις), τῇ δὲ κρύφει (φανέρωσις).

1884-5

Y
is itself changeless, but contains within it things which change their forms. He rejects this view, and asserts that the Kosmos itself changes, i.e. assumes different forms in succession. But if this is his meaning, it is obscurely expressed; he ought rather to have written something like ὅτα μεταμορφοῦμενα ἔγκειμενα ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

§ 16 b. ἐπει δὲν ὁ κόσμος παντόμορφος γέγονεν, ὁ ποιήσας τί ἄν εἰ; Does God himself ‘assume all forms’? It was frequently said that he does; as for instance in an invocation addressed to the Creator (Magic Papyrus, Dieterich Abraxas, p. 176, Reitzenstein Poim. p. 22): ἐπικαλοῦμαι σε... τὸν τὰ πάντα κτίσαντα, σε τὸν αὐτογένητον θεόν... ὁ οὐδεὶς θεὸν δύναται ἴδειν τὴν ἀληθείαν μορφήν' ὁ μετα-

Universitas Morphen οἰ διά τοὺς ὀφαζόντων ἀνάρτος αἰώνων ἀιώνος... ἐπικαλοῦμαι σε, κύριε, ἵνα μοι φαύνῃ ἡ ἀληθεία σου μορφή. This implies that God has one ‘true’ form, but usually appears in other and ‘untrue’ forms; i.e. that he is usually seen, not as he is in his own being, but only as manifested in the things that he has made.

Plato, Rep. 2. 380 ff., criticizes the popular mythology, according to which the gods either ‘change their own idūs into many morpha’, or deceive men by appearing to them ἄλλον ἐν ἄλλαις ἰδίαις; and he there asserts that ὁ θεὸς ἐπιλους τί ἐστί καὶ πάντων ἴδεια τῆς ἰδιοῦ ἰδίαι ἑκβαίνει, and that ἴδεια ἐν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἰδοι ὁ θεὸς. The writer of Corp. XI. ii was very likely thinking of that passage. According to the Platonic doctrine, the Kosmos is σωματικός and μεταβλητός, but the supreme God is ἀορώματος and ἀμεταβλητός; it must therefore be an error to say that the supreme God assumes different forms in succession; and if any morphi or ἰδία is attributed to him, it must be a morphi or ἰδία ἀορώματος (i.e. νοητή, as opposed to ἀοισθητή). The Stoics, on the other hand, ignored the supracosmic God of Platonism; their supreme God corresponded to the Kosmos (ἀοισθητῦς θεός) of the Platonists, and might be said to ‘assume all forms’. Orig. c. Cels. 1. 21: ὁ θεὸς τῶν Στυκών ἐστι σῶμα, οὐκ αἰδομανόος λέγειν αὐτὸν τρεπτὸν καὶ δι᾽ ἄλλων ἄλλων καὶ μεταβλητόν. Plut. Fac. homae 12. 926 D: ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς ἱμῖν (λέγε ἱμῖν, sc. τῶν Στυκών) οὕτως οὗ τῷ μὲν αὐτοῦ φύσιν χρώματος ἐν ἑαυτῷ μέγα τῷ καὶ συνεχείς, τών δὲ ὑφείσιν καὶ κόσμους καὶ διησχημάτωσα, τῶν χρώματος γεγονός καὶ γεγονόμενον ἐν τοῖς μεταβολαῖς; The author of XI. ii then, in his discussion of the question whether one or many...
μορφαί are to be attributed to God, is maintaining the Platonic doctrine against that of the Stoics.

ἀμορφὸς μὲν γὰρ μὴ γένειτο. ἀμορφὸς often means ‘misshapen’ or ‘ugly’, and in that sense at least cannot be applicable to God. Besides, to deny that God has any μορφή would almost amount to denying his existence. The writer does not belong to that school of Platonists who refused to ascribe any qualities or attributes to God, and defined him only by negatives. He differs from Plotinus, who says (6. 9. 4) that ‘the One’ is ἀμορφὸς καὶ μορφῆς νοητῆς, and ἀνειδον, πρὸ εἰδους ἐν παντός.

μίαν οὖν ἔχει ἴδεαν. The words ἴδεα and μορφή are here synonymous, as they are in Pl. Rep. 2. 380, referred to above. But the writer probably preferred to use ἴδεα in speaking of God, because μορφή was more commonly used in the sense of forma visibilis, and ἀνειδον μορφή would therefore sound more paradoxical than ἀσώματος ἴδεα.

[ἐι τις ἴστιν αὐτῶ ἴδεα (ἱδέα MSS.)]. This is inconsistent with ἀμορφὸς μὴ γένειτο. It must have been added by some one who hesitated to ascribe ‘form’ to God. Cf. Corp. XII. i. 1: ἐι γέ τις ἴστιν οὔ οὖν θεῷ.

οἷς ὑποσταῖν. For the omission of ἄν, cf. Corp. IX. 8 fin.

[καὶ πάσας διὰ τῶν συμμάτων δείκνυσι.] If we retain these words, we must take them to mean that God, though he does not himself appear in visible forms, imposes such forms on bodies, and thereby enables us to see the forms. But this is not satisfactory. The phrase πάσας μορφὰς δεικνύει ought rather to mean ‘to present all forms’, i.e. ‘to appear in all forms’; the subject ought therefore to be ὁ κόσμος rather than ὁ θεὸς. Perhaps the clause originally formed part of the missing passage before παντόμορφος ἐί ἴστιν in § 16 a, where the writer was speaking of the forms assumed by the Kosmos.

§ 17 a. μὴ θυμάσθης ἐι ἴστι τις ἀσώματος ἴδεα. The teacher assumes that the conception of τὸ ἀσώματος is new to his pupil. If so, Platonists could not have been included among the ‘many men’ whom the pupil had already heard speaking ‘about the All and God’ (§ 1 b).

ἐστι γὰρ ὀπερ ἡ (τοῦ λόγου) καὶ ἐν τοῖς γραφαῖς κ.τ.λ. The phrase ἡ (ἰδέα) τοῦ λόγου might perhaps mean the rhetorical or literary style of a speech. Cf. Isocr. 5. 143, ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰλόμεν ἀποσχέσθαι τῆς τοιαύτης ἴδεας, ‘to abstain from such a style, sc. τοῦ λόγου’ (A. E.)
Taylor). Compare also σχῆμα λέξεως, 'a figure of speech'. Literary style is a form, but not a 'corporeal' form; it is not a thing that we can perceive with our bodily senses. But if the writer had intended to mention literary style as an instance of an ἄσωματος ἴδεα, he would surely have expressed his meaning more fully and clearly. It seems best therefore to bracket ἡ τοῦ λόγου.

Ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς ἀκρόρειαι ὄρωνται μὲν [γάρ] πάνυ ἱδέχουσαι. Suppose that you are looking at a picture of an undulating tract of country. The ἴδεα in this case is the shape of the undulations. But there are no undulations in the σῶμα at which you are looking; the object before you is a flat surface daubed with colours. The ἴδεα then is not in the σῶμα; it is an ἄσωματος ἴδεα. It exists; but (supposing the landscape depicted to be imaginary) it exists only in someone's mind, and not in any σῶμα.

The instance however does not seem very happily chosen. It is not true that there are no undulations of any sort in the picture; for the vertical undulations of the mountain-ridge are represented in the picture on the wall by vertically undulating lines. The writer's meaning would therefore have been more clearly expressed if, instead of speaking of the varying height of the parts of the thing depicted, he had spoken of their varying distance from the eye, and said that the ἴδεα of a scene including near and distant objects is presented to us, though the σῶμα at which we are looking is a flat board.

According to the Platonists, the best preparation for dealing with νοητά or ἄσωματα is the study of geometry. The writer of XI. ii is precluded from using the conceptions of geometry for this purpose, because he has determined to assume no previous training in the pupil. But the instance of the picture is a geometrical instance in disguise; the ἴδεα ἄσωματος in this case, viz. the shape of the mountain, is a geometrical figure in three dimensions, represented by a diagram in two dimensions.

§§ 17 B–20 A. ἰννοθεσ ἢ . . . ταύτην, (τὸ) δλον. In this passage the order and connexion of the sentences is very doubtful; but I suppose the meaning to have been as follows: 'Grasp boldly the conception of an ἄσωματος ἴδεα, and realize that God is ἄσωματος; then you will see the true meaning of the statement that God contains all things. Things are in God, not as bodies are in another body, but as thoughts are in the mind of the thinker.'

§ 17 B. ἀληθετερον [ὅ] ἰννοθεσ τὸν περιέχωντα τὰ πάντα). The
words νόησον τόν περιέχοντα τὰ πάντα are unintelligible where they stand in § 18; and something of the sort is wanted here. The whole paragraph is an explanation of the statement 'God contains all things', or 'all things are in God'.

§ 18. ἡ μὲν τῶν λεγομένων ἡδίων ἐννοοῦν ἐξειν ὑπειλεί. Some terms or phrases must (under special circumstances) be taken in a special sense. Thus the phrase τὸ περιέχειν (‘to contain things’), when used with reference to God, must be taken in a sense compatible with the truth that God is ἀσώματος, and not in the sense in which it is used when we are speaking of bodies.

δὲ μὲν γὰρ τόπος [καὶ] σῶμα εἶστιν. It seems strange to say that τόπος is a body. The statement is in verbal contradiction to Corp. II. 4 a (ἀσώματος οὖν ὁ τόπος); but in that passage, ὁ τόπος means extracosmic space, or rather, the divine νοῦς with which extracosmic space is filled. Here, if σῶμα is the right reading, ὁ τόπος must mean the larger body in which a smaller body is contained. But perhaps the author wrote σωμάτων περιεχόμενον ἐστι ἢ σωμάτων περιεχόμενον ἐστι, or something to that effect.

καὶ (τὰν) σῶμα (κινητὸν) τὸ ὁμοίως ἀκίνητον. The preceding μὲν requires an answering δὲ; it is therefore certain that some words have fallen out here.

τὰ (ἐν αὐτῷ) καὶ μένα κίνησιν οὐκ ἔχει. ‘Things situated in the incorporeal’ (i.e. thoughts in the mind) are not κινητά, if we take κίνησιν in the literal and physical sense; they do not move from place to place.

§ 19. καὶ τοῦτο (οὖν MSS.) νόησον ἀπὸ σεαυτοῦ. ‘This’ (τοῦτο) is the fact that τὸ ἀσώματον (i.e. mind or thought) is capable of containing all things (πᾶντων περιεχόμενων). Any man can see that this is true of his own mind or thought; therefore a fortiori it must be true of the mind or thought of God. The difference between man and God is this, that a man can (in thought) place himself anywhere, whereas God is everywhere at once. But we are afterwards told that it is possible for a man to free himself from his limitations, and 'make himself equal to God' in this respect.

Your mind 'contains all things', at least potentially. You can think of anything in the universe, and even of things beyond the limits of the universe; and anything of which you think is 'contained in' your mind. The point of this passage is somewhat obscured by the use of the phrase 'bid your soul go to' this place or that, which might seem to imply that the mind does not 'contain'
things, but merely travels through space from one thing to another. But the writer guards against this misunderstanding by adding οὐς μεταβάσας ἀπὸ τόπων εἰς τόπον, ἄλλα ὡς έκκλεσίά. Before you thought of that particular place, your mind was already there; it is (potentially) everywhere, and therefore must be capable of including all things. The ταχύτης spoken of does not mean swiftness of movement through space; but the writer employs this word to express the instantaneousness with which the mind finds itself present anywhere at will.

Compare Lactantius De opif. dei 16. 9 f.: ‘An potest aliquis non admirari quod sensus ille vivus atque caelestis, qui mens vel animus nuncupatur, . . . tantae celeritatis (est), ut uno temporis puncto caelum omne conlustrret, si velit, maria pervolet, terras et urbem peragret, omnia denique quae libuerit, quamvis longe lateque submota sint, in conspectu sibi ipse constitutum? Et miratur aliquis si divina mens dei per universas mundi partes intenta discurrat et omnia regit, omnia moderatur, ubique praesens, ubique diffusa, cum tanta sit vis ac potestas mentis humanae intra mortae corpus inclusae, ut ne saepis quidem gravis huius ac pigrī corporis, cum quo inligata est, coercerī ullo modo possit quominus sibi liberam vagandī facultatem quīeti impatiens largiatur?’

καλεσών σου τῇ ψυχῇ εἰς ἡν δὴ (δὲ MSS.) καὶ (βαλεὶ γὴν) πορευ-θῆναι. By ψυχή is here meant the νοερὰ ψυχῆ or νοῦς. The word ἐκείνη, which is substituted for εἰς ἡν δὴ καὶ in Turn., must have come from the following ἐκαὶ. We need γῆν to contrast with ὄκειων.

The reflection that a man can send his thought, or transfer himself in thought, to any place at will, occurs in Homer; and the ‘swiftness’ of thought was already proverbial in Homeric times. Il. 15. 80: ὡς δ' ἄν ἄληθεν νόος ἄνερος, δ' ε' ἐπὶ πολλὴν | γαίαν ἀληθῶς φρει πευκάλμησι νοσή | "ἐνθ' εἶπ' ἡ ἐθνα", . . . | ὡς κρατήσει μεμανία διάπτατο ποντία Ἡρα. Od. 7. 36: τῶν νέως ἀκείαί ὅσκαί πτερῶν ἢ νόμα. Hymn. Apoll. 186 (Pythk. 8): ἔθεδο δὲ πρὸς "Ολυμπόν ἀπὸ χθόνος, ὡς τε νόμα, | εἰς Δῶς πρὸς δῶμα. Compare the saying ascribed to Thales in Diog. Laert. 1. 35: τάχυστον νοῦς διὰ παντὸς γὰρ τρέχει. Ascl. Lat. 1. 6 a: ‘omnia illi licent (i. e. omnia acumine mentis adire homini licet) . . . omnia idem est, et ubique idem est.’ Also Corp. X. 25.

οὐ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου πῦρ, [οὖς ὁ αἰθήρ,] οὖς ἡ (τῶν ἀστέρων) διήν. The solar sphere is a region of burning heat; cf. πῦρ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ κατὰ in § 7. If we retain οὖς ὁ αἰθήρ, we must understand the αἰθήρ to be
an element distinct from πῦρ, and situated above the region of fire; and it must in that case be presumed that the writer borrowed the notion of ἀληθῆ as a distinct element from the Aristotelians. But the view that ἀληθῆ in that sense is limited to the region above the solar sphere does not, as far as I know, occur elsewhere; and it seems most likely that the words οὐχὶ ὧν ἀληθῆ have been inserted by a later hand. The δύνη cannot be the movement of the outermost sphere, or that of the fixed stars; for we are told that τὸ ἐσχάτον σῶμα is not reached until the δύνη has been passed. It must therefore be the movement of the planet-spheres; and τῶν ἀστερῶν is needed to give it that meaning.

[οὐχὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστερῶν σωματα.] This cannot be right. σωματα does not correspond satisfactorily with πῦρ and δύνη; and the chance of colliding with 'the body' of one of the six 'other planets' in the course of the imaginary ascent is too small to be worth mentioning. But it is necessary for the ascending mind to pass through the δύνη of the planets, i.e. the revolving spheres to which they are affixed.

ἀυτὸ (τὸ) ἄλοιο διαρρήξωθαί: 'to break your way out of the material universe'; i.e. to break through the outermost sphere, and pass out into extracosmic space. Cf. Lucr. 1. 73 (of Epicurus): 'ergo vivida vis animi pervicit, et extra | processit longe flammantia moenia mundi, | atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoque.' In Corp. I. 13 b, we are told that the Archanthropos ἴπτων ἐποιήσατο τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τῶν κύκλων κτλ.; i.e. he broke a passage for himself downward through the sky.

τὰ ἐκτός, εἶ γέ τι ἐκτός τοῦ κόσμου. Cf. Corp. IV. 5: τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ, καὶ εἶ τι ὑπὲρ οὐρανῶν. Ascl. Lat. III. 33 a: 'quod dicitur extra mundum, si tamen est aliquid.' In Ascl. Lat. III, we are told that the extracosmic space is 'plenum intellegibilium rerum' (πλήρες νοημῶν).

§ 20 a. τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον νόησον τὸν θεόν, ὡσπερ νοήματα, πάντα ἐν δαίμον ἔχειν. The emphasis is on τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὡσπερ νοήματα. When it is said that 'all things are in God', the meaning of the statement is that all things are thought by God, or are God's thoughts.1

Most of the later Platonists regarded τὰ νοητὰ εἶδη as τοῦ θεοῦ νοήματα (see e.g. Albinus, Epitome, 9: ή ἀίδια, ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, 1 Cw. W. James, Pragmatism, p. 145: 'The great monistic Denkmittel for a hundred years past has been the notion of the one Knowe. The many exist only as objects for his thought—exist in his dream, as it were.'
νόητας αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ.; but the Platonists in general, whether they spoke of τὰ νοητὰ as existing independently of God or as existing in God's thought, sharply distinguished τὰ νοητὰ from τὰ αἰσθητά, and did not say that the latter are τοῦ θεοῦ νόηματα. The position of the writer of XI. ii appears to be somewhat different. He seems here to imply that the concrete and spatially extended world in all its detail exists in and is constituted by God's thought. A Platonist of the usual type might have said that God 'contains in himself', as his thought, a νοητὸς κόσμος which exists apart from the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος, and is the παράδειγμα of the latter; but this writer recognizes only one Kosmos, and not two; he says simply that God 'contains in himself, as his thought, the universe'. It is not quite clear, however, how this is to be reconciled with the statement in § 18, τὰ (ἐν τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ—i. e. ἐν τῷ νῦ) καὶ μὲν κόσμουν ὑμῖν ἐξει. In that passage, the 'things situated in the incorporeal' seem to be νοητά in the ordinary Platonic sense, and to be distinguished as such from the contents of the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος, which are κινητά. Perhaps the writer's meaning might be expressed by saying that the Kosmos exists in God's mind, but exists there ἀνευ ἄλητα, and consequently without spatial extension or movement. The Kosmos and all things in it are composed of ἄλη and ψυχή; but ἄλη, apart from ψυχή, has a merely potential existence. It is in virtue of their ψυχή (i. e. as ζωντα) that things actually exist; and it is the ψυχή, i. e. the life of things, that God 'contains in himself as his thought'.

We were told before, in §§ 8b–14a, that God 'makes' all things (i. e. puts life into them); we are here told that God 'thinks' all things. The writer does not bring these two propositions into connexion; but they might be combined by saying that it is God's νόησις that makes things live, or that God generates life in things by thinking them. In Corp. X. 2, a different term is used; we are there told that it is God's 'will' (θέλησις, not νόησις) that constitutes the existence of all things.

tὸν κόσμον, εαυτόν, (τῶ) διὸν. The term τὸ διὸν, which was used above to signify the material universe, has here a wider meaning, and includes both God and the Kosmos. God not only 'thinks himself', as Aristotle said, but 'thinks the Kosmos' also.

§§ 20 b, 21 a. ἦν οὖν μη σκοποῦν ἐξισοδησίᾳ τῷ θεῷ, . . . φιλοσόφων δὲ καὶ κακὸς. This paragraph contains the lesson which it is the writer's object to impress upon his readers, and to which all that
has preceded is preparatory. The good of man is ὁ ὅν θεὸν νοεῖται (§ 20 b), or ὁ ὅν θεὸν γνῶναι (§ 21 b), that is, to 'know' God, and in knowing him, to become one with him. How is a man to attain to that supreme good? The writer of XI. ii here gives his answer to that question. Spread yourself over all space and all time; expand your notion of 'yourself' till it includes the whole universe; identify yourself in thought and feeling with all living beings in all times and places, and regard the life of each and all as your own life; then you will 'know' God, for you will be as God is. The state of consciousness described is that of the man who is 'born again' in Corp. XIII. 11 b: ἐν οὐρανῷ εἰμί, ἐν γῆ, ἐν ὅθεν, ἐν ἀέρι ἐν ζῷοις εἰμί, ἐν φυτῶι ἐν γαστρί, πρὸ γαστρός, μετὰ γαστήρα πανταχοῦ (πάρεμι). And he who can speak thus θεὸς πέφυκεν, ib. 14. In Corp. XIII, these phrases are perhaps traditional, and it may be doubted whether the writer of that document fully realized their meaning. But the author of XI. ii seems to be speaking of a state of mind known to him by personal experience. He knows that it is possible to 'leap clear of all body' and 'expand oneself to the measureless magnitude' of Him who is everywhere,—to 'rise above all time' and 'become eternal',—because he himself, in some sense and in some degree, has done so.

Many people in other times and countries have had a like experience. Numerous parallels are to be found in W. James, Varieties of religious experience,¹ and in W. R. Inge, Christian mysticism, Lectures 7 and 8, 'on Nature-mysticism'. To the instances there given may be added R. Jefferies, The story of my heart, p. 8 ff.: 'Having drunk deeply of the heaven above, and felt the most glorious beauty of the day, . . . I now became lost, and absorbed into the being or existence of the universe. I felt down deep into the earth under, and high above into the sky, and farther still into the sun and stars, still farther beyond the stars into the hollow of space, and losing thus my separateness of being, came to seem like a part of the whole. . . . I came to feel the long-drawn life of the earth back into the dimmest past. . . . From all the ages my soul desired to take that soul-life which had flowed through them. . . . I prayed . . . that I might take from all their energy, grandeur, and beauty, and gather it into me. . . . (I prayed) that

I might have the deepest of soul-life, the deepest of all, deeper far than all this greatness of the visible universe and even of the invisible. . . . The same prayer comes to me at this very hour. It is now less solely associated with (outward things). . . . It is always with me. I am it." *ib. p. 38: 'I cannot understand time. It is eternity now. I am in the midst of it. . . . Nothing has to come; it is now. . . . To the soul there is no past and no future; all is and will be ever, in now. . . . There may be time for the clock, there is none for me. . . . My soul has never been, and never can be, dipped in time.' E. Carpenter, *The art of creation*, p. 230: 'The true and ultimate Self therefore in each of us is universal and common to all beings, and yet it is also individual and specialized in a certain direction. When the more universal nature of the Self descends and becomes revealed, the consciousness of the individual necessarily takes certain forms corresponding.—One of these is Love and Sympathy. The self, hitherto deeming itself a separate atom, suddenly becomes aware of its inner unity with these other human beings, animals, plants even. It is as if a veil had been drawn aside. A deep understanding, knowledge, flows in. Love takes the place of ignorance and blindness; and to wound another is to wound oneself. It is the great deliverance from the prison-life of the separate self, and comes to the latter sometimes with the force and swiftness of a revelation.—Another form is Faith, Courage, Confidence. If I have my home in these other bodies as well as my own, if my life is indeed so wide-reaching, so universal, if I feel that it is so, what is there to fear, how can I fear? All things are given into my hands. My life checked here may flow on there; innumerable are my weapons, my resources; and rooted down, deep, below all accidents, is my real being.—Or again a strange sense of Extension comes on me, and of presence in distant space and time. Mine is an endless Life, unconquerable, limitless in subtlety and expanse; and strange intimations that it is so come to me even in my tiny earth-cell,—intimations of power inexhaustible, of knowledge mysterious and unbounded, and of far presence through all forms and ranges of being.—These are some of . . . the new modes of consciousness that come. . . . Let them be felt first.

1 Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 21 a: ἐὰν δὲ κατακλείσῃ σοι τὸν ψυχάρι ἐν τῷ σώματι.
2 XI. ii. 21 a: ἐὰν εἰση ἄφοβοιμαι τῆν καὶ βάλλων σ.τ.λ.
3 XI. ii. 20 b: μηδὲν ἄδινωτον σεαυτῷ ὑπόστησιν.
4 XI. ii. 20 b: συναισθήσω σεαυτὸν τῷ ἀμφοτέρῳ μεγάλῃ σ.τ.λ.
Do not think too much about them. When you have merged your being, if it be but for a moment, in its source, then inevitably on emerging (if union has really been effected) will one or other of these feelings that I have mentioned be found occupying your mind."

When the teacher bids his pupil πάντα ομοί νοείν, he is not bidding him merely to 'think of' things, or to form concepts of them; the νόησις of which he speaks is rather what Bergson calls 'intuition', as opposed to 'analysis'. To 'think' things, in the sense in which the term is here used, is to identify oneself with them, or include them in one's own being.

The notion of 'expanding oneself to the magnitude of the All' is expressed by Plotinus in language partly similar to that of the Hermetist. Plot. 6. 5. 7: ἀνάγεται γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ δὲν, . . . καὶ νοοῦμεν ἑκείνα, οὐκ ἐσόμελα αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τύπους ἔχοντες, εἰ δὲ μὴ τύπο, ὄντες ἑκείνα. εἰ δὲν ἀληθῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχομεν, ἑκείνα ἐσομεν. . . . ὄντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ μόνον ἡμῶν, ἑκείνα, πάντες ἐσομεν ἑκείνα πάντα ἀρα ἐσομεν ἐν. ἐξω μὲν οὖν ὀρώντες ἢ ὀδεν ἑξῆμεθα, ἀγνοοῦμεν ἐν ὑπαρ, οὖν πρόκειται πολλά εἰς τὸ ἐξο, κορυφήν ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ ὑπο μὲν. εἰ δὲ τις ἐπιστραφήναι δύναιτο, . . . θεῶν τε καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὑπαται. ὑπαται δὲ, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα, οὐχ ὀς (αὐτὸς ἢ) τὸ πᾶν ἢτ', οὐκ ἔχων ὑπατο πτήσας ὀριεῖται μέχρι τῶν αὐτῶν ὑπάτων, ἀφεῖς περιγράφειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπατο ἀπαντο αὐτῶν, εἰς ἀπαν τὸ πᾶν ἢτ', προελθὼν οὐδαμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῶν μεῖνας οὐ θέρναι τὸ πᾶν. Πο. 6. 5. 12: (τῶ) παντὶ προσηλθεῖς, καὶ οὐκ ἐμείνας ἐν μέρε αὐτῶν, οὐδ' ἐσας

1 A state of mind which has some resemblance to the 'self-expansion' of Corp. XI. ii is described in a lighter tone by A. Daudet, Lettres de mon moulin : 'J'y restais presque tout le jour dans cette espèce de stupeur et d'acciabllement délicieux que donne la contemplation de la mer. Vous connaissiez, n'est-ce pas, cette jolie griserie de l'âme? On ne pense pas, on ne rêve pas non plus. Tout votre être vous échappe, s'envole, s'émépine. On est la mouette qui plonge, la poussière d'écume qui flotte au soleil entre deux vagues, la fumée blanche de ce paquebot qui s'éloigne, ce petit corail qui voile rouge, cette perle d'eau, ce flocon de brume, tout excepté soi-même.'

2 Bergson, Introduction to metaphysics, Eng. tr. 1913, p. 6: to have intuition of a thing means 'possessing a reality absolutely instead of knowing it relatively,—placing oneself within it instead of looking at it from outside points of view'. (When Wordsworth's Peter Bell looked at the 'primrose by the river's brim', his mind presumably worked only by 'analysis', and not by 'intuition'.)

3 L. e. not merely having within us 'images' or 'impressions' of things which are outside of us.

4 Aristotle said (De an. 3. 4) that ὕπατο τῶν ἄνω ὑπατεί τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπατεί τὸ νοούμενον.

5 'Since not only I, but all others also are identical with those objects.'

6 Perhaps πάντες?

7 This ἐπιστραφή corresponds to τὸ συναγείρας λατῶν τῷ ἄμετρῷ μεγαλείσι in Corp. XI. ii. 20 b, and to the παλιγγενεσία of Corp. XIII.

8 He cannot find any fixed limit by which his personality is bounded.
The All was really present to you all the time, but you were unconscious of its presence. You had not 'departed from' it, for that is impossible; ἡ άλλα παρών (τῇ παντὶ), εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἑστράφης.

Cf. Proclus In Remp. 121. 32: διὸ καὶ τὰ λόγια (i.e. the Oracula Chaldaica) παρακλείνεται πλατύνειν ἡμῖν διὰ τῆς ἀπολύτου ἦμης (i.e. by detachment from the body) λατρεύον, ἡ ἁμὴ ἄποστευον, "πνεύμων ἰδρωτὸς ἀληθοῦς" ἐφελκομένους ἀντὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ δία ἀνατάσεως.


πάντα χρόνον ὄπερδρας αἰών(ιος) γενοῦ. Eternity is here contrasted with time, as in Pl. Tim. The meaning must be 'become eternal'. But to express this meaning, an adjective is needed. The substantive αἰών would hardly serve the purpose; neither the use of αἰών as a name or epithet of a god, nor its use in XI. i to signify the hypostatized δόναμις or ἐνεργεία of God, would justify its employment in the sense here required. But a transcriber who was not aware that XI. i and XI. ii were two different documents might easily be led to substitute αἰὼν for αἰώνιος, in consequence of the prominence of αἰὼν in XI. i. I have therefore written αἰώνιος.

σευτῶν ἂγγεια ἄθανάτων, καὶ πάντα δυνάμενον νοῆσαι, πᾶσαν μὲν τέχνην, πάσαν δὲ ἐκπειρήμην. 'Art is long, and life is short', said

---

1 I.e. you have not set a limit to the extent of your self.
2 The μὴ ἢ is δὴ. A material body has been added to you, and you have become smaller by the addition. As the Hermetist expresses it, your soul has been 'shut up in the body'.
3 I.e. having become a separate individual person (by the narrowing or separating influence of the body).
4 I.e. ἢν τὸν τὸν ἔλαφον τὸν πάταρ ἄφη.
5 As αἰών (understood as meaning del ἄφη) seems to have been sometimes used as a synonym for θέας (see note on Ascl. Lat. III. 26 b–32 a), it would perhaps be possible to take αἰών γενοῦ as equivalent to θέας γενοῦ. But no instance of that use of αἰών occurs elsewhere in the Hermetica.
Hippocrates. You must reject this limitation of man's power to get knowledge. What matter if the ego whose life is bound up with this perishable body has but a few years to learn in? That narrowly restricted ego is not your true self. Realize that you are one with all that lives, and that all life is your life; then you will be actually, what you already are potentially, ἀθάνατος and αἰώνιος.¹

παράδειγμα ἔσω ζῶν (ζῆσθαι MSS.) (. . .). A verb in the imperative ('find your home in') must have been lost. The word ζῆν in the sense of the 'haunts' of animals is frequent in all periods; but I have found no instance of ζῆς, singular, in this sense. It must be remembered that ζῶν includes every kind of corporeal and animated being, from a star-god to an insect.

[πυρός, ὀδιατός] (θερμός καὶ ψυχρός), ἔρως καὶ ἄρως. Fire and water are not ποιητήρες; and the words πυρός, ὀδιατός are probably a gloss, which has been substituted for θερμός καὶ ψυχρός. The meaning is 'identify yourself simultaneously with all parts of the universe'.

τὰ μετὰ τῶν ἀθάνατων. The text may be sound, though the grammar is confused. With this phrase we must supply νοῦσον alone, and not νοῦσον ἑαυτόν, which the preceding words require.

'The things after death' are left undescribed; this writer has nothing to say about the destiny of the individual soul when disembodied. To one who has learnt to 'contemplate all time and all existence', and to identify himself with all that he contemplates, the question what will become of him, as an individual person, after the dissolution of the body, would be negligible, if not unmeaning.

¹ The thought agrees in part with that of Browning in A Grammarian's Funeral: 'Let me know all! . . . Others mistrust, and say—"But time escapes! Live now or never!" He said, "What's time? Leave now for dogs and apes! Man has Forever." And he who says this 'throws himself on God, and unperplexed Seeking shall find him'. But the Hermetist is not here thinking, as Browning presumably was, of a continuance of the man's individual and separate personality beyond the grave; and perhaps his attitude may better be compared with that of Shelley in Adonais: 'Dust to the dust! but the pure spirit shall flow Back to the burning fountain whence it came, A portion of the Eternal, which must glow Through time and change, unquenchably the same. . . . He lives, he wakes—'tis Death is dead, not he. . . . He is made one with Nature: there is heard His voice in all her music, from the moan Of thunder, to the song of night's sweet bird; He is a presence to be felt and known In darkness and in light, from herb and stone, Spreading itself where'er that Power may move Which has withdrawn his being to its own: Which wields the world with never-wearied love, Sustains it from beneath, and kindles it above.' Shelley is speaking of one who has ceased to live in the body; but the Hermetist holds that even in this life a man may, if he will, become one with 'the Power which wields the world', and so 'become eternal'.
πράγματα, ποιότητας, ποσότητας. Here πράγματα means οвещας or ὑποκείμενα, the 'substances' in which qualities and magnitudes inhere. The use of these terms in a document in which the technical language of philosophy is deliberately avoided shows that by this time a scheme of categories based on those of Aristotle and the Stoics had passed into popular usage.


If you 'shut your soul up in your body', you have nothing in common with God, and cannot 'know' God, or have that intuition of him which would make you one with him. There is no Greek word equivalent to 'person' or 'personality'; but σῶμα, in such a connexion as this, serves to express the notion of the separate and isolated ego. To 'shut one’s soul up in one’s body' means to shut oneself up in one’s separate personality, and to be concerned solely about one’s petty personal interests. The body (or τὸ αἰσθητικόν, which has its root in the body,) is that which isolates the individual man; it is through embodiment that the human soul is individualized, and severed from 'the soul of the All' (Corp. X. 7). The body exists only at one particular place and time; and as long as a man limits himself to his body, he is tethered to that one place and that one time. Such a man is interested in things only as they affect him through his body, i.e. only so far as they are or may be productive of pleasure or pain to him through his bodily senses. He is φιλοσώματος; that is to say, he is φιλαντρος in the bad sense of that ambiguous term; he is 'self-seeking'. For him, the universe is centred in his separate and narrowly limited ego; and his life is consequently filled with selfish anxieties. He is afraid of everything around him (φοβεῖται γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν), because he thinks

1 John Smith, the 'Cambridge Platonist', speaks with similar contempt of 'a soul confined within the private and narrow cell of its own particular being'. (Inge, Christian Mysticism, p. 292.)

Something like this was already taught by Heraclitus, who seems to have held that it is the earthy element in man that separates him from the universal soul, and so causes delusion and moral evil (O. Gilbert, Grießische Religionsphilosophie, pp. 77–79). Compare Apollonius Tyaneus, Ep. 58, quoted in note on Corp. VIII. 1 b.
of things only as affecting his own private interests; he is always asking with a shudder "what is going to happen to me?"  

On the subject of separate personality, and the meaning of 'self-expansion', see Inge, Personal idealism and mysticism, ch. 4, 'The problem of personality'.

§ 21 b. ἢ γὰρ τελεία κακία τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν θεόν (τὸ θεον MSS.). Cf. Corp. X. 8 b, 9 : κακία δὲ ψυχῆς ἀγνωσία. ... ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς γνώσις.

οἰδὲς ἔστιν εὑθὺ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ φέρουσα.—(ὁ. ἤ. εὐθεία, ἱδία τ. ἡ. φ. MSS.) Probably ᾳδία was inserted here by error from the following clause, and εὐθεία was changed into εὐθεία. To know God is the good; therefore, if a man is capable of knowing God, and wills and hopes to do so, he is on the way which leads to the good. The pupil has not yet attained to gnosia, but he is starting on the way to it.

πανταγοῦ συναντήσει (τοῦ) (ὁ θεός). In everything which meets your eyes, God will manifest himself to you; for wherever there is life, there God is at work. Cf. Philo De fuga et invent. 25. 141, Wendland III, p. 140 : ἢ δὲ τοῦ ... θεοῦ ζητήσει εὐθραίνει μὲν εὐθὺς ἴστατε ἐπὶ τὴν σκέψιν, ἀτέλης δὲ οὐ γίνεται, προοπαντώτατος (τοῦ θεοῦ) ... καὶ εὐθείαν ἑαυτὸν τοῖς γλυκομένοις ἰδεῖν, οὐχ οἶδοι ἵνα, ἀνήρ αὐτὸν γὰρ ... ἀλλ' ἂς ἐνεχώρησε γεννήτην φύσιν τῇ ἀπερινοπήτῳ δύναμι τροφοβαλέων.¹ 'Ophite Eoa-etangeliwm' (Reitzenstein Poin. p. 242) : I heard a voice like thunder, which spoke to me and said ἔγὼ σὺ καὶ σὺ ἐγὼ, καὶ ὧν ἐὰν ἦς, ἔγὼ ἵκει εἰμί, καὶ ἐν ἀπαυσίν εἰμί ἐσπαρμένος, καὶ ἰδίον ἐὰν θλίψης συνάλληγες μὲ, ἐμὲ δὲ συναλλήγων ἑαυτόν συνάλληγες.

οἰδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ οὐκ ἔστιν [εἰκών] (εἰκὼν). It would also be possible to write ἐν φ' οὐκ ἔστιν εἰκών, or οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν εἰκών (cf. § 20 a, τὸν θεόν ... πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐχεῖν). Perhaps ἐκών may have come from εἰκών (εἰκών); the words ἐκών ἐτεῖ φῆς might easily be altered into ἐκών ταφῆς, the reading of codd. Corp.

§ 22 a. ἐτεῖ φῆς "ἄξαρας δὲ θεός"; Platonists commonly said that God is ἄξαρας; in saying that God is ἄξαρας, the writer is asserting a paradox. Cf. Corp. V tit. : "Οτι (πῇ μιν;) ἄφαρης (ὁ) θεός, (πῇ δὲ;) φανερωσάτως ὅτι. Corp. XIV. 3 as emended : ἐτεὶ δὲ τὰ γαννητὰ ὀρῶνα τὴν, κάκον ψῆ δὴ ὀρᾶτος· διὰ τούτο γὰρ ποιεῖ, ἵνα ὀρᾶτος φῆ.¹

¹ Cf. Martineau, quoted by James, Varieties of religious experience, p. 475: 'If we cannot find God in your house or in mine, upon the roadside or the margin of the sea, in the bursting seed or opening flower; ... in the procession of life ever entering afresh, and solemnly passing by and dropping off; I do not think we should discern him any more on the grass of Eden, or beneath the moonlight of Gethsemane.' The 'procession of life' is the μεραβάς of Corp. XI. ii.
(6) νοῦς δραταί εν τῷ νοεῖν, θεὸς εν τῷ ποιεῖν. ὁ νοῦς here means 'one's own mind'. Neither ὁ νοῦς nor ὁ θεὸς is 'visible' in the literal sense of the word; but both are 'visible' in the sense that we can apprehend them through their working. My mind, as a substance, is hidden from me; but I am conscious of my thoughts, which are the workings of my mind, and in that way I can 'see' my mind. Similarly, God, as a substance, is hidden from me; but I see his workings around me, and feel them within me, and thereby I can 'see' God. In the view of this writer, God is the universal νοῦς, ('the one Knower', as W. James expresses it,) and πάντα τὰ δυτα are his νοματα (§ 20 a).

§ 22 b. τοῦτο σοι ὑπὶ τοσοῦτον πεφανέρωται. The teacher refers back to the words of the pupil in § 1 b: σοι γὰρ ἐν καὶ μόνῳ πιστεύομαι τὴν περὶ τούτου φανέρωσιν.

τὰ δὲ ἀλλὰ πάντα δύοις κατὰ σεαυτόν νοεῖ. Having once been started on the right track, the pupil will be able to think things out for himself. Cf. Corp. IX. 10: δὲ νοῦς (the pupil's mind), . . . ὑπὸ τοῦ οἶγου (the teacher's words) μέχρι τῶν ὀξύνθεις, φθανεῖ μέχρι τῆς ἀληθείας. Corp. XIII. 15: ὁ Πομάνδρης . . . πλέον μοι . . . ὁ παρείδωκεν εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀπ' ἐμαντὸν δυνήσομαι πάντα νοεῖν.

LIBELLVS XII. i

It is evident that Corp. XII consists of two distinct documents, which I call XII. i and XII. ii. We may suppose that XII. ii stood next after XII. i in a collection of 'discourses of Hermes to Tat', and that the two documents came to be read as one, in consequence of the disappearance of the title of the second. The contents of XII. i, which ends at § 14 a, are summed up in § 6: 'We are now concerned with mind; and the questions we have to consider are these:—what mind can do, and how it admits of differences; . . . for not in all men does it quench angry passion and desire.' This document then might be described as περὶ νοῆς ἀνθρωπίνου, 'concerning mind in man'. The beginning of XII. ii is lost; but what remains of it (§§ 14 b–23 b) might be described as περὶ ζωῆς. It has nothing to do with νοῦς, and is in no way connected with the teaching of XII. i.
Contents

Mind is of the very substance of God. It is diffused by God, as light is diffused by the sun. It enters into men, and makes some of them divine; but the souls of beasts are devoid of it. In men, mind works good, by counteracting their natural impulses; but in beasts, it 'co-operates with' (?) the natural impulses. The human soul, when embodied, is depraved by the evil influence of pleasure; mind heals this disease of the soul by means of medicinal pain. But those men in whose souls mind does not bear rule are like the beasts; they indulge their appetites without restraint, and thereby incur the worst of evils, and suffer the punishment ordained for them by God. §§ 1-4.

But are not men compelled by Fate to do evil deeds? And if so, how can they justly be punished for these deeds? The answer to this question is that it is only 'irrational' men (i.e. those men whose souls are not governed by mind) that are compelled by Fate to do wicked deeds; (and such men deserve the punishment which follows, because it is their own fault that they have rejected the guidance of mind, and by doing so, have put themselves under the dominion of Fate.) The rational man and the irrational alike are subject to Fate in respect of what befalls their bodies; (e.g. both alike must suffer death;) but the rational man is not subject to Fate in respect of his actions; Fate cannot compel him to commit a crime. Mind is superior to Fate, and has power to place above the reach of Fate the human soul in which it resides. §§ 5-9.

Is mind liable to 'passive affections' (παθή)? All things which enter into body are passively affected; mind therefore, when it is embodied (i.e. when it resides in a man's soul during his earthly life), is passively affected; but it ceases to be passively affected when it is freed from the body. §§ 10, 11.

Men are distinguished from beasts by the possession of mind and speech. If a man rightly uses these two gifts of God, he is almost an equal of the gods in this life, and after death he will dwell among the gods. The beasts do not possess speech; and among men, though languages differ, speech is one and the same in all nations. Speech is an image of mind; and mind is an image of God. §§ 12, 13a.

Soul is in body, mind is in soul, and God is in mind. As air is finer than gross matter, so soul is finer than air, mind than soul, and God than mind. God acts on all things; mind acts on soul, soul acts on air, and air acts on gross matter. §§ 13b, 14a.
Sources. The doctrine of XII. i is mainly Platonic; but it shows signs of Stoic influence. The writer's conception of νοῦς, and of the function of νοῦς in the human soul, is Platonic. His account of the effect of embodiment on a previously unembodied human soul (§ 2, ψυχή . . . ἐν σώματι γενομένη . . . κακίζωται) is derived from Plato (cf. Pl. Tim. 42 a); and his description of vice as disease of the soul (§ 3) may have been suggested by Pl. Tim. 86 b. He follows Plato in coupling θυμός and ἐπιθυμία (§ 4 and § 6). His notion of νοῦς παθητικός (§§ 10, 11) may perhaps have been suggested by the Aristotelian doctrine of ὁ παθητικὸς νοῦς. The influence of Stoicism is to be seen in the discussion of εἰμιμάχη (§§ 5-9); in the sentence τῆς μὲν ἡλικίας το λεπτομερέστατον . . . θεός (§ 14 a); and perhaps in the meaning given to the word ὀντία (§ 1). The term ὁ προφορικὸς λόγος (§ 12) is of Stoic origin; but the clause in which it occurs is probably an interpolation. The ἄρη of § 14 a corresponds to the πνεῦμα of the Stoics; but I do not know from what source the Hermetist derived this use of ἄρη.

The writer quotes three sayings from Hermetic dialogues in which the part of teacher was assigned to the Agathos Daimon; and one of these sayings (§ 1, τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἀνδρόπους ἡπεν ἀβανάτους κ.τ.λ.) is derived from Heraclitus, presumably through Stoic intermediaries. He also refers to an earlier discourse of Hermes to Tat concerning εἰμιμάχη.

It is possible that the writer's use of νόμος in place of δίκη (§§ 4 fin. and 9) came from a Jewish source. I can find nothing else of Jewish origin in XII. i: and there is no trace of Christian influence.

Date. The combination of Stoic conceptions with Platonism excludes the possibility of any date earlier than the first century B.C. The discourse referred to in § 5 was probably one of the διδαξοῦκοι λόγοι; and if so, some of the documents known by that name must have been in existence before XII. i was written.

The fact that the writer quotes from dialogues in which the Agathos Daimon gave instruction to Hermes may be taken to indicate that this document is one of the later Hermetica; and we may conclude that it was written in the second or third century A.D., and more probably in the third century than in the second.

Title. περὶ τοῦ ὁβοῦ. The epithet ὁβοῦ, which yields no satisfactory sense, may be accounted for as a corruption of ἄνδροπον, i.e. ἀνδροποίον.
§ I. 'O νοῦς . . . ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ οὐσίας ἐστὶν. What is meant by οὐσία here? In Plato, οὐσία is commonly contrasted with γένεσις, and applied to τὰ νοητά as opposed to τὰ αἰσθητά. Aristotle distinguishes three uses of the word οὐσία. Metaph. Z. 3, 1029 a 2: τρόπων μὲν τινα ἡ ὕλη λέγεται (οὐσία), ἄλλον δὲ τρόπων ἡ μορφή (i. e. τὸ ἐίδος), τρόπων δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων (i.e. τὸ σύνθετον ἐξ ἐίδους καὶ ἕλης, the concrete individual thing). The Stoics, who did not accept either the Platonic doctrine of νοητά or the Aristotelian doctrine of εἰδη, used the word οὐσία in the first of Aristotle's three senses. To them, the οὐσία of a thing meant the material substance of which the thing consists. The word ἐξ shows that the writer of XII. i, in his use of οὐσία, has been influenced by the Stoic usage. The meaning of his opening sentence is that νοῦς, wherever it presents itself, (e.g. the νοῦς which operates in an individual human soul,) 'comes out of', or is a portion of, the very substance of which God consists. But he is conscious that this statement might seem to imply that God consists of some material substance, such as fire (cf. Corp. IV. 1 b); and in order to guard against this misunderstanding, he adds εἰ γέ τις ἔστιν οὐσία θεοῦ κ.τ.λ. The 'substance of which God consists' is not material; what it is, 'God only knows'. It is the ἀσώματον spoken of in Corp. IV; but what that is, no man can say precisely.

εἰ γέ τις ἔστιν οὐσία θεοῦ. Cf. Corp. VI. 4 b as emended: ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ, εἰ γε οὐσίαν ἓχει, τὸ καλὸν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν.

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποτελημένος τῆς οὐσιότητος τοῦ θεοῦ. When οὐσία, through Aristotelian and Stoic influence, had acquired the meaning of 'a concrete (material or quasi-material) substance', it became necessary to coin the word οὐσιότης to express the abstract notion of 'substantial existence'. The writer hesitates to attribute οὐσία to God, and therefore here prefers to use the abstract term.

ἐστὶν ἠστηλωμένος, καθάπερ τὸ τοῦ ἠλίου φῶς. ἠστηλωμένος, 'unfolded', is here used in the sense 'spread abroad', 'diffused'. (Perhaps we ought to read ἠστηλωμένος.) God radiates νοῦς, as the sun radiates light. Cf. Corp. II. 12 b. Plotinus 5. 1. 6 (speaking of the generation of νοῦς from the One): δεὶ οὖν, ἀκμήτου δόντος (τοῦ ἐνόου), εἰ τι δεύτερον μετ' αὐτό, οὐ προοιμασθηκότος οὐδὲ βουληθήκοτος οὐδὲ ἀλος κυριθότως ἐποιήθη αὐτῷ. πῶς οὖν; . . . (δεὶ νοῆσαι) περιλαμψει ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἶνον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν λαμπρὸν φῶς περιθέον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ γεννώμενον μένοντος. Ib. § 7: δεὶ πως εἶναι ἑκείνου τὸ γεννώμενον, καὶ ἀποσώκειν τολλὰ αὐτοῦ, [καὶ εἶναι ὁμοίωτητα πρὸς αὐτόν.]

Z 2
Plotinus 5. 3. 12: kατὰ λόγον θεριόμεθα τὴν μὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ ἐνὸς) οἶον ὑμίκων ἐνέργειαν ὡς ἀπὸ ἥλιου (φῶς). φῶς τι οὖν θεριόμεθα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐπ' ἀκρῇ τῷ νοητῷ ἑστηκότα βασιλείειν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐξώσαιντα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ἑκφανέν. . . οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀποτείμηται τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ ἀπ' ταύτων αὐτῷ. Αβαμμόνος resp. 8. 2 (Testim.): the second God (the Demiurgus-νοῦς) ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἑαυτὸν ἑξέλαμψε.

οὗτος δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐν μὲν ἀνθρώποις 'θεὸς' ἐστι. The words ἐν μὲν ἀνθρώποις point forward to ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλογοις ἥμοι below. The statement that 'in men indeed νοῦς is a god' would imply that under other conditions, e.g. when it acts on beasts, νοῦς is not a god. But this cannot be right. Mind operates differently in the case of men and beasts, but must be equally divine in all its different operations; as we have just been told, it is of one substance with God, and is emitted by God. The author's meaning might perhaps be expressed by writing ἐν μὲν ἀνθρώποις θεότητος ἐνεργητικός ἐστι. 'In men, mind produces divinity by its working'; i.e. mind makes men divine, but it does not make beasts divine. This would serve to lead on to the following statement, 'therefore some men are divine'.

καὶ τινὲς ἄνθρωποι 'θεοὶ εἰσί. A Hermetist might say that 'some men are gods'; but if he said this, he could not go on to say that 'the humanity of these men is near to deity', i.e. that they are nearly gods, but not quite. It is therefore necessary to alter θεοὶ into θεῖοι.

' Ἀγαθὸς Δαίμων . . . εἶπεν. Three utterances of the Agathos Daimon are quoted by Hermes in XII. i. (See § 8 and § 13 b.) 'The Agathos Daimon' is a name given by Greeks to the Egyptian god Khnum; and the writer assumes that this god was the first teacher of the gnosis, and had given oral instruction to Hermes. We know that there were written dialogues in which the Agathos Daimon took the part of teacher; and the writer of XII. i probably found in one or more of those dialogues the three sayings which he attributes to the Agathos Daimon.

τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς (ἀνθρώπους) εἶπεν ἀθανάτου, τοὺς δὲ ἄνθρωπος θεοὺς θητεύον. This is a Stoic adaptation of a saying of Heraclitus. See Corp. X. 25.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλογοις ἥμοι (…) ἡ φύσις ἑστίν. The predicate is lost. Perhaps the Hermetist wrote something like ἐντὶ νοῦ ἡ φύσις ἑστίν. 'in the irrational animals instinct takes the place of mind'.
Cf. Corp. IX. 1 b as emended: ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις ἤ ἀνθρώποις τῇ φύσει ἦν ψυχή, ἐν δὲ ἀνθρώποις τῇ νοησεὶ.

§ 2. ὅπου γὰρ [ψυχῇ, ἕκει καὶ νοῦς ἔστιν, ὦστερ ὅπου καὶ] ζωῇ, ἕκει καὶ ψυχῇ ἔστιν. The traditional text cannot be right; for the statement 'wherever there is soul there is mind' is contradicted by the following words, 'in the irrational animals the soul is devoid of mind.' If we cut out ψυχῇ, ἕκει . . . ὅπου καὶ, what remains becomes intelligible. There is ψυχῇ wherever there is ζωή (i.e. in all ζῶα, whether rational or irrational); but in the irrational ζώα, the ψυχῇ is devoid of νοῦς. It would be possible to make sense in another way, by writing ὅπου γὰρ ψυχῇ (ἀνθρώπῃ), ἕκει καὶ νοῦς ἔστιν, and cutting out ὦστερ ὅπου καὶ ζωῇ, ἕκει καὶ ψυχῇ ἔστιν. The meaning would then be 'wherever there is a human soul, there is mind; but the souls of irrational animals are devoid of mind'.

ἡ ψυχῇ [ζωῇ] ἢτοι καὶ τοῦ νοῦ. ζωή seems to have been inserted as an alternative for ψυχῆ.

ἐργάζεται γὰρ αὐτάς (αὐτὰς εἰς MSS.) τὸ ἀγαθὸν. Beasts cannot attain to the good; but men can attain to it, through the operation of νοῶν in them.

tοῖς μὲν ἄλογοις τῇ (ἰ)διᾷ(α) ἕκαστον φύσει συνεργεῖ. Cf. § 4: συνεργεῖ γὰρ αὐτάς γενόμενος κ.τ.λ. § 10: ἔλεγε γὰρ τῶν νοῶν ἐν τοῖς ἄλογοις ζῴοις φύσεως δίκην ἐνεργεῖν, συνεργοῦντα αὐτῶν ταῖς ὀρμαῖς. What does the Hermetist mean by saying that νοῶν 'co-operates with' the instincts or impulses of beasts? We were told above that 'in beasts the soul is devoid of νοῶν'; and in § 12, it is said that God has given νοῶν (and λόγοι) to man παρὰ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα ζώα, which implies that νοῶν has not been given to beasts. We might therefore have expected the writer to say that νοῶν does not operate at all in beasts. But he tells us that it does operate in them, though not in the same way that it operates in men, or at least in 'rational' men. (Cf. § 6: ἐνδιάφορος ἠτόν (ὁ νοῦς), ἐν μὲν ἀνθρώποις τοιόσοδε, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλογοις ζῷοις ἠλλαγμένος.) We might perhaps reconcile these apparently inconsistent statements by assuming the writer's view to be that νοῶν acts on men from within, and on beasts from without.1

The human soul has νοῶς within it; and the νοῶς within, if it 'takes command' of the soul, works against the natural impulses. A beast's soul has no νοῶς within it; but a beast, being a part of the universe,

1 It would be possible so to alter § 1 as to make it express this view; e.g. one might write there ὡστε δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐν μὲν ἀνθρώποις (θεῶς) ἐνδούν ἐνοεῖ τοι. . . . ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλογοις (ζῷοις ἀντὶ νοῦ ἐνοεῖ) ἡ φύσις ἠτότι.
is governed by the divine νοῦς to which the whole universe is subject, and by which the laws of nature are determined; and thus its instinctive actions result from the working of νοῦς, in the same sense that the falling of a stone results from the working of νοῦς. But if this was the Hermetist's meaning, he ought to have said that the instincts are implanted in the beast by νοῦς (i.e. by the mind which governs the universe); and he does not say that. He speaks of instinct as something which exists apart from the action of νοῦς, and says, not that νοῦς produces the instincts, but that νοῦς 'co-operates with' them; and this I am unable to explain.


§ 3. ἀνυπότατον αὐτῶν τοῖς προλήμμασι. It is to be inferred from the context that the προλήμματα of the soul are its animal instincts or natural impulses. But does the word mean 'things which the soul has taken hold of', or 'things which have taken hold of the soul'? As the writer goes on to speak of σῶμα προελημμένον ὑπὸ νόσου, it appears that he meant προλήμματα to be understood in the latter sense.

ὅσπερ (γὰρ) ἱατρὸς ἀγαθὸς λυπεῖ τὸ σῶμα . . . καίν ἡ τέμνων. This simile may have been suggested by Pl. Gorg. 477 e−481 b. Compare especially Gorg. 480 c: one ought to force oneself and one's friends μὴ ἀποδειλαῖν, ἄλλα παρέχειν μισοῦντα καὶ ἀνδρείοι κόσμα ὅσπερ τέμνων καὶ καίν ἱατρῷ, τὸ ἄγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διώκοντα, μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀληθεῦν, . . . ὅπωσὶν ἄν . . . ἀπαλλάσσωσαι τὸν μεγάλον κακοῦ, ἀδικίας.

ὁ νοῦς (τήν) ψυχὴν λυπεῖ. ἐξωφαίρετον αὐτῆς τὴν ἠδονήν. We were told above that both λύπη and ἠδονή deprave or vitiate the soul; i.e. a man becomes vicious through seeking to escape from pain and to get pleasure. But here, λύπη is spoken of differently; it is ἠδονή alone that vitiates the soul, and νοῦς counteracts the evil influence of ἠδονή by employing λύπη medicinally. The thwarting of the natural impulses is painful; but by enduring this pain, the man is cured of the moral disease which 'pleasure' (i.e. indulgence of the natural impulse to seek pleasure and avoid pain) has produced in him. Cf. Synesius De insomniis 5, Migne 66. 1293 d: ἄναγωγὸν ἡ μετάνοια. . . καί διὰ τοῦτο τῇ δὲ τῇ κάκιᾳ κρείαν τῆς μεγίστην τε καὶ ἀρίστην τῇ τάξει τῶν ὄντων αἱ 'κρασίες' (λεγόντας) παρέχονται, τὸ λυπηρὸν ἀντευπάγουσα, καὶ τῆς ἐμπλήκτου χαρᾶς τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκκαθαίρουσαν αἰ τε
§ 2. SeraiSe I/ux<uardpumfai ouk ervypvKu0epi'r|TOutou vov. It is not quite clear whether the writer holds that nov is present in all human souls, or that it is present in some only, and not in others. At any rate, it is in some men only that nov acts as k,u,berp,1t,77, i.e. takes command. (Cf. § 3 init.: ovv a,rais ovv i^xa« ° vo™ *7U-OTaTiJo-g. § 7: 01 8$ iWdyip.01,wv itpap,€Vrbv vow fiytpjovtvuv!) In other men, nov fails to discharge its proper function of checking and thwarting the natural impulses; and if the writer considers it to be present at all in such men, his view must be that it aids and abets the όρμαί instead of counteracting them. The words συνεργός γάρ αὐταίς γενόμενος, if they were used with regard to men alone, might be thought to decide the question in favour of the latter alternative; but the writer says that δονυσ συνεργεί ταίς όρμαίς in the case of beasts also (§ 10), and he denies that nov is present in the souls of beasts (§ 2).

συνεργός γάρ αὐταίς γενόμενος (δ νούς), καὶ ἀνάσας τόσ ἐπιθυμίας, (..) εἰς ἃς φέρονται (αἱ ψυχαί). The verb of which δ νούς was the subject has been lost. According to the text of the MSS., εἰς ἃς means εἰς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας. But it would be more correct to say that the souls εἰς τὰς ἱδονᾶς φέρονται τῇ βούμῃ τῆς ὀρέξεως (i. e. τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ). Perhaps the missing phrase contained the word ἱδονᾶς; in that case, εἰς ἃς would mean εἰς τὰς ἱδονᾶς.

tauταις ἃς ὀσπερ τιμωρὸν καὶ ἐλεγχον ὁ θεὸς ἐπέστησε τῶν νόμων. Does ταύταις mean ταύταις ταῖς ψυχαῖς, or ταύταις ταῖς κακίαις? Probably the former. The νόμος is the penal law of God. It is elsewhere called δίκη; cf. Herm. ap. Stob. Exe. VII. 2: ἡ ἃς δίκη τέτακται τιμωρῶς τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἀμαρτανόντων. In the words τιμωρὸν καὶ ἐλεγχον, punishment is placed before conviction, as in Virgil's description of the procedure of Rhadamanthus, Aen. 6. 567: 'casti-gatatque auditaque dolos subigitque fateri.'
§ 5. Ὅ περὶ τῆς εἰμαρμένης λόγου, δὲ (ν) ἐμπροσθὲν μοι (δι)εξεληλυθάς (δ . . . εξεληλυθάς MSS.). The writer refers to a discourse of Hermes to Tat concerning εἰμαρμένη; and we may perhaps infer from the word διεξεληλυθάς that it was one of the διεξεληλυθάς λόγοι. Cf. Corp. V. i a: καὶ τόν δὲ σοὶ τὸν λόγον, ὁ Τάτ, διεξελείσομαι. See the extract from Hermes to Tat on πρόνοια, ἀνάγκη, and εἰμαρμένη, Stob. Exe. VIII.

ὥστε κολάζεται ὁ ἀναγκασθησθεῖν (ὁ εὖ ἀνάγκης MSS.) τῆς εἰμαρμένης διάφας τοῦ ἔργον; The Stoics asserted, in their physics, that all things without exception are determined by εἰμαρμένη; and from this it would seem to follow that men are not responsible for their actions. Chrysippus refused to accept that inference; but his endeavours to reconcile his doctrine of Fate with his belief in τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν were not very successful. His arguments on this topic are criticized by Alexander Aphrod. De fato (Arnim, Stoic. vet. fragm. II, pp. 295–297). Cf. Aulus Gellius 7. 2: 'the opponents of Chrysippus say, "Si Chrysippus fato putat omnia moveri et regi... peccata quoque hominum et delicta non suscensenda neque inducenda sunt ipsis voluntatibusque eorum, sed necessitati cuidam et instantiae quae oritur ex fato... et propterea nocentium poenas legibus inique constitutas, si homines ad maleficia non sponte veniunt, sed fato trahuntur." Contra ea Chrysippus tenuiter multa et argute disserit... Negat (Chrysippus) oportere ferri audire homines aut nequam aut ignavos et nocentes et audaces, qui, cum in culpa et in maleficio revicti sunt, perfugiunt ad fati necessitatem tamquam in aliquod fani asylum, et quae pessime fecerunt, ea non suae temeritati, sed fato esse attribuenda dicunt.'

The Hermetists, being Platonists, had a way of escape from this ἀπορία which was not open to a Stoic. They accepted the Stoic doctrine of Heimarmene so far as things corporeal are concerned (χωρίς ἔκεινης οὐδὲν τῶν σωματικῶν... γενότοι συμβαίνει); and holding that the animal impulses, in beasts and men alike, result from the influence of the body on the soul, they admitted that these impulses are determined by Fate, and that the lives and actions of those men in whom the 'bodily passions' work unchecked are wholly subject to that external power. Men of this class then they considered to be mere puppets, moved from without, like the beasts, by physical forces which are set in action by the movements of the heavenly bodies. But unlike the Stoics, they held that the corporeal world is not all; beside or above it is 'the incorporeal', and the
incorporeal is not subject to Heimarmene. νοῦς is incorporeal; and the man in whose soul νοῦς rules lives in another world, on which physical forces have no bearing. (See Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. XVIII. 3.) Such a man has ‘escaped from Heimarmene’. He is content to ‘let Heimarmene do what she will with her own clay, that is, with his body’ (Hermes in Zosimus i. 7, Testim.); his heart is set on other and higher things, and nothing corporeal has power to influence him. (See Abammonis resp. 10. 5 (Testim.) on ‘release from the bonds of ἐμμαρμάρη’.) According to the writer of Corp. IV, the gift of νοῦς is offered to all men; if a man wilfully rejects that gift, it is by his own fault that he remains a slave to Fate, and he deserves the punishment which follows.

eἰμαρταί δὲ καὶ (τὸν) τὸ κακὸν ποιήσαντα [τῷ] (κακῶν) παθεῖν. Cf. Diog. Laert. 7. 23 : Zeno the Stoic δούλον ἐπὶ κληρονομίαν, ὑπερβαίνοντας οὖν ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνην “εἰμαρτάμενοι καὶ μαθαίνομεν”, καὶ δεσμεῖοι, ἐφ᾽. But the writer of XII. i says not only that both the crime and the punishment which follows it are ordained by Heimarmene, but also (if I understand the passage rightly) that the crime is ordained for the purpose of bringing about the punishment (διὰ τοῦτο (εἰμαρταὶ αὐτῶν) δράντες; ἦσαν, ἡμεῖς πάθη); that is to say, Heimarmene determines that a man shall suffer, and compels him to commit the crime in order that he may incur the suffering. This in itself is no answer to Tat’s question, ‘Why are men punished for that which they are compelled to do?’ On the contrary, it would appear at first sight to emphasize the injustice of God’s government, and to represent Fate, the agent through whom God works, as a wantonly malignant power. But it must be interpreted in the light of what follows. The ἀλογος ἐνθρωπος, by the very fact that he has rejected God’s offered gift of νοῦς, (or rejected the guidance of the νοῦς which God has implanted in him,) already deserves punishment. Through his own fault, he is subject to Heimarmene; and to Heimarmene is assigned the task of punishing him. Heimarmene discharges this task by compelling him to commit crimes, and thereby causing him to incur penal suffering.

§ 6. νῦν δὲ περὶ νοῦς ἐστὶν ἕμιν ὁ λόγος. The subject of Corp. XII. i is νοῦς, and not εἰμαρμάρη; but the doctrine of νοῦς has an important bearing on the problem of εἰμαρμάρη, as Hermes proceeds to show.

πῶς ἐνδιάφορος ἐστίν. ἐνδιάφορος must be taken to mean ‘having ἄφορα ἐνδιάφορα within it’; cf. ἐννοοῦς and ἐνθεός. See Corp. V. 7 and IX. 7,
where the MSS. give \( \text{en} \) \( \delta \varepsilon \) \( \tau \iota \iota \varsigma \) \( \alpha \lambda \gamma \omicron \upsilon \) \( \zeta \omicron \omicron \) \( \delta \), but perhaps we ought to read \( \iota \nu \delta \omicron \delta \nu \rho \omicron \). 

\( \text{en} \) \( \delta \varepsilon \) \( \tau \iota \varsigma \) \( \alpha \lambda \gamma \omicron \upsilon \) \( \zeta \omicron \omicron \) \( \delta \), \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), \( \nu \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \), \( \pi \theta \gamma \), in the case of the beasts, \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), operates differently. The writer probably means, not that there is \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), in beasts, but that the \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), by which the universe is governed acts on beasts from without, through the forces of nature, and the \( \pi \theta \gamma \), which those forces produce in the soul. In the case of beasts then, \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), operates in the form of \( \epsilon \iota \mu \rho \alpha \mu \mu \epsilon \) \( \eta \), the power by which corporeal things are governed; in the case of \'rational\' men, in whose souls it works from within, \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), is opposed to \( \epsilon \iota \mu \rho \alpha \mu \mu \epsilon \) \( \eta \), and counteracts it. 

\( \text{en} \) \( \mu \varepsilon \) \( \tau \iota \varsigma \) \( \alpha \lambda \gamma \omicron \upsilon \) \( \zeta \omicron \omicron \) \( \delta \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), operates differently. The writer probably means, not that there is \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), in beasts, but that the \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), by which the universe is governed acts on beasts from without, through the forces of nature, and the \( \pi \theta \gamma \), which those forces produce in the soul. In the case of beasts then, \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), operates in the form of \( \epsilon \iota \mu \rho \alpha \mu \mu \epsilon \) \( \eta \), the power by which corporeal things are governed; in the case of \'rational\' men, in whose souls it works from within, \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), is opposed to \( \epsilon \iota \mu \rho \alpha \mu \mu \epsilon \) \( \eta \), and counteracts it. 

\( \text{en} \) \( \mu \varepsilon \) \( \tau \iota \varsigma \) \( \alpha \lambda \gamma \omicron \upsilon \) \( \zeta \omicron \omicron \) \( \delta \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), operates differently. The writer probably means, not that there is \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), in beasts, but that the \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), by which the universe is governed acts on beasts from without, through the forces of nature, and the \( \pi \theta \gamma \), which those forces produce in the soul. In the case of beasts then, \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), operates in the form of \( \epsilon \iota \mu \rho \alpha \mu \mu \epsilon \) \( \eta \), the power by which corporeal things are governed; in the case of \'rational\' men, in whose souls it works from within, \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu \) \( \iota \varsigma \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \), is opposed to \( \epsilon \iota \mu \rho \alpha \mu \mu \epsilon \) \( \eta \), and counteracts it.
the disembodied soul after death, are beyond the reach of εἰμαρμένη.

§ 7. ὁ μοιχεύς οὗ κακός; . . . ἀλλ' ὁ ἄλλογιμος . . . οὗ μοιχεύσας πείστας, ἀλλ' ὃς (δ') μοιχεύσας. The irrational man is subject to εἰμαρμένη in two distinct ways; Fate first compels him to commit crimes, and then inflicts pain or death on him by way of punishment for the crimes he has committed. (Perhaps the case of which the writer is thinking is that in which these penalties are inflicted by the sentence of a human judge.) Hence Tat, having been told that the rational man, as well as the irrational, πάσχει τὰ εἰμαρμένα, infers that the rational man also is compelled by Fate to commit crimes; and if he commits crimes, how can it be said that he is not κακός? Hermes' answer amounts to this, that the rational man is subject to Ηείμαρμενε in one of the two ways spoken of, but not in the other. Fate inflicts pain and death on the rational man as well as on the irrational, but does not and cannot compel the rational man to do wicked deeds. The rational man then πείστας ὃς (δ') μοιχεύσας, i.e. will undergo pain and death even as the wicked man does, but οὗ μοιχεύσας, and therefore οὗ μοιχεύσας πείστας. (E.g. Fate may cause a rational man to be unjustly condemned by a human judge, and to suffer the same penalty as the guilty; but Fate cannot make him guilty.) 'It is impossible for any man to escape from death; but the man who has mind can escape from wickedness.'

It might be objected that, if this is so, Fate acts unjustly in inflicting on the rational and innocent man the same sufferings which she inflicts on the irrational and guilty. But to this objection the Hermetist could have given an answer. The irrational man undergoes death κακός ὅν; and the κακός is φιλοσώματος. (Cf. φιλοσώματος ὅν καὶ κακός, Corp. XI. ii. 21 a.) He has identified himself with his body, and his interests with corporeal things; the destruction of his body is therefore felt by him as an evil; and this evil comes upon him as a punishment for the crimes he has committed. To the rational man, on the other hand, death is no evil; he 'hates his body' (Corp. IV. 6 b), and quits it willingly. He has deserved no punishment; and he suffers no punishment in dying.1 Fate can deal only with his body; and nothing that may be done to his body concerns him. We may suppose that the

1 'You can kill me, but you cannot do me any harm,' says Socrates, Pl. Apol. 30 c, D.
writer would have answered to this effect if the objection had been raised. But the objection is an obvious one, and it seems somewhat surprising that he did not think it worth while to give his answer to it. Perhaps the matter had been more fully dealt with in the earlier treatise on \( eιμ\alphaρ\mu\epsilon\eta \) to which he refers, and he was unwilling to interrupt his exposition of the doctrine of νοις in \( C\ellp\). XII.i by further discussion of the problem of Fate. It is possible that there is a lacuna of some length before \( μεταβολή\, \alpha\delta\ινατον \, \lambdaο\tauι \, δι\epsilon\κ\ φ\υ\gammaε\in\), and that the passage would be less obscure if we had the lost words before us.

§ 8. τον Άγαθον Δαίμωνος . . . ήκουσα λέγοντος δι ει και [ει] ἐγγράφως (ἐξ)εδεδόκει κ.τ.λ. The MSS. give ήκουσα λέγοντος δεί και ει κ.τ.λ. But δεί yields no satisfactory sense; (if any temporal adverb were used, it should rather be ποτε, as below, ήκουσα γονιν αυτου ποτε λέγοντος;) and the object wanted for the verb (ἐξ)εδεδόκει may be supplied by writing δι ει in place of δεί.

The tradition which the writer presupposes is that the god Agathos Daimon was the first teacher of the gnosis, and taught it orally to the man Hermes, but that Hermes was the first to set it down in writing. Hermes here expresses regret that the Agathos Daimon had not himself set down in writing, and so made more widely known, the saying which he proceeds to quote from him.

ὁς πρωτόγονος θεὸς. The Agathos Daimon (Khnum) was the 'first-born' god. In Kore Kosmu, Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. XXIII. 32, Kamephis (i.e. Khnum) is called ὁ πρωτάτωρ and ὁ πάντων προγενέστερος. According to the ancient theogony of Heliopolis, the epithet πρωτόγονος should rather have been applied to Tum, who was said to have issued from the waters of the primal Ocean (Nu), and generated the other gods (Wiedemann, Rel. of Anc. Eg., Eng. tr. p. 31). But Khnum seems to have held at Philae a position similar to that of Tum at Heliopolis; and in Hellenistic times, the primacy of Khnum was recognized in Lower Egypt also. The term πρωτόγονος was applied by the Orphici to their god Phanes; the parts of the Orphic Theogonia in which Phanes was spoken of were probably composed in the Ptolemaic period, and may have been influenced by Egyptian doctrines concerning Tum or Khnum. Lactant. Div. inst. 1. 5: 'Orpheus . . . deum verum et magnum πρωτόγονον, primogenitum, appellant, quod ante ipsum nihil sit genitum, sed ab ipso sint cuncta genera. Eundem etiam Φάντα
nominat.' Philo applies the adjectives πρωτόγονος and πρωτότοκος to the divine λόγος.

τὰ πάντα κατιδών. The Agathos Daimon, being the 'first-born' of the gods, (i.e. 'second God', and older than all except the 'first God', who would be called, not πρωτόγονος, but ἄγεννητος,) was the only person who 'had seen all things' (i.e. had witnessed the creation of the universe from its first beginning?); therefore, he alone knew the whole truth and could reveal it.

'Εφ' ἔστι τὰ πάντα . . . ποιεῖν δὲρ ποιεῖται. This saying of the Agathos Daimon has lost all meaning through the corruption of the text; and its sense can only be guessed from what Hermes afterwards says about it (§ 9). He sums up its contents in the words πάντων ἐπικρατεῖ ὁ νόος, . . . καὶ οἴδεν αὐτῷ ἄδυνατον κ.τ.λ.; and something like this may be recognized in the concluding words of the quotation (νοῦν, ἀφοντα πάντων, . . . ποιεῖν ὑπὲρ βουλεταί). But Hermes also says that Tat will find in the saying of the Agathos Daimon an answer to his question about Destiny, i.e. to the question 'Why is a man punished for his crimes, when Destiny has compelled him to commit them?' (§ 5). The passage quoted contains no trace of the word εἰμαρμένη; but it must have included something which might be taken to mean what Hermes expresses in the words οἴδε (τῷ νῷ) ἄδυνατον, οὗτε εἰμαρμένη ὑπεράνω θείαι ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην κ.τ.λ. We may presume then that the Agathos Daimon spoke of the relation between νοῦς and ψυχή in man, and asserted the sovereign power of νοῦς in the soul of which it takes command. But there is little hope of restoring the text. It is impossible to discover any connexion with the subject under discussion in the words ἐν ἢστι τὰ πάντα; and perhaps we ought to read ἵναστι (or ἤστι) τῷ (νῷ) πάντα, 'all things are possible for mind'. The author cannot have written νοητὰ σώματα, which would be equivalent to ἀνάσωματα σώματα. He may possibly have written (τὰ) νοητὰ (καὶ ἀνάσωματα; but if so, the rest of that sentence has been lost. The words ζωον δὲ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργεία καὶ αἰῶνι are utterly devoid of meaning. It may be conjectured that οἷον δυνατὸν is a corruption of οἴδεν ἄδυνατον, which occurs in Hermes' paraphrase below. The statement that νοῦς is the ψυχή of the supreme God (νοῦν . . . ψυχὴν ἄντα τοῦ θεοῦ) is unparalleled; and it seems probable that the only ψυχή spoken of in this passage was the human soul. But if these words are corrupt, a similar, and perhaps consequent, corruption must be assumed in the corresponding words in § 9 (ὁ νοῦς, ἦ τοῦ θεοῦ ψυχῆ).
Perhaps the last part of the passage may have been something like this: \(\delta\omega(\tau\epsilon)\nu\delta(\delta')\nu(\delta')\delta\nu\delta So\nu,\;\delta\rho\chi\omega\eta\nu\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\nu,\;\kappa\iota\;[\psi\chi\nu]\]\(\nu\epsilon\gamma\rho\gamma\epsilon\nu\)\(\delta\eta\nu\tau\alpha\;\theta\eta\nu,\;\langle\psi\chi\nu\rangle\)\(\nu\eta\epsilon\nu\;\delta\epsilon\rho\;\beta\omega\nu\lambda\nu\lambda\). ‘It is not impossible for mind . . . to make what it wills of the soul (in which it resides).’

§ 9. τοῖς ἀριστικοῖς λόγοις. The argument implied in Tat’s question (§ 5, διὰ τὶ κολάζεται κ.τ.λ.) is merely ‘contentious’. It may serve to disconcert an opponent; but it gives no help to those who are seeking the truth.

δ νοῦς [ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ψυχή]. It is difficult to believe that the phrase ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ψυχή was written by the author. It may have been inserted by some one to whom it was suggested by the words ἐπέρ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ καὶ ψυχῆ and νοῦν . . . ψυχῆ ὄντα τοῦ θεοῦ in the corrupt passage which precedes; or it may be a corruption of ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ (τῆς) ψυχῆς (ἐνοῦσα ἐνέργεια), ‘the force of God at work in the (human) soul’, or something to that effect. (A possible meaning could be got by writing δ νοῦς (τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας) ψυχῆ.) καὶ εἰμαρμένης, καὶ νόμου. In the case of the soul in which νοῦς rules, both the power of Destiny which impels to crime, and the penal law by which crime is punished, are reduced to impotence.

οὐτε ἀμελήσασαν . . . υπὸ τὴν εἰμαρμένην (θ)είναι. If a soul ‘is heedless’ of νοῦς, i.e. declines to be ruled by it, (or, in the language of Corp. IV, rejects God’s offered gift of mind,) the divine νοῦς punishes this heedlessness by making the soul subject to εἰμαρμένη.

[τὰ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ Δαίμονος ἄριστα.] If these words are retained, they must be assigned to Tat. But as his assent is sufficiently expressed by what follows (Καὶ θείως κ.τ.λ.), it is more likely that τὰ . . . ἄριστα was inserted by some admiring reader. A verb such as λέλεκται must be understood after θείως, ὁ πάτερ.

§ 10. Ἐλεγες γὰρ τὸν νοῦν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις φύσεως δίκην ἐνεργεῖν, συνεργοῦσα αὐτῶν ταῖς ὀρμαῖς. This refers to § 2: τοῖς μὲν ἀλόγοις τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστου φύσει συνεργεῖ. In the case of beasts, the operation of νοῦς takes the form of instinct. In both passages alike, it is not clear why the (external) νοῦς is said to ‘co-operate with’ the animal’s impulses, and not simply to produce them.

αὶ δὲ ὀρμαῖ . . . πάθη εἰσίν. The word πάθη originally meant quae quis patitur, ‘things which are done to one’, or ‘things which befall one’. It was applied to the feelings of pleasure and pain (regarded as states produced by the action of external objects on
the senses), and was thence extended to signify emotional disturbances (animi perturbationes) in general, including the impulses (dr̄m̄a) which result from feelings of pleasure and pain. νοῦς, being unaffected by τὰ αἰσθήματα, was usually considered to be ἀθητής; hence Tat finds a difficulty in a doctrine which brings νοῦς into close connexion with the πάθη.

καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἄρα παθητικὸς ἐστὶ, συγχροιματικὸς τοῖς πάθεσιν. It is hardly possible to call νοῦς a πάθος; but νοῦς might be said to be παθητός, i.e. to be affected by πάθη. The verb συγχροιματικεῖσθαι means 'to be in defiling contact with'. Cf. Corp. X. 17: οὔτε τὴν τοσαυτὴν ἀρετὴν (ἐκ τῶν νοῶν) ἀνέχεσθαι συγχροιματικομένον αὐτῇ παθητὸν σώμα. The active form of this verb does not, as far as I know, occur elsewhere; and the sense of mutual contact which is required would be better expressed by the middle form συγχροιματικομένος.

§ II. πάθη, δύνατον, τὰ ἐν σώματι . ὡνάματι χρήσασθαι οὐ λυπεῖ. This passage is the teacher's answer to Tat's objection that, if νοῦς co-operates with the impulses of beasts, and those impulses are πάθη, then νοῦς must be παθητός. Tat calls the answer lucid (σαφεστάτα τῶν λόγων ἀποδίδωσι); but as given in the MSS., it is obscure in the extreme. Tat's difficulty appears to be directly referred to only in the clause ἀπαλλαγεῖν δὲ τοῦ σώματος (ὁ νοῦς) ἀπηλλάγη καὶ τοῦ πάθους. This must have been preceded by another clause, now lost, to the effect that, as long as νοῦς is in the body, or operates in the body, it is παθητός. But the writer prepares the way for this statement about νοῦς by first laying down some general propositions concerning the question what things are παθητά. His doctrine appears to be that bodies are παθητά κυρίως (i.e. παθητά in the strict or primary sense of the term), but that in a wider sense 'all things which are in a body'; including things which are themselves incorporeal, are παθητά; whence it follows that νοῦς is παθητός as long as it is in a body. But what are 'the things which are in a body'? Presumably the ψυχή and the νοῦς of a man living on earth are included under this term; whether the writer meant to include under it any other things as well, I do not know. At any rate, the particular 'thing in a body' with which he is chiefly concerned is embodied νοῦς, i.e. the νοῦς which resides in the soul of an individual man during his earthly life; and his point is that

1 Cf. Porphyry, Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, 18: ἄλλο τὸ σώματος, ἄλλο τῶν ἀσωμάτων, ἄλλο τὰ ἀσωματικά, κ.τ.λ. But the ἀσωματικόν of which Porphyry speaks in that passage is ψυχή, and not νοῦς.
νοῦς in this condition is παθητός. His conception of παθητός νοῦς may perhaps have some connexion with Aristotle’s conception of ὁ παθητικός νοῦς (De an. 3. 5, 430 a), which might be understood to mean νοῦς as affected by embodiment.

[[καὶ τὰ ἀσώματα δὲ]] [κινεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ]. According to the MSS., we are here told that ‘incorporeals also are moved’. But this contradicts the preceding statement, ‘everything that is moved is body’. It is therefore certain that there is something wrong in the traditional text. I have assumed that καὶ τὰ ἀσώματα δὲ has been shifted, and ought to precede πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν ἀσώματον; that some words which followed καὶ τὰ ἀσώματα δὲ in its original position have been lost; and that some one tried to fill the gap by inserting κινεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ. If I am right in thinking that νοῦς is one of the ἀσώματα spoken of, and indeed the very one with which the Hermetist is chiefly concerned, the statement that these ἀσώματα ‘are moved by νοῦς’ must have been written by some one who misunderstood the meaning of the paragraph. In the lost words, the author must have said that ἀσώματα also, under certain conditions, (e. g. when embodied,) are παθητά. He supports this statement by the words πᾶν γὰρ . . . τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον, in which he brings in the conception of κίνησις; and thereupon follows the conclusion at which he has been aiming: ‘(νοῦς then, as long as it is embodied, is παθητός;) but when it is freed from the body, it is freed from the πάθος also’.

[κίνησις δὲ πάθος.] In order to make these words relevant, κίνησις must be taken to mean τὸ κινεῖ, and not τὸ κινεῖται. It is obvious that τὸ κινεῖται is πάθος; but the point on which the writer is here insisting is that τὸ κινεῖ also is (or involves) πάθος, and that consequently ἀσώματα (νοῦς and ψυχή), when they are ‘in bodies’ and are occupied in moving those bodies, are affected by πάθη. But the phrase κίνησις δὲ πάθος is too ambiguous and obscure to help the argument; and perhaps it is a fragment of a note inserted by a reader.

[μᾶλλον δὲ ποτε, δὲ τέκνον, οὐδὲν ἀπαθῆς, . . . διὰ τοῦτο παθητὰ ὡστε.] I can make no sense of this passage. It would be possible to put a meaning into it (or into some of the clauses at least) by rewriting the text as follows: μᾶλλον δὲ [ποτε], δὲ τέκνον, (& . . .) οὐδὲν (γὰρ τῶν ἐν σώματι) ἀπαθῆς, πάντα δὲ (τ. ὡς τὰ ἐν σώματι) παθητα. διαφέρει δὲ παθητῶν παθητοῦ τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ (τὸ καὶ πάσχει), τὸ δὲ πάσχει (μόνον). τὰ δὲ (ἀ)σώματα (e. g. νοῦς) καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ (i. e. are
capable of acting by themselves, as well as of acting on the body); (καθ’ αὐτὰ δὲ ἐνεργοῦντα ἀπαθὴ ἔστι). [[ ]] τὰ δὲ [α]σώματα δὲ ἐνεργεῖται, καὶ διὰ τούτο (δὲ) παθητὰ ἔστι. ((ἡ γὰρ ἀκαθητὰ ἔστιν (sc. τὰ σώματα) ἡ κυβέρνησις ὑπότερον δὲ ἀν ἣ, παθητά ἔστι)) But this is mere guesswork.

"Ἡ τε γὰρ ἐνεργεία καὶ τὸ πάθος παθῶν ἔστι." This can hardly be right. What the author probably meant to say might be expressed by writing "ἡ γὰρ ἐνεργεύων καὶ τὸ πάσχων παθῶν ἔστι." The embodied νοῦς both ἐνεργεῖ and πάσχει.

ἐφημοτέρω δὲ τῷ ὑμῖν χρήσασθαι οὐ λυπεῖ. This seems to mean that there are two terms which are equally applicable to embodied νοῦς, but there is no harm in using the ‘better-sounding’ of the two, and avoiding the use of the other. (This meaning would be more clearly expressed by writing τῷ δὲ εὐφημοτέρῳ ὑμίν.) The two terms are probably ἐνεργητικός and παθητός; and the former is ‘the better-sounding’ of the two, because παθητός is commonly regarded as implying depreciation.

The writer’s view appears to be that embodied νοῦς works actively (ἐνεργεῖ) in checking (or, in the case of the irrational man, ‘co-operating with’) the δρμαὶ of the human soul, but that, in doing this, it is itself affected or modified by that on which it works, and therefore not only ἐνεργεῖ, but also πάσχει. When it is freed from the body, it no longer πάσχει, but ἐνεργεῖ only. Tat, in putting forward his objection (§ 10), spoke only of beasts, and not of men; but Hermes, in his answer, seems to be speaking of men, and not of beasts; for it is only in the case of men that νοῦς can be said to be en σώματι.


ἰσότυμα τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ. ἱσότυμα means ‘equal in value’. νοῦς and λόγος are, so to speak, promissory notes, in exchange for which ἀθανασίᾳ (i.e. the life or condition of a god) can be obtained on demand.

[τὸν δὲ προφορικὸν λόγον ἱ. λέγει (ἐχει MSS.)] It would be possible to write λέγει, and take this to be an explanation added by the author himself; the λόγος of which I am speaking is the προφορικὸς

1 In vol. i, p. 230 l. 8, λόγον has been omitted by mistake.
λόγος, and not the ἐνδιάθετος λόγος'. But it seems more likely that
the note 'he means the προφορικὸς λόγος' was inserted by some
reader. In either case, the explanation given is correct; the λόγος
of which Hermes is speaking in this passage is 'speech', and not
'thought'. The terms ὁ προφορικὸς λόγος (thought expressed by utter-
ance, i. e. speech), and ὁ ἐνδιάθετος λόγος (thought which exists only
ἐν τῷ διάθεσι, i. e. unuttered thought), were first used by the Stoics.

It seems strange to say that speech, as well as νοῦς, will act as a guide
lead the disembodied soul to the abode of the gods. But the writer
probably meant that speech (whether in the form of oral teaching
and discussion,—cf. ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου μέχρι τινος ἔκχορθείς in Corp. IX.
fin.,—or in the form of verbal adoration,—cf. λόγον δὲ, ὅν αὐτοῦ ἔπικλήσωμεν in Ascl. Lat. 41 b —) is an indispensable aid or sup-
plement to thought, and that the right use of both together in this life
is needed to qualify a man for attainment to the divine life after death.

§ 13a. εἰς δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὕτω καὶ ὁ λόγος εἰς ἔστι. λόγος means
speech considered with respect to its meaning, and not with respect
to its sound. All men are of one species; and so, though men of
different nations express their thought by different sounds, the
thought expressed by these different sounds is the same. This is
proved by the fact that a term or proposition can be translated
from one language into another. E. g. the words ἄνθρωπος and
homo differ in sound, but are identical qua λόγος, i. e. in respect of
their meaning. Cf. Tertullian On the witness of the soul, 6 :
'Throughout the world man is one, though his names are various;
the soul is one, though its language is various; the spirit is one,
though its voice is various. Every nation has its own proper speech;
but the matter of all speech is the same in all.' Both Tertullian
and the Hermetist probably got the thought from some Stoic writer.

ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ Περσίδι καὶ Ἑλλάδι. As instances of different
languages, Hermes mentions those of Egypt, Persia, and Greece.
To a man residing in Egypt under the Roman empire, Egyptian,
Greek, and Latin would have been the first languages to present
themselves; but as it would have been a glaring anachronism to
make Hermes speak of Latin, the writer makes him mention the
language spoken in Persia instead. The Persian kingdom of the
Sassanidae was founded in a. d. 226; for some centuries before

1 In vol. i, p. 230 l. 12, ῥῦ has been printed by mistake for τῶν.
that date, the kingdom beyond the Euphrates was more properly called Parthian, and not Persian. But the earlier name Persia never died out in literature; (Horace, for instance, *Od. i. 2. 22*, speaks of *Persae*, meaning the Parthians;) and the Hermetist would probably be aware that the Parthian dominion was of recent date, and could not have been known to the prehistoric Hermes. *Corp.* XII. i may have been written after A.D. 226; but the use of the word Ἑρμης cannot be held to prove it.

†† (δοῦν λόγος ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ νοοῦ, καὶ (δ) νοοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ.) In the text of the MSS., the discussion of λόγος breaks off abruptly, and the γὰρ of the following sentence (δ γὰρ . . . Ἀγαθὸς Δαιμών κ.τ.λ.) has no meaning. It is evident therefore that something has been lost here. As the subject of the whole dialogue is νοοῦ, it may be presumed that the Hermetist concluded the paragraph on λόγος by explaining the relation of λόγος to νοοῦ, and then went on, in a fresh paragraph, to explain the relation of νοοῦ to God on the one hand, and to ψυχῆ and σῶμα on the other. A better connexion can be obtained by transposing to this place the words δ οὖν λόγος . . . τοῦ θεοῦ; but it is probable that, when these words have been inserted, there still remains an unfilled gap.

If my reconstruction of the passage is right, Hermes, after disposing of λόγος, proceeds to say (1) that νοοῦ is an 'image' of God, and (2) that God is 'in' νοοῦ. The relation between God and νοοῦ is described in two different ways; but both descriptions alike imply that νοοῦ is connected with and subordinate to God.

§ 13 b. ὅ γὰρ . . . Ἀγαθὸς Δαιμών ψυχῆν μὲν ἐν σώματι ἐφ' ἐνεαυ, νοοῦ δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ, [λόγον] ήθεν δὲ ἐν τῷ νῷ. Cf. *Corp.* XI. i. 4 b (Νοὸς λογιτάρια): οὗ μὲν θεὸς ἐν τῷ νῷ, ὁ δὲ νοοῦ ἐν τῷ ψυχῆ, ἡ δὲ ψυχῆ ἐν τῇ ἦλθ. It is possible that this is the passage to which the writer of XII. i is referring. If so, he must have assumed the Νοὸς who speaks in XI. i to be identical with the Agathos Daimon.

Compare also *Corp.* X. 13: δ νοοῦ [ [ἐξειταί] ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἡ δὲ ψυχῆ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι: τὸ (δὲ) πνεῦμα . . . κινεῖ τὸ (σῶμα). [τὸν οὖν θεόν τούτων πατέρα.] If these words are retained, τούτων must be taken to mean νοοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος. But the writer can hardly have said at the same time that God is 'in' νοοῦ and that God is 'the father of' νοοῦ.

§ 14 a. καὶ τὸ σῶμα δὲ (ἐστιν εἰκὼν) τῆς ἱδέας, ἡ δὲ ἱδέα τῆς ψυχῆς. I can see no sense in this. What is meant by ἡ ἱδέα? ἐστιν οὖν τῆς μὲν ἱδέας τὸ λεπτομερέστατον ἄρη, . . . νοοῦ δὲ θεοῦ. This A a 2
statement occurs again (with λεπτομερέστερον in place of -εστατον) at the end of Corp. V, where it is manifestly out of place. In XII. i, it leads on to the mention of θεός, νοῦς, ψυχή, ἄφρ, and ἦλη in the following sentence. The word λεπτομερής is properly applicable only to that which is corporeal; and this sentence, taken literally, would imply that θεός, νοῦς, and ψυχή are material substances. It must therefore have been derived from some source in which Stoic influence was predominant. The Hermetist himself, however, did not hold that God, mind, and soul are corporeal; he must have meant rather that the relation between the incorporeals θεός and νοῦς, and that between the incorporeals νοῦς and ψυχή, are analogous to the relation between the incorporeal ψυχή and the corporeal ἄφρ, and that this relation again is analogous to that between fine matter (ἄφρ) and gross matter (ἦλη). The ἄφρ which he interposes between ψυχή and ἦλη corresponds to the πνεῦμα ('vital spirit', the corporeal vehicle or integument of the incorporeal soul,) which is interposed between ψυχή and σῶμα in Corp. X and elsewhere.

ὁ μὲν θεός περὶ πάντα καὶ διὰ πάντων. Cf. XII. ii. 20 b, where these words are repeated; and id. 23 a, πάν γάρ ἐστι (ο. θεός), τὸ δὲ πάν διὰ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντα... God is περὶ πάντα; i.e. God 'is concerned with' or 'has to do with' all things; there is nothing which is not included under his control. And God is διὰ πάντων; i.e. God penetrates and pervades all things (διὰκεῖ πάντα, as the Stoics said); he is present everywhere, and is everywhere at work. Cf. Ep. ad Eph. 4. 6: εἰς θεός καὶ πατήρ πάντων, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ διὰ πάντων καὶ ἐν πάσιν.

ὁ δὲ νοῦς περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ἢ δὲ ψυχή περὶ τὸν ἄφρα, ὁ δὲ ἄφρ περὶ τὴν ἦλην. νοῦς 'has to do with' ψυχή; that is to say, νοῦς (which issues from God, and is of one substance with God, § 1) acts on ψυχή, and so indirectly acts on ἦλην or σῶμα also, through the medium of ἄφρ, which here takes the place of πνεῦμα. This statement may be applied both to the Kosmos as a whole and to individual organisms. The universal νοῦς acts on the world-soul, and the operation of the world-soul is transmitted to gross matter by the universal air; the νοῦς of an individual man acts on his soul, and the operation of his soul is transmitted to his bodily organs by the air (or pneuma) contained within his body. Thus God, by means of νοῦς, administers all things. This description of the position of νοῦς in the scale of existence, and of its function in the administration of the universe and the individual organism, forms
a fitting conclusion to the discussion of νοῦς in Corp. XII. i; and the libellus may very well have ended at this point.

LIBELLVS XII. ii

Contents

(The beginning is lost) . . . And God uses (Destiny?), Necessity, Providence, and Nature as his instruments in the administration of the Kosmos. § 14 b.1

The Kosmos is full of life. There is nothing in it that is not alive; and no part of it ever dies. It is a mistake to say that men or animals die. They undergo dissolution; but dissolution is not death, but renewal of life. All things in the Kosmos are in motion; and wherever there is motion, there is life. Life shifts from one organism to another; and for each several organism, there is a beginning and end of consciousness; but there is no beginning or end of life. Every living organism is composed of gross matter, vital spirit, and soul; and each of these three component parts is immortal. §§ 15 b–18.

But man is immortal in a higher sense than the beasts; for (1) God imparts to him knowledge of the future, through divination; and (2) whereas each kind of beasts is confined to one of the three lower elements, man not only makes use of all three, but also looks up to heaven.² §§ 19, 20 a.

(Something has been lost here.)

The life with which the Kosmos is filled is the work of God; and you can see God in his work. The forces by which life is put into matter are Destiny, Necessity, Providence, and Nature; but these forces are parts of God. God then is everywhere at work. Matter, apart from God, would have no real existence; it is God that gives it reality, by putting life into it. Material things, with all their qualities, are manifestations of God's activity. God is the All, and there is nothing beside him. §§ 20 b–23 a.

1 A disconnected fragment concerning unity and plurality (§§ 14 c, 15 a) has been inserted after § 14 b.
2 Consisting of fine matter.
3 Heaven is the region of fire, the fourth and highest element.
Worship God then. And the one way to worship God is to keep oneself free from evil. § 23 b.

Sources. The doctrine of XII. ii is partly Platonic; but marks of Stoic influence are to be seen in the use of the terms πρόνοια (and εἰμαρμένη;); §§ 14 b and 21; πνεῦμα, § 18; and οὐσία (coupled with ὄλγη and σῶμα), § 22. The importance attached to divination (§ 19) is characteristic of Stoicism; and the paragraph in which divination is spoken of may have been suggested by Posidonius.

But in his employment of the conception of life, and his description of God's work as that of putting life into matter, (not that of imposing forms on matter,) the writer is not closely following either Platonic or Stoic authorities. The language of Corp. XII. ii concerning life resembles that of Corp. XI. i and XI. ii; and the resemblance indicates either direct borrowing on one side or the other, or derivation from a common source. The doctrine that 'nothing dies' is that which is taught in Corp. VIII also; but in XII. ii it is asserted in an exaggerated and paradoxical form.

There is no sign of Jewish or Christian influence in this document.

Date. For the same reason which has been repeatedly given in dealing with other Hermetica, Corp. XII. ii cannot have been written before the first century B.C. Between this terminus a quo, and the terminus ad quem given by Lactantius's quotation (circa A.D. 310), I can find no definite indication of date; but on the ground of its resemblances to other Hermetic documents, and especially to Corp. XI. i, XI. ii, and VIII, this libellus may be conjecturally assigned to the second or third century A.D.

§ 14 b. ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ [ὶ] πρόνοια καὶ [ὶ] φύσις ὁργανά ὡστι (τῆς διοίκησεως) τοῦ κόσμου. Necessity, Providence, and Nature are instruments used by God in his administration of the universe. If we retain ἀνάγκη, we must either strike out the article before πρόνοια and φύσις, or write ἦ δὲ ἀνάγκη in place of ἀνάγκη δὲ. Compare § 21 as emended: μέρη ὡστι τοῦ θεοῦ εἰμαρμένη καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ φύσις. Possibly the same four powers were mentioned in § 14 b also; the original reading may have been εἰμαρμένη δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ φύσις. But it is also possible that ἀνάγκη δὲ is out of place, and that πρόνοια and φύσις alone were mentioned in § 14 b. The group ἀνάγκη, πρόνοια, φύσις occurs in Corp. XI. i. 5. πρόνοια, ἀνάγκη, and εἰμαρμένη are grouped together in Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. VIII and Exc. XIV; [φύσις (?), πρόνοια, ἀνάγκη, and εἰμαρμένη, in Herm. ap.
§§ 14 C, 15 A. [καὶ τῶν μὲν νοητῶν . . . καὶ ἡ άλη μία.] This passage deals with the topic of unity and plurality. It has no connexion with the rest of the dialogue; and it is probably a misplaced fragment of some other document. The writer of XII. ii presumably began by giving an account of God's government of the Kosmos, the concluding words of which are preserved in § 14 b, and then went on at once to speak of the life with which the Kosmos is filled (§ 15 b ff.).

§ 14 C. τῶν μὲν νοητῶν ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶν (ἐν) [οὐσία], οὐσία δὲ κ.τ.λ. The phrase τῶν νοητῶν (i.e. ἀσωμάτων) ἐκαστὸν is contrasted with the following phrase τῶν σωμάτων ἐκαστὸν; and the author must have written ἐστὶν ἐν, in contrast to πολλά ἐστιν. When ἐν had fallen out, the missing predicate was supplied by writing οὐσία twice. In the absence of the preceding context, it is uncertain what sort of νοητά the writer was thinking of. He may have meant by τὰ νοητά the Platonic 'ideas' (τὰ νοητά ἐδη); cf. Pl. Phileb. 15 A: ὅταν δὲ τις ἡ άνθρωπος ἐπιχειρῇ τίθησθαι, καὶ βοῦν ἔνα, καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν, καὶ τάγαθον ἐν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ πολλῇ . . . ἀμφιαβήτησις γίγνεται. But it is possible that he meant rather such incorporeal entities as ὁ θεός and ὁ νοῦς.

οὐσία δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ ταυτότης. It is the 'essence' of the νοητά, (i.e. it is that which constitutes their existence,) that each of them is ταυτόν. This means that a νοητόν is always the same with itself, that is to say, that it never changes. If the writer adopted the Platonic conception of eternity, he must have held that the νοητά are eternal (i.e. out of time), and therefore necessarily exempt from change; if not, he must have meant that the νοητά persist unchanged through endless time. In the following sentence (ἕτεια γὰρ κ.τ.λ.), ταυτότης is contrasted with μεταβολή; cf. Corp. XI. i. 2: τοῦ δὲ αἰῶνος (οὐσία ἐστὶν) ἡ ταυτότης . . . τοῦ δὲ χρόνου, ἡ μεταβολή. But ταυτότης also implies unity, as opposed to plurality.

The word ταυτότης is not used by Plato; it occurs first in Aristotle. But its employment by the Hermetists was, no doubt, suggested by Plato's use of ταυτόν as a philosophic term. See Pl. Tim. 35 A, where ταυτόν ('the principle of unity and identity', Archer-Hind ad loc.) is contrasted with βάτερον ('the principle of multiplicity and difference'); and Soph. 254 ε τò.
These words appear to be irrelevant where they occur in the MSS.; and something of the kind is needed here, to account for the following γάρ. The sequence of thought might be more clearly indicated by writing καὶ ἡ μία ἡλικία (ἐξεται γάρ τής ταυτότητος τὰ ἀυτοῦ σώματα κ.τ.λ.) ἐν δὲ τοῖς συνθέτοις πάσι σώμασιν ἀριθμὸς ἐκάστου ἐστί (i.e. in all composite bodies there is plurality). See Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. II A. 13 on τὰ ἄδιδα σώματα. For the statement 'matter is one', compare Corp. XI. ii. 9: μᾶς οὖσας τῆς ἡλίσ. Πο. Ι: μία φυσική, καὶ μία ζωή, καὶ μία ἡλικία.

ἐξεταί γάρ τῆς ταυτότητος τὰ ἀτύπητα σώματα. (ἐξοντα γάρ τὴν ταυτότητα τὰ σύμπητα σώματα MSS.) It may be considered certain that the author wrote ἀυτοῦ σώματα. The 'incomposite bodies' are the four cosmic elements, fire, air, water, and earth; and they are contrasted with the 'composite bodies' spoken of below (ἐν δὲ τοῖς συνθέτοις κ.τ.λ.). The material elements do not exist for ever in absolute 'sameness'; that is, they are not absolutely exempt from change, as the νοητά are; for they are transmuted into one another (τὴν μεταβολὴν εἰς ἀλλήλα ποιοῦνται). Yet they 'hold on to sameness' (ἐξεταί τῆς ταυτότητος); that is, they maintain their identity in another way; for though each of them is perpetually changing into the others, these transmutations compensate one another, so that the total amount of each of the four elements persists unaltered, and in this sense each of them 'maintains its sameness unimpaired for ever' (δὲ τῆς ταυτότητος τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν σώζει). Hence it follows that 'matter (i.e. the sum of the four elements regarded collectively)1 is one'.

If this explanation is right, μία must here be equivalent to τοῖς; and the words ἡ ἡλικία μία must be taken to mean, not that all the matter in the universe forms a single whole, nor that it is all of one nature, but that (considered as a whole) it persists unchanged through all time. Cf. ὁν γάρ ὄμοι σύμπας ὁ κόσμος αμετάβλητος ἐστι, § 18.

§ 15 a. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἂλλοις συνθέτοις πάσι σώμασιν ἀριθμὸς ἐκάστου ἐστι. What is meant by saying that a composite body 'has number', or that there is number in it? What are the things that are numbered? As we are told that 'there cannot be composition without number', it seems that the things numbered must be the parts or elements of which the body is composed. If so, the meaning is that every composite body consists of a certain number of distinct parts or elements, and is therefore 'many' (cf. τῶν... σωμάτων ἐκάστον πολλὰ ἐστίν above).

1 ἡλικία does not here mean ἄμορφος or ἄτομος ἡλικία.
Perhaps, however, the words might be understood in a different way; they might be taken to mean that the proportional quantities of the different elements of which the body is composed are 'numbered', or measured by number, i.e. that the elements are combined in fixed proportions. Cf. Ar. De an. 1. 5, 409 b 32 (Emped. fr. 96 Diels): ἡμών δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι οὖν τῶν συνθέτων οὐ γὰρ ὀπωσοῦν ἔχοντα τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦτων ἔκαστον, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τινὶ 'καὶ συνθέτωι' (συνταξία;) καθάπερ φησὶ καὶ Ἑμπεδόκλης τὸ ὅστοιν. 'Ἡ δὲ χθὼν ... τὸ δύο τῶν δικτῶν μέρεων λάχη νήστιδος αἴγης, τέσσαρα δ' Ἡφαιστου' τὰ δ' ὅστεα λευκά γένοντο. These verses are thus explained by Simplicius (Diels ad loc.): μέγνυσι δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅστων γένεσιν τέσσαρα μὲν πυρὸς μέρη, δύο δὲ γῆς, καὶ ἐν μὲν δέρος, ἐν δὲ διάτος. But, taken in this sense, the statement that 'each composite body has number' would be less directly connected with the question whether each thing is 'one' or 'many', which seems to be the main subject of the paragraph.

ai δὲ ἐνάθες τῶν ἀριθμὸν γεννῶσι καὶ αὔξουσι. Number is 'generated' and 'increased' by units; i.e. the number two is produced by adding one to one, and each larger number in succession is produced by adding one to the preceding number. Cf. Corp. IV. 10: ἡ γὰρ μοῦνα ... πάντα ἀριθμὸν γεννᾷ. This is a general proposition concerning number as such, and has no apparent connexion with the preceding statements that each υἱὸς is one, and each composite body is many, or 'has number'; for the writer cannot have held that a composite body is formed by adding υἱὸς together.

§ 15 b. οὐδέν ὕστερον ... δ' ὅδ' ἧν. νεκρὸν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Corp. VIII tit.: 'Οτι οὐδὲν τῶν δικτῶν ἀπόλλυται. Corp. XI. ii. 15 b: τὴν δὲ μεταβολὴν βάνατον φασὶν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

(ὁπό) τῆς πρώτης [ὁπό] καταστάσεως. This phrase implies that the universe has had a beginning.

§ 16. Ἡμι νέα γένηται. These words might mean either 'in order that the same ζῶα may be renewed', or 'in order that new ζῶα may come into being in the place of those which suffer dissolution'. The ambiguity is convenient for the writer's argument. The statement is true in the latter sense only; but in order to support the paradoxical thesis that no animal dies, it must be taken in the former sense.

tις τῆς ζῴας ὅστιν ἡ ἀνάργυς; ὅδ' κίνησις; The syllogism implied is this: 'All things which are in motion are alive; all things in the Kosmos are in motion; therefore all things in the Kosmos are alive'. But instead of saying 'All things which are
in motion are alive', Hermes says 'The ἐνέργεια of life (i.e. the result produced by the working of life) is motion'; and this amounts to no more than 'all things which are alive are in motion'. The argument therefore is not formally valid. In order to make it valid, we must assume that there is no motion other than that which results from life.

§ 17. καὶ πολυκινήτους μόνη ήδε καὶ στάσιμος. All material things except the earth are κινεῖται and not στάσιμα. The earth differs from all the rest in being στάσιμος; but though στάσιμος in one respect, it is at the same time κινητή in other respects. It is στάσιμος, in that it is fixed at the centre of the universe, and does not either move indefinitely, like the water and the air, or revolve, like the celestial spheres. But it is κινητή, in that it puts forth plants and animals at its surface, and that portions of its substance enter into the bodies of the plants and animals.

γελοιότατον δὲ ἐπίθου, εἰ τὸ τέταρτον μέρος ἄργων ἐστιν[α]. The earth is one of the four μέρη of the Kosmos, the other three being water, air, and fire. The future ἐσται cannot stand in combination with ἐπίθου. We must either write γελοιότατον δὲ ἐπίθου, εἰ ... ἄργων ἐστι (‘it is absurd to ask, as you did, whether the earth is idle’); or omit ἐπίθου, and write γελοιότατον δὲ εἰ ... ἄργων ἐσται (‘it is absurd if the earth is to be idle’, i.e. ‘it is absurd to try to make out that the earth is idle’). For the word ἄργων in this connexion, cf. Corp. XI. i. 5: ἀλλ’ ὀδὴ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐστίν ἄργια υδάμαοι.

§ 18. πῶς τοινυν ἔσθι ... τὸ δὲ ἐν (τῷ) κόσμῳ κυνούμενον ἢ κατὰ μείωσιν ἢ αὐξήσιν]. The words ἢ κατὰ ... αὐξήσιν must be cut out. If they are retained, the statement is (according to the writer's cosmology) untrue; for the heavenly bodies do not ‘increase or decrease’. It is true of earthly organisms; but the earth is only 'a fourth part of the Kosmos'.

τὸ δὲ ὅτῳ πῶς ὀδὴ ἀνάγκη τὸ αὑτῶ. (deil) ἐισα. There is life in all matter at all times; but life does not through all time maintain itself in the same organisms. A living organism sooner or later ceases to exist as such; but when it suffers dissolution, its material substance either is absorbed into the mass of the unorganized elements, which are themselves alive, or enters into the composition of other living organisms. As the writer of Corp. XI. ii. 15 b puts it, life does not perish at the dissolution of an organism, but only departs out of our sight, to reappear elsewhere.
In order to make sense of this, it seems necessary to take aiotēthos to mean 'individual consciousness', and aiotēthos 'the cessation of individual consciousness'. The life which for a time resides in a particular animal has no beginning or end; it has come from elsewhere, and will depart only to reappear elsewhere; but an animal's consciousness begins when that animal is born, and ceases when that animal suffers dissolution. (Cf. Corp. VIII. 4: othw stérpos gínetai tis aiotēthes, othk ápôleia (ζωής).) Life (ζωή) may exist without consciousness (aiotēthos); for instance, it was commonly said that plants have ζωή, but not aiotēthos. The writer may have held that the unorganized elements have life without consciousness; or he may have held that each of them has a consciousness of its own, but that this consciousness is distinct and separate from that of individual organisms, and that the former persists continuously, but the latter begins at the birth of the organism, and ends at its dissolution. In Corp. IX. 6, we are told that the Kosmos has an aiotēthos kai nòpos (i.e. a consciousness) of its own; and it would be possible to say the same of the several elements, which were called 'parts' of the Kosmos, and were sometimes regarded as gods.

theveta πωτα ((εκ ὧν παυν ζωόν ζωάσηστηκεν)), ἡ θλη (ζωή), τὸ πνεῦμα (νοῦς), ἡ ψυχή. ζωή is evidently out of place here. νοῦς, if mentioned at all, ought to stand after ψυχή (as it does in R), and not before it; but as beasts have no νοῦς, it ought not to be spoken of here. If we cut out ζωή and νοῦς, there remain (1) θλη (gross matter, i.e. earth and water), (2) πνεῦμα ('vital spirit', consisting of fine matter, i.e. air and fire), and (3) ψυχή (incorporeal); and these three are correctly described as 'the things of which every (earthly) ζωον is composed'. At the dissolution of the individual organism, its θλη goes back into the mass of cosmic θλη; its πνεῦμα goes back into the cosmic πνεῦμα, or the mass of cosmic air and fire; and it seems to be implied that its ψυχή is likewise reabsorbed into the cosmic ψυχή, i.e. the mass of undivided ψυχή whence it was parted off to enter into the individual animal. For the notion of an undivided mass of ψυχή, cf. Corp. XI. ii. 9, μᾶς ὁσμῆς τῆς θλης καὶ μᾶς τῆς ψυχῆς. Ίβ. 10, ψυχή ἡ... καθ' ἑαυτήν, τῷ ποιητῷ παρακαλέων. Corp. X. 7: ἀπὸ μᾶς ψυχῆς τῆς τοῦ παιντός πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰς... ἄστερ ἀπονενεμημέναι.

παν ἄρα ζωόν ἀθανατον διὰ τὴν ἀθανασίαν αὐτῶν. The cosmic θλη,
the cosmic πνεῦμα, and the cosmic ψυχή are immortal; and the portions of them which enter into the individual organism share the immortality of the mass from which they are temporarily parted off. Thus the parts of which the organism is composed are immortal; and the writer considers this enough to justify his paradoxical assertion that the organism itself is immortal.

§ 19. πάντων δὲ μᾶλλον (ἀθάνατος) ὁ ἀνθρώπως. Beasts can be called ἀθάνατος only by a strained and unnatural use of the term; but men are ἀθάνατοι in a different and higher sense. But in what sense? What does the writer mean by ἀθάνατος when he applies the word to men? The two reasons given for holding men to be ἀθάνατοι are these: (1) men receive from God revelations by which future events are made known to them; and (2) men are superior to beasts in that they are not restricted to one element, and look up to heaven. Neither of these facts can be considered to prove that men survive the dissolution of the body; but both may be held to show that man is a being of higher order than the beasts. It seems therefore that ἀθάνατος here means 'of like nature with the gods', and is equivalent to θεός. It is possible however that a passage containing some further explanation of the ἀθανασία of men has been lost at the end of § 20 a.

ὅ καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ δεκτικὸς καὶ τῷ θεῷ συνοιαστικὸς. Man is 'receptive of God'; that is, he is capable of becoming ἔθεος. And man is 'capable of holding intercourse with God'; that is, God speaks to men by dreams and signs.

For the notion that man is exalted above the beasts, and brought near to God, by the gift of μαντεία, cf. Synesius De insomniis 1, Migne Tom. 66 col. 1284 A: ἡ μαντεία δὲ ἀγαθῶν ἀν εἰη τὸ μέγαστον. τῇ μὲν γὰρ εἰδέναι, καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ γνωστικῷ τῆς δυνάμεως, θεός τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώπως διαφέρει θηρίον. ἀλλὰ θεῳ μὲν εἰς τὸ γινώσκειν ἡ φύσις ἀρκεῖ. ἀπὸ δὲ μαντείας ἀνθρώπῳ πολλαπλάσιον παραγίνεται τῷ κοινῷ φύσει προσήκοντος. ὁ γὰρ πολὺς τὸ παρὸν μόνον οἶδε, περὶ δὲ τοῦ μῆτω γενομένων στοχάζεται ὁ δὲ Κάλχας εἰς ἀρα ... μόνος ἤπιστατο "τά τ' εῶντα τά τ' ἐσώμενα πρὸ τ' εῶντα". 1 ... σημαίνει μὲν διὰ πάντων πάντα, ζτε αἰδελφῶν ὅντων τῶν ἐν ἐνι γίγνεται τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ ἐστὶν ταύτα γράμματα παντοτανα καθάπερ ἐν βιβλίῳ τοῦς ὁμοίας, ... ἀναγινώσκει δὲ οἱ σοφῶς, ... καὶ ἄλλος ἀλλα, καὶ ὁ

1 Hom. II. 1. 70. The Hermetist's words, ἔπαγγέλλεται ν ἀνθρωπος ἐπισταθαι τα προφητηματα καὶ ὑνεστότα καὶ μᾶλλοντα, show that he had in mind the same Homeric verse.
LIBELLVS XII. ii: §§ 18-19 365

mēν μάλλον, ὁ δὲ ἦττον. . . . αὕτως ὀρφωσυ σοφοί τὸ μέλλον, οἱ μὲν ἄστρα εἰδότες,1 . . . . οἱ δὲ ἐν σπλάγχνοις αὐτὰ ἀναγνώριτε, οἱ δὲ ἐν ὀρνίθων κλαγγαίς καὶ καβάδραις καὶ πτῆσεσι. τοῖς δὲ καὶ τα καλούμενα σύμβολα τῶν ἐσόμενων ὄτιν ἀρίθμηλα γράμματα, φωναὶ τε καὶ συγκόρ- σεις ἐτ' ἄλλω γενόμεναι, σημαντικῶν ὄτων ἄτασι πάντων. The resemblance between the Hermetist's summary treatment of μαντεία, and Synesius's fuller discussion of it, makes it probable that they drew from a common source; and it is not unlikely that both of them were directly or indirectly influenced by Posidonius. Cic. Div. 1. 6: 'Chrysippus . . . totam de divinatione duobus libris explicavit sententiam, uno praeterea de oraculis, uno de somniis: quem subseu quum librum Babylonius Diogenes edidit, eius auditor; duo Antipater; quinque noster Posidonius.' Id. i. 1: 'magnifica quidem res (μαντεία), et salutaris, . . . quaque proxime ad deorum vim natura mortalis possit accedere.'

διὰ δρωσ., διὰ σπλάγχνων, διὰ πνεύματος, διὰ δρῶσ. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 24 a: 'statuas futurorum praecias, eaque sorte, vate, somniis, multisque aliis rebus praedicentes.' Observation of the flight and cries of birds, and inspection of the livers of animals slaughtered in sacrifice, were two of the commonest forms of Greek μαντεία. The mention of divination διὰ δρῶσ is perhaps a literary allusion to the oracle of Dodona. But there may have been tree-oracles in Egypt also. 4 It is not likely that there were many oaks in Egypt; but the Hermetist may have used δρῶσ as a synonym for δεώδρων.

The word πνεύμα was sometimes used to mean the divine 'breath' by which a human being is inspired; and if διὰ δρῶσ is an allusion to the oracle of Dodona, διὰ πνεύματος might possibly be meant to allude to the inspiration of the Pythia at Delphi.4 But as the word

---

1 The writer of Corp. XII. ii does not mention astrology among the ways of getting knowledge of the future; and as it was one of those most commonly employed in his time, the omission is probably deliberate.
2 In Philostratus Vita Apollon. 6. 10, the chief of the Gymnai, on the upper Nile, makes an elm-tree talk. "τὸ δέων" ἢ τὸ "δεώδρων", πελεῖα δὴ ήν, . . . "προσειν τὸν σοφὸν Ἀπολλώνιον," καλ προσειν μὲν αὐτῶν, δὲ ἱερεύς, ἢ φωνὴ δὴ ήν ἑναρθρὸν τε καὶ θῆλη. The story is no doubt a free invention; but the man who invented it may perhaps have heard of talking trees in Egypt.
3 E. G. Democritus fr. 18 Diels (Clem. Alex. Strom. 6. 18. 167): πονηρὴ δὲ ἀσία μὲν ἐν γράφῃ μετ' ἐκθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ἱερὸν πνεύματος, καλὰ κάρτα ἀτόμ. Ps.-Plato Ascius 370 C: man could not have acquired the knowledge he possesses εἰ μὴ τῇ δείκτῃ δυνατῇ ἐνήν πνεύμα τῇ φυσι, δὲ ὁ τὴν τῶν τηλειωμένων πνεύμων καὶ γραμμάτων ἑνεχν. The πνεύμα by which the Pythia was inspired was sometimes supposed to issue from the chasm above which she was seated. Cic. Div. 1. 38: 'potest autem vis illa terrae, quae mentem Pythiae divino affluat concitatbat, evanuisse vetustate, ut
\( \text{πνεύμα} \) has been used in a different sense a few lines before, and is barely intelligible here without some explanation, it may be suspected that it has been inserted by a Christian, who wished to make the sentence applicable to the prophets of his own religion.

\( \text{ἐπίστασθαι τὰ προγεγενημένα καὶ ἔναστώτα καὶ μέλλοντα.} \) The emphasis is on \( \text{μέλλοντα.} \) To know the future is a privilege of the gods; and man, in so far as he knows the future, is godlike (\( \text{ἄδαντος} \)).

§ 20 a. \( \text{ἔκαστον τῶν ζώων ἐνὶ μέρει ἐπιφοιτᾷ τοῦ κόσμου.} \) This is a singularly futile argument. It might have been said with some show of reason that man is the only animal that has to do with all four elements; but the Hermetist shows a strange disregard of obvious facts in saying that every other animal is restricted to one element. There are amphibious animals, which haunt both earth and water; birds haunt both air and earth, and some birds swim and dive in water also. Moreover, man uses air only as the beasts use it; both men and beasts breathe air. A more plausible statement of the same argument occurs in Philo \( \text{De opif. mundi} \) 51. 147, Cohn 1, p. 51:

\[ \text{Man πᾶσι τοῖς λεχθεῖσι (sc. \( \text{γῆ, ὕδατι, ἄερι, πυρί} \)) ὁς οἰκειοτάτοις καὶ συγγενεστάτοις χωρίως ἐνδιατάται, τόπους ἀμαίβων, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιφοιτῶν, ὡς κυριώτατα φάναι τοῦ ἄνθρωπον πάντα ἐναι, χερσαίων, ἐνυδρόν, πτηνόν, οὐράνιον, \( \gamma \) μὲν γὰρ οἰκεὶ καὶ βίβηκεν ἐπὶ \( \gamma \), χερσαίον \( \xiρόν \) ἐστιν, \( \gamma \) δὲ διεται καὶ νήχεται καὶ πλεῖ πολλάκις, ἐνυδρον, . . . \( \gamma \) δὲ μετέωρων ἀπὸ \( \gamma \) ἀνώφοτον ἐξήρται τὸ σῶμα (i. e. stands erect), λέγοντι ἄν ἐνδίκως δεροπόρον ἐναι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ οὐράνιον, διὰ \( \tau \) Ἱτ ἡγεμονικάττατης τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὁφείς ἡλίω καὶ σελήνη καὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν άλλων αἰστήρων πλανήτων καὶ ἀπλανῶν συνεχῆς. \) The common source is probably Stoic.

\[ \text{ο \( \text{ϑ} \) ἄνθρωποι τούτως πᾶσι χρήται, \( \gamma \), ὕδατι, \( \text{ἄερι} [\text{πυρί}] \) \( \text{ὅρα} \) \( \text{δὲ} \) καὶ οὐράνιον. ' \text{All these' (\( \text{τούτως πᾶσι} \) must mean the three elements which have just been mentioned, viz. earth, water, and air; \( \text{πυρί} \) must therefore be cut out. The fourth cosmic region, that of fire, is here called, not \( \text{πῦρ}, \) but οὐρανός. Cf. \( \text{§ 21: τοῦ κόσμου} \) \( \text{μέρη} \) \( \text{εἰσίν} \) \( \text{οὐρανός} \) καὶ \( \gamma \) καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ \( \text{ἄερ}. \) \]  

\( \text{ὅρα} \) \( \text{δὲ} \) καὶ οὐράνιον, \( \text{ἀπεταῖ} \) \( \text{δὲ} \) καὶ \( \text{τούτοις αἰσθήσει.} \) Men do not indeed \text{make use of,'} \text{the celestial fire, as they make use of the other three elements; but they look up at it, and are in that way brought into connexion with it. It could hardly be denied that beasts and birds, as well as men, are able to 'see the sky' in the quosdam exaruisse amnes aut in allum cursum contortos et deflexos videmus.' Here the prophetic \( \text{πνεύμα} \) is regarded as a gaseous substance.
literal sense of the words; but the Hermetist considers that men are, by their bodily form, better fitted than beasts to look upward; and he holds that, in consequence of the direction of our eyes towards the sky, our thoughts are turned towards things heavenly and divine, or at any rate, that the upturning of man's eyes is symbolic of the elevation of his thought. As to the significance of 'looking up to heaven', cf. Ascl. Lat. I. 6 a: 'suspicit caelum.' Ib. 9: 'caeli suspiciendi venerabilem curam.' Ascl. Lat. III. 25: 'nemo suspiciet caelum.' Pl. Tim. 47 a: ὅψις δὲ ... αἰτία τῆς μεγίστης ὄφελειας γέγονεν ἦμᾶς, ὅτι τῶν νῦν λόγων περὶ τοῦ πάντος λεγομένων οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε ἔρρησθι μὴ ἀστρα μὴ ἔλιον μὴ ὀφρανὸν ἐδῶντων νῦν δὲ ... ἑπορωσάμεθα φιλοσοφίας γένος. Cic. Nat. deor. 2. 140, probably from Posidonius: '[(di homines) humo excitatos celsos et erectos constituerunt, ut deorum cognitionem caelum intuentes capere possent. Sunt enim ... homines ... quasi spectatores superarum rerum atque cælestium, quarum spectaculum ad nullum aliud genus animantium pertinet.]' Cic. Legg. 1. 26: 'nam cum ceteras animantes abieisset ad pastum, solum hominem erexit (natura), ad caelique quasi cognotionis domiciliique pristini conspectum excitavit.' Ov. Metam. i. 84: 'pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram, | os homini sublime dedit, caelumque videre iussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.' In the cosmogonia of 'Sanchuniathon' (quoted in introductory note on Corp. III) men are called οὐρανοῦ κατόπτα. Sen. Ep. 94. 56: '(natura) vultus nostros erexit in caelum, et quicquid magnificentum mirumque fecerat videri a suspicientibus voluit.' Lactantius Opif. dei 8. 2: 'cum igitur statuisset deus ex omnibus animalibus solum hominem facere cælestem, caetera universa terrena, hunc ad caeli contemplationem rigidum erexit bipedemque constituit, scilicet ut eodem spectaret unde illi origo est, illa vero depressit ad terram.' Lactant. Div. inst. 2. 1. 14–19, and 7. 5. 6. This commonplace is criticized by Galen, Us. part. 3. 3 (J. B. Mayor ad Cic. N. D. 2. 140): 'Those who believe man to have been made erect in order that he might look up to heaven ... can never have seen the fish called uranoscopus, not to mention various birds, which are much better adapted for looking up than man. The true upward looking, as Plato said (Rep. 7. 529), is to fix the mental eye on that which really exists.' The notion is more plausible from the point of view of a Stoic, who identifies the visible sky with the supreme deity, than from that of a Platonist; and it may have been Posidonius that first expressed it in the form in which it was adopted by later writers.
§ 20 b. [ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ περὶ πάντα καὶ διὰ πάντων.] These words occur in XII. i. 14 a, and have probably been repeated here by error. Compare διὰ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντα in § 23 a.

καὶ οὖν διόκολον ἔστιν νοησία τῶν θεῶν, . . . εἰ δὲ θελεῖς, [οὗτος] καὶ 
θεωρήσαι οὗτος. The writer distinguishes θεωρησαί, ‘to see’, from νοησαί, ‘to apprehend in thought’. Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 21 b sq.: πανταχοῦ 
θύμησαι τοῦ θεοῦ. . . . οὗτος φησι· ‘ἀόρατος ὁ θεὸς’; εὐφημήσην . . . ὁ θεὸς (οὗτος) ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν.

Having shown in §§ 15 b–18 that the Kosmos is full of life, Hermes proceeds to say in this paragraph (§§ 20 b–23 a) that all the life in the Kosmos is a manifestation of God’s working, and that God can therefore be seen in all things. But the transition is abrupt; and the new topic is in no way suggested by the preceding demonstration that man is ἀθάνατος (§§ 19, 20 a). It is therefore probable that a connecting passage has been lost. The unintelligible words 'ἐνέργεια γὰρ ἐστι δύναμις' are presumably a fragment of the lost passage.

§ 21. Ἐὰν δὲ τὴν ἀνάγκην τῶν φαινομένων. If the text is sound, the meaning must be ‘see how, in the visible world, one event necessarily follows another’. The sequence of cause and effect is unvarying and inevitable. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 39: ‘necessitas vero cogit ad effectum quae ex illius (sc. θεοῦ) primordiis pendent... necessitas, qua ad effectum vi coguntur omnia.’

καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν τῶν γεγονότων τε καὶ γινομένων. ‘Observe the indications of God’s providence (i.e. the proofs of design) in past and present events’ (or, ‘in things that have come into being in the past, and things that come into being in the present’). This topic was much dwelt on by the Stoics; see e.g. Cic. Nat. deor. 2. §§ 73–167.

(οὗτος) τὸν τηλικοῦτον θεὸν κυνομένην μετὰ πάντων τῶν ἐνότων [ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν] [θεῶν τε καὶ δαίμονων καὶ ἀνθρώπων]. ‘This great god’ is the Kosmos. The Kosmos and all things in it are ever in motion; and that which is in motion must be alive. These words then amount to a repetition of the statement that the Kosmos is πλήρωμα τῆς ζωῆς.

Something like τῶν ἐνότων is needed to complete the sense. When this had been lost, two different attempts were made to fill the gap; hence we have the two alternatives ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ θεῶν τε καὶ δαίμονων καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

Ἀλλ’ αὕτα, ὁ πάρεξ ἐνέργειας διὸς εἰσίν. What is meant by αὕτα? The things last spoken of were the Kosmos and its contents; but
these cannot be called ἐνέργειαι. The word αὕτη must therefore be taken to mean ἡ ἀνάγκη and ἡ πρόνοια. Tat says that Necessity and Providence are ‘energies’, i.e. forces at work; and he assumes that ‘energies’ are things distinct from God, and consequently, that if the life in the Kosmos is produced by ‘energies’, it cannot be the work of God. Hermes corrects his error by explaining that the ἐνέργεια of which he is speaking (viz. Necessity, Providence, and the like) ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργοῦνται; that is, they are ἐνέργειαι τοῦ θεοῦ. modes of God’s activity; they are therefore ‘parts of God’, and not, as Tat imagined, entities distinct from God. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 39 as emended: ἢ δὲ εἰμαρμένη ἐστὶν ἢ αὕτη ὁ θεὸς, ἢ ἡ μετ’ ἑκείνου τεταγμένη ἐνέργεια. Corp. III fin.: ἐν γὰρ τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἡ φύσις καθίστηκεν.

ὁ ἀγγέλες δὴ... μέρη (μελη MSS.) ἐστὶ (τοῦ) θεοῦ [ὁ ω καὶ ἀθανασία καὶ] εἰμαρμένη (αἰμα MSS.) καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ φύσις [ ]; There can be little doubt that the author gave a list of four ‘parts’ of God to match the four ‘parts’ of the Kosmos. Among the ‘parts’ of God, ἀνάγκη and πρόνοια, the two ἐνέργειαι which have just been mentioned, must have been included; with these, φύσις is fittingly coupled; and the first of the four, which has been corrupted into αἷμα, was almost certainly εἰμαρμένη. For the association of εἰμαρμένη with ἀνάγκη, πρόνοια, and φύσις, see note on § 14 b above.

[καὶ ψυχή καὶ νοῦς] [καὶ τούτων πάντων ἡ διαμονή] [τὸ λεγόμενον ἀγαθὸν]. The author cannot have coupled ψυχή and νοῦς with ἀνάγκη &c. These phrases, as well as [ὁ ω καὶ ἀθανασία καὶ] above, may be misplaced fragments of the lost passage which preceded § 20 b. Perhaps it was there said that God is the author or source of νοῦς and ψυχή, and of life in its two different forms of ἀθανασία and διαμονή. Cf. Corp. XI. i. 2: ἐνέργειαι δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ νοῦς καὶ ψυχή. Ιβ. 4 a as emended: ὃ αἰῶν κοσμεῖ τὴν ὠλην, ἀθανασίαν καὶ διαμονήν ἐνθεὶς τῇ ὠλη. XI. ii. 17 c as emended: οὐδὲ ὁ θεὸς δύναται (εἰναι) μὴ ποιών τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ δὲ τούτῳ... ὠλη.

οὐκ [ἐτι] ἐστὶ τι... δπον οὐκ ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς. Cf. Corp. XI. i. 6 a as emended: ὁ γὰρ ποιών ἐν ταῖς ἐστιν, πανταχοῦ δὲν ἐνέργεις. 

§ 22. Ἦ γὰρ ὠλη... χρόνος θεῶν (τί) ἐστιν, ἵνα τόπον (ποιῶν MSS.) αὕτη ἀπομείρισθη; Matter, if it were not ‘energized’ by God (i.e. if God did not put life into it), would have no actual existence. Lifeless ὠλη is a mere abstraction; the writer holds it to be μὴ ὄν, as the Platonists said that ἀμαρσφός or ἀποικος ὠλη is μὴ ὄν. You cannot ‘assign a place to it’, i.e. you cannot say that it is to be found in this

SS005.9  B b
or that part of the universe. All existent matter is alive; and its life must have been put into it by the vivifying activity (ἐνέργεια) of God.

τὶ δὲ [ουσ] ἀν ἢ σωρὸν αὐτὴν οὔς εἶναι, μὴ ἐνεργουμένην; If the text is right, σωρός must here mean 'an inert and lifeless mass'. But I have found no instance elsewhere of the use of the word in this sense; and some qualification of σωρὸν may have been lost. Perhaps the author may have written (νεκρὸν) σωρὸν; cf. Diod. 12. 62. 5: πολλοὺς τῶν πολεμίων νεκροῖς σωρεύσας. Or possibly the true reading may be σωρὸν; matter, if it were not energized by God, would be a σωρός, i.e. a thing that contains nothing but dead bones or ashes.

ὅπως τὸν σωματάφηται τὰ πάντα ζώα; ὅπως τὸν σωματίζηται τὰ ἀθάνατα; ὅπως τὸν μεταβαλλεῖ τὰ μεταβλητά; The two different forms which life takes, viz. immortal life (ἀθανασία) and mortal life (μεταβολή), are here distinguished, as in Corp. XI. i and ii. Compare especially XI. i. 5 as emended: τίς ἄλλος αἰτίας ζωῆς, καὶ ἀθανασίας καὶ μεταβολῆς ποιήσις; It is to be noted that the writer has already forgotten his reckless assertion that all ζώα are ἀθάνατα (§ 18 ἓν.).

ἐίτε δὲ ὡλην, εἴτε σώμα, εἴτε οὕσιαν φής. ὡλη is here, not ἀσώματος ὡλη, but matter as it presents itself to our senses, i.e. matter formed and vivified. In this sense, ὡλη is an alternative for σώμα; and that being so, οὕσια also must be taken as an alternative for σώμα. The three terms 'matter', 'body', and 'substance' are equally applicable to τὸ αἰσθητον, and you may use which of them you will in speaking of it. The word οὕσια then is here used as it was used by the Stoics, and not as it was used by Plato.

τοθι καὶ τοὔτος οὕσια (αὐτὰς MSS.) ἐνέργειας τοῦ θεοῦ. ἐνέργεια here means, not 'a force at work', but 'the result produced by a force at work'. Cf. Corp. XI. i. 2: ἐνέργειαι δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς κ.τ.λ.

(ὁ γὰρ θεὸς) . . . ἑνέργεια . . . τῶν σωμάτων (τῆς) σωματότητα. It is God's ἑνέργεια that makes body what it is. If God did not put life into it, it would be lifeless; and to be lifeless is to be non-existent.

§ 23 a. οὕτε μέγεθος οὕτε τόπος οὕτε ποιότης οὕτε σχῆμα οὕτε χρόνος παρά (περὶ MSS.) τῶν θεῶν ἔστιν. If this sentence stood alone, we might retain περὶ, and take the words to mean that magnitude, position in space, &c. cannot be attributed to God,—in short, that
God is ἀσώματος. (Cf. Herm. Exc. II A. 15.) But that statement would be irrelevant here. The connecting word ὅθεν shows that οὐτε μέγεθος κ.τ.λ. is an expansion of the preceding dicitum, 'God is the All, and there is nothing that is not included in the All'; the meaning must therefore be that no attribute of material things exists 'beside' (παρά) God, i. e. in independence of him.

χρώμα is oddly placed; if the word were used at all here, it would most naturally be put next to τότος. As σχῆμα and χρώμα are often coupled together, (e.g. ἀχρώματος τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος in Pl. Phaedr. 247 c, copied in Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. II A. 15,) it seems probable that the author wrote οὔτε σχῆμα οὔτε χρώμα.

τὸ δὲ πᾶν διὰ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντα. The phrase resembles that in XII. i. 14 a, ὅ μὲν θεὸς περὶ πάντα καὶ διὰ πάντων; but it does not necessarily follow that the writer of either document borrowed from the other.

§ 23 b. τοῦτον [τὸν λόγον], ὅ τεκνον, προσκυνεῖ. This sentence had already been corrupted in the copy used by Lactantius, who read τοῦτον τὸν λόγον . . . προσκυνεῖ, 'worship this λόγος', and took 'this λόγος' to mean the Second Person of the Christian Trinity. But Corp. XII. ii contains no trace elsewhere of a personified λόγος; and that being so, the Hermetist cannot possibly have spoken of 'this λόγος' as a God to be worshipped. The simplest remedy is to strike out τὸν λόγον (which may perhaps have been inserted by a Christian through whose hands the text had passed before it reached Lactantius), and to take τοῦτον to mean τὸν θεόν. But it is also possible that the author wrote (κατὰ) τοῦτον τὸν λόγον (in accordance with this my teaching), ὃ τέκνον, (τὸν θεόν) προσκυνεῖ, or something to that effect.'

μὴ εἶναι κακὸν. The Hermetist has chosen to write 'not to be bad' rather than 'to be good', presumably because he considers that God alone can properly be called good (see Corp. VI), and that 'not to be bad' is the utmost to which man, while yet in the body, can attain. The 'not being bad' of which he is thinking is probably not abstinence from wrong-doing towards one's fellow men (the iustitia which Lactantius, in his comment on the passage, takes this phrase to imply); he would doubtless have said, like other Hermetists, that the chief and all-inclusive virtue is not δικαιοσύνη (justice towards men), but εὐσεβεία (piety towards God); and for him, μὴ εἶναι κακὸν would perhaps mean first and chiefly μὴ εἶναι φιλοσώματον.
The doctrine of the Rebirth is to be taught only to those who are ready to be estranged from the material world. § 1.

The man whom the Rebirth brings into being is a son of God; he belongs to the world of Mind; he is composed of divine Powers. He who has been born again has become an incorporeal being; he is no longer a thing visible to bodily eyes. §§ 2–4.

The human body is subject to change, and is unreal, as are all material and sensible things. That only is real which is changeless and incorporeal. §§ 5, 6.

He who would be born again must suppress the working of his bodily senses, and rid himself of the evil passions which spring from matter. That is not impossible; but it can be accomplished only by God's mercy. §§ 7 a–8 a.

The Powers of God enter into the man, and there is built up in him an incorporeal organism, of which those Powers are the members. Knowledge (of God), Reality, the Good, Life and Light are now present in him; no evil passion can henceforth trouble him; he is changed into a god. §§ 8 b–10.

He sees things no longer by bodily sense; he sees with the eye of Mind. And thus seeing, he finds himself to be one with all that exists; he feels himself to be omnipresent and eternal. §§ 11 a–11 b.

The new self which has thus come into being is imperishable. He who has once become a god, and son of God, can never cease to be that which he has become. § 14.

The Powers, who sing praise to God in their supracosmic abode, are present in the human teacher also (inasmuch as he has been
born again), and sing within him, Thus inspired, he now sings a hymn of thanksgiving, in which he praises God (1) as maker of the material universe, and (2) as operating, through his Powers, in the mind of the man who has been born again. §§ 15–20.

The pupil, further illuminated through the influence of his teacher's hymn, gives thanks to God in a short hymn of his own devising. § 21.

Having been born again, and having thereby come to know himself and God, the pupil will bring forth good fruit. § 22 a.

The doctrine of the Rebirth must be kept secret. § 22 b.

(13 b.)

Relations of Libellus XIII to other Hermetica. The Генвкoi лóγοi of Hermes to Tat are known to the writer as a collection of documents bearing that title (§ 1). Corp. XIII, since it explains a matter which was spoken of obscurely in one of the Генвкoi лóγοι, is presumably one of the documents entitled Διεζωδοκιοι лóγοι.

The writer knows Corp. I as a document ascribed to Hermes. He expressly refers to it in § 15, and repeatedly shows acquaintance with it in other passages. In § 11 b, he appears to have copied from Corp. XI. ii. 20 b; and in § 15 there is perhaps a reference to the concluding words of XI. ii. In § 6, he has probably borrowed from §§ 9 and 15 of the Hermetic Περί ἀληθείας (Herm. ap. Stob. Εξε. Π. II A).

The term παλιγγενεσία occurred in one of the Генвкoi лóγοι; but in the extant Hermetica, the metaphor or figure of ‘rebirth’ is employed in Corp. XIII alone, and the thing signified by it is elsewhere expressed in other ways. E.g. in Corp. I, this transformation is described by the phrases εἰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν χωρεῖν (§§ 18, 19, 21); εἰς ζωήν καὶ φῶς χωρείν (§§ 21, 32); ἡ τοῦ νοῦ παρουσία (§ 22); γνώσιν ἐσχηκέναι (§ 26 a fin.); σωθῆναι (§§ 26 b, 29); τὴς ψυχῆς νήσις,— ἀληθὴν δρασις (§ 30); θεόπονος γενόμενος (ἐπὶ τὸ πεδίον ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας ἥλθον (ib.)); τῆς ἀθανασίας μεταλαβεῖν (§ 28). Corp. XI. ii: ἰσαντὸν ἐξωάσαι τῷ θεῷ (§ 20 b); συναντήσαι ἰαντὸν τῷ ἁμαρτητῷ μεγάθει, κ.τ.λ. (ib.); νοσῆσαι τῷ θεῷ (ib.). Corp. X: ἡ τοῦ ἄγαθον θέα (§ 4 b); ἡ ἐπεισοδία τῆς νοησίς λαμπροδόνος (ib.); ἀναπτάμαυ τὴς νησίν τοῖς τοῦ νοοῦ ὀφθαλμοῖς, καὶ θεάσασθαι τὸ κάλλος τοῦ ἄγαθον (§ 5); ἡ γνώσις τοῦ ἄγαθον (ib.); εἰς οὐσίαν μεταβληθηκαί,—ἀποθεωθήηαι (§ 6); γενέσθαι ἀθανασίας,—τοῦ ἄγαθον μεταλαμβάνειν (§ 8 a); γνώσις (§ 9); ἡ γνώσις τοῦ θεοῦ (§ 15 a); τῆς γνώσεως φῶς (§ 21). In Corp. IV, the process which corresponds to the ‘rebirth’ of Corp. XIII is called
"dipping oneself in the basin of ναὸς"; i.e. in that document it is figuratively described as a baptism.

Sources. The doctrine of Corp. XIII is based on Platonism. The Platonic antitheses of αἰτοθής and νοῦς, αἰσθήτα and νοητά, τὸ ἀληθὲς (= τὸ ἀλήθειαν) and τὸ ψευδὲς (= τὸ φανόμενον), the corporeal and the incorporeal, are present in the writer's thought throughout the dialogue; and in § 2 fin. there is a reference to the Platonic doctrine of ἀναμνήσεως. But in describing the change which takes place in a man when he 'comes forth from the cave', the Platonists in general were not accustomed to employ the metaphor of 'rebirth'; and the source of the conception expressed in Corp. XIII by the term παλιγγενεσία must be looked for in some other quarter. The group of Hermetists to which the author of Corp. XIII belonged probably got this conception either from the Christians, who held that men are reborn by the sacrament of baptism, or from some Pagan mystery-cult in which men were held to be reborn by a sacramental operation. But the author of Corp. XIII rejects all theurgia, as did the Hermetists in general; and accordingly, while adopting the notion of rebirth, he differs both from the Christians and from the adherents of those Pagan mystery-cults in which a rebirth was spoken of, in that he does not regard παλιγγενεσία as effected by any sacramental action.

Date. Corp. XIII is certainly later than Corp. I, which I conjecture to have been written between A.D. 100 and 200; and it is probably later than Corp. XI ii, which I have assigned to the third century. (See note on XIII. 11 b.) It also appears to be later than Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. II A. (See note on XIII. 6.) Moreover, Corp. XIII differs from almost all the other Hermetica in presenting indications that its writer was a member of a religious fraternity which already possessed established traditions and fixed forms of worship (see note on § 21), and which therefore had presumably been in existence for some considerable time. This libellus then is probably one of the latest of the extant Hermetica; and we may conclude that it was written in the third century after Christ, and most likely towards the end of that century.

Title. The insertion of ἐν ὅπερ must have been suggested by the words ἐν τῇ τοῦ ὅπερ μεταβάσεως in § 1. But those words have to do with the earlier dialogue of which Tat is there speaking, and
not with the dialogue reported in Corp. XIII. There is no reason to suppose that in Corp. XIII itself Hermes and Tat are situated ‘on a mountain’.

The words καὶ σημὸν ἔπαγγελιάς refer to § 22 b, where Hermes says to Tat σημὸν ἔπαγγελιά. But Corp. XIII cannot be called ‘a discourse about a promise of silence’; and if the phrase occurred at all in the title, it must have been connected differently.

§ I. περὶ θεώτητος (al. θεότητος) διαλέγομενος. Περὶ θεώτητος meant merely ‘about divinity’, or ‘about things divine’, all the Hermetica alike might be said to be περὶ θεώτητος. But the term is here used to indicate the special subject of one particular dialogue, and must therefore bear some more definite sense. Perhaps the meaning is ‘concerning the state of a man who has become θεὸς or ἄθεος’. Cf. Corp. IX. 1 c, where we are told that θεώτης is something done by God (to a man?), and that it is related to God as νόησις to νοῦς.


ἔμοι τε σοὶ ἴκετον γενομένου ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ ἄρους μεταβάσεως1 μετὰ τὸ σὲ ἔμοι διαλέξθηναι [πυθόμενον] τὸν τῆς παλιγγενεσίας λόγον μαθεῖν. In the dialogue περὶ θεώτητος, which was one of the Γενικοὶ λόγοι, Hermes had told Tat that ‘no man can be saved until he has been born again’. At the end of that dialogue, or in another which followed it, (μετὰ τὸ σὲ ἔμοι διαλέξθηναι,) Tat had begged Hermes to explain what he meant by ‘being born again’, and Hermes had refused, on the ground that Tat was not yet ready to be ‘estranged from the world’. The words ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ ἄρους μεταβάσεως appear to refer to the place where the scene of the dialogue referred to was laid; but as that dialogue is not extant, it is impossible to discover their meaning. One might conjecture ἐπὶ τῆς (ἀπὸ;) τοῦ ἄρους καταβάσεως, ‘when we were coming down from the mountain’. That would imply that Hermes had taken Tat up to the desert plateau above the Nile-valley, to talk with him there in private, and that it was when their talk was ended, and they were on their way back, that Tat made his request.

The infinitive μαθεῖν depends on ἴκετον γενομένου; ‘I besought you to let me learn’.

διαν μᾶλλον (τοῦ) κόσμου ἀπαλλοτριοῦσθαι [[ ]] (παραβάσεως) (sc. τὸν τῆς παλιγγενεσίας λόγον). The doctrine of the Rebirth must not be taught to the disciple until he is ready to experience the Rebirth
in his own person; and the condition of experiencing it is 'alienation from the (material) world.' The meaning of this alienation is explained in Tat's reply, ἀπελλατομος τὸ ἐν ἵματι φρόνημα ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ἀνάτης. If a man is to be changed into an incorporeal being, he must rid himself of all that binds him to the body, and must therefore put away from him all interest in things corporeal. Cf. Ep. Joh. 1. 2. 15: μὴ ἐγκαλάτε τὸν κόσμον μηδὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, κ.τ.λ. A similar thought is expressed in different terms elsewhere in the Hermetica; e.g. Corp. I. 19: ὅ δὲ ἐγκαλάτα, . . . τὸ σῶμα, οὗτος μένει ἐν τῷ σκότει κ.τ.λ. Corp. IV. 5: καταφρονήσαντες πάσης τῶν σωμάτων. Ἱδ. 6 b: ἢν μὴ πρῶτον τὸ σώμα μισήσης κ.τ.λ. Corp. XI. ii. 21 a: οἴδας γὰρ δύνασαι τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἐγκαλῶν νοήσαι, φιλοσόφατος ὑν.

παλιγγενεσίαν παραδοθοῦαι προθέμενος. 'You promised to transmit the Rebirth to me when I should be fit to receive it; I am now fit to receive it, and I ask you to fulfill your promise.' It may be doubted whether παλιγγενεσίαν παραδοθοῦαι means 'to transmit to me the doctrine of the Rebirth', or 'to cause me to be born again'. In this dialogue, the Rebirth takes place in Tat immediately after the doctrine has been expounded to him; and the two things are not very clearly distinguished. On the use of παραδοθοῦαι and παράδοσις in connexion with religion, see Norden, Agnostos Theos, pp. 288–293.

[ἐκ φωνῆς ἢ κρυβῆν]. (Perhaps κρυβῆ or κρύβετεν.) The writer of these words must have intended to say 'either openly or in secret'. But the antithesis is not correctly expressed; Hermes must speak to Tat ἐκ φωνῆς (νίκα νοεῖς), even if he teaches him in private. Besides, Tat has no motive for mentioning the alternatives here.

ἀγνω . . . ἐξ ὅπας μήτρας ἀνθρώποις ἀναγεννηθεὶς ἂν (ἀγεννηθῆ MSS.). The aorist indicative can hardly be right; the sense required is 'I do not know how a man could be born again', and this might be expressed by the optative. Tat's perplexity resembles that of Nicodemus in Ev. Joh. 3. 4: πῶς δύναται ἀνθρώπος γεννηθῆναι γέρων ὑν; μὴ δύναται εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ δεύτερον ἀεισθενῶν καὶ γεννηθῆναι;

§ 2. σοφία ἢ μήτρα, ἐν σιγῇ (κώσωσα).—(σοφία νοερὰ ἐν σιγῇ MSS.) It can hardly be doubted that νοερὰ is a corruption of μήτρα. Tat has asked two parallel questions, ἐξ ὅπας μήτρας and (ἐκ) στοράς ποίας; and since Hermes repeats the word στορά in his reply (ἡ στορὰ τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἀγαθὸν), he must have repeated the word μήτρα also.
The restoration of κόψων is less certain; but something of the sort is needed to provide a construction for ἐν συγγ.

The statement that σοφία is the μήτρα is equivalent to saying that God’s Wisdom is the mother who gives birth to the new man; and Hermes goes on to say that God’s Will (βλέπημα) is the father who begets him. (A few lines below, we are told more simply that the new man is θεὸς παῖς, a son of God himself.) The σπόρα (= σπέρμα), i.e. the vital germ from which the new man springs, is ‘the true Good’, which is regarded as a thing emitted by God’s Will.

The new man is conceived, or his birth is prepared, ‘in silence’. The New Birth cannot be brought about by verbal teaching or discussion. (Cf. § 2 fin.: ταῦτα τὸ γένος σοὶ διδάσκειν. Corp. X. 5: ἡ γὰρ γνώσεις αὐτοῦ βασιλέα σωματί ἔστω.) It agrees with this statement that Hermes is represented as having refused to talk to Tat about the παλιγγενεσία until the new man that was to be born in him had already been conceived, and the embryo was ripe for birth.

(Λέγει μοι καὶ τούτο τὴν ἑστὶ τελεσιουργὸς . . . θελήματι θεοῦ) (ὁπουργῶν). This passage is certainly out of place in § 4, where it interrupts the train of thought; and the question ‘who is the ministrant?’ would most naturally be asked in close connexion with the question ‘who is the father?’

The MSS. give τίς ἐστι γενεσιουργὸς τῆς παλιγγενεσίας; ‘Who is the worker of the birth of the Rebirth?’ The repetition of γενεσι- is awkward; and it is most likely that the author wrote τελεσιουργὸς, intending by this word to suggest an analogy between the Rebirth and the process of initiation in a mystery-cult. (Cf. τέλος, τελετή, ‘initiation’; τελευ, ‘to initiate’; τέλειος, ‘one whose initiation has been completed’. The word τελεσιουργὸς was frequently employed

1 In the Valentinian system, Sophia (Achamoth) is the mother of the πνευματικῶν in man (Irenaeus 1. 6). ‘The mother of the New Man, says Boehme, is the Virgin Sophia, the Divine Wisdom, or Mirror of the Being of God’ (E. Underhill, Mysticism, 1912, p. 147).
2 Cf. Eckhart, Pred. ii (E. Underhill, Mysticism, p. 381) : ‘It may be asked whether this Birth is best accomplished in man when he does his work, and forms and thinks himself into God, or when he keeps himself in silence, stillness, and peace, so that God may speak and work in him. . . . The best and noblest way in which thou mayst come into this work and life is by keeping silence, and letting God work and speak.’
3 Analogy, but not identity. In the mystery-cults, the thing aimed at was accomplished by means of certain ritual actions of sacramental efficacy; but no sacramental action is mentioned or implied in Corp. XIII.
4 According to Miss J. E. Harrison, ‘The meaning of the word τελετή’, Class. Rev. March 1914, the mystery-rites were originally adolescence-rites, and τέλειος, in this connexion, primarily meant ‘admitted to the status of an adult’. It may
with reference to religious initiation. In *Abammonis Resp.* 2. 11, the performance of a sacramental action is described as ἡ τῶν ἐργῶν τῶν ἁρμάτων καὶ ἐντὸς πάσαν νόσου θεωρητῶς ἐνεργούμενων τελεσιουργία. The word is much used by Dionysius Areopag, in combination with other terms borrowed from the language of the Pagan mysteries, and doubtless transmitted to him by Pagan Neoplatonists; e.g. *Caes. hierarch.* 3. 3: τοὺς δὲ τελεσιουργοὺς (χρη), ὡς ἐπιστημονικὸς τῆς τελεσιοψίης μεταδότας, τελέω τοὺς τελεσιούμενους τῇ πανάρῃ μνήμῃ τῆς τῶν ἐπιστημονικῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιστήμης. Dionysius calls the bishops τελεσιουργοῖς, as being the agents by whom the most holy sacraments are administered, and through whom the supreme consecration is conferred; he says the deacons καθαροῦς, the priests φωτίζους, and the bishops τελεσιουργοῦς. The τελεσιουργὸς then is the man through whose ministration the process of initiation is completed, and the mystēs is made τέλεως. The New Birth of *Corp.* XIII is analogous to the achievement of that union of the worshipper with his god which it was the object of mystery-rites to bring about; and the man who does that which gives occasion for another man to be ‘born again’ may accordingly be called ‘the τελεσιουργὸς of the Rebirth’.

In the particular case of Tat, the τελεσιουργὸς is Hermes. But answering the question in general terms, Hermes says that the τελεσιουργὸς is ‘some one man who is a son of God’. Hermes himself is such a man; he has been born again, and has thereby become a son of God.

“Ἄλλος [ἐστι] ὁ γεννώμενος. As Hermes is here speaking generally, and not referring to an expected παλιγγενεσία of Tat, the use of the future tense cannot be justified; and we must either strike out ἔστι, or alter it into ἔστω.

The man who has been born again is ‘another man’. The νοερὸς ἄθρωπος differs so completely from the σωματικὸς ἄθρωπος, that the change which takes place in a man when he passes from the one state to the other can be described by saying that he ceases to exist, and another man comes into being in his place. Something like this is necessarily implied when the term παλιγγενεσία is used. But the statement must not be insisted on in its literal sense. Tat becomes ‘another man’ in the course of the dialogue; yet the

have been so in a remote past; but if so, it had ceased to be so in the times known to us. The Greeks of history, when they spoke of a τελετή, were not thinking of adolescence.
Tat who 'sees with the eyes of the mind' after his transformation is after all the same person as the Tat who previously saw only with his bodily eyes.

τὸ πᾶς, ἐν παρτί. The New Man 'is the All', and 'is in all'. This is more fully expressed in § 11 b, where Tat says ἐν οὐδεμίῳ ἐίμι, ἐν γῇ, κ.τ.λ. The writer intentionally made the phrases by which Hermes here describes the new man obscure enough to invite Tat's reply, 'you are speaking in riddles'. But he had no reason to make the obscurity extend to the grammatical construction; and perhaps some word or words by which τὸ πᾶς ἐν παρτί was connected with the context may have fallen out.

(Convos γὰρ (ἐστι) τῆς ἐν ἐμοί ὁδοιας, καὶ τῆς νοητῆς) (μοῖραν ἔχει). These words have been wrongly assigned to Tat; they must have formed part of Hermes' answer.

ἐν ἐμοί is meaningless. We need some word which may stand in contrast to νοητῆς (e. g. αἴσθητης, σωματικής, or ὀλυκής); and as the speaker, Hermes, is one who has been born again, the ὁδοιά 'which is in him' (or of which he consists) is νοητῆς, and not σωματική. It is conceivable that ἐν ἐμοί might be a corruption of ἐναίμων, used as an equivalent for σαρκίνης; cf. Hdt. 3. 29: θεοὶ . . . ἐναμιοὶ τε καὶ σαρκώδεις (with reference to the bull-god Apis).

ἐκ πασῶν δυνάμεων συνεστώς. The word δυνάμεως is used in Corp. XIII, as in Corp. I, to signify the hypostatized 'Powers of God'. But in Corp. I, the 'Powers' are spoken of as residing in the supracosmic region, and collectively constituting the Noetos Kosmos. The writer of Corp. XIII adopts this conception; but he adds that the man who has been born again consists of these same Powers of God. Thus the man of whom he speaks τῆς νοητῆς ὁδοιάς μοίραν ἔχει. He is consubstantial with the Noetos Kosmos, and is a Noetos Kosmos in himself.

ἐκ πασῶν δυνάμεων συνεστώς means, not 'he consists of all the Powers' (which would be ἐκ πασῶν τῶν δυνάμεων), but 'the things of which he consists are all of them Powers', i.e. 'he consists of Powers and nothing else'. Cf. Pl. Rep. 579 b: κύκλῳ φρουροῦμενον ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμίων ('those who keep watch around him are all of them enemies').

ὦτο τοῦ θεοῦ, (ὦταν θεός) ἀναμφησκέται. This is a reference to the Platonic doctrine of ἄναμφησις. In its antenatal state, the soul was united with God and the Noetos Kosmos, and possessed all knowledge of things divine. Through its embodiment, it has
been overcome by λήθη (cf. Corp. X. 15 b); but, God willing, it
may be enabled to recall to memory its former knowledge. Mere
human teaching is powerless to impart this knowledge, and can,
at most, only give occasion for the 'reminiscence'.

§ 3. (μεταφράσεις [μεταφράσεις] πέφυκα τού πατρικοῦ γένους; With these
corrections, which improve the sense, we get an iambic senarius.
The line is presumably quoted from some play, but perhaps not
quite exactly. πατρικοῦ may possibly have been substituted for
πατρός.

οδῆ τῷ πλαστῷ τῶν στοιχείων, δι' οὗ (οὗ δρόφες), ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν.
The thing 'by means of which you see' is the bodily eye. But
the eye cannot be called a στοιχείον; and we must suppose either
that στοιχείον has been wrongly substituted for some other word
(e.g. ὄργανον), or that it is a remnant of some longer phrase (e.g.
tῷ πλαστῷ τῶν στοιχείων ὄργανον).

οὐκ ἐγὼ λέγεω πλῆν τοῦτον ὄργανον τί (τί) ἐν ἐμοί κ.τ.λ. Hermes
knows what the Rebirth is, because he has himself experienced it; but
he cannot find words to describe it adequately. It is impossible
to make one who has not experienced it understand what it is by
means of a mere verbal statement.

ἀναστατοὶ ἰδέα (θεῖαν MSS.). Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 16 b on the
ἀναστατοὶ ιδέα of God.

ἐμαυτόν (ἐμαυτόν) εἰς ἀναστατὸν σώμα. ἐμαυτόν here means
'myself as identified with my material body'. Hermes has passed
forth out of this self, and has 'entered into' (or become) a new
self, which he describes, by a paradoxical metaphor, as an immortal
(i.e. divine) 'body'. This 'body', his new self, is incorporeal, and
is composed of divine δυνάμεις.

καὶ διαλέλυται (διὸ ἡμέληται MSS.) μοι τὸ πρῶτον [σύνθετον]
ἐδος. The reading διὸ ἡμέληται may be accounted for by assuming
that διαλέλυται was read as ἡ Μέληται, and that this was altered
into διὸ ἡμέληται in an attempt to make sense.

It seems best to cut out σύνθετον. The material 'form' (ἐδος), i.e.
the body, is indeed composite, but there is no reason to call
attention to that fact; for the new man, with whom it is contrasted,
is also composite (ἐκ δυνάμεων συνετῶν). The word διαλέλυται (if
that is the right reading) must be taken to mean 'has been put
away (from me)', and not 'has been broken up'. It is not true
that Hermes' material body has been broken up; it still exists, but
it is no longer identical with him, or a part of him; it is a thing
alien to him,—a mere external object, like anything else in the sensible world,—and in that sense 'it has been put away from him'. A reader may however have supposed ἀναλυταί to mean 'it has been broken up into its component parts', and may thus have been led to insert συνθέται.

[ὁς ἐκεῖνος, ὧν ἔχεισ.] This is perhaps a misplaced doublet of ὧν ἔχεισ τοῦτοις θεωροῦμαι νῦν, ὃ τέκνον below.

οὐκ ὧν ἔχεισ τοῖς θεωροῦμαι. τοιούτως means σωματικῶς.

The new man, being incorporeal, can be seen only with 'the eyes of the mind'. Cf. Porphyry. Ad Marcellam 8: ἐγὼ οὖν ὁ ἄπότι μενος καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ὑποτιθῶ, ὃ δὲ ἐπὶ πλείους ἄφθορος τού σώματος, ὁ ἀρχόμενος καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος, καὶ χερσὶ μὲν οὖν ὁμοιῶς ἐπαφητός, διανοιῶ δὲ μονὴ κρατητός. But Porphyry's meaning is that the ego is the incorporeal soul, and not the body; and that might be said of every man alike. In Corp. XIII, on the other hand, it is implied that only he who has been born again is incorporeal, and that all other men are identical with their bodies.

§ 4. ἐμαυτὸν γὰρ νῦν οὐ̂ν ὁρῶ; Taking this as a question, we may explain the meaning thus: 'You tell me that I do not see you; you might as well tell me that I do not see myself. Both statements alike contradict the evidence of my senses'. (If this is what is meant, it might have been more clearly expressed by writing οὐ̂ν ἐμαυτὸν, νῦν ὁρῶ;) Hermes replies, 'Would that you too, like me, had passed forth out of yourself', i.e. had been born again, and so had put the body away from you. 'In that case', it is implied, 'it would have been true to say that you do not see yourself', i.e. that the body which you see is not yourself. 'But as you have not yet been born again, it cannot be denied that you see yourself when you look at your body.'

'ἔνα εἶδες, μὴ' ὃς ὦ τε ὑπνῶ ὀνειροπολούμενος, ἄλλα ἡξωρίς ὑπνοῦ. 'It is true that you see your body (and therefore "yourself", since you are still identified with your body); but when you see your body, or anything else, with your bodily eyes, the thing you see is no more real than the things seen in dreams; for all sense-perception is illusion. If you would see truly, you must wake from your present sleep (i.e. from the state of one whose soul is sunk in the body), and look with waking eyes (i.e. with the eyes of the mind).'

The same meaning might be got in another way, by writing ἔνα εἶδες ἡξωρίς ὑπνοῦ. νῦν δὲ ὁρῶς ὃς ὦ τε ὑπνῶ ὀνειροπολούμενος.
§ 5. τὸ γὰρ μέγεθος βλέπω τὸ σῶν τὸ αὐτὸ, ὡς πάτερ, σῶν τῷ χαρακτῆρι.
This is clumsily expressed, and perhaps corrupt; but the meaning must be '(I certainly do see you;) for when I look at you, I see a man of the same stature as before, and the bodily features by which I am accustomed to recognize you are unaltered'.

Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ φεῦδη. You are mistaken in saying that what you see when you look at me now is 'the same' as what you have seen before; for the human body is continually changing. My body is an illusory appearance (ψεῖδος); for all that changes is illusory; it is only that which exists in eternal changelessness that is real (ἀληθῆς, = ὅτως ὄν). Cf. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. XI. 2. (16): οἴδας ἐν σώματι ἄληθες· μόνον τὸ αὐτῶματον ἄψευδες. Exc. II A. passim; e.g. § 10, πῶς γὰρ τὸ ἄλλοισμένον ψεῦδος ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.

§ 6. Τί ὅν ἄληθες ἔστιν . . .; Τί μὴ θολούμενον κ.τ.λ. Cf. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. II A. 9: ἢ γὰρ ἄλθεια [.] ἔστι . . . τὸ μὴ ὑπὸ ὦλης θολούμενον μήτε ὑπὸ σώματος περιβαλλόμενον, γυμνόν, φανόν, ἀτρεπτόν, [ ] ἀναλλοίωτον [ἀγαθόν]. 1b. § 15 as emended: Τί ὅν ἂν ἐποίησας πάντως ἄλθεεις, ὡς πάτερ; 'Ενα καὶ μόνον, ὁ Τάτω, τὸν μὴ ἐς ὦλης, τὸν μὴ ἐν σώματι, τὸν ἀχρώματον, τὸν ἀσχημάτιστον, τὸν ἀτρεπτόν, τὸν μὴ ἄλλοισμένον, τὸν ἐπὶ ὄντα. It seems clear that the writer of Corp. XIII has copied from Exc. II A. He has borrowed τὸ μὴ θολούμενον, γυμνόν, φανόν, ἀγαθόν, from Exc. II A. 9; ἀχρώματον, ἀσχημάτιστον, from ib. 15; and ἀτρεπτόν, ἀναλλοίωτον, from both passages; and he has added τὸ μὴ περιοριζόμενον and τὸ αὐτῷ καταληπτῶν. Compare the Hermippus (Kroll and Viereck) 2. 20. 186: πολὺς ἄν ἔρωτας ἔχοι δ τοιούτοις κάλλος κατοπτεύει διδυμόνος, ἀφθαρτόν, ἀκρατόν, μὴ ὦφ' ὦλης θολούμενον, ἀτρεπτόν τε καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον.

τὸ μὴ περιοριζόμενον (διαριζόμενον MSS.). Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 18 as emended: τὸν ἀσωματὸν οἴδας ἐστὶ περιοριστικῶν, αὐτὸ δὲ πάντων περιοριστικῶν. In Corp. I. 7, the Noetos Kosmos is called κόσμος ἀπεριόμενος.

τὸ γυμνὸν is obscure here; but in Exc. II A. 9, its meaning is explained by the preceding phrase, μήτε ὑπὸ σώματος περιβαλλόμενον. The writer would have said that the human soul, when unembodied, is ἄληθῆς, but ceases to be ἄληθῆς when it is incarnated, and in this life, becomes ἄληθῆς only when it has put the body away from it by the Rebirth.

τὸ αὐτῷ καταληπτῶν. The incorporeal can be apprehended only by νοῦς, which is itself incorporeal; for 'like is known only by like'.

Digitized by Google
It would be possible to write τὸ αὐτοκατάληπτον, taking it in the same sense.

[[τὸ ἀσώματον]]. This can hardly have been written here by the author; the series ought to end with ἀγαθῶν, as in Exc. II A. 9 MSS. But some one rightly summed up the meaning of the whole sentence by putting τὸ ἀσώματον at the end of it.

ἐνεφράχθησαν αἰ. αἰσθήσεις. Cf. Corp. VII. 3: τὰ . . . αἰσθητήρα ἀναίσθητα ποιῶν, τῇ πολλῇ ὀλη αὐτὰ ἀποφράζεις. As the writer of Corp. XIII had certainly read Corp. I, it is probable that he had also read Corp. VII, which is closely connected with Corp. I.

Tat cannot apprehend 'the thought which has been put before him', i.e. understand what Hermes has said; he cannot grasp the notion of the incorporeal. And for that very reason, he makes no distinction between αἰσθήσεις and νόσσεις; he thinks he ought to be able to apprehend the thing spoken of with his senses, i.e. to see or hear it,—in imagination at least, if not by actual sense-perception. Hermes therefore has to explain to him that it is impossible αἰσθητῶς νοεῖν τὸ ἀσώματον.

τὸ μὲν ἀνωφερές [ὡς πῦρ] κ.τ.λ. The explanation that τὸ ἀνωφερές here means fire, τὸ κατωφερές means earth, &c., is correct; but the author would hardly have thought it necessary to explain the terms; and ὡς is used improperly. I have therefore bracketed ὡς πῦρ &c.

καὶ σύμπνοον [ὡς ἄηρ]. Does this mean the air 'which is breathed by all of us together', i.e. the common life-breath of us all?

τὸ ὁμόθυμου (ὁμούθυμον?), τὸ μὴ διαλύμενον. Bodies are σύνθετα and διάλυτα, i.e. are composed of the four elements, and resolved into the elements of which they were composed.

τὸ μόνον δυνάμει [καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ] νοεύμενον. Δύναμις may be taken to mean here, as before, 'a Power of God', i.e. one of the 'Powers' which are the component parts both of the divine νοεῖ, and of the mind of the individual man into whom a portion of the divine νοεῖ has entered. The incorporeal can be apprehended only by νοεῖ, or by a δύναμις which is, so to speak, one of the members of νοεῖ. But the writer was at the same time conscious of the more ordinary meaning of δύναμις, 'power' or 'faculty'; and this suggested to him the phrase which follows, τοῦ δυναμένου νοεῖ.

The word ἐνεργεία is used by some of the Hermetists in the sense of 'a power of God at work', or 'an operation of God's power'; and in this sense it would be possible to say that the incorporeal
ενέργεια νοείται. But the combination δυνάμει καὶ ενέργεια is puzzling; and it seems best to assume that καὶ ενέργεια was inserted by some one who did not understand the author's peculiar use of δύναμις.

[τὴν ἐν θεῷ γένεσιν]. These words, which are equivalent to τὴν παλιγγενεσίαν, seem to have been inserted in order to provide an object for νοεῖν. But the object required is not τὴν παλιγγενεσίαν, but τὸ μὴ σκληρὸν κ.τ.λ., i.e. the incorporeal; and as τὸ ἀσέματον seems to have been wrongly inserted above, the simplest remedy is to transpose it to this place.

§ 7 a. ἐπιστασαι εἰς εαυτῶν. Here again, the object is 'the incorporeal', that is, in this connexion, τὸν θεὸν νοεῖν, or τὰς δυνάμεις. Two lines below, this same thing, which is to be 'drawn into him', or 'born within him', is called ἦ θεότης.

§ 7 b. (. . . δεῖ) καθάραι σεαυτῶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλὸγων τῆς ἀληθείας τιμωρίων. The editors print καθάραι, imperative middle, and connect it closely with the preceding imperatives (ἐπιστασαι, δέλησθαι, κατάργησθαι). But the use of the middle voice with σεαυτῶν is hardly possible; and the description of the purification required is sufficiently distinct from what precedes it to make a fresh paragraph desirable.

The purging away of evil passions would most naturally be regarded as preliminary to the reception of that which is divine; and assuming that the author took this view, we might write (πρῶτον δὲ δεῖ καθάραι. In the following sentences, however, we are told that the evil passions do not depart until after the δυνάμεις have arrived. But there is reason to suspect that those sentences have been inserted by a later hand.

The vices or evil passions are here called τιμωρίαι. The word τιμωρίαι properly means 'punishments'. In Corp. I. 23, evil passions are spoken of as punishments inflicted on the impious by the τιμωρός δαιμόνων; and in Corp. XII. i. 5–7, they are similarly spoken of as punishments inflicted by Heirmarmene. But the writer of Corp. XIII does not speak of them as punishments of previous sin; and in this passage, τιμωρίαι must be taken to mean, not 'punishments', but 'tortures' resembling those which are inflicted on criminals.

Τιμωροῦσι γὰρ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ ἔχω, καὶ πάτερ; The writer personifies the evil passions, and therefore calls them τιμωροί, 'torturers', as well as τιμωρίαι, 'tortures'. He does not himself call them 'daemons'; but his use of the word τιμωροί may have been suggested to him by writings in which the evil in men was attributed to the operation of
Ti/uopoi(5ai'/ioi'fs. Cf. Lydus De mens. 4. 32 (Ascl. Lat. III. 33 b): 
toûs µèn tîmâroûs tôn ðaîmânov k.t.L.

 bölüm 6: Ti/uopoi(5ai'/ioi'fs. It seems probable that this list
 of tîmâroi, and the later passages in which it is presupposed (viz. 
§§ 8 c–9, 11 c–12, and a few lines in § 18), were not written by 
the original author, but were inserted by some person or persons 
whose hands the document afterwards passed. When these excres-
cences have been removed, Corp. XIII is less unworthy to take its 
place among the other Hermetica. It is true that we have no right 
to assume that the author's canons of good sense and taste agreed 
with ours, and to conclude that passages are spurious merely because 
we think them silly; but it will be found that several difficulties and 
inconsistencies in detail are cleared away when these parts of the 
text have been excised.

The list of tîmâroi is based on no logical classification; the writer 
was chiefly interested in making up the number to twelve, and was 
content to include in his list any word signifying a bad emotion, 
quality, or disposition. δόλος, ἐπιθυμία, ἀπάτη, and προπέτεια may 
have been suggested to him by the list of planetary πάθη in Corp. I. 
25. The twelfth and last is κακία, 'vice',1 which does not stand on 
a par with the particular vices (πλεονεξία &c.), but includes them all; 
and inasmuch as 'vice is ignorance', the same might be said of the 
first, ἀγνώμοια, and perhaps of the seventh, ἀπάτη, also. The number 
twelve was fixed on because that is the number of the Signs of the 
Zodiac. See § 12, where it is implied that each of the twelve 
tîmâroi results from the influence of one of the twelve zodiacal Signs. 
The astral theory presupposed differs from that in Corp. I, according 
to which each of the evil passions results from the influence of 
one of the seven planets. In both alike, the astral influences are 
held to be maleficient; but Corp. I takes into account the planets 
only, and ignores the zodiac, whereas Corp. XIII takes into account 
the zodiac only, and ignores the planets.

3. 8: ὄργιν, θυμόν, κακίαν (R. V. 'malice'), βλασφημίαν, ἀλογολογίαν. But could 
κακία be understood in the restricted sense of 'malice' where there is nothing in the 
context to suggest this limitation of its meaning.
a man is ' bound in the prison of the body ', the τιμωροί (who are compared to the agents by whom sentence is executed on imprisoned criminals) have him in their power, and can inflict their torments on him.

If we retain τὸν ἐνδιάβητον ἄνθρωπον, we must translate 'the inner man'. But there is no authority for this use of ἐνδιάβητος; it could not be justified by the Stoic phrase ὁ ἐνδιάβητος λόγος. Besides, 'the inner man' would rather mean the incorporeal man who is brought into being by the Rebirth; whereas the man here spoken of is the natural or earthly man, who is sunk in or identified with the body. It seems certain therefore that ἐνδιάβητος is corrupt.

ὁμισταντι δὲ αὐτὰ [ὁκ] ἄθρωσ. Cf. § 12, as emended: τὴν ἀποστασίν ποιοῦσαν, καθὼς (ἐπον, ἄθρωσ). On the hypothesis that the list of τιμωρίαι was added by a later hand, we may suppose that ὁκ was inserted here in order to avoid an apparent inconsistency with the interpolated sentences, in which the expulsion of each of the first six τιμωρίαι is separately and successively described.

οὕτω συνίσταται ὁ ἁμόλογος. Cf. § 8 b, εἰς συνάρθρωσιν τοῦ λόγου, and § 19, ὅσος λόγος ὄμοι οὐκεί σε. The λόγος is the incorporeal organism which is composed of divine δυνάμεις, and is brought into being by the παλιγγενεσία. It is identical with the ἄθανατον σώμα spoken of in § 3, the σῶμα τὸ ἐκ δυνάμεων συνεστός in § 14, and the νοτρα οὐσία (?) in § 10. It corresponds more or less to what Plato called τὸ λογιστικόν, and Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 1. 13) τὸ λόγον ἔχον; and it might equally well have been called ὁ νοτρα. It is quite distinct from the λόγος of Corp. I. 5 a, &c., which is a personification of the 'word' or σιάτ by which God made the world; and if we are to look for a Jewish parallel, it corresponds more nearly to the 'word of the Lord' by which he spoke to or through the prophets.

ὁτὸς τῇς παλιγγενεσίᾳ τρόπος. Hermes has now answered Tat's question (§ 3, διάφρασαν μοι τῇς παλιγγενεσίας τὸν τρόπον), as far as it is possible to answer it by mere words. But Tat is already on the verge of experiencing the Rebirth in his own person; and in what follows, it is described as actually taking place in him. It would hardly be correct to say that the words of the teacher cause the transformation of the pupil. Hermes is indeed in this instance the τελεσιωργός; but that means no more than that by his teaching and influence, culminating in the words which he has spoken in this dialogue, Tat has been brought into a fit state to be born again. The efficient cause of the Rebirth, as we are repeatedly
told, is 'God's will' or 'God's mercy'. Hermes, however, has judged his time well, and has consented to talk to Tat about the Rebirth only when Tat is ready to experience it.

§ 8 a. 'καί διὰ τούτο οὖν καταπαύει τὸ ἔλεος εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ. οὖν καταπαύει cannot be right; the meaning must be, not that God's mercy will continue to operate, but that it will now begin to operate in Tat's case, i.e. that it will bring the Rebirth to pass in him. Besides, εἰς and ἀπὸ require a verb of motion. The sense wanted might be obtained by writing οὖν κατελεύσεται τὸ ἔλεος κ.τ.λ. Hermes might rather have been expected to say something like εὑρήκησον, εἰ πως κατελεύσεται κ.τ.λ.; 'wait in silence, and let us see whether it will come'. But if he is confident of its near approach, he may very well say positively 'it will come'. Cf. § 7 a: ἔπιστησαν εἰς ἐλαυνόν (τὸ ἀδώματον), καὶ ἔλευσεν.

Hermes himself has been reborn already, and it is on Tat alone, and not on him, that 'God's mercy' is now about to operate; but he says εἰς ἡμᾶς instead of εἰς σέ, because he is deeply interested in the rebirth of his son.

After these words, we must assume an interval of solemn and prayerful silence, which is ended by the exclamation χαίρε λογίστα, ἡ τέκνων, κ.τ.λ. At that point, Hermes, in virtue of his God-given insight, perceives that his expectation is fulfilled, and that Tat's παλαιγγενεσία has actually begun. In this dialogue, as in the Hermetica in general, there is no trace of any sacramental action. The Rebirth is wrought by God alone; and the ministrations of the human τελειοσσωργός, by which the way is prepared for it, consist of nothing but teaching.

§ 8 c. ἡλθεν ἡμῖν [γνῶσις] χαρᾶς. There is some awkwardness in speaking of the arrival of χαρᾶ, when Hermes has said χαίρε ἡ τέκνων just before. This tends to confirm the suspicion that the list of τιμωρίαι, and the corresponding list of δυνάμεις, are interpolations.

ἡ λύπη φεύγεται εἰς τοὺς χωροῦντας αὐτήν. 'Grief' is imagined as an evil demon, which, when expelled from one man, seeks another into whom it may enter.

§ 9. ὁ βασιλεὺς οὕτος... δικαιοσύνης ἐστίν ἐδρασμα. 'Justice' is pictured as enthroned on her judgement-seat, like a Roman magistrate seated on his tribunal to administer the law. The 'Justice' here spoken of is the justice of God, by which men are judged, rather than the human virtue of justice, which enters into the reborn man
and becomes part of him. But according to the doctrine of this
document, the δυνάμεις which enter into the man are consubstantial
with the δυνάμεις of God, and it is therefore easy for the writer to
pass from the one to the other.

(χωρίς γὰρ κρίσεως (κτίσεως MSS.)) ἐδικαιώθημεν, ὡ τέκνον,
ἀδικίας ἀποφήσας. 'There is no need for our case to be tried and
judged; we are justified without trial; for there is no injustice
in us.' The writer takes advantage of the ambiguity of the word
ἐδικαιώθημεν, which may mean either 'we have been pronounced
just (by the judge)', or 'we have been made just'. In the former
sense, it agrees with the preceding picture of the law-court; but
it is in the latter sense only that it has any direct bearing on the
Rebirth. The reborn man 'has been made just'; i.e. the vice
of injustice has gone out of him, and the virtue of justice has entered
into him.

Paul also would have said that the new man is 'justified'. Cf.
Ep. Rom. 3. 21-24: χωρίς νόμον δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ πεφανέρωται. . . .
dικαιοσύνου δωρεάν τῇ αὐτῷ χάριτι. Ἰb. 6. 6 ff.: οἱ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν
ἀνθρώπος συνεσταινόθη, ἵνα καταργηθή τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας . . .
ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας. Had the writer of
this Hermetic passage read Ep. Rom.? At any rate, it is possible
that he had talked with Christians who used phrases taken from
that epistle.

τὴν κατὰ τῆς πλεονεξίας, (τῆς) κοινωνίαν. πλεονεξία is 'a grasping
disposition'; it is the disposition of the man who claims more
than his fair share, and seeks to take from others more than he has
a right to. Its opposite, κοινωνία, must therefore be the disposition
of one who is ready to share with his neighbours, and seeks nothing
for himself alone.

ἰδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν πεπλήρωται κ.τ.λ. The incoherence of this
and the following paragraphs down to the end of § 12 can hardly
be accounted for except on the hypothesis of interpolation; and
it seems probable that two different interpolators have been at work
in succession. In the traditional text, Hermes gives a list of
dωναίας, and a list of seven δυνάμεις, the last of which is
ἀλήθεια. He pairs off the first six τιμωρίαι with the first six δυνάμεις;
and having done so, he has no course open to him but to say that
the other six τιμωρίαι are expelled on the arrival of the seventh
and last δυνάμεις, viz. ἀλήθεια, and that 'the Good' is thereby 'com-
pleted'. He does say this; indeed, he does it twice over, first in
the words ἰδὶ τῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν πεπλήρωται παραγενομένης τῆς ἀληθείας, and then in the words τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπεγένετο κ.τ.λ. But in § 10 init., we are told, to our surprise, that the δυνάμεις are not seven, but ten in number; and in §§ 11 c–12, the fact that there are ten of them is discussed at some length. It seems therefore that the passage must have been altered. In an earlier form of it, the δυνάμεις were seven in number; but a redactor thought fit to increase their number to ten (presumably because he held ten to be ‘the perfect number’), and did so by counting in the three terms τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ζωή, and φῶς, which happened to occur in § 9 fin., but were not used as names of distinct and individual δυνάμεις.

But there is reason to suspect that even the list of seven δυνάμεις was not present in the earliest form of the text; and if this suspicion is justified, we must distinguish three different stages. (1) The original author spoke of the τιμωρίαι and the δυνάμεις collectively, but did not enumerate them. He described the Rebirth as the coming of ἀληθεία (the unique significance of which he had previously pointed out in § 6); and he may have spoken also of γνώσει, not as an entity sharply distinguished from ἀληθεία, but rather as its correlate, or the subjective aspect of it. (2) A first interpolator inserted in the text a list of twelve τιμωρίαι, and a list of seven δυνάμεις, making ἀληθεία the seventh and last of the latter. (3) A second interpolator increased the number of the δυνάμεις from seven to ten, and inserted §§ 11 c–12, in which the numbers twelve and ten are discussed.

The passages which I ascribe to the first interpolator are printed in small type, but not bracketed; those which I ascribe to the second interpolator are printed in small type and also bracketed.

φθόνος γὰρ ἰδὶ ἡμῶν ἀπεστή (καὶ αὐτοῖς τιμωρίαι). φθόνος is the eighth of the twelve τιμωρίαι in the preceding list; and the departure of the remaining four must also have been mentioned.

τὸ ἀγαθὸν . . . ἡμῶν καὶ φωτός. The writer has taken over the phrase ζωή καὶ φῶς from Corp. I, where it stands for God, or the substance of which God consists. The New Man consists of that same substance. τὸν σκότον is also a reminiscence of Corp. I.

ἐξαπτθαν [μικηθέκα] ροίζω. ροίζω must be taken with ἐξαπτθαν, and is wrongly separated from it by the participle. We might either strike out μικηθέκα, or shift it, writing ἐξαπτθαν ροίζω μικηθέκα; but the former seems preferable.
§ 10. [τῆς δεκάδος παραγυμνής.] (οὖν δή,) ὁ τέκνον, συνετέθη (ή) νοερά [γένεσις] (οὐσία) καὶ τὴν δωδεκάτην ἐξελαύνει. If we cut out the words which refer to 'the ten' and 'the twelve', what remains may be taken in close connexion with § 9. It is impossible to say that a 'birth' was 'put together'; γένεσις must therefore have been wrongly substituted for some other word, such as ὀυσία.

The phrase καὶ τὴν δωδεκάτην ἐξελαύνει appears to be misplaced. The text as altered by the interpolator may perhaps have run as Reitzenstein has rewritten it; τῆς δεκάδος παραγυμνής (or rather παραγυμμένης), ὁ τέκνον, ἡ (τῆς δωδεκάδα ἐξελαύνει), συνετέθη κ.τ.λ.

καὶ θεοί[ρη]θηκεν τῇ (ταύτης) γενέσις (συνθέσις?). ταύτης means τῆς νοερᾶς ὀυσίας. For θεοίθηκεν, cf. θεός παῖς in § 2; ἡ γένεσις τῆς θεότητος in § 7 a; θεός πέφυκας in § 14. The new man is a god.

The verb θεόθηκα is frequently used with a similar application by Dionysius Areop. εὐφραίνεται. The speech of Hermes ends, as it began, with a word expressing joy. Cf. Corp. I. 30: πληρωθεὶς δὲν ἐξελαύνει. The phrase εὐφραίνεται was suggested by Corp. I. 18–22 (ὁ ἀναγνωρίσας εὐφράσιν εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν χωρίς κ.τ.λ.). As to εἰς δυνάμεως συνετάμενον, cf. § 2, εἰς πατρί δυνάμεως συνετῶς, and § 14, τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τὸ εἰς δυνάμεως συνετῶς.

§ 11 a. (Οὐσία καὶ οὖσία—καὶ τοῦτος τὸ δυνάμεως συνιστάμενος—νοσί), καὶ (γνωρίσαις) εὐφραίνεται. The New Man were called ἀκλων, that might mean either that he is not (or cannot be) brought down to a lower level, or that he is not (or cannot be) turned from his course. But neither of these thoughts is suggested by the preceding context; and the expression of either by a single word would be abrupt and obscure. It seems probable therefore that ἀκλων is a corruption of οὕσία καὶ ἀκλων, or something similar. Cf. καὶ ἀκλων πτισις in Paul, Gal. 6. 15 and 2 Cor. 5. 17.

διὰ τῇ διὰ δυνάμεως νοητικὴ ἐνεργεία. διὰ δυνάμεως was probably written as an alternative for τῇ νοητικῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. Either phrase might stand, but hardly both together.

§ 13 a. (Ἀόητῃ ὡσίν ἡ παλιγγενεσία, . . . τὸ μηκέτι φαντάζεσθαι [εἰς] τὸ σῶμα τὸ τριχὴ διάστατον.) This is appropriate here, as a comment on Tat's statement about bodily and mental sight, in which the same verb φαντάζεσθαι was used. It is true that the sentence would

1 This meaning might be illustrated by Synesius, Hymn 3, 296: ψυχά τ' ἀκλων καὶ ἀκλωνίδε. εἰς μελανοίκας χθόνιους σκύους (μέλαις Στ.) 'both when it is not brought down (into an earthly body), and when it is brought down.'
also serve as a comment on Πάτερ, τὸ πᾶν ὅρῳ... ἐν τῷ νῷ, which
it follows in the MSS.; but Πάτερ, τὸ πᾶν κ.τ.λ. is wanted to
introduce ἐν οὐρανῷ εἶμι κ.τ.λ., which, without some such intro-
duction, is intolerably abrupt. I have therefore interchanged the
two sentences of § 13 a.

eis must be cut out. φαντάζεσθαι means 'to present something
to oneself by φαντασία', i.e. 'to perceive'. It can be used in this
sense either without expressed object, as in the preceding sentence,
or with an object in the accusative, as here (φαντάζεσθαι τὸ σῶμα);
but φαντάζεσθαι eis τὸ σῶμα is impossible.

τὸ μνήμη φαντάζεσθαι κ.τ.λ. corresponds to the negative part of
Tat's preceding statement (φαντάζομαι οἷς ὄρασι ὀφθαλμῶν); and
something more is needed, to correspond to the positive part of it
(ἄλλα τῇ νοητῇ ἐνεργείᾳ). I have therefore added ἄλλα τὸ ἀσώματον.

((Πάτερ, τὸ πᾶν ὅρῳ [καὶ] ἐμαυτὸν ἡντα, ἐν τῷ νῷ) ἐμαυτὸν ἡντα. 'Now
that I look with my mind (and no longer with my bodily eyes),
I see that I am the All.' Cf. § 2, where the new man is said to
be τὸ πᾶν, ἐν παντὶ.

The statement 'I am the All' is expanded in the following
clauses, ἐν οὐρανῷ εἶμι κ.τ.λ. By virtue of his παλιγγενεσία, Tat
has done what the pupil is exhorted to do in Corp. XI. ii. 20 b;
he is freed from the limits of space and time; he has 'grown to
a like expanse with that greatness which is beyond all measure';
he has 'risen above all time, and become eternal'. The phrases
by which his self-expansion is described closely resemble those
employed in Corp. XI. ii, and were doubtless borrowed thence.

Corp. XI. ii. 20 b. Corp. XIII. 11 b.

δμοῦ πανταχῇ (νόσσον) εἶναι, ἐν ὐδαι, ἐν γῇ, ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἐν ἀεί.—πανταχοῦ (πάρεμιμ). ἐν ἀεί.

παντὸς ἔφος ἡθο (.....). ἐν ψυχῇ εἴμι, ἐν φυτοῖς, ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐν γαστρὶ, πρὸ γαστρός, μετὰ γαστρί οὐκ εἴναι, νέος, γόνων, τεθνηγαστέρα. κίναι.

§ 11 b. πανταχοῦ (πάρεμιμ). If πανταχοῦ is not provided with a verb
of its own, it must be closely connected with the preceding words,
ἐν γαστρὶ, πρὸ γαστρός, μετὰ γαστέρα. But in that case, a word
meaning 'at all times', and not 'in all places', would be required.
In § 10, this is pointless; and the repetition of ὁ τέκνον there, in two successive sentences spoken by Hermes, is an indication that one of the two at least is out of place. But the words are appropriate when placed at the end of § 11 b, as a comment on Tat's description of his new experience. 'Now at last you know what the Rebirth is.' Hermes had previously tried to tell Tat what the Rebirth meant, and ended his account of it by saying οὗτος ὁ τῆς παλιγγενεσίας τρόπος (§ 7 b fin.). But it was impossible to make Tat understand by merely talking to him about it. He now knows what it is, because he has now himself experienced it.

§§ 11 c–12. ᾧ τότε τούτο . . . ἡ δεκας τῆν ἑνάδα.] Tat has just passed through the most stupendous of all conceivable experiences. He has been changed from a man into a god; he feels himself to be omnipresent and eternal. And this new-made god can find no more fitting occupation than to talk about the fact that the Powers of which he is composed differ in number from the vices which they have expelled! Our respect for the original author of Corp. XIII is much increased when we find that there are sufficient reasons for thinking that he is not responsible for this absurdity.

§ 13. τὸ σκῆνων τοῦτο . . . ἐκ τοῦ ζωοφόρου κύκλου συνέστη, κ.τ.λ. This section has been much corrupted; but it seems clear that the writer's meaning must have been that which is expressed by my conjectural reconstruction of the text. It is the influence of the zodiac that brings to pass the birth of the individual man, and determines his bodily form; and the zodiac is consequently here regarded as the source or cause of his bad qualities or vicious dispositions.

〈γεννώτως〉 φύσεως μιᾶς παντομόρφου(ς) ἱδέας εἰς πάλην τοῦ ἄνθρωπον. The φύσις μια is the character of the natural or corporeal man as a whole; the παντομορφοὶ ἱδέαι of it are the several τιμωρίαι (i.e. vices or bad passions), which are so many different aspects or manifestations of that one character. The word παντομορφος is specially associated with the zodiac; see Ascl. Lat. III. 19 b and 35.

〈καὶ τούτῳ συνειτότως ἐκ ζωοίων (ἐξ ἀριθμῶν MSS.) δώδεκα ὀτινῶν τὸν ἄριθμόν〉 διαζύγιοι(ς) ἂν αὐταῖς εἰσίν, ὁ τέκνον, (δώδεκα). αὐταῖς means τὰς τῆς μιᾶς φύσεως ιδέας, i.e. the evil passions. The twelve divisions (διαζύγια) into which they fall are the τιμωρίαι enumerated in § 7 b; and we are meant to understand that each
of the *τιμωρίας* is caused by one of the zodiacal Signs. Hence, the Signs being twelve in number, the *τιμωρίας* also are necessarily twelve in number.

δύναμεως <\(\gamma\)άρ> ἐστιν ἡ προσέτεια τῆς ὅρμης (ὅρμη MSS.). ὅρμη is irrational impulse in general; and ἡ προσέτεια τῆς ὅρμης is merely another name for the μᾶς φύσις spoken of above.

εἰκότως οὖν [[κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον]] τὴν ἀπόστασιν ποιοῦνται, καθὼς (ἐπον, ἀθρώς). As the several *τιμωρίας* are merely subdivisions or different modifications of one and the same ὅρμη, there is nothing to be surprised at in the fact that they all depart together on the arrival of the Powers. καθὼς ἐπον is a reference to § 7 b (ἀφιέρωνται δὲ αὕται ἄθροις). The words κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον are superfluous after εἰκότως; I have therefore transferred them to the following sentence, where something of the sort is wanted. But the original reading there was probably κατὰ λόγον, which may be taken as equivalent to εἰλόγως.

καὶ (κατὰ [ ] λόγον) ἀπὸ δὲκα δυνάμεως ἑλαύνονται (ἐλαυνόμεναι MSS.). Having discussed the fact that the number of the *τιμωρίας* is twelve, the writer now proceeds to discuss the fact that the number of the *δυνάμεις* is ten. This matter is so far distinct from the other, that it ought to be dealt with in a fresh sentence; I have therefore written ἑλαύνονται.

ἀπὸ has the meaning of ἐνός after a passive verb, as often in the traditional text of the *Hermetica*. Whether in these cases the author wrote ἀπὸ or ἐνός, we have no means of knowing.

ἡ γὰρ δεκά . . . ἐστὶ ψυχογόνος. This notion is of Pythagorean origin. Philolaus, Diels *Vorsokr.* p. 243: μεγάλα γὰρ καὶ παντελῆς καὶ παντοκράτεια καὶ θείον καὶ οὐρανίον βίον καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἥρα καὶ ἀγεμών (ἀ δεκάς). Speusippus, the successor of Plato, 'raised a hymn of praise to the number Ten' (Gomperz, *Gk. thinkers* IV, p. 4).

The number ten is 'generative of soul'. It may be doubted whether the writer attached any definite meaning to this obscure statement; but he accepted it on traditional authority, and inferred that, if the number ten is generative of 'soul' or life in the natural man, it must also be generative of the higher life which is brought into being at the birth of the new man, and that the *δυνάμεις* which operate in the Rebirth must consequently be ten in number.

ζῷη δὲ καὶ φῶς ἠμωμέναι εἰσὶν ἑνάς (εἰσὶν ἑνα MSS.). The phrase ζῷη καὶ φῶς is used in *Corp.* I to denote God; and Pythagorizing Platonists frequently said that God is the ἑνάς or μονάς.
394 CORSVS HERMETICVM

δ (δὲ) τῆς ἑνάδος ἀριθμὸς πέφυκε τοῦ [πνεύματος] τῆς δεκάδος (ἀριθμοῦ) ἀρχῆς. Α A mention of πνεύμα, in any of the various senses of that word, would be irrelevant here; what is wanted is some statement about the relation between the ἑνάς and the δεκάς.


The ἑνάς in question here is ζωή καὶ φῶς; and the implied conclusion is that in this ‘unit’ all the ten δυνάμεις are comprehended, and that the arrival of ζωή καὶ φῶς consequently involves the arrival of all the ten δυνάμεις together. The following phrase [καὶ τὴν δεκάδα τῆς ἑνάδα] is a meaningless addition to a futile argument.

§ 13 b. [διὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον . . . ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς θελεῖ.] This note must have been intended by its writer to stand at the end of the document to which it refers. Assuming it to be in its right place, we should be forced to infer that Corp. XIII originally ended here, and that §§ 14–22 b are an appendage subsequently added. But there is nothing in those sections to suggest a different author; they are written with reference to the παλαγγενεσία described in §§ 1–12, and deal with it from the same point of view. It therefore seems most likely that § 13 b has been accidentally shifted, and ought to stand after § 22 b.

§ 14. τὸ σώμα τοῦτο . . . λόσιν ἴχει (ἵπτει MSS.) ποτὲ; Having been born again, Tat wishes to know whether the incorporeal ‘body’ (or self) into which he has been transformed is perishable or imperishable, i.e. whether the effect of the Rebirth which he has experienced will be permanent or transient. At the present moment, he feels himself to be a god; but can he be sure that he will not at some future time cease to be what he is now?

The question whether it is possible for one who has attained to γνώση, or union with God, to fall away from it, is touched on in several of the Hermetica. In Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. II B. 3, the possibility of such a fall is denied (as it is in the answer given to Tat's question here): οἶδέποτε . . . ὁλοθρίαν δύναται ἐκ τὸ ἑαυτόν. On the other hand, the possibility appears to be asserted in
LIBELLVS XIII: §§ 12-15

Corpus XII. i. 9 as emended: οἴδεν (τῷ νοὶ) ἄδοικος, οὕτε εἰμαρμένης ὑπεράνω θείνων ψυχῆν ἀνθρωπίνην, οὕτε ἀμελήσασαν, ἀπερ συμβλάειν, ὑπὸ τὴν εἰμαρμένην θείαν. In Corpus I. 32, and in Ascl. Lat. 41 b, the worshipper prays that he may not fall away. Compare a sacramental prayer in the Mithraic Apathanatismos, Dieterich's 'Mithrasliturgie' (see Appendix on Rebirth): μένε σιν ἐμοὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ μου, ... ἵνα μὴ πάλιν γενόμενος ἀπογένομαι.

μη ἄδοικος θάνατος, ἔτει [ἀμαρτήσεις καὶ] ἀσεβθήσεις. μη ἄσθενος [σεται] σου ὁ ἅθραμμα τοῦ νοὶ; It is hardly worth while to tell a person that if he says impossible things he 'will make a mistake'; and ἀμαρτήσεις was most likely inserted to provide a verb after ἕτει, when ἀσεβθήσεις had been partly obliterated. Cf. Corpus II. 15 as emended: μὴ σοὶ ἐπεὶ ἀλλο τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ μόνον τὸν θεὸν, ἔτει ἀσεβθήσεις.

tὸ αἰσθητὸν τῆς φύσεως σῶμα πόρρωθεν ἄστι [τῆς] τοῦ οὐσιώδους (sc. σώματος) [γενέσεως]. 'You must not suppose, because the material body is dissoluble, that the incorporeal "body" into which you have been changed is also dissoluble; for the one differs widely from the other.'

§ 15. Ἐβουλόμην ... τὴν δία τοῦ ὅμον εὐλογίαν (μαθεῖν). Tat wishes to give thanks to God for his παλιγγενεσία; and since he is now composed of δυνάμεις, he feels that the best form which his act of worship could take would be to sing the hymn which is sung by the δυνάμεις in their supracosmic abode. He therefore says that he wishes he could be taught that hymn (sc. in order that he might join in it, or use it in his own worship).

In making Tat speak of what 'Poimandres foretold', the writer is referring to Corpus I. 26 a, where an unnamed person is told by Poimandres that, when he has departed from the body and ascended to the eighth sphere of heaven, he will 'hear the δυνάμεις, who are above that sphere, singing praise to God with a voice (or in a language) that is theirs alone'. But the writer of Corpus XIII assumes that Hermes was the man to whom Poimandres spoke on that occasion. This shows that, at the time when Corpus XIII was written, it had come to be assumed that the anonymous prophet who narrates his vision and preaching in Corpus I was Hermes.

Ἡ, (καθὼς) ἐφής, ἐπὶ τὴν ἔγκυονδα γενομένου σου (μου MSS.) ἀκοοῦσθαι (σε) τῶν δυνάμεων [[ ]] ὁ Ποιμάνδρης ἔθεσεν. καθὼς ἐφής means 'as you wrote in Corpus I', which is taken to have
been written by Hermes. With the alterations which I have proposed, the passage is a correct report of what Poimandres is there said to have predicted. It is true that, in the particular sentence referred to, the verb is in the third person (ἀκούει, sc. ὁ ἄνθρωπος); but the speech of Poimandres in which it occurs deals especially with the destiny of the person addressed; the verbs in the opening sentences of it are in the second person (ἐξῆς &c.); and if my transposition of the words πῶς εἰς ζωήν χαρήσω is accepted, the whole speech is an answer to the question ‘by what process shall I pass into life?’ If we retained ἀκούει here, we should be obliged to suppose that the writer of Corp. XIII assumed that Hermes had, at some time subsequent to the vision described in Corp. I, gone through the experience which Poimandres there foretells; but this can be avoided by altering ἀκούει into ἀκούσθαι, which suits better with ἔθεσισε (‘prophesied’).

καλῶς στεπθής; κεκάθαρσαι γάρ, λυσάμενος τὸ σκῆνος.—(καλῶς στεπθής λύσαι τὸ σκῆνος, κεκαθαρμένος γάρ MSS.) 'Your eagerness to be taught that hymn has my approval; for now that you have cast off the body (through your New Birth), you are purified (from evil passions, and are therefore worthy to hear it).’ The terminations of λυσάμενος and κεκαθαρσαι seem to have been interchanged. For λυσάμενος τὸ σκῆνος, cf. the oracle in Porphyr. Vita Plotini 22: νῦν δ’, ὅτε δὴ τὸ σκῆνος ἀλφαῖο κ.τ.λ. The active λύσαι could hardly be used in this sense.

ο Ποιμάνθρης . . . πλέον μοι τῶν ἐγγεγραμμένων οὐ παρεδίδωκεν. τῶν ἐγγεγραμμένων means 'what stands written in Corp. I'. It may be inferred from these words that the writer of Corp. XIII knew of no document other than Corp. I in which teachings of Poimandres were recorded.

eἰδὼς δὴ ἐπὶ ἐμαυτοῦ δυνήσομαι πάντα νοεῖν, καὶ ἀκούειν δὲν βουλομαι, καὶ δρᾶν τὰ πάντα. He knew that through his revelation my mental eyes were opened, and the power of apprehending the divine realities by direct intuition was conferred upon me. (Cf. Corp. I. 30: ἔγεντο . . . ἀληθινὴ δρασίς. . . . θεόπνευς γενόμενος (ἐπὶ τὸ πεδίον?) τῆς ἀληθείας ἕλθον.) There was therefore no need for him to tell me all particulars. It would have been superfluous to recite to me the hymn sung by the Powers; he knew that I could find out for myself how God ought to be adored.

καὶ ἐπέτρεψε μοι ἕκκινος ἃ ποιεῖν τὰ καλὰ. The context requires, in place of ποιεῖν τὰ καλὰ, something like νοεῖν τὰ ἄλλα (or τὰ λοιπά),
'to think out for myself what he did not tell me.' The clause looks like a reference to some particular sentence in Corp. I; but Corp. I, in the form in which we have it, contains no such injunction. (The phrases most nearly resembling it are νοεῖ τὸ φῶς καὶ γνώριζε τοῦτο, I. 7, and οὐκ ἐφήν σοι νοεῖν; I. 20.) On the other hand, Corp. XI. ii, in which Νοῖς is the teacher, ends with the very injunction which is here implied: τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα ὑμῶς κατὰ σεαυτὸν νοεῖ, καὶ οὐ διαφευγόντως. Is that the passage to which the writer of Corp. XIII is here referring? And if so, did he, by a slip of memory, imagine that he had read it in Corp. I? Or did he identify the Νοῖς who speaks in XI. ii with the Poimandres of Corp. I?

Did ai ἐν πᾶσι δυνάμεις καὶ ἐν ἑμοί ἁθοῦσι.—(did καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ ἐν ἑμοί ἁθοῦσι MSS.) The divine δυνάμεις which pervade the universe are identified with those which were spoken of in Corp. I as residing in extracosmic space, and singing to God there. But those same δυνάμεις are also present in the 'reborn' man; indeed, he is wholly composed of them (ἐκ πασῶν δυνάμεων συνεστώτων); and they sing within him, as well as 'above the Ogdoad'. It is their voice then which speaks in the hymn which Hermes now proceeds to sing.

Θελῶ, πέταρ, ἀκοῦσαι ὁ ταῦτα, καὶ βούλομαι νοῆσαι. 'I wish to hear the words of the hymn which the Powers sing within you, and to grasp its meaning', or perhaps rather 'to make it the expression of my own thought'. For the distinction between διώκω and νοῆσαι, cf. Corp. I. 1: Τί βούλει ἀκοῦσαι καὶ θεάσασθαι, καὶ νοῆσαι μαθῶν καὶ γνῶναι;

§ 15. τῆς ἀρμοζόσθης ᾧ τῆς παλιγγενεσίας νῦν ἄκουσε εὐλογίας τῶν δύον. The hymn of Hermes is the thanksgiving of one who has been born again. By joining in it as Hermes sings it, Tat will fitfully give thanks to God for his own παλιγγενεσία.

The word νῦν comes in awkwardly, and might perhaps be struck out with advantage. If we retain it, we must take it in connexion with the following words, δὲ οὖν ἐκρίνα οὕτως εὐκόλως ἐκφάνας ὁ τοῦτο. 'I will let you hear it now, though I had not meant to make it known to you so readily.'

[ὅθεν τοῦτο οὐ διδάσκεται . . . πρὸς ἀπηλιώτην.] As addressed by Hermes to Tat, this passage is quite out of keeping with the context. Why should Hermes, when 'the Powers' are about to 'sing within him', interrupt himself or them in order to state the
conditions under which this hymn is to be transmitted to people who are not now present, and lay down regulations for its use at other times? The passage is a liturgical rubric, and must have been inserted after the hymn had come to be used in worship by a religious brotherhood.

τοῦτο οὖν διδάσκεται, \( \langle \text{εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ τέλει τοῦ παντός} \rangle \): The hymn must not be taught to catechumens; only those whose course of religious instruction is completed, and who have become τέλειοι (or in other words, have been born again), are to be permitted to hear it. As the hymn is a thanksgiving for παλιγγενεσία, those who have not themselves been born again can have no concern with it, and it would be a profanation to make it known to them.

By the insertion of this rubric, the words \( \etaυρύχασον, \alpha\ ηκνών \) were too widely separated from the hymn which they had been intended to introduce; and they were consequently written again immediately before the hymn.

§ 17. \( \text{τύμπωδια κρυπτή.} \) This title must have been inserted by a later hand. \( \lambdaόγος \delta', \) which is added in some of the MSS., probably means ‘the fourth hymn’. In the extant Hermetica, hymns of more or less similar character occur in Corp. I. 31, Corp. V. 10 b, and Ascl. Lat. 41 b. When the Hermetic documents had come to be used for liturgical purposes, special attention must have been given to the hymns contained in them; and it is possible that these hymns and others like them were extracted and put together in a hymn-book, and that this one was the fourth in that collection.

As given in the MSS., a large part of the hymn is unintelligible. I have tried to put meaning into it by freely altering the text; but much remains doubtful and obscure. It falls into two distinct parts. In the first part, God is spoken of as the creator of the material universe; in the second part, God is spoken of as present in the ‘reborn’ man. In other words, the first part deals with γένεσις, and the second, with παλιγγενεσία. The second part consists mainly of an amplification of the thought expressed by Hermes above, \( \alpha\ εν πασι δυνάμεις καὶ \epsilonν ἐμοι δόδους. \) When the reborn man praises God, it is the Powers of God that speak in him.

\( \langle \text{Ἀνοιγήτω μοι πάσι μοχλὸς (μυχὸς?)} \rangle \langle \text{τού} \rangle \langle \text{κόσμου} \rangle; \)
\( \text{παρα φόινις [κόσμου] προσδεχόμενοι τοῦ ἐμοῦ τὴν ἀκοὴν.} \)

This mode of beginning a hymn seems to be of Jewish origin; it may be traced back to the Song of Moses, \( \text{Deut.} \) 32. 1: \( \piρόσεχε \)
LIBELLVS XIII: §§ 16-17

οδρανε, καὶ λαλήσω καὶ άκουντώ γήρματα ἐκ στόματός μου.
(The formula recurs, with a different application, in Isaiah 1. 2: άκουν, οδρανε, καὶ ένοικοι, γήρ, ὅτι Κύριος άλλησθεν.) In Philo In Flaccum 14. 123, Cohn VI, p. 142, the thanksgiving of the Alexandrian Jews at the downfall of their oppressor begins thus: γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν, ἀεί τε καὶ οδρανόν, τά μέρη τοῦ παντός καὶ σύμπαντα τόν κόσμον, δε μέγιστα βασιλεύ θνητῶν καὶ άθανάτων, παρακαλέσοντες εἰς εἰρημέναν τήν σφήν ήκομεν. Compare also a prayer embedded in the longer Paris Papyrus magicus, Wessely l. 1168 sqq. (Dieterich, Abraza, p. 25), which may be conjecturally reconstructed as follows:

σε τόν ἐνα καὶ μάκαρα (α)ίωνα (α)ίωνων' πατέρα τε κόσμου κοσμικαίς κλήξις λατείς.\ 1 deipr. μοί ο ώμποτης τον σύμπαντα κόσμουν, δ τό πφρ κριμάσας 'έκ του έδατος, τήν γην χυρίσας ἀπο τοῦ έδατος.\ 8

(ήνωσθε δορανε, δεξαι μου τα φθέγματα) πρόσεχε 'μορφήτ' καὶ πνεύμα καὶ γη καὶ θάλασσα ['ήμα το θαυμάζειν το θειαν δεκάχην], καὶ πρόσεξει μου τους λόγους\ 3 [ος βέλη πυρός: τι έγω είμι [άθρωπος τό έν οδράν άπλάμα κάλλιστον, 10 ενόμενον εύ τι πυρός καὶ η πνεύματος καὶ θρόσων καὶ γης. 'άνοιγμεν οδρανε, δεξαι μου τα φθέγματα.)

άκουε, (μελε, πατέρ κόσμου επικαλομαι σε την φνοματι σου κτλ.\ 5

άνοιγμεν is to be taken in connexion with προσδεχόσθω την λυκήν ('let every region be flung open to receive the sound of my voice'), and ought to precede it. κόσμου is superfluous after πάσα φύσις;

1 μάκαρα των αίωνων Pap.


3 'Thou who didst inflate the whole Kosmos.' This cannot be right. Perhaps ἕνεθος των σ. κ.

4 It could not be said that the fire of heaven is 'suspended from the water'. Perhaps εινή του πνεύματος ('above the air'). This would give an exact repetition of accentual rhythm:

5 Cf. Corp. XIII. 17: τόν κτιστατα τα πάντα, τόν εἶσαστα τή γην καὶ οδρων κριμάσα, τόν κτιστατα τα πάντα, τόν κριμάσα τή γην καὶ οδρων κριμάσα. The verb κριμάσα occurs in a similar connexion both in the cosmogonia of Corp. I and in that of Corp. III.\ 6 άνοιγμεν. Pap. Perhaps a second and distinct prayer or hymn begins here.

7 Perhaps μού τη φωνή.

8 Cf. Corp. XIII. 17: άνοιγμεν μού τη φωνή.

9 It looks as if the sentence (τα) χρήμα(τα) τού σοφού ως βέλη πυρός, 'the words of the wise are as shafts of fire', had been cut in two, and the two parts inserted at different points. But any such statement would be irrelevant here.

10 Cf. a Jewish spell πρὸς δαίμονοι σου, in Pap. mag. Par. i. 3009 (Dieterich, Abraza, p. 138): λευχοτα (ο δάκολος των δαίμων) του πλάσματος τουτου, δ ἐκλαυς ο θεός εν το άγιο λατον παραθίαν.
and something of the sort is needed to complete the first line. It seems that, after the phrase "άνοιγήτω μου πᾶς μαχλός" had been shifted, some one added Ὄμεγκρων (a poetical substitute for ὅδαιος), thinking that, after "άνοιγηθῇ γῆ", a corresponding mention of water would be appropriate.

"άνοιγηθῇ γῆ", [( ] τὰ δένδρα μὴ σείεσθε· ὤμενεν μέλλω κ.τ.λ. The verb 'open' is obscure in this connexion, unless closely followed by some phrase meaning 'receive my song'; and the earth could hardly 'open', except by splitting asunder, or forming a chasm. This difficulty might be avoided by writing σίγησον ἡ γῆ in place of "άνοιγηθῇ γῆ"; and τὰ δένδρα μὴ σείεσθε ('hush the sound of your rustling leaves') would then follow more naturally. οὐγρη might easily be corrupted into (ἀν)οὐγρη, under the influence of the preceding "άνοιγήτω.

"όμενεν μέλλω τὸν τῆς κτίσεως κύριον". This looks like a misplaced doublet of μέλλω γὰρ ὦμενεν τὸν κτίσαντα τὰ πάντα a few lines below; and if so, its insertion here may have caused the loss of some words which originally preceded καὶ τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ἐν.

"ὅ κύκλος ὃ ἄδαιος [τοῦ θεοῦ] προσβεβάζοι μου τὸν λόγον. ὃ κύκλος ὃ ᾧ, 'the immortal sphere' (i.e. the sphere of heaven), might very well stand here without a following genitive. But if a genitive followed, it is most likely to have been τοῦ ἀδήρος.

"τὸν ἑπτάσαντα" . . . τὸ γλυκὸ ὅδωρ εἰς τὴν οἰκουμένην [καὶ ἀοίκησον]. ἑπτάσαντα has come from the parallel phrase below, and has taken the place of the original word, which may have been ὀχετεύσαντα.

It is impossible to retain καὶ ἀοίκησον. In Egypt especially, 'inhabited land' and 'watered land' are synonymous terms, and the desert (ἢ ἀοίκησον γῆ) is waterless. And the absurdity is increased by the following words, which, taken with ἀοίκησον, would imply that men are maintained in uninhabited land.

Even when καὶ ἀοίκησον has been struck out, what remains is still too long to correspond to the parallel clause (καὶ ἑπτάσαντα πῦρ φανείναι); and it is probable that either some words have been inserted in the one clause, or some words have fallen out of the other.

ἐκ τοῦ ὄκεανοῦ. In Egypt, life is maintained, not by rain, but by the water of the Nile; and ὁ ὄκεανος must mean an imaginary Ocean-stream out of which the Nile is supposed to flow.

eἰς διατροφήν [ ] πάντων 'ἀνθρώπων'. ἀνθρώπων can hardly be right,
because (1) it too closely resembles ἄνθρωποι in the parallel phrase, and (2) water maintains life in beasts and plants as well as in men. ζωην or ζωή ἐχόντων would be more appropriate.

εἰς πᾶσαν πράξιν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἄνθρωποις. Fire is used by the gods (i.e. by the Sun and the other astral gods) in their administration of the universe; and it is used by men in their arts and crafts. Cf. Corp. X. 18: δημιουργὸς γὰρ ὄν ὁ νοῦς ὁμάνα τῷ πυρὶ πρὸς τὴν δημιουργίαν χρήσαι, κ.τ.λ.

δώμεν πάντες θοῦ ἅμα τὴν αἰλογιαν. πάντες θοῦ may be taken to mean 'all we on whom his bounty falls' (θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι); or, 'all we his creatures'. For the latter, cf. 'O all ye works of the Lord, bless ye the Lord'.

§ 18. οὖτος οὖν ὁ τοῦ νοοῦ οὖν ὁφθαλμός. Hitherto, Hermes has been praising God as the creator of the material universe. In the second part of the hymn, which begins with this line, he praises God as operating, through his δυνάμεις, in the mind of the man who has been born again. The first part is merely preparatory to the second, in which the hymn becomes a thanksgiving for the Rebirth.

He who has created the universe is also 'the eye of my mind'; i.e. it is through the presence of God or his δυνάμεις within me that I am enabled to see to νοητά. Cf. τὸ νοητὸν φῶς below.

συνάστε τῇ θελήματί μου. As we have been told that the reborn man consists wholly of divine δυνάμεις, there is some inconsistency in speaking of his 'will' as a thing distinct from 'the δυνάμεις which are in him'. But in dealing with such a topic as this, precise consistency of language is hardly to be expected. At this moment, the writer thinks of the δυνάμεις as portions of the divine Mind, which have entered into the man, but have not wholly absorbed him into themselves, and do not constitute his whole being; there still remains a human will, which is distinguishable from them, though wholly in accord with them.

γνώσεις ἀγία ... (χαίρετε) σὺν ἰμοί. Compare § 8 b: χαῖρε λοιπῶν, ... ἡλθεν ἡμῖν γνώσεις θεοῦ. The original author may very well have spoken of the γνώσεις by which the reborn man is illuminated, and of the joy which results from this illumination; though it was probably an interpolator that made γνώσεις and χαρά the first and second in a list of named and numbered δυνάμεις.

[καὶ σὺ μοι, ἐγκράτεια, ... τὴν ἀληθείαν.] The writer of these lines was referring to the list of δυνάμεις in § 8 b f., and must have
mentioned καρπερία among the rest, though it does not appear here in the traditional text.

τὸ ἀγαθὸν ... ὑμεῖς. ζωὴ καὶ φῶς, ἀμὴ ὡμῶν (ἡμῶν MSS.) εἰς ὑμᾶς χωρεῖ ἢ εὐλογία. Cf. § 9: τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπεγένετο ἥμα ζωῆς καὶ φωτός. The praise is uttered by the ‘Life and Light’ which is in me; it is addressed to ‘Life and Light’, i.e. to God.

ἐνεργεία τῶν δύναμεων (μου). ‘When my δύναμεως operate, it is God that operates in them.’ According to the Aristotelian usage of δύναμις and ἐνεργεία, the words might mean ‘that which exists potentially in me is actualized in God’; but there is no reason to think that the writer attached this meaning to the phrase.

It is difficult to find any sense in δύναμις τῶν ἐνεργειῶν μου; and it seems probable that the original ending of the clause was lost, and that some one filled the gap with words taken from the preceding line.

§ 19. ταῦτα βοῶσαι (βοῶσιν MSS.) ... σῇ βολῇ. It may be conjectured that τὸ πᾶν ὑμνῶσαι originally stood in correspondence to ταῦτα βοῶσαι, and σῇ βολῇ to τὸ σῶν θελήμα.

⟨⟨ὁ σὸς λόγος ...⟩⟩ ... ⟨⟨... ἐπὶ σὲ τὸ πᾶν.⟩⟩ I have assumed that the words δέξαι ἄπο πάντων λογικῆν θυσίαν | τὸ πᾶν are in their right place; and I have restored some coherence to the passage by transposing, and connecting with these words, two other clauses in which λόγος is spoken of. The last phrase of § 18 (δέξαι τὸ πᾶν λόγῳ λογικῆν θυσίαν) appears to be a misplaced doublet of δέξαι ἄπο πάντων λογικῆν θυσίαν in § 19; and this makes it probable that the preceding clause in § 18 (ὁ σὸς λόγος δι᾽ ἐμοῦ ὑμνεῖ σε) is also misplaced. According to my arrangement of the passage, Hermes first speaks about the δύναμεις, and then proceeds to speak about the λόγος. By the λόγος of the man is meant the sum of the δύναμεις which are in him, or the incorporeal organism composed of them; cf. § 7 b fin. as emended, οὕτω συνώταται ὁ λόγος, and § 8 b, εἰς συνάρθρους τοῦ λόγου. And the λόγος (‘Word’) of God may be similarly regarded as made up of the δύναμεις of God; whence it would follow that the λόγος of the man is consubstantial with the λόγος of God. But the writer seems to have had in mind at the same time the primary meaning of λόγος, viz. ‘speech’.

ὁ σὸς λόγος δι᾽ ἐμοῦ ὑμνεῖ σε. Cf. a eucharistic prayer of Sarapion, bishop of Thmuis in Egypt, c. A.D. 350 (Wobbermin, Texte und Unters. N. F. II. 3 b, p. 5): λαλησάτω ἐν ἡμῖν ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς καὶ
In the language of a Christian, Ιησοῦς and ἄγιον πνεῦμα take the place of the λόγος and δύναμις of Corp. XIII. (In 1 Cor. 1. 24, Christ is called θεοῦ δύναμις.)

The word ποιμάνεις may have been suggested by Ποιμάνδρης, the name by which the divine νοῦς is called in Corp. I. If so, the writer of Corp. XIII must have taken Ποιμάνδρης to mean 'Shepherd of men'. For the identification of God with νοῦς, cf. σῦ ὁ νοῦς in § 21.

The man who has been born again contains all things within himself (cf. § 13a as emended: τὸ πᾶν ὧν ἐμαντών ἰνα κ.τ.λ.); therefore, when he adores God, the universe adores God through him. As to λογικήν θυσίαν, cf. δέχαι λογικάς θυσίας in Corp. I. 31.

The formula here employed by the Hermetist can be traced back to the early Ionian physicists. From them it was adopted by the Stoics, and through Stoic influence, became widely current among religious writers of the Hellenistic age. Heraclitus, fr. 10 fin. Diels: ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἔχε ἐνίς πάντα. Xenophanes, fr. 27 Diels: ἐν γαίῃ γὰρ πάντα, καὶ εἰς γῆν πάντα τελευτᾷ. Arist. Met. A. 3, 983 b 6: τῶν ὅποι πρῶτων φιλοσοφησάντων οἱ πλείστοι τὰς ἐν ὑλῆς εἶδει μόνας φύλησαν ἀρχάς εἶναι πάντων ἐκ γὰρ ἑστὶν ἄπαντα τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἐς ὦν γίγνεται πρῶτον, καὶ εἰς δὲ φθείρεται τελευταῖον, ... ταύτην ἀρχήν φαινεῖ εἶναι τῶν ὄντων. (In the view of the Stoics, this physical ἀρχή—which, in their system, is fire,—is at the same time the supreme God.) Paul, Rom. 11. 36: εἰς αὐτοῦ καὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτόν τὰ πάντα. 1 Cor. 8. 6: εἰς ὦν τὰ πάντα, καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν. M. Aurel. 4. 23 (addressed to φύσις): ἐκ σοῦ πάντα, ἐν σοι πάντα, εἰς σε πάντα. Oppianus (c. A. D. 180), Hal. i. 409: Ζεὺς πάτερ, εἰς δὲ σε πάντα, καὶ εἰς σεθὲν ἐφρύζωται. In a hymn to the

(τοῦ νοῶν) τὰξ ἐν ἡμῖν [[ ]] φῶς Φῶς
(τὴν ψυχὴν... ) ἰδὼν imei).

In *Corp.* I. 17, the human νοῦς is derived from the divine φῶς, and the human ψυχή from the divine ἥμη.

[Γνεῦμα θεό... στὶ δὲ θεό]. As the series νοῦς, ψυχή, πνεῦμα repeatedly occurs in other *Hermetica*, some one may have been led by the mention of νοῦς and ψυχή in the preceding couplet to add a clause about πνεῦμα. But this clause is not likely to have been written by the original author; for πνεῦμα, in the sense in which it is usually associated with νοῦς and ψυχή (i.e. in the sense of 'vital spirit'), is a corporeal thing, and the reborn man has put away from him all things corporeal. Nor is πνεῦμα in the Christian sense (i.e. that which is highest and divinest in man) likely to have been spoken of by the author; for he uses other terms (νοῦς, δυνάμεις, λόγος) to express that conception.

§ 30. ἰ σῶς ἀνθρώπους. Cf. *Corp.* I. 32: ἰ σῶς ἀνθρώπως συναγάζειν σοι βούλεται. In both passages alike, we should rather have expected ἰ σῶς θῶς or ἰ σῶς πάις.

ταῦτα βοῶν [διὰ πυρὸς, δι' ἄρθρου, διὰ γῆς, διὰ θάνατος,] [διὰ πνεῦματος,] διὰ τῶν κτισμάτων σοῦ. The meaning is undoubtedly 'by means of my bodily organs, which are composed of the material elements'. This might be expressed by naming the four elements; but as the clause is too long to be matched by that which follows, it is most likely that the author wrote merely ταῦτα βοῶν διὰ τῶν κτισμάτων σοῦ, and that some one afterwards inserted διὰ πυρὸς... διὰ ὁθάνατος to make the meaning clearer. The explanation is correct, but is not necessary. διὰ πνεῦματος was probably added by the same interpolator who inserted the clause about πνεῦμα above. *Pneuma* in the sense of 'vital spirit' consists of fire and air, which have already been mentioned; and the *pneuma* of the Christians ought not to be coupled with the material elements.

ἀπὸ τοῦ (σοῦ MSS.) ἄλοντος τὴν εὐλογίαν εὕρων (εὕρων MSS.). ἰ ἄλων

¹ A last echo of this ancient phrase occurs in Anatole France, *La Révolte des anges*, 1914, p. 103: 'Votre science humaine... enseigne que tout sort de l'éther et que tout y rentre.' The modern opinion described in that sentence is a return to the position of the Ionian physicists,—with this difference, however, that the modern man of science does not usually, as they did, regard his material ἄρχη as a living being.
here means the world of τὰ νοητά or τὰ οὐσιώδη, of things incorporeal and eternal, in contrast to the material world to which the body belongs. The worshipper gives voice to his adoration by means of his bodily organs; but the thoughts and feelings which he thus expresses come to him from another and a higher world. But perhaps Reitzenstein may be right in reading ἀπὸ (τοῦ) σοῦ αἰῶνος, 'from thine eternity'.

δ ἦτο (ἐίδον). 'I have found what I have been seeking'; I have attained to that to which I aspired.

Bethάμα τῷ σῷ ἀναπέπαμα (I)

God's βολή and God's θέλημα are spoken of side by side, as in § 19. ἀναπέπαμα, 'I have found rest for my soul'. Cf. Sap. Sirach 6. 28: ἐν οὐσίαν γὰρ εὐφρείωσε τὴν ἀνάπασιν αὐτῆς (οὗ τῆς σοφίας), καὶ στραφύληται σοι εἰς εὐφροσύνην. Id. 51. 27: ὠλγον ἐκοπίασα, καὶ εἰρων ἐκατοπτρίσασα ἀνάπασιν. Ev. Matth. 11. 28 f.: κάγω ἀναπάσων ὑμάς... καὶ εὐφράσετε ἀνάπασιν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑμῶν.

Since the hymn as a whole is a thanksgiving for παλαγγενεσία, it may be considered certain that the Rebirth was mentioned in the concluding words; and from § 2, where God's θέλημα was said to be the begetter of the new man, it may be inferred that the missing verb after θελήματι τῷ σῷ is ἀνεγεγρηθήνη, or some equivalent.

The three short clauses with which the hymn ends are comparable to the cries by which the initiated in some of the Pagan mysteries declared themselves to have received the sacramental grace; e.g. ἐφανον κακῶν, εἰρων ἀμενον, Dem. De cor. 323 (313) (see Dieterich, Mithrasliturgie, p. 213 ff.).

§ 21. τάθεικα(ς) καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ τῇ ἐμῷ... δύναμιν (δύναμι MSS.) ἐκ τοῦ σοῦ δύνου. Tat's sentence is interrupted by the words which his father interposes, but is resumed and completed after the interruption. ὁ κόσμος ὁ ἐμός means 'the universe which is in me' (τὸ πᾶν τὸ ἐν ἐμοί), i.e. 'myself, as containing the universe, or identified with it'. But Hermes reminds Tat that, inasmuch as he has put the body from him, 'the universe which is in him' must be an incorporeal universe, made up of divine δύναμες; he ought therefore to have said ἐν τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ τῷ ἐμῷ.

Tat has already been illumined by the divine Light, from the first moment of his παλαγγενεσία; but the effect of the hymn sung by Hermes has been to produce in him a further or fuller illumination (ἐπὶ-πεφώτισται μου ὁ νοῦς); and the result is that he now feels
capable, not merely of joining in his father's thanksgiving, but of giving thanks to God in words of his own choosing.

There is no need to infer from this passage that the writer adhered to the old Egyptian belief in the magical or sacramental efficacy of verbal formulae. He does not ascribe Tat's παλιγγενεσία to the working of the hymn; for the hymn is a thanksgiving for a παλιγγενεσία which has already taken place. And without attributing any magic potency to the sound of the words, it might well be thought that the religious emotion of the pupil would be heightened when he heard his revered father and teacher pouring out his heart in adoration. The writer assumes that spiritual 'power' and 'illumination' may be conveyed from one man to another by such means; but in making this assumption, he is not adopting an Egyptian superstition; he is recognizing a fact of universal experience.

οὐ τεκνόν, μὴ ἀσκόπως (sc. πεπίστρεψε ἐξ ἑαυτῶν εὐλογίαν, with the emphasis on ἐξ ἑαυτῶν εὐλογίαν). Even for one who has been born again, it is no light matter to address the supreme God without the guidance of a recognized authority; think well before you venture on it. A beginner might easily go wrong, and unwittingly incur the guilt of impiety. The writer's attitude appears to be that of a member of a religious community which possesses a traditional liturgy, made up of prayers and hymns composed by inspired teachers. Fixed forms of worship have already been established; and a new hymn to the supreme God is not to be admitted without due consideration.

ἐν τῷ νῷ, ὁ πάτερ, ὁ θεωρῶ λέγω. The more natural order of the words would be ὁ ἐν τῷ νῷ θεωρῶ λέγω; but if the MSS. are right, ὁ ἐν τῷ νῷ has been placed first for emphasis. 'Do not fear that I shall go wrong; for the words I am about to utter are the expression of what I see in Mind' (or, as a Christian might have said, 'in the Spirit'). The insight into things divine which has come to him through the Rebirth will secure him against error.

γενέσια τῆς γενεσιουργίας. It may be suspected that the author wrote τελεσιουργίας; cf. τελεσιουργός (MSS. γενεσιουργός) in § 2. The meaning might have been more simply expressed by writing τῆς παλιγγενεσίας.

σοῦ γὰρ βουλομένου πάντα (μοι) τελεῖται. σοῦ βουλομένου refers back to ἐσθέλεις. 'It is by thy will that I am born again; it is therefore fitting that I should do thy will by giving thanks to thee.' Cf. θελήματι τῷ σῷ (ἀγεγέννηθην) in § 20, and ἐπὶ τέλει τοῦ παντός in
§ 16. We should rather have expected πάντα μοι τετέλεσται, 'I have been made τέλειος', i.e. I have been born again. If the present tense τετέλεσται is the right reading, the παλαγγευσία must here be regarded as a process still continuing.

ἀλλὰ καὶ προσθέσεις, ὅ τέκνον, "ὅπως τοῦ (σου ὅ) λόγου". Hermes amends his son's wording, as before in § 21. The meaning appears to be that Tat ought to have said δέξαι τιλογίας ἀν' ἐμοῦ διὰ τοῦ λόγου. The word λόγος cannot here mean merely 'speech'; for there would be no need to insist that Tat's 'speech of praise' (τιλογίας) was uttered 'by means of speech'. It must mean either 'the divine Logos' or 'the human reason'; and in the view of this writer, there is no essential distinction between the one and the other. The divine λόγος is the sum of the divine δύναμεις; my λόγος is the sum of 'the δύναμεις which are in me'; and the δύναμεις which are in me are identical or consubstantial with the divine δύναμεις. 'Accept praise from me through the λόγος' means, 'accept praise offered by thy λόγος, which has entered into me'. Cf. § 19: ὅ σος λόγος δι' ἐμοῦ ὄρνατε σε.

Εὐχαριστῶ σοι, πάπερ (ὅτι ταῦτα μοι αἶνεσ (αἶνει MSS.) εὐξαμένῳ). 'I thank you, father, for your approval of my hymn.' But this makes Tat ignore what his father has last said (ἀλλὰ καὶ προσθέσεις κ.τ.λ.). It seems most likely then that ὅτι ταῦτα . . . εὐξαμένῳ is an explanation added by a later hand, and that the author wrote simply Εὐχαριστῶ σοι, πάπερ. 'I thank you (for your correction).' Cf. εὐχαριστῶ δὲ ὄμω σε in Corp. I. 20.

§ 22 a. Χαῖρε, τέκνον, (ὅς ὁ) καρποφόρησοντός (-σαντός MSS.) (σου . . .). Tat has not as yet had time to bring forth any 'fruit' since his New Birth, except his little hymn; and that can hardly be meant. It seems clear therefore that Hermes must here be speaking of what Tat may be expected to do during the remainder of his life on earth. Now that he has been born again, and has thereby escaped from the illusions of sense, and entered into the world of ἀλήθεια (i.e. of eternal reality), he will bring forth the good fruits which belong to that world; that is, (as the following words explain,) he will live a life of virtuous action. Cf. Ep. Joh. 1. 3. 9: πᾶσι ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀμαρτίαν οὗ ποιεῖ, κ.τ.λ. The use of καρποφόρων to express this notion is probably of Jewish origin; cf. Matth.

Or, that he ought to have said πάντα μοι τετέλεσται διὰ τοῦ λόγου? But since he has in that clause said σοῦ θεολογοῦν, there seems to be less reason for any further addition there.
3. 8, where John the Baptist says ποιήσατε διν καρπὸν ἀξίων τῆς μετανοίας. Paul, Gal. 5. 22: οὐ δὲ καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματος ἐστιν ἀγάπη κ.τ.λ. Eph. 5. 9: ὡς τέκνα φωτός πεπιστευτέετ' οὐ γὰρ καρπὸς τοῦ φωτὸς ἐν πάγι ἀδιάθωσθην κ.τ.λ. Matt. 7. 16: ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιγνώσεσθε αὐτοὺς κ.τ.λ. The thought, as well as the expression, is rather Jewish than Platonic; the Platonists were inclined to regard virtuous action as a preparation for the gnosis of the ἀναπτεῦσις, or a precedent condition of it, rather than as a result produced by it.

[τὰ ἀγάθα] τὰ ἄθανατα ἡ ἡμετέρου. τὰ ἀγάθα is probably a variant for τὰ ἄθανατα. A genitive is required with τὰ ἑγερμὸν.; and τῆς ἀρετῆς, which is an obstruction where it stands in the MSS., is exactly what is wanted here. τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἑγερμὸν are virtuous actions; and they are ἄθανατα (divine), inasmuch as they issue from and belong to the divine world of ἀλήθεια.

⟨(νοερῶς ἐγνως σεαυτὸν καὶ τὸν πατέρα τοῦ ἡμετέρου,)⟩ The Rebirth which Tat has just experienced is what other Hermetists call 'attaining to gnosis'. When a man 'knows himself', he knows himself to be a son of God. Cf. ἀγανακτισάω ... ἑαυτὸν ἄντα ἄθανατον in Corp. I. 18. A similar thought occurs in a Logion of Jesus, Oxyrhynchus 654 (Lietzmann's Kleine Texte, Klostermann Apocrypha II, p. 17): ἢ βασ(λεία τῶν οὐρανῶν) ἐντὸς ὕμων (ἐστὶ) (καὶ δότις ἂν ἑαυτὸν) γνῶ, ταύτην εὑρίσκεις. ἐὰν γὰρ ἄληθος ἵπτε, ἵπτε ἄληθος ἵπτε; (καὶ εἰδήσετε ὅτι νῦν ἵσθε ὑμεῖς τοῦ πατρός.

§ 22 b. τὰ ἄθανατα MSS.) τῆς παλιγγενεσίας τῆς παράδοσεως. The injunctions of secrecy in this document contrast strongly with the attitude of the writer of Corp. I, who goes forth to preach his gospel to all mankind.

ἐνα μὴ ὡς διάβολοι (τοῦ παντός) λογισθῶμεν. These words give a reason for the secrecy enjoined. But what is the reason given? διάβολοι ('maligners') is unintelligible unless defined by a following genitive; I therefore assume the original reading to have been διάβολοι τοῦ παντός, as in the writer's note added below. This may be taken to mean 'maligners of the Kosmos'. It is implied in § 1 that he who would be born again must be ready to 'be estranged from the Kosmos'; and the teacher speaks in the same tone throughout the dialogue. (The reborn man ἄμορφος ὡς τῇ (αἰσθητῇ;?) οὐδότας, § 2; the material world is an illusion, §§ 5, 6; we must 'stop the working of our bodily senses', § 7 a; the body is a prison and a torture-chamber, § 7 b.) The 'illuminated' man will know how to

1 Swete's restoration. 2 γνώσεωσιν Pap.
reconcile such language with a belief that the material world, with all that it contains, has been created by God, and manifests his goodness (§17); he will understand that it is not in the universe itself that the evil resides, but in the men who use God’s krísmata amiss, and allow themselves to be dominated by material things. But others might mistakenly suppose that Hermes is expressing a hatred of the Kosmos such as that with which the writer of Ascl. Lat. III (c. 25) reproaches the Christians, or that with which Plotinus charges the Gnostics (Enn. 2. 9: superscription, Πρὸς τοῦς κακῶν τὸν δημοσιογύγην τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῶν κόσμων κακῶν εἶναι λέγοντας). Compare Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. XI. 5, where the writer gives it as one of his reasons for enjoining secrecy, that the unworthy, if they hear his doctrine, καταφρονήσουσι τοῦ παντός ός γενητοῦ.

§ 13 b. (i)8iat6kt ἡμῶν τουτοι'. . . SidfioXoi.tou Trarros). This is not said by Hermes. It is a note appended either by the author of the dialogue, or by a transcriber of it; and the writer of the note speaks in his own person. ἔπεμισισάμην means 'I have recorded in writing'. διά is, no doubt, a corruption of idia; but idia would be better placed if it stood immediately before εἰς οἶς κ.τ.λ. It is necessary to cut out εἰς οὖ, which was presumably written as a variant for εἰς οἶς.

Were the two hymns in Corp. XIII (§§ 17–20 and § 21) intended to be literally ‘sung’, and not merely ‘said’? If their author meant them to be sung, and composed words and tune together, traces of the rhythm of the music ought to be discoverable in the words, and we might expect to find in them some sort of metre. But there is nothing here that resembles the metres of classical Greek poetry; and if any regularity of rhythm is to be found in the Hermetic hymns, we must look rather for something similar to the accentual rhythm of the hymns sung in the Byzantine churches.¹ That form of com-

¹ An account of the Byzantine hymns is given by Krumbacher Gesch. der byzant. Lit., 1897, pp. 655–705. See also Bardenhewer Patrologie, 1910, pp. 485 ff. The rhythm of the Byz. hymns is discussed by W. Meyer, Ges. Abhändl. zur mittel-
position is known to have been already fully developed in the fifth century;¹ and there is nothing unreasonable in supposing that accنتual rhythm of the same kind may have been used in less elaborately constructed Pagan hymns in Egypt before the end of the third century A.D.,² i.e. at the time at which it is probable that Corp. XIII was written.

The rhythm of the Byzantine hymns may be illustrated by two specimens taken from hymns of Romanos (Krumbacher, pp. 694, 667).

(1) ἡ παρθένος σήμερον | τὸν ὑπερώσιον τίκτει,
καὶ ἡ γῆ τὸ σπήλαιον | τῷ ἄπροστατῷ προσάγει.

(2) ψυχῇ μου, ψυχῇ μου, | ἀνάστα, τί καθεύδεις:
τὸ τέλος ἐγγίζει, | καὶ μέλλεις θορυβεῖσθαι.

As another instance, we may take the ἀκάθιστος ὕμνος,³ a hymn to the Virgin Mary, which is generally attributed to Sergius, patriarch of Constantinople, A.D. 610–641, and is still used in the Eastern Church. The Greek text of it has recently been republished by Birkbeck and Woodward, London, 1917. It consists of twenty-four stanzas, preceded by a prelude. I here give as a specimen a group


¹ The greatest of the composers of Byzantine hymns was Romanos, 'the Pindar of accentual poetry', as to whose date opinions vary between A.D. 491–518 and 713–716. But the names of several men who composed hymns of the same character in the fifth century are given by Bardenhewer, p. 486.

² Two of the poems of Greg. Nazianz., c. A.D. 360 (viz. i. 1. 32, Hymnus vespertinus, and i. 2. 3, Exhortatio ad virgines) are 'accentual', at least in the sense that the distinction between long and short syllables is disregarded. A critical edition of those two poems is given by W. Meyer, Mittellatein. Rhythmic II, pp. 141 ff.; and their rhythm is discussed ib. pp. 48–51. They consist of verses most of which, though not all, conform to the type — — — — — — — — ; e.g. σὺ φωτήρας ὑπάρχων | κατηγόρας τούπλοι. That is, the typical verse is composed of two cola, each of which contains seven syllables; and in the second colon, there is an accent on the last syllable but one. (There seems to be no regularity in the positions of the other accents.) Whether the divergences from this type which occur in some of the verses were admitted by the author, or are (some of them at least) due to corruption of the text, it is difficult to say.

³ τῷ apparently counts as an unstressed syllable.

⁴ It is called ἀκάθιστος, because during its recital the congregation 'does not sit', but stands.
of six couplets, which forms part of the 19th stanza. It is one of
twelve rhythmically corresponding passages, which occur in alternate
stanzas of the hymn (the 1st, 3rd, 5th, &c.); so that the metrical
scheme of this group of couplets is twelve times repeated, syllable
for syllable and accent for accent.

Now in the two hymns of Corp. XIII there is a strongly marked
parallelismus membrorum; and the agreement between the parallel
members, both in the number of syllables and in the positions of the
accents, is close enough to make it appear possible that, if we had
the text before us in its original form, we should find the accentual
rhythm of the first of each pair of corresponding phrases repeated in
the second with as much precision as in the Byzantine hymns. I here
give a tentative reconstruction of the text, based on the assumption
that it was metrical in the sense explained; and it will be seen that
the alterations required for this purpose are not very large.

The rules which I have provisionally assumed and applied\(^1\) are these:

1. Corresponding phrases contain the same number of syllables.
2. No distinction is made between long and short syllables.

\(^1\) An allusion to the doctrine of rebirth.
\(^2\) The rhythm of the second and third couplets, for instance, might be roughly
reproduced in English thus:

\begin{quote}
Hail thou, who hast wrought \textit{a reshaping of mind in us};
hail thou, who dost give \textit{what is good and of God in us}.
Hail, for thou hast given birth anew \textit{to men conceived in shame};
hail, for thou hast taught to think anew \textit{men who were reft of sane thought}.
\end{quote}

\(^3\) These appear to be the rules observed in the Byzantine hymns. But I know
too little about those hymns to be certain that my statement of the rules is wholly
right; and assuming it to be right with respect to the Byzantine hymns, one cannot
be sure that precisely the same rules would be observed by a Pagan hymn-writer in
Egypt two or three centuries earlier.
A stress falls on every syllable which is written with an acute or circumflex accent, with the exception that circumflexed cases of the article (τοῦ, τῆς, &c.) may be treated as unstressed syllables. Corresponding cola invariably agree in the position of the last stress (which is here indicated by a double accent). In the positions of the other stresses, corresponding cola agree for the most part, but some divergence is permitted. It will be noticed that instances of rhyme, and of assonance approximating to rhyme, present themselves here and there, just as in the Byzantine hymns.

Hymn of Hermes.

(The first couplet is difficult to dispose of. Its rhythm somewhat resembles that of the two following couplets; and the resemblance might be increased by rewriting it thus:

Ἀνοιγήτω μου ἢ φός προεδεχάσθω μου, τὴν ἄκοὴν τοῦ Ἰμνου.

But to make the correspondence perfect, there ought to be a stress on μου, and one more syllable in the last colon.)

1 What is to be said about syllables written with a grave accent? They are certainly stressed in some cases; e.g. in the sixth of the group of couplets quoted above from the acathist hymn, the last syllable of καλῆ must be stressed, since the word corresponds to ψυχῶν; and in the case of ἄρχηγῇ and χρηγῇ in the second couplet, and παράξειοι in the fifth couplet, it is to be inferred from corresponding couplets in other stanzas that the last syllable is stressed. But there are also syllables written with a grave accent which are unstressed, and I cannot formulate any general rule on this point.

2 (ἢ ψυχής)
σέγησον ἡ γῆ, | μὴ σεῖσθε τὰ δέντρα·

ὑμνήσω (- - - - -) | τὸν τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ἐν ὄντα.

σιγᾶτ' ὀφραίνοι, | οἱ ἄνεμοι κοιμάσθη·

ὁ κύκλος ὁ ἀθάνατος | προσδεξάσθω μου τὸν λόγον.

\[
\left\{ \begin{array}{c}
\hat{\ell} \\
\hat{\ell}
\end{array} \right\} \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell
\]

μέλλω γὰρ ὑμεῖν | τὸν τὰ πάντα κτίσαντα,

tὸν πήξαντα γῆν | κοιμᾶν κρεμάσαντα·

\[
\left\{ \begin{array}{c}
\hat{\ell} \\
\hat{\ell}
\end{array} \right\} \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell
\]

tὸν ὀχτεώσαντα | τὸ γλυκὸ ύδωρ

εἰς τροφὴν πάντων | (- - - - - - -)

καὶ ἑπτάξαντα | τὸ πῦρ φανῆναι
eἰς πάσαν πράξιν | θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις.

\[
\left\{ \begin{array}{c}
\hat{\ell} \\
\hat{\ell}
\end{array} \right\} 
\]

δώμεν πάντες ὁμοί | αὐτῷ τὴν εὐλογίαν,

tῷ ἐν' ὀφραῖν μετεώρῳ

(. . . . . . . . . . . .)

tῷ συμπάσης φύσεως κτίστῃ.

\[
\left\{ \begin{array}{c}
\hat{\ell} \\
\hat{\ell}
\end{array} \right\} \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell
\]

οὕτως ἔστω ὁ τοῦ νοὸς μου ὀφθαλμὸς·

dέξαστε τῶν δυνάμεων μου τὴν φωνήν.

\[
\left\{ \begin{array}{c}
\hat{\ell} \\
\hat{\ell}
\end{array} \right\} \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell
\]

αὶ δυνάμεις αἱ ἐν ὑμοί,

ὑμεῖτε τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ πᾶν.

\[
\left\{ \begin{array}{c}
\hat{\ell} \\
\hat{\ell}
\end{array} \right\} \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell
\]

συνάστατε τῷ θελήματί μου

ἀπασάι αἱ ἐν ὑμοί δυνάμεις.

\[
\left\{ \begin{array}{c}
\hat{\ell} \\
\hat{\ell}
\end{array} \right\} \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell \quad \ell
\]

1 (τῶν ὡς ὑμῶν ἐξόστων)?

2 θεοὶ one syllable! Or θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις! Or θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις!
In this quatrain the lines are arranged in the order ait a. We might get the more usual order abab by interchanging the third and fourth lines.
In the hymn in Corp. I. 31, there is a passage in which similar rhythmical correspondence may be seen:

\[ \text{δια λογικάς θεοίας [ἀγνάς] ἀπὸ ψυχῆς καὶ καρδίας πρὸς σε ἀνατεμενής, ἀνεκλάμητ', ἀφάντες, σωμάτι φωνοῦμεν.} \]

\[ \begin{align*}
&\{ - \} - - \{ - \} - - x - (ter) \\
&- \quad - - - (bis)
\end{align*} \]

Syllabic and accentual correspondences of the same kind present themselves in some of the clauses of a document entitled οὖν τὸν ήγεμόνα, Pap. mag. Par. i. 1115–1166, and can be got in other clauses of it by slight alterations of the text. This document, as written in the Papyrus, was intended to be recited as a magic spell; but it seems to have been made up by putting together three distinct hymns, or parts of hymns, which were originally meant for use in religious worship. The sorcerer by whom the magic document was compiled may very likely have got all three from one and the same hymn-book. These hymns must have been composed before A.D. 300. In respect of their form, they are rather like the hymns in Corp. XIII; and they give support to the hypothesis that accentual metre, of the same character as that of the Byzantine hymns, was already in use in Egypt at the time when Corp. XIII was written. The text may be read as follows:

\[ \text{1115} \quad \begin{align*}
\text{A.}^3 & \quad \text{χαίρε, τὸ πάν σύντημα} \\
& \quad \text{τοῦ ἀρέτου πνεύματος.}^4 \quad \ast^5
\end{align*} \]

\[ \text{χαίρε, τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ διήκον ἀπὸ οὐρανοῦ ἐπὶ γῆν,}^6 \ast^5 \]

\[ \begin{align*}
&\text{(σωθείρ)!} \\
&\text{(σωθείρ)!}
\end{align*} \]

1 Possibly (οὐ ὀρθῷ ἡμῖν), or something of the sort.
2 A is a hymn to πνεῦμα, in the Stoic sense of that term.
3 Exact syllabic correspondence might be got by writing either [χαίρε, τὸ πάν σύντημα (τοῦ ἀλβρίου πνεύματος) or [χαίρε, τὸ διήκον (ἀλβρίου) πνεύματος.
4 I have substituted asterisks for the voces arcanæ (i.e. bits of gibberish, supposed to be magically potent,) which the sorcerer has inserted.
5 Possibly, [χαίρε τὸ πνεῦμα] (τὸ διήκον ἀπὸ οὐρανοῦ (ἐπὶ γῆν).
The pneuma (‘life-breath’) of an individual man is a detached portion of the cosmic pneuma. It enters into the man at his birth, clings to him during his life, and departs from him at his death. And birth and death alike are determined by God’s will, and take place ‘in goodness’, that is, are ordered for man’s good by God’s beneficence.

1 Corpus Hermeticum agrees with the first three phrases both in the number of syllables and in the position of the last stress. Perhaps καὶ θεοῦ βούλησιν, which contains the same number of syllables, but differs in accentual rhythm, ought to be bracketed.

2 B is a hymn to the Kosmos.

3 Perhaps ἴαπρητικόν κόσμῳ, ‘serviceable to the universe’.

4 Exact correspondence could be got by writing either νυκτιφαοῦς σέληνος or νυκτιφαοῦς μήνης.

5 Perhaps ἀνυσιλαμφής (or ἀνυσιλαμφής) κύκλος αἴώρημα.

6 Perhaps κατὰ πνεύματα, ‘spirits of airy phantoms’ may be taken to mean daemons, or disembodied souls. But it is a strange phrase; perhaps the original reading has been altered by the sorcerer.

This and the following line agree in the number of syllables and the position of the last stress. There is no close parallelism in the sense; but the inhabitants of the air appear to be paired with human worshippers on earth.

7 Perhaps substituted by error for some other verb (possibly συμμενίον). The words συμμενίον ἐν εὐλογίᾳ might mean ‘to sing praises in accord’, with the airy pneūmata).

8 Perhaps διδοταί, perhaps δίδοται.

9 This mention of ‘brethren and sisters’ shows that the hymn in which it occurred was used in congregational worship by some religious community. But the three lines χαίρετε πάντα ... καὶ δοσιάς have little connexion with the σχῆμα κόσμον, which is the thing spoken of in the rest of B; and it may be suspected that the sorcerer got them from another part of the hymn, or from another hymn.
δ μέγα [μέγιστον] ἔγκυκλιον ἀπειρονότον σχῆμα κόσμου,1

\{οὐράνιον, \* ὁὐράνιον\}\2 \*

\{αἰθέριον, \* ἐναθέριον\}\*

\{ιδιατῶδες, \* γαϊώδες, \* πυρῶδες, \* ἀκμῶδες, \* \}

φωτεινές, \* οὐρανοειδείς, \*

\{σκοτοειδείς (s), \* \}

\{αὐτροφευγεῖς, \* \}

έγρο(ἔρημο)πυρνόψυχον [πνεύμα].

C.6 αἰνὸς σε,7 ὁ θεὸς τῶν θεῶν

ὁ τῶν κόσμων καταρτισάμενος, *

ὁ τῶν ἁβυσσῶν θησαυρός8 ἡ ὁρατή θέσεως ἡ δράσματι1\* 9

1140 δ ἀκατατέμενα οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν, καὶ τῶν μὲν οὐρανὸν πτέρυξιν χρύσεις10 οἰωνίας11 σκέπασα,12 τὴν δὲ γῆν ἡ δράσματον ἡ οἰωνίας στηρίζει13 *

1150 τὸ τῶν αἰθέρα ἀνάκρεμάσας | μετέωρῳ ὀξύματι,14 τὸ τῶν αέρα διασκεδάζας | πνεαίς αὐτοκινήτοις15 *

1 Possibly, ὁ σχῆμα κόσμου

\{μέγα ἔγκυκλιον \}

\{ἀπειρονότον. \}

οὐρανοι ἐνωσενηλ | ὁ οὐρανοι Pap. Perhaps, \*

οὐρανίον, ἐ(π)οὐρανίον, \* αἰθέριον, ἑναθέριον.

If that were written, both pairs of epithets alike would refer to the contrast between heaven and the sublunar world.

3 Perhaps γαϊώδες, ἱδιατῶδες, which would make a still closer correspondence.

4 Perhaps φωτεινές, οὐρανοειδείς, \*

\{αὐτροφευγεῖς, \* \} (e.g. νυκτηρεψις).

5 Πνεύμα must be cut out. Its insertion was probably suggested by hymn A, after A and B had been put together. The adjectives belong to σχῆμα κόσμου; they would not be applicable to Πνεύμα. The material universe is 'moist', 'dry', hot, and cold; i.e. it is composed of elements that are respectively characterized by these four qualities. But perhaps this odd compound is to be attributed to the sorcerer; the original reading may have been 6 ἄγρων, ἄγρων, \* θερμύν, ψεφρὼν.

6 C is a hymn to God as maker of the world. In that respect it resembles the first part of the hymn of Hermes in Corp. XIII.

7 ἐν ο ὁσ Pap.

8 A reminiscence of Ps. 32 (33). 7: τιθέλει ἐν θησαυροῖς ἄθιστοιον. Θίσων is meaningless; and ἡ δράσματι has probably come from ἡ δράσματι below.

9 Ἑλληνικά is the only possible reading here.

10 Πνεύμα Pap.

11 ἀλοινος has come from αλοινος in the following line.

12 Cf. Ps. 16 (17). 8: ἐν σινῇ τῶν πτερόγυν σοι σκεπάσας ἐμ. Ps. 60 (61). 4: σκατασθήσωμα ἐν σινῇ τῶν πτερόγυν σοι. But what is meant by saying that God sheltered heaven under wings?1

13 Possibly, τὸ τῶν μὲν ἄλων (οτ τὰ μὲν ἄλων) πτερόζων | χρυσανθίαι σκεπάσας, \*

τὴν δὲ γῆν ἡ δράσματον | ἀλοινος στηρίζει.

14 Correspondence might be got by writing ὀξύματι μετεώρῳ, and counting the ἀνακρεμάσας as one syllable.

1020.9 E. e
All visible things have been made; there must therefore be a Maker of them. The Maker has not been made; he is prior and superior to all things made; and he can be seen in his works. §§ 2, 3.

The Maker is our Father. We may call him by three names,—God, Maker, and Father. § 4.

There are these two,—that which is made, and the Maker; and there is nothing beside. The two are correlative, and neither can exist without the other. §§ 5, 6.

All things are good when first made; but in course of time, evil grows on them, as rust forms on metal. God is not the author of evil; and since evil results from the duration of the things made, he has subjected terrestrial things to change (i.e. made them mortal), and so provided that the evil shall be purged away. § 7.

It is foolish and impious to deny that all things are made by God. If God is not the maker of all things, it must be because there are things which he either disdainst to make, or is unable to make. But God is good, and therefore cannot be either disdainful or incapable. §§ 8, 9.

God makes things of different kinds; he makes immortal beings in heaven, and mortal beings on earth. There is life everywhere, and

1 E. g. (ἄνω ἂνθρώπου).
2 Possibly, ἄνω ἂνθρώπου
3 τοὺς παντός ἁρχαίων | νοηθην κ. τ. λ. Pap.
all life is made by God. There are these two then,—God, and the world made by him,—and there is nothing beside them. § 10.

Sources. God is spoken of as the Maker of the world both in the Timaeus and in Genesis; and a similar conception occurs in native Egyptian documents also. The Platonic notion of God the Maker, derived from the Timaeus, must have been known to the writer of Corp. XIV; whether any Jewish or Egyptian statement of the doctrine was also known to him, we cannot tell. But he aims at simplifying the teaching that has been handed down to him, and retaining only so much of it as he holds to be indispensable; and accordingly, he omits what was said by Platonists about ἄλη (the raw material out of which things are made), and about the νοητά ἔδη (the patterns in the likeness of which things are made).

We are told in § 1 that this libellus is a summary of doctrines more fully set forth in preceding discourses of Hermes to Tat. But it is at the same time a protest against the πολυλογία and ματωλογία (§ 5) of certain teachers,—that is, against the doctrines of certain people who taught a more complicated theology, and recognized other entities besides God and the Kosmos. The writer's criticism would apply to some of the extant Hermetica, in which a Being intermediate between the supreme God and the Kosmos is spoken of. But doctrines such as he condemns were taught not only by Hermetists, but by other Platonists of the period also; and he may have had in mind the lectures or writings of some of these teachers. It is possible that some form of Christian theology, Catholic or Gnostic, was also known to him, and was included among the teachings which he contemptuously describes as 'idle chattering'. In his defence of the position that all things are made by God, he seems, like the author of Corp. XI. ii, to be contending especially against some one who taught that τὰ ἀδιάντα alone have been made by the supreme God, and that τὰ θνητά are the work of another and inferior Demiurgus (see § 10).

Date. It appears from § 1 that, at the time when Corp. XIV was written, the διεξοδικοὶ λόγοι of Hermes to Tat were already in existence; and as the διεξοδικοὶ λόγοι were probably later than the γενικοὶ λόγοι, it may be inferred that this document is one of the later Hermetica. There is also some reason to think that the author knew Corp. XI. ii, which is probably one of the later documents. Moreover, the complications of Platonic theology increased as time
went on; and the later we place the date, the more reason there would be for such a protest against them as we find in Corp. XIV. This *libellus* then can hardly have been written before the second century A.D., and is more likely to have been written in the third century than in the second.

**Title.** The MSS. give two different headings, viz. 'Ερμοῦ τοῦ τρισμεγίστου Ἀσκληπιῶν ἐπὶ φρονεῖν, and 'Ερμοῦ πρὸς Ἀσκληπιῶν. The former is right; for this document is an epistle (ἐπιστέλλαξ, § 1), and not, like most of the *Hermetica*, a report of an oral discourse or dialogue. Hermes, in accordance with his character as a religious teacher, substitutes ἐπὶ φρονεῖν ('I wish you health of mind, or wisdom') for the χαῖρειν ('I wish you joy') or ἔρωσθαι ('I wish you health') commonly employed in letter-writing. Cf. Plato *Ep.* 3 *init.*: Πλάτων Διονυσίως χαίρειν ἐπιστέλλαξ ἣν ὀρθῶς ἐν τιμαχάνῳμι τῆς βελτίωτος προσφήσεως; ὡς μάλλον κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν συνήθειαν γράφων ἐπὶ πράττειν; Seneca *Ep.* 15 *init.*: 'mos antiquis fuit, usque ad meam servatus aetatem, primis epistulæ verbis adicere "si vales, bene est"; ego valeo". Recte nos dicimus "si philosopharis, bene est". Valere autem hoc denum est: sine hoc aeger est animus.'

Cyril, quoting from Corp. XIV (see § 6), says γράφει . . . Ἐρμῆς ἐπὶ τῷ τούτῳ παντὸς φύσεως. Cyril probably found this description of the contents written as a heading in his copy; and it may have been suggested by the words of § 1 *init.*, τὴν τῶν ὅπων ἠθέλησε φύσεως μαθεῖν.

§ 1. ἔπει δ υἱὸς μου . . . ἐπιστήμην τῆς φύσεως. The situation described is this. Asclepius is the elder of the two pupils of Hermes, and has already learnt much from him. But he has for some time been parted from his master. In his absence, Hermes has been instructing Tat; and he wishes to confer a corresponding benefit on Asclepius. But in teaching Tat, who was a beginner, he found it necessary to give full and detailed explanations concerning every matter dealt with. It would be superfluous to repeat all this to Asclepius, who knew much that Tat did not know; Hermes therefore considers it enough to send to Asclepius a short summary of his discourses to Tat. Asclepius will be able to fill in the outlines and supply the explanations for himself.
This implies that the author of Corp. XIV had before him a series of discourses of Hermes to Tat, and wrote this document as an epitome of their contents, or rather, of those parts of their contents which he considered to be of primary importance (τὰ κυριώτατα κεφάλαια). And from the words in which he describes the discourses which he is summarizing (περὶ ἐνὸς ἑκάστου ἡραγκάσθην πλείωνα εἰπεῖν κ.τ.λ.) it may be inferred that they were those entitled οἱ πρὸς Τάτ διεξοδικοὶ λόγοι. Compare Corp. X (Hermes to Tat), which is described in the opening words (addressed to Asclepius) as an epitome of οἱ πρὸς Τάτ γενικοὶ λόγοι.

Apart from some slight alterations of the text, this introductory section presents no difficulty; and I see no reason to doubt that it was written by the author of Corp. XIV.

τὴν τῶν ὄρων . . . φύσις μαθεῖν. Cf. Corp. XI. (i) 1 b, where Hermes asks Nous to instruct him ἐρωτοῦσα τῶν σωτήρων φύσιν, καὶ γνώμων τὸν θεόν. ‘Knowledge of nature’ (φυσική) is knowledge of the Kosmos (τὸ πᾶν); and in both those passages, knowledge of this kind is spoken of as a thing distinct from knowledge of God, though connected with that higher knowledge and leading up to it. The same distinction is probably implied in XIV. 1. The ‘knowledge of nature’ which Tat desired was knowledge of the Kosmos; and to get this knowledge is the first stage on the way to gnoxis. Asclepius has already traversed this preliminary stage; there is therefore no need for Hermes to repeat to him the lessons in φυσική which he has given to Tat in the διεξοδικοὶ λόγοι; the teacher is free to assume all this as known, and proceed at once to speak of God, the Maker of the Kosmos. Accordingly, we find that in this document the Kosmos is spoken of only under the collective term τὰ γνώμηα (or τὰ γεννητά), and is not described or explained in detail, as it is in some of the other Hermetica (e. g. Corp. XI. ii iniit.).

ὡς νεωτέρως καὶ ἄρτι παρελθὼν εἰπὶ τὴν γνώσιν.—(ὡς ὅλος καὶ νεωτέρος ἄρτι παρελθὼν εἰπὶ τὴν γνώσιν MSS.) The youth of a pupil, and the fact that he is a beginner, are reasons for explaining things fully to him; but they are not reasons for his demanding to be taught without delay. These words must therefore be connected with what follows (περὶ ἐνὸς ἑκάστου ἡραγκάσθην πλείωνα εἰπεῖν). But a transcriber preferred to connect them with what precedes (ὑπερθέσθαι . . . οίκ ἐπέτρεπεν), and consequently altered.
the datives into nominatives. It was presumably the same person that inserted νίς, which has no meaning except in connexion with ὀν κοπτεῖτε, and even in that connexion, is hardly wanted after ὁ νίς μου above. Its insertion was probably suggested by Corp. XIII. 3 (μὴ φθόνει μου, πάτερ: γνήσιος νίς εἰμι: διάφρασών μοι κ.τ.λ.); and if so, this sentence may have been altered by the compiler of the Corpus, in order to make the introductory section of Corp. XIV appear to refer to Corp. XIII, with which it originally had nothing to do.

[μυστικότερον αὐτὰ ἐρμηνεύοις]. This seems to mean 'expressing them in language which would be intelligible only to the initiated', i.e. presenting them in an obscure and esoteric form. But there is nothing esoteric in the language of this libellus, which is rather distinguished from other Hermetic by its straightforward simplicity. In § 5, (if my explanation of that passage is right,) the writer declares himself opposed to hiding things away ἐν μυσί; and that phrase seems to mean much the same as μυστικὸς ἐρμηνεύων. It is therefore probable that the words μυστικότερον αὐτὰ ἐρμηνεύοις were not written by the author, but were inserted by some one else. The interpolator apparently failed to see that it is the omission of preliminary teaching about the Kosmos that makes the epistle suitable only for an advanced student, and therefore thought it necessary to allege another reason, namely, the obscurity of the language,—though as a matter of fact the language is not obscure.

§ 2. [τὰ δὲ γεννητὰ οἷά ὦτοι ἀλλ' ὦτον ἐτέρου γίνεται]. This appears to be a doublet of γίνεται δὲ ὦτον ἐτέρου γίνομεν. The writer cannot have intended both these clauses to stand in the same sentence; and it seems best to cut out the first of them. In place of ὦτον ἀλλο, we should have expected ὦτον ἠαυτόν.

πολλὰ δὲ [ ] τὰ φαινόμενα, καὶ πάντα [τὰ] διάφορα καὶ οἷά δρομα. Cf. τὴν πουκλίαν τῶν γεννομένων in § 7 init. The 'differences' with which the writer is chiefly concerned are the different degrees of goodness or badness, and especially, the difference between τὰ θεντα (terrestrial creatures) and τὰ ἀβαλάτα (the heavenly bodies). See § 10.

This parenthesis rather awkwardly interrupts the argument; perhaps perhaps πολλὰ δὲ ... οἷά δρομα is wrongly placed.

§ 3. οὗτος δὲ ᾧτοί (ἐἷς, καί) (πάντων) κρείττων, καὶ ἔνας ὑπὸ σοφὸς τὰ πάντα. The point that there is but one Maker is emphasized in the parallel passage Corp. XI. ii. 8 b as emended: δὲ οἳν τοιοῦτον τινα εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον πάντως ἐνα. The superiority of God in power
and wisdom is regarded as following from the fact that he is ‘older’ (πρεσβύτερος) than all else. Cf. Synesius De insomniis 1, Migne Tom. 66 col. 1284: καὶ ὁμιρρίῳ δὲ ἄρα διὰ τούτο τῆς τοῦ Δωτὸς γνώμης ἡγηταί τὰ τῶν θεῶν πράγματα, ὅτι “πρότερος γέγονεν, καὶ πλείονα οἶδεν”, αὐτῷ δήπου τῷ πρεσβύτερος εἶναι. . . καὶ διὸς δὲν θεῶν ὄν ἄρχεν ἄξιωται θεῶν, νοῦς δὲν, σοφία περιονοῖα κρατεῖ.

ἀρχεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν γνωμῶν τῷ μεγάθε, καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῆς συνεχείας τῆς ποιήσεως.—(ἀρχεῖ γὰρ καὶ τῷ πλῆθει καὶ τῷ μεγάθει καὶ τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν γενομένων καὶ τῇ συνεχείᾳ τῆς ποιήσεως MSS.) It is clear that πλῆθος must be an attribute of τὰ γνώμηα, and μέγαθος an attribute of God. The words πλῆθος and διαφορά, used in connexion with τὰ γνώμηα, correspond to πολλά δὲ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πάντα διάφορα above. The ‘many things’ are subject to the one God, because he extends beyond them and encompasses them all by reason of his μέγαθος; and their differences or variations are subject to him, because he is perpetually making things, that is, because his creative activity manifests itself afresh at every successive moment, and keeps pace with all variations in the things made.

Perhaps it is implied, as in § 7 fin., that when things change for the worse, God is always ready to replace them by other things, and so to ‘purge away the evil’. As to τῇ συνεχείᾳ τῆς ποιήσεως (and δεὶ οὐν ποιών below), cf. Corp. XI. ii. 14 a: δεὶ ἐστίν ἐν τῷ ἐργῳ.

ἐπείτα δὲ τὰ γεννητὰ ὁρῶμεν ἐστίν, κἀκεῖνος διὰ [ἀ]δρατός διὰ τούτο γὰρ ποιεῖ, ἵνα [ἀ]δρατός ἂν. δεὶ οὖν ποιών, δ(ε) ὁ δρατός [τογαροῦν] ἔστιν. The Hermetist cannot have said that God makes the universe in order to render himself invisible (ἵνα ἥνατος ἂν); he must have said that God makes it in order to render himself visible, i.e. in order to manifest himself in his works. It is therefore necessary to write ἵνα ὁ δρατός ἂν; and from this it follows that ὁ δρατός, and not ἥνατος, must be the right word in the other places also. Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 22 a: δι’ αὐτοῦ τούτου πάντα πεποίηκεν, ἵνα διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν βλέπησ. . . ὁ θεὸς (ὁ δρατάς) ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν. It is to be presumed that some reader, puzzled by the paradoxical statement that God is ὁ δρατός, altered the words with a view to making them express the orthodox doctrine of Platonism, that God is ὁ δρατός, and so made nonsense of the passage. The word τογαροῦν, which is obviously out of place, is probably an alternative for the preceding οὖν.

424 CORPVS HERMETICVM

θαυμάσας βασιλεύσει" γέγραπται "καὶ δ' βασιλεύσας ἀναπαύσεται". Clem. ib. 5. 14. 97: οὐ παύσεται δ' ζητῶν ἑως ἄν εὐρή, εὑρὼν δὲ θαυμήσεται, θαυμήσεις δὲ βασιλεύσει, βασιλεύσας δὲ ἀπανάψεται. Logia Jesus, Oxyrhynchus Pap. 654 (Klostermann, Apocrypha II, p. 17): μὴ πανασάθω δ' ζητῶν τὸν πατέρα ἐως ἃν ἵππει οὐρή καὶ ὅταν οὐρή (θαυμήσεται, καὶ θαυμ)βηθεὶς βασιλεύσει, καὶ βασιλεύσας ἀναπάψεται. The better form of the saying is that which is given in the Logia; and the resemblance of this to the Hermetist's words (at least if we accept the conjectural supplement τὸν πατέρα in the Logion) seems too close to be accidental. But there is no need to assume direct borrowing on either side. The saying may have been widely known, and may have been ascribed by some to Jesus, by others to Hermes, and possibly to other teachers also.

τί γὰρ γλυκύτερον πατρὸς γυναῖκον; Cf. Ascl. Lat. 41 b as emended: πατρῳὴν εὔνοιαν καὶ στοργὴν καὶ φιλίαν, καὶ εἰ τὸς γλυκύτερα, εἰρηγείαν εἴνεδεῖν. In the Timaeus, the word πατήρ is employed, as a synonym for γεννητής, to describe the relation of God to the Kosmos which he has brought into being; and when thus used, it did not carry with it any implication of fatherly affection towards men. But when the word had in this way come to be commonly accepted as a name of God, it was sometimes taken to connote also God's kindly care of his human children. This change in the meaning of the term 'Father' as applied to God by Pagans is parallel to, but not necessarily dependent on, that by which the Jewish conception of God as creator, law-giver, and judge developed into the Christian conception of 'our Father who is in heaven'.

§ 5. τίς τολομογίας τε καὶ ματαιολογίας ἀπαλαγῶντας χρῆ νοεῖν δύναται, τὸ γινόμενον καὶ τὸν ποιούμενον μέσον γὰρ τοὺτον ὀδηγοὺν. The

1 Instances of this occur in Epictetus; e.g. Diss. 1. 6. 40: τὸν θεόν, ... οὐ δὴ ἄραγον βασιλεὼς καὶ τοῖς συνήθειας πατρὸς, ἀκόλουθον τοῦτο ἔδωκεν Κ. Τ. Α. 1. 9. 7: τὸ δὲ τὸν θεόν ποτήρι ἐνεμένός καὶ πατέρα καὶ θεομόνα κ. τ. Ἐκ Κ. Τ. Α. 3. 24. 15: ὥσπερ γὰρ (ὁ Ἱεραλήριος) ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἱερὰς ἄρτους ἐδοκεί, οὐδὲ πάντως ἐκεῖ καὶ διεγειρότας [ὁ] πατήρ ἄρτον ἡμῶν, οὐ γὰρ μήκη λόγου ἡμᾶς ὅτι πατήρ ἄρτον ἰδεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸν πατέρα φιλοτείνων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ πρὸς ἱερων ἀφορίων ἐπιτευχθέν εἰπραττέν.

2 But in the Old Testament also, God is sometimes described as a loving father; e.g. Isaiah 63. 16: 'thou, O Lord, art our father; our redeemer from everlasting is thy name.' Jeremiah 31. 9: 'I will lead them ...; for I am a father to Israel, and Ephraim is my first-born.' Ps. 103. 13: 'like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him.'

Speaking of the early Christians, Harnack (Hist. of Dogma, Eng. tr. 1894, vol. i, p. 180) says that 'God is named the Father 'by them (1) in relation to the Son ...; (2) as Father of the world' (as in the Timaeus); (3) as the merciful one who has proved his goodness, declared his will, and called Christians to be his sons.' It is the third of these three senses that corresponds to the use of the word πατήρ in Corp. XIV. 4 and Ascl. Lat. 41 b.
writer of Corp. XIV aims at simplifying theology by rejecting all superfluities. He recognizes only God and the Kosmos, and refuses to admit the existence of any intermediate entity. But what are the particular theories which he has in mind, and against which this polemic is directed? He would condemn, as 'idle chattering', doctrines which are taught in several of the other Hermetica; e.g. he would reject the aiōn of Corp. XI. i; the τόπος-νοῦς of Corp. II.; and the hypostatized λόγος, the 'second νοῦς', and the Archantropos of Corp. I. But were those documents, or any of them, known to him? As he closely follows some parts of XI. ii, it is probable that he had read XI. i also, and was thinking, inter alia, of the hypostatized aiōn of XI. i. The 'second God' of Numenius, and Plotinus' triad (ἐν—ἀγαθόν, νοῦς, and ψυχή), would fall under the same condemnation. He would also reject, supposing that he had heard of them, the λόγος and δυνάμεις of Philo, the Christ of Paul and the fourth Gospel, and still more decidedly, the complicated systems of aiōnes or δυνάμεις constructed by Valentinus and other Christian Gnostics. But there is nothing to show whether it was some one or more of these doctrines, or others of like character, that he was specially opposing.

μηδὲν ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ((ἡ ἐν μυχῇ)) τιθέμενοι. As to ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, cf. XI. ii. 16 b: μὴ εἰς ἀπορίαν τὸν λόγον περιστῆσομεν' συδέν γὰρ ἀπορον περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ νοομένοις. The words ἦ τῶν ἐν μυχῇ are clearly out of place where they stand in the MSS., and must in any case be cut out there; and their presence can be best accounted for by assuming that ἦ ἐν μυχῇ was accidentally shifted from the place where I have inserted it, and τῶν was afterwards added. The phrase ἐν μυχῇ τίθεσθαι τι may be taken to mean 'to hide a thing away in a dark corner', and so 'to make a mystery of it'. The writer objects to all obscure and esoteric doctrines.

ἐκάτερον (—ρος MSS.) γὰρ αὐτῶν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐστιν. 'Each of them is just this and nothing else'; that is, the essence of the Maker consists in his making things, and the essence of the things made consists in their being made. The phrase is obscure in itself, but is explained by what follows (ὁ ποιών ἄλλο συδέν ἐστιν ἤ το ποιών μόνον κ.τ.λ.).

οὐκ ἦστι τὸ ἐτέρου τοῦ ἐτέρου χωρισθήναι. Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 12 b: ἃν ἐκεῖνων καταργηθῇ, ὁ θεὸς... συνέκτεσεν οὐκέτι ἑστι θεὸς. Ibid. 14 a: εἶ γὰρ χωρισθεὶς αὐτῶν, πάντα μὲν συμπεσείσθαι, πάντα δὲ τεθνησθοῖς ἀνάγκη.

§ 6. [στερήσει τοῦ ἐτέρου.] This is a doublet of τοῦ ἐτέρου ἄνευ.
§ 7. μὴ διὰ τὴν ποικιλίαν τῶν γινομένων φυλάξῃ. The ‘variety’ of the things made means the fact that they are not all alike good, but are partly good and partly bad. Cf. Astd. Lat. II. 15: ‘hoc est ergo totum qualitatis (diversae, prout natura est) materiæ.’ μὴ φυλάξῃ means ‘do not be on your guard (against the doctrine that all things are made by God)’, i. e. do not hesitate to accept it.

φοβοῦμαι μὴ ταπεινώσητα καὶ ἀδόξην τῷ θεῷ περινέψῃ. It is implied that there are people who consider it beneath the dignity of God to make things of lower grade. According to the view against which the writer is contending, God may perhaps be the maker of celestial things (τὰ ἀθάνατα), but cannot be the maker of terrestrial things (τὰ θνητά), because all terrestrial things are more or less κακά and αὐξηρά.

μὴ γὰρ ἄτιν αὐτῷ δόξα, τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ πάντα. This use of the word δόξα is rather Jewish than Hellenic.

tοὐτὸ ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ὁσπέρ οὐσία (σῶμα MSS.), ἡ ποιησις. It would be possible to say that the world which God has made is God’s body, though I do not think that any such phrase occurs in the extant Hermetica. But it is hardly possible to say that the act of making things is God’s body. See Corp. IV. 1 b, where the MSS. give τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα ἑκεῖνον.

ὁσπέρ ὁ λός τῇ χαλκῇ. Cf. Plotinus 4. 3. 7: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐξω τὸν δραμοῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ σωφροσύνην καθορᾷ καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἀλλ’ αὕτη παρ’ αὐτῇ, ἐν τῇ κατανόησις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τοῦ δ’ προτέρου ἢν, ὁσπέρ ἀγαλμάτη ἐν αὐτῇ ἰδρυμένα ὀρθα, οἷον ἐπὶ χρόνον ἢν πεπληρωμένα καθαρὰ ποιησα-μένη.

ὁ δὲ τῆς γενέσεως διαμονῆ καθάπερ ἐξανθεῖν ποιεῖ. Both here and in the following sentence, τῆς γενέσεως means τῶν γενητῶν. The subject of ἐξανθεῖν is τὴν κακίαν. Possibly αὕτη (σα. τὴν κακίαν) may have fallen out after ἐξανθεῖν. The διαμονῆ (or ἐπιδιαμονῆ) of terrestrial things is the fact that each of them, when once made, continues to exist (for a finite time). In this sense διαμονὴ is contrasted with ἀθανασία in Corp. XI. i. 2. Everything made by God is good when first made; but in course of time, evil ‘breaks out on it’, like rust on metal, or an eruption on the skin. Compare the description of the gradual depravation of the incarnated soul in Corp. X. 15 b.

It is not clear how this attempt to explain the origin of evil is to be reconciled with the writer’s view that God ‘is always making things’, which would seem to imply that God does not make a thing once for all and then leave it to itself, but that it is by his action that
the thing is maintained in existence from moment to moment, and consequently, that its condition from first to last must be his work. Who, if not God, makes the 'rust'? The Platonic answer to that question would be 'it comes from the ἀραξία which is inherent in ἡλιον, and which God cannot wholly overcome' (see Ascl. Lat. II); but the writer of Corp. XIV says nothing about ἡλιον.

Diá τούτο ἐποίησε τὴν μεταβολήν ὁ θεὸς, ὀστερ ἀνακαθαρσιν τῆς γενέσεως. Since the evil which 'breaks out on' things comes by lapse of time, and increases with lapse of time, evil can be kept within bounds only by limiting the time during which each several thing (in the sublunar world) continues to exist. For this reason God has instituted μεταβολή; that is, he has established the law by which every terrestrial organism sooner or later undergoes dissolution, and is replaced by another. The new organism starts on its career free from the rust of evil by which its predecessor was corrupted. Wicked old men die, and innocent children are born. In this way the total amount of evil is prevented from increasing.1

§ 8. τῷ μὲν αὐτῷ ἱωγράφῳ ἔξεστι καὶ οὐρανὸν ποιήσαι καὶ γῆν ... τῷ δὲ θεῷ οὐ δυνατὸν πάντα ποιεῖν; This passage was evidently suggested by Pl. Rep. 10. 596 b, c: ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόνδε τίνα καλεῖς τὸν δημομουργόν, ... ὁ δὲ πάντα ποιεῖ ... ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ οὕτως χειροτέχνης οὐ μόνον πάντα οἶδα τε σκεύη ποιήσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα ἀπατᾶν ποιεῖ καὶ ἥξα πάντα ἑργάζεται, τὰ τε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτὸν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ [ἐν 'Αιδοῦ] ὅποι γῆς ἀπατᾶν ἑργάζεται ... τῶν τοιοῦτων γαρ, οἶμαι, δημομουργῶν καὶ ὁ ἱωγράφος ἑαυτόν. But the Hermetist, while imitating Plato's words, uses the instance of the painter for a different purpose. As employed in Corp. XIV, it takes the place of the comparison in Corp. XI. ii. 12 a: σοῦ τοσαίτα τοιούτως· καὶ γὰρ βλέπεις καὶ λαλεῖς κτλ. Below, in § 10, the instance of a man sowing different seeds is used to illustrate the same point.

§ 10. ἦν γὰρ θεὸν φάσκοντες εἴλογειν ... τὰ μέγιστα εἰς αὐτὸν ἀσεβοῦσιν. Cf. Corp. IX. 9: ὡσ γὰρ δεισιδαιμονίας βλασφημοῦντι.

§ 10. ἦν γαλακτον σπέρμα καταβάλλοντα εἰς γῆν, ἐπού μὲν πυρὸν, ἐποῦ δὲ κριθὴν, ὑπὸ δὲ ἄλλο τῷ σπερμάτως ... ὡσ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἐν μὲν οὐρανῷ ἀθανασίαν σπείρει, ἐν δὲ γῆ μεταβολήν. Cf. Paul,

1 Cf. Tennyson:
'The old order changeth, yielding place to new,
And God fulfilth Himself in many ways,
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world.'
I Cor. 15. 37: o σπείρεις, οὐ τὸ σῶμα τὸ γενησόμενον σπείρεις, ἀλλὰ γυμνὸν κόκκον εἰ τίχων σίτου ἢ τινος τῶν λουπῶν· ὁ δὲ θεὸς διέσωσεν . . . ἐκάστῳ τῶν σπερμάτων ἰδίον σῶμα. . . . καὶ σώματα ἐπουράνια, καὶ σώματα ἐγκύρεια. The two passages deal with different subjects; (Paul is speaking of the resurrection of the dead, and the Hermetist, of the making of the Kosmos;) yet there is a real resemblance between them; in both alike, we are told of a 'sowing' from which spring bodies of different kinds, and in particular, both heavenly (i.e. immortal) and earthly (i.e. mortal) bodies. It is possible therefore that the language used by the two writers is derived in part from a common source.

In Corp. IX. 6, the Kosmos is described as growing successive crops of living creatures ὠσπέρ ἄγαθος [ξωῆς] γεωργός. In a magic Papyrus (Pap. mag. Berl. i. 26), the Agathos Daimon is invoked with the words ἓν γῆ μεταβολήν. Cf. Corp. XI. i. 5: ἄθανασίας καὶ μεταβολῆς ποιητής. XI. ii. 12 a: τί μέγα τῷ θεῷ [καὶ ἄθανασίαν καὶ μεταβολῆν ποιεῖν; Corp. XII. ii. 22: ὑπὸ τίνος ἄθανατητα· ὑπὸ τίνος μεταβάλλεται τὰ μεταβλητά·

[ταῦτα δὲ οPARTMENT ΕΣΤΙΝ, ἄλλα ὅλγα καὶ ἀδιάθρημα· τὰ γὰρ πάντα πέτσαρα.] The four things appear to be ἄθανασία, μεταβολή, ζωή, and κίνησις. But these are not four distinct things; for ἄθανασία and μεταβολή are different modes of ζωῆς, and κίνησις is merely the manifestation of ζωῆς. Nor is there any apparent motive for numbering them. And in what relation do these four things stand to the τέσσαρα, (viz. 'the Maker, and what is made',) in which, as we were told before, all that exists is comprised, and to which the Hermetist recurs in the following words (ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ γένεσις)? It seems most likely then that the sentence ταῦτα . . . τέσσαρα is a note inserted by some reader.

LIBELLVS XVI

Contents

Preface, §§ 1, 2. In this treatise all the Hermetic teachings are summed up. The doctrine set forth in it is at variance with the opinions of the many.

The meaning of the Hermetic writings is clear to those who read them in the right spirit; but to others, these writings appear to be
obscure. Their apparent obscurity is increased, and their force impaired, when they are translated into Greek.

**God and the universe, § 3.** God is all things; but at the same time, God is one; for all things go to make up a single whole.

**God, Sun, light, §§ 4–10 a and 12.** The three grosser elements, viz. earth, water, and air, come from below, and are supplied by the Earth; but light, the life-giving element, comes from above, and is supplied by the Sun. §§ 4, 5.

The light of the Sun is the ‘receptacle’ (or vehicle) of incorporeal substance,—if there is such a substance. But whence that incorporeal substance comes, we know not. God is hidden from us; but the Sun we see with our eyes. He is stationed in the midst of the universe, and floods with his life-giving light both heaven above and earth below. He controls the movement of the heavens, as a charioteer controls his team. By the light which he sends forth upward, he maintains the everlasting life of the heavenly bodies; by the light which he sends downward, he maintains life in a perpetual succession of terrestrial organisms. §§ 6–10 a.¹

The Sun then supplies (the light) by which the life of all things is maintained; (and the Earth) supplies the matter of which terrestrial organisms are composed, and receives (this matter) back into herself at their dissolution. § 12.

**God, Sun, Planets, Daemons, §§ 13–16.** (The planet-gods are under the command of the Sun; and) each of the planet-gods has under his command a separate corps of daemons. The daemons are partly beneficent, and partly maleficent. They have dominion over all things upon earth; and by their action are brought about the troubles which beset both communities and individual men. Daemons are seated in all parts of our bodies. At each man’s birth, the particular corps of daemons which is under the orders of the planet ruling at that moment takes possession of him. If a man is illuminated by the light of God, the daemons have no power over him. But such men are few; and all others are driven by the passions which the daemons set working in them by means of the bodily organs.

¹ *Interpolated passage on daemons, §§ 10 b, 11.* There are numerous bands of daemons. They hold a position intermediate between immortals and mortals. Executing the commands of the gods, they superintend the affairs of men, and punish impiety by plagues inflicted on human communities. Impiety alone is punished by the gods; all other sins are pardoned.
**Conclusion.** (God, Sun, Spheres, Daemons.) §§ 17-19. Life-giving energy issues from God, and is transmitted from him, through the intelligible Kosmos, to the Sun. The eight spheres (viz. the sphere of fixed stars, the five spheres of the planet-stars, the moon-sphere, and the atmosphere) are dependent on the Sun; the daemons are dependent on the eight spheres (or in other words, are subject to the gods who preside over the eight spheres); and men are dependent on the daemons. Thus all things are dependent on God. §§ 17-18.

All things are made by God, and are parts of God. God then is all things; and in making things, he makes himself. And he will never cease from making things. § 19.

**Sources.** In his conception of the supreme and supracosmic God, the writer of Corp. XVI agrees with the Platonists. He has adopted the Platonic terms νομην οἰστια and νομην κόσμος; but he does not seem to have fully grasped the doctrine which these terms imply, and he speaks of things incorporeal with less confidence than of things corporeal. (See § 6, έι δε τις έστι και νομην οἰστια, and στορισμε βαζομενων.) In § 15 (τα δοσ ἀγομα μερη της ψυχης) the Platonic psychology is presupposed; and in § 16 (ερος) there is a reference to Pl. Phaedrus 238 b. The theory of daemons expounded in §§ 13-16 is partly based on the daemonology of the Platonists, but presents some peculiar features. I do not know from what source the writer got his notion of an army of daemons marshalled in battalions of which the several planets are the commanders. (Was any such notion current among the Mithraists?)

The theory of the elements in §§ 4-10 a shows traces of Stoic influence; but the writer has discarded προ, the term used by the Stoics to denote the celestial and vitalizing element, and speaks of φως instead.

The view that the planets preside over men's births and determine their characters and actions (§ 15) is connected with the astrological beliefs commonly accepted in the time of the Roman empire. The use of the term ειμαραμενη (§ 16 fin.) to denote the government of human life by the planets is of Stoic origin. The statement (§ 15 f.) that the 'illuminated' man is free from the dominion of 'gods and daemons' (i.e. of the planets and their emissaries) is a Platonic modification of the Stoic doctrine of Heimarmene.

Both in §§ 4-10 a and 12, and in §§ 13-16, the Sun is supreme within the Kosmos, and subordinate only to the supracosmic God.
This exaltation of the Sun-god is in accordance with a tendency which began before the Christian era, and prevailed more and more as time went on. A large part of the Egyptian religion, from the earliest times, consisted of Sun-worship; and under the later dynasties, almost all the more important gods of Egypt were identified with the Sun-god, or regarded as aspects of the Sun. In the religions of Syria also, Sun-worship was prominent. Among the Greeks, any Platonist who was disposed to Sun-worship would find warrant for it in Pl. Rep. 6. 508, where the Sun is spoken of as the offspring and visible image of τὸ ἄγαθον. The Stoic Cleanthes (about 270 B.C.) placed the hegemonikon of the universe in the Sun (Arius Didymus, Diels Doxogr. p. 465), and not, as most of the Stoics, in the highest sphere of heaven. The Neo-Pythagoreans, from the Christian era onwards, were Sun-worshippers (see e.g. Philostratus Vita Apollon. passim), and identified Apollo, the god to whom Pythagoras was said to have been specially devoted, with the Sun. Plutarch (about A.D. 100), in his exposition of the Delphic religion (De Ei apud Delph. 21, 393 D), speaks of people who identify Apollo with the Sun, but himself prefers to identify him with the supracosmic deity of whom the Sun is the visible image. In the Mithraic cult, which spread to all parts of the Roman empire in the course of the second century A.D., the Sun-god was regarded sometimes as identical with Mithras, and sometimes as distinct from him, but next to him in rank. The emperor Elagabalus (A.D. 218-222) was a devotee of the Syrian Sun-god; and from his time onward, the Syrian form of Sun-worship was firmly established in the West. By the end of the third century, Sol invictus had become the chief God of the Roman empire. Thus

---

1 Cumont, Les Mystères de Mithra, 1902, p. 102. In one of the documents out of which the Mithraic Apothenatosimoi or 'Mithrasliturgie' (Pap. mag. Par. i. 475-834) is made up, Helios is identified with Mithras, while in another of them he is distinguished from Mithras, and regarded as a mediator between Mithras and men. See Appendix on Rebirth.

2 Cf. Firmicus Maternus (c. A.D. 337), Math. 1. 10. 14: 'Sol optime maxime, qui mediam caeli possides partem, mens mundi atque temperies, dux omnium atque princeps, qui ceterarum stellarum ignes flammifera luminis tui moderatione perpetuas.' ib. lib. 5 praef. 5: 'Sol optime maxime, qui omnia super omnia per dies singulos maestatis tue moderatione componis, per quem cunctis animantibus immortalis anima divina dispositione dividit, qui solus iannas aperis sedis supernae, ad cuius arbitrium fatorum ordo disponitur.' See also Julian (c. A.D. 360) Or. 4. Ad regem solem, passim; e.g. 137 c: ὁ δ' εὐμετάβαλε νοῦς τὸν ἀνθρώπον τοῦ θεοῦ προς τὸν ἀνθρώπον τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τῷ εἶναι ἑξει. τὸν ἀνθρώπον τὶς τὴν ἀληθὸς δύναμιν τῆς ἀληθοῦς δύναμις ἀτυχεί, ὁ δ' ἀλήθεια μέτρος ὑπεράνωσε νοῦν τοῦ ὄντος ὑπὲρ ὑπὸ τοῦ,... τῇ ἐντὸς τῆς ἀληθοῦς δύναμις...
the doctrine of *Corp. XVI*, that the Sun is 'second God' and cosmic Demiurugus, is in agreement with a conception of the Sun-god which gained more and more general acceptance among the Pagans of the Roman empire in each successive generation, down to the final defeat of Paganism by Christianity.

**Date.** The preface (§§ 1, 2) implies that a large body of Hermetic writings, including a collection of 'Discourses of Hermes to Asclepius', was already in existence. *Corp. XVI* must therefore be one of the later *Hermetica*; and it was most likely written in the third century A.D.

**The Hermippus.**

The writer of the dialogue entitled *Hermippus* (*Anonymi Christiani Hermippus, de astrologia dialogus*, ed. Kroll and Vierick, Teubner 1895) made use of *Corp. XVI*. I append the passages in which he has borrowed from it. Words and phrases taken from *Corp. XVI* are here printed in distinct type. *Hermippus* 1. 4. 24: πρὸς δὲ τῷ μόσῳ τῶν τουτών σφαιρῶν, δὴ καρδιὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἀν ἔχειν δόξειν, ὅτι πλείστον τῆς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως συνεμφορίας συνέθετο, φῶς ἀνάφας αἰσθητόν, καὶ ἱώαγόνων ἐμβαλὼν δύναμιν. (Ib. 1. 13. 78: ὁ ἥλιος καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ θερμὸν τὴν μόσην χωρὰν ἐν ἀπαίσι ἱσχυχεν.) 1. 10. 63: τὰ ἐκ γῆς ἴρητυθαι μὲν πρῶτον τῆς φύσεως, αὕτην δὲ τῶν ἀστέρων, τούτοις δὲ τοῦ δημιουργικοῦ νου καὶ πρώτου. 1. 16. 112–122: ἐπανεισέχον όμοι, καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἥλιου ἐπεξεργαστέον εἰς τὰ γεννητὰ δύναμιν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πᾶν σχέδιον κύρος ὑπὸ τό ἀνεξωστα. ὁ τόσο γὰρ (σκ. ὁ ἥλιος) ἔχει μὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν τῶν ἄλων ὀφθαλμόν . . . ἑγέμον δὲ ἐστὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου, καὶ πάντων γεννητοκο. γεννών δὲ ὀψεθεσί γὰρ ἡ ὄρη δὲ ἀπάλειμοι αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡ πρὸς τάταρα μετάπτασις αὐτία γίνεται φθορᾶς τῶν φθόνους. Ἀμμιανος Μαρκέλλινος (*c. A.D. 380*), 21. 1. 11: "σολ. . . ut aiunt physici, mens mundi, nostras mentes ex seco retulat scintillas diffunditas."

**Remnants of sun-worship persisted among Christians at least as late as the fifth century.** Eusebius of Alexander (fifth century): τολλοῦν γὰρ οὖν ὅταν τοὺς προσευχομένους εἰς τῶν ἡλίουν ἣδη γὰρ ἀνατείλασι τοῦ ἡλίου προσεύχονται καὶ ἱέρον ἐλέγον ἡμῖν. καὶ οὐ μόνον ἡλιογόνωσι καὶ ἀρετικόν τούτο ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Χριστιανοὶ, καὶ ἀφίνεσιν τὴν πίστιν τούς ἀρετικοὺς συναπαινινάται. (Quoted by Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, Eng. tr., 1919, p. 114; he does not give the reference.) The author of *Corp. XVI* might be called a ἡ λιοφόρονς. 1 Sc. the Sun. Cf. *Corp. XVI*. 1. 4. 24: τῷ ἀνάλογῳ τοῦ ἄνασι καὶ 17: "περὶ δὲ τῶν ἡλίουν αἰ ὁποίο εἰσὶ σφαιρές."

2 Sc. the Creator.

3 Cf. *Corp. XVI*. 10. 8: ἡ σωματικὰ ἀνατολῆς.

4 Cf. *Corp. XVI*. 17. The function here assigned to φῶς corresponds to that of the 'daemon' in *Corp. XVI*.
LIBELLVS XVI

1 Cf. Corp. XVI. 4: ἀνταπολαμβάνει δὲ (§ 7) τὴν ἄνωθεν ὑπαρξίν.
2 Cf. Corp. XVI. 7. In Hermippus, καὶ διάθεσις is omitted before καὶ γένεσις.
3 Cf. Corp. XVI. 8.
4 Cf. Corp. XVI. 11.
5 Cf. Corp. XVI. 10b. The writer of the Hermippus rightly makes § 12 a continuation of §§ 4–10a; and he places the contents of the first daemon-passage (§§ 10b, 11) after § 12, so as to bring them into connexion with those of the second daemon-passage (§§ 13–16). It is possible that in his copy of Corp. XVI the sections stood in the order 4–10a, 12, 10b–11, 13ff.; but if he had them before him in the order of our MSS., he found it necessary to change the order in writing his summary of their contents. He contrives to combine §§ 10b–11 with §§ 13–16 by assuming that the former passage has to do with spirits of a different kind from those spoken of in the latter.

The words τῶν φύσεων μετή correspond to ὑγαθόν καὶ κακὸν ὑπότες τῶν φύσεως and εἰς δὲ τινές αὐτῶν θεραπέουν ὡς ὑγαθόν καὶ κακὸν in Corp. XVI. 13; the writer of the Hermippus distinguishes these 'partly good and partly bad' beings from the 'swarm of atmospheric spirits', whom he regards as wholly bad. Being a Christian, he is accustomed to use the word δαίμονες in the sense of 'devils', and consequently applies this word to the latter class alone.

7 Cf. Corp. XVI. 14.
8 Cf. Cic. Nat. deor. 1. 12. 29: 'Democritus, qui tum imagine (i.e. δίωλα) earumque circuitus in deorum numero refer' &c. ld. 43. 12o: 'Tum enim censest
The text of Corp. XVI which the writer of the Hermippus had before him differed little, if at all, from that given by our MSS.; where our text of the passages used by him is corrupt, his borrowings show the same corruptions. He has borrowed not only from Corp. XVI, but also from four at least of the other documents of the Corpus. He makes use of Corp. I. 5 b in Hermipp. 1. 6. 37; Corp. I. 6, in 1. 13. 97; Corp. IV. 10, in 1. 18. 135; Corp. X. 6, in 2. 20. 187; Corp. X. 13, in 1. 13. 96; Corp. X. 24 f. (probably), in 1. 6. 40; Corp. XIII. 6, in 2. 20. 186. It is therefore most likely that he had in his hands a copy of the Corpus as a whole. The date of the Hermippus is unknown. Kroll (Hermipp. p. v) gives reasons for thinking that it cannot have been written much before A.D. 500. But there is no definite terminus ad quem, except the date of the earliest extant MS. of the Hermippus (A.D. 1322); and since the text of the Corpus as known to the author of the Hermippus seems to have been identical with the corrupt text of our MSS. of the Corpus, which are very likely derived from the copy used by Psellus, it may be conjectured with some probability that the Hermippus was written by a contemporary of Psellus (c. A.D. 1050), in connexion with the revival of Platonism which took place under his leadership (Krumbacher Byz. Litt. 1897, p. 433).

Corp. XVI, Title. The word ὑπομενήσις must be due to some mistake. It might mean 'definitions' of philosophic terms (cf. the Platonic

(Plato) imagines divinitates inesse in universitate rerum, tum principia mentis, quae sint in eodem universo, deos esse dicit, tum animantes imagines, quae vel prodesse nobis solet vel nocere.' Sext. Emp. 9. 19: ημώριτος δὲ εἶδωλα τινὰ φησιν ἐμπλάξειν τοῖς ἰσχρώτοις, καὶ τοῦτον τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθωτοὶ, τὰ δὲ κακοταί... εἰς δὲ ταῦτα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὑπερμεγέθη, καὶ δύο-φθορά μὲν, δῶν ἄθραμμα δὲ προσγεμείνει τὰ τε μέλλοντα τοῖς ἰσχρώτοις, θεωροῦμεν καὶ φανῆ ἄρετα. 1b. 42: εἴδωλα εἶναι ἐν τῷ περὶ χόρταν ὑπερφορή καὶ ἰσχρωτοποιήσεως ἔχουσα μορφὰς. 1

1 Cf. Corp. XVI. 14. The author of the Hermippus must have known that he was borrowing this passage (κέφαλαι καὶ μυλοῖς... διακοινωνία) from Corp. XVI, and cannot have ascribed it to Democritus; some words (such as δὲ 'Ἀσκητικῶς ἐφε') must therefore have been lost before κέφαλαι καὶ μυλοῖς.

2 Cf. Corp. XVI. 15. 3 Cf. Corp. XVI. 16.

4 Reitzenstein (Poim. p. 210) adds that he has copied some phrases in Corp. XVIII; but this seems more doubtful.
'Opm, 'Incerti auctoris definitiones', printed in Stallbaum's Plato, 1873, p. 638 ff.; and perhaps it might also be used in the sense of 'aphorisms'. But Corp. XVI is neither a collection of definitions nor a collection of aphorisms.

The original heading must have been 'Askleptou pròs 'Ammona Basiliá. The document is an epistle addressed by a pupil of Hermes and associate of Tat (§ 1 b) to a king (§§ 1 a, 2); the persons meant are doubtless Asclepius and Ammon; and as the author does not name them in the body of the epistle, he must have named them in the title. King Ammon is the god Amun euhemerized; it is assumed that he was an ancient king of Egypt, and that the teachers Hermes and Asclepius (similarly evolved by euhemerism from the gods Thoth and Imhotep) lived in his reign.

Lactantius, Div. inst. 2. 15. 6 sq. (Testim.), says 'Asclepius quoque auditor eius (sc. Hermæ) eandem sententiam latius explicavit in illo sermone perfecto ad regem.' The passage to which these words refer appears to be Corp. XVI. 15 sq.; and if so, it is implied that the title of Corp. XVI as known to Lactantius was 'Askleptou pròs ('Ammona) basiliá logos téleios. But logos téleios (sermo perfectus) is elsewhere used, by Lactantius and others, only as the distinctive title of Asd. Lat.; it seems therefore that Lactantius, if he wrote perfecto here, must have added the word by mistake. It may possibly have been suggested to him by the phrase πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ἀστερ κορυφήν in Corp. XVI. 1 a.

[περὶ θεοῦ . . . κατ' εἰκόνα ἀνθρώπου.] This is a very unsatisfactory description of the contents of the document. περὶ θεοῦ might perhaps be taken as referring to § 3; περὶ ὅλης, to § 4; [περὶ κακίας, to § 11 (?)]; περὶ εἰμαρμένης, to § 16 (?)]; περὶ ἡλίου, to §§ 5–10 a; περὶ νεωτής οὐσίας (of which περὶ θείας οὐσίας may be a variant), to § 6; περὶ ἀνθρώπου, to §§ 14–16 (?); [περὶ οἰκονομίας, unintelligible] (περὶ ?) τοῦ πληρώματος, to § 3; περὶ τῶν ἐπτὰ ἀστερῶν, to §§ 13 and 17 (though, if those sections are meant, it ought rather to be τῶν ἐξ ἀστερῶν). But the passages 'concerning daemons' (§§ 10 b, 11, and 13–16) are ignored; and on the other hand, there is nothing in the text that could possibly be described as περὶ τοῦ κατ' εἰκόνα ἀνθρώπου, which must mean 'concerning the man created in the image of God' (Gen. 1. 26). It seems probable therefore that this list of subjects was written as an index of the contents of a collection of libelli (of which Corp. XVI may have been one), and has been inserted here by error.

§ 1 a. (τούτων) τῶν λόγων . . . διεπεμψάμην. διεπεμψάμην is the
epistolary past. οἴτος ὁ λόγος is Corp. XVI, which Asclepius writes with the intention of sending it to King Ammon.

πάντων τῶν ἄλλων διάφορον κορυφήν καὶ ὑπόμνημα. οἱ ἄλλοι (λόγοι) are other Hermetic documents; and the phrase implies that a considerable number of them were already in existence when Corp. XVI was written.

The writer says that this document contains the 'crowning' doctrine (κορυφή) in which the teaching of all the earlier Hermetica is summed up, and that it will remind the reader (ὑπόμνημα) of the truths set forth in them. Cf. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. VI. 1: ὁ κυριώτατος πάντων λόγοι καὶ κορυφαίότατος οἴτος ἄν εἰη.

'φανησαται γάρ σοι καὶ τοῖς ἔμοις ἔνιοις λόγοις ἀντίφωνοι.' This is unintelligible. It looks as if the writer meant to say that the doctrine of Corp. XVI will be (wrongly) thought to be inconsistent with that of some of the earlier Hermetica. But if so, he cannot have said it in these words. γάρ does not rightly give the connexion with what precedes; it ought to have been δέ. The word σοι is strange; Asclepius would hardly say that the man to whom he is writing will mistake the meaning of what he writes, though he might very well say that others will. ἔνιοι is probably a variant for ἐμοί. As to τοῖς ἐμοῖς λόγοις, cf. μου τοῖς βιβλίοις in § 1 b. But if the meaning is 'my previous teachings', we should rather have expected τοῖς προτείρους λόγοις. The word ἀντίφωνοι commonly means 'sounding in response', and not 'discordant'.

§ 1 b. (...) 'Ἐρμής μὲν γάρ... πολλάκις μοι διαλεγόμενος καὶ ἕδικα καὶ Τάτ ἔνιοτε παρώνοις. It may be inferred from this that the author knew numerous written dialogues in which Hermes was the teacher and Asclepius the pupil, and that in some of them Tat also was present. (In Ascl. Lat. init. Tat and Ammon are present as well as Asclepius; and Asclepius is present in Corp. X, in which Hermes addresses Tat.) But the saying of Hermes which is here quoted cannot have occurred 'many times' in those dialogues; and perhaps it did not occur in any of them, but was invented by the author of Corp. XVI.

The gist of this passage is that the Hermetica will appear to some people to be obscure; γάρ therefore implies some previous mention of obscurity. But in the preceding clauses, Asclepius has spoken only of differences of doctrine or opinion, and not of the obscurity of the documents; something must therefore have been lost before Ἐρμής μὲν γάρ.
It may be doubted whether the saying of Hermes is reported in oratio recta or in oratio obliqua. In the former case, μου τοῖς βιβλίοις would mean books written by Hermes; in the latter, it would mean books written by Asclepius. The books spoken of are presumably οἱ Ἐρμοῦ πρὸς Ἀσκληπιόν λόγοι; but by whom did the author of Corp. XVI suppose those books to have been written? Did he assume that Hermes, after talking to Asclepius, had himself set down the talk in writing? Or did he assume that these discussions had been written down by Asclepius, and that Hermes was speaking of the writings in which Asclepius had recorded them?

It is not quite clear how much of what follows is ascribed to Hermes, and at what point Asclepius begins to speak in his own person; but it seems best to make what ‘Hermes said’ end at λόγων ἔχωνα. Hermes said that some people would think the writings obscure; Asclepius adds that the apparent obscurity of the writings will be increased when they are translated.

The author adheres to the tradition that the Hermetica had been written in Egyptian in ancient times, and had but recently been translated from that language into Greek. He knew that this was not true in the case of the document which he was writing; but he may possibly have believed it to be true of some of the earlier Hermetica.

He must have been an Egyptian by race; and in spite of his Hellenic education, he is still strongly conscious of his Egyptian nationality. He speaks of the Greeks as foreigners, and regards them with contempt; he holds them unworthy to know the holy secrets (μυστήρια) of the true religion.

§ 2. τῶν λόγων διατήρησον ἀνεφήμενων. Does τῶν λόγων mean the document which Asclepius is now writing, or ‘the teaching’, i.e. the whole body of Hermetica? Even if the former is meant, the arguments urged against the translation of this document would apply equally to all other Hermetic writings.

There is not the slightest reason to suppose that Corp. XVI is a translation from an Egyptian original; it was doubtless written in Greek from the first. Yet its author pretends that Asclepius wrote it in Egyptian, and wished to prevent its translation. What was his motive for making Asclepius express that wish? His assumption
that Asclepius wrote in Egyptian is natural enough; an ancient Egyptian teacher could not reasonably be supposed to have written in any other language. But why does the author, in the act of writing a religious treatise in Greek, make Asclepius say that Greek is an unsuitable language for that purpose? Probably he found it necessary to write in Greek, because most of those for whose instruction he was writing knew Greek, and did not know Egyptian; but he regretted this necessity, and felt that he could have expressed himself with more effect in his native language.

The feeble elegance (ἐκλει. καὶ ὁσπερ κεκαλλωπισμένη) of the Greek style is contrasted with the rugged strength of the Egyptian. The rhetorical devices by which Greek writers seek to embellish their writings detract from the force and significance of their language. The epithet ὑπερήφανος (‘arrogant’ or ‘disdainful’) is not applicable to the style of Greek philosophic writings; and there can be little doubt that the word is corrupt. It may possibly have come from a note written by some Greek reader who resented the contemptuous tone of the passage: ‘this Egyptian speaks ὑπερήφανως.’

As to the superiority of Egyptian to Greek as the language of religion, and the inadequacy of translations, cf. Abammonis Responsum 7. 4 sq. (an Egyptian priest is speaking): ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν σημαντικῶν τὰ βάρβαρα πρὸ τῶν ἐκάστων οἰκείων προτιμῶμεν; ... τῶν ιερῶν θυσίων, ὁσπερ Αἴγυπτων καὶ Ἀσσυρίων, οἱ θεοὶ τὴν δλὴν διάλεκτον ἱεροπρεπῆ κατεδείξαν. ... ἐκ δὴ τοῦτο καταφαίνεται ὡς εἰλόγος καὶ ἡ τῶν ιερῶν ἐθνῶν προκείμενος φωνὴ πρὸ (τῆς) τῶν ἄλλων ἄνθρώπων οὐδὲ γὰρ πάντως τὴν ἀστὴν διασώζει διάνοιαν μεθερμηνεύομεν τὰ ὁμόματα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐστὶν τινα καθ᾽ ἐκαστόν ἐθνον ἰδιώματον, ἀδύνατον εἰς ἄλλο ἐθνὸς διὰ φωνής σημαίνεσθαι. ἐπειτα κἂν εἰ οἶδον τα αὐτὰ μεθερμηνευεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὴν γε δύναμιν οὐκετί φυλάττει τὴν ἀστὴν. ἢχει δὲ καὶ τὰ βάρβαρα ὁνόματα πολλὴν μὲν ἐμφασιν πολλὴν δὲ συντομίαν, ἀμφιβολίας τὰ ἑλάττωνα μετέσχηκε καὶ ποικιλίας καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν λέξεων. διὰ πάντα δὴ οὐν ταύτα συναρμόζει τοῖς κρείττουσι. Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. 143: αἱ δὲ πρώται καὶ γενικά διαλεκτοὶ βάρβαροι μὲν, φύσει δὲ τὰ ὁμόματα ἐχονον ἐπεί καὶ τάς εἰχός ὄμολογοις οἱ ἄνθρωποι δυνατωτέρας εἶναι τὰς βαρβάρας φωνῆς λεγομένας. See also Orig. c. Cels. 5. 45 sq.

ἀυτή ἄστιν (ἢ) Ἑλλήνων φιλοσοφία, λόγων ψόφος. Cf. a letter of the Indian gymnosophist Calanus to Alexander, quoted by Philo Quod omn. prod. liber 14. 96, Cohn VI, p. 28: Ἑλλήνων δὲ φιλοσοφοῖς
LIBELLVS XVI: §§ 2-4

§ 2. ovk εξομοιομέθα, ὃσι αὐτῶν εἰς πανήγυριν λόγους ἐμελέτησαν, ἀλλὰ λόγους ἐργα παρ᾽ ἦμιν ἅκολουθα.

ὁ λόγος σου . . . κενός, ἀλλὰ μεμεστωμένος πράξει.

§ 3. [καὶ πάντα δυντα] τὸν [ἔνα] καὶ ἕνα όντα (και) τὰ πάντα. The text of the MSS. seems to be a conflation of two alternative readings, τὸν καὶ πάντα δυντα καὶ ἕνα, and τὸν καὶ ἕνα όντα καὶ τὰ πάντα.

οὐ δευτεροῦντος τοῦ ὅνος, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφότερων ἅμα τῶν. The writer probably meant to say that τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ πάντα οὐ δύο εἰσίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφότερα (ἐκ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ πάντα) ἐν ὅσι. 'The one' and 'all things' are not two distinct and separate things; they are identical. But this meaning is not rightly expressed by οὐ δευτεροῦντος (οὐ δευτεροῦντος οὐ δευτέρου όντος) τοῦ ὅνος, which would rather signify 'the One does not take the second place'.

ἐκδιδόμενος τῷ τῶν πάντων προσηγοριάν ἐπὶ πλῆθους, οὐκ ἐπὶ πληρομάτους. τὰ πάντα must be thought of, not as a πλῆθος, i.e. a number of separate things, but as a πληρμάμα, i.e. as things which go to make up a whole, and without any one of which the whole would be incomplete. The whole which τὰ πάντα go to make up is God; cf. § 19, μόρα τοῦ θεοῦ πάντα ἑστιν.


§ 4. οἶδας ἂν (αὐτ. οἶδας) ἐν τῇ γῇ πολλὰς πηγὰς ὕδατων καὶ ἄερος (πυρὸς MSS.) ἀναβρουῶσας ἐν τοῖς μεσαίοις μέρεσι. The opening is abrupt; but it is hardly necessary to assume a lacuna before οἶδας ἂν. After the preliminary invocation of the supreme God, and the remarks on the One and the All which that invocation suggested, the writer begins his exposition by speaking of the ἔλη of which terrestrial things consist; and in doing so, he starts with an appeal to the evidence of the senses. Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 6 b, where the exposition begins with the words θεώσω δὴ τὸν κόσμον κ.τ.λ.

ἔλη here means gross matter, in contrast to φῶς. ἔλη is terrestrial; φῶς is celestial. There are three kinds of ἔλη. Two of these are γῆ and ὅφη. The third, according to the MSS., is πῦρ; but this must be a mistake. In § 8, the world of gross matter is called τὸ πᾶν ὑδάτος καὶ γῆς καὶ ἄερος κύτος; and there can be no doubt that in § 4 the same three elements were spoken of, and that in place of πυρὸς we ought to read either ἄερος, or πῦρ (i.e. πνεύματος) in the sense of ἄερος. In proof that these three substances are closely
interconnected, the writer points to the fact that springs of water and jets of air or πνεύμα are seen to issue from the earth. (ἐν τῇ γῇ . . . ἐν τοῖς μεσαιτάτοις μέρεσι is apparently equivalent to ἐν τοῖς μεσαιτάτοις μέρεσι τῆς γῆς. The meaning intended would have been more exactly expressed by saying ἐκ τῶν μεσαιτάτων μερῶν τῆς γῆς, 'from the depths of the earth'.) For the notion that currents of air are emitted by the earth, cf. Seneca Nat. quaest. 5. 4 (probably from Posidonius): 'Quo modo ergo, inquis, sunt venti . . . ? Non uno modo; alias enim terra ipsa vim magnam aeris excitat et ex abdito spirat.' Ib. 14: 'Repetam nunc quod primo dixeram, e specu ventos recessuque interiore terrarum' &c. It could not be said that jets of fire are seen issuing from the earth, except in the case of a volcanic eruption; and the reader could hardly be told to observe that rare phenomenon with his own eyes.

The combination ίδοις ἐν . . . ὀρωμένας is awkward; but it may be due merely to careless writing, and not to corruption.

ἀνάθεσι μὲν αὐτῆς (ἐ. τῆς ἀλης) τὴν χορηγίαν, ἀνταπολαμβάνει δὲ τὴν ἀνωθεν ὑπαρξιν. The terrestrial globe supplies out of itself the three elements (earth, water, and air) of which all earthly organisms are composed. But there is another substance, here called ἡ ἀνωθεν ὑπαρξις, which comes down from above, and enters into the organisms composed of terrestrial matter; and it is the operation in them of this 'substance from above' that makes them living beings. This celestial and life-conveying element corresponds to the πνεῦμα of the Stoics; but the writer of Corp. XVI calls it, not πνεῦμα, but φῶς, and identifies it with the sunlight. Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 7, φῶς δὲ πάντα πλήρη κ.τ.λ., where it is said that the fire emitted by the Sun is changed into light in the course of its descent to earth.

The life-conveying light descends upon the surface of the earth, and enters into the organisms which are produced there; the Earth may therefore be said to 'receive it in exchange' for the gross elements which she gives forth. § 5. οὗτῳ γὰρ ὄφρᾳν καὶ γῆν (συν)δ(γ)εῖ ὁ δημιουργός, λέγει δὴ ὁ ἥλιος. This writer applies the term Demiurgus not to the supreme
God (who is called θεὸς τῶν δῶν διεσπόρτη καὶ ποιητὴς καὶ πατήρ in § 3), but to the Sun, who is the 'second God', and works as agent or vicegerent of the supreme God. The Sun is the 'maker' (δημουργών) of all living beings; that is, he puts life into them, and maintains life in them, by means of the light which he emits. Light, the vehicle of life, belongs to heaven; and in pouring it down upon earth, the Sun 'brings heaven and earth together'.

Τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν κατάγων, τὴν δὲ ἔλην ἀνάγων. Life, or the light by which life is conveyed, is here called οὐσία, 'true being', in contrast to ἔλη, 'gross matter'. This use of οὐσία is intermediate between the Platonic use of the word to signify incorporeal substance, and the Stoic use of it to signify corporeal substance. The οὐσία here spoken of is light-and-life, (cf. φῶς καὶ ἔλη in Corp. I,) regarded as a corporeal substance, but a substance of celestial origin, and of higher order than the terrestrial elements (earth, water, and air).

But what is meant by saying that the Sun ἔλην ἀνάγει? This phrase, taken together with the following words εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα ἔλκων, seems to imply something similar to the Stoic doctrine of the upward and downward movement of the elements. According to the Stoics, portions of earth and water are constantly ascending in the form of exhalations (ἀναθυμάματα); as they ascend, they are successively transmuted into air and fire; and in the form of fire, they serve as nutriment to the heavenly bodies. On the other hand, fire is constantly emitted by the heavenly bodies, and is transmuted into the grosser elements as it descends. Chrysippus said that the Sun in particular is fed by exhalations from the sea. (Arnim, Stoic. vet. fr. II, p. 196 ff., §§ 650, 652, 659, 661, 662; Zeller, Stoics, Eng. tr. 1880, pp. 198, 205.) The language of Corp. XVI. 5 may therefore have been suggested in part by some Stoic authority. But the writer nowhere asserts that ἔλη (i.e. earth, water, and air) is transmuted into φῶς, or φῶς into ἔλη; and when he says that the Sun 'raises up ἔλη', perhaps he means, not that ἔλη rises up to heaven in the form of exhalations, but merely that the Sun draws forth from the mass of the earth the portions of ἔλη which are formed into living organisms on the earth's surface. If so, the most obvious instance of the process may be seen in the growth of plants under the influence of the sunlight. Cf. Julian Or. 5, 172 b: ἔλκει μὲν (ὁ ἥλιος) ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς πάντα καὶ προφυλαῖται καὶ βλαστάνει ποιεὶ τῇ ἐκπνείᾳ καὶ θεματικῇ θέρμῃ, διακρίνειν οἷοι πρὸς ἄκραν λευτότητα τὰ σώματα, καὶ τὰ φύσει φερόμενα κατὰ κοινβίζει.
A verb in the present indicative seems to have been lost here. Cf. μέσος γὰρ ἐδρυταὶ κ.τ.λ. in § 7.

The author cannot have written this. Even if we assume that he accepted the Stoic doctrine of ἀναθυμάσσεις, he could hardly say that the Sun draws 'all things' into himself; for the bulk of the ἐλη of which terrestrial organisms consist, if not the whole of it, remains below when they are dissolved, and is not drawn up into the Sun. Nor could it be said that the Sun gives forth 'all things' from himself; for we were told in § 4 that ἐλη issues from the Earth, and not from the Sun. It is possible that ρᾶπατα has been transposed, and originally belonged to the clause περὶ αὐτῶν (.,.); What the Sun 'gives forth from himself' is φῶς, the vehicle of life; and if he 'draws' anything 'into himself', it must be the φῶς which he has emitted. Indeed, some statement to that effect seems needed to complete the system; for if the φῶς which the Sun emits did not in some way return to him, it is difficult to see how his supply of it could be maintained; and on the other hand, there would be a constantly increasing accumulation of φῶς, and therefore of life, on earth. The writer's probable meaning might be expressed by writing καὶ εἰς ἐαυτὸν τὸ φῶς (ἢ τὴν ζωήν) ἐλκων, καὶ ἀπὸ ἐαυτοῦ τὸ φῶς (ἢ τῇ ζωήν) διδοῦς. The Sun is the source and reservoir of φῶς, or life-stuff, as the Earth is the source and reservoir of ἐλη. When an earthly organism is broken up, the ἐλη of which it consists goes back into the Earth; and the writer probably held that the φῶς or life-stuff which has entered into it goes back into the Sun.

The workings of the Sun are ἄνεγει. The workings of the Sun are ἄναβαι, i.e. life-giving. Cf. τοῦ ἄναβοι in § 17. ἄλλα καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς (.,., καὶ) εἰς τὸν κατώτατον βύθον [καὶ ἄβυσσον] διήκοσιν. A verb has been lost after ἐπὶ γῆς. The workings of the Sun (operate) in heaven and on the surface of the earth, and penetrate even to the lowest depths (of earth or sea); for in all these regions there are living beings, and the life in all of them is due to the light emitted by the sun. ἄβυσσον is an alternative for βύθον. § 6. (.,.) ἰδοὺν ὁ τούτου ὄγκος') εἰ δὲ τις ἔστι καὶ νοητὴ οὐσία, τοῖς [.,.] ὑποδοχῇ ἄν εἰς τὸ τούτου φῶς.—εἰ δὲ τις ἔστι καὶ νοητὴ οὐσία, αὕτη ἐστὶν ὁ τούτου ὄγκος, ἣς ὑποδοχῇ ἄν εἰς τὸ τούτου φῶς
MSS.) According to the MSS., the ὄγκος (material mass) of the sun is said to be νοητή οὐσία (immaterial substance). But that is nonsense. The author's meaning must have been that the material light of the sun is the 'receptacle' or vehicle of immaterial substance (i.e. of life, regarded as an immaterial thing); and that meaning may be got by the changes I have made. Cf. Plut. Is. et Os. 51: ἡλιον σώμα τῆς τάγαθος δυνάμεως ὡς ὅρατον οὐσίας νοητής (ἀπείκασμα;) ἠγούµενος. The clause εἷς τις ἐστι καὶ νοητή οὐσία implies a preceding mention of αἰσθητή οὐσία; and the sense required might be expressed by writing (τῆς γὰρ αἰσθητής τοῦ φωτός οὐσίας πυρῆς) ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦτον ὄγκον. εἷς τις ἐστι καὶ νοητὴ κ.τ.λ.

The writer is acquainted with the Platonic term νοητή οὐσία (cf. ὁ νοητὸς κόσμος in §§ 12 and 17); but he finds it difficult to attach any definite meaning to it. On the assumption that life is an immaterial thing, the visible sunlight, he says, must be considered its ἐπιδοχή, i.e. the matter in which it inheres. But he is half inclined to adopt the Stoic attitude, and identify life with its material vehicle.

τοῦτον δὲ αὐτὴ (σὲ. ἡ νοητὴ οὐσία) συνιστάται ἢ ἡπιρρεῖ, αὐτὸς μόνος οἴδει (ὁ θεός). Life, if it is an incorporeal entity distinguishable from the material sunlight, must come from the supreme God, and be by him infused into the body of the sun, and there incorporated in the visible light which the sun emits. But the nature of the incorporeal is incomprehensible to us; whence comes that incorporeal life which the Sun receives and transmits, and of what it consists, 'God only knows'. Cf. § 17: ὁ ἡλιος διὰ τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου τὴν ἐπιρροήν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χορηγεῖται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. The νοητὴ οὐσία of § 6 is the ἀγαθόν of § 17; and both terms, in this connexion, mean life, or life-giving energy.

The subject of μόνος οἴδει must have been the supreme God, and not the Sun. Cf. Corp. XII. i. 1 as emended: καὶ ποιά τις οὐσία τυγχάνει (ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐσία), αὐτὸς μόνος ἀκριβῶς οἴςεν.

(καὶ δὲ μὲν θεὸς ἀφανῆς,) μὴ ὅφε λὴμνὸν δρόμος, στοχασμῷ δὲ βιαζομένων ποιόμενον (νοεῖν MSS.) ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦτο (σε. τοῦ ἡλίου) θεά οὐκ ἐστὶ στοχάζοντος, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ τῇ ἑπέι (αὐτὴς ἡ ὅψις MSS.) ὑπάται). In spite of the mutilation of the text, it is clear that the writer is here contrasting the Sun with the supreme God. The Sun is 'near to us in place', being within the Kosmos, whereas the supreme God, if localized at all, must be thought of as situated in extracosmic space; and the Sun is 'near to us in nature', being corporeal,
whereas the supreme God is incorporeal. The supreme God is invisible, and our conceptions of him are based on mere conjecture; but we have sure knowledge of the Sun, for we see him with our eyes.

§ 7. μέσος γὰρ ἑδρατα, οὐσεανηφορῶν τῶν κόσμων. What was the writer’s view as to the relative positions of the Sun and the other cosmic bodies? He says that the Sun ‘is stationed in the middle’, and ‘wears the Kosmos as a wreath’. Taken by itself, this statement might seem to imply a heliocentric system. The theory that the Sun is at the centre of the universe, and that the earth travels round it, had been put forward, at least as a hypothesis, by Aristarchus of Samos, ‘the Copernicus of antiquity’, about 280 B.C., and maintained by Seleucus, about 200 B.C. (Plut. De fac. in orbe lunae 6. 3, p. 923; Plut. Plat. quaest. 8. 2, p. 1006). But that opinion was condemned as impious by Cleanthes; it was suppressed by the authority of the Stoics, who adhered to the geocentric system; and a Hermetist of the second or third century A.D. is not likely to have reverted to it. Besides, the Sun is here compared to a charioteer, and that comparison would be unintelligible if he were thought of as stationary. The words must therefore be explained in some other way.

Among the Greeks, the number of the planet-stars was fixed, and their movements determined, in the fourth century B.C.; and from that time onward, it was commonly held that the earth stands fast at the centre, that the seven planets (i.e. Sun, Moon, and five planet-stars) travel round the earth in approximately circular orbits, and that the sphere of the fixed stars is more distant from earth than the planets. But as to the relative positions of the Sun and the other planets, opinions differed. (a) Plato, Aristotle, and Chrysippus

1 Probably by Eudoxus, c. 366 B.C. Sen. Nat. quaest. 7. 3: ‘Nova haec caelestium observatio est, et nuper in Graeciam invecta. Democritus quoque (c. 400 B.C.)... suspicari se ait plures esse stellas quae currant, sed nec numerum illarum posuit nec nomina, nondum comprehensis quinque siderum curibus. Eudoxus primus ab Aegypto hos motus in Graeciam transtulit.’ The five planet-stars had been earlier recognized and named in Babylonia (Jastrow, Religion in Babylonia and Assyria, pp. 217 ff.); Egyptian astronomers learnt from Babylonians, and Eudoxus studied astronomy in Egypt.

Philolaus the Pythagorean, a contemporary of Democritus, is said to have spoken of five planet-stars (Aetius, Diels Desagr. p. 337: according to Philolaus, there are ‘ten divine bodies’, viz. the sphere of fixed stars, the five planet-stars, Sun, Moon, Earth, Antichthon; and the ten, placed in this order, circle round the central fire). But there is much doubt about the authenticity and date of the doctrines ascribed to Philolaus.

2 Macrobr. Semn. Scip. 1. 19 f. See Cic. Nat. deor. 2. 52, and J. B. Mayor’s note ad loc.

3 Tim. 38, Rep. 10. 616 (cf. Epinomis 986 f.). Of the five planet-stars, Plato
placed the planets as follows in order of distance from the earth, beginning with the nearest:—Moon, Sun, Venus, Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn. (δ) Archimedes (c. 230 B.C.), Geminus (c. 77 B.C.), Cleomedes (following Posidonius), and Ptolemaeus placed them thus:—Moon, Venus, Mercury, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn. (ε) Heraclides Ponticus said that Venus and Mercury revolve round the Sun; his order therefore was this:—Moon, Sun (with Mercury and Venus as satellites), Mars, Jupiter, Saturn.

If the writer of Corp. XVI adopted order (δ), he might say that the Sun µέσος ἄρντας, meaning that the Sun holds the middle place among the planets.² Philo calls the Sun µέσος in this sense, Quis rer. div. heres 45. 222 f., Wendland III, p. 50: ὁ µέσος τῶν ἑπτά, ἡλιος. µέσος δ' αὐτῶν οὐ µόνον ἐπὶ µέσον ἐπέχει χώραν, ὡς ἡξιώσαν τίνες, καλῶ, ἀλλ' ἐτί καὶ ἑρατευόμεθα καὶ δορυφορεῖμεθα πρὸς ὑπαστιζόντων ἵκατέρωθεν... δίκαιος ἄλλως ἐστί... ἄρση τά' ἐμοι στοχάζομεθα δοκοῦμεν οἱ τῇ µέσῃ ἄπανενεμικότες ἡλιό τάξει, τρεῖς μὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτόν καὶ μετ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἱερῶν εἶναι λέγοντες, ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν μὲν φαύνοντα (Saturn), φαῖθοντα (Jupiter), πυρόντα (Mars), ἐβ' ἡλιον, μετ' αὐτῶν δὲ σταλβοντα (Mercury), φωσφόρον (Venus) τὴν αἵρεσιν γείτονα σελήνῃ.

This interpretation of µέσος ἄρντας would agree well with what is said in § 17; but it is difficult to reconcile it with § 8, where we are told that the Sun sends light upward to the heavenly bodies (τὰ ἄθανατα µέρη τοῦ κόσμου), and downward to the terrestrial sphere (τὸ πάν ἔθατο καὶ γῆ καὶ ἄρεσ κύτος). It can hardly be doubted that the moon and the planet-stars are included among ‘the immortal parts of the Kosmos’; and if so, it follows that the Sun is lower (i.e. nearer to the earth) than the moon and the five planet-stars, and the meaning of µέσος ἄρντας must be that the Sun holds a position intermediate between the heavens and the earth,—that is, the position which the Greeks in general assigned to the Moon. If this is the meaning of the passage, the writer of Corp. XVI rejected in this respect the teachings of Greek astronomy, and we must suppose that he was following some Oriental authority.

As to στεφανηφορῶν τῶν κόσμων, compare a magic invocation (Pap. mentions by name only Ἐωσφόρος (Venus) and ὁ ἵερος Ἑρμοῦ (Mercury). All five are named in the Epinomis, written soon after Plato’s death.

1 On the question whether Plato placed Venus or Mercury nearer to the earth, authorities differ. There was much doubt about the relative positions of these two planets.

2 Cf. Proclus In Remp. 69. 27 f.: εἰ δ' ὡς κρατήρ τῶν μὲν ἡλιον ἐν τῷ µέσῳ τάσσεται τῶν ἑπτά, καθ' οίς θεοργικοί λόγοι (i.e. Juliani Theurgi Hyphægetica) καὶ οἱ θεοὶ (i.e. the Oraculæ Chaldææ) φασίν. (Kroll, Orac. Chald. p. 35.)
mag. Par. i. 959 sqq., Reitzenstein Paim. p. 27) in which the Sun-god is addressed as ὁ ἄντις τῶν ἐπτὰ πόλων καθῆμενος, ὁ ἔχων ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς στέφανον χρύσον. The Sun-god was commonly depicted with a radiate wreath or crown upon his head; and the writer takes this στέφανος to symbolize the system of heavenly bodies disposed above and around him. The following simile of the chariot-driver is inconsistent with the picturing of the Kosmos as a στέφανος, and cannot have formed part of the same sentence; something must therefore have been lost before καθάτερ ἄνφοι, and the misplaced words ἄφηκεν σὺν φέρεσθαι κ.τ.λ. supply what is wanted to fill the gap.

In the Roman chariot-races, the driver looped the reins round his waist (Smith Dict. Ant. s.v. Circus); the horses might therefore be said to be 'bound to' the man.

κόσμος seems here to mean the heavens, or the heavenly bodies, rather than the universe as a whole. The earth is motionless; but the heavenly bodies 'are borne along together with the Sun' as he sweeps round the sky in his diurnal course; and the writer holds that their movement is controlled and regulated by him. The Sun then is the charioteer, and the heavenly bodies are the team he drives. The notion that the team would run away if not held in may have been suggested by the story of Phaethon. Cf. Philo De Cherubim 7. 24, Cohn I, p. 175: God made the sphere of the fixed stars and the seven planet-spheres, καὶ καθάτερ ἐποχον ἐν ὅχηματι ἄστερα (ἐκαστόν;?) ἐν οὐκείω κύκλω θεί, τὰς ἡράς ἐπιστεντες τῶν ἐπόχων οὐδεὶς, πλημμελη δεῖσας ἐπιστησάν, ἀπάσας δ’ ἐξήρθησαν ἀντοῦ, νομίσας ἐναρμόνων τῆς κυνήγεως μᾶλωτα οὐτος τάξιν γενήσασθαι: τὸ γὰρ σὺν θεῷ πάν ἐπιστην, τὸ δ’ ἄνευ θεοῦ ψεκτών. This is a protest against the view that the planets are themselves the supreme 'drivers' or rulers of the Kosmos. έλει δὲ αἱ ἥρας (...) [ζωὴ καὶ ψυχή καὶ πνεῦμα] [καὶ θανασία καὶ γένεσις]. ‘The reins’, i.e. the things by means of which the Sun controls the heavenly bodies, and restrains them from disorderly movement, are certainly not ‘life, soul, and vital spirit’; nor are they ‘immortality and birth’. They ought rather to be the rays of light which the Sun emits. ζωὴ καὶ ψυχὴ and θανασία καὶ γένεσις are perhaps two fragments of a lost sentence which led on to what is said in §§ 8 and 9 concerning the distinction between the immortal life of the heavenly bodies and the mortal life of terrestrial organisms.
The Sun, by means of his light, maintains everlasting life in immortal 
\( \zeta \) \( \alpha \), and generates temporary life in mortal \( \zeta \) \( \alpha \). Cf. Corp. XI. i. 4 a 
as emended: \( \delta \ \alpha \iota \nu \ \kappa \omega \sigma \mu \epsilon i \ \tau \iota \nu \ \\varsigma \lambda \eta \nu \), \( \alpha \theta \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \iota \sigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigm
Kosmos (see note on εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα ἐλκὼν in § 5); and if so, the Sun itself, no less than the other heavenly bodies, is subject to μεταβολή.

§§ 10 b, 11. καὶ γὰρ δαιμόνων . . . δικὴ ὑποτέττυμεν. Corp. XVI contains two distinct and separate passages concerning daemons, viz. §§ 10 b, 11, and § 13 ff. In the second passage, the topic is introduced de novo, and in words closely resembling those used at the beginning of the first passage.

The functions assigned to the daemons are different in the two passages. In the first, their business is to punish sin by plagues inflicted on human communities collectively. In the second, they are the agents by whom all material processes are carried on; and as to that part of their operation by which men are directly affected, there is indeed a brief mention of 'troubles to cities and nations', but more is said about their action on individuals. It is evident that these two passages cannot have been written as parts of the same treatise; one of the two must be an interpolation. The first of them (§§ 10 b, 11) interrupts the sequence of thought; if we cut it out, § 12 falls into its right place as a continuation of §§ 5–10 a, in which the function of the Sun is dealt with. It seems probable therefore that 10 b, 11 was extracted from some other document, and inserted in the margin of Corp. XVI as a parallel or supplement to 13 ff.

§ 10 b. καὶ γὰρ δαιμόνων χωρὶς περὶ αὐτὸν. In what follows, the daemons are spoken of as subject to 'the gods' in general (τὰ ἐν τῶν θεῶν ἐπεταττόμενα ἐνεργοῦσιν), and not to the Sun-god. It may therefore be suspected that, in the document from which this paragraph was taken, the reading was περὶ αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ θεοῦ), and that after the passage had been inserted in Corp. XVI, αὐτός was altered into αὐτῶν, in order to make an apparent connexion with the preceding statements about the Sun.

'σύνωκοι καὶ τῶν ἀναντίων δόκει εἰσὶν πάρρω ἐνθάδε'. This is an unintelligible remnant of a passage which must have been to the effect that the daemons are intermediate between the immortal gods and mortal men, and are connected with both. For σύνωκοι, cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 33 b: 'in terra) commorari nobiscum.'

μεταβολαῖς ἀἵρος (πυρὸς MSS.). 'Changes of fire' is meaningless. A satisfactory sense may be got by writing μεταβολαῖς ἀἵρος, 'changes (i.e. corruptions) of the atmosphere'. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 25 fin.: 'aer ipse maesto torpore languescet.' Pestilences were thought to be
caused by corruption of the air; so that \( \text{μεταβολής \ δέρος} \) would serve as a substitute for \( \text{λοιμοῖς}. \)

\( \text{ἀμφότεροι τὴν \( \text{δὲ τοὺς \ θεοὺς} \)} \) \( \text{ἀσέβειαν}. \) The punishment of sin was commonly said to be the function of \( \text{δίκη}; \) cf. Pl. \( \text{Laws \ 716 \ η}, \) \( \text{τῷ \ δὲ \ (θεῷ) \ dei \ εὐνεῖται \ δίκη, τῶν \ ἀπολειπομένων \ τοῦ \ θείου \ νόμου \ τιμωροῖς, \) and Herm. \( \text{ἀπ. \ Stob. \ Exc. \ VII}. \) In \( \text{Corp. \ XVI. \ 10 \ η}, \) the daemons are the agents by whom \( \text{δίκη} \) is administered.

§ II. \( \text{ἀρχὴ γὰρ (sc. \ θεοῖς) \ ἄθροποις} \) \( \text{ἐν \ τοῖς \ θεοῖς} \) \( \text{ἐπαμύνειν}. \) Cf. Hermes \( \text{ἀπ. \ Lactant. \ Div. \ inst. \ 2. \ 15.} \) 6: \( \text{τὸ \ γὰρ \ εὖ καὶ \ μόνον \ εῖν \ ἄθροποις} \) \( \text{ἐστὶν \ ἁγαθὸν} \) \( \text{εὐσέβεια}. \)

\( \text{[} \text{θεὸν} \text{ μὲν} \) \( \text{γὰρ} \) \( \text{τὸ} \) \( \text{εὖ} \) \( \text{ποιεῖν}, \) \( \text{[} \text{δαιμόνων} \text{ δὲ} \) \( \text{τοῖς} \) \( \text{θεοῖς} \) \( \text{ἐπαμύνειν}. \)\] This sentence is an interruption. It may have been shifted from some other place, possibly from the corrupt passage in § 10 b init.

\( \text{τὰ} \) \( \text{γὰρ} \) \( \text{ἄλλα} \) \( \text{τὸ} \) \( \text{ἄθροπων} \) \( \text{τολμάμενα} \) \( \text{ἡ \ πλάνη} \) \( \text{τολμᾶται (ἡ \ πλάνη} \) \( \text{ἡ \ τόλμη MSS.)} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{ἀνάγκη} \) \( \text{[} \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{ἀγνοών} \) \( \text{τοῖς} \) \( \text{θεοῖς} \) \( \text{μεταμετρεῖται}. \)

A pious man may sometimes act amiss; but if he does, his wrongdoings are only such as are caused by error, compulsion, or ignorance; and for actions thus caused, he is not held to be responsible. Cf. Ar. \( \text{Eth. \ Nic. \ 3.} \) \( \text{καὶ \ [} \text{τὸ} \) \( \text{πάντα \ παρὰ} \) \( \text{θεοῖς} \) \( \text{ἀνέκουσα}. \)

§ 12. \( \text{σωτήρ} \) \( \text{θῆ (MSS.)} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{τροφεὺς} \) \( \text{ἐστὶ παντὸς} \) \( \text{γένους} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{λίλιος}. \) This statement sums up the contents of §§ 8–10 a. \( \text{τῶν} \) \( \text{γένος} \) \( \text{means}\) every race or kind of \( \text{ζώα}, \) whether mortal or immortal.

\( \text{διαστρέψει} \) \( \text{ὁ} \) \( \text{νοστός} \) \( \text{κόσμος}, \) \( \text{τῶν} \) \( \text{αἰσθητῶν (αἰσθητικῶν MSS.)} \) \( \text{κόσμων} \) \( \text{περιέχουσιν, πληροὶ} \) \( \text{τῶν} \) \( \text{δύνακα} \) \( \text{πληροὶ} \) \( \text{αὐτῶν} \) \( \text{δύκων MSS.)} \) \( \text{[τὰς] \ σκοιλιάς} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{παντομόρφους} \) \( \text{ιδέας}. \) The Platonists said that all individual beings are constituted by the imposition of \( \text{ιδέα} \) \( \text{on} \) \( \text{ἄλη}, \) and that the source of these \( \text{ιδέα} \) is the \( \text{νοστός} \) \( \text{κόσμος}. \) The writer accepts this Platonic dogma, and tries to bring it into connexion with his own doctrine that \( \text{ζώα} \) are constituted by the influx of sunlight into gross matter. He finds an analogy between the \( \text{ιδέα} \) which stream into the universe from the Noetos Kosmos and the life-conveying rays of light emitted by the Sun. The comparison between the Noetos Kosmos and the Sun may have been suggested by the comparison between \( \text{τὸ} \) \( \text{ἀγαθὸν} \) and the Sun in Pl. \( \text{Rep. \ VI}. \)

\( \text{τὸν} \) \( \text{δύνακα} \) \( \text{presumably means} \) the mass of matter on which the \( \text{ιδέα} \) \( \text{are imposed}. \) The \( \text{νοστός} \) \( \text{κόσμος} \) \( \text{is said to} \) \( \text{‘encompass’} \) \( \text{the} \) \( \text{αἰσθητός} \) \( \text{κόσμος}, \) because it is imagined to be situated in extracosmic space.

\[\text{G g}\]
οὖν καὶ ὁ ἡλιός πάντα (τὰ) ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ [περιέχων] (ἔποικ] ἄγκοι πάντων τὰς γενέσεις καὶ ἵππωσεις. The reading of the MSS. is meaningless. The Sun, being stationed `in the middle', cannot be said to `encompass all things in the Kosmos'; and it is most likely that the preceding περιέχων has been repeated here by error. πάντων τὰς γενέσεις might perhaps be taken as equivalent to πάντα τὰ γεγο-μένα; but what could be meant by saying that the Sun `gives bulk to all things that are produced'? The Sun gives life to things, not bulk; it is the Earth that gives material bulk to them, by supplying ἐλη. It seems then that the verb of which ὁ ἡλιός was the subject must have been lost, and that the subject of ἔγκοι and the following verbs (ἵππωσεις and ὑποδέχεται) must have been Ἡ γῆ.

καμάντων δὲ καὶ βευσάντων (ἔποικ] ὑποδέχεται. An accusative is wanted. The writer most likely held that, when terrestrial organisms are broken up, the ἐλη of which they were composed goes back into the Earth, and the φῶς which entered into them and made them live goes back into the Sun. Accordingly, if the subject of ὑποδέχεται were ὁ ἡλιός, the object required would be τὸ φῶς; but if, as is more probable, the subject is Ἢ γῆ, the missing object must be τὴν ἐλην.

§ 13. ὑπὸ τοῦτο δὲ ἐτάγη ο ἑων βαμάνων χορός. Down to this point, we have been told that the Sun operates on things by means of the light which he emits. But in the paragraph which here begins, we are told that he operates on things through the agency of troops of daemons commanded by the planets. These two doctrines are independent of one another, and cannot easily be reconciled. It seems that the author or compiler of Corp. XVI has put together two distinct and inconsistent theories. In both of them, the Sun is second God, and vicegerent of the supreme God. But according to the first (§§ 4–10 a and 12), the Sun works by means of light; according to the second (§§ 13 ff.), the Sun works (through his subordinates, the planets,) by means of daemons. We must suppose that the writer took the contents of these two parts of the document from different sources; and he has made no attempt to fuse them into a consistent whole.

ἐκάστῳ τούτων ἑσάρισμοι. This appears to mean ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἀστέρων ἑσάρισμοι εἰσὶ χοροί; which might be taken to signify either `each of the ἀστέρες commands an equal number of χοροί', or `each ἀστήρ commands one χορός, and the several χοροὶ are composed of equal numbers of daemons'. The writer has expressed himself obscurely; but he probably meant the latter.
It must be the daemons, and not the ἄστερες, that are arranged in πλαυθίδες; I have therefore shifted πλαυθίδες. The word πλαυθίδες means a rectangular body. In this connexion, it must signify a body of troops drawn up in rectangular formation, and may be translated 'a column', 'a battalion', or 'a corps'. πλαυθίδες is used as a term of military tactics in Joseph. Ant. 13. 4. 4: τάξας τὴν στρατίαν ἐν πλαυθίδα.

Each πλαυθίδες of daemons is commanded by one of the ἄστερες; and το ἄστερες must here mean 'the planets', or more exactly, the five planet-stars and the moon; for the Sun, being commander-in-chief, has no one πλαυθίδες specially assigned to him. It might be inferred from this that there are six πλαυθίδες of daemons. But in § 17, there appear to be eight, corresponding respectively to the sphere of fixed stars, the five planet-stars, the moon, and the atmosphere. It is not clear whether the χοροί are identical with the πλαυθίδες or not; if not, each of the six (or eight) πλαυθίδες must be made up of a number of χοροί, as a battalion is made up of a number of companies.

The planet-gods, working in subordination to the Sun, govern the material world; i.e. they collectively discharge the function of εἴμαρμενη. And each of them discharges his special part of this function through the agency of a particular corps of daemons subject to his orders.

δάμαλοι καὶ κακοὶ ὄντες . . . τὰς ἐνέργειας. Some daemons are beneficent, others maleficent. Did the writer hold that some of the planets are beneficent and others maleficent, and that each corps of daemons takes its character from its commander? Or did he hold that each planet is partly beneficent and partly maleficent, and accordingly, that each corps includes both beneficent and maleficent daemons?

διάμορφος γὰρ οὖσιν ἐνέργεια. The daemons are in this document the personal beings by whose action all physical processes in the terrestrial region are carried on (πάντων τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς πραγμάτων τὴν ἐξουσίαν κεκληρωμένην, § 14); or in other words, they are the forces of nature, regarded as persons. And the writer holds that all natural processes result from the operation of the planets. Cf. Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. VI. 10, where we are told that the daemons have no independent existence as living beings, but are merely ἐνέργεια of the Decani, who are the highest order of astral gods in the peculiar doctrine of that document.
The daemons are 'both good and bad'; that is, the forces which operate in the material world sometimes work good, and sometimes harm. But how does it come to pass that they sometimes work harm? The daemons are subject to the planet-gods, who are subject to the Sun, who is subject to the supreme God; hence, if the daemons are partly kakov tais energeias, it might be inferred that the supreme God is the author of evil as well as of good. But the writer ignores this inference. It would have been possible for him to evade it by saying that the evil passions wrought in a man by the daemons (i.e. by the physical forces which operate in his body) are inflicted on him as a punishment for his akieia (cf. Corp. XII. i. 5-9), and that just punishment is in accordance with the right government of the universe; but he does not say this, and it seems that the difficulty did not occur to him.

§ 14. poielen taraichn ergazountai kai koin tais polesei kai tais ethnei kai idia ekatos. From this point to the end of § 16, the writer speaks only of the harm done to men by the daemons, and says nothing about the good done by them.

αναπλήττονται γαρ καί ἀνθέλκουσι (ἀνεγείρουσι MSS.) tais psuchais ημων eis deautous. ἀνεγείρουσι eis deautous is meaningless. For ἀνθέλκουσι, cf. Pl. Rep. 4. 439 B: eι ποτε τι (την ψυχην) ἀνθέλκει δυσώσαν. The daemons 'mould our souls into another shape', i.e. a shape other than that of the unembodied soul; and they 'drag our souls away (from God or from divine things) to themselves', i.e. to the material things in which they operate. Cf. στροφοῦσιν πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν ἐνέργειαν below.

ἀνκαθήμενοι ἡμῶν νεόροις κ.τ.λ. Cf. Lydus De mens. 4. 32 (Ascl. Lat. III. 33 b): τοιος μεν τιμωρούς των δαμόων, εν αυτῃ τη ύπη παρόντας, τιμωρεῖσθαι το ἀνθρώπειον κατ' ἄξιαν. See Corp. IX. 3, where it is said that evil νοματα are bred in men by daemons.

The daemons spoken of in this passage are identical with the defiling or corrupting influences of the body on the soul, as commonly described by the Platonists, except that the writer conceives these influences as persons, and holds them to be emissaries of the planets.

[καὶ αὐτῶν τῷ ἔγκεφαλῳ.] This is an alternative for μέχρι καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν σπλάγχνων. Some said that the seat of the hegemonikon is the brain; others said that it is the σπλάγχνα, and more especially the heart. The question is discussed in Galen De plac. Hippocr. et Plat.
§ 15. *χειμένον γὰρ ἡμῶν ἑκατὸν ... παραλαμβάνουσι δαίμονες οἱ κατ᾽ ἐκείνην τὴν στιγμὴν τῆς γενέσεως ὀπηρεται.* Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 35: 'inmutantur (formae) totiens, quot hora momenta habet circuli circumcurrentis.' No two men are alike in bodily constitution, (and consequently, no two men are alike in the πάθη which result from the action of the body on the soul,) because no two are born under the same astral influences. In the terms of Corp. XVI, this may be expressed by saying that no two men are influenced by the same daemons.

οὕτω γὰρ κατὰ στιγμὴν ἐναλλάσσονται, οὔτ᾽ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐπιμένοντες, ἀλλὰ ἀνακυκλούμενοι. οὕτωι probably means οὐδὲ τί πέρι, and not οἱ δαίμονες.

The function of presiding over the births of men passes from planet to planet in rapid rotation. Consequently, if A is born a moment before B, A's body will throughout his life be under the control of a corps of daemons commanded by a certain planet, and B's body will be under the control of a different corps of daemons, commanded by another planet.

εἰς τὰ δύο (Ἴλογα) μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς δύντες. 'The two irrational parts of the soul' are those distinguished by Plato, viz. τὸ θυμοειδὲς and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν, as opposed to τὸ λογικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς (= τὸ λογιστικὸν in Pl. Rep.), which is mentioned in the following sentence. It seems necessary to insert Ἴλογα, as τὰ δύο μέρη alone would hardly convey this meaning.

τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ἀδέσποτον τῶν δαίμονων ἀστηκεν. This might be otherwise expressed by saying that the man in whom νοῦς rules (i.e. the εὐσεβής, or he who has got gnosis) is free from the dominion of Heimarmene. This passage is referred to by Lactantius, Div. inst. 2. 15. 7. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 29 b init. (quoted by Lactantius ib.): εὐσεβοὶς γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε δαίμονις κακὸς οὔτε εἰμαρμένης κρατεῖ. Corp. XII. i. 9 as emended: οὔδεν (τῷ νῷ) ἀδύνατον, οὔτε εἰμαρμένης ὑπεράνω θεῖαν ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπότητι κ.τ.λ. The εὐσεβῆς ἀνθρωπος is unaffected by the πάθη bred by the body.

§ 16. (δ)τῷ οὖν ἐν τῷ λογικῷ ἄκτις ἐπιλάμπει (ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ) [διὰ τοῦ ἡλίου], [[ ]] τοῦτον[ν] καταργοῦσι οἱ δαίμονες. The ἄκτις is the ray of divine νοῦς by which the pious man is illuminated (φωτίζεται). It comes from the supreme and supracosmic God (cf. ἄκτινα τοῦ θεοῦ below); and in the phrase εἰς ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ θεοῦ, it is identified with God himself. The writer must have held that this ἄκτις comes from God to men immediately and directly, and not that it is transmitted by the Sun; διὰ τοῦ ἡλίου must therefore
be cut out. The Sun is the source of our physical life, and conveys it to us by means of his light; but his light is φῶς αἰσθητόν, whereas the ἄνω here spoken of is φῶς νοητόν. The soul which is illuminated by the invisible and incorporeal 'light' of the divine νοήμα is thereby freed from the corrupting influences of the body, which are here personified as daemons.

οὕτω δαίμονων οὕτω θεῶν. The θεοὶ are the planet-gods, whose commands are executed by the daemons.

ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἔχων ἔρως (ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἔρως MSS.) (οὕτως;) ἔστιν, ὁ πλανώμενος καὶ πλανῶν. The writer is thinking of the definition of the lower kind of ἔρως in Pl. Phaedr. 238 b: ἡ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ ὄρθων ὄρμωσις κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία, πρὸς ἡδωνήν ἀχειώσα κάλλος,1 καὶ ὑπ’ αὐτὸ τὸν ἐαυτὴς συγγεγέννων ἐπιθυμίων ἐς σομάτων κάλλος ἐρωμένως ὑσσεία (νυκτὸς ἀγωγή), διπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς βούμης ἐκνυμιαν λαβοῦσα, ἔρως ἐκλήθη. That passage is manifestly corrupt; and the words ὁ πλανώμενος καὶ πλανῶν, used by the writer of Corp. XVI in referring to it, suggest a suspicion that, in the reading of it which was known to him, some form of πλανάσθαυ occurred.2 The existence of such a reading is made more probable by the fact that Maximus Tyrius, with the same sentence of the Phaedrus in his mind, writes thus (19. 2 Hobein): τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοις (i.e. to those who loved basely) ὁ ἔρως ἵν ὄνομα ἐπιθυμίας ἐν ἡδωνής πλανώμενον1 (πλανώμενης Reiske). Ib. 20. 5: ἐπιστήμως δὲ αὐτῶν (sc. τὸν ὑβριστὴν ἔρωτα) κάλλος φύμη (read ἡδονή) οὐστρωτόν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀγωγῆς πλανώμενον. Compare Corp. I. 19 fin.: ὧ δὲ ἀγαπήσας ([]) ἐκ πλάνης ἔρωτος (τὸ) σῶμα, οὕτως μενειν τῷ ἐκόπτε πλανώμενοι.

ταῦτην δὲ τῆς διοίκησιν Ἑρμῆς εἰμαρμένην ἐκάλεσεν. This appears to be a reference to Corp. I. 9: καὶ ἡ διοίκησις αὐτῶν (sc. of the seven planets) εἰμαρμένη καλεῖται. If so, the writer assumed the unnamed teacher who speaks in Corp. I to be Hermes, as did the

1 Socrates has just said that ἔρως (of the lower kind) is one among many kinds of ἐπιθυμία, and that every ἐπιθυμία is a desire for some sort of ἡδονή, and as such, is to be distinguished from δόξα ὑσσείας τοῦ ἀριστού (ἑδα ἐν ἀντὶ τὸ ὄρθων ὄρμωσις). He gives as instances of ἐπιθυμία the desire for food and the desire for strong drink. The object of this kind of ἔρως then is ἡδονή (σωματικοῦ) κάλλος, as that of γαστρομαργία is ἡδονή ὑδαθῆς.

2 The συγγενεῖς ἐπιθυμίαι must be the other desires (γαστρομαργία and the like) which are associated with ἔρως (lust), and intensify it by their presence beside it.

---

1 Perhaps in connexion with ἅτι σώματος κάλλος (which appears to be a repetition of πρὸς ἡδονήν ἀχειώσα κάλλος). For instance, it would be possible to write (ἵνα σώματος κάλλος) (πλανάσθαι), καὶ ὑπ’ αὐτὸ τὸν ἐαυτῆς συγγεγέννων ἐπιθυμίων (| |) ἐρωμένως ὑσσεία.
LIBELLVS XVI: §§ 16-17

writer of Corp. XIII. But ταύτην . . . ἐκάλεσεν may have been inserted by a later hand.

§§ 17-19. ἦρτηται οὖν . . . αὐτὸς ἀπαυστος. This concluding paragraph is dependent partly on the contents of §§ 4-10 a and 12, and partly on those of §§ 13-16, and presupposes both those passages. § 17 (ἠρτηται οὖν οὗ νοητὸς κόσμος κ.τ.λ.) contains statements suggested by § 6 (πόθεν δὲ αὐτὴ—sc. ἡ νοητὴ οὐσία—ἐπιρρέας κ.τ.λ.) and by § 12 (ἀστέρ οὗ νοητὸς κόσμος κ.τ.λ.) and by § 17 and 18 adhere to the doctrine of planets and daemons set forth in §§ 13-16, and ignore the doctrine of ϕως set forth in §§ 4-10 a and 12. Moreover, § 19 is closely related to § 3. It seems then that the construction of Corp. XVI (apart from the preface, §§ 1 a-2,) may be best explained as follows. The writer took from one source a theory of ϕως, and from another source a theory of planets and daemons; he set down these two theories side by side,—the one in §§ 4-10 a and 12, and the other in §§ 13-16,—leaving them unreconciled; and he wrote § 3 as an introduction to the whole composed of these two parts, and §§ 17-19 as a conclusion to it.

§ 17. ἦρτηται οὖν οὗ νοητὸς κόσμος τοῦ θεοῦ [ὁ δὲ αἰσθητὸς τοῦ νοητοῦ] ὁ δὲ ἡλιος διὰ τοῦ νοητοῦ [καὶ αἰσθητοῦ] κόσμου κ.τ.λ. It is necessary to cut out the mentions of the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος, which must have been inserted by some unintelligent reader. According to the doctrine of Corp. XVI, the Sun, as second God, presides over the sensible universe; his life-giving power must therefore come to him from a supracosmic source, and cannot be transmitted to him through the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος, which is subordinate to him. The descending series is ὁ θεὸς, ὁ νοητὸς κόσμος, ὁ ἡλιος; and the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος, if spoken of at all, ought to be spoken of as the object or field of the Sun's demiurgic activity, and not as the source of it.

διὰ τοῦ νοητοῦ [ ] κόσμου τὴν ἐπιρρήθην ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χορηγεῖται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τοὺτον τῆς δημιουργίας. This is an attempt to answer the question which in § 6 was said to be unanswerable. 'The good' issues from God, and is transmitted to the Sun through the Noetos Kosmos. As to the meaning of τὸ ἀγαθὸν here, cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 27 a: 'deus . . . dispensator . . . est bonorum, id est sensus, animae, et vitae.' We might rather have expected τῆς ζωῆς in place of τῆς δημιουργίας; but perhaps δημιουργίας may be allowed to stand, if we take it to mean 'life-giving energy'.
We found reason to think that in §§ 4–10 a the Sun is regarded as the nearest to earth of all the heavenly bodies. According to that view, the Sun would have above him seven of the eight spheres here enumerated, (viz. that of the fixed stars, those of the five planet-stars, and that of the moon,) and below him, one of them only (viz. ἡ περίγειος σφαῖρα, i.e. the atmosphere). But it is possible that the position assigned to the Sun in §§ 17–19 is different from that assigned to him in §§ 4–10 a, and that the arrangement here assumed is as follows:—fixed stars, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun, Mercury, Venus, Moon, atmosphere. In that case, the Sun would have four spheres above him, and four spheres below him.

It may be inferred from this passage that besides the six corps of daemons commanded by the six planet-gods (§ 13), there is a seventh corps, commanded by a god who presides over the sphere of the fixed stars, and an eighth, commanded by a god who presides over the atmosphere. Compare the list of ὀδοιπόροι in Ascl. Lat. III. 19 b.

tῶν δὲ δαμόνων (ἡρτηναι) οἱ ἄθρωτοι. The few men who are 'illumined by God's light' must be excepted; but that exception is not here mentioned. As far as their bodies are concerned, all men alike 'are dependent on the daemons'; but 'the illuminated' are unaffected by bodily influences.

§ 18. διὸ πατὴρ μὲν πάντων ὁ θεὸς, δημιουργός δὲ ὁ ἥλιος ὁ δὲ κόσμος ὄργανον τῆς δημιουργίας. According to the doctrine of §§ 4–10 a, the ὄργανον δημιουργίας (i.e. the instrument by means of which the Sun puts life into things) is the sunlight; according to that of §§ 13–16, the ὄργ. δημ. is the army of daemons commanded by the planets. On the assumption that the writer here had in mind the former doctrine, the words ὁ δὲ κόσμος ὄργανον τῆς δημιουργίας would be meaningless, and it would be necessary to write τὸ δὲ φῶς ὁ. τ. δ. instead. But in §§ 17, 18, the doctrine of φῶς is ignored, and that of planets and daemons only is recognized; and that being so, it is possible to make sense of the words as they stand, if we take ὁ κόσμος to mean the system of spheres which has just been described. The Sun does his work as δημιουργός by means of the eight spheres; i. e. he employs as his instruments or agents the god of the fixed stars, the gods of the five planet-stars and the moon, and the god of the atmosphere; and these gods employ as their
instruments or agents the daemons who are subject to them. Compare § 7, where δ κόσμος seems to mean the heavenly bodies regarded collectively.

καὶ ὁμοιαν μὲν ἡ νοητὴ οὐσία διοικεῖ, οὕτως δὲ θεοὶ, δαιμόνες δὲ θεοὶ ὑποτεταγμένοι ὁμοιάτως διοικοῦσιν. This is unintelligible. The θεοὶ to whom the daemons are subject must be the gods of the eight spheres. But according to §§ 13-16, these gods are subject, not to ‘Heaven’, but to the Sun; and there remains no function which could be assigned to an entity called ὁμοιαν. If the passage was intended to agree with §§ 13-16 (as it probably was), it ought to have been written thus: καὶ θεοὶ μὲν δὲ θεοὶ διὰ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας διοικεῖ, ὡς δὲ θεοὶ δαιμόνες δὲ Κ.Τ.Α. If it had been meant to agree with §§ 4-10 α, it would have been necessary to write something like this: καὶ θεοὶ μὲν δὲ θεοὶ διὰ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας διοικεῖ, θεοὶ δὲ διὰ τοῦ φωτὸς πάντα δημιουργεῖ. The word ὁμοιαν, which seems to have been wrongly substituted for θεοὶ, may possibly have arisen out of ὁμοιαν in the preceding line.

§ 19. πάντα ὁδ᾽ ποιῶν εὐτυχῶν ποιεῖ. Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 14 a: δεῖ ἐστιν (ὁ θεὸς) ἐν τῷ οἰκεῖῳ, αὐτὸς δὲν ὁ ποιεῖ.¹ οὐκ δὲν ποτε παράσαντο (ποιῶν). The Kosmos therefore will continue to exist for ever.

[kαὶ δοπερ ὁ θεὸς ... τὸλος ἔχει.] This is merely a paraphrase of the preceding sentence. (But see note on Ascl. Lat. III. 29 c.)

LIBELLVS XVII

In the MSS., this passage (ἐ δὲ νοεῖς ... ἐξῆς θεολογίσομεν) follows the last words of Corp. XVI (τὸλος ἔχει) without a break, as if it formed part of the ‘Epistle of Asclepius to King Ammon’. But it is evidently the conclusion of another libellus, of which

¹ Compare Ioannes Scotus Erigena (ninth century), De divisione naturae 1. 72, Migne Patr. Lat. cxxii. 517 D: Coaeternum igitur est Deo suum facere et coessential. ... Non ergo alius est Deo esse, et alius facere, sed ei esse id ipsum est et facere. ... Cum ergo audimus Deum omnia facere, nil alius debemus intelligere, quam deum in omnibus esse, hoc est, essentiam omnium subsistere. Ipse enim solus per se vere est, et omne, quod vere in his quae sunt dicitur esse, ipse solus est. Nihil enim eorum quae sunt per se ipsum vere est; quodcumque autem in eo vere intelligitur, participacione ipsius unius, qui solus per seipsum vere est, accipit. Io. 3. 1, Migne 621 B; God is ‘principium omnium, et inseparabilis ab omni diversitate quam condidit. ... In ipso enim immutabiliter et essentialiter sunt omnia, et ipse est divisio et collectio universalis creaturarum’. Erigena derived this part of his doctrine from the Neoplatonists, chiefly through Dionysius Areopag.
all except the last few sentences has disappeared, presumably through
the loss of some leaves of the archetype from which our MSS. are
derived. (By a similar accident, the beginning of Corp. II has
been lost, together with the libellus which originally preceded it, and
of which the title alone remains.) It is possible that the lost leaves
contained the end of Corp. XVI also, and that our text of that
document is consequently incomplete; but this is uncertain, as
§ 19 serves very well as a conclusion of the Epistle of Asclepius,
and it is not apparent from internal evidence that anything is
missing after it.

Corp. XVII is a dialogue between Tat (son of Hermes) and a
king, who is probably Ammon. The concluding words (τῇ δὲ ἐπιώσγ
περὶ τῶν ἐξῆς θεολογίσμων) show that the dialogue as a whole came
under the head of θεολογία, i.e. discussion of the gods or of God;
and also, that its author intended to write one or more other
dialogues of the same kind, in which other branches of the same
subject were to be dealt with. If he carried out his intention, these
other dialogues have perished.

As the argument ends with the injunction προσκόνει τὰ ἐγάλματα,
the particular topic (or the last of the topics) discussed in Corp. XVII
must have been the question whether men ought to worship statues
of the gods. That is a question to which the Christian attacks on
idolatry forced Pagans to give attention in the third century especially,
though it was sometimes discussed in earlier times, e.g. by Dio
Chrysostomus and Maximus Tyrius.

The writer is familiar with the Platonic contrast between σώματα
and ἀνώματα, αἰσθητά and νοητά, and uses the Platonic term ὁ νοητὸς
κόσμος.

In this dialogue, the teacher is Tat; this implies that Hermes
has departed to heaven, and that his son and disciple Tat has
succeeded him as ‘prophet’ upon earth. (Cf. Kore Kosmu, Stob.
Exc. XXIII. 6 : Hermes ἀνέβαινεν εἰς ἄστρα. ἄλλ' ἦν αὐτῷ διάδοχος
ὁ Τάτ, νῦν ὁμοῦ (τούτων) καὶ παραλήπτωρ τῶν μαθημάτων.) This
notion is not likely to have arisen until a large body of Hermetic
writings, including a collection of ‘Discourses of Hermes to Tat’,
was in existence. Corp. XVII must therefore be one of the later
Hermetica; and we may conclude that it was probably written in
the third century A.D.

εἰ δὲ νοεῖς, ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. ‘If you give your attention to it, (you
cannot but see that) there are’ &c.
The reflections seen in mirrors are mentioned as instances of ἑιδωλα in Pl. Soph. 239 d, where, in a discussion of the question 'what is meant by an ἑιδωλον', Theaetetus says Δῆλον ὅτι φησιμεν τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἰδέαι καὶ κατόπτροι ἑιδωλα, ίτι καὶ τα γεγραμμένα καὶ τα τετυπημένα (i. e. pictures and sculptures) κ.τ.λ.

The word ἀσώματος is here applied both to the ἑιδωλα which are seen in mirrors, and to the ἰδέαι which are seen in bodies; and the writer makes use of the ἑιδωλα ἀσώματα seen in mirrors to explain by analogy the meaning of the statement that the ἰδέαι are ἀσώματοι.

Cf. Corp. XI. ii. 17 a (μὴ θαυμάσῃς εἰ ἵστην το ἀσώματος ἰδέα κ.τ.λ.), where the instance of a picture (i. e. an ἑιδωλον of another kind) is employed to illustrate the meaning of ἀσώματος.

[θείως νοεῖς.] The words ὁ βασιλεὺς εἰσεν could hardly be placed after the two distinct statements οὕτως ἐξε, ὁ Τάτος, and θείως νοεῖς. Besides, there is nothing specially 'divine' in the thought that the image seen in a mirror is not a body.

(. . .) οὕτως ἀντανακλάσεις εἰσὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων πρὸς τὰ σώματα. There is a want of sequence here. οὕτως was probably preceded by a clause beginning with ἄστερ, and containing a statement about ἐσοπτρα and the ἑιδωλα seen in them. As ἑιδωλα are given off by bodies, and are seen in mirrors, so ἰδέαι are given off by τὰ νοητά (= τὰ δῶτα δῶτα, the entities of which the νοητός κόσμος is composed), and are seen in bodies. In other words, bodies are mirrors in which the νοητά are reflected. We cannot see the νοητά themselves; but we can see reflections of them in material things. It is these reflections, and not τὰ δῶτα δῶτα themselves, that in this passage are called ἰδέαι (= formae visibles). They correspond to τὰ εἰσοβάτα καὶ εἰσώντα τῶν δῶν αἰ μιμήματα in Pl. Tim. 50 c. Cf. Ascl. Lat. III. 36 fin.: 'sunt enim (sol et luna) quasi speculorum nostrorum similes, imagimim similitudines aemulo splendore reddentium.'

In ἀντανακλάσεις τῶν ἀσωμάτων, the term ἀσώματα, which was previously applied (1) to the ἑιδωλα, and (2) to the ἰδέαι, seems to denote neither ἑιδωλα nor ἰδέαι, but the νοητά (= δῶτα δῶτα) from which the ἰδέαι come. In place of πρὸς τὰ σώματα, we might rather have expected ἐν τοῖς σώμασι (cf. αἱ ἰδέαι αἱ ἐν σώμασι φανώμεναι above). What the writer probably meant might be expressed thus: ἰδέαι τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἀντανακλάνται πρὸς τὰ σώματα. 'Forms

1 Cf. Paul, I Cor. 13, 12: βλέπομεν γὰρ ἂρτι ἐν ἑισόπτρον ἐν αἰνίγματι.
of (or derived from) the incorporeal νοητά are reflected against bodies', i.e. are projected on bodies, and reflected from them to our eyes, as the image of a thing is projected on a mirror and reflected from it.

[καὶ τῶν σωμάτων πρὸς τὰ ἀσώματα, τοντεστὶ τοῦ αἰσθήτου πρὸς τῶν νοητῶν κόσμων.] This is a meaningless addition. It could not be said that bodies are reflected in τὰ νοητά as in a mirror.

καὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ (κόσμου) πρὸς τῶν αἰσθητῶν. The Aisthetos Kosmos (i.e. the whole made up of all σώματα) is a mirror in which the Noetos Kosmos (i.e. the whole made up of all νοητά or ὄντως ὄντα) is reflected.

διὸ προσκύνει τὰ ἀγάλματα, . . . ὡς καὶ αὐτὰ ἱδέας ἠχοῦσα ἀπὸ τοῦ (νοητοῦ) κόσμου. Here, the general principle laid down in the preceding sentences is brought to bear on the question whether statues of the gods ought to be worshipped. On this question, see Ascl. Lat. III. 24a and 37. Perhaps it was in answer to Christian attacks on idol-worship that the author of Corp. XVII wrote in defence of the Pagan usage, as the passages on 'god-making' in Ascl. Lat. III were certainly written in defence of the Pagan cults against the attacks of Christians.

A cult-statue is a σῶμα, and, like all σώματα, presents a 'reflection' of a νοητόν. But the νοητόν which the statue 'reflects' is a living being,—a νοητὸς θεός. Compare Philo's identification of the ἱδέα or λόγοι with daemons or angels (Schürer, Gesch. des Jud. Volkes 1909, iii, p. 707).

As to the notion that cult-statues are mirrors in which νοητά are reflected, cf. Plut. Is. et Os. (Parthey) 77, on Egyptian animal-worship: εἴπερ ὅν όι δοκιμώτατοι τῶν φιλοσόφων οὐδὲ ἐν ἄψυχοις καὶ ἀσωμάτῳ πράγμασι αἰνήμα τοῦ θεοῦ καταδέστηκεν δύσιν ἁμαρτείν οὐδὲ ἀτίματες, ἐτί μάλλον οὔμας τάς ἐν αἰσθητομεναῖς καὶ ἐν ψυχήν ἱχνάντες καὶ πάθος καὶ ἡθος φύσεως (i.e. animals) ἱδέας τητις Squire) [κατὰ τὸ ἰδῆς] (. . .). ἀγαπητέον ὅν οὐ ταῦτα (sc. τὰ ζώα) τιμῶντα, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτον τὸ θεῖον, ὅς ἑναγενέστερον ἐσόπτρων, καὶ φύσει γεγονότων, ὡς ὁργανὸς ἡ τέχνην ἔδει τοῦ πάντα κοσμούντος θεοῦ νομίζειν.1 (Perhaps, καὶ φύσει γεγονότων ὡς ὁργανὸν), ἥ(ν) τέχνην δεὶ τοῦ πάντα κοσμούντος θεοῦ νομίζειν. Statues of the gods are τοῦ θεοῦ ἐσόπτρα, made by human τέχνη; the animals worshipped by the Egyptians are ἑναγενέστερο τοῦ θεοῦ ἐσόπτρα, made by φύσις, which is God's τέχνη.) Plotinus 4. 3. 11: καὶ μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ τάλαι σοφοί, ὡςοι ἐβουλήθησαν θεοὺς αὐτοῖς παράναι, ἵερα καὶ ἀγάλματα
The time has come for the evening meal, at which the King must be present as host; the discussion must therefore be adjourned. Cf. the concluding words of Julian Or. II: Ο Atatürk, το προφήτην, περί την τῶν ἔλεων ἐπιμέλειαν γενόσθαι (γίνεσθαι MSS.). The word may mean ‘an inspired teacher’. But προφήτης was the title borne by Egyptian priests of a certain rank or grade; and it is possible that the writer intended to imply that Tat was a priest of the class denoted by this title.

LIBELLVS XVIII

This document has nothing to do with Hermes or any pupil of Hermes; and the only reason for calling it ‘Hermetic’ is that it is included in the Corpus Hermeticum in one of the two classes of MSS. in which the collection has come down to us, and in that respect stands on a par with Corp. XVI and Corp. XVII. It consists of two or three fragments of an epideictic oration ‘in praise of kings’. Its author does not, like the Hermetists, put what he has to say into the mouth of a prehistoric teacher, but speaks in his own person. He appears to have been a rhetor by profession, and one who made high claims for the art which he professed. He says that musicians and other artists are inspired by God, and asserts that he himself, as an artist in speech-making, is likewise inspired.

The circumstances presupposed are these. The Roman empire is under the rule of two or more ‘kings’ who reign conjointly. The rulers have recently brought a formidable war, or series of wars, to a successful conclusion (ἐκ τῶν ἰκείων τροπαίων ἢ τοῦ λόγου προθυμία, § 7 b; αὐτοῦ τὰ τῆς νίκης πεπραγμένα τοῦ λόγου προθυμία, § 8; πάντως αὐτὸς τῆς νίκης, § 9; ὁ δὲ τῆς νίκης . . . πεπραγμένα τοῦ λόγου προθυμία, κτ.λ., § 10;) and established peace (τούς τῆς κοινῆς αὐθελίας καὶ εἰρήνης πρατέας, § 10; τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἰρήνης εὐεργείαν ἀπλώσασι κτ.λ., § 16). Their success is celebrated at a
festival held in some city of the empire; and the orator does his part in the celebration by delivering this speech.

Who are the reigning 'kings'? That part of the oration in which their actions were spoken of in detail has been lost; but the style and diction agree well with a date not far from A.D. 300. It is most likely then that Reitzenstein is right in his conclusion that the 'kings' are Diocletian and his colleagues,—i.e. the two Augusti, Diocletian and Maximian, and the two Caesares, Galerius and Constantius,—who reigned jointly from A.D. 293 to 305. During the first five or six years of their joint rule, Maximian and Constantius re-established the imperial power and restored security in the West by a series of successful wars in Gaul, Britain, and Africa, while Diocletian and Galerius did the like in the eastern half of the empire. Galerius secured the Balkan peninsula against barbarian invasion by his campaigns on the Danube; Diocletian in person reconquered Egypt (295–296); and the war waged by Diocletian and Galerius against the Persians (296–297) was concluded by a treaty of peace, the terms of which were highly satisfactory to the Romans. By the year 298, a situation such as is implied in Corp. XVIII had been attained; a series of successful wars had ended in the establishment, throughout the empire, of peace and prosperity such as had long been unknown. It is probable then that the speech was composed in or about A.D. 300.

1 Reitzenstein (Piom, p. 199) says that the oration is addressed to certain emperors 'who are present, or are supposed to be present'. But I can find no proof that the presence of the emperors, or any of them, is assumed. The basileis are spoken of in the third person only. Ο θυμάστερον, § 7 a, may very well have been addressed to the local dignitaries who presided at the festival, and not to the emperors themselves: and, αυτοί τοῖς βασιλεῖσι φίλοι, § 8, does not necessarily imply that the 'kings' are present.

2 Keil, in Reitz. Pioi, pp. 371 ff., investigates the rhythm of the clausulae in Corp. XVIII, and seeks to show that the writer observed laws of accentual rhythm which were in force for artistic prose in the fourth century A.D., but not earlier; and he infers from this that the speech 'cannot have been written before the end of the third century'. This inference seems to me to be stated somewhat too positively. In the first place, the rhythmical form of a large proportion of the clausulae is doubtful, because of the corruption of the text; and it is not likely that all writers of artistic prose throughout the Roman empire adopted the new laws of accentual rhythm simultaneously; and it would be difficult to prove that rules which were commonly observed in the fourth century were not observed by a few writers here and there before A.D. 300. Still, Keil's argument gives support to the opinion that the speech was not written before the reign of Diocletian, which is probable for other reasons.

3 'Quattuor principes mundi ... unum in rem publicam sentientes' (Vopiscus, Hist. Aug. 30. 18. 4). Cf. the description of celestial concord in Corp. XVIII. 14 b.

4 Paneg. Lat. VIII. (V.) 20. 2 (A.D. 298): 'Tenet uno pacis amplexu Romana respublica quidquid variis temporum vicibus fuit aliquando Romanum; et ulla, quae
There is nothing to show in what city the oration was delivered, or supposed to be delivered. Corp. XVIII has come down to us in a collection of documents most of which were certainly written in Egypt; and this fact points to Alexandria. But the successes of the rulers must have been celebrated in every city of importance throughout the empire; speeches of this character were doubtless delivered at many different places,—e.g. at Antioch, and at Nicomedia (Diocletian's place of residence); and the compiler of the Corpus (or the man who added Libellus XVIII to the Corpus) may have used for his purpose any such oration, of which a copy chanced to have come into his hands.

Did he include the whole of the speech in his collection? If so, the loss of the greater part of it might be due either to accident or to deliberate excision. (A Christian transcriber would have a strong motive for omitting the praises of Diocletian and Galerius, of which it is to be presumed that the bulk of the speech consisted.) But it seems more likely that the compiler of the Corpus himself selected those parts of the speech in which religious thoughts occurred, and rejected the rest. He would be interested in the theory of inspiration which is set forth in the prooemium (§§ 1-7 a), the ‘praises of God’ with which the oration began and ended (§§ 7 b-9 and 11-14 a), and the passage in which the concord of the celestial gods is spoken of (§ 14 b); but he would see no reason to include in his collection of religious documents a description of the achievements of certain Roman emperors.

The probable character of the missing parts of the speech may be inferred from the rules which Menandros Rhetor (Περὶ εἰδευκτικῶν, Spengel Rhetores Graeci, vol. iii, pp. 368 ff.) lays down for the composition of an ἐγκώμιον βασιλέως, and from extant specimens of such saepe veluti nimia diffuserat mole, tandem solido cohæsit imperio. Nihil ex omni terrarum caeleque regione non aut metu quietum est, aut armis domitum, aut pietate devinctum.' (The Panegyrici Latini, ed. G. Bachrens, Teubner 1911, are a series of orations spoken mostly in Gaul, and ranging in date from A.D. 291 to 391. See especially Paneg. VIII (V), delivered March 1, A.D. 298, addressed to Constantius, and dealing chiefly with his reconquest of Britain; and X and XI, addressed to Maximin.)—D. Cozza, L'Imperatore dalmata (Diocletianus), 1912, p. 68, says that 'after the Persian war, or, to speak more precisely, about A.D. 300, the Roman world was tranquil; the defence of the boundaries was by that time guaranteed, and peace was assured'. Diocletian's Edictum de pretis rerum venalium, A.D. 301, begins thus: 'Fortunam rei publicae nostrae, cui iuxta immortales deos bellorum memoria, quae feliciter gessimus, gratulari licet, tranquillo orbis stato et in gremio altissimae quietis locato . . . .'

1 We cannot be sure that it was really delivered; it may be a literary composition written in the form of an oration.
encomia, e.g. the anonymous Eîς βασιλεία included in the works of Aelius Aristides (Or. 35, vol. ii, p. 253 Keil), and Julian’s panegyrics of Constantius (Or. 1 and 2).

The traditional text of Corp. XVIII presents numerous passages in which a phrase or statement is repeated in slightly different words. The author of the oration cannot have thus repeated himself; how then did these iterations arise? They might perhaps be accounted for by the supposition that our text is not derived from the author’s manuscript, but that two or three men who heard the speech delivered took notes of it in writing, and a written text was constructed by putting their notes together. Or possibly the text given in the Corpus may have been transcribed from a rough copy or first draft of the speech, in which the author wrote down alternative phrases as they occurred to him, with the intention of subsequently choosing between them, and working up this raw material into a finished oration.

Contents.

Prooemium, §§ 1–9, (15), 10, (16). If the music goes amiss by reason of a defect in the instrument, the blame must not be laid on the musician. And so, if my speech goes amiss by reason of my human weakness, you must not lay the blame on the inspiration which comes to me from above. God is the great musician; he makes music in all the universe; and I too am an instrument on which he plays. If there is any failure, do not blame the divine Musician,—for he cannot fail,—but lay the blame on the defects of his human instrument. §§ 1–4.

But sometimes a musician, when his instrument has failed him, has found the defect made good by help sent from above. And so it is with me. I feel in me a God-given power which will make good my deficiencies; and so I shall not fail. §§ 6, 7 a.

I am to speak in praise of kings. I will begin by praising God, the supreme King. God reigns for ever; and from him all earthly kings derive their power. §§ 7 b–9.

Having praised God, I will pass on to the praise of these our kings on earth. In praising them, we shall be training ourselves to praise God rightly. God has given them their sovereignty, and grants them victory even before war begins. To them our thanks are due for the boon of peace. To establish peace is the chief function of a king. The very word ‘king’ suggests peace; and the statue of a king is a safe refuge. §§ (15), 10, (16).
Praise of the reigning kings (missing, except this fragment):
Among the celestial gods there is perfect concord; (and in like manner there is concord among our kings). § 14b.

Peroration, §§ 11-14a:
I will end, as I began, by praising God. God is to us as the Sun is to the plants. He fosters the growth of our souls by pouring down on us the efflux of his wisdom; and it is meet that we should use in praise of him the faculties which he has fostered in us. § 11.

God is to us as a father is to his infant children. His greatness transcends all that we can say; but he pardons the inadequacy of our praise, and takes pleasure in our childish lispings. §§ 12, 13.

God is good, and infinitely great. He is eternal, and he makes the world endure for ever. § 14a. (The rest is lost.)

Title. The original title is lost. Some late transcriber has inserted περὶ τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους τοῦ σώματος ἐμποδιζόμενης ψυχῆς before § 1, and περὶ εὐφημίας τοῦ κρέιττονος, καὶ ἐγκύκλιον βασιλέως before § 11. The first of these two headings is inappropriate, but must have been meant for an interpretation of what is said about the musician and his instrument in §§ 1-7 a. The other is made up of two distinct headings. περὶ εὐφημίας τοῦ κρέιττονος would be a suitable heading for §§ 11-14 a; and ἐγκύκλιον βασιλέως (not βασιλέως) would serve either as a heading for §§ 15-16, or as a title of the whole document.

§§ 1-5. τοῖς τῆς παμμολίου... ἐναρμοσθαι λύραν. In this passage, the statement that the musician is not to be blamed for a failure caused by a defect in his instrument is repeated no less than five times. (§ 1: ὅ μὲν γὰρ... τὸν δὲ (ὁργάνων) τὸ δισθενέτας καταμεμφέτας. —§ 2: οὐ τῷ πνεύματι... τῆς δὲ τὸν ὀργάνον καταμεμφέτας σαθρότητι. —§ 4: μὴ εἰς αὐτὸν... τῆς δὲ χορδῆς καταμεμφώμεθα τὴν δισθενείαν.— § 5: τοῦ συμπτώματος περὶ τὸ ὀργάνον γεγονός, οὐδέποτε τὸν μονοσοφήγον ἡμάσατο.—Ἰδ.: οὐκ ἔσχον [τὴν] κατ' αὐτοῦ αἰτίαν.) Seeing that the author was evidently trying to produce a masterpiece of style, and must have taken pains about his composition, it is impossible to believe that he can have been guilty of this purposeless iteration. Some of the phrases in which the thought is repeated may have been written as alternatives or substitutes; and some of them may have been notes intended to explain the meaning of the text. § 1. ἐ τῶν ὀργάνων ἀναρμοστία. Properly speaking, it is the musician

1 The man who inserted this heading must have taken 'the musician' to mean the soul, and 'the instrument' to mean the body.
that ἀρμόττεται (tunes) τὴν λύραν, i.e. adjusts the several strings so as to make them sound the notes of the particular scale (ἀρμονία) which he intends to use. But it may be supposed that there is some defect in the lyre which makes it impossible for the musician to tune it rightly, or causes it to go out of tune after he has tuned it rightly; e.g. a peg may be loose, and fail to keep the string at the right pitch.

The statement that, under the circumstances supposed, 'the musician is bound to be jeered at by the audience' contradicts a proposition which is asserted five times over in the text (οὐδὲς ποτὲ τὸν μουσικόν ἔρισατο; &c.) therefore it cannot have been written by the author, but must be a note appended by an objector. That being so, it seems best to take καταγέλαστον τὸ ἐπιχείρημα as part of the same note, and translate 'The writer's argument is absurd; for' &c. (ἐπιχείρημα, 'an attempted proof', is a technical term of logic.) The words καταγ. τὸ ἐπι. would not be suitable as an apodosis to εἰ ... ἐμποδὼν ... γένηται κ.τ.λ.; for though the result produced might be ridiculous, there would, according to the author's view, be nothing contemptible in the enterprise or endeavour (ἐπιχείρημα) of the musician.

§ 3. [ἐπὶ π.ι. [ἐπὶ π.ι. οἱ ἄριστοι ... τὴν μαθητὴν ἐπιτελούσεν.] This seems to be a description of a concert in which four different kinds of instruments are used. The instruments are the trumpet (σάλτιγξ), the flute (ἀιμός), the reed-pipe (κάλαμος),1 and the lyre (implied by πλήκτρον, the thing with which the lyre is struck). From the words ἄρις μὲν ... ἄρις δὲ it must be inferred that in the case supposed these different kinds of instruments are played, not simultaneously, but separately and in succession.

The passage is clearly out of place here; and I cannot find any place at which it would fit into the text.2 Possibly it may have

1 Does κάλαμος here mean an instrument made of a single reed, with holes at intervals,—a simpler kind of flute? Or does it mean a 'Pan-pipe' (σάλτιγξ), i.e. a mouth-organ consisting of a number of reeds of different lengths fastened together?

2 It might perhaps be made to follow the words τοῖς τὴν παλμοὐδον μελῳδίᾳ τὴν ἀρμονίαν ἐκπαγχελλάξαν, § 1 int. ; but this would unduly lengthen out a sentence that is already long enough.
come from a sentence preceding § 1; the orator may have begun by describing a concert, and then gone on to put the case of defects occurring in the music. The opening of the oration might perhaps be accounted for by assuming that, at the festival at which it was delivered, the speech-making was preceded by a concert such as is here spoken of. An audience that had just been listening to a series of musical performances would be prepared to appreciate what the speaker says about musicians and instruments.

οδ το πνεύματι τοῦ μουσικοῦ τις ἀναπέμπτεται τὴν αἰτίαν. πνεύμα here means 'inspiration', in the sense of artistic impulse derived from a divine source. The writer assumes that the musician is 'inspired', as poets were commonly said to be. Cf. Pseudo-Pl. Axiophus 370 c (see note on Corp. XII. ii. 19). Spiritus (= πνεύμα) is similarly used by Latin authors. Cic. Arch. 8. 18: the poet is 'divino quodam spiritu inflatus'. Hor. Sat. 1. 4. 46: 'quidam comedia necne poema | esset quaesivere, quod acer spiritus ac vis | nec verbis nec rebus inest.' Od. 2. 16. 38: 'mihi spiritum Graiae teneum Camenae Parca non mendax dedit.' Od. 4. 6. 29: 'spiritem Phoebus mihi, Phoebus artem carminis nomenque dedit poetae.' Hence, 'to lay the blame on the musician's πνεύμα' means, to say that the failure results from the inadequacy of the artistic impulse which comes to him from God.

This was evidently written as an alternative for οδ το πνεύματι τοῦ μουσικοῦ τις ἀναπέμπτεται τὴν αἰτίαν.—το μὲν must mean το κριτον (= το θεϊ), and not το μουσικα; for σέβας (reverential awe) is too strong a term to describe the hearer's approval of a competent performer.

έμποδὼν κατέστη, . . . 'έμποδίσασα(α). έμποδίσασα has probably been substituted by error for some nearly equivalent word, e.g. νοχλήσασα. But it is possible that the sentence originally ended at έμποδών κατέστη, and that το μὲν . . . συλήσασα has been subsequently added.

§ 3. οὕτωι δὲ καὶ ήμων τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀσθενείας χάριν μὴ τῶν θεωρῶν καταμέψεσαι (τὴν τέχνην). καταμέψεσαι usually takes an accusative; cf. τὸ ἀσθένεις καταμέψεσαι in § 1, and καταμεμφώθηκα τὴν ἀσθενείαν in § 4. (In § 2, it seems best to read τὴν σαθρότητα in place of τὴ σαθρότητα.) Menandros Rhetor Peri ἑπίδεικτικών, Spengel III, p. 374: καταμέψεσαι τὴν θρασύτητα. Hence it is to be presumed that an accusative has been lost after καταμέψεσαι;
and τὸν τέχνην would serve the purpose. In this connexion, ἡ τέχνη differs little in meaning from τὸ πνεῦμα.

At this point, the speaker brings to bear on his own case the principle which he has laid down in the instance of the musician and his instrument. The orator's πνεῦμα or τέχνη (i.e. he himself, quasi inspired artist) corresponds to the musician; the orator's σῶμα (i.e. he himself, as subject to human weakness or error,) corresponds to the instrument. If his performance falls short of perfection, the hearers must ascribe the blame, not to his πνεῦμα or τέχνη (which comes from God, and partakes of God's infallibility), but to personal defects arising from the body in which his immortal soul is incarnated. The thought might be expressed in terms familiar to Platonists by saying that the πνεῦμα or τέχνη of the human artist is one aspect of the divine νοῦς implanted in man, and that the divine νοῦς is infallible. Perhaps the writer had in mind Pl. Rep. 1. 342 b, where Socrates maintains that an artist, quasi artist, cannot err; οὕτω γὰρ πνεῦμα οὕτω ἀμαρτία ὀδοξία τεχνή πάρεστιν, ... αὐτὴ δὲ ἀβλαβὴς καὶ ἀκέραιος ἔστιν κ.τ.λ.

ἀκάματον μὲν [ἐστι] [τὸ] πνεῦμα [εἰσπνεῖ; ὁ θεὸς] [εἰς] (τὸ ἡμέτερον γένος). (Cf. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκάματον ἀποδίδωσι τὴν τέχνην in § 1.) This very doubtful restoration of the text is at least a possible way of expressing what must have been the sense intended, viz. that the orator who delivers this speech is inspired by God, as musicians, and artists in general, are inspired (cf. ἡμῶν τῆς ἐκείνου σοφίας τὴν ἀπόρροιαν δεξαμένους in § 11), and that, in so far as he is inspired, he cannot fail.

For the notion that orators are inspired, cf. Seneca the elder, Swas. 3. 6: 'memini una nos ab audione Nicetis ad Messalam venisse. Nicetes suo impetu valde Graecis placuerat. Quaerebat a Gallione Messala, quid illi visus esset Nicetes. Gallio ait "plena deo". Quotiens audierat aliquem ex his declamatoribus quos scholastici caldos vocant, statim dicebat "plena deo".'

I have inserted after this sentence the misplaced fragment ὅ γὰρ τοι ... ἀκάματος ἔστιν, because the statement that 'God is ἀκάματος' serves to explain and justify the assertion that 'the πνεῦμα which God gives is ἀκάματον'.

⟨⟨ὁ γὰρ τοι (⟨θεός⟩), κατὰ φύσιν μουσικὸς [ι] [υπάρχων], καὶ [ι] ἀρμονίαν ὡς μονὸν (ἐν τῷ παντὶ) ἔργα βάμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄχρι τῶν κατὰ μέρος [ι] τῆς οἰκείας μελῳδίας τὸν βυθὸν παραπέμπων, κ.τ.λ.)⟩ God is a musician. The universe is the instrument on which he plays, and the cosmic process is the music which he makes. (Cf. ἤρως ... μῖαν
§§ 3-4

The writer was thinking of 'the music of the spheres'. But God plays on each thing severally, as well as on the sum of things collectively; and when he inspires an individual orator, that is merely one special instance of his universal music-making.

For the notion that God 'plays on' the man inspired by him, as a musician plays on his lyre, cf. Philo, *Quis rer. div. leges* 52. 259. Wendland III, p. 59: προφήτης γὰρ ἵδιον μὲν οὖν ἀποφθέγγεται, ἀλλὰ δὲ πάντα, ὑπερχώντος ἑτέρου... μόνῃ δὲ σοφῶς ταῦτ' ἐφαρμότει, ἐπει καὶ μόνος (ὁ σοφὸς) ὁργανὸν θεοῦ ἔστιν, ἤχειον κρονόμενον καὶ πληρόμενον ἀδότατον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. *Ibid.* 53. 265 f.: ἔστωκείεται γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν ὁ νόος (i.e. our merely human intellect quits us) κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πνεύματος ἀφείν. ... ὅτως γὰρ ὁ προφήτης, καὶ ὁ πρὸς λέγειν δοκεῖ, πρὸς ἀληθείαν ἴσοναίτει, καταχρήσται δὲ ἑτέρου τοῖς φωνητηρίοις ὁργάνοις, στῶματι καὶ γλώττῃ, πρὸς μὴν δὲν ἐν τῇ θελή τέχνη ἔστι διὰ ἀδότατο καὶ παρμοῦντα ταῦτα κρονών, ἑνόχαι καὶ παναρμόνια καὶ γέμωντα συμφωνίας τῆς πάσης ἀστελλεῖ. Reitzenstein compares Montanus (Epiph. *Haer.* 48. 4): ἰδοὺ δὲ ἀνθρωπος ὅσεὶ λύρα, καὶ γὰρ ἐφίππαμαι ὅσεὶ πληκτρόν.

The ordered sequence of things may be described as a 'rhythm'; the word ρυθμόν may therefore be allowed to stand here, though it is inappropriate in § 4 fin. But it would be possible to cut out τῆς οἰκείας μελδίας τῶν ρυθμῶν, and take the preceding ἀρμονίαν as the object of both ἀργαζόμενος and παραπέμπων.

ἀδηματός ἔστιν. God, the supreme Musician, cannot fail or fall short in his art.

dει [δὲ καὶ] ὁσαύτως ἐχειν τῆς [οἰκείας] ἐπιστήμης. I take this to be an explanation or expansion of ἀδηματός ἔστιν.

[ὅποκής δὲ ταῖς εὐδαιμονίαις]. This seems to be a clumsily written alternative for the following words, εὐεργεσίαι δὲ ταῖς αὐτίας διὰ παντὸς κεχρημανὸς. The εὐεργεσίαι of God, in this connexion, are his gifts of πνεῦμα (inspiration) to men.

§ 4. εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ Φειδίᾳ τῷ δημοαργῷ ὁδὸς ὑπήκουσεν ἢ τῆς ὠλὴς χρεία πρὸς ἐντελῆ τῆς ποικίλαν (.,.,.). Hitherto, the only art discussed (except that of the orator) has been the art of music; and there has been nothing to lead up to a mention of Phidias the sculptor. If we cut out τῷ Φειδίᾳ, and take τῷ δημοαργῷ to mean God, the sentence expresses one of the leading thoughts of the *Timaeus*. God, in his ordering of the universe, aims at the best; and if the result falls short of perfection, that is due to the resistance of the ὄλη on which God has to work. Perhaps a genitive,—τοῦ
kόσμου or something of the sort,—may have been lost after τὴν
τούκληαν. We may suppose that τὸ Φείδα was inserted by a reader
who misunderstood the sentence, and took τὴς ὀλης to mean the block
of marble which the sculptor shapes.

In the missing words which followed, the writer must have applied
the general principle laid down in the Timaeus to the particular case
of the inspired orator. In this instance also, God does his part
without fail; and if there is any failure in the speech delivered, it
must be caused by the intractability of the ὀλη with which God has
to deal,—that is, in this instance, by the human deficiency (ἡ περὶ
tὸ σῶμα ἀσθενεία) of the orator.

The same thought might be expressed in another way by saying
that it is not the divine Musician, but the human instrument, that
is to blame; and if we retain the following passage, (⋯ ⋯) διήρκεσθε
δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ μουσουργός κ.τ.λ., we must interpret it accordingly; i.e.
we must here take 'the musician' to mean God, and 'the string'
to mean the orator. This one repetition of the statement in § 2
(oὐ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ μουσικοῦ κ.τ.λ.) may perhaps be allowed to stand,
especially as the terms are to be understood differently in the
second passage. In § 2, the words are used in their literal sense;
'the musician' there means the lyre-player, and 'the instrument'
means his lyre. But in § 4, (the analogy having been explained
in the interval,) the words are to be taken metaphorically; 'the
musician' means God, and 'the string' means the man whom God
inspires. It might, however, be argued against this interpretation
that the limiting words κατὰ δύναμιν are more applicable to the
human artist than to God; and I am not sure that it would not be
better to bracket διήρκεσθε ⋯ ἡφάνσεν.

τῆς εὐμοσιας τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἡφάνσεν. ῥυθμός cannot here mean
' rhythm', in the sense in which that term is commonly used in
speaking of music; for the fact that a string is out of tune makes
no difference to the rhythm. Even if every note were wrong in
pitch, the rhythm might still be faultless. If the reading is sound,
we must take τῆς εὐμοσιας τῶν ῥυθμῶν to mean, not the keeping of
right time, but the sounding of right tones. But this would be
a strange use of the word ῥυθμός.

§ 5. [ολλᾶ δῆ] [τοῦ συμπτώματος ⋯ τῶν μουσουργῶν ἡπάσατο κ.τ.λ.]
The thought so many times repeated is here expressed in plain and
simple language; and as such language is out of keeping with the
florid style of the oration, it is most likely that this passage is an
explanatory note appended by some reader. ἀλλὰ δὴ is perhaps a doublet of the ἀλλὰ δὴ at the beginning of § 6.

'ὅπως τῆς κρούσεως πολλάκις πρὸς τὸν τόνον ἐμπεσοῦσθαι'. These words might perhaps be struck out with advantage; but if we retain them, we must suppose the writer's meaning to have been 'when the musician strikes the string (rightly, and yet the sound produced is wrong)'.

[οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὡς τιμωτατοί.] This may be a misplaced duplication either of οὕτως διέ Καὶ ἡμῶν κ.τ.λ. in § 3 ininit., or of οὕτως οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς . . . , ὡς τιμωτατοί in § 7 a ininit.

§ 6. [ὡσπερ αὐτῷ πολλάκις ὁργάνῳ κεχρημάτων (αἱ. κεχρημάτων).] If we altered this into ὧθελε αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ) πολλάκις ὧσπερ ὁργάνῳ κεχρημάτων, it would be intelligible as a fragment of a sentence dealing with the subject of §§ 3, 4 (God plays on the man inspired by him as a musician plays on his instrument); and it may possibly have come from the lost passage after τὴν ποικιλίαν in § 4.

[καὶ τὴν τῆς νευρᾶς θεραπείαν.] This looks like a doublet of καὶ τῆς νευρᾶς φυλάττειν τὴν χώραν below.

<τὴν λύραν> δι' ἀπορρήτων ἐναρμοσάμενον. (Cf. τὴν οἰκείαν ἐναρμόσασθαι λύραν in § 5 ἐπι.) The following story of the cicala is told for the purpose of illustrating this statement. The orator 'puts his lyre in tune by mysterious (or supernatural) means', i. e. makes up for his own deficiencies by means of πνεῦμα breathed into him by God, as in the story the musician made the tune go right, in spite of his broken string, by means of the cicala sent by Apollo. For δι' ἀπορρήτων, cf. τλητόμενον ἀδότας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ and τέχνη ἀδότας in Philo Quis rer. div. heres 52. 259 and 53. 265, quoted above.

[λέγεται μὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ.] In the traditional text, two differently worded versions of the story have been intermixed.

(a) λέγεται μὲν δὴ (ὡς) καὶ τῶν τεχνίτων κιθαρίδων διαγωνιζομένου, τῆς νευρᾶς βαγείας, [ὑπὸ τοῦ κραίττωνος] τὸ παρὰ τοῦ κραίττωνος εἴμενες (. . .

. . .) τὴν νευρὰν ἀνεπλήρωσεν αὐτῷ, καὶ τῆς εὐδοκιμήσεως παρέσχε τὴν χώραν.

(b) λέγεται μὲν δὴ τινα τεχνίτην, τὸν τῆς μουσουργίας ἐφόρον θεὸν ἔχοντα εἰμενήν, ἐπειδὴ ἐναγώνων τῆς κιθαρίδων ποιουμένην [ἡ] νευρὰ βαγεία πρὸς ἐμπόδιον τῆς διλήσεως αὐτῷ γεγένητο, (. . .). ἀντὶ μὲν γὰρ τὴς νευρᾶς αὐτῷ τέττιγα κατὰ πρόνοιαν τοῦ κραίττωνος ἐφιάζοντα ἀναπληροῦν τὸ μέλος [. . .], τῶν κιθαριδών δὲ [. . .] τῆς λύπης παυσάμενον τῆς νύχης ἀποχηκιαὶ τῆς εὐδοκίμησιν.
The cicada must have been mentioned in (a) as well as in (b); something corresponding to τέττιγα . . . ἑφιξάνοντα must therefore have occurred in (a) before τὴν νευράν ἄνεπλήρωσε. In (a), the verbs ἄνεπλήρωσεν and παρέσχε are in the indicative, and must therefore have been preceded by ὢς or ὅτι; in (b), the corresponding verbs are in the infinitive, and the accusative τοια shows that the lost verb of the first sentence also must have been in the infinitive.

Antί (Ἀρπί MSS.) μὲν γὰρ τῆς νευρᾶς αὐτῷ τέττιγα κ.τ.λ. This tale is told, on the authority of Timaeus (c. 264 b. c.), by Strabo, 6. 1. 9, p. 260: ἰδεῖνυτο ἰν ἀνδριάς ἐν Λοκρίδις (Locri in South Italy) Εὐνόμου τοῦ κυθαριστοῦ, τέττιγα ἐτί τὴν κιθάραν καθήμενον ἔχων. φορεῖ δὲ Τίμαιος Πυθίου ποτὲ ἁγωνιζόμενος τούτον τε καὶ Ἀρίστωνα Ρηγήνου ἔρισαι "περὶ τοῦ κλήρου1. τῶν μὲν δὴ Ἀρίστωνα δείδασα τὸν Δελφῶν ἐκείτω συμπράττειν . . . τοῦ δὲ Εὐνόμου φάσαις ἁρχὴν μηδὲ μετέναι ἐκείνου αὐτοῦ (se. the Rhegines) τῶν περὶ φωνῆν ἁγωνισμάτων, παρ' οἷς καὶ οἱ τέττιγες εἶνεν ἁφονο1. τὰ εὐφθογγοτάτα τῶν ἔχων, ὁμώς εὐδοκιμεῖλ μηδὲν ἤττον τὸν Ἀρίστωνα, καὶ ἐν ἆλπιδι τὴν νίκην ἔχαν νικήσας μέντοι τὸν Εὐνόμον, καὶ ἀναθεῖσα τὴν λέιχθαν εἰκόνα ἐν τῇ πατρίδι, ἐτείχῃ κατὰ τῶν ἅγινα μίας τῶν χερών ῥαγείας ἑπιστάς2 τέττις ἐκπληρώσει αὐτῷ φθόγγον.

Clem. Alex. Prot. 1: ἔργος ἀν οὐκ καὶ ἄλλον τούτοις ἄδελφον 3 διηγησάσει μῦθον, ὡς καὶ πόσον1 Εὐνόμον τὸν Λοκρόν καὶ τέττιγα τὸν Πυθίου. πανηγυρεῖ Εὐληνηκὴ ἐτί νεκρῷ δράκοτα συνικρατεῖ Πυθιό, ἐπταφίων ἐρημου Βοάντος Εὐνόμου. . . . ἄγων δὲ ἢν, καὶ ἐκβαρύζει ὁρὰ καῦματος Εὐνόμου, ὀπτικά οἱ τέττιγες ὑπὸ τοῖς πετάλεως ἱδον ἀνὰ τὰ ὅρη θερόμενοι ἤλιο. . . . ἐρημοῦνε σηρι κρι τῷ Λοκρῷ. ἐφίπτεται [3] τέττις τῷ ξυνῳ' ἔτερετειν ὡς ἐπὶ κλάδῳ τῷ ὀργάνῳ καὶ τοῦ τέττιγος τῷ ἄρματι ἁμοσάμενοι 1ὅφος1 τὴν λειτουργὰν ἀνεπλήρωσε χορδῆν.4 οὐκοιν φόδη τῇ Εὐνόμου ἀνέτει 1 οἱ τέττις, ὡς τὸ μῆδος βουλεῦεται. χαλκοῦντο σμασιστασίον5 Πυθιό6 τοῦ Εὐνόμου αὐτῇ τῇ κιθάρᾳ καὶ τὸν συναγωνιστὴν

1 Strabo has just said that in the territory of Rhegium the cicadas are mute, whereas those across the border, in the territory of Locri, sing like the rest of their kind.
2 Perhaps ἐφιπτάς.
3 I.e. similar to the tales told about Amphion, Arion, and Orpheus.
4 Sense might be made by reading either τοῦ τέττιγος τῷ ἀρματη (τὸν λειτούργαν ἀνεπλήρωσε χορδῆν, οι τοῦ τέττιγος τῷ ἁματη (τῶν καῦμασ τὴν λειτούργαν ἀμοσάμενος τῷ φόδῃ τὴς αἱ). Χ.
5 Perhaps ἀνεμοσάμενος. It could not be said that the μῆδος set up a statue.
6 Strabo speaks of a statue at Locri; Clement speaks of a statue at Delphi. There must have been somewhere a statue of a musician with a cicada perched on his lyre; and no doubt the story was invented to account for the statue.
Clement ignores the point of the story; for he uses it merely to show that, according to the mistaken belief of the Pagans, animals have sometimes been charmed by music.


κατὰ πρόνοιαν τοῦ κρείττονος. τὸ κρείττον means τὸ θεῖον οὐ θεώς.

§ 7 a. οὖσις οὖν καὶ αὐτός αἰσθάνομαι πάσχειν. The orator's bodily organs, or merely human faculties, correspond to the strings of the musician's lyre. They are defective; but the deficiency is made good by an influx of divine inspiration, just as in the story the broken string was replaced by the cicala. The orator himself, as distinguished from his organs or faculties, corresponds to the musician in the story.

The application of the analogy of music in this paragraph is different from that in §§ 3, 4, according to which God is the musician, and the orator is the instrument on which God plays. When God is the player, there is nothing that can be compared to the cicala which was sent to help the player.

This refers to τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀσθενείας χάρα in § 3. The orator’s ‘body’ is a lyre with a broken string. There would be no sense in saying ‘it seems that I am (or was) confessing’, when it is an unquestionable fact that the speaker has confessed; I have therefore cut out οὖσις here, and written ((iuo-ovpy(r/o-)tii' below.

πρὸ βραχίων ἀφρόστωσι διακείθη (καθωμολόγησα) is an alternative for ἄρτι...τὴν ἀσθενείαν καθωμολόγησα.

§ 7 b. τοιγάρτοι τὸ πέρας τῆς ἀφελείας ἐστ[α]ι βασιλέων εὔκλεια. Down to this point, the orator has been speaking of himself; he has told his audience that he is a man inspired by God. He now proceeds to announce the subject of his oration; it is to be a speech ‘in praise of kings’. πέρας here means ‘end’ in the sense of ‘aim’ or ‘object’ (σκοπός). Cf. Lucian Harmonides 2: ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἀφίηκα τῆς εὐχῆς. Ἰδ. 3: ἐπὶ πέρας ἤκειν με τῆς ἐλπίδος. It is impossible to make sense of ἀφελείας. The author may perhaps have written ἐπαγγελίαι; cf. τοῖς...ἐπαγγελλόμενοι in § 1 init.

1 I e. τὸν τέττυια. The cicala ‘helped him in the contest’.
2 Ἰδ. § 2: ἥδη οὖν μόνος κενοὶ πεποιητέοις, θελεουσι μονοκρι τὸ γῆν ὕπολαμβάνοτε, κ.τ.λ.
ek ton (tou el MSS.) ekeinon trupaiai he tou logou prothumia. It is
because of the victories which our kings (i.e. the reigning Augusti
and Caesares) have won that I am eager to tell forth their praise. As
to he tou logou prothumia, one might compare Ps. 44 (45). 1: leproiato
he kardeia mou logon agathou' logon einoata eapo to bastele.
Agye de iowein touto yap [ed mousoourgos] (o theos) bouleita. The
mousoourgos spoken of in this section is the orator himself. The word
cannot here mean God, the Musician who uses the orator as his
instrument; for it could hardly be said that God 'will make sweeter
melody' (leprovrateon melodias) when he deals with a loftier theme.
Cf. § 9 init., where ed mousoourgos is spoken of as praising God, and
therefore cannot be God, and must be the orator. But if ed mousoourgos
means the orator, touto ed mousoourgos bouleita would mean merely
'I wish this', which would be intolerably feeble and pointless;
I have therefore substituted o theos for ed mousoourgos in this clause.

[Agi de stpeusmeen touto yap ed mousoourgos thele.] This is an
alternative for Agi de iowein . . . bouleita.

Kal proe touto tin lwna themosetai.] I have bracketed these words,
because they too closely resemble ta ta luras enmerosetai in § 8 init.

Dowsa per ta ta upothikes meizona [ta thedtn] eixe. Ta ta upothikes
means tin upothesin, 'his theme'. The subject of eixe is ed mousoourgos;
but a reader took ta ta upo. to be the subject of the verb, and
inserted tin thein to serve as object.

§ 8. elis basileias autou malistota ta ta luras enmerosetai, kai ta
egkmilwn ton tonon eixe. The orator is prepared (1) to speak of kings,
and (2) to speak in praise of them. But it may be suspected that
the author wrote elis basileion egkmimou autou malistota ta ta luras
enmerosetai, and that kal . . . tonon eixe is a subsequent addition. The
following words, [kal ton skopton elis basileiou epainous], are mere
repetition of this.

touo kata elkona ekeinou tin skhetoukian ekostas. Earthly kings are
ekones of God, the supreme King. The thought is similar to that of
Hor. Od. 3. 1. 5: 'regum timendorum in proprios greges, reges in
ipsum imperium est Iovis, clari giganteo triumpho, cuncta supercilio
moventis.' (Clari giganteo triumpho corresponds to kallinicos proitos
in § 9.)

§ 9. de aphanatos mwn obsti [dia pantos] [adivos te] kai el aphanw to
kratov eksw. An earthly king reigns for a little time; but God lives
and reigns from a past without beginning to a future without end.
Dia pantos is a meaningless addition to aphanatos, which of itself
implies 'living on through all time'. Perhaps δε διδό τοι και ει διδόν τον κράτος εχων would be more satisfactory.

§ 15. (οντω μεν δη των θεων . . . η προς τοις βασιλειας ευημερια.) In § 11, the speaker says 'I will now end my speech by praising God'. All that followed § 11 must therefore have had to do with God, and not with human kings. But §§ 15 and 16 have to do with human kings, and not with God. It is evident then that these two sections are out of place, and must have been shifted from an earlier position. § 15 fits in well after § 9, and § 16 after § 10.

δει γαρ [απο των βασιλεων αρξαμενων και] απο των ανακομένων. The speaker has said 'I will begin with God' (§ 8), and has done so (§ 9). He would be contradicting himself if he then proceeded to say 'we must begin with human kings'. But he might very well say 'it is good to praise human kings, because the practice which we get in doing so will enable us to praise God better',—especially as it is his intention, after speaking of human kings, to come back to the subject of God, and praise him again at greater length (§ 11 ff.).

§ 10. ειι τους τουτων επαινους των ημιν καταβαινει δ λογος. This is almost a repetition of ἄλλα δη καταβαινομεν και επι των δεκαμενων παρ ικεινον τα σκηπτρα in § 15. But perhaps καταβαινει may have been substituted for some other verb.

οις [παλαι] μαλιστα το κυρος αρα του κρείττονος θεου] κεκοροφωται. This looks like a reminiscence of Pindar Ol. 1. 182: επ' ἀλλου δ' ἀλλο μεγαλοι, το δ' εσχατον κορυφωται βασιλευς ('the topmost summit is for kings', Gildersleeve). παλαι may have arisen out of a duplication of μαλιστα.

οις η νικη προς της ικεινου δεξιαις πεπραταιναι. της ικεινον δεξιαις is probably a sign of Jewish influence. The 'right hand' of God is often spoken of in the Old Testament; e.g. Ps. 117 (118). 15: δεξια κυρου επισης δυναμιν, δεξια κυρου υψωσε με.

οις τα βραβεια και προ της εν πολημοις [αρρωστιαις] ἀριστειαις προετρεπεται. This probably means that a mere threat of war is enough to make the enemy yield, so that there is no need for actual fighting. Perhaps the speaker alludes especially to the recently concluded treaty of peace with the Persians; for though battles were fought with them in 296 and 297, the Persian king recognized the superiority of the forces organized by Diocletian before they were fully brought into action, and the settlement with which the war ended was considered a triumph of Roman diplomacy rather than a conquest by force of arms. Paneg. X. 7. 5: ' . . . antequam
Diocletianum sponte se dederent regna Persarum. Verum hoc Iovis sui more nutu illo patrio, quo omnia contremescunt, et maiestate vestri nominis consecutus est. 

*Ibid. 10. 6*: 'Rex ille Persarum, numquam se ante dignatus hominem confiteri, fratri tuo (i.e. Diocletiano) supplicat, totumque, si ingredi ille dignetur, regnum suum pandit; ... amicitiae nomen impetrare contentus promeretur obsequio.'

_Paneg. XI. 5. 4_: 'etiam illa quae armorum vestrorum terrore facta sunt velut armis praetereo, Francos ad petendam pacem cum rege venientes, Parthumque vobis munerum miraculis blandientem.'

_Cf. Paneg. VIII (V). 13. 1_ (of the recovery of Britain by Constantius): 'Hoc igitur bellum ... ita, Caesar, adgressus es, ut, statim atque illo infestum maiestatis fulmen intenderas, confectum omnibus videretur.'

[oës oë tò basileièin nóvón ìlìv la và tò éristeíin sunnétaktai.] This feeble clause is an a ticlimax after the more vigorous phrases which precede it; and tò éristeíin is a repetition of éristeías (árrıwerías MSS.). It is very likely that one or two of the other parallel clauses also are interpolations. Perhaps the sentence originally ended at προευρέσθαι, and δὲ ... ἑσταται and oës ... tò βάρβαρον, as well as oës ... συννέτακται, were subsequently added. (Note the rhythmical correspondence of κεκορίφωται, περπυτάνευται, and προευρέσθαι.)

§ 16. τοσαύτης (τοσαύτην;) ἢμῖν εἰρήνης εὔετηρίαν ἀπλώσασι κ.τ.λ. The thought expressed by τούς τῆς κοινῆς ἀσφαλείας καὶ εἰρήνης πρυτάνεις in § 10 is carried on and amplified in what is said about εἰρήνη in § 16. εἰρήνης εὔετηρίαν is rather awkward; it is possible that the original reading was τοσαύτην ἢμῖν εἰρήνην ἀπλώσασι, and that εὔετηρίαν was written as an alternative for εἰρήνην.

καὶ (διὰ) τοῦ λόγου [τού εἰς εἰρήνην (αἰ. καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης)] κρατεῖ. This must be intended for an explanation of βάσει λεία ταῖς κορυφαῖς ἐπιμβαίνει. The true king gets the mastery by reason or persuasion (and not by force); his authority meets with no resistance; and so he attains to the topmost height 'with smooth tread', i.e. by peaceful means. But it may be suspected that the words καὶ (διὰ) τοῦ λόγου κρατεῖ were added by a later hand, and that the passage originally ran thus: βασιλεῖς γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο εἰρηταί, ἐπειδὴ βάσει λείᾳ ταῖς κορυφαῖς ἐπιμβαίνει· ὡστε καὶ τούτων σύμβουλον ἵστον εἰρήνης.

[καὶ διί γε ὑπερέχειν πέψυκε [τῆς βασιλείας] τῆς βαρβαρικῆς.] If we retain the traditional text, we get the statement that kings, as such, are necessarily victorious over certain kings. This absurdity can be avoided by cutting out τῆς βασιλείας, supplying γῆς with τῆς
βαρβαρικῶς, and assuming that the writer applied the term βασιλείας to the Roman emperors alone.

[toig artillery καὶ ἐπιγραφαὶ βασιλείως πολλάκις εἰσὶν τὸν πολέμιον ἀνέστειλεν (ἀνεστέλλεν τέφρου MSS.).] τέφρου can hardly be combined with πολλάκις; and it may very well be a mistaken repetition of τέφροι above.

In this paragraph, the speaker is talking about the blessings of peace; it is therefore inappropriate here to speak of driving back the enemy in war. For the same reason I have bracketed ἐνήγγησε τῆν νίκην καὶ β' below.

καὶ οἱ καθιστάντες οἱ τούτῳ τοῖς μάλιστα χειμαζομένους ὅρμοι τυχάνουσιν [εἰρήνης]. This probably refers to the practice of claiming ἁπλὰ (i.e. assīli) by clinging to a statue of the emperor. Do the words ἤδη δὲ καὶ μόνη εἰκών φανείσα βασιλείας τὸ ἄτρομον προνάσησε refer to that same practice, or to incidents of some other kind? ¹

§ 14 b. ((oix xevov xov (tois) ekeiç . . . dp/0i'qinv iriruv.)

ἐκεῖστ (= ekei) means 'in heaven'; and οἱ ἐκεῖσται are the astral gods. In this passage the orator speaks of gods, but not of God; it cannot therefore have formed part of the peroration (§ 11 ff.), which consisted of 'praise of God'; and it is presumably a detached fragment of the lost 'praise of earthly kings' which preceded § 11. The unanimity of the celestial gods was doubtless spoken of as a type or pattern of the unanimity of the kings (Diocletian and his colleagues). Cf. Aelius Aristides Περὶ ὁμονοίας ταῖς πόλεσιν, 23. 76 f., vol. ii, p. 52 f. Keil: οὐτος (sc. concord) ὁ τῶν πόλεων κόσμος ἀληθινός . . . τεκί καὶ τοῦ πάντα ωφρακὸν καὶ κόσμον . . . μία δὲ ποτί γνώμη καὶ φιλία δύναμις διόκει· καὶ μετὰ οὖν τῆς ἡλίου τε πορεύεται τὴν αὐτοῦ χώραν φυλάττων δι' αἰώνος, καὶ σελήνης φάσματα καὶ αὐτέρων φορά χωρεῖ . . . καὶ τάξεις ἐκάστων πρὸς ἀλλήλα . . . φυλάττονται, νυκτός τῆς ὁμολογίας, διαφοράς δὲ συνεμεῖς έννοιος οἴδε ἐγγυγομένης, ἀλλὰ τῷ θεῷ πάντων συγκεκωρικώτων, καὶ μᾶς γνώμῃ περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προσ-

¹ Schiller, Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit II, p. 34: 'in the third century, the images of the emperors played an important part, and one of the first cares of a new government is to set up such images, and to send them to the provinces. From the time of Maxentius onward, we can see more exactly what was meant by sending them. When Maxentius got the sovereignty, he caused his image to be carried about in Africa, and thereby publicly proclaimed his rule. This practice had developed out of a custom of the camps. The image of the reigning emperor stood in the shrine of the camp, and received divine worship there; the fall of an emperor caused this image to be thrown down, and when a new emperor was appointed, his image was at once set up.' Paneg. Lat. VIII (V). 15. 6: 'Demens qui nesciebat, quacunque fugeret, ubique vimar vestrae divinitatis esse, ubi vultus vestri, ubi signa (statuae) coherentur.'
The star-gods foresee and collectively predict the future. This seems to be an allusion to astrology; but if so, it is irrelevant here.

\[\epsilon\zeta\sigma\alpha\tau\omicron\nu\omicron\varsigma\] The writer of Corp. IX speaks of the \(\nu\omicron\omicron\nu\iota\varsigma\iota\omicron\sigma\iota\) and \(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\iota\varsigma\iota\) of the Kosmos, and the \(\nu\omicron\omicron\nu\iota\varsigma\iota\omicron\sigma\iota\) and \(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\iota\varsigma\iota\) of God.

\[\delta\iota\alpha\tau\omicron\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\alpha\zeta\omicron\omicron\nu\iota\\iota\nu\iota\iota\iota\] \(\epsilon\rho\gamma\alpha\zeta\omicron\omicron\nu\iota\) has come by duplication from \(\epsilon\rho\gamma\alpha\zeta\omicron\omicron\nu\iota\) below.

\(\tau\omicron\gamma\alpha\rho\) \(\epsilon\zeta\sigma\alpha\tau\omicron\nu\omicron\varsigma\) \(\phi\iota\tau\omicron\nu\) \(\epsilon\rho\nu\iota\) \(\alpha\alpha\omicron\varsigma\). That which unites them to one another (as if by a magic charm), and makes peace and harmony among them, is their \(\epsilon\rho\nu\iota\) (\(\tau\omicron\nu\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\), or \(\tau\omicron\nu\ \theta\iota\varsigma\iota\)), which
is the same in each and all of them. The word ἐρήμος here carries with it its Platonic associations. For φίλτρον, cf. Plut. Numa 16: τὴν γεωργίαν...οἶνον εἰρήμης φίλτρον ἐμμέτοι τοὺς πολίτας.

§ II. ἄλλα σπεύδει οἱ 'λόγοι'...περατώσαι τὸν λόγον. ὁ λόγος has been substituted by error for some term meaning 'the speaker'.

This is the beginning of the peroration. The whole of the discourse in praise of the reigning 'kings', which must have followed §§ 1-10 (§16), and preceded § II, has been lost, with the exception of the misplaced fragment 14 b.

There ought to be no mention of kings here. The meaning must have been that the orator, having been employed in praising earthly kings throughout the main body of his speech, will now end by praising God, as he began by doing so (§§ 8, 9). The simile which follows (apistep ὁ ἡλιος κ.τ.λ.) supplies a reason for praising God, but not for praising kings. The words ἐπείτα... βραβευόντων must have been added after §§ 15, 16, in which earthly kings are spoken of, had been shifted from their original position to the end of the text.

This is a paraphrase of the preceding sentence, and was most likely written as an explanatory note on it. The words εἰς... τὸ κρείττον ἀντανακλάσομεν τὸ πέρας directly contradict ἐπείτα δὲ καὶ τῶν θεσμάτων βασιλέως κ.τ.λ. If the speaker said that he was going to end his oration by talking about God, he could not say that he was going to pass on afterwards to human kings.

τῆς ἄνω δυνάμεως is a correct but superfluous explanation of τοῦ κρείττονος.

Απετείκαν τὸν λόγον ἡλιοῦ...τὴν βλάστην ἀπασιν κ.τ.λ. The Sun fosters the growth of plants by pouring down his light and heat upon them; and when they have grown and flowered, he draws out their fragrance, and takes it to himself as the firstfruits of the produce. Thus the sweet scents which rise from the plants are a payment which the Sun receives from them in return for what he has done for them.—God is to us as the Sun is to the plants. He fosters the growth of our souls (i.e. develops our faculties) by pouring down on us 'the efflux of his wisdom'; and it is our duty to use in his worship the powers which he has made to grow up in us. We ought then to
send up our songs of praise to God, to whose fostering we owe it that we have power to sing, as the plants give forth their fragrance to the Sun, to whose fostering they owe it that they have power to give forth fragrance.

[πρῶτος (πρῶτον ?) ἀνασχύν.] There is no reason to speak of the sunrise here. It is not 'on his first rising' only, but throughout the day, that the Sun both fosters the growth of plants and draws out their fragrance.

tῶν καρπῶν τὰς ἀπαρχὰς. The scent of the flowers is regarded as the 'firstlings' of the produce which the plants will yield when the fruit has ripened. The heat of the sun makes the flowers give forth their scent; and this is what is meant by saying that the Sun 'plucks the sweet odours of the plants with his rays'.

[καὶ κείρεσ αὐτῶ αἰ ἀκτίνες]. The notion might be illustrated by the carvings of Ikhnaton, the heretic king of Egypt, in which the sun-disk is depicted sending forth rays, each of which terminates in a hand.

[ἀνὰ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀρξαμένους καὶ.] This has nothing to do with the simile of the Sun. The interpolation was suggested by ἐκ τοῦ κρείττονος . . . ἢρχαμέθα in the preceding sentence.

tὰ [ἡμέτερα] τῶν ψυχῶν [ὑπὲρ]οὐράνια φυτα. This is a reminiscence of Pl. Tim. 90 a: πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐγγυγένειαν . . . ἡμᾶς αἴρειν, ὥς ὄντας φυτὸν οὐκ ἐγγείων ἀλλὰ οὐράνιον. See note on Ascl. Lat. I. 6 b, 'desuper deorsum radices pervenientes.'

καταχρωμένους τάλιν εἰς αὐτῷ(ν) [ ] [ ] τὴν βλάστην ἀπασαν. ἡ βλάστην ἀπασα is that in us which corresponds to πάντα τὰ βλαστήματα in the case of the plants nurtured by the Sun; that is, it means the faculties which God has developed in us by means of the ἀπόρροια τῆς ἐκείνου σοφίας which he has poured down on us. We must apply these faculties to the worship of Him from whom we have received them.

[γυμναστέον τὰ τῆς εὐφημίας]. The verb γυμνάζειν is meaningless in this context; it must have come from § 15, where γυμνασία is spoken of. But γυμναστέον may have taken the place of some other verbal in -τέον; and we might get a satisfactory construction for the sentence by writing ἀνοικτόν τὰ τῆς εὐφημίας (cf. τὴν εὐφημίαν ἀναφέρεσθαι πρότειν in § 12), and placing these words before καταχρωμένους. The praise which we send up to God corresponds to the scent which the sun's heat draws forth from the flowers.
§§ 11-12

[heten ημιν ἐπομβρύσσε] ἐπομβρύν τι τινι means 'to rain down something on something'. ἐπομβρύζειν is sometimes used in the same sense, but occurs also in the sense 'to water (something) with rain'. If we write ἥν άτος ημιν ἐπώμβρυσεν, and put this after την βλάστην ἄπασαν, we get a possible meaning: 'all the growth of faculties within us) which God has watered (with the ἄπορροια of his wisdom)', i.e. which God has fostered by showering down his wisdom on us. A mention of rain seems inappropriate in a sentence in which God is compared to the Sun; but perhaps the Sun, as lord of heaven, might be considered to send down rain upon the plants as well as light and heat.

A man speaking in Egypt would not be likely to mention 'rain' in this connexion; it may therefore be thought probable that this phrase at least, if not the whole oration, was written elsewhere than in Egypt. But the word ἐπομβρύζειν might perhaps be applied to irrigation also.

§ 12. το πατρι των ἡμετέρων ψυχών. In this paragraph the simile of the Sun is dropped, and the relation between God and men is described by a different figure; 'we are God's infant children'.


καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχουσιν.] This unduly anticipates αἰτητέων δὲ τὰ τῆς συγγνώμης κ.τ.λ. in § 13; and it is not wanted here, as the word προσώπων sufficiently implies that all is well when the children do the best they can.

τὸ μείζονα αὐτὸν εἶναι (τοῦ) τῶν ἐαυτοῦ γεννημάτων (ἐπαινοῦ). It would be absurd to say that 'the fact that God is greater than his offspring' redounds to his glory; it is small glory to a father that he is taller and stronger than his infant children. The thing which redounds to God's glory must be this,—that the utmost that men can say is too little to describe his greatness. Cf. Corp. I. 31: ἀγιος εἰ, θο ἱερά τῶν (πάντων ἑπαίνων.

τὸ δομογενὲς τῶν πατέρα ἀπειροδύναμον (εἶναι) καὶ ἀπειροτέρμονα. God's power and (goodness?) are infinite; (and we, being finite, are incapable of describing what is infinite.) All that we can say in praise of God amounts to no more than acknowledging this.
ἀπειροτέρμων does not occur elsewhere. It ought to signify 'having infinite boundaries or limits'; but that, if it means anything at all, can only mean what would be more clearly expressed by ἀνεκάθεν or ἀτέρμων.

§ 13. [ὑπὸ τοῦ] ἀνθρώπου, ἀπερ ἐκγένος [ἐπὶ] ἐκεῖνον τυγχάνοις, τὰ τῆς εὐφημίας ἐνεωτὸν. The sentence interrupts the sequence of thought. It is probably part of an explanatory note on the paragraph.

§ 13. ἄνωτέρου τοῦ [καὶ] τοῦς [ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως, ὡστὶ δὲ] καὶ [ἡμᾶς . . .]. In the preceding sentence, it was said that God pardons us for the inadequacy of our praise. In this sentence, the speaker goes further, and says that God not only pardons us, but takes pleasure in our praise, inadequate though it be. For χαίρειν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως, cf. Corp. I. 31: ἄγνω ὁ θεός, δὲ γνωσθῆναι βούλεται.

καὶ τὴν εἰς θεὸν εὐφημίαν ἢμὶν εὐφρήσατο. The subject of εὐφρήσατο must be God; and its object cannot be τῆς εὐφημίας, but might be τὴν τῆς εὐφημίας δύναμιν, 'our power to praise him.' Perhaps the original may have been something like (ὁ θεός) τὴν τῆς εὐφημίας δύναμιν ἢμὶν εὐφρήσατο; and it is possible that this may have come from a note on the simile of the Sun in § 11. It is fitting that we should praise God, because it is from him that we have received our power to praise.

§ 14. ἐν δὲ αὐτῷ τῆς οἰκείας ἀριστερείας (ἀπειρεφείας MSS.) ἑκὼν τὸ πέρας. God's pre-eminence is limited by himself alone, i.e. by nothing external to him. This seems to be a roundabout way of saying that God's greatness is infinite. God is αὐτοπρέπον, and therefore ἀπερίφραστος. Compare the use of αὐτογέννητος as an equivalent for αὐτογέννητος.

ἀδάνατος δὲ ὂν, καὶ [ἐν αὐτῷ] τὴν ἀτελευτητὴν λήξειν [περίχων] [ . . . ] ἀπὸ τῆς [ . . . ] ἑνεχθείας καὶ εἰς τὸν κόσμον παρέχων. ἐν αὐτῷ has been repeated by error; and περίχων is a doublet of παρέχων. —τὴν ἀτελευτητὴν λήξειν must be taken to mean τὴν τῆς ἀτελευτητικῆς λήξειν, 'its appointed lot of endless existence'. God, being himself immortal (or eternal), bestows everlasting duration on the Kosmos. Cf. Pl. Tim. 39 b and 41 b; Corp. VIII. 2 as emended: ὁ δὲ κόσμος ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς αἰδίον ὄντος ἀδάνατος γέγονεν.

τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν εἰς διασωστικὴν εὐφημίαν. The sentence ends with these meaningless words; and the rest of the 'praise of God' with which the oration concluded has been lost.