FALSIFICATIONS
OF THE
RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK

Actual Exchange of Telegrams Between
Paris and St. Petersburg at the
Outbreak of the War

EDITED BY
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With the Approval of the German Foreign Office

NEW YORK B. W. HUEBSCH, INC. MCMXXXIII
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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

For the documents that appeared in the Russian Orange Book I consulted both the French and English texts as given by von Mach in his book "Official Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War."

H. W.
Everybody has heard of the origin and significance of the so-called color books which were issued by the different governments after the outbreak of the war and, being composed of official documents, pretended to give an authentic representation of the diplomatic negotiations just previous to the war. Owing their existence less to a desire for moral vindication than to a well planned political design, these books all had but one aim: to prove that the enemy alone was responsible for the catastrophe. One cannot overestimate the influence they exercised on public opinion, especially during the first months of the war. The layman was convinced that now he had before him the whole documentary material which, only a few days ago, had been the jealously guarded secret of diplomatic offices, and he felt
able henceforth to form his own opinion, to weigh out the exact amount of praise or condemnation due to the different Powers and their responsible leaders. Thus began the acute state of war psychosis during which the individual lost all power of realizing how much he was being led, not to say duped, and to what degree of bias and impotence his judgment had been degraded by the propaganda—in some countries startlingly brilliant—of political wire-pullers.

Even the scientific historical researches, begun soon after the outbreak, which tried to ascertain the true reasons for the war, have been influenced to a considerable degree by these various color books: the English Blue Book, the French Yellow Book, the German White Book, the Russian Orange Book, etc. This can easily be understood since for a long while they were the only documentary evidence available. On the other hand it was just this historical research work which finally made the first breach in the bulwark of the color books, and shook the naïve faith in their authority and in the infallibility of their thesis. For it is evident that
a critical analysis of the color books and a comparison of their documents with each other as well as with the events described must lead to two conclusions: in the first place it becomes clear that some of these documents have not been reproduced honestly, that they have been tampered with, shortened, or altered, to fit a certain tendency; in the second place one cannot but feel that the choosing of the documents themselves has been done arbitrarily, that some important telegrams have been deliberately left out, in favor of others which merely served as padding. Further than this, however, critical analysis could not proceed for there was as yet no possibility of reaching new documentary matter from which the falsifications might have been righted, the suppressed parts supplied.

In this respect the present publication forms a valuable supplement to the Official Russian Orange Book, and fully obviates the two great shortcomings mentioned above as far as the exchange of telegrams between Paris and St. Petersburg is concerned. The documentary matter which is here published for the first
time enables the reader himself to detect the falsifications and supply the omissions, thereby giving him an authentic instead of an arbitrary collection. To the scientific investigation of war-causes this opens up new vistas.

Being considered of especial importance, the telegrams from and to the Embassy at Paris were numerically predominant in the Official Russian Orange Book of 1914. The original numbers of the telegrams, however, had been omitted here as in other collections of the kind, so the reader should not grow suspicious at the great gaps and infer the suppressions which, as we now can see, comprised some of the most important telegrams. In this present publication the original numbers of the telegrams have all been retained, which helps in the consecutive study of the documents; for identification becomes extremely difficult when assisted only by the date and references to previous communications in the text. The Paris telegrams from July 24 to August 2, 1914, bear the consecutive numbers 184 to 226. They are all to be found in this present publication with the exception of numbers 199, 200, 205, 211 and [iv]
213, which, being without political importance and having no bearing on the development of the crisis, would only interrupt the continuity of the other documents. However, to give the reader the chance to judge for himself, a synopsis of each of these five telegrams has been given in a special appendix at the end of this pamphlet.

Thus it is the political correspondence of the Russian Embassy at Paris from July 24 to August 2, 1914, which forms the contents of this book. From this watch-tower we now can overlook the trend of events as mirrored in Paris. And with it we have won a new, honest, absolutely objective starting point for the final clearing up of the question of war guilt.

Even a superficial comparison of the documents in this publication with those in the Official Orange Book gives surprising results. One can actually say that it contains everything that is necessary to prove that the ideas the German people had formed of French and Russian tactics were correct. As to the German diplomat who was used to hearing his foreign colleagues express their intentions in
certain harmless-sounding conventional formulas—he must find a piquant interest in now perceiving how they spoke and wrote about these same matters among themselves.

It is of course impossible within the space of this preface to examine more closely the new viewpoints which arise from the exposure of these falsifications. This must be left to a thorough study of the inner connections of events.

The footnotes which accompany the documents and call attention to their interrelations are intended only to assist the reader’s memory and, as such, I trust they fulfill their aim. The falsifications and omissions themselves, printed in this book with black type, speak an eloquent language of their own.

The reader must not expect that this booklet gives exhaustive information about the causes that brought on the war. He must realize that, although the crisis following the murder at Sarajevo claims high historical and political importance, it yet was only the external impact which precipitated the outbreak, not its actual, underlying cause. Still, in this
crisis as in a crystal, one sees reflected the fundamental opposition of Austrian and Russian interests in the Balkans which characterized the whole political history of the last decades and which, at first side by side, but finally closely allied with the French plans for revanche, has been the gravest menace to European peace.

This opposition was deeply rooted in the oldest political traditions of both Vienna and Petersburg. It stood out as clear as day in the Austrian and Russian estimates of the situation created by the Serajevo murder. As was to have been expected, however, Entente propagandists paid no attention to these facts. To them the conflict was "deliberately brought about by Austria-Hungary—with the approval and assistance of Germany—to crush Serbia, become leader in the Balkans, and alter the Balance of Power in favor of the Central Empires."

In the political circles of the Entente countries, and especially among their responsible leaders, these statements of course were not taken seriously for a moment. Yet they had them hammered into the public opinion of the
whole world. And now only, thanks to historical research and serious journalism, does one slowly begin to realize that the opposition of Austrian and Russian interests in the Balkans was the core and cause of the world conflict.

How great the danger inherent in this opposition really was had probably never been realized by the general public, especially since both Powers had chosen the same motto for their Balkan policy and mutually approved of it. This motto, well beloved among diplomats, was: "preserving the status quo." Unfortunately nobody seemed to realize that each side gave these words an absolutely different meaning. To Austria it meant the preserving of her economic interests in the Balkans as a preliminary condition to her existence as a great power—to Russia it meant the prevention of all non-Slavic influences from interfering with the old oriental dreams of Muscovite expansion. This opposition explains that, the Powers being grouped as they were, the question of preserving the status quo in the Balkans was at the same time the question of keeping the Balance of Power in Europe.

[viii]
One can understand this better if one differentiates between a static (Austrian) and a dynamic (Russian) status quo. But perhaps a review of the different stages of both countries’ Balkan politics will be more enlightening than mere words. As far as Austria is concerned, there was in 1908 the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, perhaps a hasty measure, but one that created no new condition, only sanctioned an old one; then the creation of an autonomous Albania and the prevention of Serbia’s gaining access to the Adriatic, thereby producing a counterbalance to the Balkan states’ greatly increased size and vigor since the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913. As far as Russia is concerned, there was its behavior during the annexation crisis, Racconigi, fathering of the Balkan bloc, and, as logical sequence, of the Balkan wars, then France’s active support of Russia against Austria (compare Poincaré’s autograph letter of Nov. 4, 1912), the prying loose of Roumania from the Three Power Treaty, and finally the planning of a union between Serbia and Montenegro. In short: on one side the desire to preserve the old, on the
other the desire to evolve the new. At the same time Austria’s static methods, on account of her choice of means, often seemed more aggressive than the secret underground agitations of Russia—just as the occasionally spectacular politics of the young German Empire were in fact eminently conservative, solely concerned with keeping its place in the sun, while the other powers quietly but ruthlessly usurped one of the sunny places after another.

In the Balkans the dynamic method naturally was more effective than the static one. This explains why, in 1914, when the crisis came, Austria had not to fight for her economic interests alone, but already she had to ward off encroachments which threatened her very existence. Austria felt that she had to teach Serbia a lesson, to stop once and for all the menace of subterranean Serbian explosives. In this sense the conflict actually was only an Austro-Serbian matter which it seemed possible to localize. At any rate it had to be settled now, for otherwise the constant danger at her flank would have weakened Austria to such an extent as to throw the whole of Europe out of
balance and disturb the static status quo. It was this question of keeping the Balance of Power which decided Germany in the critical days of 1914.

Russia however regarded the controversy in a very different light, for an Austro-Serbian conflict, even if it should be localized, would necessarily put an end—at least in the western Balkans—to the pan-Slavic evolution she had backed since 1908. Both Russia and France favored a gradual compulsory shifting of the European balance in favor of the Entente through the organic development of its powers. Consequently anything that might disturb the dynamic status quo was regarded by them with alarm.

These short explanations may suffice to show the reader how, contrary to the naively simple thesis of Entente propaganda, the problems of July, 1914, were of enormous significance and widest bearing. Against the dark background of these complicated interrelations we must visualize the negotiations in the following documents, if we wish to come nearer an understanding of the real causes of the war.
Aside from the valuable insight into France’s and Russia’s diplomatic treatment of circumstances leading directly towards war, we owe the present publication yet another enlightenment of extraordinary import: its destroying fundamentally once and for all the legend of a German surprisal of unsuspecting France. This coarsest of all Entente legends has done us immeasurable harm. French chauvinism still feasts upon it, and even to-day one dares repeat it to the French masses—although every Frenchman ought to emphatically reject the imputation that otherwise France would have spurned her duties as an ally and not have entered the war.

It now has been proved authentically (1) that France from the very beginning of difficulties shared Russia’s views, (2) that, contrary to Germany’s efforts in Vienna, she always categorically refused to use her influence in restraining Petersburg and even, by repeated assurances of her unconditional support, strengthened that Government’s will to fight, (3) that from the first she was determined to make war and had advised Petersburg accordingly be-[xii]
fore any decision about war or peace had been reached (telegram 216 from Paris), and (4) that she omitted declaring war on Germany because she thought it more effective, with respect to public opinion in France and England, if the first move should come from the German side (telegrams 218, 222, 225, 226).
EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS

Plain Type—text compared with the original documents and found to have been correctly given in the Official Russian Orange Book.

Black Type—the falsifications and suppressions of the Official Russian Orange Book, established by comparison with the original documents.

[R. O. B.]—stands for Russian Orange Book.
**LIST OF TELEGRAMS**

**I**

**TELEGRAMS FROM THE RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY AT PARIS**

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**TELEGRAM FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT PETERSBURG TO THE FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE**

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**Telegrams from the Russian Embassy at Paris to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs**

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DOCUMENTS

RUSSIAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT PARIS TO RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Telegram No. 184. [R. O. B. No. 8.]

Paris, July (11,) 24, 1914.

A copy of the note officially presented at Belgrade has to-day been communicated to the French Government by the Austrian Ambassador, with the addition of a detailed statement of reasons which already was published in the papers. The German Ambassador later visited the Minister and read to him a communication containing the Austrian arguments, and indicating that in case of a refusal or aggressive attitude on the part of Serbia, Austria would be obliged to resort to pressure and, in case of need, to military measures. The communication ended with the observation that, in the opinion of Germany, this question ought to be settled between Austria and Serbia direct, that it was to the advantage of the Powers to localize the affair by leaving it to the interested

1 Bienvenu-Martin, French Minister of Justice, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during Viviani's visit in Petersburg. [4]
parties, and that Germany ardently desired the localization of the conflict, for the interference of another Power would, on account of existing treaties, bring on incalculable consequences. The Acting Head of the Political Department, who was present at the interview, asked the Ambassador whether the Austrian action should be considered as an ultimatum or only as a mise en demeure—in other words whether, in the event of Serbia not submitting entirely to the Austrian demands, hostilities were inevitable. The Ambassador avoided a direct reply, alleging that he had no instructions. But from his tone one could imply that the hope of a settlement of the incident through Austro-Serbian negotiations is not as yet lost. As Berthelot further told me, former Minister Pichon to-day had a conference with the Austrian Ambassador from which he also gained the impression that Austria does not consider her measure an unconditional ultimatum.

Sevastopuolo.

* * *

* Berthelot.
The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

To Russian Chargé d’Affaires at Vienna.

Communicated also to London, Rome, Paris, and Belgrade

Telegram No. 1488. [R. O. B. No. 4.]

Petersburg, July (11,) 24, 1914.

Please convey the following message to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs:

The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help smooth away the difficulties which have arisen.

In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Serbian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the re-

[6]
sults of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Serbian Government.

A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

Prince Koudashev is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna, and we hope that the Government with whom you are accredited will adhere to the point of view set forth above, and will see their way to furnish similar instructions to their representative at Vienna.

Sazonov.

* * *

8 Prince N. Koudashev, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna.
Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 185. [R. O. B. No. 15.]


I have received your telegram No. 1488 respecting the extension of the time limit of the Austrian ultimatum, and have made the communication in accordance with your instructions. The French Representative at Vienna has been furnished with similar instructions. Sevastopulo.

* * *

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 186. [R. O. B. No. 19.]


Please refer to my telegram No. 184. L'Echo de Paris has to-day published, in not altogether correct form, the declarations made yesterday by the German Ambassador, and has added comment in which it character-
ized these utterances as being in the nature of threats. The German Ambassador, who is much upset by these disclosures, to-day visited Berthelot, and protested solemnly 'that his words in no wise bore the threatening character attributed to them. He stated that Austria had presented her note to Serbia without any definite understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless approved of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly, "the arrow once shot" (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided by her duties as an ally. The fact that Baron Schoen found it advisable to undertake this new step has in some respects quieted the Foreign Office, who consider it a sign that Germany does not seek war at any cost. On this occasion the Havas Agency published a communication from the German Embassy with the same meaning as to-day's explanations by Baron Schoen, in which it is pointed out that the Austrian note has not the character of an ultimatum but only signifies that an answer is demanded within a certain time; the communication further ex-

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*Acting Head of the Political Department for Foreign Affairs.*

[9]
plains that the German step only intends to localize the Austro-Serbian conflict. The exposures of L’Echo de Paris have caused a panic at to-day’s exchange. Meanwhile the absence of the President of the Republic and of the Prime Minister 5 prevents the Foreign Office from making any definite statement about present events. Public opinion, however, and the Press without distinction of party, is extremely agitated by occurrences; even Jaurès condemns the Austrian step which threatens to bring on a general war.

Sevastopuolo.

* * *

RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA

Telegram No. 1508. [R. O. B. No. 25.]

Petersburg, July (13,) 26, 1914.

I had a long and friendly conversation to-day with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. After discussing the ten demands addressed to Serbia, I drew his attention to the fact that,

5 René Viviani, French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
quite apart from the awkward form in which they were presented, some of them were quite impracticable, even if the Serbian Government should agree to accept them. Thus, for example, points one and two could not be carried out without recasting the Serbian press law and associations law, and to that it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupshćina. As for enforcing points four and five, this might lead to most dangerous consequences, and even to the risk of acts of terrorism directed against the Royal Family and against Pachitch, which clearly could not be the intention of Austria. With regard to the other points it seemed to me that, with certain changes of detail, it would not be difficult to find a basis of mutual agreement, if the accusations contained in them were confirmed by sufficient proof.

In the interest of the maintenance of peace which, according to Szapary, is as much desired by Austria as by the other powers, it is necessary to end the present tension as soon as possible. With this object in view it seems to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Am-
bassador should be authorized to enter into a private exchange of views with me, in order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of the (10,) 23, of July with me. This method of procedure would perhaps enable us to find a formula which would be acceptable to Serbia while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect to her chief demands. Please convey the substance of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and friendly manner.

SAZONOV.

Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy.

*   *   *

RUSSIAN CHARGÉ D’AFFAIRES AT PARIS TO THE RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Telegram No. 187. [R. O. B. No. 28.]

Paris, July (13,) 26, 1914.

The German Ambassador again visited the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs* to-day, and made to him the following declaration:

* Bienvenu-Martin.
“Austria has declared to Russia that she does not desire territorial acquisitions, and that she harbors no designs against the integrity of Serbia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace, and to act the police. Consequently it rests with Russia to prevent war. Germany is at one with France in her ardent desire to preserve peace, and she sincerely hopes that France will exercise a moderating influence in Petersburg.”

The Minister pointed out that Germany on her part might well act on similar lines in Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit displayed by Serbia. The Ambassador replied that such a course was not possible, owing to the decision not to intervene in the Austro-Serbian dispute. The Minister then asked whether the four Powers—Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France—could not make representations at Petersburg and Vienna, since the matter amounted, in effect, to a dispute between Austria and Russia. The Ambassador alleged that he had no instructions.

7 The suppressed words state clearly the Austrian-German view of how the conflict with Serbia is to be treated; Russia however never agreed with this view.
Finally the Minister refused to agree to the German proposal, because of the Prime Minister's absence. Berthelot unfortunately was not present at this conference.  

Sevastopulo.

* * *

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 188. [R. O. B. No. 29.]

Paris, July (13,) 26, 1914.

The Director of the Political Department has expressed the personal opinion that the series of representations made by Germany at Paris aim at intimidating France, and at securing her intervention at Petersburg. Taking all the facts together and considering the whole attitude of Germany and Austria-Hungary, he is inclined to think that these Powers desire a brilliant diplomatic victory, but do not

8 This sentence was suppressed in the Orange Book, because through it the view which Berthelot expresses in telegram 188—that Germany was trying to intimidate France—would have been greatly weakened.

9 Compare footnote 8 to telegram 187 from Paris.

[14]
want war at any price, although in the extreme case they would not retreat before it. He considers energetic and emphatical representations by England as promising to be effective in Berlin.

Sevastopuolo.

* * *

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 189. [R. O. B. No. 27.]

Paris, July (13,) 26, 1914.

The Director of the Political Department informs me that, upon his informing the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador of the contents of the Serbian reply to the ultimatum, the Ambassador did not conceal his surprise that it failed to satisfy Giesl. In the opinion of the Director of the Political Department Serbia's conciliatory attitude should produce the best impression in Europe.

Sevastopuolo.

* * *

10 The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Belgrade.
RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO
RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT PARIS

Telegram No. 1521. [R. O. B. No. 32.]

Petersburg, July (14,) 27, 1914.

I am referring to Sevastopolu’s telegram No. 187 and my telegram No. 1508. The British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cab-

11 Although Vienna considered it inadmissible to remodel in collaboration with Russia the note it already had presented to Serbia, it yet was ready to further negotiate with Petersburg. This readiness which is recognizable in the further course of events and must be credited to Germany’s influence, can also be traced in the suppressed telegram 1592 from Petersburg.
inet are to prove impossible, I will be ready
to accept the British proposal or any other
proposal of a kind that would bring about a
favorable solution of the conflict.

I wish however to clear up in time a mis-
understanding which found its way into the
answer the Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs 12 gave to the German Ambassador at
Paris regarding counsels of moderation to be
given to the Imperial Cabinet. We have to
reject these at the outset, 13 as we have, from
the beginning, taken a stand we cannot alter,
since we already met all the acceptable de-
mands of Austria-Hungary.

Sazonov.

Also communicated to London, Berlin,
Vienna, and Rome.

*   *

*  

12 Bienvenu-Martin.
13 Sazonov uses two kinds of measures, for he and his
confederates constantly insist that Germany use a moderating
influence in Vienna. Compare the suppressed telegrams 201
and 203 from Paris.
Referring to my telegram No. 1521.
I have taken note of the reply returned by the Serbian Government to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our expectations in its moderation, and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfaction to Austria. We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria, unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking a pretext for an expedition against Serbia.

Sazonov.

* * *

14 In the Orange Book the word “expedition” was supplemented by the word “war.” The changing of this one word clearly illustrates the difference between the Austrian and Russian points of view.
I refer to my telegram 187.

The conference mentioned in that telegram took place at about 5 o'clock. At 7 the German Ambassador called at the Ministry for the second time and talked over the situation with Berthelot, to find a way out. He emphatically insisted on excluding every possibility of a mediation or conference, but expressed the view that perhaps England might give advice in Vienna. He did, however, not make it clear whether this idea came from his Government or from himself. In the end he expressed the desire that a short account of the French-German negotiations in behalf of the conservation of peace be published. This account was published to-day.

Sevastopuolo.

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18 This whole telegram has been falsified in the Orange Book in which it is worded: "The German Ambassador discussed the situation again to-day at great length with the Director of the Political Department. The Ambassador laid great stress on the utter impossibility of any mediation or conference."
Russian Chargé d’Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 191. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, July (14,) 27, 1914.

The French Ambassador in Switzerland insists upon the suitableness of having the position of Russian Military Attaché to Switzerland filled as soon as possible.

Sevastopuolo.

* * *

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 192. [R. O. B. No. 36.]

Paris, July (14,) 27, 1914.

It is clear from your telegram No. 1508 that you were not then aware of the reply of the Serbian Government. The telegram from Belgrade informing me of it also took twenty hours to reach us. The telegram from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent the day before yesterday at eleven o’clock in the morning, at special triple rate, which contained instructions to hold our ground, only reached

[20]
its destination at six o'clock. There is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed by the Austrian telegraph office.

Isvolsky.

* * *

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 193. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, July (14,) 27, 1914.

Just returned. I have again taken over the management of the Embassy.

Isvolsky.

* * *

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 194. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, July (14,) 27, 1914.

The President of the Republic foregoes his visits to Copenhagen and Christiania and will be back here on Wednesday.

Isvolsky.

* * *

[21]
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 195. [R. O. B. No. 35.]

Paris, July (14, 27, 1914.

Directly after my return to Paris I discussed the situation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the presence of Berthelot and Abel Ferry. They confirmed the information respecting the action taken by the German Ambassador, which Sevastopuolo already has telegraphed to you. This morning Baron Schoen confirmed his declaration of yesterday in writing, i. e.: "(1.) That Austria seeks no territorial acquisitions and that she harbors no designs against the integrity of Serbia. Her sole object is, to secure her own peace and quiet. (2.) That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war. (3.) That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent desire to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating influence upon Russia."

16 Under-Secretary of State in the French Foreign Office. His name was omitted on account of the suppression of second half of this telegram.

17 Although the omission of this word does not alter the general trend, it evidently was intended to make the Austrian assurances appear as unimportant as possible.

[22]
Baron Schoen laid special emphasis upon the expression of solidarity of Germany and France. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs is convinced that these steps on the part of Germany are taken with the evident object of alienating Russia and France, of inducing the French Government to make representations at Petersburg and of thus compromising our ally in our eyes; and finally, in the event of war, of throwing the responsibility not on Germany, who is ostensibly making every effort to maintain peace, but on Russia and France.

To-day at two, before the Austrian Ambassador's move which is described in my telegram No. 196, the German Ambassador called on Abel Ferry and, in the name of his Government, made a new proposal: "an intervention of France and Germany with Russia and Austria-Hungary." Abel Ferry replied that he would make the proposal known to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and only remarked that he thought it would be more suitable to leave intervention to the Four Powers. To this Baron Schoen personally agreed. The
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he does not quite understand this new move of Baron Schoen's, that, however, he mistrusts it, and has the intention of merely telling him tomorrow that he will give him the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ answer on Wednesday, when he shall have returned to Paris. At any rate, I was surprised how well the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and his colleagues understand the situation, and how firm and quiet is their decision to give us fullest support and to avoid even the smallest suspicion of a disagreement with us.18

Isvolsky.

* * *

**RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT PARIS TO RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

Telegram No. 196. [R. O. B. No. 37.]

Paris, July (14,) 27, 1914.

On the instructions of his Government, the Austrian Ambassador has informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that Serbia’s

18 The second half of this telegram was omitted in the Orange Book, because it proved too clearly the unjustifiably distrustful, unfriendly attitude of France, which precluded the success of any German step in Paris.
answer has not been considered satisfactory in Vienna, and that to-morrow, Tuesday, Austria will proceed to take "energetic action" to force Serbia to give the necessary guarantees. The Minister having asked what form such action would take, the Ambassador replied that he had no exact information on the subject but it might mean an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, or a crossing of the Serbian frontier.¹⁹

Isvolsky.

* * *

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs
Telegram No. 197.²⁰ [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, July (14,) 27, 1914.

Jules Cambon²¹ telegraphed from Berlin that, in answer to his question of what attitude Germany would take towards a partial mo-

¹⁹ In the Orange Book the end is worded: "it might mean either the crossing of the Serbian frontier, or an ultimatum, or even a declaration of war," the latter eventuality being subsequently represented as an especially sharp measure of pressure.

²⁰ This telegram was altogether suppressed in the Orange Book, being an inconvenient proof of Germany's not unconditionally warlike attitude.

²¹ French Ambassador at Paris.
mobilization of Russia, Jagow stated that such a mobilization would not be followed by German mobilization but that, in case of a Russian attack upon Austria, Germany would at once retaliate by attacking Russia.

Isvolsky.

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Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at London and Paris

Telegram No. 1528. [R. O. B. No. 43.]

Petersburg, July (15,) 28, 1914.

My conversations with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is rather in agreement with Austria’s inflexibility. The Cabinet of Berlin, which could have stopped the whole development of the crisis, seems to exercise no influence upon its ally.

The Ambassador found the answer of Serbia

22 German Secretary of State.
23 In the Orange Book the words more than ever were added here.
24 This means that Germany shared as such the Austrian view of the symptomatic and, for the Monarchy, vital importance of the Sarajevo murder.

[26]
insufficient. This German attitude is especially alarming.

It seems that, better than any other Power, England would be in a position to induce the German Government to the necessary action. It is in Berlin that, without doubt, the key to the whole situation can be found.²⁵

Sazonov.

* * *

RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO
RUSSIAN AMBASSADORS AT LONDON,
PARIS, VIENNA, BERLIN,
AND ROME

Telegram No. 1538. [R. O. B. No. 48.]

Petersburg, July (15,) 28, 1914.
Referring to my telegram No. 1521.
In face of the declaration of war²⁶ between

²⁵ This is to imply that the true reason for Austrian unyieldingness is to be found in Berlin.
²⁶ In the Orange Book this reads: “In view of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia it is necessary that England, etc.” This is a double falsification. On the one hand hostilities had not commenced at that time (compare the first suppressed sentence of telegram 1544 from Petersburg). On the other hand, the suppressed part of the sentence proves that it was Petersburg, and not Vienna, who first refused to consent to direct negotiations between the two Cabinets.

[27]
Austria-Hungary and Serbia my direct negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador evidently are useless. It is necessary that Great Britain should take instant mediatory action, and that the military measures undertaken by Austria against Serbia be immediately suspended. Otherwise mediation will only serve as an excuse to make the question drag on, and meanwhile make it possible for Austria to crush Serbia completely.²⁷

Sazonov.

* * *

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris

Telegram No. 1539. [R. O. B. No.—]

Petersburg, July (15,) 28, 1914.

I telegraphed to Berlin:
Following Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war to Serbia we shall to-morrow announce

²⁷ In the Orange Book this continues: “and to assume a ruling position in the Balkans.” This addition clearly intends to present the Austro-Serbian conflict, which in fact and in the opinion of most Powers could have been localized, as a question of the European Balance of Power.

[28]
mobilization in the military departments of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kasan. In bringing this to the attention of the German Government, repeat that Russia entertains no intentions of aggression towards Germany. Our Ambassador in Vienna has as yet not been called home.

London, Vienna, and Rome informed.

Sazonov.

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Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris

Telegram No. 1540. [R. O. B. No.—]

Petersburg, July (15,) 28, 1914.

You may communicate the contents of my telegram No. 1539 to the Government with whom you are accredited.

Sazonov.

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28 This whole telegram was suppressed in the Orange Book, because it proves beyond doubt that the Serbian and Russian mobilization was far ahead of the Austrian military preparations which so far had been directed only against Serbia, and that Russia therefore had no reason to consider herself menaced.

[29]
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 198. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, July (15,) 28, 1914.

Your telegram No. 1521 has been received. I consider it my duty to make it clear that, as follows from yesterday's conference at the Quai d'Orsay, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs does not for a moment admit the possibility of exercising a moderating influence in Petersburg. The only reply he made to the German Ambassador was, that it is not Russia but Austria who endangers the peace, and that, in any case, if there was question of any moderating influence, this should be exercised not only in Petersburg, but first of all in Vienna. As a result of his conversation with Baron Schoen the Minister declined to accept the German proposal.

Isvolsky.

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29 Here again two kinds of measures are being used. Compare note 13 to telegram 1521 from Petersburg, and the ending of the suppressed telegram 201 from Paris.

[30]
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 201.⁸⁰ [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, July (15,) 28, 1914.

The German Ambassador again called upon the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day and declared that, although he had to make no communication or proposal of an official nature, he yet wished to talk with him about the present condition and about ways and means for the omission of steps which it might be impossible later to retrace. He added that it is Germany’s sincere wish to coöperate with France in the maintenance of peace. In answer to the Minister’s remark that England had come forward with a plan for mediation by the four Powers and that this plan already had been accepted by France and Italy, Baron Schoen said that Germany is ready to join the negotiations of the Powers, provided that these negotiations should not take the form

⁸⁰ This completely suppressed telegram is very valuable in disclosing Germany’s whole attitude during the crisis. In reference to the impossibility of Germany exercising strong pressure in Vienna, compare note 13 to telegram 1521 from Petersburg, and the suppressed telegram 198 from Paris.
of a court of arbitration or a conference, to which form Austria would be unable to consent. To this the Minister answered that, in case the Austrian Government objected to the form only, one would be able to reach the same end by different means, and that it would be very easy for the German Government to insist that Austria grant the Powers time to find a conciliatory way out. Baron Schoen replied that he had no instructions relative to this, but that he was well aware that Germany would be unable to exercise pressure upon Austria. With this the Ambassador complained of the French press which accuses Germany in, as he professes, an unjust way of goading on Austria. According to him it is true that Germany approves of Austria’s acts, but that she had not previously been informed of the contents of the Austrian note. He stated that the German Government cannot in too brusque a way stay the arm of Austria, who must be granted guarantees for Serbia’s conduct. Finally the Ambassador once more confirmed that Germany is ready, in coöperation
with the other Powers, to work for peace.

Isvolsky.

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RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO
RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT PARIS

Telegram No. 1544.  [R. O. B. No. 49.]

Petersburg, July (16,) 29, 1914.

I telegraphed to Berlin referring to my tele-
gram No. 1521.

The German Ambassador informs me, in the
name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not
ceased to exercise a moderating influence at
Vienna, and that she will continue to do so,
even after the declaration of war. Up to this
morning there has been no news that the Aus-
trian army has crossed the Serbian frontier.31

I have begged the Ambassador to express my
thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenor
of his communication. I have informed him of
the military measures taken by Russia, none
of which, I told him, were directed against
Germany. I added that neither should they be

31 Compare note 26 to telegram 1538 from Petersburg.

[33]
taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation being the mobilization of the greater part of the Austrian army.

The Ambassador said that he was in favor of direct explanations between the Austrian Government and ourselves, and I too was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government to which he had referred, found an echo in Vienna. I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of finding the most suitable methods for a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four Powers—Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year’s crisis.

I told the Ambassador that, after the con-
cessions which had been made by Serbia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria[^32] showed some good will, and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

Sazonov.

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Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris

Telegram No. 1547. [R. O. B. No.—]

Petersburg, July (16,) 29, 1914.

I request you to communicate the contents of my telegram No. 1544 to the Government with whom you are accredited. Telegrams of same contents sent to London and Nisch.[^33]

Sazonov.

* * *

[^32]: An attempt to shift the whole responsibility on Austria.
[^33]: Communication of these telegrams to Nisch hardly could serve to make the Serbian Government more yielding.

[35]
RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO
RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT PARIS

Telegram No. 1548. [R. O. B. No. 50.]

Petersburg, July (16,) 29, 1914.

Referring to my telegram No. 1544.

At the time of my interview with the German Ambassador I had not yet received M. Shebèko's telegram No. 105. The contents of

34 Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Telegram No. 105. [R. O. B. No. 45.]

Vienna, July (15,) 28, 1914.

I spoke to Count Berchtold to-day in the sense of your Excellency's instructions. I brought to his notice in the most friendly manner how desirable it would be to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Serbia.

I drew Count Berchtold's attention to all the dangers which an armed conflict between Austria and Serbia would mean to the peace of Europe.

Count Berchtold replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with Petersburg. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had decided much against their will on the energetic measures taken against Serbia, now could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussions about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of intensity, that the Government, even should they wish to, no longer could consent to such a course. This was all the more

[36]
this telegram constitute a refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government. From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government’s taking the initiative in any steps which they may consider advisable.

Sazonov.

Communicated to Vienna, Rome, Berlin, Nisch, Constantinople and Bucharest.

* * *

impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Serbian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Serbia's promises for the future. He evidently was much perturbed by the news of Montenegro's mobilization, and expressed his surprise at this act which in his opinion was wholly unwarranted. From this conversation I gained the impression that the Austro-Hungarian Government wish to deliver a blow at Serbia, to raise their prestige in the Balkans as well as in their own country, but that they count on Germany's help and on the other Powers' love of peace, to localize the conflict.


35 In opposition to this assertion it must be emphasized that, in spite of all this, Austria wished for a localization of her conflict with Serbia, and that the Vienna Cabinet's refusal which Sazonov quotes referred only to a remodelling, with Russia, of the note to Serbia—not to direct negotiations with the Petersburg Cabinet. Compare note 11 to telegram 1521 from Petersburg, and the suppressed telegram 1592 from Petersburg.

[37]
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris

Telegram No. 1551. [R. O. B. No. 58.]

Petersburg, July (16,) 29, 1914.

The German Ambassador to-day informed me of the decision of his Government to mobilize, if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now, in point of fact, we only began these preparations in consequence of the mobilization of eight army corps already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Serbia.

As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten our own military preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French Government of this and add that we are sincerely grateful to them for the declaration which the French Ambassador made to me on their behalf, to the effect that we could count fully upon the assistance of our ally, France. Under existing circumstances this declaration is especially valuable to us. It is much
to be desired that England, without losing time, join France and Russia, for only in this way can she succeed in preventing a dangerous shifting of the Balance of Power.  

Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany.

Sazonov.

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Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris

Telegram No. 304. [R. O. B. No.—]

Petersburg, July (16,) 29, 1914.

I request you to urgently communicate to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs the following telegram from the French Ambassador at Petersburg:

"The German Ambassador has just declared to M. Sazonov that, in case Russia should not discontinue her military preparations, the German army would receive orders to mobilize.

The extraordinary significance of this whole communication of Sazonov's becomes clear, when we consider Isvolsky's answer. See the suppressed telegrams 208, 209, 210, from Paris.

[39]
M. Sazonov answered that the Russian preparations were caused (1.) by the unyielding spirit of Austria, (2.) by the fact that already eight Austro-Hungarian army corps have been mobilized. The tone in which Count Pourtalès made his statement has caused the Russian Government to at once order the mobilization of the thirteen army corps which are intended against Austria-Hungary.”

Sazonov.

* * *

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs
Telegram No. 202. [R. O. B. No.—]
Paris, July (16,) 29, 1914.

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that the German Ambassador communicated with him this morning, about as follows: Germany continues her efforts in Vienna, to induce Austria to a friendly exchange of opinions which would decide the aim and scope of the steps undertaken by her and of which Germany

37 Compare note 28 to the suppressed telegram 1539 from Petersburg. In that telegram, by the way, Sazonov alleges that it is the Austrian declaration of war—not the German Ambassador's tone—which causes Russia to mobilize.

38 Bienvenu-Martin.

[40]
as yet is not fully informed. The fact of the declaration of war will not stand in the way of this exchange of opinions, in the course of which Germany hopes to receive declarations which will satisfy Russia. Finally Baron Schoen once more protested against the allegations that Germany is encouraging Austria not to yield.

Isvolsky.

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RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT PARIS TO RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Telegram No. 203. [R. O. B. No. 53.]

Paris, July (16,) 29, 1914.

For the information of the President of the French Republic on his return, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had prepared a short summary of the present situation, approximately in the following terms: Austria, fearing internal disintegration, seized upon the assassination of the Archduke as an excuse for an attempt to obtain guarantees, which may assume the form of an occupation of Serbian military lines or even Serbian territory. Germany is supporting Austria and declares that, inasmuch as we receive the assurance that
Austria seeks no territorial acquisitions, the preservation of peace depends upon Russia alone, for it is a question of a matter which should be localized between Austria and Serbia, namely, the punishment of Serbia for her former policy, and the obtaining of guarantees for the future. Germany concludes from this that a moderating influence should be exerted at Petersburg. This sophism has been refuted both in Paris and London. In Paris, Baron Schoen vainly endeavored to induce France to adopt joint action with Germany towards Russia for the preservation of peace. The same attempts were made in London. In both capitals the answer was given that any action taken should be at Vienna, as it was Austria's inordinate demands, her refusal to discuss Serbia's few reservations, and her declaration of war, that threatened to bring on a general war. France and England are absolutely

39 Unfair omission, intended to remove all foothold from the German argumentation and justify the term “sophism” which is used further on. Another sign of the tendency which we characterized in note 17 to telegram 195 from Paris.

40 This word probably was suppressed in the Orange Book because public opinion scarcely would have shared such a view, especially since Germany was constantly being advised to use a moderating influence on her ally. Compare note 13 to telegram 1521 from Petersburg, and note 30 to the suppressed telegram 201 from Paris.

[42]
unable to bring any moderating pressure to bear upon Russia, as, so far, that Power has shown the greatest moderation, most particularly in her advice to Serbia to accept as much as possible of the Austrian note. Apparently Germany has now given up the idea of pressure upon Russia only, and inclines towards mediatory action both at Petersburg and Vienna, but at the same time both Germany and Austria are endeavoring to cause the question to drag on. Germany is opposing the conference, without suggesting any other practical course of action. Austria is continuing discussions at Petersburg which are manifestly of a procrastinating nature. At the same time she is taking active steps, and if these steps are tolerated, her claims will increase proportionately. It is highly desirable that Russia should lend all her support to the proposal for mediation which will be made by Sir E. Grey. In the contrary event, Austria, on the plea of guarantees, will actually be able to alter the territorial status of eastern Europe.

Isvolsky.

* * *

[43]
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 204. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, July (16,) 29, 1914.

The firm attitude taken by the French press continues. It severely judges the Austrian attack and apparent complicity of Germany; and without hesitation acknowledges the effect this must have upon us, insisting that we cannot remain indifferent. As far as French solidarity with us is concerned, this is considered as self-evident and not even thoroughly discussed. In this sense all journalists express themselves, among them such prominent personalities from the most diverse parties as Pichon, Clemenceau, and even 41 Jaurès, as well as the father of anti-militarism, Hervé.

Isvolsky.

* * *

41 When one remembers that Jaurès was assassinated soon afterwards, this little word "even" in the suppressed telegram takes on an almost sinister aspect.
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 206. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, July (16,) 29, 1914.

At his arrival in Paris the President of the Republic was greeted with demonstrations of sympathy by the crowds assembled at the station and in the streets. Margerie told me that the President, from conversations he has had during his trip with prefects and political personalities, has convinced himself of the firm, energetic, yet quiet spirit of public opinion, which clearly understands the true meaning of present events. This same spirit even prevails among a great many of the Radical Socialists. To the efforts of anti-militarist demonstrations by the revolutionary party the Government attributes no importance, and will use peremptory measures against them. Our military attaché reports fully about prepara-

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42 The Political Director of the French Foreign Office.
43 "The true meaning of events" to the French nation evidently lay much deeper than their superficial cause—the Austro-Serbian conflict.

[45]
tory military proceedings. The spirit in circles of the army and chiefs of command is very high. I will report in a special telegram about the attitude of the press.

Isvolsky.

* * *

RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT PARIS TO RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Telegram No. 207. [R. O. B. No. 55.]
Paris, July (16,) 29, 1914.

Viviani has just confirmed to me the French Government's firm determination to act in concert with Russia. This determination is upheld by all classes of society and by the political parties, including the Radical Socialists who have just addressed a resolution to the Government expressing the absolute confidence and the patriotic sentiments of their party. Since his return to Paris, Viviani has telegraphed an urgent message to London that, direct discussions between Vienna and Petersburg having ended, the London Cabinet should again put forward their proposal for mediation by the Powers as soon as possible under

"Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs."
one form or another. Before seeing me to-day Viviani saw the German Ambassador, and the latter again assured him of the peaceful intentions of Germany. Viviani having pointed out that if Germany wished for peace she should hasten to give her support to the British proposal for mediation, Baron Schoen replied that the words "conference" or "arbitration" alarmed Austria. Viviani retorted that it was not a question of words, and that it would be easy to find some other form of mediation. In the opinion of Baron Schoen it was necessary for the success of the negotiations between the Powers to know what Austria intended to demand from Serbia. Viviani answered that the Berlin Cabinet could quite easily make this enquiry of Austria, but that, meanwhile, the Serbian reply might well form the basis of discussion. Finally Baron Schoen complained of France's military preparations and said that, in this case, Germany would be forced to make the same arrangements. Viviani, for his part,

45 The suppression of this sentence characterized the beginning of the propaganda which is to blame the outbreak of the war on Germany. Of the same tenor are the telegrams 210, 214, 215, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 225, 226, from Paris, and 1554, 1637, and 304 (Paléologue's telegram) from Petersburg.
declared that France sincerely desires peace, but that at the same time she was firmly determined to act in complete harmony with her allies, and that he, Baron Schoen, might have convinced himself that this determination met with the warmest approval of the country. Viviani has forbidden an intended anti-militarist meeting of the revolutionary party which was to take place to-night.

Isvolsky.

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Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris
Telegram No. 1554. [R. O. B. No. 60.]
Petersburg, July (17,) 30, 1914.
I telegraphed to Berlin with reference to my telegram No. 1521.
No. 1: The German Ambassador who has just left me has asked whether Russia would be satisfied in case Austria promised not to violate the integrity of the Kingdom of Serbia. I answered that such a promise would not

46 In the Orange Book there is the addition and friends which was added later for England's sake. But the original wording of the Russian telegrams from Paris shows that French policy, from the very beginning, was based on the English alliance.

[48]
suffice. Upon the Ambassador’s urgent request to state under what conditions we would agree to suspend our military preparations, I dictated to him the declaration reproduced under No. 2, to be immediately forwarded to Berlin. Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question, for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany and Austria may gain time.\footnote{47}

No. 2: If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations.\footnote{48}

\begin{flushright}
Sazonov.
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\footnote{47 The Orange Book here adds: “to make military preparations.” Compare note 45 to the telegram 207 from Paris. \footnote{48 This formula of Sazonov’s meant no more, no less, than the demand that Austria-Hungary cancel her ultimatum to Serbia, which of course Vienna could not comply with.}}
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris

Telegram No. 1555. [R. O. B. No.—]

Petersburg, July (17,) 30, 1914.

Very urgent. I refer to my telegram No. 1554.

Until we shall have received through the German Government an absolutely satisfying answer from Austria, we shall continue our preparations for war. This is communicated to you very confidentially.  

Sazonov.

* * *

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 208. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, July (17,) 30, 1914.

Your telegram No. 1551 received.

This telegram reached me in the night and I communicated it at once, that is to say at three in the morning, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. According to my suggestions our

49 Useless to comment on this! In connection with the following suppressed telegram this declaration is important for the fixing of the date when general Russian mobilization began.
military Attaché made the same communication to the Minister of War. Poincaré, Viviani, and the Minister of War Messimy, at once had a conference at the Élysée, as a result of which a telegram of about the following contents was sent to the French Ambassador at Petersburg. The telegram begins with a reference to the instructions he received from the armoured cruiser "France." It then continues: "The French Government is ready to fulfill all their obligations as an ally. But they think that it would be appropriate at the present moment, while negotiations still are pending between the less interested Powers, if Russia, as far as the defensive and precautionary measures which she considers necessary permit, would not take any immediate steps which Germany might use as a pretext to order the general or partial mobilization of her forces." 50

Isvolsky.

* * *

50 The whole importance of this suppressed telegram becomes evident in connection with the telegram 1551 from Petersburg and the two following, also suppressed, telegrams 209 and 210 from Paris.

[51]
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 209. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, July (17,) 30, 1914.

Continuation of my telegram No. 208.

The contents of the telegram to the French Ambassador at Petersburg were at once transmitted to London, and Paul Cambon was charged to enter into immediate consultation with Grey, to decide on the mutual attitude of France and England, about which these two Powers, according to a general understanding existing between them, have to confer as soon as a period of political tension occurs.

Isvolsky.

* * *

51 French Ambassador at London.
52 The inquiry of P. Cambon's was made on account of the notes exchanged November 22, and 23, 1912, between P. Cambon and Grey, which formed the basis of the political and military agreement between England and France.
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 210. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, July (17,) 30, 1914.

Continuation of my telegram No. 209.

Margerie with whom I just spoke tells me that the French Government do not wish to interfere with our military preparations, that, however, they would consider it most desirable on account of the still continuing negotiations for the preservation of the peace, if these preparations were carried on in the least open, least provocative manner possible. For his part, the Minister of War expressed the same idea to our Military Attaché, and said we might declare that, in the higher, interests of peace, we were willing to slow down for the time being our preparations for mobilization, which would not hinder us to continue and even accelerate these preparations, but on so doing we would have to refrain as much as possible from the transportation of troops on a larger scale. At half past ten a ministerial conference will take place, presided over by Poincaré. After
its termination I shall at once see Viviani.\textsuperscript{53}

Isvolsky.

\* \* \*

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 212. \textsuperscript{[R. O. B. No.—]}

Paris, July (17,) 30, 1914.

The ministerial conference presided over by Poincaré expressed its approval of the telegram sent last night to the French Ambassador at Petersburg, as mentioned in my telegram No. 208.

Isvolsky.

\* \* \*

\textbf{Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris}

Telegram No. 1583. \textsuperscript{[R. O. B. No. 67.]}

Petersburg, July (18,) 31, 1914.

No. 1.

Please refer to my telegram No. 1554.

The British Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me of the

\textsuperscript{53} This telegram, suppressed in the Orange Book, is irrefutable proof that for Petersburg as well as for Paris all further negotiations in favor of peace, including the proposals of Grey and the efforts of Germany in Vienna, were merely a cloak behind which military preparations were secretly carried on in Russia as well as in France.

\textsuperscript{[54]}
wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications in the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Ambassador. I replied that I accepted the British suggestion. Accordingly I send you the text of the modified formula under No. 2. 

Sazonov.

* * *

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris

Telegram No. 1582. [R. O. B. No. 67.]

Petersburg, July (18,) 31, 1914.

No. 2. "If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory; and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude."

Also communicated to Berlin, Vienna, London, and Rome. 

Sazonov.

* * *

*54 The fact that Sazonov himself did not take his proposal [55]
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris

Telegram No. 1592. [R. O. B. No.—]

Petersburg, July (18,) 31, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador called on me and told me that his Government are ready to enter into an exchange of opinions in reference to the contents of the ultimatum sent to Serbia. I expressed my gratification and remarked to the Ambassador that it would be preferable to have these negotiations in London under participation of the Great Powers. We hope that the English Government will accept the management of this conference, whereby it would oblige all Europe to gratitude. To assist these negotiations to a successful end it is most desirable that Austria discontinue her military operations on Serbian territory.

seriously can be proved by the following: the telegram with his formula was sent from Petersburg in the evening of July 31st, at ten minutes after ten. And that same day in the morning the French Ambassador at Petersburg, Paleologue, confirmed to his Government “the full mobilization of the Russian army”—as is proved by the last sentence of the suppressed telegram 215 from Paris. One cannot then very well deny that the Russian Government must, by this time have had its decision made in favor of war. Sazonov’s proposal therefore proves the correctness of the view expressed in note 53, about Russia and France using all further negotiations merely as a cloak behind which to hide their war preparations.
Also communicated to London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.\

Sazonov.

* * *

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 214. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, July (18,) 31, 1914.

The French Ambassador telegraphed that Jagow asked him to call and told him that, to his greatest regret, Germany, in consideration of "the general mobilization of the Russian army" is forced to take up military precautions which conform to the German term "Kriegsgefahr" and include different measures such as the closing of the frontier, the proclaiming of martial law, etc. Germany asks Russia to demobilize, in default whereof she also will mobilize. The ministerial conference which at

55 Compare notes 52 and 53. As far as the readiness of Austria-Hungary in respect to direct negotiations with Russia is concerned, compare note 35 to telegram 1548 from Petersburg. In reference to Sazonov's demand, Austria should stop her military operations on Serbian territory, compare the telegram 210 from Paris.
once met under presidency of Poincaré decided to adopt the most complete measures in regard to the five army corps stationed near the frontier, said measures however not bearing the character of "mobilization." When Margerie told me this he added that France would immediately answer German mobilization by mobilizing her own forces. It should be noticed that a dispatch of the Havas Agency, received here from Berlin, also speaks of the "general mobilization of the Russian army," which suggests the idea that Germany endeavors, for one reason or another, to call forth a premature, analogous action on the side of France.

Isvolsky.

* * *

56 With regard to these five French frontier corps one should remember that on the very next day, August 1 (see the also suppressed telegram 217 from Paris) the Russian military attaché at Paris was able to notify his Government that they were in "full war-preparedness."

57 In the last sentence of this telegram Germany is suspected of having tried, by false news about Russian mobilization, to bring about French mobilization on July 31st, so as to shift responsibility for the outbreak of the war upon France. On reading this insinuation one is reminded of the German proverb: "Was ich denk und tu—Trau ich andern zu." For, on the one hand, the French preparations were already far advanced (see note 56), on the other hand the German news corresponded with the facts. (See last sentence of the suppressed telegram 215 from Paris.)
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 215. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, July (18,) 31, 1914.

At half past six in the evening the German Ambassador came to Viviani and declared in the name of his Government that, considering the "full mobilization of the Russian Army and Navy," Germany had been forced to adopt, measures which correspond to the German term "Kriegsgefahren." At the same time Germany demanded that Russia demobilize. Russia is granted twelve hours' time after which, in case of a declining answer, Germany also will mobilize. Baron Schoen added that he has been charged to inquire what attitude France would take in case of an armed encounter between Russia and Germany. Viviani listened to the Ambassador’s message but declined to give him any answer. Thereupon Baron Schoen said that he will come to-morrow at one for his answer, and begged in advance to give the necessary orders for his departure. At the moment a special ministerial conference is in session under presidency of the President.
of the Republic. Margerie, who just told me these particulars declared that in all probability Viviani would not give the Ambassador his answer to-morrow either, as he sees in Germany's proceedings a trick, to put the blame for a declaration of war upon France. Margerie added that a telegram from the French Ambassador at Petersburg, dated from this morning, had just been received, which confirms the full mobilization of the Russian army without adding any explanations whatsoever.58

Isvolsky.

* * *

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 216. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, July (18,) 31, 1914.

From the military Attaché to the Minister of War. At 1 A. M.

58 In reference to the great importance of the report from the French Ambassador about general Russian mobilization see notes 54 and 57. The propaganda mentioned in note 45 was now in full swing. To comprehend perfectly how deceitful Viviani was towards the German Ambassador when he refused an answer to a direct question on July 31st and had no intention of answering him the next day either, one must realize the contents of the suppressed telegram 216 from Paris.
The French Minister of War disclosed to me with hearty high spirits that the French Government have firmly decided upon war, and begged me to confirm the hope of the French General Staff that all our efforts will be directed against Germany and that Austria will be treated as a quantité négligeable 

Isvolsky.

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RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT PARIS

Telegram No. 1601. [R. O. B. No. 70.]

Petersburg, (July 19,) August 1, 1914.

At midnight the German Ambassador announced to me the instruction of his Government that, if within twelve hours, that is by noon on Saturday, we have not begun to demobilize, not only against Germany but also against Austria, the German Government will be compelled to give the order for mobilization. To my inquiry whether this meant war the Ambassador replied in the negative but added that we were very near war.

59 Compare note 58.

[61]
Same message to Ambassadors in Berlin, London, Vienna and Rome.

Sazonov.

* * *

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris

Telegram No.— [R. O. B. No.—]

Petersburg, (July 19,) August 1, 1914.
Germany has declared war upon us.

Sazonov.

* * *

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 217. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, (July 19,) August 1, 1914.
The military Attaché begs to inform your Excellency: Compilation in respect to army of July 19, Aug. 1: The six frontier corps, 14, 15, 16, 21, 8, and the Bavarian 2, are being reinforced with parts of the 7, 11, and perhaps 18, on the front German-Luxembourg-Belfort. Increased transportations of troops are taking place, the furnishing of horses is being termin-
ated. An early attack from Metz or the territory Saarburg-Bruges is possible. In France the five frontier corps are in full war readiness.  

Isvolsky.

* * *

RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT PARIS TO RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Telegram No. 218. [R. O. B. No. 73.]

Paris, (July 19,) August 1, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador yesterday saw Vivani twice and declared to him that Austria, far from harboring any designs against the integrity of Serbia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers. To-day the German Ambassador called on Viviani even before the time set by himself yesterday. Viviani expressed his surprise at his yesterday's move which, 

60 In respect to the five French frontier corps compare note 56.

61 Viviani's "surprise" over this step of the German Ambassador's must have been rather artificial: compare telegrams 210, 215, and 216 from Paris, all three suppressed.
he said, was not justified by the relations between France and Germany. Upon the Ambassador's explaining that, on account of the general mobilization of Russia's land and sea forces which evidently were not directed against Austria alone but also against Germany, Germany was forced to adopt energetic measures, Viviani replied that, according to information received here the mobilization of Russia's sea forces had not taken place. This visibly perplexed the Ambassador. As result of the long talk Baron Schoen did not repeat his demand of an answer about France's intentions, nor his threat of departure, and asked Viviani to receive him once more this evening at six. Although to-day the German Ambassador's conduct was more moderate, the French Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced that under the guise of "Kriegszustand" mobilization is in reality being carried out, which might put the French army into an unfavorable position. On the other hand it is very important for France on account of political considerations relative

62 This reference to the Russian naval forces is a barefaced sophism.
to Italy and most especially England, that the French mobilization should not precede the German one, but form the answer to the latter. This question is now being discussed in ministerial conference at the Elysée, and it is very possible that general mobilization will be decided upon.

Isvolsky.

* * *

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 219. [R. O. B. No. 74.]

Paris, (July 19,) August 1, 1914.

On the receipt in Paris of the telegram from the French Ambassador at Petersburg, reporting the communication made to you by the German Ambassador respecting Germany's decision to order general mobilization to-day, the President of the French Republic has signed the order for mobilization. Lists of the reservists called to the colors are being posted in the streets. The German Ambassador has just visited Viviani for the second time, but told him nothing fresh, alleging the impossibil-
ity to decipher the telegrams he has received. Viviani informed him of the signature of the order for mobilization issued in reply to that of Germany, and expressed to him his amazement that Germany should have taken such a step at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was still in progress between Russia, Austria, and the Powers. He added that mobilization did not necessarily entail war, and that the German Ambassador might stay in Paris as the Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in Petersburg; so likewise there is no reason for the departure of Baron Schoen, who, by the way, has not repeated his threat.

Isvolsky.

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63 How completely this representation of Viviani's twists the truth can be seen by consulting the telegrams Nos. 210, 216, and 222 from Paris.

64 Instead of this, the Orange Book simply says: "the German Ambassador may stay in Paris." Considering the telegrams 216 and 218 from Paris—see note 61—it can hardly be said that "there was absolutely no reason for Baron Schoen's departure." Viviani's whole attitude is, without doubt, carefully planned to fit with the propaganda described in note 45.
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 220. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, (July 19,) August 1, 1914.

Margerie told me that, according to information from very secret sources, Italy has the intention of at first remaining neutral, justifying herself by the way in which the conflict broke out; but that later, according to the trend of events, she would take the one or the other final decision.

Isvolsky.

* * *

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 221. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, (July 19,) August 1, 1914.

From the military Attaché: General mobilization has been announced at 3.40 in the afternoon. The Minister of War expressed the wishes (1.) that Serbia be influenced by requesting her to more speedily take the offensive; (2.) that daily news be forthcoming indicating the German army corps directed against us;

\[65\] Compare note 45.
(3.) that he be kept informed of the date of the beginning of our offensive against Germany. For the French, now as ever, that most desirable direction of our thrust would be: Warsaw—Posen. According to news from Denmark the following army corps are destined to fight against us: I, XVII, XX, the VI guards-reserves-corps, and the II corps.

Isvolsky.

* * *

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 222. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, (July 19,) August 1, 1914.

Your telegram about Germany’s declaration of war against us reached me at eleven o’clock. I communicated it at once personally to the President of the Republic who immediately called the ministers into conference. Poincaré declared to me in the most emphatic manner that he himself as well as the whole Cabinet are firmly resolved to fulfill wholly and completely the duties which the alliance imposes upon France. From this, however, a number [68]
of highly complicated questions arise, questions of a political as well as a strategic nature. First of all, according to the French Constitution, a decision of Parliament is necessary to declare war. To call in Parliament would take at least two days. Although Poincaré does not doubt what the decision would be, he would yet prefer to omit public debate of the application of the Treaty of Alliance. From this reason and from considerations mostly in regard to England it would be preferable if the declaration of war came from Germany, instead of from France. Further, one should consider that this is only the first day of mobilization and that it would be more favorable for both allies if France should not begin military operations before her mobilization is more advanced. However, Poincaré is convinced that Germany will not wait for the declaration of France, but will attack her at once, without allowing her to finish mobilization. Poincaré will call me as soon as the conference has discussed all these questions and will tell me the result.

Isvolsky.

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68 Compare note 45.
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 223. [R. O. B. No. 75.]

Paris, (July 19,) August 1, 1914.

I hear from the President that during the last few days the Austrian Ambassador emphatically assured both Viviani and himself that Austria had declared to Russia her willingness to respect both the territorial integrity of Serbia and her sovereign rights, but that Russia had intentionally received this declaration in silence. I remarked that this was a lie, and Poincaré replied that Austria had made similar declarations in London, where they might make a very dangerous impression, and that they should be officially denied there also.

Isvolsky.

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67 The Orange Book has: “To this I opposed a categorical dementi.” In regard to the Austrian declarations compare the written report of Baron Schoen’s in Paris under “point 1” of the telegram 105 from Paris, also the verbal declaration of Count Pourtalés in Petersburg, as well as Sazonov’s answer in the first two sentences of the telegram 1554 from Petersburg.

68 The Orange Book’s version: “To this I opposed a cate-
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 224. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, (July 19,) August 1, 1914.

A telegram from the French Ambassador at Bucharest arrived here which states in anxious terms the intention of Roumania to remain strictly neutral or even act in accord with Austria. The President of the Republic told me that, without losing any time, one must influence Roumania by promising her Transylvania. According to Poincaré’s idea one also should try to get Italy on our side by promising her Valona and a free hand in Albania.

Isvolsky.

* * *

...gorical dementi,” leaves it to the reader whether he will apply the dementi to Austria’s affirmation that she would respect Serbia’s sovereign rights, or to her declaration concerning Serbia’s territorial integrity. That this latter was actually guaranteed by Austria is proved without doubt by note 67. The sovereign rights of Serbia which might have been involved by the punitive measures which the Serajevo murder had made necessary, could then have formed the object of

[71]
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 225.  [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, (July 19,) August 1, 1914.

Three o’clock in the morning. I just came from the President of the Republic who told me that the ministerial conference once more confirmed the decision that France must fulfill completely her duties as an ally. The conference recognized that it would be to the advantage of both allies if France finished her mobilization before the opening of hostilities. Mobilization would require ten days, for the end of which period Parliament would be called. Poincaré continues to fear that Germany will attack France at once, to hamper the completion of mobilization.

Above details must be kept very secret.

Isvolsky.

* * *

the direct negotiations between Austria and Russia for which Austria had always expressed her readiness. Compare, in regard to this, note 35 to the telegram 1548 from Petersburg. Isvolsky’s assertion therefore is proved groundless, a circumstance which helps to explain the falsification of this passage.
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris

Telegram No. 1627. [R. O. B. No. 78.]

Petersburg, (July 20,) August 2, 1914.

It is evident that Germany is doing her utmost now, to shift upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to order general mobilization by the immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while limiting herself to discussions of a procrastinating nature, was bombarding Belgrade.

The Russian Emperor had promised the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guarantee and after so many proofs of Russia’s desire for peace,

69 With respect to the suppression of this reference to the “general” character of Russian mobilization, compare note 20.

70 In the Orange Book one finds this addition: “and carried on complete mobilization.” This addition evidently is meant to cover up the obvious falseness of the telegram from Vienna with the alleged order for general Austrian mobilization on July 28. (Compare Orange Book No 47.) At any rate, the double-dealing here suspected of Austria corresponds exactly with the activities of Russia and France. Compare telegram 210 from Paris, and note 53.
Germany neither could nor had the right to doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independence of Serbia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European Balance of Power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The European—even world-wide—character of this dispute is infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs.  

Sazonov.

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71 In the Orange Book the following sentence was added: "By her decision to declare war upon us at a moment when negotiations were still in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility." In this addition we behold, unveiled and unashamed, the propagandist distortion of truth which wants to blame on Germany the guilt of having brought on the war. See note 45. Compare France's and Russia's attitude with regard to these same negotiations between the Powers, which are now represented as having been so full of promise. (See telegram 210 from Paris.)
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 225. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, (July 20,) August 2, 1914.

To-day, Sunday, is considered the first day of mobilization.

Isvolsky.

* * *

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Telegram No. 226. [R. O. B. No.—]

Paris, (July 20,) August 2, 1914.

The Germans cross the frontier in small divisions and a few minor encounters have already taken place on French territory. This gives the French Government the chance to declare to Parliament, which has been called for Tuesday, that France has been attacked, and omit a formal declaration of war. To-day news was received that German troops set foot on Luxembourg territory, thereby violating the

72 This telegram has been given—evidently by mistake—the same number as the last one of the previous day, August 1, 1914.

[75]
neutrality of this duchy which was guaranteed by the treaty of 1867 that, among others, England and Italy have signed. This circumstance is considered very fortunate for France, as it no doubt will call forth a protest from England, and may cause it to show more energy. There is additional news according to which German troops are said to advance towards Arlon, which would prove their intention of also violating the neutrality of Belgium. This would be still more objectionable to England. Viviani at once telegraphed to London, and advised the French Ambassador to call Grey's attention to this circumstance.

Isvolsky.

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[76]
APPENDIX

SYNOPSIS OF TELEGRAMS FROM THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY AT PARIS, SENT BETWEEN THE (11), 24, OF JULY AND (20, OF JULY) 2, OF AUGUST, 1914, AND NOT INCLUDED IN ABOVE DOCUMENTS.

Telegram No. 199, dated July (15,) 28, 1914: inquiring about communication of Parisian telegrams to other Embassies.

Telegram No. 200, dated July (15,) 28, 1914: inquiring about possibility of Parisian branch banks coming to the assistance of Russian banks.

Telegram No. 205, dated July (16,) 29, 1914: desire of Russians living in France to enter French army as volunteers.

Telegram No. 211, dated July (17,) 30, 1914: opening of a special credit in favor of the Russian Ambassador at Paris.

Telegram No. 213, dated July (18,) 31, 1914: detaining of an attaché of the Russian Embassy who was to go to Russia.